# Amicus Curiae Brief — Train v. City of New York

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0368%3A10

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 420 U.S. 35

## Text

9 gS sea AO had

_No. ike 77 and No. 721978

INTHE BED Bae saad
SUPREME COURT OF THE unten STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1973 ys ia

, SS eaEEEIEEEEeEeae

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES oe
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER; _

vs.

‘

THE CITY OF NEW YORK ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND
Ne CUE ine
WITH THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

CITY OF DETROIT, PARTY PLAINTIFF |

ee

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES ,
‘ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION A AGENCY, PETITIONER.

vs. “
CAMPAIGN CLEAN WATER, INC.

Ry aac aed

: AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE STATES OF TEXAS,
WISCONSIN, MISSOURI, ORLABOMS AND KANSAS

JOHN L, HILL xf
Attorney General of Texas

Sl A Rie RAT BM Demy RARER DOTASIA OD IE a Pat Mi WN a

>

See cm wreccied

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CITATIONS
TI. INTRODUCTION ooo occccccccecececetsseseeveseeveveseeveveseee. 2
Il. INTEREST OF AMICI .00...cccccccccccccccsccscevescscevesesveseses 3
III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES..............0.00........ 10
A. Summary of Argument.n....ccccccccccccccccccecceeees . eel 10

B. The only discretion given the Administrator by the

Act in the construction grant funding process is at
the project approval stage, rather than the allotment
stage, and must be exercised in a manner consistent
with the requirements and purposes of the Act....11

. The Administrator's argument that he is authorized

to control the “rate” of spending by controlling 7
timing of allotments is unsupported in the Act and4s
inconsistent with continual funding mechanism of

“reallotment””...........cccccccccsccscescsecesescescsseeseecestecceeeee. 27

, D. Neither the doctrine of sovereign immunity nor that

of political question is applicable to this

CONTLOVENGY «isis. sccccssessssensonsecscorseeveesercevecsdsoseseraneces 28

V. CONCLUSION .........cccccccccsssscsessesesssssreseseeseeeeees...33
pan te

Ne.

oA a Si SV Weinrich a OL

CITATIONS

ee See

CASES: Pages

Baker v. Carr,

B36I U.S. 186 (1962) oo. ceecceeeeeceeeteeeeeeneeeeeenaeeeeenanes 31

weet Le

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
344 U.S. 1 (1952) occccccccccsssccccceseeseeccseeesesesesesssseseneseanens 4

Citizens of Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971) .......ccccccccccccecccecscesccessesesseseescessenes 30

Dugan v. Rank,
372 U.S. 609 (1963) oc. ccccsesesceeeeseeeeeseeneneeeeeeseeenees 29

Estrada v. Ahrens, .
296 F.2d 690 (Sth Cir, 1961) .......... eects 30

First National Bank of Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank .and
Trust Co.,
385 U.S. 252 (1966) oo... cccecccccceeeeeeeeensneseeeeeeeeeeeaeenenes 22

ae i * ma ae ” .
diet astaclptien Stora MARCIE eos taht AG Bi RIA DE Aas OLN

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp.,

337 U.S. 6B2 (1949) .ccrcccccccccsccccessssssseeesereeeeeeeeeseeenes ".29
Marbury v. Madison,

5 USS. (Cranch) 137 (1803) ........cccccceseeeeeeeeeeegeeeeees 32,33
National Labor Relations Bd. v. Fruit & Veg. Pack. &

Whse., Loc. 760, 2

377 U.S. 5B (1964) .....ccccescsscessssssssssssscsssssressenenecesessnens 23

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
380 F.2d-770 (2nd Cir. 1967); aff'd. per curiam sub.
nom.. World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American Airways,

Inc.,
391 U.S. 461 (19GB) coccecccecccecceceeeceeeeeeeees asneenesaeeeh 22,23

oe a ~m

CASES: Pages

Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,

424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) oo... cecccecesseeeeeeeees 30
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,

OEE 8. SOE TAGGLY irtiaesersets wise antisists 22
Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States,

B16 U.S. 317 (1942) a. secesecsssssessesessetensneesssertnnesseees 21
State Hwy. Comm'n of Missouri v. Volpe,

347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972) oo... cececeeeeeees 25
State Hwy. Comm’h of Missouri v. Volpe,

479 F.2d 1099 (8thiCir. 1973)... cece 24,25
Taylor v. McElroy, %

360 U.S. 709 (1959) oo... cccccccessssscceceseeessesseeees 4
Texas v. Fri, A-73-CA-38

(W.D. Tex., decided Oct. 2, 1973) ........cccccccecceeeeteeeees 7
Texas v. Train, 73-1895

(Sup. Ct., filed June 19, 1972) ooo... cccceeeceecceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 3
Texas v. Train, 73-3965 & 73-4026

(5th Cir., filed Jan. 14, 1974) oo eeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeees 3
Texas v. Train, A-74-CA-004

(W.D. Tex., filed Jan. 14, 1974) oo... cccceeeees 7
Turner v. City of Memphis,

369 U.S. 350 (1962) oo. cccccccccccecceseseeceesessenees 4
United States v. Richard M. Nixon,

42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (July 24, 1974) ooo. 33,33
United States v. United Mine Workers of America,

330 U.S. 258 (1947) occ ccccssssceseeceessesssnssssceeceeesens 21

( —lll—

pe ee ee ee ee Ee

ee ee

STATUTES

5 U.S.C. § 701. et seg. (1964) (Administrative procena ee
29,3

§ 702 (Section 10) (L964) coc cec ec cee ee eee ees 29

23 U.S.C. § 101, et seg. (1964) (Federal-Aid Highway a

$ 1LO4(0b) (1964) cooccccccccccccccccccccccecccuecuceuceesceeeeeeens 24

33 U.S.C. § 1158 (1970) (Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1956 las amended]) .........c...cccccececeeeeee neste neces 12

33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. (Supp. 1974) (Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972) ............ 2

B 1261la) (1974 SUBD.) sevescccccsiccsccsvsassnsoeseseceses 14

® 1284 (1974 SOs): sseccccssiesisinscremctcccrsiennnes 17,26

§ 1285 (1974 Supp.)\Sec. 205 of the Act) 16,20,22,

23,26

§$ 1285(a) (1974 Supp.) (Sec. 205(a) of the Age i
§ 1285(b\1) (1974 Supp.) ....... asaaneaavntpbenenbegiionns 28
$ 1287 (1974 Supp.) (Sec. 207 of the Act) .. 16,19,

20,21,22,23,24,26
§ 1311(b) 1B) (1974 Supp.) ..........cccssseserrees 14
§ 1311(b) 2) B) (1974 Supp.) ...... eer 14
© 1319 (1914 SUDO) ciicsceisvesessissncscrnacesacevcsansenves 15
§ 1965 (1978 SUGD.) siiceicccicrasoajsncmmniencanm 15

—jiv—

nS

t4

cuctbeonen Ponts a ee

sts SE

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

118 Cong. Rec.:

S 16871 (Daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) 00.000. 3,19
S 16872 (Daily ed. Oct. 4.1972) coco. 24
S 18534 (Daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972) coco. 20
S 18546 (Daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972) coccccecceecceee. 21
S 18547 (Daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972) ........ areeoeris 22
S 18549 (Daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972) 0... 21
H 2506 (Daily ed. March 27, 1972) occ. 24
H 9119 (Daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) coco. 26
H 9122 (Daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) cooccccccccccccececeee. 17
H 10268 (Daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) ooo. 21
—_y—

BOOKS Pages

C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 106, pp. 477-78 (1970) ...4

TEXAS POLLUTION REPORTS, July 2, 1974 at p. 2 .......0+ 8

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MATERIALS.

Environmental Protection Agency, Report to the Congress:
Costs of Construction of Publicly-Owned Waste Water
Treatment Works: 1973 “Needs” Survey (revised Nov.
LOTS tcecetcamrees giecanassvishseaxesnseneaed vacbesenesesn es eiinneeeei ate 8

Joint Hearings on Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by
the President Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)... 21,23

Hearings Before the Committee on Public Works, House of
Representatives, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., on H.R. 11896,
FBR DIBGS... ccccnsesesavecvansscinverssavcarnsecsssestasexteverstanansaunnne 13

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess., on the Environmental Protection
Agency's 1973 Needs Survey at pp. 27, 5 aS 9,16

S. Rept. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong. Ist Sess. 5 (1971); 2 US.
Code Cong. Admin. News. at 3672 (1972) «0.0... 13

1. The Act, its background and purposes.

Trying to avoid the inescapable conclusion that he
has blatantly ignored the will of Congress by the action
complained of here, the Administrator has omitted
from his brief any discussion of the overall Act as it
interrelates with the grant program, and has likewise
failed to mention the background against which the Act
was passed. No doubt the City of New York and
Campaign Clean Water will detail these matters for the
Court. Amici would simply note two salient points.

First, until the passage of the Act in 1972 the federal
program of waste treatment grants had been an
abysmal failure. One of the principal reasons was the
method of funding the program — the traditional
authorization/appropriation process. Under the old
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, only
those sums actually appropriated by Congress
pursuant to the authorization contained in the Act
could be allotted to the States and “[nJeither a finding
by the Secretary that a project meets the requirements
of this subsection, nor any other provision of this
subsection shall be construed to constitute a
commitment of the United States to provide funds or
pay any grant for such project.” 33 U.S.C. § 1158 (1970).
As happens so often, Congress never appropriated as
much as it had authorized. As an inevitable result,
construction of treatment works proceeded at an
agonizingly slow pace. In 1971 the Senate Committee

wont SSCS GEE SIEBER BAER IOS LAGE HE LEG EERIE APE SE

thie DR ec tiied eS! hs

or Pubtic Works, in a report to the full Senate on its
version of the new Act (S. 2770), observed that:

eet Ps

© CANE

[t]he lack of adequate funding of grants to assist
States and localities in oe sewage
treatment plants is causing critical problems.

Of the $3.4 billion authorized for this eee by

the 1966 legislation, only $2.2 billion was

appropriated. The backlog of projects eligible for

ade payments has reached a total of nearly $2
illion.'*

The Administration's proposal for federal assistance for
waste treatment construction, embodied in S. 1013
submitted by Senator John Sherman Cooper in 1971,
would have perpetuated the traditional funding process
with an authorization to appropriate $6 billion over a
three year period. Both the Senate (in S. 2770) and the
House (in H.R. 11896) rejected this approach in favor of
contract authority. Congress stood firm in its choice of
this funding mechanism, despite the opposition of then
Administrator Ruckelshaus that the contract authority
approach “sidesteps all the safeguards provided by the
budgetary-appropriations process.”"*

It is at best illogical, and at worst absurd, to suggest
that Congress chose allotment and contract authority

"S. Rept. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong.. Ist Sess.
Cong. Admin. News at 3672 (1972): Li rary of Congress, A
Legislative History of the Federal Watef Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 at 1415, 1423 [hfreinafter referred to as
Legislative History).

"Hearings Before the Committee—on—Pubtic Works, House of

Representatives, 92d Cong., 1st Sess..on H.R. 11896,H.R. 11895 at
297; Legislative History at 1195. (Ruckelshaus letter of December
13, 1971, to Rep. John A. Blatnik, Chairman, Committee on Public
Works).

ee, | ee

M1); 2 U.S. Code

Biscx RAT site NE om

over the Administration’s objections to remove the
uncertainty from the construction grant program, and
then simultaneously reinjected the same uncertainty
back into the system by giving the Administrator the
discretion to choose the amount to be made available by
allotment.

Second, the 1972 Act made the grant program an
integral part in achieving the Act’s overall purpose —
“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(1974 Supp.). Of the $24.6 billion authorized to
implement the Act, $20.75 billion ($18 billion for fiscal
years 1973-1975, and $2.75 billion for reimbursement
of projects already underway in 1972 with State funds)
was designated for the grant program.

Congress concluded that these substantial sums for
waste treatment plant construction were needed to
assist States and local governments in achieving two
specific requirements of the bill. First, the Act requires
generally that “secondary” or “more stringent” sewage
treatment be achieved in all publicly owned treatment
works existing on July 1, 1977. 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(1)(B)(1974 Supp.). Secondly, the Act requires
that by July 1, 1983, all publicly owned treatment
works provide for the application of the “best
practicable” waste treatment technology over the life of

the plant. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(B)(1974 Supp.).

a ae

Having set the deadlines and goals and provided the
financial assistance to meet them, Congress created a
rigorous mechanism of enforcement. Violation of the
Act renders a municipality liable for civil penalties up
to $10,000 a day. Willful or negligent vioiations are
punishable by criminal fines from $2,500 to $25,000 per
day, by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both.'’ 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1974 Supp.). The Act may also
be enforced by private citizens. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1974
Supp.). Successful ‘private litigants may obtain, in
addition to injunctive relief, their costs of litigation,

including attorney and expert witness fees. Id. ~

By enactment of this interrelated statutory scheme of
deadlines, assistance, and enforcement, Congress
sought to require the Administrator to conduct a waste
treatment plant construction grant program to ensure
generally the restoration of the nation’s navigable
waters to their natural state, the attainment of
secondary or more stringent treatment by mid-1977,
and the employment of “best practicable” treatment
technology by mid-1983. ‘ |

The Administrator's impoundment of funds has made
attainment of these goals impossible, and has left the

States and cities vulnerable_to civil_and criminal _

‘Ifa municipality is a party to a civil action under the Act, the
State in which the municipality is located must be joined as a party
and, to the extent that State law prevents the municipality from
raising funds to pay a civil penalty, the State shall be liable for the
payment.of any judgment.

etna

7
EERE LON PEE GY LI IEE OLED LPL RY

Betinax

liability. This cannot have been the intent of
Congress.*”

2. The Meaning of the “Harsha Amendments”.

Ignoring the rest of the Act and its legislative history,
the Administrator cites two small alterations made in
S. 2770 by the Conference Committee as supporting his
right to allot as much or as little as he pleases.*' The two
amendments in question were to Sections 205 and 207
of the Act, as shown below (bracketed material deleted,
italicized material added).

ALLOTMENT

Sec. 205 (a) [All] sums authorized to be
appropriated pursuant to section 207 for each fiscal
year beginning after June 30, 1972, shall be
allotted by the Administrator not later than the
January Ist immediately preceding the beginning
of the fiscal year for which authorized, except that
the allotment for fiscal year 1973 shall be made not
later than 30 days after the date of enactment of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments

AUTHORIZATION

Sec. 207. There is authorized to be appropriated
to carry out this title... for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1973, not to exceed $5,000,000,000, for the

"In the hearings on EPA's 1973 needs survey, Senator Muskie
expressed concern over this problem, noting that “Congress
considered funding as jnextricably related to the deadlines and
> a objectives.” See Needs Survey Hearings, supra, note 16
at 02. ‘

"Brief for the Petitioner at 16-19.

ae ee

ONO 5 tM LW AER ek REE ONE NEON DION I EP

fiscal vear ending June 30, 1974, not to exceed
$6.000,000,000 and for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1975. not to exceed $7,000,000,000.

The explanatory statements made by Congressman
Harsha, the conferee at whose suggestien the
amendments were made, and those of Senator Muskie,
the manager of the Senate conferees and the bill's
principal sponsor, make clear, however, that these
amendments were simply to clarify the Administrator's
flexibility to control the actual expenditure of funds,
and were not meant to permit a reduction in the
amounts made available at the allotment stage for
potential obligation and expenditure. Here it is
important to remember that commifment or obligation
of funds can occur under the Act only when and if the
Administrator approves a specific waste treatment
project. 33 U.S.C. § 1284 (1974 Supp.).

In explaining the amendments to the House on
October 4, 1972 ‘before the President’s veto),
Congressman Harsha stressed that their sole purpose
was to ensure that the Administrator would have
flexibility with regard to the obligation and
expenditure of funds:

I want to point out that the elimination of the
word “all” before the word “ sums" in section he
and insertion of the phrase “not to exceed”
section 207 was intended by the managers of the
bill to emphasize the President’s flexibility
control the rate of spending. (Emphasis adde ee

“118 Cong. Kec. at H 9122 (Daily ed. October 4, 1972): Legislative
History at 243.

Hes. |:

&- ae TRI ae Sat eI re MR ee Ua Sy tea a Os

A discussion among Congressmen Gerald R. Ford,
Harsha and Jones” sheds further light on the meaning
and intent of the amendments:

MR. GERALD R. FORD .... I think it is vitally
important that the intent and purpose of section
207 is spelled out in the legislative history here in
the discussion on this conference report.

As I understand the comments of the gentleman
from Ohio (Harsha), the inclusion of the words in
section 207 in three instances of “not to exceed”
indicates that is a limitation. More importantly
that it is not a mandatory requirement that in 1
eo ending June 30, 1973, there would be $5

illion and the next year ending June 30, 1974, $6
billion and a third year ending June 30, 1975, $7
billion obligation or expenditure ?

Mr. HARSHA.\ I do not see how reasonable

inds could come toany other conclusion than that
the language means we can obligate or expend up to
that sum — anythingup to that sum but not to
exceed that amount....

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I would
like to ask the distinguished chairman of the
subcommittee and the chairman of the House
conferees whether he agrees with the gentleman

from Ohio. (Mr. HARSHA).

Mr. JONES of Alabama... . My answer is “yes”.
Not only do I agree with him, but the gentleman
from Ohio offered this amendment which we have
now under discussion in the committee ot
conference, so there is no doubt in anybody’s mind
of the intent of the language. It is reflected in the
language just explained by the gentleman from
Ohio. (Mr: HARSHA). j

“Congressman Jones was Chairman of the Conference Committee
and a floor manager of the bill.

scaecs

VLE AEE LINO MB a OT ae Ete ALE A i,

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, this
clarifies and certainly ought to wipe away any
doubts anyone has. The language is not a
mandatory requirement for full obligation and
expenditure up to the authorization figures in each
of the 3 fiscal years. (Emphasis added. )**

Senator’ Muskie’s*® explanation of the Harsha
amendments on October 4, 1972, similarly stated that
the amendments were intended only to grant
obligational and expenditure flexibility and that the
sums specified in Section 207 must be allotted, even
though they need not be fully obligated:

Under the amendments' proposed by
Congressman WILLIAM HARSHA and others, the
authorization for obligational authority are “not to
exceed” $18 billion over the next 3 years. Also, “a//”
sums authorized to be obligated need not be
committed, though they must be allocated. These
two provisions were suggested to give the
Administration some flexibility concerning the
obligation of construction grant funds. (Emphasis
added. )*"

It was with this understanding of the meaning and
intent of the amendments that the Congress
overwhelmingly passed the bill. The President
evidenced a like understanding of the effect of Sections

*4118 Cong. Rec. at H. 9123; Legislative History at 247.
*°*Senator Muskie is Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Air
and Water Pollution (which reported the Senate version, S 2770),
and he was the sponsor of the legislation, a floor manager and a
member of the Conference Committee.

**118 Cong. Rec. at S 16871; Legislative History at 166.

oo, oe

IR te ee es ac a ne RT Pe LE AAT ISG EP ALO IDL IDRIS AR OD 0 5

Shae nee LR

Baaetiradsccmew Reve es ee

205 and 207 when he vetoed the bill. He stated in his
veto message that:

Certain provisions of. . . [the bill] confer a measure
of spending discretion and flexibility upon the
President, and if forced to administer this
legislation I mean to use those provisions to put the
brakes on budget-wrecking expenditures as much
as possible.

But the law would still exact an unfair and
unnecessary price from the public. For | am
convinced ... that the pressure for full funding
under this bill would be so intense that funds
approaching the maximum authorized amount
could ultimately be claimed and paid out, no matter
what technical controls the bill appears to grant
the Executive. (Emphasis added).*’

The President thus expressed a clear understanding
that Sections 205 and 207, as amended by the conferees,
only gave the Administrator “spending discretion and
flexibility”. The President realized that the sums
specified in Section 207 had to be allotted and thus
available for obligation. He was prompted to veto the
bill by his fear that pressures to obligate available
funds would overcome the Administrator’s spending
flexibility.

After the President’s veto the conference amendment
of Sections 205 and 207 were again discussed in both
houses. On October 17, 1972 Senator Muskie reiterated
that the sole intent and purpose of the amendments was

"118 Cong. Rec. at S 18534 — S 18535 (Daily ed. October 17,
1972); Legislative History at 139.

ics

GR Genes 0o8 LGR ABE BOREL ESS SS Chl EDO ALOE PBL PLE AROUSAL SABA

to give the Administrator some flexibility concerning
the obligation of the,sums specified in Section 207 but
that he must, in any event, allot those sums.**
Congressman Harsha repeated his explanation of the
amendments to the House on October 18, 1972.

I want to point out the elimination of the word
“all” before the word “sums” in section 205(a) ahd
insertion of the phrase “not to exceed” in section
207 was intended to emphasize the President’s
flexibility to control the rate of spending.

!

Second, I would like to point, out that the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency must approve plans, specifications, and
estimates. This is the pacing item in the expenditure
of funds. It is clearly the understanding of the |
managers that under these circumstances, the
Executive can control the rate of expenditures.

(Emphasis added. )*"

**118 Cong. Rec. at S 18546, S 18549; Legislative History at 116,
122. On January 31, 1973 Senator Muskie stated before the Senate
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers that the Act mandated
allotment of $5 billion and $6 billion in fiscal years 1973 and 1974
respectively. See generally, Joint Hearings on Impoundment of
Appropriated Funds by the President Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm.
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 407-408 (1973). Because of Senator Muskie’s
important role respecting the passage of the Act, his statement,
made so recently after enactment of the Act and directed to the
construction in question, is entitled to great weight in interpreting
the statute. See, United States v. United Mine Workers of America,
330 U.S. 258, 281-282 (1947); Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-330 (1942).

“°118 Cong. Rec. at H. 10268 (Daily ed. October 18, 1972):
Legislative History at 98.The use of the word “emphasize” by
Congressman Harsha is an acknowledgement that his
—— not intended to make a substantive change in
the Act.

eo een

'

LATA ARG PD “ie ee

Congressman Harsha then explained the impact of the
Act’s funding provision in terms of expenditures in
future fiscal years. In so doing, he demonstrated clearly
that it was his understanding that Sections 205 and 07
required allotment of the full amount of the&é\m
specified in Section 207:

[T|he first major impact of the obligations from the
$5 billion authorizations for the fiscal year ending _
June 30, 1973, is in fiscal year 1975... .

As a matter of fact, for fiscal year 1973 if all the
money were obligated and placed under contract,
there would only be $20 million needed to meet the
obligations. . . (Emphasis added.)*”

Congressman Harsha’s hypothetical presumed that
the entire $5 billion would be available by allotment for
obligation and was intended to emphasize to the House
that the President’s fear about “budget-wrecking” was
unwarranted in view of the lag between the
“obligation” of funds and the time when they would
actually be spent. Senator Muskie made the same point
to the Senate the day before, when he noted that the ful!
$18 billion authorized by the Act probably would not be
spent until the end of fiscal year 1979.*!

The statements of these legislators, as the creators of
the Act, are of controlling weight in interpreting the
meaning, intent and purpose of Section 205 and 207.
See, e.g., First National Bank of Logan, Utah v. Walker
Bank and Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966); Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395
(1951); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Civil —

EE.

118 Cong. Rec. at S 18547 (Daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972); Legislative
History at 119.

o 22

CONG ie A he! Os LO: 08 De AGI SOLA PEREIRA MCE A LOSE AS” Ah APE

Aeronautics Bd., 380 F.2d 770, 779-782 (2nd Cir. 1967):
affd per curiam sub nom., World Airways, Inc. v. Pan
American Airways, Inc., 391 U.S. 461 (1968). These
members of the House and Senate Public Works
Committees. were fully familiar with the funding
mechanism of the Act. They knew the difference
between allotment, obligation, and expenditure and
cannot be assumed to have used these words loosely or
inadvertently. It is especially significant, moreover,
that on October 18, 1972, after the President’s veto and
veto message, Congressman Harsha expressed an
understanding that the Act mandated the allotment of
the full amount of the sums specified in Section 207. As
sponsor of the amendatory language upon which
Defendant has relied to reduce allotments,
Congressman Harsha’s understanding is particularly
persuasive. See, National Labor Relations Bd. v. Fruit
& Veg. Pack. & Whse., Loc. 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66-67
(1964).

There emerges only one interpretation of Sections
205 and 207. The Administrator must allot among the

~ States $5 billion in fiscal year 1973, $6 billion in fiscal

year 1974 and $7 billion in fiscal year 1975**. He may,

“Former EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus candidly recognized,
after he left EPA, that this was his interpretation of what Congress
had intended:

I think this was the intention of Senator Muskie and others when the law was
passed— get out of the business of having to draw up priorities with various
projects, ang be able to say they can fund them all at once. I also recognize it is
very frustrating to the States, that they have to go through this priority

rocess again when they felt they were out of it, as a result of the amount of
unding.

Joint Hearings on Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the

-President Rgore the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of

the Senate

omm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 418
(1973).

—93—

e

GE ee ee

a er ae ASN PR Th UES RANA TRASH SE RN EC aa Tag Oe TN

however, in the exercise of his discretion to approve
construction project plans. specifications and estimates
under Section 203, control the rate of obligation of those
allotted sums and hence the rate of expenditures

-————resulting from such obligations. This obligational and

ME RENO ARE Get Le PA tte Oa Gt

expenditure flexibility is the only discretion afforded
the Administrator with regard to the sums specified in
Section 207.

.“ Even at the contract approval stage, however, the
Administrator may not refuse to obligate funds on the
grounds unrelated to the Act. The most instructive
authority on this point is the Eighth Circuit’s
well-reasoned opinion in State Hwy. Comm’n of
Missouri v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973), not
only bécause it involved the Federal-Aid Highway
Act,** expressly acknowledged by Congress as the
model for Titlé II of the Act,** but because the reasen for
the impoundment was the need to control inflationary.
pressures. wf

In that case the Secretary of Transportation had
apportioned (allotted) the total sum authorized to be
appropriated®’ but had imposed “contract controls”
forbidding actual obligation of the full amount so
apportioned. The State Highway Commission of
Missouri brought suit seeking to compel the Secretary

“23 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (1964).

‘118 Cong. Rec. H 2506 (Daily ed. March 27, 1972): Jd. at S 16872
‘Daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972); Legislative History at 367, 368.

“See, 23 U.S.C. § 104¢b) (1964).

pick, * Tee

to rescind the controls and to release the funds. The
trial court held for the plaintiff and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. In sé doing, the court of appeals analyzed the
whole act to discern its intent and purposes and
concluded that:

To reason that there is implicit authority within
the Act to defer approval for reasons totally
collateral and remote to the Act itelf requires a
strained construction which we refuse to make. It is
impossible to find from these specific grants of
authority discretion in the Secretary to withhold
approval on projects Congress has specifically
directed because of a system of priorities the
Executive chooses to impose on all expenditures.
The Congressional intent is that the Secretary may
exercise his discretion to insure that the roads are
well constructed and safely built at the lowest
possible cost, all in furtherance of the Act, but
when the impoundment of funds impedes the
orderly progress of the federal highway program,
this hardly can be said to be favorable to such a
program. In fact it is in derogation of it. It is
difficult to perceive that Congress intended such a
result. State Hwy. Comm'n of Missouri v. Volpe,
479 F.2d at 1114 (8th Cir. 1973).

Likewise in the instant case Congress cannot be
presumed to have intended to permit the Administrator
to disapprove a construction project because of
considerations related to inflation. As made plain
earlier, Congress knew of the Administration’s
objections to the funding provisions of the Act and by
overriding the veto, Congress reiterated its

“State Hwy. Comm'n of Missouri v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.
Mo. 1972). bee

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FRR A IN a Bia He

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disagreement with the President’s dire predictions of
the Act’s impact on the economy.

Furthermore, it was the expressed intent of Congress
that the Administrator’s discretion would be limited by
the purposes and objectives of the Act. Congressman
Jones, in the course of his explanation of the Conference
Report to the House, declared that “(t]he Congress has
given to the Administrator the most explicit guidance
that it could contrive as to what factors and parameters
he is to take into account in the administration of this
act.”** Moreover, Senator Muskie, in discussing the
Conference amendments to Sections 205 and 207,
which were intended to emphasize the Administrator’s
obligational and expenditure flexibility, also addressed
the question of the limits of the Administrator’s
discretion, stating that “[t]he conferees do not expect
these provisions to be used as an excuse in not making
tlie commitments necessary to achieve the goals set
forth in the act.”**

In short, the Administrator’s discretion under
Section. 203 is limited by the letter and intent of the Act.
He may not use the narrowly circumscribed authority
Over project approval to defeat or postpone the clean
water goals of the Act.

7118 Cong. Rec. H 9119 (Daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972). These factors are
set out in Section 204 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1284 (Supp. 1974).

*118 Cong. Rec. at S 16871 (Daily ed. October 4, 1972).

96

OF RE DEI ED EL 0 PSR LI a Gea 0 “ ieee

Amici urge the Court to consider this portion of their
argument most seriously. The Administrator has
effectively announced in his brief** that if he loses this
round and is required to allot, he will attempt to
circumvent the Court’s judgment by placing the newly
allotted funds in “reserve” accounts and simply refuse
to obligate them. This would obviously violate the Act,
since these sums would clearly not be “available” for
obligation, notwithstanding the Administrator’s
sophistical argument to the contrary.*’ The Court must
make it plain that the Administrator must allot all
sums authorized and that no alternate actions that
likewise defeat the purposes of the Act will be tolerated.

C. The Administrator's argument that he is authorized
to control the “rate” of spending by controlling the
timing of allotments is unsupported in the Act and is
inconsistent with continual funding mechanism of
“reallotment”’.

The Administrator, in a vain attempt to make control
over allotments equivalent to control over the “rate” of
_ Spending, now says he expects ultimately to allot the
sums he has withheld.*' By periodically augmenting
the allotments, so the new argument goes, the
Administrator extends the time in which the
authorized sums are available and hence reduces the

“Brief for Respondent at 27-28.
“rd. ot 28, nn. 12.
“Brief for Petitioner at 26, 29.

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“rate” of spending. This is pure sophistry. All that this
accomplishes is postponement of the program and the
goals it was designed to achieve. As the court of appeals
noted in City of New York:*

... the Act nowhere mentions any type of later
augmentation proceduré, and rather states in
section 205(a) that “the allotment for fiscal year
1973 shall be made not later than... .” (Emphasis
the Court’s).

Moreover, if Congress had intended the
Administrator to have the kind of control over
allotment he seeks tu establish in this case, there would
have been scant need for Congress to provide for the
mechanism of automatic reallotment. 33 U.S.C. §
1285(b)(1)(1974 Supp.). Plainly, Congress constructed
the statutory mechanisms of allotment and reallotment
to provide for continual funding over an extended
period of time to remove the uncertainty that had
plagued the grant process prior to the 1972 Act. As
indicated earlier, the notion of administrative
discretion to allot any given amount at any given time
is totally at odds with this carefully conceived statutory
scheme.

D. Neither the doctrine of sovereign immunity nor that
of political question is applicable to this controversy.

“Combined Appendix at 33A.

ca

Amici are of the firm view that the Administrator has
no discretion at the allotment stages. Nevertheless, we
do not believe that a contrary conclusion would require,
as the Administrator contends,** dismissal of the suit.

First, the action falls squarely within the exception to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity which allows suits
against federal officials who have allegedly acted
beyond their statutory powers or have exercised their
statutory powers in a constitutionally void manner.
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963); Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949).
The mere fact that discretion is vested in a federal
administrative officer does not inean that he has free
reign to abuse that discretion, and whether an abuse
has occurred, i.e., whether the officer has exceeded his
statutory authority, is clearly within the Dugan and
Larson exception.

x

Moreover, sovereign imiaunity has been waived by
the United States in cases of this sort by enactment of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et
seq. Section 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702, provides
quite plainly and simply that “{a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action wthin the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”

* Brief for Petitioner at 30, et seq.

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In Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961),
the court explained the impact of the APA on sovereign
immunity thusly:

By providing judicial review in an action brought
by “any person adversely affected or aggrieved b
any agency action” Congress permitted suits whic
under established tests would certainly be barred
as suits against the government ... The Act
thereby makes a clear waiver of sovereign
immunity in actions to which it applies.” Estrada
v. Ahrens, supra, 296 F.2d at 698.

Accord, Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d

859, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1970).*4

The Administrator tries to hide behind the provision
of the APA that excludes suits complaining of actions
committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. §
701(a). This Court has declared this to be a “very
narrow exception . . . applicable in those rare instances
where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that ina
given case there is no law to apply.’” Citizens to
Preserve Overton ‘Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971). The statute here is not drawn in “broad terms,”
but rather in such highly detailed and specific terms as
to negative even the slightest degree of discretion at the
allotment stage. But assuming, arguendo, some
discretion exists, it is certainly not unbridled. The Act’s
express commitment to specific deadlines and goals and
the unmistakable evidence in the legislative history of

“It seems axiomatic to us that one must imply, from a statement
by the Congress that judicial review of ageney action will be
granted, an intention on the part of Congress to waive the right of
sovereign immunity: any other construction would make the
review provisions illusory.” Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,
supra, 424 F.2d at 874.

—30—

8 SOD lt Al Bet

Congressional resolve to achieving these deadlines and
goals provides ample guidelines for judicial
determination of whether that discretion has been

abused.

The Administrator also argues that to try to resolve
whether there has been an abuse of discretion in this
case would require the courts to decide a “political
question.”* The standards for determining whether
this issue presents a nonjusticiable political question
were provided by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962):

Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually
der tl constitutional commitment of the
j- ue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
vf judicially discoverable and manageable
standards of resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion: or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one
question. 369 U.S. at 217.

As in his Administrative Procedure Act argument,
the Administrator urges again that there are no
criteria by which to judge whether he has abused his
discretion. The Court, however, is not being asked to
take over the management of the Environmental
Protection Agency, or to assume the weighty role of the

45Brief for Petitioner at 47.

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President of the United States; it is being asked to
construe a statute and to determine whether Congress
intended to grant the Administrator discretion to take
the action complained of here. Since Marbury v.
Madison, it has always been “emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is”. 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

This Court recently reaffirmed the principle of
Marbury v. Madison in a case in which the doctrine of
political question was similarly urged as a bar to
judicial review of Executive action. United States v.
Richard M. Nixon, 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (July 24, 1974).
The issue was whether the doctrine prevented the
Court from deciding whether the President had to
comply with a subpoena to produce certain tape
recordings and documents relating to his conversations
with aides and advisers. The argument was made, as it
is impliedly made here, that the Judiciary should defer
to the judgment of the Executive as #@ what the law
requires. The language used in rejecting the claim is
particularly applicable to the instant controversy.

Notwithstanding the deference each branch must
accord the others, the “judicial power of the United
States” vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1 of
the Constitution can no more be shared with the
Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for
example, can share with the Judiciary the veto
power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary
the power to patina a presidential veto. Any other
conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of
separation of powers and the checks and balances
that flow from the scheme of a tripartite

nil.

SAC HN DR SR ae nN RN

Oe ee

sovernment. The Federalist, No. 47, p. 313 (C. F. ‘&

ittel ed. 1938). We therefore reaffirm that it’ is
“emphatically the province and the duty” of this
Court “to say what the law is” with respect to the
claim of privilege presented in this case. Marbury
v. Madison, supra at 177. United States v. Richard
M. Nixon, supra, 42 U.S.L.W. at 5244.

Here, too, the Court cannot concede to the Executive the
intrinsically judicial determination of whether the
impoundment of such vast sums of money was
authorized by Congress in the Act.

CONCLUSION

The court of appeals in City of New York was
eminently correct in ruling that the Administrator was
required to allot the full amounts authorized by the Act
for waste treatment construction grants. City of New
York should therefore be affirmed and Campaign Clean
Water should be reversed and judgment rendered for
full allotment in favor of Respondent Campaign Clean
Water.

Even if the Court be convinced that some discretion
at the allotment stage was vested in the Administrator
by the Act, amici would still pray that the court of’
appeals judgment in Campaign Clean Water be
reversed, and the district court’s judgment be affirmed,
since the present state of the record — the record of the
marked disparity between what the Administrator has
allotted and what is really needed to meet the letter and
intent of the Act — shows clearly that that discretion -
has been flagrantly abused.

eae

*

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN L. HILL
Attorney General of Texas

LARRY F. YORK
First Assistant Attorney General
of Texas

PHILIP K. MAKWELL

Assistant Attorney General of Texas
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711

AC 512 — 475-4143

ROBERT W. WARREN LARRY DERRYBERRY

Attorney General of Wisconsin Attorney General of Oklahoma
Theodore L. Priebe Paul C. Duncan

Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General
JOHN C. DANFORTH VERN MILLER

Attorney General of Missouri Attorney General of Kansas
Robert M. Lindholm ‘ Curt T. Schneider

Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General
« Attorneys for Amici

ROE SERRATE Git IRR EE

¥

Bethan

LA DRIAL MII PADDLE LO th IN AA

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Philip K. Maxwell, one of the attorneys for the
States of Texas, Wisconsin, Missouri, Oklahoma and
Kansas, amici herein, and a member of the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify
that, on the 15th day of August, 1974, I served copies of
the foregoing brief to the Supreme Court of the United
- States and on the several parties thereto, as follows:

1. On the United States, by mailing a copy in a duly
addressed envelope, with air mail postage prepaid, to
Robert H. Bork, Sclicitor General, Carla Hills,
Assistant Attorney General, Danicl M. Friedman,
Deputy Solicitor General, Edmund W. Kitch, Assistant
to the Solicitor General, Robert E. Kopp, and Eloise
Davies, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C., 20530. | | :

2. Norman Redlich, Corporation Counsel, John R.
Thompson, First Assistant Corporation Counsel, Evan
A. Davis, Gary Mailman, and Alexander Gigante, Jr.,
Assistant Corporation Counsels, Attorneys for the City
of New York, Municipal Building, New York, New
York, 10007, and James R. Atwood, Covington &
Burling, 888 — 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C..
20006, Of Counsel, in duly addressed envelopes with air |
mail postage prepaid.

—35—

3. Alan B. Morrison and W. Thomas Jacks, Suite 700
— 2000 P Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036.
Attorneys for Respondent, Campaign Clean Water, ina
duly addressed envelope with postage prepaid.

/

‘

; PHILIP ¢ MAXWELL

‘ Assistant’ Attorney Genefal

=

aero

ed

AOE AD ALAM AP GR TR ABA 8

ADDENDUM I

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT

» OFFICE OF THE CLERK
EDWARD W. WADSWORTH 600 CAMP STREET
CLERK | NEW ORLEANS, LA. 70130

May 28, 1974
TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD:

No. 73-3965 - State of Texas, et al, v.
No. 73-4026 - Russell E. Train, Administrator of the
' Environmental Protection Agency.

—

[Argued & Submitted 4-29-74 - N.O. West Courtroom]
Gentlemen:

I am directed by the Court to advise that the disposition
of the referenced cases is being withheld pending
decision of the Supreme Court in the cases Train v. City
of New York, (73-1377), Train v. Campaign Clean Water
(73-1378), certiorari granted April 29, 1974.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD W. WADSWORTH, Clerk

—37—

By /s/ Richard E. Windhorst, Jr.
Richard E. Windhorst, Jr.. Chief
Judicial Support Division

REW, Jr.:rev

Messrs. Robert E. Kopp &
Eloise E. Davies

Mr. Theodore L. Priebe

Mr: Paul C. Duncan

Mr. Philip Maxwell

Mr. Curt Schneider

—38—

ADDENDUM

Page 2 TEXAS POLLUTION REPORT

WATER FUNDS: EPA Regional Adm Busch
Says Texas has recewed the hea’s share ot
wastewater grants awarded in Region VEO Texas
Lousiana, Arkansas, Okluhoma and New Mexico
OF the $69. 10b 286 awarded in the region since
July 1973 Texas got $37,433 255 The funds come
from the Congresstonally appropriated $9 billion tor
the states in fiscal years 19731974. and 1975. With
two ot the years over, EPA has allocated $3 bithon
Nationwide, or $134.756.229 tox States in Region
IV Busch aid. “The agency expects to award much
of the remaining S6 bilhon in the next 12 months ”

Busch added. “I am extremely pleased with the
Progress bemeg made m our onstruction grants
Program. and am confident that 4 solid base: has
been established to carry torward a Program in
achteving our goal of clean water, We will Re
working closely with State and local officials in the
moaths ahead to keep the program moving | am
also pleased to announce that the States mn Region
VI were the first in the nation to submit their
Priority lists for FY “75 funds.”

FUND DEFICIT: Even with Texas getting the
hon’s share ot the Federal money available the
Water Quality Board says that Texas cites have 204
Preyects that won't be funded because Federal funds
avatlable m FY “75 are $27,000 000 short of whats
needed The WOR, Proyecto lst mctudes
$169100,000 in proyects. while available Pederal
tunds amount to $142.100.000 Board Bee Du
Yantis wrote Texas members of Congress about the
Problem and imcluded a detatled bst of which
Projects will be funded and which ones dre Caught mn
the $27 million deficit. He added that “to complete
sonstruction just) for this list™ would require
$615.000,000 in the future and $675 000,000 if
telated costs, such as infiltration studies. are
wehudéd) Yantis said that means the real deficit in
Brant” funds ts “approximately $450) to $s00
million

Projects talling into. the $27,000,000-short and-
won't-be funded category by Congressional district,
are’ Dist 1 Joaquim, Seven Pomts, Hatlsville.
Campbell, Omaha. Bullard. Douglassville Mare tt,
Murchison, Reno. Broaddus. Winfield. Tenaha.
Lennius MUD and Athens. Dist 2 Montgomery
County MUD 6, Liberty-Danvalle EWSD 1. Lavy
River improvement Dist of Montgomery County,
Devers, Coldsprings, Sour Lake. Kirbyville, North
Zulch MUD, Whispering Oaks. Orange. Fvadale ISD,

_Kountve, Grapeland. Tucker ISD. Woodville,

=

Jewett, Kennard and Hardin County WCID 1, Dist 3
Richardson. Little kim, Glenn Heights. Dallas (3

I]

July 24, 1974

projects), Murphy, Woodland Hills. Connth and
Dallas County Community College. Dist 4 Howe,
Lindale, Highland Village. Rowlett, Kerrp. Royse
City, Campbell, Bullard. Little Elm. iake Dallas
MUA, Glenn Heights, Collensville. Aubrey Tom
Bean, Prot Point, kate, Connth and Westminster
Dist $ the projects in Dallas County histed in Dist
>. plus Seagovilie, Dist 6 The projects in Dallas
County mm Dist 3 plus Garrett, Streetman and
Hubbard. Dists 7. 8,18 and 22. Hares EWSD 6,
Tomball, Spenwret-Place MUD. College View MUD.
Clearwoods Improvement Dist. Haris County WCID
4, Port of Houston. Lomax, Haris UD S$, Fort Bend
WCID 2 Dist 9 Galveston WCID 19. Beach City.
Jefterson WCID 10. Bevi! Oaks. San Leon MUD,
Port of Galveston and Jefferson FWSD 1. Dist 10
Mflugerville. Burton. Carmine. Florence, _ Hays
County Wimberly WSD_ Dime Box. Glidden FWSD.
Clay, Sunset Valley, Hempstead, Snook. Fayett
WCID and San Marcos.

Dist 11 - Gatesville, B Th

MoGregor, Bell WCID 4 Fort Gates, Goldthwaite
Round Rock. Matte forena Mblam WoIp |
Marble Dolls We Wt Pewatr Motgan, Low hredeli
and Lacy Lakeview, Dist #2 North Tarun MWD
ad Swmaw Dist 93 Megorgel Windtinorst
Ctuldress and Canvon, Dist 14 Wharton WOLD po
Victona-Guadalupe Blance RA. Compas Christy and
Nucces WOID 15. Dist 18 Por Manstield PUD
and Pduouh Dist 16 Odesss, Van Hon
Goldsouth. Ft Hancock WOID fand Barstow. Dist 17

Haskell. San Saha Amon. Tye. Retan Gauss
Plans. DeLeon Newark. Javton Comanche
Garnesvilld. Gores. Eorsan and Stephenville’ Dist 9

Shallow ater, Odessa Cisted in Dist Loy Abernathy .
New Deal and Smyer. Dist 20 San Antome «2
Prowctsh and Somerset, Dist 21 those listed im
Dist 20 plus Sunnse Beach MUD 1. Boerne.
Junction, Fredericksburg. Crockett WwCID of.
Sterling City. Brackettville. Winters, New Brauntels
and Mestzon. Dist 23° Those listed m Dist 20 plus
Carrizo Springs. Laredo, Natalia. Jourdonton. Big
Wells. Dilley and Maverick County, Dist 24 those
sted im other Dallas County districts plus Flower
Mound and Sanger

. —39—

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0368%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.