# Memorandum — Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0401%3A03

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Memorandum
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 421 U.S. 60

## Text

FILE

{

No. 73-1742 en 3
nT AK. JF

IN THE
Suprenve Court of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE UNITED
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioners,
Vv.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE CoUNCIL, INC. SAVE
AMERICA’S VITAL ENVIRONMENT, JANEY WEBER, AND
SUSANNE ALLSTROM,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF CERTIORARFTO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS B. STOEL, JR.

eo
—e (Member of the Bar of the
an . Supreme Court)
fie} e
NES RICHARD E. AYRES

OGDEN DOREMUS

Counsel for Respondents

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co.. INC. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON. D. C. 20001

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 78-1742
J
J
RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE UNITED
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioners,
Vv.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE CoUNCIL, INC. SAVE
AMERICA’S VITAL ENVIRONMENT, JANEY WEBER, AND

SUSANNE ALLSTROM,
Respondents.

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Respondents Natural Resources Defense Counsel, et al.
(for convenience, ‘““NRDC”), support the granting of a
writ of certiorari, for the purpose of resolving a conflict
among the circuits. In all other respects, the petition is

without merit.
BACKGROUND

In enacting the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Con-
gress expressed its strong commitment to the goal of
rapidly restoring the nation’s air to healthful and en-

2

vironmentally beneficial quality. The new statute sub-
stantially altered the previously-prevailing distribution
of responsibility for attacking this major health prob-
lem, markedly enlarging the supervisory role of the fed-
eral government over State and local efforts to abiuie
pollution. This decision was not lightly taken. Through
the 14 previous years, four separate federal statutes ' had
entrusted this task to the lower jurisdietions, without suc-
cess. In 1970, the Congress found that, far from im-
proving, ‘the air pollution problem is more severe, more
pervasive, and growing at a more rapid rate” than be-
fore.*

It was thus obvious to the drafters of the 1970 legis-
lation that a far stronger federal role was needed if the
air was to become clean again. Hence large areas of
regulation were exclusively entrusted to the federal EPA:
for example, establishing emission standards for ‘new
sources” of pollution, based upon the application of the
best available technology ($ 11%);* setting standards for
sources of “hazardous pollutants” ($112); controlling
automotive fuel additives ($ 211): and regulating emis-
sions from new automobiles and other ‘mobile sources”’
($ 202).

With respect to existing stationary sources of pollution,
however, Congress chose not to discard totally the State
and local programs that had developed under the pre-

. . > .
vious legislation. Instead, the legislature undertook a
creative exercise in federalism, building upon the exist-
ing organizational structure and expertise of the State

' Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 872 (1955): Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat.
392 (1963): Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 79 Stat. 996 (1965);
Clean Air Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).

°S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) at 1.

©42 US.C. § 185%-6. Because the United States Code notation
for the statute is quite clumsy. we hereafter adopt the qviginal
notation of the Act.

3

and local agencies, but allocating to EPA certain major
functions to prevent inaction. The State and local agencies
were to prepare and submit “Implementation Plans,”
binding themselves to a specific program oi action de-
signed to meet federally established standards for health-
ful air quality as expeditiously as practibie, but (subject
to the two exceptions discussed below) not later than mid-
1975.' The object was, as the court below correctly noted,
to ensure that ambitious commitments were undertaken
by the States, in order to force the development of tech-
nology and the pace of administrative action. Natural
Resources Defense Council, ct al., V. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, (decision below) Pet. App. at 22a.

In view of the States’ previous failure to commit them-
selves energetically to the needed measures, however, the
legislation sharply curtailed State and local autonomy
even with respect to Implementation Plans, For example,
though the States were to formulate Implementation
Plans, EPA was instructed to exercise a powerful su-
pervisory role. If a State Plan failed in any respect to
meet the detailed statutory blueprint of £$110'a), EPA
was to disapprove it and promulgate binding federal reg-
ulations ‘to replace the offending portion. Consistent with
the new scheme, the statute also sharply curtailed the
States’ power to defer the implementation of their Plans.
Where the States had previously exercised the power to
grant a variance (or its equivalent) from their control
regulations whenever a poiluter could meet vaguely speci-
fied and highly discretionary standards such as “hard-
ship,” the new law substituted two carefully drawn fed-
eral procedures—“extensions” (3 110(e)! and “postpone-
ments” ($110(f'). Consistent with the Congress’ de-
termination that the restoration of healthful air quality

'$110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857¢-5. This section is reprinted, with the
original notation, in Appendix C of Petitioner’s Appendix at page
56a, et seq.

4

Was so urgent it must take precedence over narrow
economic interests, NRDC, ct al., v. EPA, (decision below)
Point V ‘unchallenged in the instant petition for cer-
tiorari), Pet. App. at 48a et seq.; NRDC, et al., v. EPA,
478 F.2d 875, at 888-9 (1st Cir., 1973), these two pro-
visions limited the degree of flexibility and administrative
discretion, while providing relief for genuine cases of in-
ability to comply. Federal ‘‘extensions,”’ of as much as
two years, could be granted to a State or Air Quality
Control Region in those few instances where, even with
the application of all the available means to control pollu-
tion, an area was so polluted that healthful air quality
could not be attained even by 1975. Likewise, in the
unusual situation where a specifit polluter could not meet
the requirements of his State’s Plan, the federal EPA
could grant him immunity from the statute’s penalties
for up to one year at a time through a federal “postpone-
ment.’”’ In order to avoid the abuses associated with the
State variance procedures, however, this federal variance
provision was designed to force a formal demonstration,
in a judicialized federal administrative hearing, that
continued jeopardy of the public heaith was truly un-
avoidable, and that the continued operation of the offend-
ing source without penalty served an important public
interest. Since the standard for obtaining a_postpone-
ment was purposely stricter than that for obtaining State
variances, the federal law pre-empted the existing State
laws.

In August, 1971, the EPA Administrator promulgated
regulations which were inconsistent with this provision,
in that they purported to make the application of. the
federal postponement procedure discretionary with fed-
eral and State administrators, rather than mandatory as
Congress had intended. 40 C.F.R. $ 51.32(f) (formerly
42 C.F.R. $ 420.32'f)). Under these regulations, a pol-
luter would be required to seek a postponement rather

5

than a State or local variance only upon a finding by the
State that the requested variance would prevent the at-
tainment or maintenance of a National Air Quality
Standard. When, in May of 1972, acting under this reg-
ulation, the Agency approved State Implementation Plans
that would continue to authorize State variances in vio-
lation of $ 110(f), NRDC, in conjunction with numerous
local citizens and clean air organizations, petitioned for
review of the approvals of a number of State Pians.:

Beginning with the First Circuit, four federal Courts
of Appeals subsequently upheld these petitioners’ conten-
tion that EPA had illegally attempted to .mpute discre-
tion where none had been intended. .All four agueed
wholeheartedly that Congress had intended to pre-empt
State variance procedures. They differed on only one
point: the date on which pre-emption was to occur. The
Fifth Circuit, agreeing with petitioners, held that the
postponement procedure was intended to pre-empt State
variance procedures immediately: that is, once EPA had
approved a State Plan, a polluter could be insulated from
attack for violating a part of it only if he obtained a fed-
eral postponement. The First Circuit, later followed by
the Eighth and Second Crrenits, held that pre-emption
occurred as of the date set for attainment of the National
Primary Standards (mid-1975 or earlier, except in those
few cases where a State had sought and obtained an ex-
tension for attainment pursuant to £ 110(e)).

EPA has since stated its agreement with the First Cir-
cuit position, though it has not, more than a year after
the court’s_decision, rescinded its illegal regulation. Thus
in petitioning this Court for a writ of certiorari, the

’ Because the statute’s review provision, $307 of the Clean Air
Amendments, required a petition for review of a Plan approval to
be brought in the “appropriate circuit,” it appeared impossible to
challenge the approvals of all deficient State variance statutes in
one piece of litigation. Hence the same Il gal issue was brought
before several federal Courts of Appeal.

6

Agency has presented the Court with the narrow issue
of whether pre-emption has already occurred, or whether
it will occur only at the attainment date.

THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED

Respondents believe the Court should grant the writ,
because it presents a conflict in the circuits that should
be resolved. As noted previously, the Clean Air Amend-
ments represent a major change in governmental policy
towards pollution control, intended to place public ‘health
properly in the fore. The decision to pre-empt State
variance laws, substituting a federal procedure designed
to be more protective of public health, is one of the lynch-
pins of this effort to increase the pressure to restore
healthful air quality as rapidly as possible. On such an
important matter of public policy, this Court should take
the opportunity to resolve the conflict over precisely when
the more protective federal procedure becomes effective.
Furthermore, the conflicting holdings reached by the dif-
ferent circuits, could, in a few instances, result in uneven
treatment of the affected industries.

On the merits, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is incon- ~
testably the more carefully reasoned and correct. It is
grounded securely in the clear language of the statute,
and in extensive legislative history that plainly estab-
lishes the Congressional intent to pre-empt entirely the
State law variances. By contrast, the First Circuit’s
decision, which the petitioners charitably characterize as
“solomonesque,” Pet. for Cert. at 7, represents a compro-
mise between the positions of NRDC and EPA that is
not supported by either the statute or its legislative his-
tory. Obviously, this summary memorandum is not ap-
propriate for a full explication of this point, but it suf-
fices to say that the lower court was fully aware of the
ambiguous snippet of floor debate claimed by the govern-
ment to support its position, Pet. for Cert. at 14, eor-

7

rectly concluding that it was neither powerful nor per-
Suasive when ranged. against the plain language of the
statute and overwhelming legislative history on the other
side.” Likewise, the Fifth Circuit carefully considered,
and repeatedly rejected, the claim that a decision in
NRDC’s favor would disrupt the administration of the
federal program. This same claim was made before the
First Circuit in opposition to the rule the Agency now
says it is willing to embrace. The claim must be seen
for what it is—an appeal to the lawless notion that the
courts and the Congress have no power to redress illegal
conduct undertaken by the executive branch.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing, respondents urge that
the Court grant the petition for certiorari, in order to
resoive the conflict among the circuits. a

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas B. Stoel, Jr.

THOMAS B. Stor., Jr:

(Member of the Bar of the
Supreme Court }

n

s’ Richard E. Ayres
RICHARD E. AYRES

“s’ Ogden Doremus
OGDEN DorREMUS

Counsel for Respondents
July 8, 1974

* The petitioner's suggestion that the quoted statement by Senator
Muskie is the “only relevant legislative history” is simply and woe-
fully in error.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0401%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
