# Appendix — Fusari v. Steinberg > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0356%3A01 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1975 - **Citation:** 419 U.S. 379 ## Text sirines LIBRARY 3 [ Supreme Court, U. waME COURT, U, 5 FLEE D APPENDIX MAY 4 18% MICHAE mee HALL POCAK-IR., 0 IN THE Supreme Court of the Gnited States OCTOBER TERM, 1973 No. 73-848 Jack A. Fusari1, Commissioner of Labor of the State of Con- necticut, Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act. Appellant, -x ¥.z a erent LARRY STEINBERG, et al Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT Appeal Docketed November 13, 1973 Jurisdiction Noted February 19, 1974 tN 10. ee ee 12D RHE SRR EN LPS E RO. AB AP BSE NTA el IS TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Relevant Docket Entries ......0....ccccccccceccececceeccecccee. la Exhibit B of Original Complaint ................0cccc0000.0-. 7a Amended Complaint.......00.00..0cccccccccceececceeccecceeceeeees 12a Answer to Amended Complaint ......... ue Seadasseopdencasaps 32a Stipulation to Facts ......ccccccccececcescsceseeseeeceececceese. 35a Stipulation as to Plaintiffs’ Exhibits........................ 4Sa Stipulation to Depositions..................... Pbeeonbensiart 46a Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 9 (Deposition of Eleanor BS UMNAUD | acarace cose cen rasa suaatsaeluveselndevidardy oisen2auesnosen. 47a Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 14 (Letter dated December Be BID eros ettonimcecic best ps peersabecieteeuasleviscanteinesisel ances, I13a Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 15 (Letter dated February 27. EIDG) sicassertviesersness tue Sbaresaveeiatsigft-ninssfeateeucvasaeees 115a Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 16 (Letter dated October Be TIO) cciacvauesanresshucescuisedcaediceailosiesiectacis dance. 117a Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 17 (Letter dated August BOBS TINS) assets estes seesceaveseuserssareiseesoaes isos 119a Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 27 (UC Form 45 and Memorandum dated June 30, 1972)........................ I2la Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 28b (Letter dated May BNO eheigciaasa pate aceasta oat eoisectonicreusat ate e case, 123a Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 28c (Letter dated November ab 3.) Innere oan ei en Ae ere ere ne ne re 125Sa Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 28d (Letter dated April Lae | J.) eet One ne ene ae ne 127a 4 Od Oe. 3 « i 4 Page ‘17. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 28e (Letter dated May : DF FFF cece coc nerapiveareenesnetocevscecsurciseiores matuerdeneeerees 129a : 18. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 29m (Memorandum dated { October 6, 1972).............. stuesruseaacnierooeseucecxeeuaresenaes I3la 19. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 290 ivemorandum dated INOVEMDEE 10, F912) vseccisscerinn searemcieetesperceaccinresniens 132a 20. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 31 (Time limitations on 3 deciding appeals to the Unemployment Compen- ; sation COMMISSION ..............::ccccesseceeesseeeeeteeeeeeetseeees 133a | > 21. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 32 (Affidavits and Supple- ¢ mentary Affidavits of Delia Triana and Juan Mi- ; CRIED sessiscininesenncancres oa speueupityceieneunsvapsuatounvorawndentieters 135a 22. Defendant's Exhibit A (Affidavit of Carl D. ‘ SCORN) oes isos nsec ce eens ecneceserenrereencmionsnees 143a j 23. Defendant’s Exhibit B (Affidavit of Petra Collazo). 145a : 24. Letter from Attorney General to Three-Judge Dis- i Tye oO: Se oer ee ern rer 147a : 25. Proposed Consent, Onder isescsssccessscerizsnesinscencdoesncsexs 149a 26. Affidavit of Theodore W. Hatcher................00.000 150a / 27. Transcript of Proceedings of May 14, 1973 : (Proceedings Prior to Testimony of Theodore j WY, SAMMI) ak cecen eres ccccerstigcgreeeeessie-cimsemepcnartening ISla 28. Transcript of Proceedings of May 14, 1973 (Testimony of Theodore W. Hatcher) ..................... 159a 29. Defendant’s Exhibit C (Unemployment Compen- ; sation Booklet — “Your Rights and Responsibilities under the Connecticut Unemployment Compensa- RO EF siciacricdcctse eee esse 228a 30. Memorandum of Decision (noted only) .............0000 254a LCA CLAS SE NN RBS “4 31. a2. 34. ii APPEAL oasseetststistnteerniitttitivtrtittinen es - Court's Order re Motion for Suspension of Injunc- tion Pending APPEAL... eeessssseetsseesseeeeeeeessececn Court's Order re Motion for Proceeding in forma PAUPETIS csssessertsnstsneettsseuntettetenittitsicec aren 50 s . s~ eG IE Hie. NN GEM Op REM BAYNE ORIN PE: ER EAE LS POO LO CB CALA AL LORI IE! -la- JACK A. FUSARI, Commissioner of Labor of the State of Connecticut, Administrator, Unemployment Compensa- tion Act. Appel‘ant, LARRY STEINBERG, et al Appellees. Relevant Docket. Entries * * * * 6 12 Complaint filed. 7 Motion to Dismiss filed. \ 7 Motion for Order Determining this Action is not a Class Action filed by defendant. * * * * 9/11 Motion to Intervene filed by Mary Delicato, Dilly La- Pietra, Margaret Hoadley, Judith Roy, Shirley Gon- zales and Leo E. Hart. * * * * 9/18 Motion to Determine the Propriety of Class Action filed by plaintiffs. : 9/19 Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs filed by Delia Triana, Luis Rodriguez, Primitivo Comacho and Juan Miranda. 9 19 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Delia Triana, Luis Rodriguez, Primitivo Comacho and Juan Miranda. 9 19 Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs filed by Jose M. Lo- pez and Juan Lopez. 9 19 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Jose M. 9/22 10/10 10/16 10/19 10/20 10/20 Lopez and Juan Lopez. Objection to Motion to Intervene filed by defendant. Objection to Motion to Intervene filed by defendant. * * ‘ - Hearing on (1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; (2) De- fendant’s Motion for~Order Determining this Action is not a Class Action; (3) Motion of Mary Delicato, Dilly LaPietra, Margaret Hoadley, Judith Roy? Shirley Gonzales and Leo E. Hart to Intervene: (4) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Determine the Propriety of Class Action; (5) Motion of Delia Triana, Luis Rodriguez, Primitivo Comacho and Juan Miranda to Intervene as Plaintiffs; (6) Motion of Delia Triano, et als for Preliminary In- junction; (7) Motion of Jose M. Lopez, et al for Pre- liminary Iniunction; (8) Motion of Jose M. Lopez, et al for Preliminary Injunction; * * * (10) Defendant's Objection to Motions to Intervene dated 9, 7; 72; and (11) Defendant’s. Objection to Motion to Intervene dated 9/19/72; * * * Decision Reserved on all eleven motions. Newman, J. M-10/ 3/72. Motion for Hearing to Present Testimony Regarding Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Notice of Mo- tion, filed by defendant. Hearing re Defendant's Motion to Present Testimony regarding Motions for Preliminary Injunction. Affi- davits of D. S. Ballew and Delia Triana, filed by De- fendant.. Defendant’s witnzsses Mrs. Vivienne Gold- stein, Mildred P. Cogswell and Carl D. Eisenman sworn and testified, * * * Decision Reserved. New- man, J. M-10/ 17/72. Affidavit of Carl D. Eisenman filed. Affidavit by Juan Lopez filed. Application for Convening ot a Three-Judge District Court, filed by plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs. NIRS TS. RDN OA A Co en te ee 11, 13 11/13 -3a- Supplementary Affidavit of Primitivo Comacho filed. Supplementary Affidavit of Juan Miranda filed. Supplementary Affidavit of Delia Triana filed. * - * * Hearing on Plaintiffs’ and Intervening Plaintiffs’ Appli- cation for Convening a Three-Judge Court. Plaintiffs and Intervenors orally withdraw their claims for retro- activity. Decision Reserved. Newman, J. M-11/6, 72. Memorandum of Decision on ‘Motions to Convene Three-Judge Court, to Intervene, to Dismiss and for Temporary Injunction, entered. Plaintiffs’ request for determination of this suit as a class action will be de- * ferred for consideration by the Three-Judge Court. The motions to intervene filed by Hart, Gonzales, Roy, Hoadley, LaPietra, Delicato. Comacho, Rodriguez. Jose Lopez, and Juan Lopez are denied; the motion to intervene as plaintiffs filed by Miranda and Triana are granted; the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied: the plaintiffs’ motion to convene a three-judge court is granted; and the intervening plaintiffs motion for temporary injunctive relief is denied. Newman, J. M-11/ 14/72. . * * * * Pd Intervening Complaint of Delia Triana and Juan Mi- randa filed. * * * * * * * Motion for Production of Documents filed by plain- tiffs. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Matter in an Amended Complaint, endorsed as follows: “Motion granted, absent objection.” Newman, J. M-12/4 72. Amended Complaint filed. * * * * 1973 Interrogatories to the Defendant and Requests to Pro- duce filed by plaintiffs. Objection to Interrogatories and Requests to Produce filed by defendant. * * * * * * * Answer to Amended Complaint filed by defendant. Answer to Motion for Production of Documents filed by defendant. * * * * Answer to Interrogatories and Requests to Produce to- gether with documents, filed by defendant. * * * * Claim for Three-Judge Court Trial List filed by plain- tiffs. Tapes of Depositions of Eleanor H. Smarz and Com- missioner Loughlin filed. Deposition of Eleanor H. Smarz filed. Deposition of Commissioner Loughlin filed. Motion to Redetermine the Propriety of a Class Ac- tion filed by plaintiffs. Objection to Motion to Redetermine the Propriety of a Class Action filed by defendant. Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Re-Determine the Pro- priety of a Class Action. Decision Reserved. * * * Newman, J. M-+/ 18/73. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Redetermine the Propriety of a Class Action, endorsed as follows: “Motion referred for consideration by the three-judge court.” Newman, J. M-4, 17/73. J 9/17 ‘Proposed Consent Order filed by Defendant. -Sa- * *x * * Three-Judge Court Hearing on the Merits. | Plaintiff's witness sworn and testified. Stipulation to facts filed. Stipulation as to Plaintiffs’ Exhibits filed. Stipulation to Depositions filed. (Exhibits 8 and 9) Plaintiffs’ Ex- hibits | thru 31 filed. Plaintiffs’ List of Exhibits 1-30 filed. Defendant's Exhibits A thru E filed. | Defend- ant’s witness sworn and testified. * * * * Affidavit of Juan Miranda, Sept. 6, 1972: Supplemen- tary Affidavit of Juan Miranda, Oct. 18, 1972: Affi- davit of Delia Triana, Sept. 12, 1972: and Supplemen- tary Affidavit of Delia Triana, Oct. 18, 1972 to be marked as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 32, filed by plaintiff. Affidavit of Theodore W. Hatcher filed by Defendant. * * * * Memorandum of Decision entered. “This suit presents the question of whether either the Fourteenth Amend- ment, or § 303 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 503 (a) (1), requires that recipients of Conn. unem- ment compensation benefits be afforded a Goldberg v. Kelly (397 U.S. 254 (1970)) hearing prior to being de- prived of such payments, etc. ***, we conclude that the Connecticut System fails to meet minimal due process standards and therefore must be enjoined. Rule 23 (b) (2)'s requirement are met. and we designate this a class action. In summary, we find that the “seated interview” system as currently used for terminating or Suspending the payment of unemployment compensa- tion benefits does not provide minimal due process under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. We accordingly enjoin the defendant Administrator. his successors in office, agents, etc. from administering Chapter 567, Conn. Gen. Stat. (§ 31-222 e1 seq.) in such a manner as to deprive members of the plaintiff class : of unemployment benefits without first according 9/25 them a constitutionally sufficient prior hearing. This opinion shall serve as the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).” Smith, C. J.; Blumenfeld, D. J.; Newman, D. J. M-9/ 17/73. *** Motion for Suspension of Injunction Pending Appeal filed by defendant. Judgment entered that the defendant Administrator, his successors, etc. are enjoined from administering Chap. 567, Conn. Gen. Stat. (§ 31-222 et seq.) in such a man- ner as to deprive members of the plaintiff class of un- ployment benefits without first according them a con- stitutionally sufficient prior hearing. Markowski, C. Approved: Smith, C. J. ; Blumenfeld, D. J.; Newman, D. J. M-9/25/73. Hearing on Motion for Stay Pending Appeal to Su- preme Court. Argument by Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant. Decision Reserved. Newman, J. M-10/ 2/73. Order entered that the injunction issued by this Court on September 17, 1973, is stayed pending disposition of defendant's appeal by the Supreme Court, provided that defendant file a notice of appeal with this Court by October 9, 1973, and file a jurisdictional statement with the Supreme Court by November 9, 1973. Smith, C. J.; Blumenfeld, D. J.; Newman, D. J. M-10/ 4/73. * * * * Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States filed by defendant. : * * * * Appeal docketed. Clerk's Certificate. Jurisdiction noted. Order entered granting Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis. -7a- EXHIBIT B Case 1161-B-71 UNEMPLOYMENT COMMISSION LARRY S. STEINBERG Rt. 44, RFD No. | SECOND DISTRICT West Willington, Connecticut 06279 ~ 045-36-2590 Mailing date Vs. May 10, 1972 THE ADMINISTRATOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT Local office 18 X APPEARANCES: Douglas M. Crockett. Esq. for the claim- ant. Bernard Gerling for the Administrator. The claimant registered for work and filed a new claim for un- employment benefits as of April 11, 1971. On November | the examiner disapproved claims from October 10 on the ground of unavailability. The claimant's appeal, dated November 5, was assigned for hearing on December 2, 197]. Postponed at the re- quest of the claimant and held on January 13, 1972 at Willi- mantic, Connecticut. FINDING OF FACTS : 1. The claimant is a single man 25 years old. He has a bachelor’s degree from the University of Connecticut. His major field of study was geography. 2. He worked as an.ironmaker for Scherer Steel Company from sometime in 1969 to May, 1970. 3... The claimant registered for work and filed a new claim for unemployment benefits as of April 17, 1971. In the interim after May of 1970 he had been ill. Beeniiecs emia -8a- 4. On April 26, 1971 the claimant was seated and was in- terviewed by an examiner who told him of his rights and re- sponsibilities under the Unemployment Compensation Law, in- cluding the responsibility to reasonably seek work during every week for which benefits are claimed. 5. The claimant then received benefits for 26 weeks at $82 a week, through October 9, 1971. 6. On June 29 the claimant was again seated and inter- viewed by an examiner, who told him to keep a list of places where he looked for work. 7. On August 24 he was again seated and interviewed by an examiner who told him he must expend the scope of his ef- forts to find work, which up to that time had been mainly to telephone or go to Locals 37 and 424 of the Ironworkers Union. 8. On October 27 the claimant was again seated and in- terviewed by an examiner. He told the examiner that except for an inquiry at Brand Rex in May, 1971, all his efforts to ob- tain work had been through the hiring halls of the Ironworkers Union. In the week ending October 23 he had gone to the hall of Local 37 in Providence and had telephoned to Local 424 in New Haven and Local [5 in Hartford. He stated that he would accept only union work. He is not a union member but can work on a permit after all union card holders who want work are placed. 9. The above was summarized in writing and the claimant signed the information as true and correct. 10. The claimant was not given unemployment checks on October 27 for the weeks ending October 16 and 23, 1971, which would have been given to him if his claims had been approved as they had been in previous weeks back to April 26. He was told that his checks would be held and that he would get a de- cision in the mail. 11. If the claimant had asked for an immediate written decision on the disapproval of his claims it would have been given to him on that day. This is the policy and practice of the Unemployment Compensation Department. ~9a- 12. Because he did not ask for a written decision on that day the examiner mailed him a decision on November I disap- proving his claims from October 10. From this decision the claimant appealed on November 5. 13. A hearing of this appeal was assigned for December 2. 1971. At the claimant's request the hearing was postponed to January 13, 1972. 14. The claimant.worked for Trahan Seafoods from No- vember 22 to December 22. 1971. He was laid off due to lack of work. 15. He filed a partial claim for the week ending Decem- ber 25, 1971 which was paid in the amount of $53. 16. He received unemployment benefits in subsequent weeks and has continued to receive them to the date of this finding of facts, at $82 a week. 17. The claimant contends that he had no opportunity to be heard prior to the stopping of his benefits effective October 10, 1971. 18. Notice is taken here of the policy and practice of the Unemployment Compensation Department. The policy is never to disapprove a claim until after at least one seated interview, At periodic interviews the examiner inquires of the claimant about any restrictions he may be placing on his availability in the labor market. The examiner also inquires where the claim- ant has looked for work. The claimant is informed that the Law requires he look for work. He is also informed that if he does not meet the eligibility requirements of the Law he will not re- ceive checks. 19. This policy and practice was followed with this claim- ant. 20. The claimant was given not one but several hearings on his benefit eligibility status. At each of the seated interviews on April 26, June 29, August 24 and October 27 the claimant had every opportunity to present information favorable to his Version of the facts in his situation. 2) ae mate ROO AEE OTR Ty -10a- 21. The claimant's contention that he had no opportunity to be heard prior to the stopping of his benefits effective Oc- tober 10 must fall in the light of the facts found. The Depart- ment’s policy and practice are reasonably calculated to ensure that benefits are paid when due. 22. It is further found that had he continued to receive benefits he would not have made any more efforts to obtain work in subsequent weeks than he had made up to October 27. 23. His failure to make greater efforts to obtain work than he did make, after having been unemployed for a year and five months, leads to the conclusion that the claimant was re- stricting himself to employment as a union ironworker. He failed to expose himself unequivocally to the labor market and rendered himself unavailable for work within the meaning of the Law, because he was not ready, willing and able to accept work which he did not have good cause to refuse. 24. “It is further found that the claimant, during the weeks 4 in issue, from October 10 to November 20, failed to make rea- sonable efforts to obtain work. DECISION The Unemployment Compensation Law provides, among its conditions of eligibility for benefits, that a claimant must be available for work and that he must make reasonable efforts to obtain work during each week for which benefits are sought. The claimant, during the period at issue, is found not to have met this condition. It is held that he was correctly declared in- eligible for benefits from October 10 through November 20, 1971. The examiner's decision is affirmed. THADDEUS J. PAWLOWSKI Commissioner, Second District The only appeal from this decision is to Superior Court. Six copies of such appeal must be filed with the Unemploy- ment Commission within 14 days of the date of this decision. Such appeal must state the grounds on which you assert that the decision is incorrect. NR Fe BOR Ree Oe! AEN GEREN a aes ce ae a OW hee See -Ila- MEMORANDUM The question raised by counsel as to whether due process of law was denied to the claimant by reason of his checks for unemployment benefits being withheld from him without a hear- ing, is one of deep interest. Notice has been taken of the policy and practice of the Unemployment Compensation Department as being reasonably calculated to ensure payment of benefits when due. Attention should be given to the phrase any week with respect to (Section 31-325) Connecticut General Statutes. Bene- fits are paid or denied based on what happens during a given week. If a claimaat has not met the benefits eligibility condi- tions, benefits dre not due. Only after the week has elapsed can a decision on entitlement for such week be made. The Depart- ment takes pains and expends time and energy to inform all claimants of what their rights and responsibilities are under the Law. As to the claimant's contention that he was not heard. he is a college graduate and if he did not understand what the ex- aminer said to him on four different occasions, he was not pay- ing attention. -12a- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT (Title Omitted in Printing) AMENDED COMPLAINT Introduction Plaintiffs bring this suit to challenge several aspects of Connecticut’s unemployment compensation procedures. First, plaintiffs challenge Connecticut’s policy of terminating, with- holding, or suspending unemployment benefits of persons who have been determined eligible and subsequently ineligible pur- suant to an administrative decision without a prior hearing which meets the due process requirements set forth in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254. Plaintiffs maintain that this policy, authorized by Conn. Gen. Stats. §$31-241 and 31-243 denies plaintiffs due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and further vio- lates the “payment when due” provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. $503 (a)(1). Second, plaintiffs challenge the “work effort” provisions of Conn. Gen. Stats. $§31-235(a) and 31-236(1) and defendant's implementation of said statutes on the ground that these provisions, as enacted and as applied to plaintiffs and others similarly situated, are unconstitutionally vague, have operated to deny plaintiffs unemployment benefits without due process of law and as enacted and applied conflict with $503(a)(1) of the Social Security Act. 1. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others si- milarly situated, bring this suit to redress the deprivation of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Social Security Act of 1935, as mended, 42 U.S.C. $501 et seq. 2. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment declaring Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-235(2), 31-236(1), 31-241 and 31-243 uncon- stitutional as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and invalid as inconsistent with the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §503(a)(1). Plaintiffs further seek an injunction enjoining defendant from ARLENE DLO NR lg Tare -13a- Suspending, terminating, or withholding the unemployment benefits of persons who have filed, or will file, valid initiating claims pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-230, 31-235(1)(3) and 31-241 without affording said persons a prior hearing which satisfies the due process requirement set forth in Goldberg y. Kelly. (Copies of Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-230, 31-235, 31-236(1), 31-241 and 31-243 are attached to this Amended Complaint as Attachment A). . 3. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Title 28 U.S.C. §1343. 4. Plaintiffs’ action for injunctive and declaratory relief is brought pursugnt to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983. 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated. The members of this class are so numerous as to make joinder of all of them im- practical. The class is composed of all present and future un- employed workers in Connecticut who have filed valid initiating claims for unemployment compensation benefits Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-230, 31-235(1)(3) and 31-241 and whose benefits have been or will be terminated, suspended, or with- held by defendant pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-241 and 31-243 without affording said persons a Goldberg v. Kelly prior hearing, excepting those persons who from time to time exhaust their entitlement to those benefits by virtue of the operation of Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-236. This class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical: there are questions of law and fact common to the class; the claims of the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class and; the defendant and his agents and employees have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole. PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Larry Steinberg is a citizen of the United States and a resident of West Willington, Connecticut. vanicesiel i, Bast hae a Re ee OPT NN ESTE Ta Chetan: eae a eRe nO A te -14a- 7. Plaintiff Cecil Paskewitz is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Somers, Connecticut. 8. Plaintiff Juan Miranda is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Bridgeport, Connecticut. 9. Plaintiff Delia Triana is a refugee from Cuba who has applied for permanent residency in the United States. She re- sides in Bridgeport, Connecticut. 10. Defendant Jack A. Fusari, sued in his individual and official capacity, is the Commissioner of Labor for the State of Connecticut. Under Connecticut Genera} Statutes, §31-1, he is designated as the individual responsible for administering the Unemployment Compensation Act of the State of Connecticut. 11. Under the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Statute, Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-222 et seq., an initial determina- tion of eligibility is made after an unemployed claimant files an initiating claim and a claim examiner determines, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-241, that the claim is valid. 12. The statutory provisions relating to the initial deter- mination of eligibility provide, in relevant part, as follows: Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-230 .... As used in this section an initiating claim shall be deemed valid if the claimant is unemployed and meets the requirements of subsections (1) and (3) of section 31-235. Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-235 — Benefits eligibility conditions; qualifications. An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if it has been found that: — (1) he has made claim for benefits in accordance with the provisions of section 31-240 and has registered for work at the public employment bureau or other agency designated by the administrator within such time limits, with such frequency and in such manner as the admin- istrator may prescribe, provided failure to comply with POLL LORAIN Abd DAA RT Ss NBS IEE ate Eaiehana -1Sa- this condition may be excused by the administrator upon a showing of good cause therefor; ... . . (3) he has been paid wages by an employer who was subject to the provisions of this chapter during the base period of his current benefit year in an amount at least equal to thirty times his benefit rate for total unemploy- ment, some part of which amount has been paid or was earned in at least two different calendar quarters of such base period. Conn. Gen. Statg §31-24] Initial determination The administrator, or a deputy or representative desig- nated by him and herinafter referred to as an examiner, shall promptly examine the initiating claim and, on the basis of the facts found by him, shall determine whether or not such claim is valid and, if valid. the weekly amount of benefits payable and the maximum possible duration thereof. \ 13. After an initial determination of eligibility is made by defendant, the claimant customarily reports bi-weekly at his local unemployment compensation office to receive his benefit checks for the preceding two-week period. 14. Plaintiff Steinberg filed an initiating claim for unem- ployment benefits on or about April 17, 1971, was declared eligible and received weekly benefits through October 9, 1971. 15. On October 27, 1971. plaintiff Steinberg reported to the unemployment compensation office to receive his benefits . for the weeks ending October 16 and 23. 1971. Following an informal discussion with an unemployment office “interviewer” in November, Mr. Steinberg was told he would not receive his unemployment checks. 16. On November 16, 197] Steinberg received written no- tice that he was disqualified retroactive to October 10, 1971 for failure to be “available for work” and make “reasonable efforts to obtain work”, as required by Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-235(2). 17. On November 5, 197] plaintiff Steinberg appealed the termination of benefits. A hearing was held before an ap- -l6a- peals Commissioner on January 3, 1972 and the Commissioner subsequently upheld the termination of benefits. 18. Plaintiff Paskewitz filed an initiating claim for un- employment compensation benefits in August, 197!, was de- clared eligible and received benefits until February, 972. 19. On February 16, 1972, Paskewitz’s applicat.on for ex- tended benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. $31-252(b) was approved. 20. On March 2, 1972 plaintiff Paskewitz went to the Enfield Unemployment office to collect his first checks for Ex- tended Benefits and was told that his payments were being sus- pended or terminated as the Unemployment Compensation Department had made an error in the determination of his eligibility: When Mr. Paskewitz inquired as to the specific reason for this action, he was told that his case was being “investigated”. 21. Plaintiff Paskewitz appealed this termination on March 2, 1972. A hearing was scheduled in August, 1972/b\ut was postponed at the request of Mr. Paskewitz’s attorney. ‘he appeal was heard on October I1, 1972, but to date, the Com- missioner has not rendered a decision. 22. Plaintiff Triana filed an initiating claim for unem- ployment benefits on or about June 18, 1972, was determined eligible, and received weekly benefits through July 8, 1972. 23. On July 27, 1972, Mrs. Triana went to the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensation office to receive her benefits checks for the weeks ending July 15 and July 22, 1972. 24. After speaking briefly with an unemployment office “interviewer”, Mrs. Triana was told that her benefits were being terminated indefinitely, retroactive to July 9, 1972, because she had not made “reasonable efforts to find work”. (Plaintiff Triana’s affidavit, dated September 12, 1972, already on file with this Court, is hereby incorporated as if fully pleaded herein). 25. On or about August 7, 1972, Triana filed an appeal on the termination of benefits. Because of the large backlog of pending appeals, totaling 6,100 state-wide as of August 31, 1972, A LA opt -17a- her appeal was not heard by an unemployment Commissioner until October 27, 1972. 26. On November 10, 1972. the Commissioner rendered his decision. The Commissioner's findings of fact included a finding that Mrs. Triana “was desperate for work and sought all types of work in the local labor market.” The Commissioner's decision was that Mrs. Triana was incorrectly declared. ineli- gible for the four weeks between July 29. 1972 and August 18, 1972 and that she was entitled to benefits for that period. (A cop of the Commissioner's decision is attached to this Amended Complaint as Attachment B). 27. Plaintiff Triana was scheduled to receive the wrong- fully withheld benefits on November 27, 1972 but on that date was told that release of the checks had not yet been approved. 28. Plaintiff Miranda filed an initiating claim for unem- ployment benefits on July 2, 1972, was determined eligible and received benefits through August 12, 1972. 29. On August 27, 1972, Mr. Miranda reported to the Bridgeport Unemployment C ompensation office to receive his benefit checks for the weeks ending August 19 and 26, 1972. Following a brief discussion with a department examiner, Mr. Miranda was told that he would no longer receive benefits be- cause he had not made “reasonable efforts to find work™. (Plain- tiff Miranda’s affidavits, dated September 6, 1972 and October 18, 1972 which are already on file with this Court. are hereby incorporated as if fully pleaded herein.) 30. On September 11, 1972. Miranda received written no- tice that all claims from August 13, 1972 were disapproved and on September 13. 1972 Miranda {iled an appeal. 31. A fact-finding appeal hearing was held before an Un- employment Commissioner on October 17, 1972. 32. On October 24, 1972 the Commissioner rendered his written deicision and held that during all periods in question Mr. Miranda had “demonstrated a sincere effort to seek em- ployment within the meaning of the Unemployment Compen- sation Act” and therefore was eligible for benefits withheld for : ; > Deiterisecicitnserisoin ses tt Sale weet SO RNR BRE CLE -18a- the eight week period trom August 13, 1972 to the date of the appeal hearing. (A copy of the appeal decision is attached to the Amended Complaint as Attachment C.) 33. On November 23, 1972, plaintiff Miranda received the unemployment compensation benefits which had been wrong- fully withheld from him. 34. The weekly benefits of each plaintiff were terminated, suspended, or withheld without a prior due process hearing pursuant to defendant's statewide policy, authorized by Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-241 which provides in pertinent part as follows: The administrator, or deputy or representative desig- signated by him and hereinafter referred to as an exam- iner shall promptly examine each claim for a benefit payment for a week of unemployment and, on the basis of facts found by him, shall determine whether or not the claimant is eligible to receive such benefit payment for such week and the amount of benefits payable for such week... .. Such decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith unless the claimant. . . . within seven days after such notifica- tion was mailed to his last known address .. . . files an appeal from such decision and applies for a hearing. 35. Plaintiffs Steinberg, Triana and Miranda were denied unemployment benefits for allegedly failing to comply with the statutory “work effort” requirements as set forth in Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-225(2) and 31-236(1): §31-235(2) An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if it has been found that... (2) he is physically and mentally able to work and is available for work and has been and is making reason- able efforts to obtain work. §31-236 — Disqualifications “An individual shall be ineligible for benefits (1) If the administrator finds that he has failed without sufficient cause either to apply for available, suitable work when -19a- directed so to do by the public employment bureau or the administrator, or to accept suitable employment when of- fered him by the public employment bureau or by an em- Ployer, such ineligibility to continue for the week in which such failure occurred and for the next four following weeks. Suitable work shall mean either employment in his usual occupation or field or other work for which he is reason- ably fitted, provided such work is within a reasonable dis- tance of his residence, and. in determinating whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the adminis- * lator may consider the degree ‘of risk involved in his health, safety and morals. his physical fitness and prior training and experience, his skills, his previous wage level and his length of unemplovment. 36. Upon information and belief defendant has no written Standards or regulations with respect to Conn. Gen. Stats. §$§31-235 (2) and 31-236(!) and the application of said statutes is left to the subjective determinations of numerous interview and claim examiners employed by defendant. 37. The lack of written Standards and regulations with respect to Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-235(2) and 31-236(1) make it difficult for claimants who are adversely affected by the opera- tion of said statutes to receive a meaningful, due process appeal hearing before an Unemployment Commissioner. 38. _ Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-235(2) and 31-236(1) are vague and arbitrary and, as enacted and as applied to Plaintiffs and members of their class, have operated to deprive them of pro- perty without due process of law. 39. Defendant's policy and practice of terminating or withholding claimants’ unemployment benefits without a prior due process hearing -and the overburdened appeal process, Operates to deny plaintiffs and members of their class their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. Said poli- cy and practice is also in conflict with the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §503(a)(1) which provides in relevant part: The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification of payment to any State unless he finds the law of such State, approved by the Secretary of Labor under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. includes provisions for £ x % € = : * SR RES Ee Geet BIRR ARNT Ne CRIN ONE NN lg 8 ge pnt ee * -20a- (1) such methods of administration as are reasonably calculated to ensure full payment of unemployment com- pensation when due. (Emphasis added). 40. Plaintiff and members of their class have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury until the Defendant's above described practices and the Connecticut Statutes which authorize said practices are declared illegal and unconstitutional and are enjoined by this Court. 41. Plaintiffs and their class have no adequate adminis- trative remedy or remedy at law. 5 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated respectfully pray that this Court: 1. Assume jurisdiction of this case and set this case down for a prompt hearing; 2. Certify, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) F.R.C.P. that this case may proceed as a class action; 3. Enter a final judgment declaring that: (a) Defendant’s practice of terminating, suspending, withholding or reducing unemployment compensation benefits of plaintiffs and members of their class who have been deter- mined eligible and subsequently ineligible pursuant to an ad- ministrative decision without a Goldberg v. Kelly prior hearing, is invalid under the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. §503(a)(1) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (b) Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-241 and 31-243, insofar as they authorize defendant’s practice of terminating, suspending, withholding or reducing unemployment benefits without a Gold- berg v. Kelly prior hearing, conflict with the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. §503(a)(1) and the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment and are, therefore, invalid. (c) Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-235(2) insofar as it provides that: An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if it has been found that... AQAA PD oe aes DAN, Gk | ae - oo Sed be Gee eT cae ae “ , l P ~ j x 3 a de -39a- 14. The most common reason for denying benefits to a claimant who has been initially determined eligible to receive benefits is an alleged failure to comply with the “reasonable effort” and “able and available” section of Connecticut General Statutes, Section 31-235(2). These reasons generally account for -between 60 and 70 percent of the denial of benefits resulting from “seated interviews”. Other common reasons for denial of benefits on a continuing eligibility claim include refusal of a suitable job offer and disqualifying or deductible income. 15. Eligibility is determined on week-to-week basis even though the claimant may visit the office on'y bi-weekly. When a claimant is denied benefits for one or both weeks in a two- week claims period, the Defendant's written policy is that the claimant will remain eligible for subsequent time periods so long as he satisfies eligibility requirements for those periods. In actual practice, however, some claimants who were found in- eligible for one claims period and who filed appeals to the Un- employment Compensation Commission were denied benefits for later periods on the grounds that “they have appeals pend- ing’, in violation of the department's written policy. PARTIES 16. Plaintiff Delia Triana filed a valid additional claim for unemployment compensation benefits on June 18, 1972 in Bridgeport, Connecticut, was determined eligible, and received weekly benefits through July 8, 1972. 17. On or about July 24, 1972, Mrs. Triana reported to the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensation office to file for and receive her benefit checks for the weeks ending July 15th, and July 22nd, 1972. 18. On that day, Mrs. Triana reported to the Claims Line to pick up her checks. After submitting her U.C.-45 and U.C.- 46 forms, she was told by a department employee that there was a question as to her eligibility for the two-week period and that she should get in a different line for a “seated interview”. 19. After waiting in the “seated interview™ line, Mrs. Tri- ana spoke with a department claims examiner who discussed Lar Sipaa NANA Pes Ne. -40a- her efforts to obtain work during the two-week period ending July 22, 1972. 20. The claims examiner, determined that she had failed to comply with Connecticut General Statutes, Section 31-235(2) which requires making “reasonable efforts to obtain work” and she did not receive her checks for the weeks ending July ISth and July 22nd, 1972 at that time. At two subsequent bi- weekly appointments at the Bridgeport Unemployment office, Mrs. Triana was disqualified from receiving benefits for the four-week period between July 29, 1972 and August 18, 1972 on the grounds that she had failed to make “reasonable efforts to obtain work”. 21. On or about July 27, 1972, written notice was sent by the Department to Mrs. Triana ina letter signed by Mrs. Smarz, the manager of the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensation office, informing her that she was disqualified indefinitely from July 9, 1972 because she failed to satisfy the “reasonable ef- forts to obtain work” section of Connecticut General Statutes, Section 31-235(2). On or about August 7, 1972, Mrs. Triana filed an appeal on the termination of her benefits. Because of a large backlog of pending appeals, totaling 6,100 state-wideas of August 31, 1972, her appeal Was not heard\by an Unemployment Commissioner until October’ 27, 1972. : 22. On November 10, 1972, the Commissioner rendered his decision on Mrs. Triana’s appeal. The Commissioner’s find- ings as fact included the finding that Mrs. Triana “was desper- ate for work and sought all types of work in the local labor market”. The Commissioner’s\decision was that Mrs. Triana was correctly denied benefits for the first two weeks in question and was incorrectly declared ineligible for the four weeks be- tween July 29, 1972 and August 18, 1972, and that she was en- titled to benefits for the latter period. She was paid accordingly and neither Mrs. Triana nor the Department of Labor appealed the Commissioner's decision to Superior Court. 23. Plaintiff Juan Miranda filed an initiating claim for unemployment benefits effective July 2, 1972 in Bridgeport, Connecticut, was determined eligible and received benefits through August 12, 1972. On or about August 30° 1972, Mr. Miranda reported to the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensa- -4la- tion office to receive his benefit checks for the weeks ending August 19th and 26th, 1972. 24. On that day, Mr. Miranda went to the Claims Line to pick up his checks but after showing his U.C.-45 and U.C.- 46 forms he was told by a department employee that there was a question as to his eligibility for the two-week period and that he should get in a different line for a “seated interview”. 25. After waiting in the “seated interview” line. Mr. Mi- randa spoke with a department claims examiner who discussed Mr. Miranda’s efforts to obtain work during the two-week peri- od ending August 26, 1972. 26. The claims examiner determined that he had failed to make “reasonable efforts to obtain work” and therefore failed to satisfy the statutory requirement of Connecticut General Statutes, Section 31-235(2), and he did not receive his checks for the weeks ending August 19, and August 26, 1972 at that time. 27. On September 11, 1972, written notice was mailed from the Department, signed by Mrs. Smarz, the manager of the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensation office, that all claims from August 13, 1972 were disapproved and on Sep- tember 13, 1972 Mr. Miranda filed an appeal to the Unemploy- ment Commissioner. \ 28. Said appeal was heard before an Unemployment Commissioner on October 17, 1972. 29. On October 24, 1972, the Commissioner rendered his decision and held that during all periods in question, Mr. Mi- randa had “demonstrated a sincere effort to seek employment within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act” and therefore was eligible for benefits withheld for the eight- week period from August 13, 1972 to the date of the appeal hearing. The Department of Labor did not appeal this decision and Mr. Miranda subsequently received the eight-weeks of benefits. 30. Plaintiff Larry Steinberg filed a valid initiating claim for une: ployment compensation benefits in Willimantic. Con- POS ROY Rls ae np pets Poe er Ne sth Cin Med MeL ein Peer SON weg tT ae —— Se dits ie SDE eH Ade ehiBt Co AR in -42a- necticut on or about April 17, 1971, was declared eligible and received weekly benefits through October 9, 1971. On October 27, 1971, Mr. Steinberg reported to the Willimantic Unemploy- ment Compensation office to file for and receive his benefit checks for the weeks ending October 16, and October 23, 1971. * 31. On that day he reported to the Claims Line to file for his benefits but was informed by a department employee that he should stand in a different line for a “seated interview”. After discussing his efforts to obtain work with a Department claims examiner, Mr. Steinberg was informed orally that he would not receive his unemployment benefit checks for the weeks ending October 16, and October 23, 1971 because he had failed to use “sufficient efforts to obtain work”. 32. On or about November 1, 1971, Plaintiff Steinberg received written notice from the Willimantic Unemployment Compensation office that he was disqualified retroactive to Oc- tober 10, 1971 for failure to be “available for work” and failure to make “reasonable efforts to obtain work” as required by Connecticut General Statutes, Section 31-235(2). 33. On November 5, 1971, Plaintiff Steinberg appealed the termination of his benefits to the Unemployment Compensa- tion Commission. On January 13, 1972 a hearing was held be- fore an Unemployment Commissioner and on May 10, 1972 the decision upholding the termination of benefits by the unem- ployment compensation office was issued by the Commissioner. The Commissioner's finding as fact included the findings that Mr. Steinberg” . . . was given not one but several hearings on his benefit eligibility status . . .”, that he “. . . had every oppor- tunity to present information favorable to his version of the facts in his situation. . .”, and that “On August 24, he was again seated and interviewed by an examiner who told him he must expend (sic) the scope of his efforts to find work, which up to that time had been mainly to telephone or go to Locals 37 and 424 of the Iron Workers Union”. Mr. Steinberg did not appeal the Commissioner's decison to the Superior Court. 34. Plaintiff Cecil Paskewitz filed an initiating claim for unemployment compensation benefits on August 16, 1971. in Enfield, Connecticut. On or about October 14, 1971 he was declared eligible for benefits retroactive to August, 1971 and received weekly benefits until February, 1972. a Se a re sae s -43a- 35. On February 16, 1972, Mr. Paskewitz’s application for extended benefits pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes. Section 31-232, was approved by the Enfield Unemployment Compensation office. 36. On March 2, 1972, Mr. Paskewitz went to the En- field Unemployment office to collect his checks for extended benefits and was told by a department employee that he was no longer eligible and would not receive extended benefits. 37. Mr. Paskewitz appealed this termination of benefits on March 2, 1972. A hearing was scheduled in August, 1972 but was postponed at the request of Mr. Paskewitz’s attorney. The appeal was heard on October 11, 1972, but to date. the Un- employment Commissioner has not rendered a decision on the appeal. 38. The weekly unemployment benefits of each Plaintiff were terminated or withheld pursuant to Defendant's state-wide procedure authorized by Connecticut General Statutes. Section 31-241 which provides in pertinent part as follows: The administrator, or deputy or.representative designated by him and hereinafter referred to as an examiner, shall promptly examine each claim for a benefit payment for a week of unemployment and, on the basis of facts found by him, shall determine whether or not the claim- ant is eligible to receive-siich benefit payment for such week .. . Such decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith unless the claimant. . . within seven (7) days after such notification was mailed to his last known address . . . files an appeal from such decision and applies for a hearing. 39. The State of Connecticut does not presently partici- pate in the Aid To Families With Dependent Children-Unem- ployed Parent Programm. (AFDC-UP). -A4a- THE PLAINTIFFS, By: JoHN M. CREANE 285 Golden Hill Street Bridgeport, Connecticut Tel: (203; 336-0141 RayMonr J. KELLY Tolland-'Windham Legal Assistance Program, 35 Village Street, P.O. Box 358 Rockvi.le, Connecticut + Tel: (203) 872-0553 THEIR ATTORNEYS THE DEFENDANT, By: DonaLD E. WASIK Assistant Attorney General Employment Security Division Labor Department (AG-7) Hartford, Connecticut ‘ Tel: (203) 566-3990 ale a ie Ee a - OLN EOE IROL EE MET ae eH 5 pe ee —— ™ _ FOOT PAL he ee -4Sa- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT (Title Omitted in Printing) STIPULATION AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ EXHIBITS It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties that the Plaintiffs’ exhibits Numbers | through 30 described in Plaintiffs’ List of Exhibits, dated May 3, 1973, be admissible, saving any and all objections to relevancy. . It is further stipulated that xerographic copies of these ex- hibits may be submitted in place of the originals. PLAINTIFFS, By: JOHN M. CREANE 285 Golden Hill Street ‘Bridgeport, Connecticut (203) 336-0141 RAYMOND J. KELLY Joun A. DZIAmMBA Tolland-Windham Legal Assistance 746 Main Street, P.O. Box D Willimantic, Connecticut (203) 423-8425 DEFENDANT, By: DonaLp E. Wasik Assistant Attorney General Employment Security Division Labor Department (AG-7) Hartford, Connecticut (203) 566-3990 . i, % *: uae o + rr Oa Oe e ™ Pee, We 4 . | ; -46a- * 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT a : FOR THE %y ‘ DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT i (Title Omitted in Printing) 4 ; STIPULATION TO DEPOSITIONS i 1. The undersigned parties stipulate and agree that the 1 Deposition of Eleanor Smarz, (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 9.) February ; 8, 1973, and Timothy J. Loughlin (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 8.) Febru- i ary 8, 1973 reflect Department policy and are admissible as : evidence in the above entitled case. : / THE PLAINTIFFS, i By: RAYMOND J. KELLY ; JOHN A. DZIAMBA ; Tolland-Windham 4 Legal Assistance Program 35 Village Street, P.O. Box 358 | Rockville, Connecticut : e Telephone (203) 872-0553 : JOHN M. CREANE ye d 285 Golden Hill Street 3 Bridgeport, Connecticut a 3 | 3 3 ¥ Telephone (203) 336-0141 THEIR ATTORNEYS THE DEFENDANT, By: DONALD E. WASIK ~ Assistant Attorney General Employment Security Division Labor Department (AG-7) Hartford, Connecticut Telephone (203) 566-3990 -47a- UNITED STATES DISTPICY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT ——— LARRY STEINBERG, CECI: PASKEWITZ, DELIA TRIANA, and JUAN MIRANDA CIVIL’ ACTIO: NO. JACK A. FUSARI, .Commissioner of Labor, The Acministrator, The Unemployment Compensation Act, State of Connecticut AT BRIDGEPORT ) | vs. PEBRUARY 8, 1972 ) ) ) DONALD 4, TAMIS, ESO, “ 412 East “Main Street | ®~*Ageport, Connecticut 06608 DEPOSITION OF ELEANOR H. sw BRIDGEPORT UNEMPLOY ENT CON I || APPEARANCES; JOEN M. CREANE,- ESO, | RAY KELLY, ESQ. 35 Villaze Street P. 0. Box 358 Rockville, Connecticut 06606 Attorneys for Plaintiffs DONALD E, WASIK, FSa, Assistant Attorney General Labor Department (AS-7) Employment Security Division Hartford, Connecticut Attorney for Defendant 15,204 | | | | } | a ae iin meee niet Hint santos ean -48a- «+e. Deposition of Eleanor H. Smarz, taken on behalf i of the vlaintiffs in the hereinbefore entitled action, dursuant i to Rule 30 (a) and (b) (1) and Rule 30 (b) (4) of the Federal Hl Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To i ‘fake Depositions By Means Of A Tane Recorder was granted with- | out objection Januarv 15, 1973 by Judse Newman. The deposition | was recorded simultaneously on two “ape recorders and this | verbatim transcript was typed by an employee of Bridzeport “eral | Services, Inc., Margarita Torres, who was present at the tal:inz \ i \ | | ! | of the deposition at the office of Bridgeport Lesal Services, Inc | | | 412 East Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut, commencins at 1:45 p.m. on Thursday, February 8, 1973. | | OATE AND STIPULATIONS MR. CREANE: The oath and deposition of Mrs. Smarz will be administered by agreement of the i aR 1 parties by Attorney Ira Horowitz, a Commissioner of the Superior Court. MR. HOROWITZ: Raise your ripht hand: To you swear that the statements you will give in this de- | position are the truth, the whole truth and nothihe but the truth, so help you God? MRS. SMARZ: I do. MR. CREANE: The customary stipulations, which I'll read into the record, have been arreed to by the parties. -49a- STIPULATIONS It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and among counsel for the respective parties that all formalities in connection with the taking of this Geposition, including time, place, sufficiency of notice, and the authority of the officer before whom it is being taken may be and hereby are waived; | It is further stipulated and agreed that objections other than as to form are reserved to the time of trial; It is further stipulated and agreed that the readcine and signing of said deposition by the witness is hereby waived. MR. CREANE: (directed to Mr. Wasik) The initial questions will be asked by Ray and then I'll have some questions and then, of course, you have the right to cross-examinewhen we're through. DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KELLY: Q Mrs. Smarz, will you give us your full name and , rr ee et se oe. address, please? A Miss Eleanor Helen Smarz, 120 Clirr Street, Shelton, Connecticut. © And would you tell us your job and the title that “you hold? A I'm the manager of the Unemployment Compensation Department in Bridgeport, Connecticut. Q Would you please tell us how many people work for vou > C3] -50a- at the Bridzenort Office? ‘ A At vresent there are 33, plus some that are on loan : is from the Connecticut State Employment Service. } 9 Of these 33 personnel that work in the Bridgenort 2 Unemployment Compensation Office, how many of them are fact- | finding examiners? a A To the best of my knowledge I think I have 9 at 4 present. We've had some changes. j © How many employment security aides do vou have in tae : Bridgevcort Office and by that I mean level, one, two and three? : A I don't, I'm not sure of the levels. I believe that 4 there are four. d © Of those... * ’ A Wait a minute, I'm sorry, I could have brought tiese i figures more accurately with me. We've had some changes tnat o have taken place, that I'm... : 4 Q Would you be able to supnly those firures for us? j | A I can very easily if you want them and then you ~ill i | have them accurately. : : © Alright. Of the nine fact-finding examiners, or tue 4 nine veopvle that you said conduct fact-findine examinations, are 4a they all entitled-is their job description, fact-findine exasiners, 2 or do they have other job titles? F A At present they all are fact-finding examiners. ; sad sue oe ca i ‘ * S . rete -Sla- Q They're paid under that salary scale? A Salary scale, yes. Q Of the other 24 employees that work in the Bridreport Office do any of them also conduct fact-finding examinations? A On occasions. Q Under what circumstances would they be required to do fact-finding examinations? A If its, if we're under extreme pressure and we have a large-number of fact-findings to do there is somé selective interviewing that they can do. Q During the past year were some of these personnel used as fact-finding examiners, over and above the nine that are cesignated fact-finding examiners? A Yes Q How many? A, I can't give you the exact figure, out I could obtain that for you at the office. Q On a, well, for the purposes of an example. Ona busy day, how many people would you switch ever to become fact- finding examiners out of the rest of your staff? A Well anywhere from say 2 to possibly 6 or more. 1 couldn't tell you that exactly depending on what the circun- stances were and where they were needed at the time. Q 0.K. Would you explain for us now, how exactly a fact-finding determination is conducted? ‘ oui SOC Ma 22 stern atin ene ae A RTP Me eS eo ibicinast si Ge) Catia Sate eileen A CN -52a- A Now in what instance are you referring to? Q Say aman comes in who is, or a woman, who is already been determined eligible and there's a question now as to their eligibility and this is a non-monetary determination. What is the procedure that is normally followed? A If an issue arises, he is seated, he is asked to be seated for an interview and then he is called, in turn, by a fact-finder for an interview. } > What would start in motion the determination that tnere had to be a fact-finding on the person? A The interviewing that occurred on the claim line, is that wnat you are referring to? ® Yes A PoSsibly an issue of availability’ on the claim line may cause this. : 9 O.K. Going back one step then..-Does normally tie question of eligibility arise when the person goes up to get his check? A. Yes Q What, does he have to present any form to show that he has complied with the unemployment compensation law? A He presents an effort form. Q And what is that form? A That he has made effort to obtain emoloyment in the Fe ae ie fe cetera wo Ging ACs aba cia ¥ FRM ck RRC TAUNTS HS -S3a- the past two weeks. These forms are issued to them each week when they file and they take it home with them, complete it at home, and return it with them on their next visit. Q Is that the form that's known as UC-45? A Yes. Q And all claimants have to present their UC-45 form before they can get their checks? A When they're filing their claim, ves. Q ‘There is, there. If the line or the number of claimant that day was very great, is the reoutrement of presentinz the UC-45 form ever waived? A io. ® It is required in every case before the claim can be filed? A Yes. © Wow the person who first examines that uC-45 claim, what is their job title and position? A It would be either an employment security aide or an employment security interviewer. © And if they find some non-compliance or some problem about availability for work, then the person is directed? A mo go to the fact-finding to have a seat. ® And what occurs during the actual fact-findinc pro- cedure? (9] Bes PeRNIEe nS matey poe % eee net i en eae eee 2 MOSM ea eR epee ee a -54a- , . A The fact-finder will call them to the desk, revicw ¢ wnatever the issue is and discuss the circumstances with then. a i 2 If the issue involves tne failure to make a reason- 4 4 able effort to find work, how will the fact-finder determinc Waévacr cucre has deen compliance or not? What standards, or guidelines does he use? A ‘“eil, each case has to be handled on its own merits. Ané they have to take into consideration the individual that Caer ee eT tney are interviewing. It's difficult to establish this without a snccific oase. Do you want to cite a case for me and nerhans I can-- i © If we could use a hynothetical case, where a man has filled out six places on nis UC-45 form and there is some question 3 in tne employment security aide's mind whether or not these might have been the same places that he went to the week before, or whether she's seen these on his previous UC-45 forms, what would the fact-finding examiner look for to determine the validity of the search for employment by the claimant? Pe ee ee es A Well they take into consideration the man's skills, a the type of work he's seeking, his availability, the hours that Ly he's available for work and his, the actual contacts that he's made to get the job. If it's a repeated effort, he would be asked, why. This is not always considered unreasonable. ‘The a) man may be asxed to return to this place at a specific time and : ~ on — DUPRE STONE REL ete a ait on Sn — nm i al ih PELEONER SSR oI -5Sa- this is all taken into consideration and it's on this basis that the benefits would be either approved or denied. - © Would there be any checking by the fact-findirg de- terminer to see if the person did go to where they said? A There may be, yes. If they stated they filed applica- tions and this occured at an interview and to determine whether or not it's valid, they may contact the employer to find out wnat actually occurred. Q Would that be, would that contact occur while the claimant was there, being interviewed? A Yes, if its possible for the interviewer to contact the enployer at that time. Sometimes they can't reach the emplover at that specific time or there may be extreme pressure and they can't rcach the employer. They haven't the time to contact the employer so it would be delayed. Q If a question of eligibility still arises and the employer is not able to have been contacted, will the man receive his benefits for that week if there's still a question in the fact-finder's mind? “Oh, he may or may not depending on what the other circumstances there are involved, in a situation. I couldn't answer that with a direct yes or not. Let me say this, that in many instances, the claimant is given benefit of the doubt. But to say, you know, it's difficult to Give you a direct yes or no answer in aay of these instances because I don't know the exact circumstances of the case. 19] a LEGAL AES Sher y saghiect t aka gb él Sahat nitt eine Pe ee -64a- \ .Q Mrs. Smarz would you please explain what is the © practice and procedure followed in employing a pre-termination hearing by the office. What sets it in motion and what exactly is it™ .A A predetermination hearing is done in reference to a separation of employment, is that what you're referring to? “Q Yes, excuse me. The redetermination hearing we're talking.. The pre-termination hearing, not re-determination, unless our terms are somewhat different. In a pre-termination ‘hearing, after a person has been found initially elisible, what exactly is the oractice or procedure that is followed, and when did this wie of hearing start? A Are you referring now to separation, to refusals of referral by the Employment Service? Q Yes. A That type of hearing? Q Yes, and what other circumstances would necessitate a pre-termination hearing? SS ES A CS ES A Well there are, if a claimant reports to the office ani files a claim and is separated from employment for other than lack of work and it's determined by the reason for separation, that a hearing must be scheduled for the employers involvec. a Ne at (19) -65a- He is at that time notified and we have what we call a2 pre- determination hearing form, which is mailed to the employer with a supplementary fact-finding report and a slip is given to the individual, scheduling him for a hearing and a time that he will renort and the sevaration from employment be discussed at that time. : Q Do nre-determination hearings ever occur after a person has been found eligible for benefits and has berun to receive checks? ” A If there, now lect me see if there is an instance. I'm trying to think. Now if a claimant refuses a referrel by the Employment Service, and it 4s determined that a hearine is necessary, at that time there is a hearing scheduled. A Foute Slip is received from the Employment Service, and we send to “the individual a hearing notice scheduling a hearing for him *o cone in and the hearing notice explains what the situation is. That there is a hearing scheduled for him and he reports at that timo and we nave a hearing regarding the separation or the refusal of | referral, I'm sorry. Q O.K. Dealing with a specific issue of refusal to a certain referral. Until such time as a pre-determination hearing is rendered, is the man or woman still entitled to collect benefits? -66- Dit bei hh el errr | r A Yes, I believe so. The, he is receiving his Senef.t: We are notified by the Employment Service that he has refusec a referral and we immediately notify him to renort for a hearing by a five-day period. \ } 2 What form does this pre-detgrmination hearins tie, Hb Rea aD Nine. apse rasan! Mothensihas ! ‘ | ! li is it the same as a fact-finding? y | | ! A Yes, it's a fact-finding. It's a fact-findinzs inter- \ view. © Is there the necessity to check third-varty information, not present when the hearing is going on? eT ae es Say, that he did report on this specific referral. And then if the | | H i A Well there may be if the individual disputes the fnc%/ | | employer contact is made and it's determined that the fadtividual) \ was, there and some error, we were notified that he fatled to report, that would be your third party. If he was there and the job wasn't suitadle for him then perhans the claim for benefits are paid. But, that would be your third party. ' Sometimes there may be a question ariSing where they nave to | « , i it contact the Employment Service interviewer tnat made the route | | Slip. : 1 Q If there is a conflict between the statement of the | claimant and the statement of the party that the claimant was ‘ I referred to, how does the person who hears the pre-detcermination || hearine, how do they render a judgment? -67a- ¢ A Only on the facts that they have before them, to Q But if for example, a man claims that he went to the Dlace, the job that he was referred to, and that they told hin that no jobs were available, later on a call comes in from that ' | | | | | | determine whether they can“@pprove or deny. i ! | employment, that possible place of employment, stating that the | | man was never there. After an initial check, the man claims that he went there but they didn't take his name cown and they possibly forgot him. Is there any standard or guideline? A Yes. Very often an individual, if he has been to this place can describe some conversation or some individual that he saw there and he's given benefit of the doubt on the basis that he was there. Q How long have these pre-determination hearing been in effect? A I don't remember exactly when we started using then. Q Is it, are they fairly recent? Within the last two years? A For separations, I believe they've been, well since. Do you know, Mr. Wasik? I'm sorry. I have to direct it to hin. | Was it about June of 1970 that we went in for pre-determination hearings on separations and then at a later date on the refusals of a route slip from the Employment Service? The exact date I can't tell you. I would almost say, I'm trying to think now. | [a] -_—— -68a- © This isn't a long-standing practice that's veen in effect for, like ten or fifteen years? A No, definitely not. No this all stems from Java. O Alright. o.k. Thats.. A That's what you want? Q What employees are eligible to handle nre-dctermina- tion hearings? A I don't understand. Q Are there situations, as with the fact-findinc, where the employment security aide would be able to do a ore- determination hearing? A An employment security aide? Q Yes. A There may be an ‘otlgee where they may do i%, tut its doubtful. — ~ either of level one or two, would nrovably not do a ore- determination hearing? A ‘That's right. Q Normally thén woule it be the practice that only an employment security aide number three, one with exveriencc, might be called upon to co a pore-determination hearinc? iota BEARS ERIN IO gener, —— 16PF Lb Ihe Pe SP 2 age Q In other words, normally an employment. security a‘ce | | f -69a- A No, its. Q Is it rather unlikely? A it's unlikely, unless there is an extreme emermency. But it's unlixcly. O Is the level of exvertise anc knowledze reauircd for a pre-determination hearing, higher than for a fact-findinz determination? A. Well, they have to be. JI would say so. O That there is the necessity of a higher expertise for that tyve of vre-determination hearing? A Yes. . % “rs. Smarz, is the manual that entitled Unemovrrens | Compensation Rerulations used by the versonnel in your o“fice? I'm referring to that vellow panerback pamphlet that was.. A Yes. Q That is usec. Is that available to ail fact-Fincers and redetermination, veople who handle redetermination hearincs, | pre-determination hearings? A Under the UC law they are avaiiabic. «9 Does each fact-finder also have a cony of the Interoretive Direst on court decisions? &{ I have a master copy in the office “ 3 4 (39 -74a- © You indicated that either a pre-termination or nre- determination hearings, in any event, a fact-finding hearin= is given when there is an issue of a person refusinr a referral bdy the Employment Security Division? A Yes. Q Are there any other type of circumstances where tnis type of hearing wou'd de given before the person's benefits vere terminated? A ‘Yell is they are seated for an interview and there is some question that's coins to arise we ask them if they want to Aave the interview then or if they want to, would like to ‘ave a nearine scheduled. We zive them that option. A But if they choose to have.a later hearine, tirey woulc not set... A They. would schedule another nearine for then. © ‘Shey would not get their benefits in the meantiinc, Tz | sorry, I didn't hear the ansvwer? A Xo. Q When a hearine is given involving a referral or sc fusai of a referral by the Employment Division, that would involve a cuestion of whether the applicant or the claimant had ‘n fact refused it, whether it had in fact been offered, wict.er i in fact ne had a valid reason for refusing it if indeec he did refuse it. Are any -75a- “ of these issues ever involved on a, when a fact-findine= decision is made that a person nad not used reasonable efforts to find work, would any of these factual issues ever be present in that type of cases? A TI don't understand what you mean. Our issue at and is the fact that he refused a referral. © Right. In that case, he is generally given notice ana an opportunity to have a hearing and to present evidence if he ecnooses to defore the decision is made? ee © On the reasonable effort. fact-findine decisions, those ave generaliy conducted the day that the person comes in to nic! un their check. Isn't it true that in some of those cases, there will be factual issues involved, such as whether or jot od the man had in fact sone to several nlaces that he had listcs. on the UC-&5 form? A» Yes. | Q In those cases. you indicated that the fact-finder would try to confirm whether in fact he had rone to the places he listed or stated that he went to, but it wasn't alwavs nocssibi to reach the emvloyer. Isn't that correct? © And that the fact-finder-would make his decision pared on facts that he could confirm on the spot. What I am asin~ vou | - | te | | Se ee Te EOL ect. Rete Manet aera r te on a A AI, as es aaa et PRC UN Lee SRN ERE Re LS eb ebeA cis NSD he Oe NBO nics a ER iacineln tS FM phy oF nin a 4 a ; } q 3 rs z 3 [301 -Toa- is whether or not you see any significant difference between factual issues that might be involved in the.reasonable effort decision, as opvosed to factual Issues. thaé night be involved in a refusal of referral bv the employment, service. In other words why are hearings given before the person is terminated on refusal of referral by Employment Service but not on reason- able effort issues? a 2 ean only say it's been procedure. © On the issue of the reasonable effort to obtain work, which ‘ir. Kelly went into, some of it, wnen he was questioning you earlicr, I'd like to go into that in some more detail. ‘To your knowledge is the statutory requirement of reasonable effort snecifically defined in any denvartment written regulation or policy letter? A Ho, nov. You mean like a number, so many contacts is considcred reasonable effort or what have you. No, not to my xnowledze. - It's,each effort case is handled by its own in- dividual merits. 2 You indicated that,what I'd like to ask you, you | talk to your fact-finders, do you not, when you are training ther before they begin their duties? Ps A Yes. (31) -77a- - Q And I assume you would have periodic meetinrs to go over new regulations or policy letters you might get. You also indicated that occasionally you give, or sometimes you ive: the benefit of the doubt to the claimant when there is a question of whether he had made reasonable efforts. Is there any sinzle “standard that is used by the fact-finding examiners on decidins one way or the other, on whether the person gets their benefits? A You mean on giving them benefit of the doubt? Q Are they told that they are to apply a specific standard, such as the person gets benefits if they have a reason- able doubt that the person had not made sufficient efforts? Is there any type of standard, a single, uniform standard tiat they are asked to apply, when they have a doubt in their mind? A It all depends on why there is any doubt in their mind as to whether they had made a reasonable effort. Xo, there's, I'm sorry I don't understand you. If its handled on its own individual merits and there is some doubt as to why, as to whether or not this individual should be paid, then ‘he Goubt would either stem from the fact that the individual coesn'¢ understand the circumstances or there is somereason why he > hasn't looked for work, which may create an issue of availabilityl. Or there may be an issue that possibly he had a job pendine and it didn't materialize for him and if this could be verified, nc'd| | be given benefit of the doubt and paid benefits. It's so ~enera}, ihe ag ash Mab onaeea Casali debe a Ml ee es Te EE eT ee meneame areas oe: a -78a- ~ It's difficult because evervthine is handled on,each cas&Q varies. © Tnat's true. And isn't it true that, et least dn some cases, the identical set of facts presented to the nine cifferent fact-finders who are emnloved richt now, that there might very- well, on questionable cases, there micht very well be a different decision reached by different fact-finders? 4 ‘mere misht be. © Are you familiar, “Mrs. Smarz, with a policy letter, which I'll show vou in a moment, i believe the date of it is 1956, relating to the statutory requirement of reasonable efforts to obtain work. I'1li show it to you and ask you if you are familiar with it? A I'm familiar with it. Every so often I take them and re-read them and review them. O For the record I'm referring to a "Disputed Claims Policy Letter", with the identifying nunber SRU,A60H dircetcd to all unemployment compensation manarers signed by Ceorre Walker, Director. The date of the policy letter is October 22, 1356 and the policy letter attemnts, does it not, to define what constitutes reasonable effort? .A That's it's not a hard and fast rule, yes. © Wow this nolicy letter indicates a number of vartables or factors that might influence whether or not the person iad made reasonable effort and I'd like to go into that a littie hit, [33] -79a- not just what's in the letter but what actually comes un in your office as cases come in. Would one factor that would be taker, into account by the fact-finding examiner to determine wacther or not reasonable effort had been made, be whether or not the serson had a car? : A It might be, yes. > Would a person who had a car be expected to so to more places than a person who did not have a car? To conduct amore far-ranging search for work? A Perhaps a more far-ranging one. @ Would a verson who had access two days a week to the use of a car of a friend or of a relative be held to a higher standard on working than a person who did not have a car at all? A Well there would probably be other factors that would enter into that also. Q But that could be one of the factors that would have to be weighed by the fact-finding examiner? A Maybe. Yes. Q I'm sorry, are you saying that he should, but micht not? Or that maybe he would and maybe he wouldn't? 4K That would be one of the factors but then, in addition to that there would be other factors *hat would determine the decision also. Q What type of weight? oes ge RA SESE IS EIN Se RE nA IRS RN RT Ae RIN i a shin a OANA REY Ha Se | Rene oe re a re ey Paria arare SOTTO See NE Cerca Se See : ‘% a 4 j 4 4 -80a- A The tyve of work that the individual does would enter into that. : © What was the employment situation in Bridrenort aurzns, | June, July and August of this summer? Would you descride it ao many jobs available, or fewer than usual, or a very tisht labor market with few jobs available? A There were some jobs that were available. © But would you describe it as a fairly, as a ticnt labor market? Do you know what the unemployment rate wrt in Bridcenort during June, July and Aurust? A I would say that, oh, I'd have to check the statistical! | fierures. H Q But did you, was that information nassed on to the fact-finding examiners during each month? Are they informed of what the unemployment rate is? j A No. a) They're not? > Not the percentare figure, no. O In the policy claims letter referred to earlier cated Detober 22, 1956, 1t states that it is not intended to reevire claimants to make futile trins to employers' irine halls just for the saxe of buildings up a record of job seeking when there : are not many jobsavailable. Do your fact-finders taxe into account the job market when they're making a determination as | ' to reasonable effort? : ' ' a5” -8la- La) A ‘SO @ certain extent. . But they are not given the information on a recular basis of wnat the economic indicators show for availability of joos? A “ell they may have a general idea, ir Giscussion, but I don't actually sive them the information on a percentaze basis, tne actual statistics. O So that you're not sure to wheat ezvont they taxe char inco account on their fact-findine decisions? f (unintellizible) Q Have you ever seen it described as one of tho factors that influenced the decision of a fact-finder when he writes nis fact-findinr report, as being the basis for his decision, or onc of the factors? ff Net shat I rieeckors 6 ‘Ir. Blair is employed in your office, is he not? A Yes. OO What 15 nies. A Paet-fincer. © Ke deseribed the fact-findine function on reisonable elTors to obtain work, £4 a nenarine which is an exhibit in this ease, as bein= dasically a matter of jud7ment an the part of tune ract-findin« examiner when he's maxing Gecisions on reasonable efforts. Would vou concur with that Gescription? A ib SBT ak at OA aah Bd Sg RTA SURREAL Ain OE Sy ax SC REA AS cS hae Batiiteeh ia —_— A What was his descrivtion? Q® That in the end it comes down to good judmment, on whether they employ good judgment or not,on making a determina- tion as to whether the person has used reasonable effort. A Well the whole intent cof reasonable effort is that the incividual is making efforts to obtaih, making efforts, so that he may obtain employment from these efforts in the future. And this is all taken into consideration. Now it would be on the judement of the interviewer as to whether or not this is actual reasonable effort. Q Prom your experience what would you say would be the average, if there is an averace length of time for a fact-findinr interview on the issue of reasonable effort to obtain, to work? Would it be 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 15 minutes? A Well they vary. 15 minutes to a half-hour, sometimes 10 minutes. 9 Do you keen figures on the number of fact-finding interviews that are conducted in your office on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis? A Yes. Q Do you know how many were conducted durins the nea period of claims during this summer? For example, do you know approximately how many were conducted during June, July or August? 37] -83a- A No. I could get those figures. Q Would you make a note? A You want them? © Yes. You keep them on monthly basis? A Yes, Hartford. Statistics would have that in Hart fcrd. Seite , s MR. WASIK: You're talking about the interviews? THE DEPONENT:, Yes, they want the numver of interviews, the fact-finding interviews held durin; June, July and August, of 1972. MR. CREANE: Not all of them, really. ‘c're interested in the one that involves fact-findins inter- views other than initial eligibility. We don't want the fact-finding interviews or predetermination hearin on separation. issues. > THE DEPONENT: I think they have a oreaxkco:n on that. I would have to check that. BY “MR. CREANE: QO. Do you know how many claims, initial and continuine claims, were filed in your office last week or the-week bcfore that, just approximately? Kiba TARR GC TAM, me NaF DSR Ra RUE RRA NL ioe ET ike. SSR RAR ENG rae ER A Bis Rae aE Pe ee ee ne -84a- A Between 5,000 to 7,000. Q That would be both new claims and continued? & And continued. The figures varies, that's why I can't give you a definite figure. Those are all obtainable. Q There's a definition by the Devartment of reasonabic effort to obtain work, a statutory requirement for elicibility, contained in this 1956 Policy Letter. I'11 read it to you and ack you if that is senerally the standard that you try to annly and to neve pour fact-finding exaniners apoly. In paracranh two % states, "reasonable efforts to obtain work are such cffort as we would ordinarily exnect anyone to make who is honestly loox- ing for work". A Yes. Q That 1s a very difficult standard to annly, isn't it Mrs. Smarz, in all honesty? A Is it difficult? Q Yes. A Yes, it is difficult. That's why I try to say that it has to be handled on each individual case. Q In order to handle it on an individual case, to make a fair determination on an individual case, the fact-finding examiner would have to know quite a bit about the Claimant, sould (39] ne not. He'd have to know the man's baéksround, the size of his family, his past work record, how badly he needs employment, what type of man he is, his physchological makeup, he would have to xnow cuite a bit, wouldn't he, to make an individual deter- mination? What is reasonable for that man might not be reasonable for another man, isn't that right? A Well it's impossible to know all that about an individual as far as that's concerned, but tie type of work that he's seeking and something about his Background in that particular work and where it's available and what efforts he has mace to get that tyne of work would be my main concern. ® There is in fact, no written list of all of the factors which might influence a decision on whether a reason- able effort to find work has been made, isn't that correct? A dot to my knowledge. Q And in fact, such an exhaustive list would probably not be possible, would it, since there are so many factors which might influence a particular determination by a fact-findine examiner? 4 A That's true. Q To your knowledge, what written standards, relating to reasonable efforts to obtain work, what written standards or policy letters are available to the fact-finding examiners in your office other than this policy letter dated 1956? ey See a) Sade a Le oe Gee aes Sea 5 Stas wn OS piteitlige AR tan REINA, ad AAs OTS Scien iS i Bia ee ey ee ee [He] -86a- To give them puidance in maxinrg their decisions? A Why I'd have to check all my Policy Letters to «ic- termine it, because I have a breakout on it. There's a recent memorandum that came out over the signature of Carl Ziseman. Q I can show you some recent Policy Letters and you can tell me if there are any others, to your knowledee. ~'1) give you a moment to look them over. Is there a requirement, written or unwritten at the Bridgeport unemployment office that persons, when they fill out their UC-45 form, if they List all of the places that they visited all in one day for that two week period, that that would not be reasonable effort? In other words a person went to all ‘n one day, the six places or seven places? A What I would be concerned about in that instance, an: what ve would question, is what about the other nine workinz days in the week, in the two-week period, and why dicn't they” | maxe efforts during that period, because it misht- create an issugnof availability. oe Q Were claimants told that they had to have at least six employers sign the card in order to be elisible? A The employer isn't required to sign the card. ® To list six places of employment that they've vicitcc, were they told that they had to? OOP Tey » vat Bors -87a- A It was not an official notification that they were to tell these people, if that is what happened. But this is, there's no official number or anything in reference to this. Q Suppose a verson, person A, went to six places and > oem Question which was that there was an inexhaustable list of factors ~ “ | } | which could influence the fact-fincing examiner when he made || determination as to whether a reasonable effort has beon macc. | — seem to contradict an earlier statement when you incicatcd “ithas, in fact, the factors were spelled out in the memorancuns | | and my point is that there are only three factors discussed in || the memorandum that you referred to. A . . . i| A. Alright, you have your age. You have: your skills, | i the tyne of work. You have your memorandum on effort here in your reasonableness. That‘ts what I was referring to. i | LT H i| | | oe BY vA ‘ -Yla- Q Well the reasonableness definition, voulén't vou asree simoly is: reasonable is what the fact-findine ¢xamirer determines to be reasonable under the circumstances? A Under the circumstances. Q So that there are man: other factors which can influence whether or not the effort is found to be reasonable? A Yes. Q For example, you indicated that a verson who went back to a place that they had annlied to at an carlter noint, misht or mimnt not de unreasonable for them to do that, to re- apply at factories that they had been to at an earlier dnc? A If an employer indicated that there mav be ennlov- ment if he returned there asain in two weeks, that he may irve a jod for him, it would be reasonable for him to return there. 9 Would the size of the factory that the nersor ve > dack to de a factor? In other vords, if & person went o7e: ocriocically to a very large factory which was known to hive periodically, that might be treated differently doy the fact- Tincing examiner than revisiting a very small factory with a v | low turnover of ezployees? A 6It mieht de. OQ And tiat there are no, that you really rely on tre i mood fudement and gooc sense of your fact-findine examiners to o — Bevvsreneieiae ones ians [mm -96a - why it makes it so difficult. They usually will have the hearin-~ while they're there. If someone has created the problem in the past of not having the hearing or is collecting or is electinr | to have the hearing at a future date, then we vav them their I penerits. Then they nave the hearing later. Q So they are paid? A I know what you're talking about. You're referrinre I have so few of them that actually occur. MR. CREANE: I think we might have, there might be a misunderstanding here. I just want to make sure that we're talking about the same situation. When you talked about a person being paid, pending a hearin-, you're talking about a refusal of a referral, that tyne of an issue, are you not? A refusal of the job offered | by the Employment Service? THE DEPONENT: Yes. They vould be vaid their benefits, right. And then if an issue occured whcre we are going to deny the benefits when it would have be, constitute an overpayment. You f-llow? Do you under- ' stand what I mean? MR. CREANE: Do you mind if I ask questions to try to clarify? (Directed to Mr. Wasik). ecleant Pt Ne 2, Ae Nasa CMEC EE to the question that arose isere. They would be paid their checks). ee SOL Ea IPE PE 6 PO LEY BE ADIA CE AEE te lg Oh MCLELLAN ELN A ae 1 > -97a- BY AR. CRATE: © A person comes in and is referred to a fact-findinz examiner because of a quest‘on of lack of reasonable effort, do your fact-finding examiners, is there a written policy, do they always tell the claimant, “you can have your hearing in a week or now ever long it will take you to get your witnesses tozetiier and you'il get your checks today, anyway, until you get the hearin??" Vv You're not saying that those checks will be paid that day, are you tuat a person can choose to have the hearing a week or two weeks f Well he can't choose to have it a week or two weeks later, because the hearing would be scheduled five days hence or what have you. I mean as far as that's concerned we would schedule a hearing for him. ; © Or even one day hence. Are you saying that the per- son will get their two checks for the period? A If they, let me put it this way. If it's a ouestion that I want to go home this afternoon and I can brir¢- this information back to you, we'd let him go home and bring the in- formation back or he's coming back the next day, we would brins it back, he would bring it back the next day. So you would nold vayments for that period of time until he brought back the in- formation. How you have an issue of a hearing that's beins scheduled and I think that's what your referrinz to. © A predetermination hearing or pre-termination nearinsc? [st - ELS 6 BL AOA LDS AEA ETO -_ -9Ra- A Well sometimes an individual will sit down and they're advised that if they want you can interview them now on the issue or vou can interview them at a later time. If he wants 2 hearine, if he wants a scheduled hearinn, as a rulc, tnev will hav2> it then. If an issue arises where they want to have it five days hence, ‘ou would pay them and schedule then ? for a hearine. If an issue comes up where they are zoin= to be denied benefits on the period, it would be an overpayment. Now the, this, how can 7 ail times is there. ! i | i} O I just wanted to ask, you mentioned that you hid core \ | i li employees who were working while they were soins to school. Are | the two Snanish-speaking employees full-time emplovees, or are | they working onlv on a vart-time basis? A Full-time basis. ® Full-time employees. How long have they been iith the Bridreport office. A They started I think in December of 1971 and: January jes 1972, I think both of them came in. © Prior to that time were there any Spanish-snea‘:in’ emmloyees in the bridceeport office? A I became manazer in December of 1971, so J can't. ! 9 Did you work in that office before? «\ Years aro. 9 O.K. But in that period, say from December of Syl, bacx five years ago, vou have no knowledre of what the enovioynent situation was? | . | | | ' H { | H -_ SO PREM NRE re MTN Aen anime. -106a- A No I haven't. It wouldn't be, it was very vaczuc. I wouldn't know of the staffing pattern. Q What is the employment, what is their job title, | these two Svanish-spveaking employees? A Employment security aides. | Q Level? j A Yes, I think they're two. | Q Two. Both of them are level two? A I thinx so. Q And that they wouldn't be involved in fact-findinr determinations? A No. | Q I have no further questions. | BY “MR. CREANE: i Q Just one final question. The fact-finding examiners | | when they're hired, what type of trainine or experience arc ticy miven before they begin their actual duties? | | A Well, it varies. There -is a certain amount of train- | ing that I, as a manarer, would give them. | ' | O Would you deseribe that? { A They have the policy letters that I give them to read and review. We have, they're acquainted with the Inter- | |pretive Dizest, the laws, the fact-finding forms. Brief basic | | | | ' co [én outlines as to what they would need to compile into a resort. Discussions on the various tynes of fact-findines that may arise. Tnev're told about tne inserts, I acquire some books for t*cm on interviewinn. They start with some of the simpler cases, sort of an on the job trainine. Their cases are revievied by the sunert. visor and co through a six-month vrobationary veriod and any unusual cases that arise are discussed. They're alwavs frce to ask any questions that may arise, to check anvthine that vc have available in the office. If anythine unusual comes un, it's referred to the adjudication unit in Hartford. Q Of the nine fact-finding examiners that are oresentiv working there, tow many have come to work in your office curvin- the past year? How rany of them were working there a year 270? A I think 111 but one. They weren't all workin-~ in the capacity of fact. finders. They were promoted. One enre fro: another cffise up state. She was promoted and civen the annotrnt- ment in the Bridgeport office. ‘ne other.. © So, how many were working as fact-finders a vear 270? If you don't know, don't answer. A I'd say four or five. Q Out of a total of how many fact-finders a vear a-o? A ,Actual fact-finders, were two. There was anot..cr title for a groun that were brought in and they were broucnt in to train for fact-finding. I can't think of the title ovf-hand. ' ‘ ' ‘ ‘ ‘ yatabseuddy % 2 4 ‘ . 2 | 3 - 3 4 3 a 3 C4 4 [63] SRAM EE SAID ES LE LE RA AINE AG -108a- MR. KELLY: Excuse me, were they called the intermittent ciaims examiner? Tic DEPONENT: Oh, no. I'll get that nane for you if vou'd like because I know that they hac a different title for that. But then they were annointed, they took the exam and were appointed as fact-finders. ‘ney worked in the capacity of fact-finders. SY AR. CRIANE: You indicated in resnonse to a question from “Vir. Wasik that in normal times, whatever they mizht be, that it is the practice to give periodic redeterminations? A Periodic interviews, yes. O And what is the, how does that work? A Well, initially-- Q By the way, are we in normal times now at the Brid-ec- port office? Are neriodic redeterminations given on rerularlvy seneduled basis? A Not quite. The claimant is given a benefit ririts interview and all the eligibility reouirements are explained to them. Then they file their first compensable claim. % And when the workload is not? A When the workload is normal, we are oneratinz normally their elisibility requirements are all explained and durinz we may code him or her every six or eight weeks denendinzy om what -109a- the course of this interview any questions that may arise with them are discussed. All the, and the examiner will determine at that time the type of work the individual is looking for, the amount, the age of the individual, the marital status of woman, man and whether or not there may be any factors that would in- volve his availability for employment. And then they're coced for periodic re-interviews. Q How does that work, the periodic re-interviews® A Well, say for a woman that has children and she's seekint work. She was laid off, or she quit her job because she | has a problem, a babysitting problem, what have you. She ouit her job, she's now avatiabie for work and she's looking, for wor':. She meets the eligibility requirement at this time and we would probably-re-code her for an interview every fourth week. Q So that the re-coding for a periodic reintervic::-- A She would be re-coded. Q Would be if there was some special circumstances? A Special circumstances that may be involved. Q But it doesn't mean that everyone would be coded for a neriodic interview? A Every fourth week, no. And then an older person who 4s available for work and making, efforts to get work, seeking wor": the circumstances are. ce RE ae Gd DRS TRE RN “ere pisret asa (64) -110a- / 10a Oo That answers my question. A It would be sect in that manner. MR. CREANE: Don, do you have any furtner questions. “2, WASIK: No. M2. CREANE: Thank you very much Mrc-. Smarz. THE DEPONENT: Now you mentioned somevhinr, let me clarify a point. You mentioned something about the hearings and there was something that I wanted tol clarify with vou. As I exvlained that when an individual is seated for a hearing, now, and this is one noint that I try to stress with my people that they can have the. hearing, now or the hearing, is they can have it scheduicc for them and if it is rescheduled they are paid their benefits. You asked me why I thoucht there were so few of those re-scheduled hearings. Wasn't tnat one auction that you asked? MR. CREANE: Well, in fact, so few tiat vou could not recall a single instance where on the issue of reasonable effort. THE DEPONENT: For reasonable effort it iias arisen. cr) -I1la- MR. CREANE: Yes. THE DEPONENT: I can't really recall it. We give them a brief explanation that they have the right to have a hearing now or the hearing later ana they choose now, so we just proceed with it. MR. CREANE: Do you know if your fact-findinq examiners always tell the person that they can set their checks now 4f they choose to have their hearing later? THE DEPONENT: No, I can't honestly say that they would probably say that. And this is one thnin~ I wanted to clarify with you. But if an issue does arise, and the individual does say that, does request to have a hearing scheduled, he 4s paid and that's the procedure that follows. If it's determined at the hearing that he is ineligible for benefits an overpayment would be sect un, MR. CREANE: But, that is, ordinarily, the claimant would be told you can —e the hearing now or you can have it later? SHE DEPONENT: Tnen they elect. MR. CREANE: O.K. Thank you very much. FRADE 2A. a aa dow Cee Atel PROS Shanti IAR ggDATEDL aceite ATT Se aE [c«]| -112a- STATE OF CONNECTICUT ) | ) ss. March 20, 1973 Bridgeport COUNTY OF FAIRFIELD ) I, Margarita Torres, an employee of Bridgeport Legal Services, Inc., do hereby certify that the deposition of (MRS. ELCANOR H. SMARZ was taken under oath before me pursuant to Rules 30 (a) and (b) (4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at 412 East Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut on Thursday, February 8, 1973 at 1:45 p.m. ; I further certify that the witness was sworn by Attorney Ira Horowitz to tell the truth, was examined by counsel and her testimony was recorded on tape and was sub- sequently transcribed by me as herebefore appears. Dated At Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 20th day of March, 1973. ' Sh trgarnch ATi Mapgarita S. .orres PP Lal habe BMT a -I13a- ST/TE OF CONNECTICUT LABOR DEP/RTMFNT Employment Security Division Fl. Ex. 14 Unemployment Compensation Department 92 Farmington Avenue Hartford 15, Com. SHU AULLETIN WO. 15 Decerber 6, 1955 TO: ALL U. C. MANAGERS (ND PACT PIMDING EX/MIWERS IM LOC/L OFFICES 1. 2. 3. Due to the snowstorm end resulting prospects of dangerous driving conditions, the conference of fact finding expminers rnd claims supervisors which was held in Centrel Office on Fridey, December 2, 1955, on the subject of writing non~ determinetionc was ended sooner then had been plenned. Becsuse of the of "completeness." With reference to this subject we hed pointed out that "completeness" of # non-monetary determinstion requires the presence of four elements: (1) stetement of the law which is determinative of the issue; (2) of the facts on which the decision is basedy (3) statement of the re in arriving st the conclusions and (l) the We had considered our proposed presentation and discussion of the element of "reasoning" as the most importent pert of the entire subject of writing non- monetary determinetions end were diseppointed that the opportunity for this presentation ena discussion wss lost by the early sdjourment of the nesting. It wae intended to put perticuler stress and emphasis on the "reasoning" pert of determinations beceuse of the fact that we heve not heretofore n-monetary determinetion poges 10, Ll, end 12 of the "Manuel on Writing Non- Monetery Determinrtions," copies of which were distributed st the conclusion toward observing the epplicetion of the "reasoning" element in a non-monetary determination. ; sich) a wh kapha RAS 21 ESO a heilts Nis SMe ai at Ibs RU te od dks ‘ Le -l14a- [-2 7 S2U BU'LITIN MO. 15 December 8, 1955 Effective December 19, 1955, ll non-monetory determinctions in cases of aveil- ebility, lerving work, discherces, end refusal of referral to or offer of work will contein, in addition to the customary facts and conclusion, the reasoning usec in arriving at the conclusion. Inserts 1 and 2 in the current list of authorized decision ---inserte will no longer be used, since, in decisions on refusels of referral to or offer of work, the determination must henceforth contain e statement of the "reasoning" as indiceted above. Similarly, the use of insert 9 (Lack of Effort) in the list of authorised inserts, is to be dis- continved. With respect to the required determination in this type of case, ottention is directed to the serple determination appearing under (5) on page 7 of the Manual. Morris E. Tonken fpproveds Special Review Unit . f . A . AL Va yi Tea, = Georre J. ‘Welker Director iegenitettiat i tei eins nt tS RE SR oe A eta L -l1Sa- - STATE OF CONNECTICUT LABOR DEPARTMENT Employment Security Division Pil. Ex. 15 Unemployment Compensation Department 92 Farmington Avenue Hartford 15, Conn. February 27, 1956 ALL_U.C. MANAGERS AND FACT FINDING EXAMINERS IN LOCAL OFFICES During the past several weeks we have made a careful and detailed study of cases in which the local office decision was reversed by an unemployment commissioner. Of the various different issues which were found to have been included in these cases, the issue of leaving work was perhaps more prominent with respect to the questions raised by the reversals in connection with the manner in which the cases were originally handled by the local office. In the leaving work category of cases there ceems to be the greatest variance between the local office examiner's finding of facts and the unemployment commissioner's finding of facts. Cases have een repeatedly observed in which the reason for the quit as found by the commissioner was completely different from the reason for the quit as found by the fact finding examiner. It is frequently found that the fact finding report indicates, in the claimant's version, more than one reason for the quit, in which case the examiner has based his decision on his application of one of these reasons; whereas the commissioner has found that the motivating reason for the quit was not that chosen by the local office examiner, but was rather one of the other reasons which had been mentioned to the fact finding examiner by the claimant in the course of the interview and which had been referred to in the fact finding report. For example,*¥the fact finding report indicates that the claimant had quit his job because his employer had refused his request for expense money to defray the costs of commuting a considerable distance to and from work - the report mentions, more or less in passing, that daily driv- ing of this considerable distance, has been aggravating his sacroiliac con- dition - the commissioner finds that the aggravation of claimant's sacroiliac condition motivated the quit, rather than the employer's refusal to pay expense money. The situation presented by the above type of case as well as other similar cases which have been observed in our survey raises a definite possibility that the leaving work cases involve an area in which our fact finding examiners must be particularly astute and direct special attention in their fact finding interviews to uncover and determine the specific and actual reason for the claimant's quit. Where the-claimant assigns more than one reason for his quit, it is incumbent on the examiner to determine whether any one reason of those expressed was the specific reason which impelled the quit. Where there is an inference or-an implication that claimant quit his job for a reason in addition to that specifically expressed by the claimant, the reason so raised by infer- ence or implication should not be ignored by the examiner; in such case, the examiner should determine, after careful questioning, whether that r€ason was B/. AlN Nea fie iO CT aS MR EE ALG MAB ROS: Nd li Aes s Heli Si Sout Se ap, Same Se eR NR Mesos shat hey? FH A SALLE LEAR TENE ELM IETS HE Ta AE EER DNL A ERO SAE NEON Se nm ek toe kes _ = February 27, 1956 or was not the motivating cause of the quit. In other situations, where the reason for the quit as expressed by the claimant is obscure, ambiguous, or of doubtful authenticity in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, it is incumbent on the examiner to continue and pursue a line of questioning designed to discover the real and actual reason for the quit. Fact finding examiners are urged to direct particular attention to fact find- ing interviews in “leaving work" cases in the light of the above comments. (s) George J. Walker . Director -117a- Pl. Ex. 16 STATE OF CONNECTICUT Lasorn Derartment — Empcoyment Security Dmsion 92 Farmmincton AveNUE * Hartroap 15. Connecnicut {NEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION October 22, 1956 | DEPARTMENT Disputed Cleins Policy Letter, SRU, A60H TO: ALL U. C. MANAGERS SUBJECT: Statutory Requirenent of "Reasonable Efforts to Obtain Work" 1. Statutory Provision One of the conditions of eligibility for benefits prescribed by our Un- enploynent Compensation Law is that the clainant "has been and is woking reasonuble efforts to obtain work." (Section 7507 (2) ). 2. What constitutes "Reasonable Efforts?" "Reasonable efforts to obtain work" ore such efforts os we would ordi- morily expect anyone to wake who is honestly looking for work. Just how uuch effort is required to satisfy this condition cannot be set down under any hard and fast rule. Aside from the efforts which we require elderly persons to wake, as discussed below, the extent to which a Claimant is required to mcke such efforts in order to characterize then as “reasonable" efforts within the meaning of the law depends upon sev- eral varying factors - labor warket conditions prevailing at the partic- ular tire, claiuant's physical condition, the length of claimant's un- euployuent, the extent to which the claimant's union serves as an exclusive hiring agent, etc. For exouple, where, in a given area, there ore numerous potential sources of crploy.ent which way provide opportu- nities for such work as the clainant desires, a reasonable effort to find work on his part will require more nucerous and frequent euiployer contacts. If, however, there is very little hiring taking place because of depressed econauic activity and the Buployuent Service hus nost of the existing jobs listed in its files, then a less complete round of visits to possible employers is indiccted. Siuilurly, where, by virtue of union regulations, oa claincnt's sole source of employnent is his union agent, constant contact with the union agent would constitute a reasonable effort to obtain work. It is not intended to require clain- ants to wake futile trips to euployers' hiring offices just for the sake of building up a record of job seeking. Siuilarly, where the claimant is afflicted with a physical discbility which is not so serious os to negative his eligibility for benefits but is of such nature as to re- strict his physical robility, a less concerted proyra of euployer con- tects by such Claiuant is indicated. ae DER BEN AMER WA Nhs NOB, RIS IGE eG Whaat LWA SIL hating ds AEE Sallie ak AAS ey / 7 -118a- file. Disputed Claoins Policy Letter, SRU, A60H October 22, 1956 3. Procedural Application of "Reasonable Efforts" Requirernent In connection with the applicction of the “reasonable efforts" require- uent of the law from a procedural standpoint, attention is directed to the procedure described) in the Chief oi Benefits' Meuorandu. No. 153, DA 26, subject: "Procedure for Periodic Reinterviews," dated June 30, 1954. 4. Requirenent of "Reasonable Efforts to Obtain Work" With Respect to Claiiiants Fifty-five Years of Age and Gver It has becone increasingly apparent that present labor uarket conditions are such thct the prospects of obtaining work are not generally favorable to persons fifty-five years of age and over. Where there is an adequate supply of labor a:ong the younger element of the labor force, the older elexent is inevitcbly pushed into the outer fringe of the labor pool. Since we recognize that persons fifty-five years of age and over find it difficult to obtain work through the mediwi of independent search, it is undesirable to recuire such persons to wake an independent search for work. As stated above, "it is not intcnded to require claimants to wake futile trips to euployers' hiring offices just for the sake of building up a record of job seeking." In view of the status of the elderly worker in today's lobor Larket, the conclusion is reached that the uointenance of an active registration with the Connecticut State Euployuent Service constitutes "reasonable efforts to obtuin vork" with respect to all claiuants fifty-five years of ege and over. Very truly yours, Director mee A Move Segphefiie Erecting Director Prepared by Special Review Unit net peemenens TS oT TENET ye -119a- STATE OF CONNECTICUT Ex. 17 LABOR DEPARTMENT TO: Emp.oyment Security Division Unemployment Compensation Department 92 Farmington Avenue Hartford 15, Conn. R & A Bulletin No. 20 August 20, 1958 ALL U. C. MANAGERS AND FACT FINDING EXAMINERS Cases have come to our attention in which the claimant has been denied benefits because of an unreasonable restriction on his availability and, upon filing a claim for the week immediately following the disallowed claim, he advises the examiner of his removal of the restriction in question. The claimant's claim series is then reinstated and his eligibility is established. In cases such as that described above, it is sometimes true that if the claimant had been advised by the examiner that the re- striction which he has imposed on his availability will require a finding of ineligibility, the claimant would have immediately reconsidered his employment desires and withdrawn his stated restriction. The withholding of benefits from the claimant for One week without advising him of the reason for such action before the issuance of the decision and the granting of benefits for the next week in consequence of his declaration of compli- ance with the availability requirement after being notified of the reason for his ineligibility is neither an equitable nor a realistic method of handling this situation. In any case in which the claimant's expressed restriction on his availability is such as to conipel a finding of ineligibility, the fact find- ing examiner must orally advise him, before issuing a written decision of disapproval, that the restriction in question has the effect of making him ineligible for benefits. If the claim- ant, despite such advice, adheres to the restriction, a decision of disapproval is in order. If, how2ver, the claimant reconsiders his employment desires and, in the light of the examiner's advice, withdraws his restriction, thereby putting himself in compliance with the availability requirement, an award of benefits is in order. Lo Se A Soe te -120a- dtae iclea te a — + ' Ls) ' R & A Bulletin No. 20 August 20, 1958 Cases have been observed in which the claimant is initiating a claim series after childbirth and despite the fact that the end- ing date of the two month period after childbirth falls within the first benefit week for which a claim is filed, such claim is approved by the local Office examiner. The approval of such claim is contrary to law. SIA RR Ha ate RO CAIRN iy aN AN ART SS lat N 7 Where the claimant is claiming benefits two months after child- birth, the first week for which she may be eligible for benefits is the week which, in its entirety (exclusive of Sunday), is beyond the ending date of the two month period following the date of childbirth. Thus, if the two month period ends on Mon- day of -the first week for which the claimant claims benefits, the claimant is ineligible that week. LRadiepisak Wound 8 | ils Pla 4 & ; Morris E. Tonken 3 Review and Appeals App roved: Joseph J. Gibbons Executive Director , Pp Ppa eee arena = Se a ee " PDE ALA She Dig RENAE I RIC AALS A ath PONS “8 M8 -121a- Pl. Ex. 27 rome a80- 20 ‘ANTEROPFICE MEMORANDUM (REV. 8-700 To, ALL LOCAL OFFICE MANAGERS, FIELD AND CENTRAL DATE: JUNE 30, 1972 OFFICE SUPERVISORS FG0% Sohn F. Pescatello, Chief of Benefits OIECT: CONTINUED CLAIM WORK EFFORT INFORMATION FORM (UC 45) The form is to be used for all intrastate continued claims. It is to be given to all claimants and they will be required to return it on their next scheduled visit. Completed forms will be retained in the Claim Record Card and are to be used as an indication of the claimant's search for work. A fact- finding interview should be scheduled, as space and time permit, for those claimants that indicate that their search for employment or availability is questionable. Checks should not be issued to claimants that show they did not look for work (unless there is a valid non-disqualifying reason) without a factfinding interview that clearly establishes their eligibility. . Lines should not be held up for claimants to fill out this form. It should be completed and signed by the claimant before reporting to the office. Claimants should be informed that employers are not required to complete or make entries on this form. After the initial distribution supplies should be reordered from the Stock Room. This procedure is to be implemented immediately upon receipt of the forms. John F. Pescatello . Chief of Benefits . APPROVES? 3’: Theodore W. Hatcher U.C. Director Pn CURR aR. a) (»8q) “Sa8j)202q GIMQGS {> Sig Ys VOT2ZUUOD UI >pew SiuIwaIeIS yr eyI A112? Aqaaan 1 0) apew s1u2ma)eI8 28/8) 10) San1[euId Faptacid ae] aq eM PUwsaPUN | “2m ay (papacy j! ‘apis saqio 287) Aye Ure[ x2 ‘0M 30) YOO] 10U PIP MOA 4] “Q x ILEANA RSM REE CEI s.70nsa0 AuBNOS BUCE Lchahaoasdihdsneel ssaucov 034 39¥1NODS3DVIG Bavo aO Baas hOMM O14 NOSUBG “Kp qeem (USWA! T UW? BIE OF 110552 penusisgn A (os]e apis 2aqio 28) Paireiuor Sa>r"/d J29qI0 PUB “FuoTUR 10g8| ‘saakojdwa woj2q 1st) pu® ATINIIUVD LNIVd “* ‘wioy S1y) VO $21/1Ua a_Bw 10 212/dWO> Or Pasinda! lou 28 sirholdwy wonegasag [ea87) 218;4 pue yoog 1uaWAs INCA Gitm@ Paruaseaid Pus Par2jdwo> Iq 1snw wo} sry 20 | (Om Pury o1 OP MOA PIP eye “GINIVTD (S)NIIS 24) FouN (21PPEND (sng) ose) on 66 BNWN or wows > = NOILVWYOSN! 1Y0333 WHOM WIVTD G3NNILNOD * im) :03¥9A0D GOINAd ZZ “XH “Td = -14a0 NOMLVSNadWOD LNIWAOTAWANN “NNOD ite Sd Fa al PRO a ete sp YON So iS tal ¥ ls LN Tey SemNet a 92 Farmington Avenue nistrator STATE OF CONNECTICUT Hartford 15, Conn. dE. Hausman LASOR DEPARTYENT utive Director BIPLOWENT SECURITY IvISION UNE?PLOYMENT COMPENSATION DKPARTYONT SRU BULLETIN NO. 8 Pl. Ex. 28 b May 19, 1953 To; All U.C. 8 and Fact Finding Examiners 1. Special Review Unit has observed numerous local office decisions deny~ ing benefits for restricted availability which cannot be said to be supported by the facts appearing on the accompanying fact finding re- porte. These are cases in which the findings of fact as presented in the fact finding report raise nothing more than a mere inference or an implication that the claimant is imposing a restriction on her availability - and it must be remembered that a decision based on inference or implication is as vulnerable as a decision based on presumption. The fact finding reports in these cases are completely defective since they do not contain complete coverage of the question whether an actual restriction exists, amd, conversaly, the decisions FFRs "Clt has been vnemployed for 2 months - seeking work as a grinder or machine operator - believes she should receive at least $1.15 an hour.” Decisions "By limiting your employment prospects to work paying at least $1.15 an hour, you have placed 80 severe a restriction on your availability for work as to render yourself, in effect, unavailable for work and therefére ineligible for benefits." The mere fact that the claimant believes herself to be entitled to at least $1.15 an hour cannot compel a sound conclusicn that the claimant will not accept employment which pays less than that figure. Hence, her statement does not support a conclusion that she has imposed a restriction on her availubility. The contents of the above quoted report are a sufficient indication to a reviewer that the examiner, in the course of interviewing the claimant, failed to pursue his line of questioning to an ultimate conclusion. He obviously failed to ascer- tain from the claimant whether she will or will not accept employment less than $1.15 an hour. In the absence of a statement to this effect in the fact finding report, there is no support for the exariner's conclusion that the clainant has unreasonably restricted hor availability. Q t In fact finding reports on the isSue of restricted availability, such expressions as “prefers first shift," or “would like job from 11 A.M. to 3:30 P.M.," or “wants job within walking distance of home,” or "would rather not work for less than .95 an hour," should not appear without an explanatory elaboration, obtained from the claimnt, as to whether the stated preference actually constitutes a specific limitation on the employment the claimant is willing to accept. In fact, such reports must contain an unequivocal statement whether the claimant will or will not accept employment outside his stated preference. -124a- es [- 2 ‘) SRU Bulletin, Continued Yay 19, 3.953 2. Despite previous discussions of the impurt of General Letter 163, cases still appear in which local offices have failed to observe tne procedural requirements prescribed in that letter relative to the transmittal of Additional Claims attached to the fact finding re directly to Special Review Unit, where the Additional Claim 8 ed under such circumstances as to invoke application of General Letter 163- he have observed recurring instances of "163" cases in which local offices have transnitted the Additional Claim and fact finding report, each through normal channels, with the result that an unnecessary merit rating charge problem is created in Central Office. It is recormended that the above nentioned transmittal procadure be rehearsed at the next training session in each local office. ~ ao «| “my Men + I ornyrn Vorris FE. Tonken Special Neview Unit Approved: f-- J Mra ten ard —. Hausmen Kxecutive Direct [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0356%3A01. Public record. Not legal advice.