# Opinion — Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opinion
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 420 U.S. 546

## Text

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(Slip Opinion)

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re-
leased, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time
the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion *
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, *

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD
ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT :

‘No. 73-1004. Argued October 17, 1974—Decided March 18, 1975

Petitioner, a promoter of theatrical productions, applied to respond-:
ents, members of a municipal board charged with managing a city
auditorium and a city-leased theater, to present a musical produc-
tion at the theater. Upon the basis of outside ‘reports from which
it concluded that the production would not be “in the best interést
of the community,” respondents rejected the application. Peti-
tioner’s subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction was denied
following a hearing by the District Court, which did not review thé
merits of respondents’ decision but concluded that petitioner had
not met the burden of proving irreparable injury. Petitioner then
sought a permanent injunction permitting it to use the auditorium.
Several months later, respondents filed their first responsive
pleading, and the District Court. after a three-day hearing on the
content of the musical, concluded that the production contained
obscene conduct not entitled'to First Amendment protection and
denied injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals’ affirmed. Held:

1. Respondents’ denial of use of the municipal facilities for the
production, which was based on the board members’ judgment of
the musical’s content, constituted a prior restraint. Shuttlesworth
v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147; Cantwell y. Connecticut, 310 U. S.
296. Pp. 6-11, ;

2. A system of prior restraint “avoids constitutional infirmity
only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system,” Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U. S. 51,58; viz., (1) the burden of instituting judicial
proceedings, and of proving that the material is unprotected, must

_ Test on the censor; (2) any restraint before judicial review can be
imposed only for « specified brief period and only to preserve the

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‘

/ Syllabus

status quo; and (3) a prompt judicial determination must’ be
assured. Since those safeguards in several respects were lacking
here, respondents’ action violated petitioner's First Amendment
rights. Pp. 12-16.

486 F. 2d 894, reversed.

BiackmuN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, Stewart, MarsHatt, and Powett, JJ., joined. Dove-
as, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Wuire, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Burcer, C. J., joined; Rennauist, J., filed a
issenting opinion.

OO

LLL LEELA ALAA LEAL

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
in the preliminary peiet of the United States Keports. Keaders are re-
mented to aot he Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
inited States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
‘ormal errors, in order that corrections may be made ore the pre-
liminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-1004

Southeastern Promotions, ; ; ;
Ltd., Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Ap-
43 peals for the Sixth Circuit.
Steve Conrad et al.

{March 18, 1975]

Mr. Justice BLacKMUN delivered the opinion of the
Court. -

The issue in this case is whether First Amendment
rights were abridged when respondents denied petitioner
the use of a municipal facility in Chattanooga, Tennessee,
for the showing of the controversial rock musical “Hair.”
It is established, of course, that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has made applicable to the States the First Amend-
ment’s guarantee of free speech. Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).

See te

Petitioner Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., is a New
York corporation engaged in the business of promoting.
and presenting theatrical productions for profit. On
October 29, 1971, it applied for the use of the Tivoli, a
privately owned Chattanooga theater under long-term
lease to the City, to present “Hair” there for six days
beginning November 23. This was to be a road com-
pany showing of the musical that had played for three

years on Broadway, and had appeared in over 140 cities
in the United States.’ :

.) Twice previously, petitioner informally had asked permission to
use the Tivoli, and had been refused. In other cities, it had encoun-

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2 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD —

Respondents are the directors of the Chattanooga Me-
morial Auditorium, a municipal theater.? Shortly after
receiving Southeastern’s application, the directors met, —
and, after a brief discussion, voted to reject it. None of
them had seen the play or read the script, but they under-
stood from outside reports that the musical, as produced
elsewhere, involved nudity and obscenity on stage. Al-
though no conflicting engagement was scheduled for the
Tivoli, respondents determined that the production would
not be “in the best interest of the community.” South-
eastern was so notified but no written statement of
reasons was provided.

On November 1 petitioner, alleging that respondents’
action abridged its First Amendment rights, sought a pre-
liminary injunction from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Respondents did
not then file an answer to the complaint.* A hearing was

tered similar resistance and had successfully sought injunctions
ordering local officials to permit use of municipal facilities. See
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F. 2d 340
(CA5 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm
Beach, 457 F. 2d 1016 (CA5 1972): Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CA10 1972): Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345 (WDNC 1971);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634
(ND Ga. 1971). See also P. B. J. C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp.
757 (Mass. 1970), vacated and remanded for further consideration,
413 U. S. 903 (1973). But see Southeastern Promotions. Lid: v.
City of Oklahoma, Civil Action No. 72-105. (WD Okla. March. 27,
1972), reversed, 459 F. 2d 282, supra.

The musical had been presented if two Tennessee cities, Memphis
and Nashville. ~ .

*Code of the city of Chattanooga, § 2-238. The Board’s mem-
bers are appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city’s board
of commissioners. § 2-237. The chairman, respondent Conrad. is
commissioner of public utilities, grounds and buildings. § 2-236.

* Neither did it file at that time a formal motion to dismiss. That
motion was made later, on November 22, some time after the initial

2 Se MS ere a ne CORR RE £ ce TY - a

.-SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 3

held on November 4. The District Court took evidence
as to the play’s content and respondent Conrad gave the
following account of the Board’s decision:

“We use the general terminology in turning down the
request for its use that we felt it was not in the best
interest of the community and I.can’t, speak beyond
that. That was the board’s determination.

Now, I would have to speak for myself, the policy
to which I would refer, as I mentioned, basically in-
dicates that we will, as a board, allow those produc-
tions which are clean and healthful and culturally
uplifting, or words to that effect. They are quoted
in the original dedication booklet of the Memorial
Auditorium.” App. 25.*

The court denied preliminary relief, concluding that peti-
tioner had failed to show that it would be irreparably
harmed pending a firfal judgment since scheduling was
“purely a matter of financial loss or gain” and was

compensable.

hearing. An answer was finally filed, pursuant to court orderon
March 31, 1972.

*The Memorial Auditorium, completed in 1924, was dedicated to
the memory of Chattanooga citizens who had “offered their lives”
in World War I. The bookiet referred to is entitled “Souvenir of
Dedication of Soldiers & Sailors Auditorium Chattanooga om.
It contains the following:

“It will be [the Board’s] endeavor to make [the Auditorium] in
communit:: eenter of Chattanooga; where civic, educational, religious,
patriotic and charitable organizations and associations may have a
common meeting place to discuss and further the upbuilding and
general welfare of the city and surrounding territory.

“It will not be operated for profit, and no effort to obtain financial
returns above the actual operating expenses will be permitted.
Instead its purpose will be devoted for cultural advancement, and
for clean, healthful, entertainment which will make for the upbuild-
ing of a better citizenship.” Exhibit 2, p. 40.

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4 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

Southeastern some weeks later pressed for a permanent
injunction permitting it to use the larger Auditorium,
rather than the Tivoli, on Sunday, April 9, 1972. The
District Court held three days of hearings beginning
April 3. On the issue of obscenity vel non, presented
to an advisory jury, it took evidence consisting of the full
script and libretto, with production notes and stage in-
structions, a recording of the musical numbers, a souvenir
program, and the testimony of seven witnesses who had
seen the production elsewhere. The jury returned a
verdict that “Hair” was obscene. The District Court
agreed. It concluded that conduct in the production—
group nudity and simulated sex—would violate city ordi-
nances and state statutes® making public nudity and

5 Chattanooga Code:

“Sec. 6-4. Offensive, indecent entertainment.

“Tt shall be unlawful for any person to hold, conduct or carry on,
or to cause or permit to be held, conducted or carried on any motion
picture exhibition or entertainment of any sort which is offensive
to decency, or which is of an obscene, indecent or immoral nature,
or so suggestive as to be offensive to the moral sense, or which is
calculated to incite crime or riot.”

“Sec. 25-28. Indecent exposure and conduct.

“It shall be unlawful for any person in the city to appear in 4
public place in a state of nudity, or to bathe in such state in the
daytime in the river or any bayou or stream within the city within
sight of any street or occupied premises; or to appear in public in
an indecent or lewd dress, or to do any lewd, obscene or indecent
act in any public place.”

Tennessee Code Annotated (1971 Supp.):
39-1013. Sale or loan of material to minor—Indecent exhibits.
“Tt shall be unlawful:

“(a) for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary con-
sideration or otherwise exhibit or make available to a minor:

“(1) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture
film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion
of the human body, which depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess
violence, or sado-maisochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors;

“(2) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, however

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SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD:v. CONRAD 5

obscene acts criminal offenses. This crimina! conduct,
the Court reasoned, was neither speech nor symbolic
speech, and was to be viewed separately from the musi-

reproduced, or sound recording, which contains any matter enumer-
ated in paragraph (1) hereof above, or which contains explicit and
detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excite-
ment, sexual conduct, excess violence or sado-masochistic abuse, and
which is harmful to minors;

“(b) for any person knowingly to exhibit to a minor for a mone-
tary consideration, or knewingly to sell to a minor an admission
ticket or pass or otherwise to admit a minor to premises whereon
there is exhibited a motion picture, show or other presentation
which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess
violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors.
“39-3003. Obscene material—Knowingly selling, distributing or

exhibiting—Penalty.

“Tt shall be a misdemeanor for any person to knowingly sell,
distribute, display, exhibit, possess with the intent to sell, distribute,
display or exhibit; or to publish, produce, or otherwise create with
the intent to sell, distribute, display or exhibit any obscene material.”

Subsequent to our grant of the petition for certiorari in this case,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that § 39-3007 of the Tennessee
Code, which defined “obscene material,” as those words were used
‘n § 39-3003 and related sections, was unconstitutional for failure to
satisfy the specificity requirements of Miller v. California, 413 U. S.
15 (1973). Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. State, —- Tenn. —, 510
S. W. 2d 258 (1974). Thereafter, a new obscenity statute, Acts
1974 (Adj. S), ¢. 510, was enacted by the Tennessee Legislature;
§ 14 of that act specifically repealed the above quoted § 39-3003.

® Respondents also contended that production of the musical would
violate the standard lease that petitioner would be required to sign.
The relevant provision of that lease reads:

“This agreement is made and entered into upon the following
expressed covenants and conditions, all and everyone. of which the
lessee hereby covenants and agrees to with the lessor to keep and
perform:

“1. That said lessee will comply with all laws of the United States
and of the State of Tennessee, all ordinance of the City of Chata-
nooga. and all rules and requirements of the police and fire depart-
ments or other municipal authorities of the City of Chattanooga.”
Exhibit 3.

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6 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

cal’s speech elements. Being pure conduct, comparable
to rape or mirder, it was not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection. Accordingly, the Court denied the in-
junction. 341 F. Supp. 465 (ED Tenn. 1972).

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed. 486 F. 2d 894
(1973). The majority relied primarily on the lower
court’s reasoning. Neither the judges of the Court of
Appeals nor the District Court saw the musical per-
formed. Because of the First Amendment overtones, we
granted certiorari. 415 U.S. 912 (1974).

Petitioner urges reversal on the grounds that (1) re-
spondents’ action constituted an unlawful prior restraint,
(2) the courts below applied an incorrect standard for
the determination of the issue of obscenity vel non, and
(3) the record does not support a finding that “Hair” is
obscene. We do not reach the latter two contentions,
for we agree with the first. We hold that respondents’
rejection of petitioner’s application to use this public
forum accomplished a prior restraint under a system lack-
ing in constitutionally required minimal procedural safe-
guards. Accordingly, on this narrow ground, wé reverse.

II
Respondents’ action here is indistinguishable in its
HF Bar effect from the official actions consistently

-identified as prior restraints in a long line of this Court’s

decisions. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S.
147, 150-151 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S.
313, 322 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. 8. 290, 293-
294 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161-162
(1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938).
In these cases, the plaintiffs asked the courts to provide
relief where public officials had forbidden the plaintiffs
the use of public places to say what they wanted to say.
The restraints took a variety of forms, with officials

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SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 7

exercising control over different kinds of public places
under the authority of particular statutes. All, however,
had this in common: they gave public officials the power
to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression.

Invariably, the Court has felt obliged to condemn sys-
tems in which the exercise of such authority was not
bounded by precise and clear standards. The reasoning
has been, simply, that the danger of censorship and of
abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms
is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over
a forum’s use. Our distaste for censorship—reflecting
the natural distaste of a free people—is deep-written in
our law.

In each of the cited cases the prior restraint was em-
bedded in the licensing system itself, operating without
acceptable standards. In Shuttlesworth the Court held
unconstitutional a Birmingham ordinance which con-
ferred upon the City Commission virtually absolute
power to prohibit any “parade,” “procession,” or “demon-
stration” on streets or public ways. It ruled that “a law
subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to
the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective,
and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is
unconstitutional.” 394 U.S., at 150-151. In Hague v.
CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939), a Jersey City ordinance that
forbade public assembly in the streets or parks without
a permit from the local Director of Safety, who was
empowered to refuse the permit upon his opinion that he
would thereby prevent “riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage,” was held void on its face. Jd., at 516.

In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), a
unanimous Court held invalid an act which proscribed
the solicitation of money or any valuable thing for “any
alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause” unless
that cause was approved by the secretary of the public

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8 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

welfare council The elements of the prior restraint were
clearly set forth:

“It will be noted, however, that the Act requires
an applicaiion to the secretary of the public welfare
council of :he State; that he is empowered to deter-
mine whetier the cause is a religious one, and that
the issue o/ a certificate depends upon his affirmative
action. If he finds that the cause is not that of
religion, to solicit for it becomes a crime. He is not
to issue a certificate as a matter of course. His
decision to issue or refuse it involves appraisal of
facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation
of an opinon.” IJd., at 305.

The elements of prior restraint identified in Cantwell
and other cases were clearly present in’ the system by
which the Chaitanooga Board regulated the use of its
theaters. One seeking to use a theater was required to
apply to the Boird. The Board was empowered to deter-
mine whether the applicant should be granted permis-
sion—in effect, a license or permit—on the basis of its
review of the content of the proposed production. Ap-
proval of the spplication depended upon the Board’s
affirmative actin. Approval was not a matter of rou-
tine; instead, i: involved the “appraisal of facts, the
exercise of judgnent, and the formation of an opinion”’
by the Board.’

7 With respect t petitioner’s musical, respondents’ determina-
tion was that the jroduction would not be “in the best interest of
the community.” Chat determination may have been guided by
other criteria: (1) tieir own requirement, in the words of respondent
Conrad, that a prduction be “clean and healthful and culturally
uplifting,” App. 25; or (2) the provisions of the statutes and ordi-
nances prohibiting public nudity and obscenity. Whether or not
their exercise of discetion was sufficiently controlled by law, Shuttles-
worth v. Birminghan, supra, there can be no doubt that approval
of an application rquired some judgment as to the content and
quality of the prodution.

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 9

The Board’s .judgment effectively kept the musical
off stage. Respondents did not permit the show to go
on and rely on law enforcement authorities to prosecute
for anything illegal that occurred. Rather, they denied
the application in anticipation that the production would
violate the law. See New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U. S. 713, 735-738 (1971) (Wuire, J.,
concurring).

Respondents’ action was no less a prior restraint be-
cause the public facilities under their control happened
to be municipal theaters. The Memorial Auditorium
and the Tivoli were public forums designed for and dedi-
cated to expressive activities. There was no question as
to the usefulness of either facility for petitioner’s produc-
tion. There was no contention by the Board that these
facilities could not accommodate a production of this
size. None of the circumstances qualifying as an estab-
lished exception to the doctrine of prior restraint was
present. Petitioner was not seeking to use a facility
primarily serving a competing use. See, e. g., Cameron
v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (1968); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U. S. 39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131
(1966). Nor was rejection of the application based on
any regulation of time, place, or manner related to the
nature of the facility or applieations from other users. See
Coz v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Poulos
v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408 (1953). No rights
of individuals in surrounding areas were violated by noise
or any other aspect of the production. See Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). There was no captive
audience. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U. S. 298, 304, 306-308 (1974) ; Public Utilities Comm’n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-468 (1952) (Dove.as, J.,
dissenting).

Whether petitioner might have used some other, pri-
vately owned, theater in the city for the production is

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10 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

of no consequence. There is reason to doubt on this
record whether any other facility would have served as
well as these, since none apparently had the seating
capacity, accoustical features, stage equipment and elec-
trical service that the show required. Even if a pri-
vately owned forum had been available, that fact alone
would not justify an otherwise impermissible prior
restraint. “[OJne is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”
Schneider v. State, supra, 308 U.S., at 163.

Thus, it does not matter for purposes of this case that
the Board’s decision might not have had the effect of
total suppression of the musical in the community.
‘Denying use of the municipal facility under the circum-
stances present here constituted the prior restraint.®

8 Also important, though unessential to our conclusion, are the
classificatory aspects of the Board’s decision. A licensing system
need not effect total suppression in order to create a prior restraint.
In Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U. §. 676, 688 (1968), it was
observed that the evils attendant on prior restraint “are not rendered
less objectionable because the regulation of expression is one of classi-
fication rather than direct suppression.” In that case, the Court
held that a prior restraint was created by a system whereby an
administrative board in Texas classified films as “suitable for young
persons” or “not suitable for young persons.” The “not suitable”
films were not suppressed, but exhibitors were required to have
special licenses and advertise their classification in order to show
them. Similarly, in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. &. 58
(1963), the Court held that a ‘system of “informal censorship”
working by exhortation and advice sufficiently inhibited expression
to constitute a prior restraint and warrant injunctive relief. There,
the Court held unconstitutional a system in which a commission was
charged with reviewing material “manifestly tending to the cor-
ruption of the youth”; it did not have direct regulatory or sup-
pressing functions, but operated by persuasion and intimidation,
and these informal methods were found effective.

In the present case, the Board classified the musical as unfit for
showing in municipal facilities. It did not make a point of pub-

ORL AOE PURE WUT i SE ICANN AT Nite OT Bi IME

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 11

That restraint was final. It was no mere temporary
bar while necessary judicial proceedings were under way.’

Only if we were to conclude that live drama was unpro-
tected by the First Amendment—or subject to a totally
different standard than that applied to other forms of
expression—could we possibly find no prior restraint here.
Each medium of expression, of course, must be assessed
for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it,
for each may present its own problems. Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503 (1952); see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969). By its
nature, theater usually is the acting out—or singing out—
of the written word, and frequently mixes speech with
live action or conduct. But that is no reason to hold
theater subject to a drastically different standard. For,
as was said in Burstyn, supra, at 503, when the Court
was faced with the question of what First Amendment
standard applies to films,

“the basic principles of freedom of speech and the
press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not
vary. Those principles, as they have frequently
been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of

licizing its finding that “Hair” was not in the “best interest” of the
public, but the classification stood as a warning to all concerned,
private theater owners and general public alike. There is little in
the record to indicate the extent to which the Board’s action may
have affected petitioner’s ability to obtain a theater and attract an
audience. The Board’s classification, whatever the magnitude of its
effect, was not unlike that in /nterstate Circuit and Bantam Books.

® This case is clearly distinguishable from Heller v. New York, 413
U. S. 483 (1973). There, state authorities seized a copy of a film,
temporarily, in order to preserve it as evidence. /d., at 490. The
Court held that there was not “any form of ‘final restraint,’ in the
sense of being enjoined from exhibition or threatened with destruc-
tion.” Jbid. Here, the Board did not merely detain temporarily a
copy of the script or libretto for the musical. Respondents reached
a final decision to bar performance. -

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12 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

expression the rule. There is no justification in this
case for making an exception to that rule.”

III

Labelling respondents’ action a prior restraint does not
end the inquiry. Prior restraints are not unconstitu-
tional per se. Bantam Books, Inc. vy. Sullivan, supra, 372
U.S., at 70 n. 10. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
716 (1931); Times Film Corp. vy. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43
(1961). We have rejected the contention that the First
Amendment’s protection “includes complete and absolute
freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of
motion picture .. . even if this film contains the basest
type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful

‘overthrow of orderly government... .” Id., at 46-47,

Any system of prior restraint, however, “comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra,
372 U.S., at 70; New York Times Co. v. United States,
supra, 403 U.S., at 714; Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971): Carroll v. Princess
Anne, 393 U. 8. 175, 181 (1968); Near y. Minnesota,
supra, 283 U.S., at 716. The presumption against prior
restraints is heavier—and the degree of protection
broader—than that against limits on expression imposed
by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory
deeply etched in our law: a free socicty prefers to punish —
the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It

is always difficult to know in advance what an individual
will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitu:iate
speech is often « finely drawn that the risks of freewheel-
ing censorship are formidable. See Sneiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958),

In order to be held lawful. respondents’ action, first,
must fit within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 13

the prohibition against prior restraints, and, second, it
must have been accomplished with procedural safeguards
that reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally
protected speech. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra,
372 U. S., at 71. We do not decide whether the per-
formance of “Hair” fits within such an exception or
whether, as a substantive matter, the Board’s standard
for resolving that question was correct, for we conclude
that the standard, whatever it may have been, was not
implemented by the Board under a system with appro-
priate and necessary procedural safeguards,

The settled rule is that a system of prior restraint
“avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place
under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the
dangers of a censorship system.” Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U. S. 51, 58 (1965). See United States v. Thirty-
seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 367 (1971); Blount v.
Rizzi, 40@U. S. 410, 419-421 (1971) ; Teitel Film Corp. v.
Cusack, 390 U. S. 139, 141-142 (1968). See also Heller
v. New York, supra, 413 U.S., at 489-490 ; Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, 372 U. S., at 70-71; Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436 (1957). In Freed-
man the Court struck down a state scheme for the li-
censing of motion pictures, holding “that, because only a
judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures
the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to
impose a valid final restraint.” 380 U. S., at 58. We
he!d in Freedman, and we reaffirm here, that a system of
prior restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it
lacks certain safeguards: First, the burden of instituting
judicial proceedings, and of proving that the material is
unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any re-
straint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a °
specified brief period and only for the purpose of presery-

POA OMIA SO OOH Hsu 4 WP ath Siren

14 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD
i.

ing the status quo. T'hird, a prompt final judicial deter-
mination must be assured,

Although most of our cases have pertained to motion
picture licensing or censorship, this Court. has applied
Freedman to the system by which federal customs agents
seize imported materials, United States -v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, supra, and to that by which postal officials
restrict use of the mails, Blount vy. Rizzi, supra. In
Blount we held unconstitutional provisions of the postal
laws designed to control use of the mails for commerce in
obscene materials. The provisions enabled the Post-
master General to halt delivery of mail to an individual
and prevent payment of money orders to him. The ad-

ministrative order became effective without judicial ap-

proval, and the burden of obtaining judicial review was
placed upon the user.

If a scheme that restricts access to the mails must fur-
nish the procedural safeguards set forth in Freedman, no
less must be expected of a system that regulates use of a
public forum. Respondents here had the same powers
of licensing and censorship exercised by postal officials in
Blount, and by boards and officials in other cases.

The theory underlying the requirement of safeguards
is applicable here with equal if not greater force. An
administrative board assigned to screening stage produc-
tions—and keeping off stage anything not deemed cul-
turally uplifting or health ful—may well be less responsive
than a court, an independent branch of government, to
constitutionally protected interests in free expression.’
And if judicial review is made unduly onerous, by reason
of delay or otherwise, the board’s determination in prac-
tice may be final. ; f
————_ : 2 \

*°See Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 Harv._L.
Rev. 518, 522-524 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Re-
straint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 648, 656-659 (1955).

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 15

Insistence on rigorous procedural safeguards under
these circumstances is “but a special instance of the
larger principle that freedoms of expressions must be
ringed about with adequate bulwarks.” Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, 372 U. S.. at 66. Because the
line between unconditionally guaranteed speech and
speech that may be legitimately regulated is a close one,
the “separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech
calls for . . . sensitive tools.” Speiser v. Randall, supra,
357 U.S., at 525. The perils of prior restraint sre well
illustrated by this case, where neither the Board nor the
lower courts could have known precisely the extent of

nudity or simuleted sex in the musical, or even that either

would appear, before the play was actually performed,”

Procedural safeguards were lacking here in several
respects. The Board’s system did not provide a proce-
dure for prompt judicial review. Although the District
Court commendably held a hearing on petitioner’s motion
for a preliminary injunction within a few days of the
Board’s decision, it did not review the merits of the
decision at that time. The question at the hearing was
whether petitioner should receive preliminary relief, i. e.,
whether there was likelihood of success on the merits and
whether petitioner would suffer irreperable injury pend-
ing full review. Effective review on the merits was not
obtained until more than five months later. . Through-
out, it wes petitioner, not the Board, that bore the burden
of obtaining judicial review. It was petitioner that had

"There was testimony that the musitak as performed differed
“substantially” from the seript, App. 79-80, and that the show was
varied to fit the anticipated tastes of difierent audiences in different
parts of the country. J/d., at 93. The musical’s nude scene, appar-
ently the most controversial portion, was played under varying
conditions. No actor was under contractual obligation to perform it,
and the number doing so changed from one performance to another,
as did the lighting, and the duration of the scene. Jd., at 97-98, 23.

%

‘

.
16 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

the burden of persuasion at the preliminary hearing if
not at the later stages of: the litigation. Respondents
did not file a formal answer to the complaint for five
months after petitioner sought review. During the time
prior to judicial detertiination, the restraint altered the
status quo. Petitioner was forced to forego the initial
dates planned for the engagement and to seek to schedule
the performance at a later date. The delay and uncer-
tainty inevitably discouraged use of the forum.

The procedural shortcomings that form the basis for
our decision are unrelated to the standard that the Board
applied. Whatever the reasons may have been for the
Board’s exclusion of the musical, it could not escape the
obligation to afford appropriate procedural safeguards.
We need not decide whether the standard of obscenity
applied by respondents or the courts below was suffi-
‘ciently precise or substantively correct, or whether the
production is in fact obscene. See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974) ; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S.
153 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130
(1974); Miller v. California, supra; Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U? S. 518 (1972). The standard, whatever it may _
be, must be implemented under a system that assures
prompt judicial: review with a minimal restriction of First
Amendment rights necessary under the circumstances.

Reversed.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 73-1004

Southeastern Promotions, On Wee of Caton :
Ltd., Petitioner, n Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Ap-

v peals for the Sixth. Circuit.

Steve Conrad et al.
|Mareh 18, 1975]

Mr. Justice DovuG.as, dissenting.

While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the ac-
tions of the respondents constituted an impermissible
prior restraint upon the performance of petitioner’s rock
musical, I am compelled to write separately in. order to
emphasize my view that the injuries inflicted upen peti-
tioner’s First Amendment rights cannot be treated ade-
quately or averted in the future by the simple application
of a few procedural band-aids. The critical flaw in this
case lies not in the absence of procedural safeguards, but
rather in the very nature of the content screening in
which respondents have engaged.

The Court today treads much the same path which it
walked in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965),
and the sentiment which I expressed on that occasion
remains equally relevant: “I do not believe any form of
censorship—no matter how speedy or prolonged it may
be—is permissible.” /d., at 61-62 (concurring opinion).
See also Star v. Preller, —— U. S. —— (1974) (dissenting
opinion); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78
(1961) (dissenting opinion).

A municipal theatre is no less a forum for the expres-
sion of ideas than is a public park, or a sidewalk; the
forms of expression adopted in such a forum may be more
expensive and more.structured than those typically seen

2 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

in our parks and streets, but they are surely no less en-
titled to the shelter of-the First Amendment. As soon as
municipal officials aré’ permitted to pick and choose, as
they are in all existing socialist regimes, between those
productions which are “clean and healthful and cultur-
ally uplifting” in content and those which are not, the
path is cleared for a regime of censorship under which full
voice can be given only to those views which meet with
the approval of the powers that be.

There was much testimony in the District Court con-
cerning the pungent social and political commentary
which the musical “Hair” levels against various sacred
cows of our society: the Vietnam War, the draft, and the -
puritanical conventions of the Establishment. This com-
mentary is undoubtedly offensive to some, but its contri-
bution to social ccnsciousness and intellectual ferment is
a positive one. '» this respect, the musical’s often ribalu
humor and trenchant social satire may someday merit
_ comparison to the most highly regarded works of Aristo-
phanes, a fellow debunker of established tastes and re-
ceived wisdom, yet one whose offerings would doubtless
meet with a similarly cold reception at the hands of Estab-
lishment censors. No matter how many procedural safe-
guards may be imposed. any system which permits
governmental officials to inhibit or control the flow cf
disturbing and unwelcome ideas to the public threatens
serious diminution of the breadth and richness of our
cultural offerings.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-1004

Southeastern Promotions, - . .
Lid., Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Ap-

= peals for the Sixth Circuit.

Steve ‘Conrad et al.
[March 18, 1975]

Mr. Justice WuHiITe, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE
joins, dissenting.

Although in Part II of its opinion the Court lectures on
the evils of standardless licensing systems, understand-
ably this is not the ultirmate basis for decision. However
broad discretion the Chattanooga authorities may other-
wise have, plainly they are subject to the laws against
obscenity and public nudity, and the standard lease re-
quires that productions such as “Hair” not violate the
law. In this respect, the licensing system is not: without
standards. As might be expected, therefore, the issue
in the case, as defined by the District Court and the
Court of Appeals, was not whether local authorities had
undue discretion but whether they correctly refused to
license “Hair” on the ground that the ‘production would
fail to satisfy “Par. 1 of the standard lease form requiring
the licensee to comply with all state and local laws in its
use of the leased premises,” these laws being the laws
against obscenity, public nudity and display of sexually
oriented materials to minors. In so framing the question,
the courts below reflected the prayer of the complaint,
App. 13-14, which sought a declaration that the musical
was protected expression under the First Amendment,
did not, violate any city ordinance and was not obscene.
An injunction requiring local authorities to make the
municipal facilities available for the production of “Hair”’
was also sought.

2 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

The District Court and the Court of Appeals consid-
ered the issue tendered and held that the contemplated
production of “Hair” did not qualify for a lease under
the relevant state and local laws. Here, the majority
does not address this question, but nevertheless reverses
on the ground that the Chattanooga permit system is
“lacking in constitutionally required minimum proce-
dural safeguard.” Ante, p. ——. The Court’s under-
standing of our prior cases is unexceptionable, but reach-
ing decision on this-ground is inappropriate. In the first
place, no such issue appears to have been tendered to the
District Court or to have been decided by either the Dis-
trict Court or the Court of Appeals. As already indi-
cated, the complaint sought a declaration that “Hair”
did not violate the relevant ordinances and statutes as
well as an injunction permitting the use of municipal
facilities for the showing of the musical. Secondly, how-
ever inadequate the Chattanooga system might be under
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), the parties
have now been to court; and, after trial, “Hair” has been
held violative of Tennessee statutes by both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals. This Court does not
now reverse or disapprove these decisions in this respect;
and assuming their correctness, as is therefore appropri-
ate, is it the Court’s intention in reversing the judgment
of the Court of Appeals to order that “Hair,” which has
been held obscene after trial, must be issued a license for
showing in the municipal facilities of Chattanooga? If
this is the case, it is a very odd disposition, one which I
cannot join. On the record before us, it would be error —
to enter any judgment the effect of which is to require
the Chattanooga authorities to permit the showing of
“Hair” in the municipal auditorium.

_ The Court asserts that “Hair” contains a nude scene
and that this is “the most controversial portion of the
musical.’ This almost completely ignores the District

ee A A a A chk RS

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 2

Court's description of the play as involving not only
nudity but repeated “simulated acts of anal intercourse,
frontal intercourse, heterosexual intercourse, homosexual
intercourse and group intercourse ....” *

1 Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465, 472-

474 (ED Tenn. 1972):
“Findings of Fact

“Turning first to the issue\of obscenity, the script, libretto, stage
instructions, musical renditiohs, and the testimony of the witnesses
reflect the following relevant matters (It should be noted that the
script, libretto, and stage instructions do not include but a small
portion of the conduct hereinafter described as occurring in the play):

“The souvenir program as formerly distributed in the lobby (Ex-
hibit No. 1) identified the performers by picture and biographical
information, one female performer identifying herself as follows:

“ ‘Hobbies are picking my nose, fucking, smoking dope, astro projec-
tion. All that I am or ever hope to be, I owe to my mother.’
“It was testified that distribution of this program had now been dis-
continued. Prior to the opening of the play, and to the accompani-
ment of music appropriate to the occasion, a ‘tribe’ of New York
‘street people’ start gathering for the commencement of the per-
formance. In view of the audience the performers station themselves
in various places, some mingling with the audience, with a female
performer taking a seated position on center stage with her legs
spread wide to expose to the audience her genita] area, which is
covered with the design of a cherry. Thus the stage is set for all.
‘that follows. The performance then begins to the words and music
of the song ‘Aquarius,’ the melody of which, if not the words, have
become nationally, if not internationally, popular, according to the
evidence. The theme of the song is the coming of a new age, the
age of love, the age of ‘Aquarius.’ Following this one of the street
people, Burger, introduces himself by various prefixes to his name,
including ‘Up Your Burger,’ accompanied by an anal finger gesture
and ‘Pittsburger,’ accompanied by an underarm gesture. He then
removes his pants and dressed only in jockey shorts identifies his
genitals by the line, ‘What is this God-damned thing? 3,000 pounds
of Navajo jewelry? Ha! Ha! Ha!’ Throwing his pants into the
audience he then proceeds to mingle with the audience and, selecting
a female viewer, exclaims, ‘I’ll bet you’re scared shitless.’

“Burger then sings a song, ‘Looking For My Donna,’ and the
tribe chants a list of drags beginning with ‘hashish’ and ending with

4 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

Given this description of “Hair,” the First Amendment
in my view does not compel municipal authorities to
permit production of the play in municipal facilities.

‘Methadrine, Sex, You, WOW!’ (Exhibit No. 4, p. 1-5) | Another
male character then sings the lyric:
“SODOMY, FELLATIO, CUNNILINGUS, PEDERASTY—FA-

THER, WHY DO THESE WORDS SOUND SO NASTY”
. MASTURBATION CAN BE FUN. JOIN THE HOLY ORGY,

KAMA SUTRA, EVERYONE.’ (Exhibit No. 4, p. 1-5)

“The play then continues with action, songs, chants, and dialogue
making reference by isolated words, broken sentences, rhyme, and
rapid changes to such diverse subjects as love, peace, freedom, war,
racism, air pollution, parents, the drafi, hair, the flag, drugs, and
sex. The story line gradually centers upon the character Claude
and his response and the response of the tribe to his having received
a draft notice. When others suggest he burn his draft card, he can
only bring himself to urinate upon it. The first act ends when all
performers, male and female, appear nude upon the stage, the nude
scene being had without dialogue and without reference to dialogue.
It is also. without mention in the script. Actors simulating police
then appear in the audience and announce that they are under arrest
for watching this ‘lewd, obscene show.’

“The second act continues with song and dialogue to develop the
story of Claude’s draft status, with reference interspersed to such
diverse topics as interracial love, a drug ‘trip,’ impersonation of
various figures: from American history,’ religion, war, and sex. The
play ends with Claude’s death as a result of the draft and the street
people singing the song, ‘Let the Sunshine In,’ a song the testimony
reflects has likewise become popular over the Nation.

“Interspersed throughout the play, as reflected in the script, is
such ‘street language’ as ‘ass’ (Exhibit No. 4, pp. 1-20, 21 and 2-16),
‘fart’ (Exhibit No. 4, p. 1-26),-and repeated use of the words ‘fuck’ *

“2 Lincoln is regaled with the following lyrics: ‘I’s free now
thanks to you, Massa Lincoln, emancipator of the slave, yeah,
-yeah, yeah! Emanci—mother fucking—pater of the slave, yeah,
yeah, yeah! Emanci—mother fucking—pater of the slave, yeah,
yeah, yeah!’ With Lincoln responding, ‘Bang my ass . . . I ain’t
dying for no white man!’”_~ "6

“3 A woman taking her departure says to the tribe, ‘Fuck off,
kids.’ (Exhibit No. 4, p. 1-35). The following dialogue occurs
as Claude nears his death scene:

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS. LTD. v. CONRAD 5

Whether or not a production as described by the District
Court is obscene and may be forbidden to adult audiences.
it is apparent to me that the State of Tennessee could
constitutionally forbid exhibition of the musical to chil-

and the four letter word for excretion (Exhibit No. 4, pp. 1-7, 9 and
41). In addition, similar Ianguage and posters containing such lan-
guage were used on stage but not reflected in the script.

~ “Also, throughout the play, and not reflected in the seript, are
repeated acts of simulated sexual intercourse. These were testified
to by every witness who had seen the play. Thev are often unre-
lated to any dialogue and accordingly could not be placed with
accuracy in the script. The overwhelming evidence reflects that
simulated acts of anal intercourse, frontal intercourse, heterosexual
intercourse, homosexual intercourse, and group intercourse are com-
mitted throughout the play. often without reference to any dialogue.
song, or story line in the play. Such acts are committed both stand-
ing up and lying down, accompanied by all the bodily movements
included in such acts, all the while the actors and actresses are in
close bodily contact. At one yioint the character Burger performs
a full and complete simulation of masturbation while using a red
microphone placed in his crotch to simulate his genitals. The evi-
dence again refleecs that this is unrelated to anv dialogue then
occurring in the play. The evidence further reflects that repeated
acts of taking hold of other actors’ genitals occur, again without
reference to the dialogue. While three female actresses sing a song
regarding interracial love, three male actors lie on the floor immedi-
ately below them repeatedly thrusting their anaes at the singers.
At another point in the seript (Exhibit No. 4, p. 2-22) the actor
Claude pretends to have lost his penis. The Belen accompanying
this line is to search for it in the mouths of other actors and
actresses.”

““Burger: I hate the fucking world. don’t vou?

“Claude: I hate the fucking world, I hate the fucking winter,
hate these fucking streets.

““Burger: I wish the fuck it would snow at least.

“*Claude: Yeah, I wish the fuck it would snow at least.
““Burger: Yeah. I wish the fuck it would.

““Ciaude: Oh, fuck!

“Burger: Oh, fucky, fuck, fuck!’ (Exhibit No. 4. p. 2-22)”

—

6 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. ». CONRAD

dren,? Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), and
that Chattanooga may reserve its auditorium for produc-
tions suitable for exhibition to all the citizens of the city,
adults and children alike. ‘Hair’ does not qualify in this
respect, and without holding otherwise, it is improvident
for the Court to mandate the showing of “Hair” in the
Chattanooga auditorium.*

2 The producer, director, and president of petitioner, Southeastern
Promotions. Ltd., did not insist in the District Court that petitioner
was entitled to exhibit the play to minors contrary to local law.
His testimony, Tr. 7-8, was that if there was “a standing ordinance
related to the exclusion of minors, we would certainly abide by
es

3 As appears from pp. 16-17 of the transcript of oral argument,
petitioner’s counsel was of the view that the issue of obscenity must
be reached:

“So it would appear that the question of obscenity is not avoided
even if the Court agrees with petitioner that the standards used were
ultimately bad. Since on remand the respondents are going to press
obscenity as the basis for denying access to HAIR and to the lower
courts are going to sustain that position, we therefore urge this
Court to address itself to the question of the appropriate standards,
not only to prevent a waste of resources and judicial economy, but
because of widespread public interest in resolving this issue. There
‘are few plays that can afford the expense of litigation all the way
to this Court.”

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-1004

Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd., Petitioner,
v.
Steve Conrad et ai.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Ap-
_ peals for the Sixth Circuit.

[March 18, 1975]

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting.

The Court treats this case as if it were on all fours
with Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), which
it is not. Freedman dealt with the efforts of the State
of Maryland to prohibit the petitioner in that case from
showing a film “at his Baltimore theater,” Freedman,
supra, at 52. Petitioner here did not seek to show the
musical production “Hair” at its Chattanvoga theater,
but rather at a Chattanooga theater owned by the city of
Chattanooga.

The Court glosses over this distinction by treating a
community owned theater as if it were the same as a city
park or city street, which it is not. The Court’s decisions
have recognized that city streets and parks are tradition-
ally open to the public, and that permits or licenses to
use them are not ordinarily required. “. .. [O]1ie who
is rightfully on a street which the state has left open
to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the
constitutional right to express his views in an orderly
fashion. This right extends to the communication of
ideas by handbill and literature as well as the spoken
_ word.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1942).
The Court has therefore held that where municipal au-
thorities have sought to exact a license or permit for those
who wished to use parks or streets for the purpose of

2 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD

exercising their right of free speech, the standards govern-
ing the licensing authority must be objective, definite,
- and nondiscriminatory. Shuttlesworth v.. Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147 (1969). But until this case the Court has
not equated a public auditorium, which must of neces-
sity schedule performances by a process of inclusion and
exclusion, with public streets and parks.

In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, £68
(1968), the Court recognized that the Government as az
employer was to be viewed differently than the Govern-
ment as a lawmaker for the citizenry in general:

“ . , [I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of.
its employees but differs significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech
of the citizenry in general.”

See, e. g., Communications Association v. Doud, 339
’ U. S. 382, 402-403 (1950); United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U. 8. 75, 95 (1947); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 50-51 (1961). Here we deal with
municipal action by the city of Chattanooga, not j1o-
hibiting or penalizing the expression of views in dramatic
form by citizens at large, but rather managing its munici-
pal auditorium. In Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47
(1966), the Court said:

“The State, no less than a private owner of property,
has power to preserve the property under its con-
trol for the use for .which it is ldwfully dedicated.
For this reason, there. is.no merit to the petitioner’s
argument that they had a Constitutional right to
stay on the property .... /The United States Consti-
tution does not forbid a State-te control the use of its
own property for its own lawful non-discriminatory
purpose.” ~

5

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 3

‘The Court avoids the impact of cases such as Adderley
by insisting that the municipal auditorium and the the-
ater were “public forums designed for and dedicated to
expressive activity,” ante, at 9, and that the rejection of
petitioner’s application was not based on “any regulation
of time, place, or manner related to the nature of the
facility or applications from other users.” Ante, at 9.
But the apparent effect of the Court’s decision is to tell
the managers of municipal auditoriums that they may
_exercise no selective role whatsoever in deciding what
performances may be booked. The auditoriums in ques-
tion here have historically been devoted to “clean, health-
ful entertainment”’’;’ they have accepted only produc-
tions not inappropriate for viewing by children so that
the facilities might serve.as'a place for entertaining thé
whole family. Viewed apart from any cunstitutional lim-
itations, such a policy. would undoubtedly rule out much
worthwhile adult entertainment: But if it is the desire
of the citizens of Chattanooga? who presumably have paid
for and own the facility, that the attractions to be shown
there should not be of the kind which would offend any
substantial yumber of potential theatergoers, I do not
think the poliev can be described as arbitrary or unrea-
sonable.* Whether or not the production of the version
of “Hair” here under consideration is obscene, the find-
ings of fact made by the District Court and affirmed on

'See the Court's opinion. ante. at 3 n. 4

? Limitations on the use’of municipal auditoriums by Government
must be sufficiently reasonable to satisfy the Due Process Clause
and ean not unfairly diseriminate in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. A municipal auditormm which opened itself to Republicans
while closing itself to Democrats would run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is no allegation in the instant case that the
auditormmes accepted equally graphie productions while unfairly dis-
criminating against Hair because of its expressions of political and
social belief.

¥

4 SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD -”

appeal do indicate that it is not entertainment designed
for the whole family.’

_/ If every municipal theater or auditorium which is “de-
signed for and dedicated to expressive activities” becomes
subject to the rule enunciated by the Court in this case,
consequentes unforeseen and perhaps undesired by the
- Court may well ensue. May an opera house limit its
productions to operas, or must it also show rock musicals?
May a municipal theater devote an entire season to
Shakespeare, or is it required to book any potential pro-
ducer on a first come-first-served basis? These questions
are real ones in the light of the Court’s opinicn, which
by its terms seem to give no constitutionally permissible
role in the way of selection to the municipal authorities.

But these substantive aspects of the Court’s opinion
are no more troubling than tne farrago of procedural
requirements with which it has saddled municipal author-
ities. Relving on Freedman, the Court ho’is that those
charged with the management of the auditorium have the
burden of instituting judicial proceedings, that “restraint”
prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a speci-
fied brief period, and that a prompt final judicial deter-
mination must be assured. Ante, at 13-14.

If these standards are applicable only where a lease
for a production is refused on the grounds that the pro-
duction is putatively obscene, the Court has performe4
the rather novel teat of elevating obscene productions to
a preferred position under the First Amendment. If
these procedures must be invoked every time the man-
agement of a municipal theater declines to lease the fa-
cilities, whether or not because of the putative obscenity
of the performance, other questions are raised. What

‘The findings of fact of the District Court, reported, at 341 F.
Supp. 465, 472-474, were repeated by the Court of Appeals, at 486
F. 2d 894, 895-897.

oA

é

=*SSOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD 5

will be the issues to be tried in these proceedings? Is the
Court actually saying that unless the city of Chattanooga
could criminally punish a person for staging a perform-
ance in a theater which he owned, it may not deny a lease
to that same person in order for him to stage that per-
formance in a theater owned by the city?
A municipal theater may not be run by municipal au-
thorities as if it were a private theater, free to judge on
a content basis alone which plays it wished to have per-
formed and which it did not. But, just as surely, that
element of it. which is “theater” ought to be accorded
some constitutional recognition along with that element
of it-which.is “municipal.” I do not believe fidelity to
the First Amendment requires the exaggerated and rigid
procedural safeguards which the Court insists upon in
this case. I think that the findings of the District Court
and the Court of Appeals support the conclusion that
petitioners were denied a lease for constitutionally ade-
quate and nondiscriminatory reasons. I would therefore
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

LOL PLORNLLEE LPG IE ILO MAHER NOE

CON SALAH MANETS

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0387%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.
