# Amicus Curiae Brief — Cort v. Ash

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 422 U.S. 66

## Text

INDEX
Page
I IN oo 1
Interest of the United States 2
Statutes involved 3
I PRES 6
Summary of argument ae
Argument 10
I. The broad power of Congress to regu-
late federal elections to prevent their
corruption authorizes a prohibition
upon corporate political expenditures

from general corporate funds _..____. 12

II. The limitations upon corporate political
contributions in 18 U.S.C. 610 are con-
stitutional because they are a reason-
able method of protecting the electoral
process 19

A. The statute does not violate the
constitutional rights of corpora-
tions, their officers, or their share- ~
holders _ 19

1, The First Amendment Tights

of shareholders _ 24
2. The First Amendment rights

of corporate officers 25
3. The First Amendment ina

OF Corporetete 20 26

B. Section 610 is neither unconstitu-
tionally overbroad nor unconstitu-
tionally vague 30

It
Argument—Continued Page
C. Section 610 does not deny equal
protection in violation of the Fifth
Amendment os)
Conclusion 36
CITATIONS
Cases: ;

American Civil Liberties Union v. Jen-
nings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, probable ju-
risdiction noted sub nom. Staats v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 417
U.S. 944 3

Associated Press v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 301 U.S. 108 28

Associated Press v. United States, 326
US. 1 25

Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342
U.S. 337 32-33

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601__. 31

Burroughs and Cannon v. United States,

290 U.S. 534 12, 18, 14, 19

Civil Service Commission v. Letter Car-
riers, 413 U.S. 548 14, 29, 31, 34

Clarke, Ex parte, 100 U.S. 399 12

Curtis, Ex parte, 106 U.S. 371 _..____. 14

Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369,
certiorari denied, 320 U.S. 788 14

Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. North-

' western Iron and Metal Company, 335
US. 525 28

Lorain Journal Company v. United States,

342 US. 148 28

Cases—Continued Page

National Association for the Advance-

ment of Colored People v. Button, 371

U.S. 415 30
National Labor Relations Board v. Vir-

ginia Electric and Power Company, 314

U.S. 469 28
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service

Commission, 330 U.S. 127 : 14
Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S.

557 28
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 783 __-...- 31
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 . 28
Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061__.. 3
Pipefitters v. United States, 407 US.

385 11, 20, 21
Siebold, Ex parte, 100 U.S. 371 _... 12
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 874 ___ 35
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330

U.S. 75 13, 14
United States v. Automobile Workers, 352

U.S. 567 11,15, 16, 19
United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 ___. 11
United States v. Congress of Industrial

Organizations, 335 U.S. 106 .._...11, 18, 28

United States v. Finance Committee To
Re-Elect The President, C.A.D.C., No.
73-1918, decided December 2, 1974 ie 3

United States v. Harriss, 347 US. 612_.14, 33, 34

United States v. Maryland Savings-Share

Insurance Corp., 400 U.S. 4 35
United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S.
632 28, 36

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367__. 27, 32

Casée—Continued Page

United States v. Painters Local Union
No. 481, 79 F. Supp. 516, reversed on

other grounds, 172 F.2d 854 _._...__.. 11
United States v. Petrillo, 3832 U.S. 1 32, 35
United States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39__. 14
United States v. United States Brewers’

Association, 239 Fed. 163 11
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 USS.

396 14, 34
Yarbrough, Ex parte, 110 U.S. 651 12
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S, 37 _...__. 27

Constitution and statutes:
United States Constitution: >.
ii © i a 12

Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 18 12 P
vee Sh tome Ba 13
First Amendment passim .
Fourth Amendment 28
Fifth Amendment 28, 35, 36
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,
43 Stat. 1070, 241 et seq. 13,17

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Title II, Sec. 205, 86 Stat. 10, 18 U.S.C.
(Supp. II) 610 : passim
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Title I, 86 Stat. 3, et seqg., 47 U.S.C.

(Supp. II) 801, et seg. 18
Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1147 17
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,

61 Stat. 136 18

Public Law 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, et seg. 18
34 Stat. 864-865 16

Vv

Constitution and statutes—Continued
36 Stat. 822 _-

OP
40 Stat. 1013 2 Re
54 Stat. 767 -
wee ee

Miscellaneous:

40 Cong. Rec. 96
41 Cong. Rec. 22
65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 __.___..

06. Come. Bee Sree
Hearings before the House Committee on
the Election of the President, 59th
Cong., Ist Sess. - 23-24, 25

25
16
15
17

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 73-1908
STEWART S. Cort, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

RICHARD A. ASH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UN ITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

4

QUESTION PRESENTED

The United States will discuss the following ques-
tion:

Whether 18 U.S.C. 610, which regulates political
contributions in connection with federal elections
made by corporations,* violates the First Amendment

1 Although Section 610 pertains to both corporations and
labor unions, for the purposes of this brief we discuss its
applicability to corporations only.

2

or denies corporations or their stockholders equal pro-
tection.

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

One of the issues petitioners raise is the constitu-
tionality of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 610, recently re-
enacted and amended in Title II of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971, which prohibits corpora-
tions and labor unions from making contributions
and expenditures from general funds in connection
with any federal election. It. provides criminal pen-
alties of up to $5000 in fines for corporations and
labor organizations that violate its provisions, and
up to $1000 and one year imprisonment for officers
or directors who consent to the prohibited contribu-
tions or expenditures.

In the present case, a shareholder of Bethlehem
Steel Corporation alleged that the directors of Bethle-
hem had violated Section 610, and sought injunctive
relief and compensatory and punitive damages on
behalf of Bethlehem, asserting that the statute pro-
vides an implied private cause of action. One of the
defenses asserted by the directors was that Section
610 is unconstitutional.* If the Court reaches that
issue (see infra, pp. 10-11), its determination would
have a significant impact upon the United States
with respect to prosecutions under this provision and

The United States takes no position on the other major
question in this case: whether there is a private right of
action for violation of Section 610.

83

perhaps with respect to its efforts to enforce other
federal campaign financing laws. See e.g., United
States v. Finance Committee To Re-Elect The Presi-
dent, C.A.D.C., No. 78-1918, decided December 2,
1974; Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061 (8.D.
N.Y.) ; American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings,
366 F. Supp. 1041 (D. D.C.), probable jurisdiction
noted sub nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 417 U.S. 944.°

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. 610 provides:

Contributions or expenditures by national banks,
corporations or labor organizations. .

It is unlawful for any national bank, or any
corporation organized by authority of any law
of Congress, to make a contribution or expendi-
ture in connection with any election to any politi-
cal office, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held

. to select candidates for any political office, or for
any corporation whatever, or any labor organiza-
tion to make a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any election at which Presi-

8 The Pichler and Finance Committee cases involve attacks
upon the campaign contribution reporting provisions of Title
III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.
(Supp. II) 431-441). Staats, currently before the Court,
focuses upon Title I of the same Act (47 U.S.C. (Supp. II)
801-805), which regulates campaign spending for communica-
tions media advertisement. Section 610 was amended as
part of Title II of the Act (18 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 610).

4

dential and Vice Presidential electors or a Sena-
tor or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resi-
dent Commissioner to Congress are to be voted
for, or in connection with any primary election
or political convention or caucus held to select
candidates for any of the foregoing offices or
for any candidate, political committee, or other
person to accept or: receive any contribution
prohibited by this section.

Every corporation or labor organization which
makes any contribution or expenditure in viola-
tion of this section shall be fined not more than
$5,000; and every officer or director of any cor-
poration, or officer of any labor organization,
who consents to any contribution or expenditure
by the corporation or labor organization, as the
case may be, and any person who accepts or
receives any cuntribution, in violation of this
section, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or,
imprisoned not more than one year, or both;
and if the violation was willful, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.

_ For the purposes of this section “labor organ-
ization” means any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee
or plan, in which employees participate and
which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.

Section 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, 86 Stat. 10, amended Section 610 by adding

5

at the end of that section the following paragraph
(18 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 610):

As used in this section, th: phrase “contribu-
tion or expenditure” shall include any direct or
indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, de-
posit, or gift of money, or any services, or any-
thing of value (except a loan of money by a
national or State bank made in accordance with
the applicable banking laws and regulations and
in the ordinary course of business) to any can-
didate, campaign committee, or political party or ~
organization, in connection with any election to
any of the offices referred to in this section; but
shall not include communications by a corpora-
tion to its stockholders and their families or by
a labor organization to its members and their
families on any subject; non-partisan registra-
tion and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a cor-
poration aimed at its stockholders and their fami-
lies, or by a labor organization aimed at its
members and their families; the establishment,
administration, and solicitation of contributions
to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for
political purposes by a corporation or labor orga-
nization: Provided, That it shall be unlawful for
such. a fund to make a contribution or expendi-
ture by utilizing money or anything of value
secured by physical force, job discrimination,
financial reprisals, or the threat of force, job dis-
crimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues,
fees, or other monies required as a condition of
membership in a labor organization or as a con-
dition of employment, or by monies obtained in
any commercial transaction.

6
STATEMENT

Respondent, a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel Cor-
poration (“Bethlehem”), instituted this suit against
Bethlehem’s directors shortly before the 1972 presi-
dential election, both individually and derivatively on
behalf of ‘the corporation. He alleges that the direc-
tors violated 18 U.S.C. 610 by using Bethlehem’s
general corporate funds “to influence the United
States electorate to help bring about a Republican
Party victory” in the election (A. 8, 11).*

The suit was induced by an advertisement paid for
by Bethlehem which appeared in many national maga-
zines and whose basic theme, respondent averred,
constituted an endorsement of the 1972 Republican
Party candidate (A. 21). While the advertisement
did not mention any candidate by name, it criticized
the “careless rhetoric and accusations that are be-
ing thrown around” in the. presidential campaign,
“their main target being the business community,”
and referred disapprovingly to a statement “made by
a political candidate” (A. 31). The advertisement
also indicated that upon request Bethlehem would
send the text of the speech given by the Chairman of
the Board of Bethlehem (A. 32), from which the
advertisement was derived. The full speech made sev-
eral other disapproving references to “a prominent
presidential candidate” and a “campaign based on
cynicism and mistrust” (A. 32).

+“A” refers to petitioners’ Appendix; “Br.” refers to
petitioners’ brief.

7

In its opinion denying respondent's motion for a
temporary restraining order (A. 19), the district
court held that since the Department of Justice had
exclusive authority to enforce Section 610, no private
cause of action could be implied (350 F. Supp. 227,
281; A. 52-53), and that the advertisement did not
constitute an expenditure prohibited by Section 610
because the advertisement did not mention any can-
didates specifically by name. The court considered
it unnecessary to resolve the defendants’ First
Amendment challenges to the provision.

Petitioners subsequently filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment in the district court (A. 79), which
was granted without opinion (A. 87). The court of
appeals reversed (496 F.2d 416; A. 92), holding that. ,
there is a private cause of action for violation of
Section 610, and the proscription in Section 610 ap-
plies to any expenditure made with a “partisan pur-~
pose,” that is, made “for the purpose of influencing
someone’s election to federal office” (496 F.2d at 425;
A. 106), even though it did not expressly mention a
candidate by name. .

The court concluded that Sessile there was a fac-
tual dispute whether the Bethlehem advertisement
was partisan, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment. The court declined to address
petitioners’ contention that Section 610 was unconsti-
tutional, noting that since the district court had not
resolved the issue, it could be reasserted on remand
(496 F.2d at 426; A. 108).

ee
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The statutory scheme in 18 U.S.C. 610 comes
within the broad power of Congress to enact legisla- |
tion aimed at preserving the integrity of the electoral
process, which includes the authority to prevent the
corrupting effect upon politics of unchecked political
spending by corporations. Control over corporate
political spending has been one historical cornerstone
of three-quarters of a century of continued congres-
sional effort to limit the impact of aggregated power
upon politics. Many decisions of this Court have rec-
ognized the legitimacy of that effort.

The means chosen to limit corporate power in the
electoral process, through Section 610, are reason-
ably calculated to fulfill Congress’ legitimate objective
without undue effect upon First Amendment rights.
The restrictions are narrowly drawn: they permit
corporations to make political contributions so long
as the funds have been voluntarily contributed by
shareholders, and they allow corporate officers to
supervise the political funds and decide how they will
be spent. They also permit the corporation to expend
general non-contributed funds for the purpose of
administering and soliciting voluntary contributions.

Section 610 prohibits only the use of general cor-
porate funds in connection with federal elections, be-
cause such expenditures have a disproportionate im-
pact upon the electoral process in that they do not
necessarily reflect the particular political sentiments
of individual investors who are the sources of ‘the

funds. A corporation thereby able to aggregate funds
for political purposes which could not otherwise be
aggregated on a voluntary basis would have political
leverage of a kind unavailable even to organized blocs
of partisan contributors. The net effect of Section
610, therefore, is to eliminate this disproportionality
and assure that corporate political expenditures repre-
sent only those funds voluntarily contributed by share-
holders for avowedly political purposes.

The statutory scheme places no restraint upon the
First Amendment rights of shareholders to express
their political views and associate for political ends.
To the contrary, Section 610 furthers First Amend-
ment interests by protecting the rights of sharehold-
ers whose political views are either in the minority or
_ at odds with the views of corporate officers, since it
prevents the corporation from using general corporate
funds for political purposes. Similarly, Section 610
permits corporate officers free reign to express their
views, so long as they do not draw upon general cor-
porate funds to do so. Moreover, the statutory scheme
only has an incidental effect upon the First Amend-
ment rights of corporate entities.

Nor is the statutory scheme, barring corporate ex-
penditures made from general funds “in connection
with any election,” unconstitutionally overbroad nor
impermissibly vague. Its proscriptions comprehend a
range of corporate conduct which is easily identifi-
able and commonly understood. Any overbreadth is
insubstantial in relation to the unquestionably valid

10

scope of the statute, and the statute is sufficiently
~ definite to give notice of the proscribed conduct.
Finally, contrary to petitioners’ assertion, it is no
violation of equal protection to hold corporations and
labor unions, in Section 610, to a higher standard of
behavior than voluntary associations, partnerships, or
other unincorporated organizations—none of which
poses as great a potential for abuse of the electoral
process. In any event, Congress may act selectively,
and a prohibition within its power directed at a

particular class is not rendered invalid because it ©

does not also: reach every. other class upon which

Congress may constitutionally place similar restric-

tions. .
ARGUMENT

The contention that Section 610 is unconstitutional
was made as a defense to a claim by a shareholder
that the directors of Bethlehem Steel Corporation
violated that section through certain acts done at the
time of the 1972 presidential election. Neither the
district court nor the court of appeals reached the is-
sue; indeed, in declining to do so, the court of appeals
noted that the issue would be open on the remand that
it ordered. The petition for certiorari raised the con-
stitutional issue, and this Court sects the petition
;without limitation.

: Although the issue is thus before the Court, under
this Court’s settled practice of not deciding constitu-
tional questions unless necessary, and particularly

when the lower courts have not reached them, we

——

a

11

believe that there is no occasion for the Court to
reach the question in this case. Indeed, in United
States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, the
Court in a similar situation declined to consider con-
stitutional challenges to Section 610.°

If this Court reaches the constitutional question,
the validity of the restrictions ir. Section 610 upon
corporate campaign expenditures must be evaluated
in light of (1) the broad congressional authority un-
der the Constitution to regulate and control federal
elections, which includes the power to prevent their
corruption by corporate political expenditures, and
(2) the narrow prohibitions of the statutory scheme,
which must, be viewed in relation to the precise abuses
which Congress sought to correct. We shall show that
- Congress has authority to impose limitations upon
corporate political expenditures, and that the restric-
tions in 18 U.S.C. 610 are constitutional.

[+10 bon United States v. Congress of Industrial Organiza-

, 885 U.S. 106, 110, and Pipefitters v. United States, 407
U.S. 385, 399-400, the Court found it unnecessary to reach
the -constitutionality of Section 610 because it was able to
dispose of the cases on non-constitutional grounds. The stat-
ute and its predecessors have been upheld in United States
v. United States Brewers’ Association, 239 Fed. 163 (W.D.
Pa.); United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 79 F.
Supp. 516 (D. Conn.), reversed on other grounds, 172 F. 2d
854 (C.A. 2); United States Vv. Bpwle, 482 F. 2d 755 (C.A.
D.C.).

12

I. THE BOARD POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGU-
LATE FEDERAL ELECTIONS TO PREVENT
THEIR CORRUPTION AUTHORIZES A PROHIBI-
TION UPON CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDI-
TURES FROM GENERAL CORPORATE FUNDS.

1. Congress has broad power to enact legislation
aimed at preserving the integrity of the electoral
process.* Starting with Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, and Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, this Court
has upheld the authority of Congress to prohibit ac-
tions that directly violate the integrity of the election
process, such as stuffing ballot boxes or failing to re-
turn poll books. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S.
651, the Court, in upholding a conviction for beat-
ing a Negro to prevent him from voting in a con-
gressional election, essayed the broad scope of con-
gressional power to safeguard the federal electoral
process, and concluded that: ;

If the recurrence of such acts as these prison-
ers stand convicted of are too common in one
quarter‘of the country, and give omen of danger
from lawless violence, the free use of money in

*The authority over congressional elections stems from
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides that
“t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations * *°*.” The
authority to protect presidential elections apparently stems
from the “necessary and proper” clause of the Constitution
(Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 18); see Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 US.
651, 658; Burroughs and Cannon Vv. United States, 290 U.S.

534, 545.

=

a
13

elections, arising from the vast growth of recent
wealth in other quarters, presents equal cause
for anxiety.

If the government of the United States has
* * * no authority to provide against these
evils, * * * then, indeed, is the country * * *
at the mercy of the combinations of those who
respect no right but brute force, on the one
hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the
other. [Jd. at 667; emphasis added.]

In Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290
U.S. 534, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat.
1070, 2 U.S.C. 241 et seg., which limited the amounts
candidates for congressional elections could spend and
required the disclosure of contributions to and ex-
penditures by political committees, as applied to the
election of presidential and vice presidential electors.
In rejecting the contention that the Act could not be
applied to that election because under Article II, Sec-
tion 1 of the Constitution only the States, but not
Congress, could thus regulate presidential elections,
the Court said (290 U.S. -at 545): :

To say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard [a Presi-
dential] election from the improper use of money

_to influence the result is to deny to the nation
in a vital particular power of self protection.

In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US.
75, 78, the Court sustained the congressional power
to forbid any employee of the federal executive
branch from “taking ‘any active part in political

14

management or political campaigns.’” The Mitchell
decision was based on Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371,
in which “[t]he right to contribute money through
fellow employees * * * was held not to be protected
by any constitutional provision.” 330 U.S. at 97.
See also United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396;
Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548.

The Court has also sanctioned congressional au-
thority to regulate the political activity of individuals
and organizations who are employed by state gov-
ernments but paid from federal funds, Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S.
127; who are on federal premises, United States v.
Thayer, 209 U.S. 39; or who receive or solicit con-
tributions for the purpose of influencing legislation,
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612; see also,
Egan v. United States, 187 F.2d 369 (C.A. 8), cer-
tiorari denied, 320 U.S. 788 (employees of organiza-
tion chartered or regulated by federal law).

The power of Congress to safeguard “the integrity
of [the] basic governmental process [of elections]”
(United States v. Harriss, supra, 347 U.S. at 625),
includes the power to control corporate political
spending. Uncontrolled corporate political expendi-
ture would entail as much an “improper use of money
to influence the result” (Burroughs and Cannon,
supra, 290 U.S. at 545) of an election-as the use of
funds for corrupt purposes. Fifty years ago, during
the debates on the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of

15

' 1925, Senator Robinson stated (65 Cong. Rec. 9507-
9508) :

Many believe that when an individual or as-
sociation of individuals makes large contribu-
tions for the purpose of aiding candidates of po-
litical parties in winning the elections, they ex-
pect, and sometimes demand, and occasionally, at
least, receive, consideration by the beneficiaries

of their contributions which not infrequently is
harmful to the general public interest. It is
unquestionably an evil which ought to be dealt
with, and dealt with intelligently and effectively.
These problems are no less serious today.than they
were in 1925. Large corporations have access to funds
far beyond the financial resources of most individuals.
Were these organizations free to use their resources
_ for political purposes without limitation, there would
be a serious danger of corrupting the electoral process.
2. The restriction upon the political power and
influence of corporations in Seetion 610 has been
one cornerstone of Congress’ continuing “concern for
elections ‘free from the power of money’” (United
States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575).
The history of congressional action “to protect the
political process from what it deemed to be the
corroding effect of money employed in elections by
aggregated power” (id. at 582; emphasis supplied)
began almost three quarters of a century ago. Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s 1906 message to Congress recom-
mended as the first item of congressional action a
law prohibiting political contributions by corpora-

16

tions. 41 Cong. Rec. 22. Shortly thereafter, in 1907,
Congress provided:

That it shall be unlawful for any national bank,
or any corporation organized by authority of
any laws of Congress, to make a money contribu-
tion in connection with any election to any
political office. It shall also be unlawful for any’
corporation whatever to make a money con-
tribution in connection with any election at
which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors
or a Representative in Congress is to be voted
for or any election by any State legislature of a
United States Senator. [34 Stat. 864-865.]

As this Court indicated, the aim of this statute “was
not merely to prevent the subversion of the integrity
of the electoral process. Its underlying philosophy
was to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the
individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct
of government” (Automobile Workers, supra, 352
U.S. at 575). -

Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted a publicity
law that required committees attempting to influence
the results of congressional elections in two or more
states to report all contributions and disbursements
and to identify contributors and recipients of sub-
stantial sums. 36 Stat. 822. In 1911 Congress en-
acted the first limitations on spending for congres- |
sional campaigns, which also prohibited candidates
from promising employment for the purpose of ob-
taining support. 87 Stat, 25. In - Congress made

17

it unlawful either to offer or to solicit anything of
value to influence voting. 40 Stat. 1013.

The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat.
1070, codified and revised this legislation. Section 313
of the Act strengthened the 1907 statute by prdhibit-
ing “contributions” as well as “money contributions,”
extending the prohibition on corporate contributions
to the election to Congress of Delegates and Resident
Commissioners, and penalizing the recipient of any
forbidden contribution as well as the contributor.

Fifteen years later, when Congress extended the
Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1147, it imposed further limita-
tions upon political contributions: it set a maximum
of $5000 on contributions by a person to any candi-
date or to any committee supporting him, and limited
to $3 million the total expenditures which a political
committee could make in any year. 54 Stat. 767.
In offering these latter provisions, Senator Bankhead
expressed Congress’ continuing concern with the cor-
rupting impact of money on politics (86 Cong. Rec.
2720):

We all know that money is the chief source
of corruption. We all know that large contribu-
tions to political campaigns not only put the
political party under obligation to the large con-
tributors, who demand pay in the way of legis-
lation, but we also know that large sums of
money are used for the purpose of conducting
expensive campaigns through the newspapers and
over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of
literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose

18

of paying the expenses of campaigners sent out 3

into the country to spread propaganda, both
true and untrue.

These restrictions were extended to labor unions
in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61
Stat. 136, 159-160), to mitigate “the undue and dis-
proportionate influence of labor unions upon federal
elections” and “to preserve the purity of such elec-
tions * * * against the use of aggregated wealth by
union as well as by corporate entities” (United
States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335
U.S. 106, 134).

The problem of controlling the financing of elec-
tions has received Continued attention from Congress
in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (86
Stat. 3, 47 U.S.C. (Supp. IT) 801, et seg.) and the
1974 amendments to that Act (Public Law 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263, et seq.).

In view of Congress’ continuing efforts to limit the
influence of money upon the politica) process, and
the many decisions of this Court which have recog-
nized the legitimacy of those efforts, Congress cer-
tainly has authority to control what has been viewed
for three quarters of a century as a primary source
of election abuse: corporate political contributions.
The only issue is whether the means chosen to con-
trol the abuse arr reasonably calculated to do so,
without undue effect upon First Amendment rights.
“The power of Congress to protect the election of
President and Vice President from corruption being
clear, the choice of means to that end presents a
question primarily addressed to the judgment of Con-

\!

19

gress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are
really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their
necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end,
the closeness of the relationship between the means
adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for
congressional determination alone” (Burroughs and
Cannon, supra, 290 U.S. at 547-548).

As we now show, the restrictions imposed upon cor-
porations by Section 610 comprise an appropriate and
reasonable method for “protect[ing] the political
process from * * * the corroding effect of money em-
ployed in élections by aggregated power” (Automo-
bile Workers, supra, 352 U.S. at 582).

Il. THE LIMITATIONS UPON CORPORATE POLITI-
CAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 18 U.S.C. 610 ARE CON-
STITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY ARE A REASON-
ABLE METHOD OF PROTECTING THE ELEC-
TORAL PROCESS.

A. The Statute does not violate the Constitutional
Rights of Corporations, their Officers, or their
Shareholders.

Petitioners predicate their constitutional argument
on the proposition that Section 610, as applied, con-
stitutes a “blanket prohibition of contributions and
expenditures by labor unions and corporations” (Br.
61). To the contrary, the limits embodied in Sec-
tion 610..are narrowly drawn and are reasonably
calculated to avoid the specific abuses at which Con-
gress aimed. Rather than constituting “blanket pro-
hibition” on corporate political expenditures, they
merely assure that such political expenditures repre-

20 ¥

sent the voluntary contributions of individual share-
holders.

Section 610 makes it unlawful for any corporation
or any labor union : |

to make a contribution or expenditure in con-
nection with any election at which Presidential
and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or
Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or
in connection with any primary election or politi-
cal convention or caucus held to select eandidates
for any of the foregoing offices * * *._

In Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401,
this Court held that this prohibition does not apply
to contributions or expenditures derived from volun-
tarily financed union political funds segregated from
other union funds. The Court also stated in Pipe-
fitters that solicitation by union officials is permissible,
so long as it is conducted under circumstances plainly
indicating that donations are for a political purpose
and that those solicited may decline to contribute
without loss of job or any other reprisal within the
institution’s power. Jd. at 414. Moreover, the Court
construed Section 610 to permit union officials to de-
cide how the monies raised will be spent, and to con-
trol the voluntarily contributed funds. Jd. at 415.

The same principles, we submit, are equally ap-
plicable to corporations. .That is, the statute does not
bar corporate political contributions which represent
funds voluntarily contributed by stockholders for that

21

purpose, nor does it bar corporate officials from so-
liciting stockholders to make such contributions.

Section 205 of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 10, confirmed that “8 610
does not apply to-union and corporate contributions
and expenditures from political funds financed in
some sense by the voluntary donations of employees
[and stockholders]” (Pipefitters, supra, 407 U.S. at
409) by amending Section 610. to include the follow-
ing paragraph:

As used in this section, the phrase “contribu-
tion or expenditure” shall include any direct’ or
indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or
anything of value except a loan of money by a
national or State bank made in accordance with
the applicable banking laws and regulations and
in the ordinary course of business) to any candi-
date, campaign committee, or political party or |
organization, in connection with ‘any election to
any of the offices referred to in this section;
but shall not inelude communications by a corpo- |
ation to its stockholders and their families or by ©

| a labor organization to its members and their
families on any subject; non-partisan registra-
tion and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corpo-
ration aimed at its stocksolders and their fami-
lies, or by a labor organization aimed at its
members and their families; the establishment,
administration, and solicitation of contributions
to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for

political purposes by a corporation or labor or-
ganization: Provided, That it shall be unlawful

22

for such a fund to make a contribution or ex-

' penditure by utilizing money or anything of
value secured by physical force, job discrimina-
tion, financial reprisals, or the threat of force,

job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by
dues, ives, or other monies required as a condi-
tion of membership in a labor organization or as
a condition of employment, or by monies ob-
tained in any commercial transaction. [Empha-
sis supplied.]

The 1971 amendment also excludes from coverage
corporate funds used for “the establishment, admin-
istration, and solicitation of contributions to a sepa-
rate segregated fund * * *.”

Thus, a corporation may use funds for political
purposes which stockholders. voluntarily contributed

and solicit contributions for political purposes from

shareholders and their families. Indeed, the amended

statute expressly permits political communication by

/

a corporation to,its shareholders and their families, |
and non-partisan registration and “get-out-the-vote”
campaigns by a corporation aimed at its shareholders
and their families. oi

The statutory scheme of ‘Section 610 thus permits
extensive political communication by corporations:

corporations may send political advertising to their,

shareholders and solicit them for political etnteibo- ~

- tions; corporations may also communicate their politi- —

cal views to the public at large as long as the com- |
munications are financed from the voluntary contri-

| butions ag individual shareholders. The statute there-

fore is narrowly drawn to avoid the precise evil about
which Congress was concerned—the undue influence
upon the electoral process that the use of general cor-
porate funds is likely to create. |

The constitutional issue is thus a narrow one:
whether a corporation, which is organized for other
than political .irposes, may be barred from making
political contributions and expenditures from its gen-
eral funds.

One of Congress’ concerns about unlimited cor-
porate spending was the disproportionate impact it
would have upon the political process—exceeding the
abilities of any individual or bloc of individuals to
have their voices heard. Corporate political expendi-
tures drawn from general corporate funds have a dis-
proportionate impact simply because such expendi-
tures do not necessarily reflect the political views of
the individual shareholders who are the sources of
the funds. A corporation that was thereby able to

.aggregate funds for political purposes which could
not otherwise be aggregated on a voluntary basis
would have political leverage of a kind unavailable
even to organized blocs of partisan contributors. In-
deed, one reason for the restrictions embodied in
Section 610 was “the feeling that corporate officials
had no moral right to use corporate funds for con-
tribution to political parties without the consent of
the stockholders” (United States v. Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations, supra, 335 U.S. at 113). See
Hearings before the House Committee on the Election

a4

of the President, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 76; 40 Cong.
Rec. 96.

The net effect of Section 610 is to eliminate this
disproportionality and assure that corporate political
expenditures represent only those funds voluntarily
contributed by shareholders for avowedly political
purposes. The scheme comprises a reasonable means
of limiting undue corporate leverage in the political
process without encroaching upon the First Amend-
ment rights of shareholders or corporate Officers, and
only incidentally affecting the First Amendment
rights of corporations. .

1. The First Amendment Rights of Shareholders.

As noted above, Section 610 permits individual
shareholders to make voluntary political contributions
through the corporation. It therefore imposes no re-
_ straint upon their right to express political views.

Nor does Section 610 restrict the collective voice of
groups of shareholders who share the same political
sentiments. It does not bar the formation of volun-
tary political organizations by shareholders to express
their political views, even by the pooling of money
they voluntarily furnish for the purpose of making
political contributions. Indeed, by preventing the use
of corporate funds to support political candidates
whom some stockholders may oppose, the statute fur-
thers First Amendment interests.

The Amendment rests on the premise “that the
widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the

25

welfare of the public.” Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20. In preventing shareholders
from using corporate funds to support candidates
opposed by minority shareholders (and corporate
management from deciding, on behalf of all share-
holders, which candidate to support), the statute
protects, rather than restricts, the First Amendment
freedoms of individual shareholders.

As Congressman Williams of Mississippi com-
mented during the hearings on the original Act of
1907:

[N]o corporation has the right, and no board of
directors of a corporation and no manager of a
corporation has the right, to embezzle the money
belonging to the stockholders of the corporation
and to divert it from its legitimate use to a pur-
pose for which the company was not chartered
by appropriating it to Democratic, Republican,
Populist, Socialist, or any other campaign fund.
[Hearings before the House Committee on the
Election of the President, 59th Cong., Ist Sess.
76; 40 Cong. Rec. 96.]

2. The First Amendment Rights of Corporate Officers.

Section 610 does not abridge the First Amendment
rights of corporate officers to express their political
views. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, Section 610
does not have a “chilling effect” upon the exercise of
those rights (Br. 68), and it does not, as the amicus
maintains, entail a prior restraint designed “to
silence a corporate officer” (Amicus Br. of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 32).

26

Petitioner Cort, the Chairman of the Board of
Bethlehem Steel, was free to speak out against, as he .
put it, the “false statements” and “outrageous accusa-
tions” about the business community made by “a
political candidate” in the 1972 presidential election
(App. 31), and he was free to advertise his message
so long as he did not spend general corporate funds
to do so. He was also free to publish a pamphlet
criticizing the views of “a prominent presidential
candidate” (App. 32), so long as he did not finance
the pamphlet from unsegregated corporate funds.

The sole restriction upon corporate officers in Sec-
tion 610 is that they cannot use for political purposes
unsegregated corporate funds which were not ex-
pressly contributed by shareholders for such purposes.
Section 610 puts corporate officers on the same foot-
ing as everyone else under the First Amendment—
they can make their own political contributions and
expenditures out of their own pockets but cannot
draw upon general corporate funds for that purpose.

3. The First Amendment Rights of Corporations.

As noted above, Section 610 permits corporations
to make political expenditures from a segregated
political fund voluntarily contributed by sharehold-
ers. The statute also permits corporations to estab-
lish and administer such a fund, and to solicit volun-
tary contributions to the fund, even if the cost of ad-
ministering and soliciting derives from general cor-
porate funds. The corporation also may conduct a
_ nonpartisan registration campaign aimed at its share-

27

holders. Beyond these types of political participation,
however, the corporation as an entity may not
venture.

The limits upon corporate political expenditures
prescribed in Section 610 do not unconstitutionally
restrain the First Amendment rights of corporations.
As this Court stated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 51:

Where a statute does not directly abridge free
speech, but—while regulating a subject within
the state’s power—tends to have the incidental
effect of inhibiting First Amendment ‘rights, it
is well settled that the statute can be upheld if
the effect on speech is minor in relation to the
need for control of the conduct and the lack of
alternative means for doing so. [Citations
omitted. }

That standard, equally applicable to the federal
government, is satisfied in the present case. The stat-
ute “is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion” (United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377).
To the contrary, its purpose and effect is to further
free expression by preventing the disproportionate
influence that corporations—as entities apart from
their shareholders and officers—could exert upon the
political process by using general corporate funds to
support particular candidates.

A corporation is subject to much greater regula- |
tion than individuals, and the scope of permissible
governmental control over it is necessarily broader
than it is with regard to individuals. As this Court

28

said in United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632,
651, 652 (dealing with Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment challenges to the corporate reporting require-
ments of the Federal Trade Commission Act) :

[C]jorporations * * * are endowed with public
attributes. They have a collective impact upon
society, from which they derive the privilege of
acting as artificial entities. The Federal Govern-
ment allows them the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce. Favor from government
often carry with them an enhanced measure of

regulation.

* * * * x
[T]he disparity between artificial and natural
persons is so significant that differing treat-
ment can rarely be urged as an objection to a
particular construction of a statute.

See also Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S.
557, 561; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.

This Court repeatedly has upheld over First Amend-
ment objections regulatory schemes which restrict cor-
porate communication so long as they do not dis-
criminate against communications media. See, e.g.,
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,
301 U.S. 103; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. North-
western Iron and Metal Company, 335 U.S. 525;
Lorain Journal Company v. United States, 342 U.S.
148; National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia
Electric and Power Company, 314 U.S. 469.

As noted, Section 610 is not directed against speech
at all. It simply bars corporate political contribu-
tions, whatever their purpose—whether used to pay

29

the rent of a candidate’s office or for a newspaper
advertisement advocating his election. The effect
of the statute upon the corporation’s First Amend-
ment rights is incidental. In view of the strong
public interest in protecting the electoral process
from the corrupting influence of the use of general
corporate funds for political purposes, such _inci-
dential effects do not unconstitutionally abridge the
corporation’s First Amendment rights.

In Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, this Court recently upheld under the
First Amendment the constitutionality of the pro-
hibition in the Hatch Act against partisan political
activity by federal employees. The Court’s analysis
and reasoning is equally applicable here. .

The Court first essayed the history of attempts
by Congress to insure “that federal service should
depend upon meritorious performan¢e rather than
political service, and that the political influence of
federal employees on others and on the electoral
process should be limited” (id. at 557). The Court
then held that the “balance [Congress] has so far
struck,” of barring partisan political activity by
government employees while permitting them to par-
ticipate fully in the electoral process, is “sustainable
by the obviously important interests sought to be
served by the limitations on partisan political ac-
tivities now contained in the Hatch Act” (id. at 564).
The Court stated (id. at 567): “[n]either the right
to associate nor the right to participate in political
activities is absolute in any event. * * * Nor are the
management, financing, and conduct of political cam-

30

paigns wholly free from government regulation”
(footnote and citations omitted; emphasis supplied).

Section 610 similarly represents a “sustainable”
balance, consistent with the First Amendment. In-
deed, the Hatch Act—barring federal employees from
ali partisan political activity—entails a far more
onerous restriction than Section 610, which imposes
no restraints upon individuals acting alone or in
groups. It merely restricts political contributions and
expenditures by corporate entities separate and apart
from the shareholders and officers of whom they are
comprised. The Hatch Act, on the other hand, direct-
ly restrains~the-partisan—politieal-_activities_ of indi-

viduals.

B. Section 610 is Neither Unconstitutionally Overbroad
Nor Unconstitutionally Vague.

Contrary to petitioners’ further contentions, Sec-
tion 610 is neither unconstitutionally overbroad on
its face nor unconstitutionally vague. Its proscription
against contributions or expenditures made “in con-
nection with any elections” comprehends a range of
corporate conduct which is easily identifiable and
well understood. The statutory scheme evidences
the “precision of regulation” which this Court has
said to be the “touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms.” National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored» People v.
Button, 371 U.S.4415, 488. The statute is a narrow |
prohibition precisely directed against the evil sought
to be avoided—disproportionate corporate influence

31

over elections through political contributions—while
permitting individuals associated with the corpora-
tion fully to exercise their First Amendment rights
of speech and association.

This Court has repeatedly setoneil to strike down a
statute as overbroad on its face where there were a
substantial number of situations to which it could
be validly appli¢d. “Thus, even if there are marginal
applications in which a statute would infringe on
First Amendment values, facial invalidation is in-
appropriate if the ‘remainder of the statute * * ‘*
covers a whole range of easily identifiable and con- —
stitutionally proscribable * * * conduct * * *’”
(Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760, quoting from
Civil, Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, supra,

S. at 580-581). And as the Court
in B rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, “where
conduct and not merely speech is involved” the over-
breadth must “not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legiti-
mate sweep.”

The provision in Section 610 barring contributions
or expenditures made by corporations “in connection
with any election” embraces a clear range of con-
stitutionally proscribable conduct. While there could
be marginal applications infringing upon First
Amendment values—where, ior example, corporate
advertising dealt solely with issues and never im-
pliedly referred to a candidate—such potential over-
breadth is insubstantial in relation to the unques-
tionably valid scope of the statutory scheme.

32

The phrase “in connection with any election” is
not impermissibly vague. The words define situa-
tions in which corporations might use their resources
to influence the electoral process with as great pre-
cision as the nature of the subject matter permits.
They reach a precise and readily ascertainable type
of conduct, see United States yv. O’Brien, supra, 391
U.S. at 381, and convey a “sufficiently definite warn-
ing as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices. The Consti-
tution requires no more.” United States v. Petrillo,
882 U.S. 1, 8.

In Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S.
337, the Court noted that because of the necessary
imprecision of language, only a “reasonable degree
of certainty can be demanded” of any — As
it observed:

_Acriminal statute must be sufficiently definite
give notice of the required conduct to one who
ron avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge
in its application and the lawyer in defending
one charged with its violation. But few words
possess the precision of mathematical symbols,
most statutes must deal with untold and unfore-
seen variations in factual situations, and the ~
practical necessities of discharging the business
of government inevitably limit the specificity
with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.
Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree
of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair
to require that one who deliberately goes peril-

33

ously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall
take the risk that he may cross the line. [342
U.S. at $40; footnotes omitted.]

Moreover, “if the general class of offenses to which
the statute is directed is plainly within its terms,
the statute will not be struck down as vague, even
though marginal cases could be put where doubts
might arise” (United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
618).

Here the statute is clear in prohibiting what was
done in this case—the financing of public advertise-
ments and pamphlets which criticized the views of
one of the major candidates (referred to, but not
named) in the 1972 presidential election. The com-
pany had financed political advertising—a direct “‘ex-
penditure” made “in connection with” a presidential
election. Petitioners were amply warned that their
advertisement and pamphlet critical of a political
candidate in all but name were within the boundary
of proscribable conduct.

Moreover, the phrase “in connection with any elec-
tion” derives meaning from the context in which
it is used and the statutory design. The purpose
of the statutory scheme is to control and limit
corporate influence upon the electoral process. An
expenditure or contribution is made “in connection
with any election” if it is intended and designed
to support or discredit a particular candidicy, that
is, if one of its purposes is to urge and encourage
the electorate to vote in a certain way. The words
are given greater specificity by the remainder of

2S ERD FSC NRO RISA ROCIO

34

the statutory scheme, which exempts non-partisan
registration and “get-out-the-vote” campaigns by a
corporation aimed at its shareholders and any com-
munications by a corporation to its stockholders and
their families.

This Court has upheld, against vagueness chal-
lenges, phrases in other regulatory statutes implicat-
ing First Amendment rights that were no more
definite and specific than the words “in connection
with an election.” See, ¢.g., United States v. Wurz-
bach, 280 U.S. 396 (upholding the provision of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act prohibiting any per-
son from receiving money “for any political pur-
pose whatever’); and United States v. Harriss,
supra (upholding the provision of the Federal Regu-
lation of Lobbying Act prescribing certain require-
ments for any person who receives money “to be used
principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which
person is to aid” in “influenc[ing] directly or in-
directly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by
the Congress of the United States’).

In Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers,
supra, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
prohibition in the Hatch Act against federal em-
ployees “taking an active part in political manage-
ment or in political campaigns.” The Court stated,’
in words equally applicable to the instant case (413
U.S. at 577-579) :

There might be quibbles about the meaning of

[language in the statute and regulations]; but
there are limitations in the English language

a

35

with respect to being both specific and manage-
ably brief, and it seems to us that although
the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent
on finding fault at any cost, they are set out
in terms that the ordinary person exercising
ordinary common sense can sufficiently under-
stand and comply with, without sacrifice to the
public interest.

C. Section 610 Does Not Deny Equal Protection in
Violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Petitioners contend ‘that, in singling out corpora-
tions and labor unions, Section 610 denies equal pro-
tection in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Petitioners maintain that Section
610 does not prohibit voluntary associations, partner-
ships or unincorporated organizations from making
political contributions in connection with federal elec-
tions. But as this Court has held, Congress may act
selectively, and a prohibition within its power direct-
ed at a particular class is not rendered invalid be-
cause it does not also reach every other class upon
which Congress may constitutionally place similar
restrictions. United States v. Maryland Savings-
Share Insurance Corp., 400 U.S. 4; United States v.
Petrillo, supra, 332 U.S.°at 8-9; Sproles v. Binford,
286 U.S. 374, 396.

Moreover, it is rational to hold corporations and
labor unions to a different and more stringent stand-
ard than other associations. “Congress may have
considered that the volume or proportion of unincor-
porated business or the relatively small size of in-:

36

dividually owned enterprises * * * made it possible
to omit persons [in such entities] from duties and
penalties imposed on artificial combinations of cap-

ital.” United States v. Morton Salt, supra, 338 U.S. °

at 651. Indeed, 1s we have already stressed, Section
610 does not prohibit shareholder majorities from ex-
pressing their collective political sentiments through
voluntary political organizations. Such voluntary as-
sociations, partnerships or unincorporated organiza-
tions simply do not pose the same possibility of dis-
proportionate influence upon the electoral process as
corporations or labor unions which are able to aggre-
gate funds not otherwise volunteered for political

purposes.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Section 610 is consistent
with the First and Fifth Amendments.

Respectfully submitted.

ROBERT H. BORK,
Solicitor General.

JOHN C. KEENEY,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.

Rosert B. REICH,
Assistant to the Solicitor General.

Pee JEROME M. FEIT,
RoBeRT H. PLAXico,
Attorneys.

FEBRUARY 1975.

He 6. &. coveenment peimtine orrice; 1975 369673 107

eRe ee I an ot ED em OP ee

Pi

Ga?

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0434%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.