# Brief for Respondent — FPC v. Texaco Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for Respondent
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 417 U.S. 380

## Text

ii Citations

Cases Page
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931) .............. 12
Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936) .................... 13

Austral v. Federal Power Commission, 428 F. 2d 407
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Associated Gas
Distributors v. Austral, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), (South-

ern Louisiana Area Rate Cases) ......0000000000000..0000... 18-19
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) 2.000000. 13
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S.

eS PRS ARCO E CI REISS |, SOR AN ieee 9
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S.

ARTY pe GE RE Sate Pat NOT Goa) 2 CE GS a RD Tar 9
Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commis-

sion of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932) .............. 8, 24-25
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,

SO ee Ce aa hh oats en 26

& L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164

po eS RGR REE RUS Sah ck Se ona seme 13
Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline

Si er is Ne CID 5 oscs ic centchcsecolucrcclarsic-ce ies 10

Farms Corporation v. Baldwin, 293 U.S.

BU TN aca ick eaeiclecs tic doiiecsdscoinnnst 13
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) ................ 5, 10, 11, 24
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) ..........00.0000.... 12, 13
New England Division Case, 261 U.S. 184 (1923) ............ 13
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ...........0.0.0..- 10
N.L.R.B. v. Jonss and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US.

yf Gea alarecatnts toed CC FA RRC Ferro ent dn 10

Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
5 | ARLES Sane Ri ting: SOE AEST a Aas 11, 12, 14, 17,22

Citations — (Continued)
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672
RR SERRE AGS ene D1 4

Tagg Bros. and Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S.
SE I ids sceasatlincaotensustankacton et rathcigie vesencsVbsoss-orccien 13

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942) 00000. 10

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. of Oklahoma, 348 U.S.
I ND shia oil bik oer eng hase tad no Pap casncvnod vib ova vive 16, 24

Law Review Articles, Comments, and Notes:

Thompson, “The Texas Market Demand Statute on
Oil and Gas and Its Application,” 39 Texas L.
ort cicarpscarnconsanadeuikeedadaiia 25

Note, “Conservation of Natural Gas and the Federal-
State Conflict,” 64 Colum. L. Rev. 888 (1964) ............ 26

Setaadiel Dindies end Menge

“Clean Energy Message from The President of the
United States” H.R. Doc. 92-118, 92nd Cong.,
ist Seus., pp. 1 and 4 (June 4, 1971) ............................ 21

Unpublished Scholarly Works:

Hodges, “Natural Gas: Price Regulation v. Supply,”
Unpublished Richard J. Gonzales Lecture, College
Business Administtation, University of Texas (April —
IER ETE SD a Mon, ee a0 El a 23

Magazine and Newspaper Articles:

SO TOISAS SNE 16

iv Citations — (Continued)
Statutes
Federal: ~~

Natural Gas Act of 1938, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 717, 717a, 717b, 717c, 717d, et seq., 7174r(b),

PN iad, persis ch Dasani ane sadendtioscbelten 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 2
Ss sic nascscnnecdocecscosis 2
Transportation Act of 1920, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 6,

Moosic icsnehenceoveneacceneoces 13
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. 902 ...... 13-14

Regulations
Federal Power Commission:
I rk daw sacs 2, 3, 5,6

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, (Exemption of Small
Producers From Regulation), Docket No. R-393,
gies SE Ae a ri te 4,5

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

eR

No. 72-1490

EI

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,

Petitioner,
v.
TEXaAcoO, INC., et al,
Respondents.
oe
No. 72-1491
I

DupDLeY T. DouGHERTY, et al., Co-Executors of the
ee ee ee Ae
Petitioners,
v.

TEXAcO, INCc., et al,
Respondents.
a

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit

rT —

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
JAMES M. FORGOTSON, SR.
a

OPINION BELOW
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals (FPC Pet., pp. 3a-22a)*
is reported at 474 F. 2d 416 (D. C. Cir. 1972). The initial

1 Reference “FPC Pet.” is to the FPC’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari in
No. 72-1490. Reference “App.” refers to the separately bound joint
Appendix in this Court.

———

2

order (No. 428) of the Federal Power Commission (App. 135-
154), its Order (No. 428-A) of Amendment (App. 159-161),
and its Order (No. 428-B) denying rehearing (App. 238-253)
are reported at 45 FPC 454, 45 FPC 548, and 46 FPC 47,
respectively.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered De-
cember 12, 1972 (FPC Pet., pp. 23a-25a). The Federal Power
Commission’s (hereafter called FPC) Petition for Rehearing
was denied on February 5, 1973 (FPC Pet., pp. 26a-28a). The
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed on May 3, 1973
and was granted on October 9, 1973 (App. 254).? The juris-
diction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and § 1%)
of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED |

Does the FPC have authority to exempt certain independent _
producers* of natural gas from certain filing requirements and
direct rate regulation with respect to interstate wholesale sales‘
of natural gas under provisions of the Natural Gas Act of
1938, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (hereafter called
the Natural Gas Act) by, among other things, shifting the
burden of establishing the justness and reasonableness of rates

2 The Court concurrently granted the Petition in No. 72-1491 — which
sought review of the same Judgment of the Court of Appeals — and
ordered the cases consolidated for oral argument (App. 254).

3 Independent producers are natural gas producers not affiliated with an
interstate natural gas transmission pipeline company.

4 Wholesale sales of natural gas for interstate transmission, consump
tion or use.

3

for said sales from said producers to the purchasers* despite the
clear statutory language to the contrary? If there is statutory
authority for the above-described scheme of regulation, does
any and all FPC regulation® of any independent producers of
natural gas with respect to their interstate wholesale sales of
natural gas constitute such invidious discrimination that it vio-
lates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and negate state conservation laws with respect to
natural gas so that it violates the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, making the above mentioned
orders or any orders of the FPC affecting independent pro-
ducers of natural gas void?

STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
Sections 4, 5, 7 and 16 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 717c, 717d, 717 and 717o are set forth in FPC Pet., pp.
85a-93a. U. S. Const. Amend. V and Amend. X are set forth
in Addendum A to this brief, infra, p. A-1.

STATEMENT
This case involves judicial review of Orders 428 (App.
135-154) and 428B (App. 238-253) of the FPC, issued
March 18, 1971 (App. 135-154). In summary, said Orders
exempt completely from direct rate regulation by the FPC
under the Natural Gas Act all existing and future interstate
wholesale sales of natural gas by independent producers with

5 Purchasers are interstate natural gas transmission pipeline companies or
other producers who buy natural gas for subsequent resale to the above
mentioned pipeline companies.

* Application of the Natural Gas Act and concomitant FPC regulation,
including rate regulation.

4

less than ten (10) billion cubic feet of interstate wholesale sales
per year.

A. Background

In 1954, this Court in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Wis-
consin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) held that interstate wholesale
sales of natural gas by independent producers of natural gas
were subject to the Natural Gas Act, the Rules and Regula
tions of the FPC promulgated thereunder, and the regulatory
jurisdiction of the FPC. Among other things, that decision
subjected the above-mentioned independent producers with
respect to interstate wholesale sales of natural gas to rate
regulation and various other limitations on their freedom to
contract, such as restriction of their right to terminate selling
gas under a gas sales contract after said contract had expired
by its own terms.

A relatively complex regulatory program evolved over the
next 16 years to regulate independent producers with respect
to interstate wholesale sales of natural gas. Meanwhile, for
whatever cause, a natural gas shortage developed in the United
States. As part of an overall effort to cope with this shortage
and to attract more natural gas to the interstate market, ic.
sale for transmission into or consumption or use in states
other than the state in which said gas is produced, the FPC
entered into the R-393 Rulemaking Procedure (App. 1-13)
which led to the promulgation of Orders 428 and 428B de-
scribed above.

B. Proceedings Before The Commission
The Orders in question arose from the FPC’s Rulemaking

5

Proceeding, Docket No. R-393, to exempt certain independent
producers from regulation, notice of which was filed on July
23, 1970 (App. 1-13).

James M. Forgotson, Sr. (hereafter called Forgotson) is an
independent producer with production and interstate whole-
sale sales of natural gas in Louisiana and Texas. Within the
deadline set by the FPC for filing written comments on the
‘proposed Rule, Forgotson objected to the proposed rule on the
ground that the FPC lacked jurisdiction to issue all regulatory
orders under the Natural Gas Act affecting any independent
producer of natural gas, because such jurisdiction subjects such
independent producers to inappropriate federally administered
public utility treatment and discriminates against such produc-
ers in a manner which is repugnant to the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States (App. 57-72), See Morey
v. Doud, 354 US. 457 (1957).

Forgotson then, through his attorney, attended the confer-
ence regarding the merits of the proposed rule held by the
FPC on December 8, 1970 (App. 97-134).

The FPC issued Order No. 428 on March 18, 1971 (App.
135-154). On March 31, 1971, Forgotson filed an Application
‘For Rehearing (App. 155-158), protesting against the juris-
diction of the FPC to issue this or any other order affecting

Forgotson sought judicial review, pursuant to Section 19(b)
of the Natural Gas Act of Order No. 428 and Order No.

428B, which denied Applications For Rehearing on Order
428 (App. 238-253).

6
C. The Decision Below

Upon judicial review of the validity of Orders 428 and
428B the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, with one judge dissenting, set aside the
above-mentioned FPC Orders after concluding that the FPC
in issuing such Orders had exceeded its authority under the
Natural Gas Act (FPC Pet., pp. 3a-22a).

That court’s decision turned upon an analysis of specific
provisions of the Natural Gas Act, namely, Sections 4, 5, 7
and 16 (FPC Pet., pp. 85a-93a). The court concluded, in
effect, that the regulation of rates for interstate wholesale
sales of natural gas was mandatory, and not discretionary or
permissive, regardless of the volume of said sales by an inde-
pendent producer in a given time period. In that connection,
the FPC’s Section 16 classification powers would not permit
the exemption of the interstate wholesale sales of natural gas
by certain independent producers from direct rate regulation
under Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act (FPC Pet., pp. 7a-10a).
That being the case, the court held that the FPC’s Order
Nos. 428 and 428B represented a clear-cut abdication of the
FPC’s statutory duty to assure that all regulated rates for inter-
state wholesale sales of natural gas, including those of the inde-
pendent producers whose sales were exempted from direct
rate regulation under Orders 428 and 428B, be “just and
reasonable” (FPC Pet., pp. 10a-16a). This departure from
statutory duty and standards through the so-called “indirect”
mode of regulation at the pipeline or purchaser level was held
to be contrary to the provisions of the Natural Gas Act.

“Nothing at all insures that those levels (of rates allowed
to be passed on to consumers) will be ‘just’ or ‘reasonable.’

7

That is the essential flaw in the Commission’s plan. That
is the point at which the FPC abdicates its regulatory re-
sponsibility in derogation of the purposes and mandatory
terms of the statute. Indirect ‘regulation’ by such novel
‘standards’ is worse than an exemption simpliciter. Such
an approach retains the false illusion that a government
agency is keeping watch over rates, pursuant to the stat-
ute’s mandate, when it is in fact doing no such thing.”
(FPC Pet., pp. 12a-13a).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As will be shown hereafter, the judgment below should be
affirmed because: (1) the decision below is clearly correct as
a matter of statutory interpretation and (2) the decision below
is clearly correct as a matter of constitutional law even if
the court below erred in statutory interpretation in reaching
its decision. The arguments of the other Respondents dealing
with the correctness of the decision below as a matter of
statutory interpretation presented in their briefs are correct
and substantially complete and will not be repeated here. The
only argument to be presented here is the constitutional ar-
gument.
The primary thrust of the constitutional argument is that
any and all FPC regulation of independent producers of nat-
ural gas with respect to interstate wholesale sales of natural
gas, is unconstitutional because:
A. Said application and concomitant regulation, as time
and experience have shown, constitutes invidious, capricious
discrimination against these producers in violation of the
guarantees of equal protection of the law, embodied in the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States.

B. The above-mentioned FPC regulation has had an ad-
verse effect on the natural gas conservation policies of the
states, depriving the states of what this Court in Champlin
Refining Company v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma,
286 U.S. 210 (1932) said is an inherent part of the police
power — the prevention of above and below ground waste
of oil and gas — and thereby violates the Tenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.

In addition, judicial removal of any and all FPC regula-
tion of independent producers of natural gas with respect to
interstate wholesale sales of natural gas should have no effect
on any actions, sales, regulations or operations of such inde-
pendent producers until after the effective date of said removal.

ARGUMENT
I

THE FPC DOES NOT HAVE ANY JURISDICTION
OVER ANY INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS OF NAT-
URAL GAS WITH RESPECT TO INTERSTATE
WHOLESALE SALES OF NATURAL GAS BE-
CAUSE ANY AND ALL FPC REGULATION OF
INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS WITH RESPECT TO
INTERSTATE WHOLESALE SALES OF NATURAL
GAS VIOLATES PROVISIONS OF THE FIFTH
AND TENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES.

A. ANY AND ALL FPC REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT PRO
DUCERS OF NATURAL GAS WITH RESPECT TO INTERSTATE WHOLE-
SALE SALES OF NATURAL GAS CONSTITUTES INVIDIOUS DISCRIMF
NATION AGAINST THESE PRODUCERS IN VIOLATION OF THE GUAR-
ANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, EMBODIED IN

9

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED SIATEs.

In light of current and evolving technology and economic
developments in the energy industry, any and all FPC regula-
tion of any interstate wholesale sales cf natural gas by inde-
pendent producers constitutes unconstituticnal, invidious dis-
crimination. This discrimination is against the independent
producer in favor of the gas utility, each being a supplier cf
natural gas. Said discrimination is also against these same
independent producers in favor of producers cf energy-yield-
ing commodities other than natural gas, i.e., crude oil, liquid
petroleum condensates and gas, coal, and nuclear fuels. Be-
cause such discrimination is-invidious, FPC regulation of in-
dependent natural gas producers is a violation cf constitu-
tional guarantees of equal protection of the law, and thereby °
violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution ®f the United
States.

The equal protection of the law guarantees contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States are provided against discriminatory acts of the Fed-
eral Government through inclusion of equal protection guar-
antees within the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) and 349 U.S. 294 at 298 (1955), which by implication
applied equal protection clause provisions to end racially seg-
regated schools in the District of Columbia, which are gov-
emed by Federal, not state law. This Court in those cases
stated that all provisions of Federal, state or local law re-
quiring or permitting racial disc-imination in public schools
must yield. 349 U.S. 294 at 298 (1955).

10

The most recent decision of this Court applying constitu-
tional equal protection of the law guarantees (of the Four-
teenth Amendment) to invalidate economic regulation was
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Forgotson’s contention
is that any and all FPC regulation of independent producers
with respect to their interstate wholesale sales of natural gas
violates the equal protection of the law guarantees against
discriminatory economic regulation announced in Morey y.
Boud, supra.

This is in spite of (1) the now substantially undisputed power
of Congress to pass nondiscriminatory economic regulatory
legislation under the .commerce clause of the Constitution,
N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); and (2) the
decisions that such regulation either by the states or the Fed-
eral Government does not constitute a deprivation of property
without due process of law. Federal Power Commission v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Company, 315 U.S. 575 (1942); Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), a ruling was
affirmed, enjoining enforcement of the Illinois Community
Currency Exchange Act of 1943, because the act violated
the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The act in question provided a comprehensive system for
licensing and regulation of community for-fee check cashing
services and issuers of money orders and made operation of
an unlicensed establishment a crime. In order to obtain 4
license, establishments were required to pay both licensing

and investigative fees, furnish information to the Illinois State

11

Auditor’s Office, maintain specified amounts of cash on hand
and possess surety bonds in specified amounts. In addition, each
exchange had to be financed and conducted as a separate busi-
ness entity. Finally, a license could not be issued unless the
State Auditor determined that its issuance would promote a
convenience and advantage to the community. The American
Express Company and its money orders were explicitly exemp-
ted from the provisions of the act.

The majority of this Court made the following points clear
with respect to application of equal protection guarantees
to economic regulatory legislation:

(a) The clause permits the exercise of a wide scope of
discretion in classification and prohibits only those clas-
sifications that are purely arbitrary.

(b) The complainant must carry the burden of show-
ing that the law in question does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.

(c) Regulatory legislation to be valid cannot single
out any company or group of companies and create a
closed class with accompanying economic advantages to
the closed class. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.457 (1957).

Morey v Doud, supra, has never been overruled by this
Court.

The wrong in the legislation invalidated in Morey v. Doud,
supra, was that the American Express Company was given
legal preference, particularly in the business of selling money
orders.

The FPC stands on the authority of Permian Basin Area Rate

12

Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), for upholding the constitutionality

of FPC regulation of independent producers with respect to
interstate wholesale sales of natural gas.

This Court in Permian, supra, never considered the equal
protection question raised herein. In addition, former deci-
sions of this Court sustaining the constitutionality of statutory
laws do not preclude bringing subsequent suits to test their
validity in light of later actual experience because statutory
laws, valid when made, may become arbitrary in operation
by reasons of later events. Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 US.
765 (1931).

This Court in Permian, supra, relied primarily on the cases, .
discussed immediately below, to determine the legality of the
above-mentioned FPC regulation.

The first of those cases is Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876). That case arose upon an information action, filed
in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, against public
warehousemen for operating without a license. Mr. Chief Justice
Waite dealt with the issues in the following way:

“ ‘There is no doubt that the general principle is favored,
both in law and justice, that every man may fix what price
he pleases upon his own properties or the use of it; but if
for a particular purpose the public have a right to resort
to his premises and make use of them, and he have a
monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the
benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, for
his monopoly perform the duty attached to it on reason-
able terms.

“«* * * Twyhenever the accident of time casts upon @

party the benefit of a legal monopoly of landing goods
* * * he is confined to take the reasonable compensation

J

13

only * * *’” Munn v. [llinois, 94 U.S. 113 at 127 (em-
phasis added)

Two other key decisions relied upon also turn on the neces-
sity for rate regulation when applied to monopolistic situ-
ations. Tagg Bros. and Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S.
420 (1924) involved monopolistic practices and price fixing
by brokers at the Omaha, Nebraska stockyards.

The New England Division Case (Akron, C & Y Ry. Co. v.
United States), 261 U.S. 184 (1923), involved a means of
distributing already regulated revenues from railroads, each
of which at that time had a monopoly or a controlled oligopoly
of a service covering a given territory or region. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission under the Transportation Act
of 1920, 15 U.S.C. § 418 was simply allowed to try to assure
an equitable division of profits in a clearly regulated, monopo-
listic or oligopolistic industry. See also Covington and L. Turn-
pike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896) (a turnpike-
transportation monopoly subject to rate regulation); Acker v.
United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936) (Chicago Stockyards —
substantially similar to Tagg Bros., supra.)

Another decision used to support rate regulation of the type
carried out by the FPC is Hegeman Farms Corporation v.
Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934). That decision really involved
minimum prices or floors on a perishable and unique product,
milk, and gave no consideration to the possible discriminatory
effect of maximum prices.

The last major precedent relied on is Bowles v. Willing-
ham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944). In that decision, the rent con-
trol provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942

14

(passed during the emergency of World War II), 50 U.S.C.A,
Appendix 902, were challenged. This Court’s decision rested
on a point unrelated to the constitutional issues raised herein,
namely that a nation which can demand the lives of its men
and women during the waging of a great war is under no con-
stitutional mandate to provide a system of price controls on
the domestic front which will assure to each landlord a fair
return on his property.

The discussion above clearly shows that this Court in Per-
mian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) did not
consider the discrimination issue raised by Forgotson herein,
but instead looked at the above mentioned FPC regulation,
as an abstract proposition and concluded that it was sup
portable because non discriminatory rate regulation is per-
missible to deal with war emergencies or monopolistic situations
or, where minimum rates are involved, to protect public health.
It is Forgotson’s contention that the above mentioned FPC
regulation is discriminatory and cannot be justified in January,
1974, by the precedents used by this Court in Permian, supra.

It is Forgotson’s contention that FPC regulation of inde
pendent producers of natural gas with respect to interstate
wholesale sales of natural gas creates two closed or economi-
cally favored classes of energy suppliers which classes are
given accompanying economic advantages, namely (1) gas
utilities which can buy a premium fuel at non-competitive
prices and (2) producers of all other energy-yielding commodi-
ties such as crude oil, coal and nuclear fuels who are, except
in emergencies, subject only to state conservation laws and the
market mechanism for determination of their prices. For ths

15 7S

season said application is arbitrary, capricious and cogstitutes
invidious discrimination unless it can be justified otherwise.

This Court in many previous cases has classified parties
to natural gas regulatory litigation, involving independent pro-
ducers with respect to interstate wholesale sales of natural
gas, as producers, consumers and the FPC.

It has classified independent producers as producers, has
equated gas utilities with consumers and has classified the
FPC as the FPC. A better classification would be: Suppliers,
which includes producers, interstate gas pipeline transmis-
sion companies and gas utilities; Regulators, which balance
the interests of consumers and suppliers in the interests of
social and economic justice (which includes the FPC and state
public utility or service commissions and which should in-
clude the conservation commissions of the states); and Con-
sumers, ¢€.g., housewives or industrial enterprises using nat-
ural gas as a fuel.

It is Forgotson’s contention in the case of gas utilities that
equating them and their interests with the consumer and the
consumer interest has resulted in placing a discriminatory bur-
den on another member of the Supplier group, the independent
producer, and given a preference to the gas utility, another
member of that same group on the erroneous grounds that
this is protecting the consumer interest.

The consumer interest is really different from the interest
of the gas utility and it is the gas utility, not the consumer,
that receives the direct benefits that accrue from overall FPC
regulation of said independent producers, e.g., on August 10,

16

1971, the FPC ruled that a natural gas pipeline: company must
pass any refunds from its suppliers (primarily independent
producers) on to its gas utility customers, even if there were
no assurance that such refunds would reach the ultimate con.
sumer. The Commission held that the money must be passed
on to the gas utility, “leaving it to the state and local authori-
ties to order further flow through.” See The Wall Street Jour.
nal, p. 6, Col. 3, dated Wednesday, August 11, 1971.

Any and all FPC regulation of independent producers of
natural gas with respect to interstate wholesale sales of nat-
ural gas results in the independent producers being regulated
in a manner quite similar to gas utilities when in fact such
regulation is inappropriate for said independent producers.
This has resulted in placing the gas utilities in the position of
an economically favored closed class.

What is being done to independent natural gas producers
by FPC regulation of their interstate wholesale sales of nat-
ural gas goes beyond mere lack of wisdom, providence and
harmony with a particular school of thought. Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co. of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). It con-
Stitutes regulation which in light of current conditions is arbi-
trary, invidious and discriminatory. It has created a closed-
class of entrepreneurs within the Supplier group, the gas util
ities, which are subject to risks in no way comparable to
those of the independent natural gas producer. The gas
utilities earn a guaranteed rate of return for their security
holders and have a competitive advantage against other energy
suppliers, because of their being able to buy their raw mate
rial at a controlled maximum price, free from market forces.

17

To meet the test of equal protection, all members of the
group should be treated alike to the greatest extent possible.
The test does not require either comprehensiveness of regu-
lation or absolute mathematical equality of treatment. Neither
does it require dealing with all facets of the problem at the
same time, but allows legislative discretion to attack some
evils before attacking others. Nevertheless, equal protection
should not permit one member of a group to be regulated
in order to advance the economic interests of another group
or groups in the same class without cléur justification. In the
current situation interests of the gas utility members of the
Supplier group are advanced at the ultimate expense of the
independent natural gas producer.

It might be argued that the overall FPC regulation of the
interstate natural gas sales of independent producers which
results in their being treated like a gas utility is appropriate
and places no discriminatory burden on said independent pro-
ducers because both independent natural gas producers and
gas utilities are public utilities. This Court dealt with that con-
tention in 1968 when it stated:

“Producers of natural gas cannot usefully be classed
as public utilities. They enjoy no franchises or guaranteed
areas of service. They are intensely competitive vendors
of a wasting commodity they have acquired only by costly
and often unrewarded search.” Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747 at 756-757 (1968).

A major issue then is whether the result of FPC regulation
of independent producers of natural gas with respect to inter-
state wholesale sales of natural gas must always be public

18

‘di ‘tutional discriminati

Forgotson’s contention is that the answer to this question
is yes for the reasons set out below.

It might be argued that independent producers of natural
gas are not treated like public utilities by the FPC with respect
to interstate wholesale sales of natural gas because the FPC
need abide by no fixed formula and can pragmatically adapt
policies and procedures: to meet changing conditions. For-
gotson’s contention is that as a practical matter, there is and
can only be public utility treatment of said sales by sei
independent producers, because that is all that a regulatory
agency like the FPC can do. It can develop formulas ad
infinitum, but they all have been and perforce will be based
on allowing some “fair” rate of return on capital expendi
tures and operating costs with or without added artificial in
centives to stimulate hoped for exploration and development
of additional gas reserves.

The FPC’s actual performance substantiates this conclusion.

In the major independent producer gas rate cases, the central
controversies have involved what should be allowed as capt
tal costs, what are operating costs, what should be allowed
as a fair return on an investment (including such questions
as whether expenditures for dry holes or gas of less than pipe
line quality constitute capital costs or expenses), should im
centives for exploration be allowed, and if so, how much?
These are all classical public utility regulatory questions. See
e.g-, Austral v. Federal Power Commission, 428 F. 2d 407

19

(Sth Cir., 1970); cert. denied, sub nom. Associated Gas Dis-
tributors v. Austral, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).

Consequently the above mentioned FPC regulation consti-
tutes inappropriate public utility treatment of said independent
producers and unconstitutional discrimination by advancing
the economic interest of another member of the supplier group,
the gas utilities, unless some clear-cut justification for it exists.

In addition, there is another closed class created by the
above mentioned FPC regulation, the producers of other energy-
condensates and gas, and nuclear fuels, who are not treated
like public utilities and who are regulated primarily, except
in emergencies, only by the market mechanism and state con-
servation laws with respect to the interstate or intrastate whole-
sale sales of their products.

It should be emphasized that natural gas like crude oil and
coal, or for that matter nuclear fuels, is simply an energy-
yielding commodity which when consumed yields a given
: amount of energy per unit of mass or volume consumed.
Yet the independent natural gas producer with respect to
interstate wholesale sales of natural gas is, among other things,
subject to rate regulation and cannot terminate sales to pur-
chasers even after the expiration of said purchaser's sales
contract without permission of the FPC. In addition, said

tioned herein are not subjected. Consequently, there is fur-
ther invidi liscriminati inst said ind ; ,

ee

20

gas producers with respect to said sales unless there is some
clear-cut justification.

The question then is, is there any clear-cut justification for
creation of the two favored closed classes, the gas utilities
and the producers of other energy-yielding commodities, there-
by permitting FPC regulation of independent natural gas pro-
ducers with respect to interstate wholesale sales of natural gas
and the resulting discrimination? Do the following characteristics
of said independent producers, said sales or the product have
any special features which will justify the discrimination, men-
tioned above, resulting from the above mentioned FPC regv-
lation?

4

(1) Transmission or Transportation Characteristics
of the Product.

In this country because of advances in technology related
to transmission of fuels, coal slurries, as well as natural gas,
crude oil and liquefied petroleum condensates and gases can
be transported by pipelines in interstate commerce, either for
use or resale at their remote destination. Coal, crude oil,
liquid petroleum condensates and gases, and heavier so-called
bottle gases (e.g., butane and propane) can also be sold either
at the wellhead, mine shaft, excavation pit, refinery or gas
processing plant to pipelines for interstate transmission and
subsequent resale or sold directly to customers, not for resale,
who then use pipeline facilities to transmit the product o
commodity to other locations in distant states for use as energy
sources. In addition, natural gas itself can be liquefied an
shipped via railroad tank car, truck, barge or ocean-going
vessel rather than by a pipeline to interstate or foreign det

21

tinations either for resale or direct use, just as other hydro-
catbon or fossil fuels or even the nuclear fuel, uranium, can
be shipped. Consequently, the product has no special features,
referred to above, with respect to transmission or transpor-
tation.

(2) Scarcity of the Product.

It can be assumed that natural gas is in actual short sup-
ply in the United States. So are crude oil, liquid petroleum
condensates and gases.

Even nuclear fuel (uranium), still a fuel of the future, is

scarce. In discussing the uranium supply problem, President
Nixon, on June 4, 1971, stated:

“A major cause of our recent energy problems has
been the sharp increase in demand that began about 1967
* * *. But in the last four years it has been growing at
a faster pace and forecasts of energy demand a decade
from now have been undergoing significant upward re-
visions.

* s *

“* * * Because of its highly efficient use of nuclear
fuel, the breeder reactor could extend the life of our
natural uranium fuel supply from decades to centuries
* * *” (emphasis added). “Clean Energy Message from
The President of the United States.” H.R. Doc. 92-118,
92nd Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 1 and 4 (June 4, 1971).

Consequently, the product has no special features, referred
to above, with respect to its scarcity.

(3) The Ideal Energy-Yielding Commodity Nature
of the Product.

It must be assumed that natural gas is a very excellent energy-

22
yielding commodity in that it has a high BTU value per unit
volume (averaging about 1,000 BTU/cubic foot), and burs
without fly ash sulfur oxides, and many products of incomplete
combustion such as hydrocarbon radicals and carbon monoxide.

However, nuclear fuels produce no fly ash, sulfur oxide or
hydrocarbon combustion air pollution products and have a
much higher BTU content per unit consumed (whether by
weight or volume). Moreover, both refining and combustion
processes are being developed to decrease markedly the pol-
lution problems caused by consumption of crude oil products
and work is proceeding on developing “synthetic” gas by
hydrogenation of coal. Consequently, natural gas is an excel
lent energy-yielding commodity, but is not the ideal energy-
yielding commodity. It clearly is and has been the preferred
commodity because of its artificially low price which has re-
sulted from the discriminatory regulation discussed in this
brief. Consequently, the product has no special features, re-
ferred to above, with respect to its being the ideal energy-

(4) Monopolistic Characteristics of Independent Producers.

Production and interstate wholesale sale of natural gas
by independent natural gas producers as distinguished from
interstate pipeline transportation and distribution to ultimate
consumers, is not and has not been monopolistic, but com-
petitive. See generally “Utility Corporations, Final Report
of the Federal Trade Commission to the Senate of the United
States pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 83,” 70th Cong,
Ist Sess., No. 84-A (1936); see also Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747 at 756-757 (1968). The competition s

23

as great or greater than among producers of other fuels such
as coal, crude oil, liquefied petroleum condensates and gas
and uranium, in addition to producers in other industries such
as automobiles.

In 1970, according to the FPC itself, there were over 4,600
independent producers engaged in interstate sales of natural
gas for resale and 70 independent producers controlled a total
of approximately 85 percent of the interstate sale for resale
market nationwide (with no measurement of the intrastate
market which is quite sizeable and has been preferred wher-
ever possible by many independent producers because of FPC
regulation of the interstate market). Furthermore, new firms
are entering the interstate sale for resale market. In 1962, 10%
of this particular market was occupied by firms entering after
1960. Hodges, “Natural Gas: Price Regulation v. Supply,”
unpublished Richard J. Gonzales Lecture, April 23, 1970,
College of Business Administration, University of Texas.

If production rather than markets is analyzed, the four
largest independent producers at the national level controlled
32.1% of production and the eight largest independent pro-
ducers controlled 37.6% of production as of 1962. By way
of contrast, the production concentration for the four largest
producers of all products in the United States was 40% with
many basic products such as automobiles, copper, soap, glass,
electric light bulbs, and photography equipment showing of
90% or above among the four largest producers of each
product. Hodges, supra.

By disaggregating the national market on a regional basis,
the top four independent gas producers in 1962 controlled

24

only 24.7% of the Gulf Coast regional market for interstate
sales for resale, and 22.9% of the Mid-Continent-Permian
Basin regional market for interstate sales for resale. Further-
more, the big four in the Mid-Continent-Permian Basin area
are not necessarily the same as the big four in the Texas-Gulf
Coast, Southern Louisiana or Rocky Mountain areas. Hodges,

supra.

Consequently, said producers have no special features, re-
ferred to above, with respect to monopolistic characteristics
except for their being highly competitive.

Consequently, any and all FPC regulation of said inde
pendent producers with respect to interstate wholesale sales
of natural gas creates invidious discrimination which cannot
be justified and is more than unwise, improvident or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought. Williamson y.
Lee Optical Co. of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).

This is not to say or even imply that the Natural Gas Act
is totally unconstitutional or even that its application to con-
trol field prices of gas charged by producer-affiliates or sub-
sidiaries of interstate gas transmission companies is uncon-
stitutional. It is FPC regulation of any independent natural
gas producers with respect to interstate wholesale sales of nat-
ural gas that is unconstitutional.

B. ANY AND ALL FPC REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT PRO-
DUCERS WITH RESPECT TO INTERSTATE WHOLESALE SALES OF

NATURAL GAS HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CONSERVA-
TION POLICIES OF THE STATES, DEPRIVING THE STATES OF WHAT

THIs CourRT IN Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation

25

Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), samp Is AN
INHERENT PART OF THE POLICE POWER — THE PREVENTION OF
ABOVE AND BELOW GROUND WASTE OF OIL AND GAS — AND
THEREBY VIOLATES THE TENTH AMENDMENT TO THE COoN-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

This argument is well summed up in an article by the late
Ernest O. Thompson. Thompson, “The Texas Market Demand
Statute on Qil and Gas and its Application,” 39 Tex. L. Rev.
139 (1960). In that article, Thompson, who was at the time
the Chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission, in describ-
ing the Texas oil and gas conservation policy which remains
effective today, referred to statutes and court decisions which
enunciate said policy and concluded that said policy is based
on prevention of underground and above ground waste, in-
cluding economic waste.

The real issue for this Court is: Does the above mentioned
FPC regulation negate this state policy by causing waste,
because artificially low prices caused by said application and
regulation might dictate either premature abandonment of
wells or failure to complete wells, both of which can result
in permanent “flooding out or drowning” of geological for-
mations capable of producing gas and/or associated oil and
permanent loss of recoverable oil and gas in place?

In light of the high cost of regulation, even if a special ex-
ception is allowed by the FPC with respect to gas prices from
certain wells to prevent waste, such an exception frequently
will not be sought, and FPC-dictated artificially low gas prices
with respect to said sales by said producers can cause other-
wise premature abandonment or failure to complete in spite

—

26

of an adequate market demand and adequate pipeline capac.
ity to transport the gas to willing and needy buyers.

Although there are no real precedents dealing with th
scope or weight of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States in a situation such as this, a collision be
tween Federal authority and the legitimate exercise of the
states’ police power has occurred which in this case should
be resolved in favor of the states’ police power because with-
out the conservation program of the states working properly,
there will be no supply of natural gas to be sold to consum-
ers at just and reasonable prices or at any price.

See Note, “Conservation of Natural Gas and the Federal-
State Conflict,” 64 Colum. L. Rev. 888 (1964).

JUDICIAL REMOVAL OF ANY AND ALL FPC
REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS
WITH RESPECT TO INTERSTATE WHOLESALE
SALES OF NATURAL GAS SHOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON ANY ACTIONS, SALES, REGULA-
TIONS OR OPERATIONS OF SUCH INDEPEND-
ENT PRODUCERS UNTIL AFTER THE EFFEC-
TIVE DATE OF SAID REMOVAL.

This point is well supported by the jurisprudence of ths
Court. In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), this Court held that a later hold

ing of unconstitutionality of a Federal Statute would mt
operate retroactively so as to render previous judgments under

‘27 sae

the law later determined to be unconstitutional, null and void.
That decision is still good law today.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Respondent Forgotson respectfully
prays that the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD H. ForGOTSON,
WoRSHAM, ForsYTHE & SAMPELS,
-Twenty-Five Hundred,
2001 Bryan Tower,
Dallas, Texas 75201,

Attorneys for
James M. Forgotson, Sr.

28

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a member of the Bar of this Court, hereby
certifies that a copy of the foregoing Brief has this the
day of January, 1974 been served upon each counsel of reo-
ord for respondents in accordance with Rule 33 of this Court,
by depositing the same in a United States mail box, with
first class postage prepaid, addressed to said counsel at their
post office addresses.

Edward H. Forgotson

AMENDMENT V — CAPITAL CRIMES; DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; SELF-INCRIMINATION; DUE PROCESS;
JUST COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
_ of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
" forces, or in the Militia, when ‘in actual service in time of
~ War or public danger; nor shall| any person be subject for
_ the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
~ gor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
"against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

se

=e

~ without due process of law; nor shall private property be
_ taken for public use, without just compensation.

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_. AMENDMENT X — RESERVED POWERS TO STATES
- The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
_ stitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
_ the States respectively, or to the people.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0304%3A19. Public record. Not legal advice.
