# Jurisdictional Statement — Hill v. Stone > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0406%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement - **Published:** January 1, 1975 - **Citation:** 421 U.S. 289 ## Text Sta PRS Ey RS SITET TE Re ETE NS ARN oe OEE ee Se eee ee ¥ > > IN THE T micuaee RODAK, ir ae SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ge wT OCTOBER TERM, 1973 73-1723 No. John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas, Appellant, Vv. Michael L. Stone, et al., Appellees On appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern Distirect of Texas Jurisdictional Statement JouN L. Hitt Attorney General of Texas Larry F. York First Assistant Attorney General Counsel of Record : Mike WILLaTr Assistant Attorney General G. Cuar.es Kopspisu ) Assistant Attorney General _ May, 1974 ; INDEX Page The Opinions Below...................ccccccccccesecnenessssssssesseeeeecceeseees 2 Statement of the Grounds on Which the Jurisdiction OR Chis COmrt- 18 DVO ROG cs csicnseeacssctendosens scare crenvanenei Z Question Presented by the Appeal ................0::ceeceeeeeeeees 3 Statement of the Facts of the Case ss deignethuugaacsencadenanseo unas 4 The Question Presented is Substantial ................0..0....::0e 8 OTIC TSIM, esc vsssscsececaecensicegcancsite Feinectssoacescossnssceusienias oes 29 Appendix A-Judgment and Memorandum Opinion of BT oo nal Os |g Sen ee eee emer ae ee imran la Appendix B - Notice of Appeal ...................cecceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 1b Appendix C - Full Text of: Tex. Const. Art. VI, Section 3 (1955) «0... lc Tex. Const. Art. VI, Section 3a (1955) «0.0.0.0... lc Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.03 (Supp. 1973) ...... 2c Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.04(a) (Supp. 1973) ..3c Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.07 (1967)... 3c Charter of the City of Fort Worth, Ch. 25, Section 19 oo... scsssecnenneeneereeeeeeees 4c Appendix D - Factural Stipulations Taken From the . PPG +4 FIRE COPE E pcs chicssvicos scternisies carsnarey a avasene nee: ld PROS AS ROR | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: Page Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District,410 U.S. 743 (1973)... 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) ......... 22, 23 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 000000. eee 10 Campbell v. Wright, 95 S.W. 2d 149 (Tex. Civ. PDD: L950, NO WUE ro ehccenssseectercr tert eerie 15 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) ooo 9 Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).... 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 21 City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 GL of] 1) eee 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 21 DuBose v. Ainsworth, 139 S.W. 2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940, writ dis.) 0.0... ccccccccssssseccceeceessssseeneeeeees 13 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 8b) Preece «fa 40 Franklin v. Krause, 32 N.Y. 2d 234, 298 N.E. 2d GN ascetics rpece cee sraseons sasteneancauntbiaiseiag aeeeaes 25 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).........cccccceseeeeeeeeeeeees 10 Hadlev v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970)... 22 Handy v. Holman, 281 8.W. 2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App. DD TRO WN aca excsecsgegsgrcencntcenste tteeotenqugeneocanee 14, 15 Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors, 383 US GS 11 9OG Diss scrasexesstunsacesorexseuvocenceaseveraedpasenseatvors 9, 17, 24 O TABLE OF AUTHORITIES > CASES: . Page Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, © 895 U.S. 621 (1969) «seers “4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 27 Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bache, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)... ccc ceceseereessesseneeeenneeeeersbesseseetenseseeneeseenees 9,18 Lucchese v. Mauermann, 195 S.W. 2a 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946, writ ref. n.r.e.) cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812 (1947) oo... cece ceccecssceecescccecceccsenecscesseeseeeeceseoes 15 Markowsky v. Newman, 134 Tex. 440, 136 S.W. 2d 808 CL GADD secccesccvcsyoocencessavenavncestvncesscovesssasnaatansoekasscnsuesetttnees 15 McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) ........:.: eee 16, 20, 27 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US. 420 (1961) ....... 19, 21, 29 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162 (1875) ......... 24 Montgomery Independent School District v. Martin, 464 S.W. 2d 638 (Tex. 1971) .......ccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 14, 27 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)... eects 19 Police Jury of Vermillion Parish v. Hebert, 404 a S. BOT (V9 TY eeccaceseocesncasarcn en cesenioseker enna toate 21 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) oo. ce eet 19 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) oo... eee 10, 18, 23 Richter v. Martin, 342 S.W. 2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961. NO WIE) cccesresnssserseccersvesosensasverderesnnnceneeonnasenseneses 15 Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973)... 16, 17, 24, 25 —ili— aA RAE NRE NY MRROONR NIE BIEN Ss ERAN eg AAI PPE Re MEL Bese EAH LOL Ay AMEE ALINE ARSE ot _TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: : Page Royalty v. Nicholson, 411 S.W. 2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967, writ ref. n.r.@.) i ceeecceeeeeeeeeeeeees 15 Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) ....... 3, 20, 22, 23 24, 25, 26, 27 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) wu. eeceeccce ee eeees 23, 24 Stewart v. Parish School Board of Parish of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. La. 1970), affd mem., 400 U.S. 884... 13, 14, 21 Texas Public Utilities Corporation v. Holland, 123 S.W. 2d 1028 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939, 8 a) 80 | oe ee ee eee 14, 15 STATUTES: Texas Revised Civil Statutes Ann. PEE FO OO SU 1 O78) scarenesstenerseenepan atin treet encutwees 6 ys Sm a a 0,8 ea 13 Texas Election Code Annotated PRPAICIS- 9.09 (SND 19 8) epcavceseecssgra seca retsnaert ease onesie 3 Article 5.04(a) (Supp. 1973) ............ccsesccsssssoesssressseees 3 PUCCIO OOF CI 9G 8) vccsassccsacessgucei.tensadttstesassd eactsiaeeanseeece 3 Charter of the City of Fort Worth, Ch. 25, Section 19 ..... 3 United States Code: Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1253 oo... ceeeeeeececseeeeeeeeees 3 Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2101 (b) ooo. ceececceeeeeeeeees 3 Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2281 oo... ccccecceeeeecceeeesneeee 2,6 Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2284 ooo ecceccceceeeeeeeeeeees 2,6 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A..........8. 2,6 aye TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: Constitution of the United States Fourteenth Amendment .............:::::eeeeeeees 2 3,6, 1,10, 12, 18 Constitution of Texas Tex. Const. Art. VI, Section 3 (1955)........ eee 3 Tex. Const. Art. VI, Section 3a (1955) «0.0... 3,4 OTHER AUTHORITIES: Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 457-477 (1973) .......e.ceesseeeeeeeeeteeterees 25 -The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. Q4-105 (1973) ....cccccvccccccscccscseeccssccsssccssssescocscossssssnerseess 25 © —_v— 7 ba pigs IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES STATES No. — John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas eR ak Appellant, Vv. Michael L. Stone, et al., Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS ARES PEAR GY es PTT PORE NER Re ER syINS cy Jurisdictional Statement Pes. th Appellant appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, entered on March 25, 1974, grant- ing a permanent injunction against appellant, and submits this Statement to show that the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction of the appeal and that a substantial question is presented. =, ng yD TPA TE IR ¥ A : ‘ Bees. PRHes THE OPIN IONS BELOW The opinion of the three-judge federal court sitting as the District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, is unreported as of this date. Copies of the judgment and the memorandum opinion are attached hereto as Appendix A. STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT IS INVOKED (1) This suit was brought before a three-judge federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, as a class action pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 23. By this suit, appel- lees sought to enjoin appellant from applying certain Texas constitutional and statutory election laws, as well as certain provisions of the Charter of the City of Fort Worth, Texas, which qualify the right to vote in general obligation tax bond elections upon the render- ing of real, personal, or mixed property for taxation, as being in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion. (11) The judgment sought to be reviewed is the ruling _of the District Court granting a permanent injunction against appellant. That judgment was entered on March 25, 1974. The Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort =; Worth Division, on April 18, 1974 and is attached hereto as Appendix B. (iii) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review this decision by direct appeal is conferred by Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1253 and 2101 (b). (iv) The following decisions sustain the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review the judgment on direct appeal in this case: Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Stor- age Disirict, 410 U.S. 719 (1973); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v:. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). (v) The validity of Tex. Const. Art. VI, Sections 3 and 3a, Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.03 (Supp. 1973), Tex. Election:Code Ann. Art. 5.04(a) (Supp. 1973), Tex. Elec- tion Code Ann. Art. 5.07 (1967), and the Charter of the City of Fort Worth, Ch. 25, Section 19, are here in- volved. The full text of these laws are set forth in Ap- pendix C hereto. QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL The following question is presented by this appeal: Are Texas election laws limiting the franchise in ~general obligation tax bond elections to persons who own taxable property which has been rendered for taxation consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Un- ited States Constitution? ae: Pitbtsttasntascxncs. wrivsRabese STATEMENT OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE Article VI, Section 3a, of the Texas Constitution pro- vides that voters voting on bond issues which will be paid in whole or in part from tax revenues must be “only qualified electors who own taxable property in the... political subdivision . .. where such election is held, and who have duly rendered the same for taxation,...” In 1969, when it first became apparent from the decisions of this Court in Cipriano v, Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S. Ct. 1897, 23 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1969), and Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 5. Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed. 2d 583 (1969), that the above and related provisions of the Texas Constitution and Statutes might be incompatible with the United States Con- stitution, the Texas Attorney General’s Office, and the bond industry and ‘their attorneys, devised a dual-box election procedure whereby at each tax bond election two separate ballot boxes are provided. In one box only resident qualified electors who own taxable property and who have duly rendered the same for taxation are allowed to vote, and in the other box, all other resident qualified electors (who are otherwise qualified, but do not own taxable property which has been duly rendered for taxation) are allowed to vote. The votes cast in each box are recorded separately, and the returns are can- vassed in such manner as reflects separately the votes cast by the two respective groups of electors. . Bonds have only been approved by the Texas Attor- ney General if a majority of the property owners who a ae have rendered their property approved, and if addition- ally, a majority of all voters approved. This procedure assured that bonds issued were compatible with both the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitu- tion. The dual-box election procedure was followed in the generabobligation tax bond election made the sub- ject of this case. On April 11, 1972, the City of Fort Worth held a tax bond election to seek authorization to issue bonds to build a library system. The ordinance authorizing the election stated that the election was to“... be held and conducted, in effect, as two separate but simultaneous elections, to-wit: one election at which only the resi- dent, qualified electors who own taxable property in the City and who have duly rendered the same for taxation shall be entitled to vote on said propositions, and ° _ another election at which al]l other resident, qualified electors s of the City shall be entitled to vote on said propéitions. The votes cast at each of said separate but simultaneous elections shall be recorded, returned, and canvassed separately.” The result of the election was as follows: Owners of Property ~ Rendered for Taxation FOR 10,849 AGAINST 12,234 consi peal ereitew Deeamne = Non-Renderers FOR 3,758 AGAINST 1,132 TOTAL FOR: ‘14,607 TOTAL AGAINST: 13,366 —On April 17, 1972, the City Council appro and_ adopted the election and, thereafter, acting pursuant to the Texas election laws, refused to sell the library bonds. On that same day, the appellees filed a class action pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 23 requesting that a three-judge district court be convened under the au- thority of 28 U.S.C. Sections 2281 and 2284. John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas, was joined as defendant because Texas law requires that said offi- cial certify the legal validity of the proposed municipal bond issue. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 709d (Supp. 1973). After the bonds have been approved by the At- torney General, Texas statutes provide that they are incontestable except for fraud and unconstitutionality. Appellees requested the District Court to declare the Texas election laws involved to be in irreconcilable conflict with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellees further requested the District Court to enjoin ay appellants from giving any force or effect to the Texas election laws in controversy as they might relate to the outcome of the bond election held on April 11, 1972, or any other such elections thereafter held. The case was submitted to the District Court on stipu- lated facts as they appeared in pages 19 through 43 of the District Court’s Pre-Trial Order entered on November 8, 1972 and said factual stipulations are attached hereto as Appendix Do e See F On March 25, 1974, the three-judge court entered a judgment and opinion (Appendix A) declaring the ques- tioned Texas election laws to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion and enjoined appellants from giving any force or effect to said laws. The District Court stayed its judg- ment for ten days to enable the parties to submit an application for stay to the Circuit Justice, the Supreme Court, or a Justice thereof. On the 2nd day of April 1974, appellant filed a Motion to Modify Judgment and/or for Partial Stay in the District Court requesting a modification of the judg- ment to provide that the Texas dual-box election proce- dure in bond elections be continued pending the final outcome of this cause before the Supreme Court. The District Court entered an order on April 9, 1974, deny- ing the appellant’s Motion. The District Court granted an additional five day stay of their judgment to enable =, LF Mo LILLE LN ELL LS LOO TICL OS ee . | eee eA Setar ia his pcg na the parties to submit an application for stay to the Circuit Justice, the Supreme Court, or a Justice thereof. Appellant field an application for a partial stay of the District Court’s judgment with the Circuit Justice, Mr. Justice Powell, on April 15, 1974. The Circuit Justice requested a reply to appellant’s application from appel- lees. Upon receipt of the reply, the Circuit Justice granted a partial stay of the District Court’s judgment _by order entered on April 25,1974, THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS SUBSTANTIAL The issue involved in this appeal is of great impor- tance to the State of Texas and the political subdivi- sions thereof, as well as more than one-fourth of all the states which in one manner or another qualify the right to vote in general obligation bond elections on the basis of property ownership or taxation. The importance of the issue is accentuated by its potential effect on the financing which is vital to the function of the states and their subdivisions in erecting and maintaining needed public improvements. In making a final determination of the issue involved in this appeal, this Court will unquestionably and substantially affect the functions of local government as well as the continued viability of reasonable state voting qualifications in this area. The. United States Supreme Court has been pre- sented over the last decade with numerous controver- _8— e®? ___As-a general proposition, the states have ".,. broad ___ sies concerning the qualifications which various states have placed upon the exercise 01 the franchise in state and local elections. Although each of the decisions of this Court have been concerned with the particular type of election at hand and its circumstances, those same decisions have been applied generally in virtually every area of election law by this Court as well as thé various lower courts, state and federal. powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.” Lassiter v. North- ampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959). This Court in Lassiter determined that voter qualification requirements may be sustained either when they pro- mote intelligent or responsible voting (voting compe- tence) or when they perform either of these Ace in a decision upholding North Carolina’s litéracy re- quirement. This Court also cited as constitutionally permissible qualifications based on age, residence, and previous criminal record. In keeping with the principle of Lassiter, this Court has condemned voter qualifications which bear no de- monstrable relation to the promotion of intelligence and responsibility in voting. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (military personnel); and Harper v. Vir- ginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax). An equally important basic premise stressed by this | Court is that the issues in any election should be de- =: oe NYP PLP MEL LF VIR TAF es 1 ’ cided by a majority of the people concerned with the outcome. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); and Baker v. Carr, 360 U.S. 186 (1962). However, “. . . once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Harper, supra. ‘In 1969 and 1970, this Court rendered several deci- sions holding invalid state laws which selectively granted the right to vote on grounds that they denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The first of these decisions was Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). In Kramer, this Court struck down a New York statute which granted the right to vote in a local school board election only to those who owned or leased taxable real property in the district or were parents or custodians of children enrolled in the public schools. On the same day this Court decided Kramer, it also handed down Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). The Cipriano decision invalidated a Louisiana statute which permit- ted only property owners to vote on the question of approving bonds that were to be financed exclusively from the revenues of a municipal public utility. The third important decision was Phoenix v. Kolodziejski. 399 U.S. 204 (1970), in which an Arizona constitutional limitation of the franchise in general obligation bond elections to persons who are qualified electors and also real property taxpayers, was held to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. |) FP ATSC = TN A MA aaa, The decisions of this Court in Cipriano and Kramer were carefully reviewed by appellant, Texas Attorney General, with respect to their application to the Texas election laws governing general obligation tax bond elections. No changes in Texas voter qualifications were deemed necessary in light of those decisions be- cause this Court's opinions were not inclusive of the’ facts or the law surrounding Texas tax bond elections. However, in order to protect the outstanding public securities of this State and to insure that any subse- quently voted securities would not be subject to attack based upon a controlling, unfavorable decision of the Phoenix case, which was at that time pending in this Court. it was decided that tax bond propositions should be covered by a dual-box election. The result of this dual-box election policy was to require that issuers of tax bonds be required to meet all the voter qualification tests of the Texas Constitution and statutes, and in addition thereto, be required to submit tax bond propositions to the balance of the otherwise qualified electorate. Before approval would be given in the form of the Attorney General's opinion as to the validity of securities, any and all underlying propositions must have been approved not only by the owners of taxable property duly rendered, voting In a separate box, but also by the aggregate of all electors. This policy was viewed originally as a temporary measure. on the assumption that the final. determina: tion of the Phoenix case would put the question to rest, oem 1 (eee BS a aaa ot Maas Rai ey 27 cay So i Sa 8 So es a A 40, t aseait i PORT OLE IN SA LENG NER PRON LY ER BC Me CRT i tia aa be a Ce par ETE teases ~ However, that decision did not settle the issue in Texas tax bond elections. The precedents of Kramer, Cipriano and Phoenix constitute the framework for the District Court’s judgment that the Texas constitutional and statutory qualifications for the exercise of the franchise in a gen- eral obligation tax bond election are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The basic test announced in those cases and ostensibly applied by the District Court in this case requires that the Court determine whether the voter exclusions are “. . . necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” Kramer, at 627. There are significant differences between the three cases cited above-and the provisions of the Texas elec- tion laws relevant to this case. In Cipriano, this Court held that ownership of property, as a restriction, is irrelevant to an election for the approval of bonds that would be financed by revenues of a public utility, thereby substantially and directly affecting property owners and non-property owners alike. The present case does not concern revenue bonds. Both Kramer and Phoenix basically involved voting restrictions based on real property taxation under circumstances which indi- cated that such a classification excluded many persons significantly affected by way of both burden and be- nefit. Pointedly, this Court in Phoenix limited its re- view to this question: “Does the Federal Constitution permit a State to restrict to real property taxpayers the ae, ee vote in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds?” The Texas law does not restrict vot- ing rights to owners of real property. Indeed, under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 7145 (1960), “All property, real, personal or mixed, except such as may be hereinaf- ter expressly exempted, is subject to taxation and the same shall be rendered and listed as herein prescribed.” Stewart v. Parish School Board of Parish of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. La. 1970), affd mem., 400 U.S. 884, 27 L. Ed. 2d 129, 91S. Ct. 136, is another case in the progression which needs discussion. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana struck down Louisiana statutes which re- stricted eligibility to vote in tax bond elections to prop- erty taxpayers and also weighted each elector’s vote by the monetary value of his assessed property. The Dis- trict Court said that the affluence of the voter was not such a compelling state interest as to justify the denial of the vote to some and the dilution of the votes of the majority. Texas has no such problem. It is immaterial to the right to vote in a bond election whether one’s owner- ship of property be great or small. DuBose v. Ainsworth, 139 S.W. 2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940, writ dis.). Also, in Stewart, the District Court noted in footnote three (page 1173) that under Louisiana law the term “property taxpayer’ equates with the term “real property tax- payer” or “landowner”. Texas mekes no such distinc- tion and, to the contrary, generates a substantial amount of tax revenues from personal property as evi- = |: a ri Laat ay eT ae S erat ta " — —— s ss Ree errr ere scree porcupine en cote aa YER TIE INS BNA IEE Piterdecsinectncianes » denced in the attached Pre-Trial Order (Appendix D. Stip. #24A). In Montgomery Independent School District v. Mar- tin, 464 S.W. 2d 638 (Tex. 1971), the Texas Supreme Court faced the precise issue of this case. After consid- eration of the Kramer, Cipriano, Phoenix and Stewart cases, the Court determined that, “Unlike those restrictive voting laws which have been declared unconstitutionally narrow and li- mited, the laws in Texas have consistently granted the right to vote in general obligation bond elec- tions to all who own personal property as well as to those who own real property. Texas Public Utilities Corporation v. Holland, 123 S.W. 2d 1028 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939. writ dis.). In Handy v. Holman, 28% S.W. 2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App, 1955. no writ), the right to vote of forty resident ¢citizens was challenged because immediately before participating in a bond election, they had each rendered personal property valued at $100 for the very purpose of voting in a bond election. The court upheld their right to vote and also said that electors should not be ‘parsed out of their constitutional right to vote by reason of any shortcoming in compliance with statutory re- quirements concerning the proper and timely rendition of personal property. It is the contention of the Attorney General, and we agree, that voter qualifications of ownership under the Texas constitutional and statutory pro- visions stated above. as interpreted by our deci- sions, are so universal as to constitute no impedi- ment to any elector who really desires to vote ina bond election. A voter is qualified if he renders any kind of property of any value, and he need not have actually paid the tax. ay The quoted provisions of the Constitution and the Education Code requiring the property owner tu duly render his property for taxation have been often construed by the Texas courts in connection with voting rights Property is ‘duly rendered’ within the meaning of the Texas Constitution if the property is placed on the tax rolls by the tax asses- 7 The election results were as follows: Owners of Property Non Rendered for Taxation Renderers Total Proposition One For 13,466 4,094 17,560 Against 9,834 850 10,684 Proposition Two For 10,849 3,758 14,607 Against 12,234 1,132 13,366 —25a— * Cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 1973, _ U.S:.___, 93 S. Ct. 1245. Rosario contains language that some might interpret to support the contention that non-rendering citizens are disenfranchising themselves, with no help from the state. In Rosario the plaintiffs i challenged a New York law requiring those who wish to vote in a a particular party primary to enroll in that party at least 30 days 3 prior to the last general election preceding the primary. Plaintiffs claimed that those who failed to enroll in time, and thus were refused the right to vote in the primary, were being deprived of their right to equal protection. The Court rejected that contention, saying that if plaintiffs were disenfranchised, they had disen- franchised themselves by failing to enroll. > We believe Rosario is inapposite. New York’s enrollment re- quirement was a reasonable state effort to preserve the integrity of the electoral process, a goal the Court called “legitimate and valid.” The Texas rendering requirement, by contrast, is primarily an attempt to aid the state’s taxatiop efforts, and is not designed to protect or improve the electoral process. Party enrollment, like i registration, is an integral part of elections, and the state is fully justified in setting deadlines and cutoff dates necessary to ad- ministrate the electoral process. And an unavoidable concomitant of registration and enrollment is voluntary action by the indi- vidual voter. One cannot argue that voluntary submission to taxa- tion is necessary to the administration of elections. * But cf. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 1973, __U.S. ___, 93 S. Ct. 1224. In that case the Court approved an election in which the right to vote for directors of a water district was limited to landowners and apportioned accord- ing to the extent of the voter’s holdings. The case is distinguishable becaue the Court emphasized that a water district is a governmen- tal unit with a special limited purpose and a limited scope of authority. Therefore, the “one person, one vote” principle did not apply. It is inescapable that that principle does apply to the City of Fort Worth, a unit of local government exercising general govern- mental power. 1° The ease with which citizens may meet Texas’ rendering re- quirements does not buttress the defendants’ argument that plain- tiffs have not suffered discrimination. The Supreme Court has | Rite 4 Kon S bittimancea away Pa ARERR SER —26a— . i ee oe a ee eT ee ee ee ee ol a ee said: To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Electors, 1966, 383 U.S. 663,668, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1082. ''Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 1972, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with “precision,” .. . and must’ be “tailored” to serve their legiti- mate objectives: ... And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on cuistitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose “less drastic means.” | [Citations omitted. ] 405 US. at 343, 92 S. Ct. at 1003. ' The quotations are from Art. VI, Sec. 3a, of the Constitution of Texas. ps ee eb at * APPENDIX B © Notice of Appeal | —_ PRT, : a » ‘ . * — Ra 4 - > ® % iJ . ae See . > im a * ’ e * ent ‘ % » ame memanarssen om _—s .* ~- Ces , a 1 : * —s ‘ * . ~~ ~ ° . ‘ * ; a leah tate wail aes . eg ee Ta 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FORT WORTH DIVI- SION . Michael L. Stone, et al., 1 Plaintiffs Ti \ Civil Action )( No. 4-1975 vt The City of Fort Worth, et al., )( Defendants Ni » NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES . Notice is hereby given that John L. Hill, Attorney General of the State of Texas, Defendant in the above named case, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States from the final order granting a perma- nent injunction entered in this action on the 25th day of March, 1974. A ARAN EEE eS SUE Woe {aves TB TR Re pia ee ebiaietaitctiarcesicccericttn' is This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Respectfully submitted, JOHN L. HILL Attorney General of Texas MIKE WILLATT Assistant Attorney Gencral G. CHARLES KOBOISH Assistant Attorney General Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 (Note: Filed with District Clerk on April 18, 1974.) Pon ene TES song ee PROOF OF SERVICE I, Mike Willatt, an attorney in the Office of the Attor- ney General of Texas, Appellant herein, depose and say that on the _.._day of... ss, : 1974. | served copies of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States on the several parties thereto, as follows: (1) on Michael L. Stone, et al, Plaintiffs by mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope with first class post- age prepaid, addressed to Mr. Don Gladden and Mr. Marvin Collins, counsel of record for the Plaintiffs, lo- cated at 702 Burk Burnett Building, Fort Worth, Texas 76102. (2) on R.M. Stovall, Mayor; S.G. Johndroe, Jr., City Attorney; Roy A. Bateman, City Secretary; Leonard E. Briscoe, Taylor Gandy, Jess M. Johnston, Jr., W.S. Kemble, Jr., John O’Neill, Ted C. Peters, Pat Reece, Mrs. Margaret Rimmer, council members; and the City of Fort Worth, a municipal corporation, by mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope, with first class post- age prepaid, addressed to Mr. S.G. Johndroe, Jr., City Attorney, Attorney for Defendants, located at 1000 Throckmorton Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102. aie ian a i ? a i i 5 ; ' 4 { : All parties requried to be served have been served. eae Matern ; MIKE WILLATT 4g Assistant Attorney General Subscribed and sworn to before me, at — this _____ day of , 1974. 5 Notary Public i r = - = Y a a ee oe z APPENDIX C Full text of: | Tex. Const. Art. VI, Section 3 (1955) Tex. Const. Art. VI, Section 3a ( 1955) Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.03 (Supp. 1973) Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.04 (a) (Supp. 1973) Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.07 (1967) Charter of the City of Fort Worth, Ch. 25, § 19 Pati PER RG wR teE Saal (rae agar eect ee aR 2 REAR NONIL NAREAOE OOO BE ILE TEI i vl Tex. Const. Art. VI, Section 3 (1955): § 3 Municipal elections; qualifications of voters Sec. 3. All qualified electors of the State, as herein described, who shall have resided for six months im- mediately preceding an election, within the limits of any city or corporate town, shall have the right to vote for Mayor and all other elective officers; but in all elec- tions to determine expenditure of money or assumption of debt, only those shall be qualified to vote who pay taxes on property in said city or incorporated town; provided, that no poll tax for the payment of debts thus incurred, shail be levied upon the persons debarred from voting in relation thereto. Tex. Const. Art. VI, Section 3a (1955): § 3a. Bond issues; loans of credit; expenditures; assump- tion of debts; qualifications of voters Sec. 3a. When an election is held by any county, or any number of counties, or any political subdivision of a county, or any defined district now or hereafter to be described and defined within the State and which may or may not include towns, villages or municipal corpo- rations, or any city, town or village, for the purpose of issuing bonds or otherwise lending credit, or expending money or assuming any debt, only qualified electors who own taxable property in the State, county, political Eom | Toners eH ? ed Wh Paw hi RE SEIN Se ts subdivision, district, city, town or village where such election is held, and who have duly rendered the same for taxation, shall be qualified to vote andvall electors shall vote in the election precinct of their residence. Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.03 (Supp. 1973): Art. 5.03 Qualifications for voting for bond issues, lend- ing credit, expending money, or assuming debt When an election is held by any county, or any number of counties, or any political subdivison of the state, or any political subdivision of a county or any defined district now or hereafter to be described and defined within the state, and which may or may not include towns, villages, or municipal corporations, or any city, town, or village, for the purpose of issuing bonds or otherwise lending credit, or expending money or assuming any debt, only qualified electors who own taxable property in the state, county, political subdivi- sion, district, city, town or village where such election is held, and who have duly rendered the same for taxa- tion, shall be qualified to vote and all electors shall vote in the election precinct of their residence. Property shall be deemed to have been duly rendered for taxa- tion, for the purpose of determining eligibility to vote in an election as provided in this code and in Article VI, Section 3a, of the Texas Constitution, only if the prop- erty was rendered to the county, city, district, or other — political subdivision holding the election within the pera) Fae period of time fixed by law for such rendition, or was placed on the tax rolls by the tax assessor prior to the date on which the election was ordered, if the regular rendition period expired before that date. _ Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.04 (a) (Supp. 1973): Art. 5.04 Affidavit of voter in bond election, etc. (a) Before any person is allowed to vote in an election for the purpose of issuing bonds or otherwise lending credit, or expending money or assuming any debt, he shall sign and swear to an affidavit to the effect that he owns property, giving a description of one item, which has been duly rendered for taxation to the political subdivision holding the election at a time and in a manner which entitles him to vote in the election, as provided in Section 35 (Article 5.03) of this code. The voter’s registration certificate number shall be shown on the affidavit, and it shall contain a statement that the affiant understands that the giving of false infor- mation in the affidavit is a felony punishable by a fine not to exceed $5,000 or by imprisonment in the peniten- tiary not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and _ imprisonment. " Tex. Election Code Ann. Art. 5.07 (1967): Art. 5.07 To vote in city elections All qualified electors of this State, as described in the tc —3c— PEALE S55 ENE LIS SIR II Bers. SEEN oe Rn ER aR Ae LE ee ee CENTS 5 I t ; & two preceding Sections [ Arts. 5.05, 5.06] who shall have resided for six (6) months immediately preceding an election within the limits of any city or incorporated town shall have a right to vote for mayor and all other elective officers, but in all elections to determine the expenditure of money or assumption of debt, or issuance of bonds, only those shall be qualified to vote who own taxable property in the city or town where such election is held and who have duly rendered the same for taxa- tion; and all electors shall vote in the election precinct of their residence. > Charter of the City of Fort Worth, Ch. 25, § 19: Section 19. Issuance and Sale of Bonds —The City Council shall have authority to provide for the issuance and sale of bonds for permanent im- provements and for any other legitimate municipal purpose as may be determined by the City Council; but no bonds shall be issued to fund any overdraft or inde- btedness incurred for current expenses of the city gov- ernment, or any subdivision thereof. The City Council shall also have the right to fund any maturing bonds by the issuance of new bonds in lieu thereof at the same or a lower rate of interest. No bonds shall be issued or refunded that bear a greater rate of interest than five per cent per annum, and the same shall never be sold for less than par and accrued interest, and all bonds shall pemore. aa 7 Band ea Not HT Ne ONG: A a ORG Bata express upon their face the purpose of purposes for which they are issued. No bonds shall be issued unless authorized by ordi- nance, which ordinance shall provide an adequate fund from the taxes for the payment of the annual interest and sinking fund of not less than two per cent _ per annum for the ultimate redemption of such bond issue, and such ordinance shall become effective with- out the necessity of publication. Provided, that no bonds shall be issued, nor bonded debt created, unless author- ity therefor shall first be submitted to the qualified voters who pay taxes on property situated within the corporate limits of the City of Fort Worth; and, if a majority of the votes cast at such election are in favor of the issuance of such bonds, then such issue shall be made; but, should the majority of the votes cast at said election be against the proposition, then such bonds shall not be issued. The City Council shall have full power and authority to prescribe the way and manner _in which such election shall be held, the notice to be given therefor, the polling places in the various parts of. the City at which the election is to be held, prescribe the form of ballot, and the other details of said election, independently of the general election laws of the State of Texas. But this requirement as to submitting the question of the issuance of bonds to a vote of the people before the same can be authorized shall not apply to the refunding of bonds heretofore issued, where the same — ,~ ae aie 0 AAU OD PEN EAE ANGE FA 2 can be refunded at the same or a lower rate of interest, if . 5 in tHe judgment of the City Council the said bonds ; cannot be retired, either in whole or in part, at matur- i ity. The said bonds when issued shall be submitted to ; and approved by the Attorney General of the State of { Texas, as required by the statutes of this State’before | being offered for sale in the market. ie (3 i. i i ‘a 4 i 1% } POE eR a IIL : eat ae 5. FACTS ESTABLISHED BY STIPUATION 1. That the defendant City of Fort Worth is a munici- pal corporation located in Tarrant County, Texas, and duly organized and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas and by home-rule Charter duly adopted by its electorate in December of 1924 under the provisions of Article X1, Section 5, of the Constitution of the State of Texas. 2. That at the time of the filing of this suit, defendant Crawford Martin was the duly elected Attorney Gen- eral of the State of Texas. 3. That defendant S.G. Johndroe, Jr., is the duly ap- pointed City Attorney of the City of Fort Worth. 4. That at the time of the filing of this suit and at the ° present time R.M. Stovall is the duly elected Mayor of. the City of Fort Worth. 5. That the defendant Roy A. Bateman is the duly appointed City Secretary-Treasurer of the City of Fort Worth. 6. That at the time of the filing of this suit and at the present time the defendants, Leonard E. Briscoe, Taylor Gandy, Jess M. Johnston, Jr., W.S. Kemble, Jr.. et fe John J. O'Neill) Ted C. Peters, Pat Reece and Mrs. * Margret Rimmer. are the duly elected members of the City Council of the City of Fort Worth. 7. That Plaintiffs’ Exhibit “A” is a true and correct copy of the Charter of the City of Fort Worth, as amended. 8. That Chapter VI of the Charter of the City of Fort Worth provides for certain duties and responsibilities of the defendant S.G. Johndroe, Jr., as City Attorney, and reads as follows: “DEPARTMENT OF LAW” “Section 1. In addition to the departments created and placed under the immediate control of the City Manager, there is hereby created another department, to be known as the Department of Law. The Director or head of this department shall be a competent practicing lawyer, of recognized ability, residing in the City, whose appointment - shall be recommended by the Manager and ap- proved by the Council. He shall serve for a period of two years from the date of his appointment, unless sooner discharged by the Council, either upon its own motion or upon the recommendation of the Manager, on account of his services not proving satisfactory; and of this matter the Council shall be the sole judge, and their decision with respect thereto shall be final. “Section 2. The Director of the Department of Law shall be known as the City Attorney, and shall have power to appoint such assistants as may be _9q— ~ deemed necessary by him, subject to the approval of the Manager and the Council: such assistants to serve in that capacity as long as their services are satisfactory to the Council and the City Manager. The City Attorney and his assistants shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by resolution of ‘the Council. - “Section 3. Duties of the City Attorney.—He shall be the legal adviser of and attorney and coun- sel for the City and for all officers and departments thereof, in all matters relating to their official duties. He shall prosecute or defend all suits for and on behalf of the City in all the courts, and shall prepare all contracts, bonds and other instruments in writing in'which the City is concerned, and shall endorse on each his approval as to the form and legality thereof. No such bond, contract or instru- ment shall become effective without such en- dorsement by the City Attorney thereon. “Section 4. He shall attend all sessions of the Council and make diligent investigation and re- port to the Council, or to the City Manager, or any ° director of departments, his opinion with respect to any legal matter submittéd to him by any of them. He shall, either in person or by an assistant, act as Prosecuting Attorney in the Corporation Court. He shall prosecute all cases brought before such court and perform the same duties, as far as they are applicable thereto, as are required of the Prosecut- ing Attorney of the County. He shall maintain his office in the City Hall, in such place as may be provided by the Council, and shall freely confer with and advise the City Manager on all matters that may be referred to him by the City Manager. He shall prepare in correct legal form all ordi- nances passed by the Council. “Section 5. The City Attorney shail apply in the —3d— g EG PLLA ANE REE TNA ASI mE KCN Et yr ah VC Neh name of the City to a court of competent jurisdic- tion for an order of injunction to restrain any mis- application of the funds of the City, or the abuse of its corporate powers, or the execution or perfor- mance of any contract made in behalf of the City in contravention of law, or which was procured by fraud or corruption. ; “Section 6. When an obligatien or contract made on behalf of the City granting a right or easement, or creating a public duty, is being evaded or viol- ated, the City Attorney shal likewise apply for the forfeiture or the specific performance thereof, or for such relief as the nature of the case may require. “Section 7. In case any officer or commission shall fail to perform any duty required by law, the City Attorney shall apply to a court of-competent juris- diction for a writ of mandamus to compel the per- formance of such duty. “Section 8. Taxpayers’ Suits.—In case the City Attorney, upon written request of three taxpayers of the City, fails to make any application provided ~ for in | (any of the preceding three sections, such en ag deel may institute suit or proceedings for such purpose, in their own names, on behalf of the City; but no such suit or proceeding shall be enter- tained by any court until such request shall have been first made to the City Attorney, nor until the said taxpayers shall have given security for the costs of the proceedings. “Section 9. The City Attorney and his assistants shall be responsible for the proper and efficient handling of the entire legal affairs, suits, pleas and litigation in which the City is interested. No extra counsel shall be employed to assist the City Attor- ney, save and except in cases of extraordinary im- portance and emergency, and then only on the _4Ad— written recommendation of the City Manager showing the necessity and importance of employ- ing such additional legal assistance. approved and adopted by the Council. In such contingency, the Council shail fix in advance, as far as practicable. the compensation to be allowed such extra counsel] by resolution spread upon the minutes.” 9. That. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit "B” (also identified as Ex- hibit lin Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint) is a true and correct copy of Ordinance No. 6644, which ordi- nance was the ordinance calling the bond election held on the 11th day of April, 1972. 10. That Section 19 of Chapter XXV of the Charter of the City of Fort Worth reads as follows: “Section 19. Issuance and Sale of Bonds,—The City Council shall have < uthority to provide for the issuance and sale of bonds for permanent improve- ments and for any other legitimate municipal pur- pose as may be determi y the City Council: but no bonds shall be issue@ £0 fund any overdraft or indebtedness incurred ‘for current expenses of the city government, or any subdivision thereof. The City Council shall also have the right to fund any maturing bonds by the issuance of new bonds in lieu thereof at the same or a lower rate of interest. No bonds shall be issued or refunded that bear a greater rate of interest than five per cent per annum, and the same shall never be sold for less than par and accrued interest, and all bonds shall express upon their face the purpose or purposes for which they are issued. “No bonds shall be issued unless authorized by ordinance, which ordinance shall provide an ade- ae; , Se a NE Hee Tee eee SRO aD ay & Broreereneemense rem rnrmmenmmemesiennnuennm names pIeene Emer EDS quate fund from the taxés for the payment of the annual interest and sinking fund of not less than two per cent per annum for the ultimate redemp- tion of such bond issue, and such ordinance shall become effective without the necessity of publica- tion. Provided, that no bonds shall be issued, nor , bondéd debt created, unless authority therefor shall first be submitted to the qualified voters who ay taxes on property situated within the corporate imits of the Eity of Fort Worth; and, ifa majority of _ the votes cast at such election are in favor of the issuance of such bonds, then such issue shall be made; but, should the majority of the votes cast at said election be against the proposition, then such bonds shall not be issued. The City Council shall have full power and authority to prescribe the way and manner in which such election shall be held, the notice to be given therefor, the polling places in the various parts of the City at which the election is to be held, prescribe the form of ballot and the other details of said election, independently of the gen- eral election laws of the State of Texas. But this requirement-as to submitting the question of the issuance of bonds to a vote of the people before the same can be authorized shall not apply to the re- funding of bonds heretofore issued, where the same can be refunded at the same or a lower rate of interest, if in the judgment of the City Council the said bonds cannot be retired, either in whole or in part, at maturity. The said bonds when issued shall e submitted to and approved by the Attorney Gen- eral of the State of Texas, as required by the sta- tutes of this State, before being offered for sale in the market.” 11. That section 29 of Chapter XXVIII of the Charter of the City of Fort Worth reads in part as follows: “Section 29. Elections — Council to Provide for _6d— Holding Same — Counting Returns and Declaring Result.—The City Council shall make all nece-- sary regulations concerning elections. the manner and method of holding same, by proper ordinance = eracted for that purpose. Such regulations, how- ever, shall be in keeping with the provisions of thi- Charter and shall be in keeping and consistent with the provisions of the State law applicable to elections in municipalities, insofar as the same may be practicable. ***” That Section 30 of Chapter XXVIII of the Charter of the City of Fort Worth reads as follows: “Section 30. Oath of Office.—Every officer of the City shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe to an oath or affirmation. to be filed and kept in the office cf the City Secret- EER RARE ar RR Rt RIN Reha Ti esis ea becca cme ne van eae ea € ary, that he will support, protect and defend the S Constitution and laws of the United States and of | the State of Texas, and in all respects faithfully © discharge the duties of his office or position. This z provision shall apply to the City Manager andto —~ the heads of departments.” : 12. That Article 709 of the Revised Civ:! Statutes of . the State of Texas provides in part that “Before any bonds shall be offered forsale.***the —— mayor ***shall forward the bonds to the Attorney . General, together with a certified copy of the order | or ordinance levying the tax to pay the interestand = 7 provide a sinking fund, and a statement of the total f bonded indebtedness of the ***city ***, including = | the series of bonds proposed, together with the f amount of the assessed value of the *** city for : purposes of taxation as shown by the last official = © assessment of such *** city ***. Such *** mayor _7d— tl r shall also furnish the Attorney General with any additional information he may require.” 13. That Article 709d of the Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas provides in part that ~ “When *** the bonds of any incorporated city *** are offered for sale, the party offering, or proposin to sell, such bonds, obligations, and pledges shall first submit them to the Attorney General, who shall carefully inspect and examine the same in connection with the law under which they were issued, and shall diligently inquire into the facts and circumstances so far as may be necessary to determine the validity thereof; and, upon being satisfied that such bonds, obligations, and pledges were issued in conformity with law, and that they are valid and binding obligations, he shall there- upon certify to their validity, and his certificate to that effect, so procured by the party offering such bonds, obligations, and pledges as the case may be, shall be submited to the Comptroller *** with the bonds, obligations, and pledges so offered for sale, ai shall be carefully preserved by the Comptrol- er. KI? 14. That the Attorney General of Texas has duties which include the certification of the legality of pro- ceedings underlying the issuance of any proposed municipal bonds and the issuance of an opinion as to such legality prior to their registration by the Com- ptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas. 15. That Article 4398 of the Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas provides as follows: _8d— “ATTORNEY GENERAL “Art. 4398. To examine bonds He shall carefully examine a!! county and municipal bonds sent to him as provided by Article 709, in connection with the facts and the Constitu- tion and laws on the subject of the execution of such bonds, and if, as the result of such examination, he shall find that such bonds were issued in confor- mity with the Constitution and laws, and that they are valid and binding obligations upon the county, city, or town, by which they are executed, he shal] so officially certify.” 16. That prior to the holding of the election of April 11, 1972, the defendant City Secretary of the City of Fort Worth instructed each of the election judges for the bond election, and that such instruction basically re- quired the separation of the votes of persons who owned taxable property which had been rendered for taxation from those of other qualified electors or voters who had not rendered property for taxation. 17. That the defendant City of Fort Worth and Roy A. Bateman made available two separate affidavits for voters at the polling places on April 11, 1972, one of such affidavits being for persons owning taxable prop- erty which had been duly rendered or assessed for taxa- tion, and the other affidavit being for persons who did not wish to sign an affidavit showing ownership of tax- able property which has been duly rendered or assessed for taxation. These affidavits are Plaintiffs’ Exhibits —_9d— ee ae a a LAT MAIS, MOE" 1 TARA EN Ee EASES ENR Pee (-1 and C-2. and these exhibits are also identified as Exbibit K in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. 18. That the returns of the municipal election of the City of Fort Worth held on April 11, 1972. were canvas- sed and approved by the City Council of said City in regular, open, public meeting on April 17. 1972, which canvass and approval reflect the following: ¢ “Councilman Gandy made a motion, seconded by Councilman Briscoe, that the tabulation of returns of the City of Fort Worth Bond Election held April 11, 1972, as prepared from the certified returns, submitted by the judges and clerks in each election precinct. and presented by the City Secretary, be found correct, and that the votes cast on Proposi- tion No. 1, as submitted were: Owners of Property Non - Rendered for Taxation Renderers Total For ?} 13,466 4,094 17,560 Against (/ 9,834 850 10,684 and that the votes cast on Proposition No. 2 were:. For 10.849 3.758 14,607 Against 12,234 1,132 13,366 and that the tabulation of returns of said election be in all things approved and adopted. When the motion was put to a vote by the Mayor, it prevailed unanimously.” . —10d— 19) That prior to issuing and selling any genera! obligation bonds, it isa matter of necessity to publish an ‘official not ice of sale thereof; to describe and provide for terms and specifications in the sale thereof; to make provision for redemption, denomination. type of bid and interest rates, and basis of award: to provide for a good faith deposit: to provide for printing and the furnishing of the purchaser's written opinion: to provide no- litigation certificates; to provide for delivery: to regu- late future sales: and to prepare and furnish an official bid form; and that after the taking of bids thereon: it is recessary to provide a complete transcript of the pro- ceedings, to adopt an ordinance levying the tax to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund. to provide a statement of the total bonded indebtedness of the City. including the series of bonds proposed, together with the amount of the assessed value of the real, personal and mixed property in the City for purposes of taxation as shown by the last official assessment rolls, to submit the bonds to the Attorney General of Texas for inspec- tion and certification pursuant to Article 709d of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. and to furnish the Attor- ney Generai with any additional! information that he may require. 20. That the defendant City Attorney. S.G. Johndroe. Jr.. has advised the City Council of the opinion deli- vered March 10, 1971. in Montgomery Independent School District v. Crawford Martin, Attorney General of Texas, 464 S.W. 2d 638 (1971), wherein the-Texas —11ld— Bieter pest seg ete: Supreme Court upheld the validity of Article 6, Section 3a. of the Texas Constitution when challenged on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and the Supreme Court of Texas also found that such provision did not violate, but strengthened, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment; and that the defendant City Attor- ney, S.G. Johndroe, Jr., as admitted in Paragraph 22 of the Original Answer of Defendants, R.M. Stovall et al., further advised the City Council of the City of Fort Worth of the procedural steps and necessary prerequis- ites prior to the issuance and sale of general obligation bonds as set out above in Stipulation No. 19. 21. That the defendants, City Council members of the City of Fort Worth, when acting as a body in their official capacity as City Council members and as the duly authorized governing body of the City of Fort Worth, have the “authority to provide for the issuance and sale of bonds for permanent improvements and for any other legitimate municipal purpose as may be de- termined by the City Council”; and that such authority is conferred in part upon the City Council by Chapter XXV, Section 19, of the Charter of the City of Fort Worth. 22. That defendant Roy A. Bateman, in his capacity as City Secretary of the City of Fort Worth, had the following duties with respect to the April 11, 1972, City , of Fort Worth bond election as set forth in Ordinance Ato. 6644 of the City of Fort Worth: » “SECTION 6. “That the official ballots to be used shall be in compliance with the applicable provisions of Arti- cle 6.05 of the Election Code of the State of Texas, as amended, and shall have written or printed thereon the following: , PROPOSITION NO. 1. “Place an ‘X’ in the square beside the statement indicating the way you wish to vote. CFOR CAGAINST Shall the City of Fort Worth, Texas. through its City Council, issue its negotiable soupon bonds in the principal sum of Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) for the legitimate municipal pur- pose of acquiring, equipping and improving the physical equipment and personal property of the Fort Worth Transit Company, a private corpora- tion, and acquiring the necessary lands therefor. said bonds being payable serially as may be deter- mined by the City Council, so that the last matur- ing bonds shall become payable within forty (40) years from the date thereof. bearing interest at a rate not to exceed the maximum prescribed by law at the time of the issuance thereof, payable semi- annually, and levy a sufficient tax to pay the in- terest on said bonds and create a sinking fund sufficient to redeem said bonds at the maturity thereof? PROPOSITION ) “Place an ‘X’ in the square beside the statement —13d— indicating the way you wish to vote. (1 FOR CO AGAINST Shall the City of Fort Worth, Texas, through its City Council, issue its negotiable coupon bonds in the principal sum of Six Million, Eight Hundred Sixty Thousand Dollars ($6,860,000.00) for the pur- pose of making permanent city improvements by constructing, building, improving and equipping buildings for the public library system and acquir- ing the necessary lands therefor, said bonds being payable serially as may be determined by the City Couttgil, so that the last maturing bonds shall be- come payable within forty (40) years from the date thereof, bearing interest at a rate not to exceed the maximum ‘prescribed by law at the time of the issuance thereof, payable semi-annually, and levy a sufficient tax to pay the interest on said bonds and create a sinking fund sufficient to redeem said bonds at the maturity thereof? “SECTION 7. “That the City Secretary is hereby ordered and directed to prepare and issue ballots for absentee voting and for the special election and to stamp same ‘Official Ballot, on which ballots shall be printed the propositions hereinabove set forth. OK OK “ORC LION 10; “That the City Secretary shall furnish election officials said ballots, together with any other forms, blanks or instructions in accordance with the Charter of the City of Fort Worth, Texas, and the laws of the State of Texas insofar as same are ap- plicable, and the provisions of this ordinance un- —14d— less a court of competent jurisdiction orders other- wise. “SECTION 11. “That the way and manner of holding this elec- tion, the notice to be given therefor, the polling places, the personne! of the officers, precinct judges and substitutes therefor who are to hold the same, and all details connected with the holding of the election shall be determined and arranged by the City Council and administered under the direction of and by the City Secretary. 2K OK OK ok OK OK “SECTION 13. “That the City Secretary is hereby authorized and directed to cause notice of said election to be given by posting a substantial copy of this election order in each of the election precincts of said City and also at the City Hall. That this notice of said election shall also be published on the same day in each of two (2) successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation published within said City, the date of the first publication to be not less than fourteen (14) days prior to the date set for said election, and the City Secretary shall see that proper publication is made and proper notice of this election is given, in full conformity with the Char- ter of the City of Fort Worth, Texas, and the applic- able statutes of the State of Texas.” 23. That on the 13th day of March, 1972, the City Council of the City of Fort Worth adopted Ordinance No. 6644, which provided for the submission of two propositions to the electorate of the City of Fort Worth, the election to be held on April 14, 1972; and that such —15d— propositions are set out in Stipulation No. 22 above (Section 6 of Ordinance No. 6644). That Ordinance No. 6644 provided in Section 3 thereof for the holding of two separate but simultane- ous elections, as follows: “SECTION 3. “That said election shall be held and conducted, in effect, as two separate but simultaneous elec- tions, to wit: One election at which only the resi- dent, qualified electors who own taxable property in the City and who have duly rendered the same for taxation shall be entitled to vote on said propos- itions, and another election at which all other resi- dent, qualified electors of the City shall be entitled to vote on said propositions. The votes cast at each of said separate but simultaneous elections shall be recorded, returned.and canvassed separately. It is hereby declared that the purpose of holding the election in such manner is to ascertain arithmeti- cally: (a) The aggregate votes cast at the election for and against said propositions by resident, qualified electors of the City; and also (b) The aggregate votes cast at the election for and against said propositions by resident, qualified electors who own taxable property in the City and who have duly rendered the same for taxation. Each elector shall be entitled to vote once on each of the propositions in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this ordinance. “That the the above and foregoing dual election —16d— procedure shall be followed unless a court of compe- tent jurisdiction orders otherwise.” 24. The Attorney General's policy in the approval of general obligation tax bonds since December 19, 1969, has been that each proposition must be approved by the property owning ad valorem taxpayers whose property has been duly rendered (as required by Article 6, §§ 3 and 3 (a) of the Texas Constitution) and each proposi- tion must also receive the approval of the aggregate vote of property-owning ad valorem taxpayers whose property has been duly rendered and all other qualified electors (the test required by the Phoenix case). This position was taken to insure that all general obligation tax bonds voted in Texas would be in full compliance with the Texas law and at the same time be protected in the event the Supreme Court of the United States sub sequently holds the Texas voter qualification test for tax bond elections invalid. As a practical mat- ter, until such time as the Texas law is tested in the Federal Courts, the municipal bonds of this State and its political subdivisions would be unmarketable with- out this protective procedure. The Texas Supreme Court in Montgomery Indepen- dent School District v. Crawford Martin, Attorney Gen- eral of Texas, 464 S.W. 2d 638 (1571), has spoken on the question of who shall vote in general obligation tax bond elections in Texas and it is incumbent upon the Attorney General of Texas to insure that the directives —17d— SEER ARP NS A Cee aie eee ie eng Beevers Se aa at ean Tear Te eee ae of that Court are complied with in the approval of tax bonds. In those instances when tax bonds are not in- volved, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), and Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), are followed. 24A. If Robert S..Calvert, Comptroller of Public Ac- counts of the State of Texas, were present in court, he _would testify under oath that the requirement of rendi- tion of property, personal and mixed, tangible and in- tangible, as a prerequisite to vote in a general obliga- tion bond election is a matter of compelling necessity by reason of the plain and simple fact that no property is more susceptible of concealment than is personal and mixed, tangible and intangible property. He would further testify, if he were present in court, that for the year 1970, the total personal property rendered for taxation in Texas amounted to $3,996,729,956.00 and for the year 1971 amounted to $4,261,631,147.00, which is an increase of 6.23%. This increase of $264,901,191.00 in personal property rendi- tions for the year 1971 constitutes 11.59% of the over- all increase in renditions of real, personal and inixed property over that rendered in 1970, which produces dollar-wise an additional $529,802.38 in tevenues to the State. The total approximate revenues to the State as a result of ad valorem tax on personal property in the year 1971 amounted to approximately $8,523,262.30. —18d— 24B. If Robert S. Calvert, Comptroller of Public Ac- counts of the State of Texas, were present in court, he would testify under oath that the requirement of rendi- tion and disclosure of property for purposes of ad val- orem taxation is of the utmost importance, that there is a compelling necessity for an effective system of tax assessment and collection, and that such a system is mandatory for the orderly creation of, payment of and discharge of tax bond obligations. 25. That the declared intent of the City Council of the City of Fort Worth with respect to the sale and issuance of the general obligation tax-supported bonds as de- clared in the adoption of Ordinance No. 6644 was as follows: “SECTION 8. “That in the event the tax-supported bonds are authorized at the special election hereby ordered, the City Council of the City of Fort Worth, Texas, may issue for sale any part or portion of said amounts at such time and times as in the judgment of the City Council it determines that a lawful interest and sinking fund may be provided for to take care of and disthanpe any part or portion of the bonds so issued for sale, it being the purpose of this section to make clear that the City Council of the City of Fort Worth, Texas, may not be required to issue the full amount of the series of the bonds as herein submitted but may issue for sale any portion of the same at such time and times as itdetermines advisable, under the authority hereby conferred after said eléction.” —19d— ta da | LERIEMN, 26. That assuming the requirements in Articles 5.03, 5.04 and 5.07 of the Texas Election Code and in Article 6, Sections 3 and 3a, of the Texas Constitution (which statutory and constitutional provisions all defendants have taken an oath “to support, protect and defend”) did not exist, and assuming the policy of the Attorney Gen- eral of Texas, as set forth in Stipulation No. 24 above, had never been announced and declared, then the City Council of the City of Fort Worth could exercise its independent legislative judgment and discretion and by ordinance would take such steps and procedures neces- sary to prepare for the issuance and sale of the Library Bonds submitted in Proposition No. 2 (Section 6 of Ordinance No. 6644). 27. That assuming the requirements in artilce 5.03, 5.04 and 5.07 of the Texas Election Code and in Article 6, Sections 3 and 3a, of the Texas Constitution (which statutory and constitutional provisions all defendants have taken an oath to “support, protect and defend”) did not exist, and assuming the policy of the Attorney Gen- eral of Texas as set forth in Stipulation No. 24 above had never been announced and declared, and assuming that the City Council of the City of Fort Worth deter- mined it advisable, in the exercise of its independent legislative judgment and discretion, to take such steps and procedure necessary to prepare for the issuance and sale of the Library Bonds.submitted in Proposition No. 2 (Section 6 of Ordinance No. 6644), then and in such event the defendant Mayor of the City of Fort Worth, —20d— id acting in his official capacity, would, as soon as possible and as soon as is consistent with orderly procedure and due care, inasmuch as Proposition No. 2 in the April 11, 1972, bond election received a majority of votes cast by all non-rendering and rendering voters of the City of Fort Worth, Texas, and before any of such bonds were offered for sale, cause to be forwarded to the Attorney General the bonds and a transcript thereof, together with a certified copy of the order or ordinance levying the tax to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund , and the statement of the total bonded indebtedness of the City, including the series of bonds proposed, to- gether with the amount of the assessed value of the City for purposes of taxation as shown by the last official assessment of such City, and would also furnish the Attorney General with any additional information he might require. 28. That on April 17, 1972, the City Council of the City of Fort Worth, Texas, while in regular session, unanimously adopted the following motion: “Councilman Gandy made a motion, seconded by Councilman Briscoe, that the City Council go on record as stating that if the legal entanglements did not exist, the City would proceed to sell the library bonds voted April 11, 1972, to build a new central library, provided the other terms and con- ditions surrounding the sale of the bonds and con- struction bid procedures were reasonable and ac- ceptable to the City Council, and when the motion was put to a vote by the Mayor, it prevailed unani- mously.” —21d— x 4 OSs, CORRE Pet parte ee OSPR SAR IE A HAS. Sh are Pa Berens Biativicsica ae yty 29. That some time. after the bond election held on April 11, 1972, defendant S.G. Johndroe, Jr., City At- torney of the City of Fort Worth, Texas, advised the City Council of said City “that the Attorney General has — refused to certify bonds approved in identical circum- stances, and it would be pointless to submit the Library Bonds (that is, the bonds submitted in Proposition No. 2) to the Attorney ‘i«neral,” and he generally advised the City Council of the City of Fort Worth that it is just the same as if the issue had failed. 30. That assuming that the requirements in Articles 5.03, 5.04 and 5.07 of the Texas Election Code and in Article 6, Sections 3 and 3a, of the Texas Constitution (which statutory and constitutional provisions all de- fendants have taken an. oath “to support, protect and defend”) did not exist, and assuming that the policy of the Attorney General of Texas, as set forth in Stipula- tion No. 24 above, had never been announced and de- clared, and further assuming that the City Council of the City of Fort Worth had exercised its independent legislative judgment and discretion and had the City Attorney take such steps and procedure necessary for him to prepare for the issuance and sale of the Library Bonds submitted in Proposition No. 2 (Section 6 of Or- dinance No. 6644), then and in that event the defendant City Attorney of the City of Fort Worth would prepare all instruments and documents necessary for the is- suance and sale of the Library Bonds and endorse his approval thereon. —22d— 31. That on April 11, 1972, plaintiffs Michael L. Stone, Dorothy I. Ellis, Pat (Mrs. George A.) Crowley, James D. Henderson and Marjorie M. Watson were resident, qualified electors of the City of Fort Worth, the State of Texas, and the United States, and all of the plaintiffs remain such resident, qualified voters to this date. 32. That plaintiff Pat Crowley is one and the same person as “Mrs. George A. Crowley,” who holds Tarrant County Voter Registration Certificate No. A-137229. 33. That all of the plaintiffs voted in the City of Fort Worth bond election held on April 11, 1972; that all of the plaintiffs cast ballots on both of the propositions submitted; and that all of the plaintiffs voted “for” (in favor of) the Library Bonds, Proposition No. 2. 34. That plaintiffs Michael L. Stone, Dorothy I. Ellis and James D. Henderson voted as qualified voters of the City of Fort Worth and not as rendering property own- ers, and that they voted “for” (in favor of) Proposition No. 2. (See Affidavit, Plaintiffs Exhibit E; also iden- tified as Exhibit C in Plaintiffs’ First AmendedCom- plaint) 35. That plaintiffs Pat Crowley and Marjorie M. Wat- son voted in the City of Fort Worth bond election on April 11, 1972, as rendering property owners, and that they voted “for” (in favor of) Proposition No. 2. (See —23d— i et SS a a A Biiittsia seats igh Affidavit, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit F; also identified as Ex- hibit D in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint) — 36. That all of the above plaintiffs are fully competent to testify to the matters of fact contained in Stipulations Nos. 31 through.35, inclusive, and that each plaintiff has personal knowledge of that portion of such facts which pertain directly to him. 37. That if plaintiffs Michael L. Stone, Dorothy I. Ellis, Pat Crowley, James D. Henderson and. Marjorie M. Watson were. present in court, they would testify under oath to the matters of fact stipulated by the parties hereto in Stipulation Nos. 31 through 35, inclu- sive. That the defendants stipulate that they have no evi- dence or testimony to present to this Court which would in any way contradict or impeach the truth of the mat- ters of fact stated in Stipulations Nos. a1 ae 35, ‘inclusive. 38. That all of the bonds proposed to be issued under Proposition No. 2 (Library Bonds) would be general obligation, tax-supported bonds. 39. That the principal of and interest on general ob- ligation, tax-supported bonds issued and sold by the City of Fort Worth to bona fide purchasers for value are paid solely from the revenues from taxes levied, asses- —24d— sed and collected by the City of Fort Worth from persons who own real, personal or mixed property which has been rendered for taxation. 40. That if defendant Roy A. Bateman were present in court, he would testify under oath that the requirement of rendition of property, personal and mixed, tangibie and intangible property; and that the requirement necessity to local taxing authorities by reason of the plain and simple fact that no property is more suscepti- ble of concealment than is personal and mixed, tangible and int intangible property; and that the requirement of voluntary rendition and disclosure of such property for purposes of ad valorem taxation is of the utmost importance and vitally necessary for an effective sys- -~~tem of ad valorem tax assessment and collection and is directly and inextricably related to the creation of, payment and discharge of tax-supported bond obliga- tions. . | ; ba § £ % 4 f % f 5 : 4 H x E Chaak®. Sh cite 41. That ifdefendant Roy A. Bateman were present in court, he would testify under oath that the ad valorem tax is the life blood of local government financing and that the increasing burdens of local needs and inflation make ever increasing demands on local governments for additional tax revenues. 42. That ifdefendant Roy A. Bateman were present in court, he would testify under oath that the principal and interest on general obligation, tax-supported bonds ALES DAR iene ee —25d— issued by the City of Fort Worth are, and will be, paid solely from the proceeds derived from taxes levied, as- sessed and collected from persons who own real, per- sonal or mixed property which has been duly rendered for taxation; that the assessed valuation of real (includ- ing improvements), personal and mixed property in the City of Fort Worth for the fiscal year 1970-71 was $1,370,483,290; that of such assessed valuation, real property constituted $1,017,895,540, and personal and mixed property amounted to $352,587,750; that the assessed valuation of real (including improvements), personal and mixed property in the City of Fort Worth for the fisca: year 1971-72 was $1,444,024,440; and that of such assessed valuation, real property constituted $1,077,271,500 and personal and mixed property amounted to $366,752,240. 43. That ifdefendant Roy A. Bateman were present in court, he would testify under oath that for the year ending September 30, 1970, the City of Fort Worth derived $16,388,154 in taxes from real property ren- dered and placed on the assessment rolls and $5,676,669 from personal and mixed property rendered and placed on the assessment rolls; that for the year ending September 30, 1971, the City of Fort Worth derived $18,205,947.35 in taxes from real property ren- dered and placed on the assessment rolls and $6,198,138.73 from personal and mixed property ren- dered and placed on the assessment rolls; and that more than one-fourth of the total funds derived from af —26d— taxation in the City of Fort Worth for the years 1970-71 was derived from the taxation of personal and mixed property in said City. 44. That ifdefendant Roy A. Bateman were present in court, he would testify under oath that the fiscal year 1971-72 will require that from the funds derived from taxation, the sum of $7,364,524 must be allocated for principal and interest payments on genef€fl obligation tax bonds outstanding, which bonds are owned and held by bona fide purchasers for value throughout not only the entire United States but the world, and that the requirement of rendition of personal and mixed prop- erty, tangible and intangible, as a prerequisite to vote in a general obligation bond election is a matter of compelling necessity to the City of Fort Worth by reason of the plain and simple fact that no property is more susceptible of concealment than is personal and mixed, tangible and intangible property. That as of December 31, 1971, the outstanding un- paid general obligation tax bond indebtedness of the City of Fort Worth was $92,852,000. That the City Council of the City of Fort Worth must provide funds to meet its outstanding general obliga- tion tax bond payments during the fiscal year 1971-72 in the amount of $7,364,524, and that in excess of $1,840,000 of such $7,364,524 must be obtained from taxes derived from the rendition of personal and mixed —27d— VALERIE I? OE, PERE APOE re property in the City of Fort Worth. 45. That the defendant Roy A. Bateman is fully com- petent to testify to the above matters of fact contained in Stipulations Nos. 40 through 44, inclusive, and as Treasurer of the City of Fort Worth, he has personal knowledge of such facts. 46. That plaintiffs stipulate that they have no evi- dence or testimony to present to this Court other than that contained in the foregoing stipulations which will in any way contradict or impeach the truth of the mat- ters of fact stated in Stipulations Nos. 24, 24A, 24B, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45. That plaintiffs do not, however, stipulate that these reasons are sufficient to deny some resident, qualified voters cf these taxing authorities the right to have their vote fully counted in bond elections, nor do they admit that these reasons satisfy the legal tests of Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89S. Ct. 1886, 23 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1969), to the effect that restrictions on the right of otherwise qualified voters to vote (other than those of age, residence, etc.) must be necessary to promote a compelling State in- terest. 395 U.S. 621 at 627, 89 S. Ct. 1886 at 1890, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 at 589. Furthermore, the plaintiffs object to any testimony that there is a compelling necessity for exclusion of non-property owners in this type of election on the grounds that such testimony is a conclusion of law on —28d— the part of the witness and that such testimony invades the province of the Court in deciding questions of law. 47. On April 11, 1972, the City of Fort Worth in fact held a bond election submitting two propositions to the voters: Proposition Number I provided for approval or non-approval by the voters of bonds for a transportation system; Proposition Number II provided for approval or non-approval of bonds by the voters for library facilities. On April 11, 1972, the following votes were cast and recorded on Proposition Numbers I and II in such Fort Worth city bond election: Owners of Property . Non Rendered for Taxation Rbnderers Total \ Proposition I For 13,466 4,094 17,560 Against 9,834 © 850 10.684 Proposition II For 10,849 3,758 14,607 Against 12,234 1,132 13,366 48. The defendant City of Fort Worth, with the ap- propriate approval by the defendant City Council members of the City of Fort Worth, the defendant Mayor R.M. Stovall, and the defendant City Attorney —29d— Gr, 9 OPES BUS RY DO ge eS | ws S.G. Johndroe, Jr., has sold the Transportation System bonds approved by the voters of the City of Fort Worth in Proposition Number I in the April 11, 1972 bond election. —30d— Ph ai Sus rbe? yl --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0406%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.