# Amicus Curiae Brief — Wolff v. McDonnell

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0338%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 418 U.S. 539

## Text

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
ARGUMENT . 4
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY . 4

I. MANY OF THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

DEEMED TO BE IMPRACTICAL BY THE

STATE OF NEBRASKA HAVE BEEN

INSTITUTED ATLORTON. ........ 5
Il. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL SHOULD EX-
TEND TO DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS. . ... 6
A. Nature of the Individual’s Interest . . . . .. 7
B. The Governmental Interest . ....... 9

Ill. INMATES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSERS ....... 12

IV. INMATES SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO
CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES ....... 13
-QONCLUSION ................ «455

APPENDIX (Letters of Consent)

(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

Cases:
Davis v. Alaska,

42 U.S.LW. 4295 (U.S. Feb. 26,1974) . . ..... BB
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

411 U.S.778(1973) . ........2.2.... dU
Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S.254(1970) . . ... 2... ee es 4,8
Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S.471(1972) ............ 4,8
Pollard v. Washington,

CA No. 2055-71 (D.D.C.1971) . . . . . . 2,3,5,6,7,14
Pointer v. Texas,

MOOUB: OOD... 2. ww wee eh hh hh hh hl CUM
Woodard v. Washington,

CA No. 1659-71 (D.D.C.1971) . . . . .. . . 2,4,9,14
Wright v. Jackson,

CA No. 73-186-A (E.D. Va. 1973) . . .2,3,4,5,6,7, 8, 13,14
Constitution and Statutes:
U. S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment. . . .... . . 2,4
Miscellaneous:
es OR - | a a a,

Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of
the State of California, AmicusCuriae. . . . . . . 12,14

(iii)

Pager

Deposition of John O. Boone on January 20, 1972,

in Pollard v. Washington, supra . . . . . . 9,10,11,14,15
Deposition of Carl Coleman on July 30, 1973,

in Pollard v. Washington,supra . . ........ 7
Deposition of Thomas P. Gaydos on July 31, 1973,

in Pollard v. Washington,supra . . ..... 6, 10, 13
gp aor rehearsal 1973,

in Wright v. Jackson, supra. . . . -... 7,8
Deposition of Joseph L. Mastin on July 30, 1973,

in Pollard v. Washington,supra . . . . .... =. + #«=‘&T7;,12
Deposition of Clarence Larry Swain on July 31, 1973,

in Pollard v. Washington,supra . . . . . 2 6
Deposition of James Edward —o = 22,

1973 in Wright v. Jackson, supra... . .. . 67,9
District of Columbia Prison Disciplinary Procedures

and Code of Prison Offenses, initially approved

December 7, 1973, approved in final form on

December 27, 1973, and incorporated in final

order on January 11, 1974, in Wright v. Jackson,

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, Task Force
Report: Corrections(1967) . . . . ....... «dS

-—

OC eee OMe Ce, eee eee on

SNE SE OE LD aE MN Sal, Oey IIE Tae ONE IE Lye EY

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-679

CHARLES WOLFF, JR., et al,
Petitioners,

Vv.

ROBERT O. McDONNELL, et ai,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

BRIEF OF INMATES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX AT LORTON, VIRGINIA

AMICI CURIAE

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are the representatives in class action litiga-
tion of the 2,000 inmates of the District of Columbia De-
partment of Corrections’ Correctional Complex at Lorton,
Virginia. These inmates have an intense interest in the

7

basic questions concerning prison administration and con-
trol raised by this case. In three actions, Nathaniel Wrighi,
III v. Delbert C. Jackson, Civil Action No. 73-186-A (E.D.
Va. 1973), Pollard v. Washington, Civil Action No. 2055-
71 (D.D.C. 1971), and Woodard v. Washington, Civil Ac-
tion No. 1659-71 (D.D.C. 1971), Lorton inmates have
sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the proce-
dures followed in the disciplinary proceedings at the Com-
plex. In their complaints, plaintiffs asserted that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution requires that they be accorded, inter
alia, the rights to confront their accusers, to cross-examine
witnesses, and to be represented by counsel.

On September 12, 1973, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia (Judge Albert V. Bryan,
Jr., presiding) preliminarily granted substantially all relief
requested by the Wright plaintiffs, and on December 7,
1973, it initially approved a new “Prison Disciplinary Pro-.
cedures and Code of Prison Offenses,” which it incorpor-
ated in the final order on January 11, 1974. These pro-
cedures required, inter alia, that an inmate called before
the Lorton disciplinary board for other than a “petty”
tule infraction be informed of and accorded the following
procedural rights:

2

(1) written notice of the charges and the time and
place of the hearing,

(2) the right to be personally present before the
disciplinary board,

(3) the right to remain silent,

‘

3

(4) the right to counsel or a lay substitute,'

(5) the right to present written evidence,

(6) the right to call witnesses,

(7) the right to know the names of and confront his
accusers, including correctional officials and inmate
informants, unless the prison officials cari show
that the disclosure of an inmate informant’s name
would pose a threat to his safety,

(8) the right to cross-examine all witnesses appearing
before the board,

(9) the right to be judged by an impartial panel of
persons not engaged in any previous investigation
of the charges against the accused,

(10) the right to examine the written record or taped
recording of the proceedings,

(11) the right to a written appeal, and

(12) the right to receive a copy of the prison discip-
linary procedures and rules, with a clear delinea-
tion of the possible punishments for violations
thereof.

Judge Bryan’s decision has been appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and in light of both
this Court’s decision to hear the present case and the ap-
peal of the Wright decision, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia has stayed the Pollard

1 The court did not reach the question of appointed counsel,
because there has been, at least until the present date, an adequate
number of private attorneys who are willing to be retained by
prisoners without fee, and because of the availability of law students
for the representation of prisoners upon request.

ae ji

4

and Woodard actions. Hence, amici curiae have a substan.
tial interest in the basic due process questions before this
Court. They file this brief with the written consent of
the parties, pursuant to Rule 42(1) of the Rules of this
Court. Copies of the letters of consent are being filed
with the Clerk and are appended to this brief.

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In the Wright case the District Court held that the Fifth
Amendment requires prison authorities to conform prison
disciplinary proceedings to some of the elemental standard
of due process of law. The Court ruled in substance that
the inmate’s interest in the accuracy of the fact-finding
process in disciplinary proceedings — an interest that the
prison authorities share — could be protected by the erec
tion of procedural safeguards without infringing improperly
on the governmental interest in maintaining the security
and order of the prison. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). Among the procedural incidents of the disciplinary
process required by Judge Bryan are the rights to counsel,
to confrontation of accusers, and to cross-examination of
witnesses. Since these three rights lie at the center of the
issues in the present case; the amici curiae in the instant
brief will describe the disciplinary procedures at Lorton
and will then demonstrate, through some of the evidence
considered by Judge Bryan, that granting these procedural
rights would serve the interests of both the government
and the inmate. --

5

I. MANY OF THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS DEEMED
TO BE IMPRACTICAL BY THE STATE OF NE-
BRASKA HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED AT LORTON

Deposition testimony taken in both the Wright and
Pollard actions shows that many of the procedural rights
guaranteed by this Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra,
and by the Eighth Circuit in this case were, in practice,
afforded to Lorton inmates even before Judge Bryan's
judgment in Wright.

The disciplinary process at Lorton was commenced by
a correctional officer writing a disciplinary report concern-
ing his observation of an infraction by an inmate. This
disciplinary report was transmitted to the shift supervisor
who interviewed the inmate as to the substance of the
report after reading the report, including the names of
accusers, to the inmate. After conducting an investigation,
the shift supervisor could transmit the report to a disci
plinary board made up of three employees of the Depart-
ment of Corrections. At the disciplinary hearing before
this board,’ the inmate could make a statement on his
own behalf with the assistance of either counsel or a lay
substitute. If the charges were sustained, and the discipli-
nary board recommended that good time be forfeited or
that the inmate be transferred to maximum security, then
the recommendation would be transmitted to the Super
intendent of the Complex who, in turn, must recommend
punishment to the Director of Operations. Ordinarily, al-
though not invariably, the disciplinary board was composed
of persons who had taken no part in prior investigation
of the charges against the inmate; the inmate would be
advised that anything he tells the investigating officer may
be used against him; the board would telephone witnesses

6

outside the inmate’s presence; and brief summary minutes
of the proceedings would be taken.”

However, Lorton rules and regulations did not provide
inmates with the following procedural incidents in disci-
plinary hearings, as a matter of right:

(1) the right to receive a copy of an investigatory re
port prepared by a correctional official prior to
the disciplinary hearing;

(2) the right to receive written notice of the charges;

(3) the right to call witnesses in his behalf; and

(4) the right to cross-examine witnesses.?

Lorton officials were unable to explain why these rights |
could not be afforded inmates,‘ and Judge Bryan apparent |
ly believed that these minimal due process guarantees :
could be instituted without impairing any valid state inter
ests.

Il. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
SHOULD EXTEND TO DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS

As just stated, one of the rights that was recognized at
Lorton even without any judicial command was the right

2 Deposition of James Edward Swoboda, then Associate Admin-
istrator of Operations, on August 22, 1973, in Wright v. Jackson,
Civil Action No. 73-186-A (E.D. Va. 1973) [hereinafter, Swoboda
deposition] at 19-29, 56-57; deposition of Clarence Larry Swain,
then Acting Superintendent of Adult Services, on July 31, 1973, in
Pollard v. Washington, Civil Action No. 2055-71 (D.D.C. 1972)
[hereinafter, Swain deposition] at 18-24; deposition of Thomas P.
Gaydos, then Acting Shift Captain, on July 31, 1973, in Pollard v.
Washington, supra, [hereinafter, Gaydos deposition] at 26, 32-33.

3 Swoboda deposition at 27, 38; Swain deposition at 19-20, 23.
4 Swain deposition at 30-33.

—

7

to be represented at a disciplinary hearing by counsel or
lay substitute. Experience at Lorton demonstrates that
the presence of counsel or a lay substitute serves the. in-
terests of both the state and the inmate in the adminis-
tration of the correctional process. Balancing government-
al and inmate interests, due process dictates that the in-
mate’s overwhelming interest in an accurate fact-finding
process far outweighs any tenuous interest of prison ad-
ministrators in punishing inmates summarily, and this is
the only interest that is claimed to be advanced by deny-
ing counsel to inmates.

A. Nature of the Individual’s Interest

Prisoners at Lorton have been deprived of statutory
“good time” credit, segregated in maximum security facili-
ties, denied privileges accorded other residents of the in-
mate population, and denied parole* as a result of disci-
plinary hearings conducted by correctional officials.®

5 Deposition of Lt. Joseph L. Mastin, shift supervisor, on July
30, 1973, in Pollard v. Washington, supra, [hereinafter, Mastin de-
position] at 10; Swoboda deposition at 58-62; deposition of Leon
L. Keenan, administrator of maximum security, on August 22,

1973, in Wright v. Jackson, supra, (hereinafter, Keenan deposition]
at 7-15; deposition of Carl Coleman, Chairman of District of Colum-
bia Parole Board, on July 30, 1973, in Pollard v. Washington, supra,
at 21-24.

6 For example, Kenneth O. Pollard, named plaintiff in the Pol-
lard action, alleges that as a result of prison disciplinary hearings,
he was (1) segregated from the general inmate population for a
period of seven months and placed in punitive segregation and soli-
tary confinement, during a large portion of which time he was re-
fused vitally needed medical attention; (2) denied the opportunity
during that entire period to engage in productive work or to parti-
cipate in rehabilitative, recreational, or vocational programs; (3)

(continued)

8

Deposition testimony in Wright shows that Lorton inmate
may be confined to a “control cell,” called the “hole,”
for indefinite periods of time. While so confined, the in.
mate may not leave the “hole” or see other inmates, and
he cannot work, attend educational classes, or receive reaj-
ing materials or visitors. Some inmates have been con-
fined to the Complex’s Maximum Security Facility for up
to five months while being denied the right to work or
attend classes.’

Clearly, such punishment for disciplinary violations in-
flicts “grievous loss,” Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972,
and gives the inmate a “substantial interest” in the accur-
acy of the fact-finding process by which such a loss is
inflicted. Infliction of such a loss calls for some orderly
process. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 482.

6 (continued) deprived of 100 days of previously eamed statu-
tory good time; (4) deprived of 365 days of meritorious good time
for which he had been recommended by a prison guard; (5) sub-
jected to an investigation resulting from information supplied by
Lorton officials to the United States Attomey for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia upon which an indictment was returned but which
in turn was found so insufficient as to compel dismissal of the
indictment; and (6) subjected to a determination that he had com-
mitted felonious assault on a prison guard, which may jeopardize
his opportunity for parole.

7 Keenan deposition at 7-8, 9, 11, 16.

Bi trike Poet

9

B. The Governmental Interest

The State of Nebraska implies that the presence of coun-
sel would transform informal hearings into formal adver-
sary proceedings which would (1) slow the response of
prison officials in quelling potentially riotous situations,
(2) erode the respect of inmates for the authority of pri-
son officials, (3) increase tensions in the prison, and (4)
disrupt the rehabilitatory function of disciplinary hearings.
These contentions have no merit, as demonstrated by the
deposition testimony of Lorton officials.

Since mid-1973, Lorton inmates charged with rule in-
fractions have had the unqualified right to have counsel
or a lay substitute present at disciplinary hearings*® and
at no time have correctional officials complained that the
presence of counsel has interfered with prison security.

This full-scale legal assistance program resulted princip-
ally from the efforts of Mr. John O. Boone, former Super-
intendent of the Lorton Complex, who in early 1972 is-
sued a proposed order on disciplinary procedures which
provided in part:

“The resident may be represented by counsel,
a staff member, another resident, or a law
student. The resident shall be represented by
counsel if the alleged violation constitutes a
crime for which he could be prosecuted, un-
less he intelligently waived this right.”?

8 Swoboda deposition at 21.

9 Part VII(B), Plaintiff's Exhibit #6 in deposition of John O.
Boone, Superintendent of the Lorton Complex, on January 20,
1972, in Woodard v. Washington, supra, [hereinafter Boone deposi-
tion] at 35.

10

Although this order was never formally adopted, it led to
negotiations between LAWCOR — an American University
Law School sponsored student group — and the Lorton
Superintendent of Operations, which resulted in a Proposal
to allow LAWCOR representation of “all residents charged
with rule violations which are considered serious by the
Institutional Staff.”"© When asked whether he believed
that implementation of the LAWCOR proposal would “be
contrary to your interests in maintaining the health, secu
rity, and order of the prison,” Superintendent Boone
stated:

ka
-
;
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:
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2
$

“A. Let me say that this is a draft which |
will eventually have to look at or the
superintendent to see if this is what we
are going to use as procedures so it
could come out differently. But I say
generally improved procedures is directly
related to the safety and security of
the community.

“Q. And just to make sure I am clear then |
the improvement of procedures will :
help the security, health and safety and
order of the community as you see it.

“A. As I see it, yes.””!!

LAWCOR has represented inmates in more than 300 dis

ciplinary hearings and the program is in full operation to
day.!2

10 Praintiff's Exhibit #3, Item 1, Boone deposition at 14.
11 Boone deposition at 21.

12 1+. Gaydos extensively described the prison disciplinary
procedure at Lorton and described the LAWCOR program. Gaydos
deposition at 17-18.

—

The foregoing testimony indicates that the right to
counsel presents no threat to prison security while both
the inmate and the State “have interests in the accurate
| finding of fact and the informed use of discretion — [the
inmate] to insure that his liberty is not [further impinged]
and the State to make certain that it is [not] unnecessarily
) interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation . . . Re
|

11

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).8 Both
the legal representation program at Lorton and the testi-
mony of Mr. Boone indicate that the presence of counsel
at disciplinary hearings will “help the security, health and
safety and order of the [prison] community. . . Ria

13 indeed, the principal state interest in Gagnon which militated
against requiring counsel at every probation revocation hearing — a
more adversary hearing would be “less attuned to the rehabilitative
needs of the individual” — is not prevalent in punitive prison disci-
plinary hearings. “Decisions regarding the withholding or forfeiture
of good time credit generally differ from the parole decision in that
they turn solely on the offender’s behavior during his period of
imprisonment: Good behavior entitles him to early release regard-
less of anyone’s judgment as to his potential for living a law-abiding
life in the community. He should therefore have an opportunity to
challenge charges of misconduct. Where such charges may lead to
a substantial loss of good time and a resultant increase in the actual
length of imprisonment, the prisoner should be given reasonable
notice of the charges, full opportunity to present evidence and to
confront and cross-examine opposing wgtnesses, and the right to repre-
sentation by counsel.” President’s Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections 86
(1967).

14 Boone deposition at 21.

12

lll. INMATES SHOULD BE ALLOWED
TO CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSERS

Although the rights of confrontation and cross-examina
tion are closely related, the right of confrontation in the
prison disciplinary context applies most forcefully to the
prisoner’s right to know the name of his accuser, who is
most often the prison guard who prepared the disciplinary
report initiating the charge. The right of cross-examination
requires that the accused inmate or his retained counsel
be given an opportunity to question and probe both his
accusers and any other witnesses at the disciplinary hear-
ing.

The State of California in its amicus brief contends that
the right to confront one’s accusers would have a volatile
effect on “internal prison control and stability” since a
charged inmate might retaliate against his accuser.'5

However, Lt. Joseph L. Mastin, shift supervisor at Lor
ton and chairman at approximately 50 percent of the disci-
plinary board proceedings, deemphasized this problem by
testifying that in interviewing an inmate against whom a
disciplinary report has been filed, he “sometimes” read to
the inmate the name of the accusing officer. Moreover,

“Ninety percent of the time the inmate knows
_ who the guy was that wrote him up anyway.”

Another shift supervisor, Lt. Thomas P. Gaydos, supported
Lt. Mastin’s observations. In response to the question,
“How frequently is the [disciplinary] process initiated by
a fellow inmate, as opposed to a correctional officer?”,

15 Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of the State of
California, Amicus Curiae, at 10-11.

16 Mastin deposition at 5.

:
*

Je et pe OP tas be a ek PR Ae OA boas

PT te ae ie

13

Lt. Gaydos stated: “In comparison, it would be very in-
frequent.”"7_ In response to a later question as to whether
an inmate was apprised at the disciplinary hearing of the
name of the reporting officer, Lt. Gaydos stated that
“generally he knows who it is, but if he asks, he’s told.””'8
Finally, Lt. Gaydos agreed with the proposition that
“generally” most of the witnesses who are listed on a dis-
ciplinary report are other employees of the Department

of Corrections.!9

The foregoing deposition testimony clearly demonstrates
that granting inmates the right to confront their accusers
will not jeopardize internal prison security since (1) cor-
rectional officers, not‘ inmates, most frequently initiate
the disciplinary process, (2) the accused usually knows
the name of his accuser, and (3) as provided in Judge
Bryan’s final order in Wright, if prison authorities believe
that an inmate accuser’s safety would be threatened if he
were identified, they may deny the accused any opportunity
to confront the informant.

IV. INMATES SHOULD BE
PERMITTED TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES

Since “[c] ross-examination is the principal means by
which the believability of a witness and the truth of his
testimony are tested,” Davis v. Alaska, 42 U.S.L.W. 4295,
4298 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1974); see Pointer v. Texas, 380 |
U.S. 400, 405 (1965), an inmate who cannot cross-ex-
amine witnesses remains deprived of the most essential of

17 Gaydos deposition at 7, 13-14.
18 Gaydos deposition at 32.
19 Gaydos deposition at 58-59.

14

procedural safeguards accorded the criminally accused.
The State of California claims that cross-examination by
inmates at disciplinary hearings could erode their respect
for the authority of the prison officials who are cross-
examined.” However, deposition testimony by Lorton

officials in the Pollard, Woodward, and Wright cases demon |

strates that granting to inmates the opportunity to cross-
examine will not jeopardize state interests.

For example, Superintendent Boone testified that he
considered valuable the right of an inmate to call witness
es as long as “it does not involve coercion,”*! and in
support of his proposal that “residents shall be permitted
to cross-examine the officer who filed the disciplinary
report and other witnesses,” he testified as follows:

“The officers will have some fears and all of

that. I think it highly desirable, however,
because in fact, I think it would be very,

very important in the correctional process

that the inmate be able to face the person
that charges him with the offenses.””?

il

ee

In other words, Superintendent Boone recognized that of- —

fenders have certain procedural rights not inconsistent
with the goal of rehabilitation since a person who receives
what he considers to be unfair treatment is likely to be-
come a difficult subject of rehabilitation. The only prob
lems Superintendent Boone was able to envision from ac-
cording this right were the “administrative problems” of

20 Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of the State of
California, Amicus Curiae, at 10.

21 Boone deposition at 22.
22 Boone deposition at 37-38.

et ee PE ERS NR re ee ene

15

overtime pay for officers called from another shift.2
These “administrative problems” cannot justify the denial
of a fundamental procedural right.

CONCLUSION

Insofar as the issues in this case relate to the constitu-
tional requirements of counsel, confrontation, and cross-
examination in prison disciplinary proceedings, the judg-
ment below is amply supported by the experience at the
Lorton Complex and should be affirmed.

ee ies

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM H. ALLEN
MICHAEL A. SCHLANGER
DAVID S. WEISSBRODT
Covington & Burling
888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
GEOFFREY J. VITT

Cohen and Rosenblum, Ltd.
320 King Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22313

Attomeys for Amici Curiae

April 5, 1974

23 Boone deposition at 38.

Mr. David S. Weissbrodt

Attorney at Law

Covington & Burling

888 16th Street, N. W. g
Washington, D.C. 20006

la
; APPENDIX
P eanenn
4 Bepartment of Justice ee ee
= 471-2211 So
a LUNCOLN MAROLS woenee
: ——
j March 25, 1974 econo
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3

webh

Re: Wolff, et al. v. McDonnell, et al.
‘736679

inate Mi LIBS!

Dear Mr. Weissbrodt:

Consent of petitioners is hereby given to you on behalf of
the prisoners you represent in Pollard v. Washington, Civil Action No.
2055-71 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
to file an amicus curiae brief herein.

Ba AAP NG kM ed 3 oh a hE

Very truly yours,

CLARENCE A. H. MEYER
Attorney General

f SHttol KE neh

Mel Kammerlohr
Assistant Attorney General

MK:jc

2a

e LAW OFFICES OF
CLINE. WILLIAMS. WRIGHT. JOHNSON 8 OLDFATHER

= LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68508

March 22, 1974

» 8. 20006
Re: Wolff, et al v. McDonnell, et al
73-679

Dear Mr. Weissbrodt:

Your request to file an amicus curiae brief in sxoport
a petition in the above proceeding has
been received

As counsel for respondent, I hereby consent to your
filing an amicus curiae bricf on behalf of prisoners ch
you have been representing in Pollard v. Washinecton, Civil
Action No. 2055-71 in the united States District Court for
the District of Columbia in the United States Supreme Court.

Very truly yours,

wae caus

CASE EI PAE ARR IO: ONT

NS, at Ba RTS ty GP

fod pot Be

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0338%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.