# Amicus Curiae Brief — Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 418 U.S. 241

## Text

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-797

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY,
a division of
KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS, INC.,
Appellant,
v.

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida

MOTFION-FOR-LEAVE-TO FILE-BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS |

National Association of Broadcasters
1771 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
202-293-3560

JOHN B. SUMMERS
Counsel

BRENDA L. FOX
February 28, 1974 Of Counsel

<<

ASS DUPLICATORS, INC.—1732 Eye Strest, N.W.—Washington, 0.C.—298-6537

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-797

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY,
a division of «
KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS, INC.,
Appellant,
v.

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR,,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

The National Association of Broadcasters (hereinafter NAB)
moves pursuant to Rule 42 of this Court for leave to file a
brief amicus curiae in the above entitled proceeding. NAB has
received written permission to file such a brief from both parties
to this case.

NAB is a non-profit association of radio and television broad-
cast stations and networks. As of February 20, 1974, NAB's
membership included 2,366 AM radio stations, 1,473 FM radio
stations, 529 television stations and all nationwide commercial

2

broadcast networks. The objective of the NAB, according
to its by-laws:

. . . Shall be to foster and promote the de-
velopment of the arts of aural and visual
broadcasting in all its forms; to protect its
members in every lawful and proper manner
from injustices and unjust exactions; to do
all things necessary and proper to encourage
and promote customs and practices which
will strengthen and maintain the broadcast-
ing industry to the end that it may best
serve the public.

All communications media share a common interest in
the presence of substantial threats to the unfettered ex-
ercise of freedom of the press. The Florida statute in

question in this case presents such an assault, for in the
name of "fairness" it represents a severe restraint upon

the exercise of journalistic editorial discretion by news-

paper publishers. Thus, in keeping with the above-stated
objectives, the NAB herein seeks to protect its members
from the potential ramifications and ‘chilling effect" of
government encroachments upon the press.

NAB respectfully submits that in addition to its mutual
interests with newspapers in this case, the broadcaster has
other concerns in the outcome of this matter which would
not be adequately represented by Appellant. In particular, the
broadcast media are now beset with an administratively
conceived and judicially supported fairness doctrine. It is
likely that some discussion of this doctrine will emerge in
the course of this proceeding. Thus, NAB is concerned
that in determining the rights of newspapers and the con-
stitutionality of the Florida "right to reply" statute, the

1 See, e.g, Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement at 20-27.

3

theoretical grounds upon which the fairness doctrine is
based will come into issue.2_ NAB is of the opinion that
judicial comments at this time will affect significantly the
interests of commercial broadcasters to the extent that such
comments may affect the fairness doctrine.

WHEREFORE, in view of the significance of this matter,
the NAB respectfully requests that it be granted leave to
file the annexed brief amicus curiae in the above entitled
proceeding.

Respectfully submitted,

National Association of Broadcasters
1771 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
202-293-3560

JOHN B. SUMMERS
Counsel

BRENDA L. FOX
February 28, 1974 Of Counsel

2 The continued validity of the doctrine may be in question, see,
e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 148-70 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

INTEREST OF AMICUS .
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .
ARGUMENT
I. IMPOSITION OF A RIGHT OF REPLY
STATUTE FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES

IMPAIRS THE EXERCISE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY IMPOSING

A PRIOR RESTRAINT UPON THE PRESS .

ll. THE FLORIDA STATUTE IS CONSTITU-
TIONALLY INFIRM AND THE COURT
NEED NOT AND SHOULD NOT BASE

ITS RULING ON A REVISITATION all
ITS RED LION DECISION .

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .

AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases:
Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co.,
440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971) .

Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New —
385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967) .

Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963)

- -|@

15

16

(ii)

~~

Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972). . . 2... . 11, 12, 13

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee,

412 US. 94 (1973) . ... . . 3,4, 5, 6, 7,9, 10, 11
Mills v. Alabama,

384 US. 214 (1966) . . . . 2... . . ws. 5,6
Near v. Minnesota,

203 US..GT ISS) 5... ck ee 4 EE Kw 4
New York Times Co. v. United States,

WS US PISCE eS 4
Organization for a Better Austin v. aaa

402 US. (1971). . . . eee ws 4
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,

395 US. 367 (1969) . . . . . . . . . 2,7, 8,9,

10, 11, 12, 14, 15

Tomillo v. The Miami Herald Publishing Co.,
3B Fie, Supp. SO (1973). 2. wk ww we ee ee B

Constitution and Statutes:

United States Constitution, First Amendment

passim
Florida Statutes, section 104.38 . . . . . . . . . passim

Miscellaneous:
Ervin, Congressicnal Record ae of = ed.

Nov. 14, 1973) . . . . : oe = 13, 14
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970). . 6
Mott, American Journalism (1962) . . . . . .... 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-797

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY,
a division of
KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS, INC.,
. Appellant,
v.

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

INTEREST OF AMICUS

The National Association of Broadcasters (hereinafter NAB)
submits this brief amicus curiae in support of the Appellant
herein. The interest of amicus NAB has been stated in full
in the accompanying Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus
Curiae.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

NAB adopts the Statement of the Case as set forth in
Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at pages 5-7

2

NAB submits that the Florida ''right to reply"’ statute,
Section 104.38, which requires newspapers to publish, with-
out charge, replies of political candidates who they criti-
cized during election campaigns, does violate freedom of
the press as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Thus,
NAB respectfully urges this Court to reverse the decision
of the Supreme Court of Florida and thereby eradicate
the severe restraints upon the exercise of journalistic dis-
cretion and its abridgement of a free press as imposed
by the constitutionally infirm "right of reply" statute.

In its review of the Florida statute, however, NAB urges
the Court to render its decision within the confines of
the First Amendment, without effecting further solidifica-
tion of its 1969 decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. y.
F.C.C.! wherein it established the constitutionality of the
so-called fairness doctrine as applied to broadcast licensees
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Red
Lion has come under increasing question and if it is to
be revisited, it should be in a case involving application
of the fairness doctrine to a broadcast station — not in a
case involving the constitutional validity of a state statute
encroaching upon the First Amendment rights of a news-
paper.

ARGUMENT

I. IMPOSITION OF A RIGHT OF REPLY STATUTE
FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES IMPAIRS THE
EXERCISE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY
IMPOSING A PRIOR RESTRAINT UPON THE
PRESS.

By its decision, the Supreme Court of Florida would have
us forsake the First Amendment in order to preserve the

1 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

3

values it represents. Thus, it describes the "right of re-
ply" statute as: :

. in the interest of all the people, pro-
vides that candidates for public office under
certain prescribed circumstances shall have a
right of reply, a right of expression. It does
not deny to the owner of the instruments of
the newspaper industry any right of expression.
The statute assures, and does not abridge, the
right of expression which the First Amendment
guarantees.”

Even such "‘assurances,"' if the Florida statute be viewed
as such, are, nevertheless, circumspect under the scope of
the First Amendment:

"In our early history one view was that
the publisher must open his columns ‘to any
and all controversialists, especially if paid for
it.''' Mott, American Journalism, 55 (1962)
[quoting Benjamin Franklin].

"Franklin disagreed, declaring that his news-
paper was not a stagecoach, with seats for every-
one; he offered to print pamphlets for private
distribution, but refused to fill his paper with
private altercations."" /bid. (citation omitted).

And that philosophy, according to Justice Douglas, ‘be-
came implicit in the First Amendment.'* An affirmative

2 Torillo v. The Miami Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80
ve (1973) as reproduced in Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at app.
A 18.

3 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 152 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

4 Id.

4

requirement may still constitute a form of censorship and,
more importantly, it may impose a "chilling effect" upon
the free exercise of First Amendment rights.> Consequently,
even an affirmative requirement must overcome the heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity, the same as
would any system of prior restraint of activities protected
by the First Amendment. New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); accord, Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), Near v. Minn-
esota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

> In Columbia Broadcasting, supra, Justice Douglas, in a footnote
reference, stated:

The monetary and other burdens imposed on the
press by the rights of a criticized person to reply,
like the traditional damage remedy for libel, lead
of course to self-censorship respecting matters of
importance to the public that the First Amendment
denies the Government the power to impose. The
burdens certainly are as onerous as the indirect
restrictions on First Amendment rights which we
have struck down .... In each instance we held
the restriction unconstitutional on the ground that
it discouraged or chilled constitutionally protected
rights of speech, press or association.

Id. at 168, note 18 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

© Quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931), the
Court in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723
(1971) stated:

"The fact that the liberty of the press may be
abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does
not make any the less necessary the immunity
of the press from previous restraint in dealing
with official misconduct."

5

In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), this Court held
that there is no right to access to the airwaves which
would require broadcasters to accept paid editorial an-
nouncements. Similarly, in Associates & Aldrich. Co. v.
Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971), the
court held that a newspaper could not be compelled to
accept and print advertising in the exact form submitted.
Yet another alleged right of access was denied in Avins
v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151
(3rd Cir. 1967), as the court upheld the refusal of law
review editors to accept a proffered article. These cases
demonstrate that the imposition of an affirmative duty
upon freedom of the press is not likely to be constitu-
tionally valid.

It remains to be determined whether the Florida ''right
of reply'’ statute is capable of overcoming the presumption
against its constitutional validity. NAB suggests that it
cannot. As discussed in Appellant's Jurisdictional State-
ment at 16-20, there are few clear objectives of the stat-
ute. One raises the issue of a state's interest in fair elec-
tions. This Court in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214
(1966), noted that:

Whatever differences may exist about in-
terpretations of the First Amendment, there
is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs.
This of course includes discussions of candi-
dates, structures and forms of government,
the manner in which government is operated
or should be operated, and all such matters
relating to political processes .... Suppression

6

of the right of the press to praise or criticize
governmental agents and to clamor and con-
tend for or against change . . . muzzles one of
the very agencies the Framers of our Constitu-
tion thoughtfully and deliberately selected to
improve our society and keep it free. /d. at
218-19.

Thus, the Court invalidated a state criminal statute prohibit-
ing the solicitation of votes on election day.

Another purported objective of the Florida statute is
to counter alleged media concentration and monopoliza-
tion.’ Justice Douglas noted, in Columbia Broadcasting,
supra, that:

Of course there is private censorship in
the newspaper field. But for one publisher
who may suppress a fact, there are many who
will print it. But if the government is the
censor, administrative fiat not freedom of
choice carries the day. /d. at 153 (Douglas,
J., concurring).

7 But see statement by Thomas I. Emerson, a leading First
Amendment scholar:

"|. . any effort to solve the broader problems of
a monopoly press by forcing newspapers to cover
all ‘newsworthy’ events and print all viewpoints,
under the watchful eyes of petty public officials, is
likely to undermine such independence as the press
now shows without achieving any real diversity."
The System of Freedom of Expression (1970), p.
671.

Columbia Broadcasting, supra at 151 (Douglas, J., concurring).

7

Similarly, Justice Stewart noted that:

Even though it would be in the public
interest for the respondents’ advertisements
to be heard, it does not follow that the
publi¢ interest requires every broadcaster
to broadcast them. And it certainly does
not follow that the public interest would
be served by forcing every broadcaster to
accept any particular kind of advertising.
Id. at 144 (Stewart, J., concurring).

NAB respectfully suggests that the precedents clearly
mandate the invalidation of the Florida statute as an un-
justifiable encroachment upon the exercise of fundamental

First Amendment rights.®

Il. THE FLORIDA STATUTE IS CONSTITUTION-
ALLY INFIRM AND THE COURT NEED NOT
AND SHOULD NOT BASE ITS RULING ON A
REVISITATION OF ITS RED LION DECISION.

Implicit in the Appellant's arguments before the Court,
as evidenced in its Jurisdictional Statement, is a call for

8 What kind of First Amendment would best serve
our needs as we approach the 21st century may be
an open question. But the old fashioned First
Amendment that we have is the Court's only guide-

line; and one hard and fast principle which it an-
nounces is that government shall keep its hands

off the press.
Columbia Broadcasting, supra at 160 (Douglas, J., concurring).

8

the reaffirmation of Red Lion with its distinctions among the
various communications media in terms of First Amend-
ment protections.? NAB submits that this is not the
appropriate factual situation for revisiting that decision.

In the first place, the Florida statute here under review
should be interpreted within the narrow confines of the
First Amendment. As previously discussed, restraints
upon the free exercise of First Amendment rights bear

a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.
Those which fail to assert a compelling interest capable
of overcoming that presumption are simply void.

A second reason for not revisiting Red Lion is that
the case before the Court involves newspapers and not
the broadcast media. Reliance upon that holding in this
case would serve to solidify Red Lion in the face of a
definite trend away from its holdings. If Red Lion is to
be revisited, it should be within the perspective of a set
of facts applicable to broadcasting and the fairness doc-
trine.

This Court noted in Red Lion that:

There is nothing in the First Amendment
which prevents the Government from requir-
ing a licensee to share his frequency with
others and to conduct himself as a proxy

9 Red Lion, supra at 386.

Although broadcasting is clearly a medium
affected by a First Amendment interest, (cita-
tion omitted) differences in the characteristics
of news media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them. (foot-
note and citation omitted).

9

or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of _
his community and which would otherwise,

by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.

Red Lion, supra at 389.

Despite attempts by some to interpret this language in its
broadest sense, this Court, in Columbia Broadcasting, re-
jected the claim that individuals and groups had a right
to purchase advertising time to comment on public issues:

The licensee policy challenged in this case
is ultimately related to the journalistic role
of a licensee for which it has been given
initial and primary responsibility by Congress.
The licensee's policy against accepting edi-
torial advertising cannot be examined as an
abstract proposition, but must be viewed in
the context of its journalistic role. Colum-
bia Broadcasting, supra at 118 (Burger, C.J.)

More important, as we have noted, Congress
has affirmatively indicated in the Communi-
cations Act that certain journalistic decisions
are for the licensee, subject only to the re-
strictions imposed by evaluation of its over-
all performance under the public interest
standard. /d at 120.

More profoundly, it would be anomalous
for us to hold, in the name of promoting
the constitutional guarantees of free expres-
sion, that the day-to-day editorial decisions
of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind

10

of restraints urged by respondents. To do
so in the name of the First Amendment
would be a contradiction. /d. at 120-121.

Thus, it seems apparent that the possible scope of the
Red Lion decision has been limited by Columbia Broad-
casting. Accordingly, any reliance upon Red Lion in
determining the rights of the parties in the instant case
would necessitate a step backwards in solidifying a decision
which has since become subject to some modification. As
was noted by Justice Stewart:

This Court was persuaded in Red Lion to
accept the Commission's view that a so-called
Fairness Doctrine was required by the unique
electronic limitations of broadcasting, at least
in the then-existing state of the art. Rightly
or wrongly, we there decided that broadcasters’
First Amendment rights were '‘abridgeable."
But surely this does not mean that those rights
are nonexistent. And even if all else where in
equipoise, and the decision of the issue before
us were finally to rest upon First Amendment
"values" alone, I could not agree with the
Court of Appeals. For if those "values" mean
anything, they should mean at least this: /f
we must choose whether editorial decisions are
to be made in the free judgment of individual
broadcasters, or imposed by bureaucratic fiat,
the choice must be for freedom. Columbia
Broadcasting, supra at 146 (emphasis added).
(Stewart, J., concurring).

NAB further opposes a revisiting of Red Lion at this
time because it is apparent that the fairness doctrine, as
embodied in that case, is likely to come under scrutiny

11

in the future. Justice Douglas, for one, has stated with re-
spect to Red Lion that:

I did not participate in that decision and,
with all respect, would not support it. The
Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First
Amendment regime. Columbia Broadcasting,
supra at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring).

In Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., Chief
Judge Bazelon, in his dissenting opinion, questioned not
only the application of the fairness doctrine to station
WXUR, but also challenged certain of the precepts upon
which the doctrine is founded. Thus, he stated that:

. . . abridgement of individual rights may be
tolerated only when in the long run it en-
hances the right of the public to receive
access to the marketplace of diverse views.
Obviously this requires a delicate balancing:
any harm to private rights must be out-
weighed by benefit to the public. (foot-
note omitted). /d at 66 (Bazelon, C. J.,
dissenting).
In considering the WXUR matter he noted that the im-
position of the fairness doctrine did not serve to enhance
access to the marketplace of diverse views:

WXUR was no doubt devoted to a particu-
lar religious and political philosophy; but

it was also a radio station devoted to speak-
ing out and stirring debate on controversial
issues. (footnote om.) The station was
purchased by Faith Theological Seminary

10 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

12

to propogate a viewpoint which was not

being heard in the greater Philadelphia area.
The record is clear that through its inter-

view and call-in shows it did offer a variety

of opinions on a broad range of public issues;
and that it never refused to lend its broadcast
facilities to spokesmen of conflicting viewpoints.
(footnote om.).

The Commission's strict rendering of fairness
requirements, as developed in its decision, (foot-
note om.) has removed WXUR from the air.
This has deprived the listening public not only
of a viewpoint but also of robust debate on in-
numerable controversial issues. It is beyond
dispute that the public has /ost access to infor-
mation and ideas. /d. at 69 (Bazelon, C.J., dis-
senting).

Recognizing that the fairness doctrine is premised upon
the scarcity of frequencies concept,'! Judge Bazelon sug-
gested that the time was ripe for a thorough review of
the doctrine in light of the current state of broadcast
technology:

Whether in this case the Commission has
simply taken the doctrine too far or applied
it too rigidly, or whether the trouble lies
deeper, cannot be determined without a re-
mand. . . . Do fairness policies truly pro-
mote a marketplace of uninhibited, wide
and robust debate? (footnote om.) It is

11 Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Gov-
ernment is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose views should be expressed on
this unique medium.

Red Lion, supra at 389.

13

proper that this court urge the Commission
to reconsider this case in light of its fairness
hearings; that we encourage the Commission
to draw back and consider whether time and
technology have so eroded the necessity for
governmental imposition of fairness obliga-
tions that the doctrine has come to defeat
its purposes in a variety of circumstances;
that we ask whether an alternative does

not suggest itself — whether, as with printed
press, more freedom for the individual broad-
caster would enhance, rather than retard, the
public's right to a marketplace of ideas. /d.
at 79-80 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).

Moreover, similar concerns have recently been expressed

by Senator Sam Ervin, a leading constitutional authority
and respected member of the United States Senate. Dis-
cussing the same WXUR case, he stated:

The underlying rationale of the fairness

' doctrine is that since broadcasting outlets

are so scarce, they must be regulated to
insure balanced presentations of contro-
versial issues. This is one assumption which
can no longer be accepted without challenge.
As of March 1973, there were a total of
7,399 radio stations broadcasting in this
country. This compares with a total of
1,761 daily newspapers in circulation ... .
Most Americans, wherever they are situated,
can receive numerous radio signals, and us-
ually this means they can hear competing
views. In Dr. Mclntire's case, while WXUR
was the sole radio station in Media, Pa., the
town was located in the greater Philadelphia

14

broadcasting area within the range of a my-
riad radio signals. . . . It is safe to say
that the public in the Philadelphia area had
a great variety of "respectable" views to lis-
ten to, but only from WXUR could it hear
challenges to those views. !?

As a remedy to this intolerable situation, Senator Ervin
suggests that the fairness doctrine be operative only where
there is present a scarcity of available radio signals. He
would presume scarcity only in a locality served by less
than four broadcasting signals or where competing views _
are in fact not being aired.'3

The Senator's scheme may never be adopted, but his
concern evidences a growing trend both in the courts, in
the Congress and in the FCC itself that the fairness doc-
trine be subjected to further scrutiny. Accordingly, NAB
respectfully submits that in light of that apparent trend,
the principles of Red Lion respecting application of the
doctrine to broadcasters should not be further encrusted
in precedents set by this Court in the instant case.

12 119 Cong. Rec. (reprint of daily ed. Nov. 14, 1973) at 2.
13 Yq, at 3.

15
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, NAB respectfully urges the
Court to declare the Florida "right of reply" statute un-
constitutional as an abridgement of the First Amendment.
Moreover, we call upon the Court to so rule without re-
affirming its holdings in Red Lion.

Respectfully submitted,

National Association of Broadcasters
1771 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20003
202-293-3560

JOHN B. SUMMERS
Counsel

BRENDA L. FOX
February 28, 1974 Of Counsel

16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing Mo-
tion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Ami-
cus Curiae of the National Association of Broadcasters
have been served this day by mail upon each of the
following:

Richard M. Schmidt

Martin J. Gaynes

Ian D. Volner

Cohen & Marks

1920 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
Of Counsel for Appellant

Daniel P. S. Paul

James W. Beasley, Jr.

Paul & Thomson

1300 First National Bank Building

Miami, Florida 33131
Counsel for Appellant, The Miami Herald
Publishing Company

Jerome A. Barron
Professor at Law
The National Law Center
George Washington University
720 - 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Counsel for Appellee, Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.

17

Tobias Simon
Tobias, Simon & Elizabeth Du Fresne
Suite 208
1492 South Miami Avenue
Miami, Florida 33130
Counsel for Appellee, Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.

Lawrence E. Walsh

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York 10005
Attorney for Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press Legal Defense and Research Fund,
Art Buchwald, Horace G. Davis, Jr., James J.
Kilpatrick, Anthony Lewis, Robert D. Novak,
Carl T. Rowan, Hugh Sidey, Thomas G. Wicker,
and Jules J. Witcover

Kirkland & Ellis

130 E. Randolph Drive

Suite 2800

Chicago, Illinois 60601
Attorneys for Chicago Tribune Co. Gore News-
papers Co. and Sentinel Co.

Patterson, Belknap & Webb
One Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
Attorneys for Dow, Jones & Company, Inc.

Harry A. Inman
1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
Attorney for The New York Times Company

18

Townley, Updike, Carter & Rodgers

220 East 42nd Street

New York, New York 10017
Attorneys for New York News, Inc.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
515 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90071
Counsel for The Times Mirror Company

Wi"iams, Connolly & Califano
100 Hill Building
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for The Washington Post Company

Melvin L. Wulf
22 East 40th Street
New York, New York 10016
Attorney for American Civil Liberties Union

Arthur B. Hanson

888 Seventeenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorney for The American Newspaper Publish

Association

/s/ Gwendolyn B.
Gwendolyn B.

2 tri

---

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