# Amicus Curiae Brief — Gosa v. Mayden > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0198%3A08 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1973 - **Citation:** 413 U.S. 665 ## Text OCT 25 9i2 Supreme Court of the Hnite RATERE oe. corm OCTOBER TERM, 1972 No. 71-1398 JOHN W. WARNER, Secretary of the Navy, Petitioner, , Vv. JOHN W. FLEMINGS, Respondent. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 71-6314 JAMES ROY GOSA, Petitioner, v. J. A. MAYDEN, Warden Respondent. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MOTION-POR-LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF OF THE WORKERS DEFENSE LEAGUE, AAMC LS RP ROWLAND WATTS, 112 East Nineteenth Street, New York, New York 10003, Attorney for the Workers Defense League, Amicus Curiae JAP he Me e R e e 2 e e eeseoeoeeeeoseneveneesseonneas ess ARGUMENT: If retroactive application of O’Callahan is not mandated by classical jurisdictional concepts, administrative impact would be so minor, and personal impact on the former defendant so substantial, as to merit granting NE Fis s eck bkonad6 Chin keccccoees 3 B. Consequences of Punitive Discharges are Dispropor- tionately Severe When Contrasted with Civilian MS Soe ewok es occr Pens Cole lee. IE i609. p's 64 SkGCKS Es osc ow wed ucins 9 APPENDIX A: Analysis of a Sample of Reported Decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals for Possible Effect of Retroactivity ................. 10 APPENDIX B: Army, Navy and Marine Corps Court-Martial cascani OEEOE Pn t taped aaa 12 APPENDIX C: Effects of a Dishonorable Discharge: A Case History i a ti teh ahd Bh Nee ee ee eo ee oe ee RS Oe eee ONE OE SSS SR he eo 6 eee 6 6S Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae TO THE HONORABLE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: The undersigned, as counsel for the Workers Defense League, located in New York City, respectfully moves this Honorable Court for leave to file the accompanying brief as Amicus Curiae. The written consent of the attorneys for all parties has been obtained and filed with the Clerk of the Court. Although the brief was not served within the period prescribed by the Rules of this Court, counsel for all parties were advised, when their consent was requested, that the text of the accom- _ panying brief would be forwarded to them on October 13, 1972, and that service of the printed brief would be accom- plished not later than October 23, 1972. Said dates have been complied with. ~ Respectfully submitted, ROWLAND WATTS 112 East Nineteenth Street New York, New York 10003 Attorney for Workers Defense League October 20, 1972 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1972 No. 71-1398 JOHN W. WARNER, Secretary of the Navy, Petitioner, Vv. JOHN W. FLEMINGS, Respondent. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 71-6314 JAMES ROY GOSA, Petitioner, v. J. A. MAYDEN, Warden Respondent. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT BRIEF OF THE WORKERS DEFENSE LEAGUE, AMICUS CURIAE INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE The Workers Defense League is submitting a brief herein as amicus curiae because of its interest in the question of jurisdic- 3 tion and the impact of court-martial proceedings in these cases. " The Workers Defense League is an organization dedicated to the protection and extension of those civil rights which are guaranteed by the laws and Constitution of the United States. It has long been concerned with military justice, and previously appeared as amicus curiae in Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1953). The Workers Defense League maintains that courts-martial, despite recent improvements, have always been fundamentally and procedurally infected with infirmities which mandate this Court’s rejection of their past assertions of jurisdiction over offenses respecting which the Federal and State civil courts had statutory jurisdiction. ARGUMENT IF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF O’CAL- LAHAN 1S NOT MANDATED BY CLASSICAL JURISDICTIONAL CONCEPTS, ADMINISTRA- TIVE IMPACT WOULD BE SO MINOR, AND PERSONAL IMPACT ON THE FORMER DE- FENDANT SO SUBSTANTIAL, AS TO MERIT GRANTING OF RETROACTIVITY. The cases at bar are concerned with the possible retroactive application of this Court’s holding in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 US. 258 (1969), as refined in Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).In effect, this Court will determine whether, if retroactivity is not mandatory, it is appropriate in light of the considerations set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US. 618 (1965), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). It is our contention that retroactivity is required because O’°Callahan is concerned with what Judge Weinstein aptly termed “classic competence jurisdiction,” United States ex rel. ~~] 4 Flemings v. Chaffee, 330 F Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. N.Y. 1971). It is horn book law that the rulings of a court lacking power over the person or the act involved are necessarily null and void. To hold otherwise “would militate against our whole concept of power and jurisdiction,” Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single- ton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960). If, nonetheless, the Linkletter-Stovall considerations are here pertinent, we contend that the onerous éffects of punitive discharges awarded by courts-martial are so substantial, and the burden upon the Government of administering appropriate re- lief to affected applicants so readily met, as to compel this Court to hold that court-martial jurisdiction should always have been limited to the least possible power adequate to protect valid military interests, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955). Every unnecessary extension of mili- tary jurisdiction has constituted an improper encroachment upon the civil courts and the treasured personal rights secured by the Bill of Rights, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957). We therefore offer to this point the following data and arguments. A. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT OF RETROACTIVITY WOULD BE MINOR During the three year interval since the O'Callahan decision, the only published statistical analysis of its probable retroactive impact has been Blumenfeld, Retroactivity after O’Callahan: an Analytical and Statistical Approach, 60 Geo. L. J. 551 (1972) (hereafter, Blumenfeld). We have made a gase-by-case analysis of all pre-O’Callahan opinions reported in Volumes 3, 8, 13 and 18 of Decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals, so as to augment the data presented in Blumenfeld. Of the 590 cases analyzed, 10 (1.7%) would probably be affected by retro- 5 activity; 139 (23.6%) of the opinions do not contain sufficient factual information for determining the effect with reasonable certainty; the remaining 441 (74.7%) almost certainly will not be affected by the outcome of the cases at bar. Appendix A gives the enumerations by categories. The figures for affected cases should be read with some caution. Approximately one-third of all courts-martial involve unauthorized absences (denounced by Article 86, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §886); Appendix B; cf. Blumen- feld, 580-581, n. 149. It has been the experience of the Military Justice Program of amicus that such cases present few eviden- tiary or procedural problems likely to be granted review by the Court of Military Appeals. Consequently, civilian-type offenses are reviewed in that Court with greater proportional frequency than are they tried by courts-marital. As there is no reason to believe that, prior to the O'Callahan decision, O’Callahan- Relford considerations were weighed in deciding whether to grant review in the Court of Military Appeals, any over-repre- sentation of civilian-type offenses in the sample of cases ana- lyzed would d fortiori extend to cases which would be affected by retroactive application of O’Callahan. The above data lend weight to Blumenfeld’s determination that “approximately one percent of all general court-martial cases tried and appealed from June 2, 1969, until December 31, 1970, involved offenses that were nonservice-connected,” Blum- enfeld, 580, n. 147. The data suggest that said determination can be generalized to all such courts-martial during the past two decades. Even if it is assumed that substantial numbers of affected individuals would seek administrative or judicial relief,* the * A questionable assumption in the light of recent experience. See Blumenfeld, 578 et. seq., n. 140-149. As a practical matter, only sentences to lengthy periods of confinement or punitive discharge create a s.ufficient- 6 attendant administrative burden is insufficient cause for reject- ing retroactivity. “The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expedi- ency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government,” Reid v. Covert, supra, at 14. If we are indeed a nation ruled by laws, not men, judicially rewriting the Constitution to suit alleged administrative convenience would constitute a blatant succoring of bureaucratic arrogance. B. CONSEQUENCES OF PUNITIVE DISCHARGES ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY SEVERE WHEN CONTRASTED WITH CIVILIAN SENTENCES A Bad Conduct or Dishonorable Discharge can be given only upon conviction by general or certain special courts-martial. In the Army, approximately 81% of all enlisted men convicted by general courts-martial during calendar years 1964-1968 were adjudged punitive discharges. Appendix B, Table B-3. After serving any sentence of confinement, the recipient of such a discharge is subject to consequences which far exceed any disability that can grow out of a civilian criminal conviction. It should be noted that our statistics are not necessarily representative of convictions prior to 1951. Those convictions antedate Congressional Presidential actions designed to secure a fair trial for an accused In such cases, the very fact-finding procedure upon which the is predicated is necessarily suspect. Thus there is substantial that Flemings in fact stole the car (in 1944); there is no serious that Gosa committed the rape (in 1966). 7 The recipient of a punitive discharge is deprived of virtually all veterans’ benefits, including medical benefits for disabilities incurred in the line of duty prior to commission of the under- lying offense. (By way of contrast, a civilian employee later fired for cause does not lose disability compensation.) He is subject to the same statutory disabilities as is a civilian ex- convict. Further, he is stigmatized as disloyal at every turn in his civilian life. - ‘ Employment opportunities are all but non-existent in any branch of Government or in defense-related industry. In the balance of the private sector, employment applications univer- sally require statements of criminal convictions and military service, including type of discharge. The punitively discharged applicant consequently starts with two red flags when seeking employment. R-T-P, Inc. (formerly the Joint Apprenticeship Program, founded by amicus) advises us that approximately half of the trade unions will not entertain as apprenticeship application from recipients of punitive discharges. Those that do, do so hesitantly. The financial sector perceives a greater risk in lend- ing money to punitively discharged persons. In Appendix C, a single but not atypical case history is described. Regardless of the age of the accused at time of trial, there exists no effective statutory provision for expunging or remit- ting a punitive discharge at any time.* This contrasts with the Amy Court of Military Review, and formerly The Judge Advocate Gen. eal of the Army, anticipates the adoption of such a provision: [The trial judge at courts-martial] should have the power to suspend and the power to impose deferred sentences. A deferred sentence is a sentence which is withheld for a prescribed period. If the accused . Straightens out, we'll say, in six months, then the judge issues an Order which wipes out not only the sentence but the conviction. It salubrious provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§4209, 5005 et. seq. (Federal Youth Corrections Act), 5031 et. seg., and comparable legislation enacted by the various States. The contrast is particularly striking when viewed in the light of the youthfulness of personnel tried by general courts-martial. Appendix B, Table B-1 contains data provided by the Records Control and Analysis Branch of the United States Army Judi- ciary for calendar years 1960 through 1969. They reveal that of 18,589 enlisted personnel tried by general courts-martial, 6,365 (34%) were below the age of twenty; 8,614 (47%) were between twenty and 24 years of age, inclusive. During Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, more than 90% of the records of trial received for review at the Army’s Defense Appellate Division involved convictions of persons under twen- ty-five years old at time of trial. Appendix B, Table B-4. Data provided by the Military Justice Division of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, contained in Appendix B, Table B-2, are comparable. We have been advised that the Air Force does not keep comparable statistics. We contend that the penalties involved in most of those convictions which might be voided by retroactive application of O'Callahan are far in excess of the maximunt permitted in the civilian courts which properly had concurrent if not exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses charged. Furthermore, the possi- bility that subsequent good behavior would result in expunging purges the man’s record completely. In other words, the ABA Standards on Sentencing Alternatives should ke adopted . . . Hodson, The Manual for Courts-Martial—1984, 57 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1972). Note that the Department of Defense has recently adopted a policy and implemented procedures favoring recharacterization of undesir- able discharges (typically awarded on request, in lieu of court-martial) in cases involving use or possession of drugs. Blumenfeld, 572, n. 117. 9 the record of conviction does not exist; although in many cases it would, if the accused had been tried in civil courts. Because the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice, if relevant to the instant cases, must be examined from the perspectives of the affected persons as well as the adminis- trators of justice, we submit that the data we have presented tips the balance of interests in favor of retroactive application of O'Callahan. CONCLUSION ., It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should be affirmed, and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should be reversed. Respectfully submitted, ROWLAND WATTS 112 East Nineteenth Street New York, New York 10003 Attorney for the Workers Defense League, Amicus Curiae Marcy H. Cowan Fredric J. Gross Roy A. Jacobs doyce Kornbluh Edward N. Leavy OF COUNSEL ; ce APPENDIX A ANALYSIS OF A SAMPLE OF REPORTED DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS FOR POSSIBLE EFFECT OF RETROACTIVITY The opinion in every case reported in 3 USCMA (October Terms, 1952-3), 8 USCMA (October Terms, 1956-7), 13 USCMA (October Terms, 1961-2) and 18 USCMA (October Term, 1968) but excluding those cases decided subsequent to June 2, 1969, has been analyzed in an effort to determine if retroactive application of O'Callahan would nullify the pro- ceedings. In conducting the analysis, consideration was given to the following factors: (A) Was the nature of the offense(s) charged purely military (e.g., desertion, disobedience)? (B) Did the perpetrator use his or his victim’s military status as an aid to accomplishing the crime (e.g., assaulting one’s company com- mander while off post would be deemed service-connected)? (C) Was the offense committed on post or at post limits? (D) Did the crime occur in a locality where a non-military American flag court was open (N.b., Okinawa was deemed not be be such a locality on the authority of United States ex rel. Jacobs v. Froehlke, 334 F.Supp. 1107 (D. D.C. 1971), appeal pending)? The results are summarized in Table A below. A list of those cases which apparently would be affected by retroactivity, and those in which the opinion is insufficiently detailed to permit such a determination, is provided so as to permit replication. As not all courts-martial are reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals, and as cases in which the Court reversed a conviction are included in the tabulation, extrapolations from these data must be made with caution. 11 TABLE A: EFFECT OF RETROACTIVITY ON CASES IN SAMPLE Vol. Affected Indeterminate Unaffected Total 3 3 16 128 147 8 4 56 162 222 13 ms 30 88 121 18 0 37 63 100 total .° 139 441 590 % 1.7 23.6 74.7 100. 3USCMA: 8 USCMA: 13 USCMA: 18 USCMA: Cases which would be affected, listed by docket number i in se- quence of Court’s decision: 1244 9392 15700 [none] 1990 9592 16268 2720 9444 16405 9768 Indeterminate cases 1194 9223 9646 10180 | 15282 16163 | 21346 21689 1945 9401 9738 9546 | 15332 16204 | 20903 21703 2119 9113 9861 10227 | 15334 16018 | 21342 21526 2068 9587 9762 9645 | 15525 16207 | 21004 21555 3354 9731 10331 10311 | 15636 16282 | 21203 21657 3580 9992 10428 10833 | 15724 16489 | 21223 21676 3627 9199 10597 10567 | 15094 15936 | 21100 21704 3629 9681 9647 10799 | 15676 16064 | 21465 21709 1738 9421 9737 9723 | 15643 16172 | 21106 21719 3102 9687 10009 10418 | 15626 16237 | 21306 21721 2819 9606 10088 10429 | 15636 16491 | 21253 21636 12 APPENDIX B ARMY, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS COURT-MARTIAL STATISTICS Oot Geset SABI IS8Z Z6IZ OLST FEET FELT FEET OZBT G6LT OCI “'*':'*** jrrOy ST 019g = LOS HST TST) GOT LSZCEGE ~=«OCBE CORP «999.~«*TO** ~sea0 puecz 4¥ = ¥I98_ BLE GET «SOIT BSL 689 ZI8 98 FEL 999 G99 °°°°': 2-02 ‘v€ ($989 069 SfL 892 6rS 89h 699 869 9699 I8¢ 9¢9 0z 4epup aDV % MHOL G696I 896I L961 9961 S96I P96I £961 7961 1961 O96T 1eX TepuayeD TVILYVWSLUNOO TVHANAD AG Gara.L TANNOSUGd GALSTINA AWUV :1-€ ATAVL “SLAY JO Jaquinu [e303 ay} Jo %OT UBY} S89] SATOAUT ‘A1099489 Ydee 10] “PIO stea4 OF JaAa0 suosied JO S[e12} 784} yse88ns pure ‘T-g aqey, ‘eyep AWIY ay} UI punoy 724} 0} [ROIQUAap! ysoulye u1E}3ed eB 4Da]J0I BVP Bquireae ayy Ing “pezepnoyeo aq youueo sesejuaoied astdeid *Ajjuanbasuog ‘ajqeiteae jou St ‘sTeL} JO Jaquinu [2303 Zurj2edsez pur ‘og ade sAOqge [auuosied sdio_ sulze~| pue Aven jo S[e11} 0} se eyep “q'ny ‘PIO sia Og suosied sepnjoxe ‘[) 6] pue OLET 404 8822 =I8l Of SIZ 612 Ié6r vet «Sst F6L FS HTS BAZ Ct eee TOL cOOT IT Zt OFT LbT OT vel OTT 98 6ST 691 oz °'': UNOD [eeds Gog 989 89 86 69 cL Ts 0s cy 8s $9 sg me 2 rere WNOD [eiauaD *08°SZ FOV S6S0Z 221% 899% LbPZ Z9EZ ESIz SE9T 9@2T IST SSO ZLET PERT “occ eee ee: OL GII9T 6IST IST OZ8T 99LT ZSLI €LET ISOT OLZT 998T 6SII Zezl ‘°°: UNOD [epedg Gog a esrb 86809 «=6FS8) LZ9 «GS SCO ST in) | old but having misrepresented his age to a draft board, was inducted into the United States Army. Private Manera, Serial Number 42 164 526, was subsequent- > ly trained and qualified at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to drive various military vehicles, including 3/4 ton trucks. Upon reassignment ’ to Korea, he was required to obtain further qualification to _ operate military vehicles for his new unit. He did not so qualify because of an alleged failure to use proper hand signals. : On July 27, 1947, Manera and five other soldiers were given | permission to travel on leave by 3/4 ton truck to a point remote ' from post. The assigned driver of the truck, together with his ' companions, suggested Manera take the wheel. At their repeated urging, and with the knowledge that the Army had previously | qualified him to drive such a vehicle, Manera assumed control of | the truck and proceeded to operate it with due diligence. At one point in the trip the truck hit a large hole in the road _ and went out of control. Manera attempted to brake its mo- _ mentum, but the brakes failed. Manera reached for the hand | brake, but because of his short stature and the handle’s posi- | tion, he momentarily lost sight of the road. Thereupon the | truck went off an embankment at the entrance to a small _ bridge. Two Korean children playing at the water’s edge were struck by the truck. One suffered only minor injuries, but the other died a few days later despite Manera’s carrying the child _ toa hospital. 16 Manera was tried by a general court-martial for variow | offenses related to this unfortunate incident. He pleaded not guilty, but was convicted and sentenced to a year in confine ment at hard labor, total forfeitures and a dishonorable dis F charge. On review, the sentence and conviction were affirmed. & On June 28, 1947, Manera was released from confinement and received his dishonorable discharge certificate. On tha occasion he was given an orientation lecture by a Major in the Army. He advised Manera that he could never re-enlist, he could not go on military property, he was not allowed to vote, he could not hold a Government job and he could not personally own “titles, lands and property.” As Manera has said, the Major’s description of the significance of the dishonorable dis charge “distorted my mind.” Returning to civilian life, Manera experienced many hard. ships because of the dishonorable discharge. For one year he could not obtain employment. He became financially deper- dent upon his adoptive grandmother. Later he was to work for year and a half as a printer’s helper by concealing the fact of his military service and dishonorable discharge. He was still quite young and entirely believable when he asserted that he had never been in the armed forces. He left that first job and travelled to California. There he once was arrested while riding with a friend in whose car Los Angeles police allegedly found marijuana. The charges against Manera were dismissed; the friend was later acquitted. The experience of the arrest, and the scornful attitude displayed by police officials upon learning of his dishonorable discharge, convinced Manera that he would be happier back home in New York. Manera obtained employment gluing valises. As soon he had saved enough money to leave California, he quit that job and returned to New York. There he again obtained employ- ment in a printing shop by concealing his military history. 17 Subsequently, his employer learned of the dishonorable discharge. Manera was fired. Ostensibly, the cause was his falsifi- cation of the job application. He was next employed cleaning the interiors of airplanes, first for American Airlines, later for United. In each instance, he had falsified his employment application by concealing his military experiences. While working for the airlines, he made application for a chauffeur’s license. In that application he was candid about his dishonorable discharge. After a two year wait he received the license, and became eligible to drive a taxi. About a year later, while driving hacks part time, he was examined by one Captain Delaney of the New York City Police Department, who threat- ened revocation of the license because of the court-martial conviction and the, California arrest. Manera filed a written statement in his defense.\For a period of time he most anxious- ly awaited the results. He never heard further about the matter. Since 1966 he has ibtven taxis as his sole source of income. He lives in fear of a revocation of his hack license. Manera has never registered to vote in the belief that he is ineligible to do so. He has never served on a jury. He is unable to obtain a loan without a cosigner. He cannot afford the purchase of a home, although with Gi benefits such a purchase would have been within his means. He was afflicted with malar- ia while in Korea, and has suffered occasional relapses subse- quent to his discharge. He has been refused treatment in Veterans Administration hospitals for those attacks of malaria. His efforts to purchase a New York City taxi medallion (re- quired for owners of licensed cabs, and valued in the neighbor- hood of $15,000) were aborted upon the broker’s learning that Manera had received a dishonorable discharge. 18 Aside from the legal and administrative restraints on his activities, Manera bears a moral scar of which he is deeply ashamed. “I can’t stand up and argue with nobody,” he com. plains. “I have a dishonorable discharge that can be thrown up to me at any time.” On one occasion Manera assisted in the apprehension of an armed assailant of a third party. When the arresting officer offered to obtain for him publicity respecting his heroism, and indicated that it could lead to improved employment opportun- ities, Manera insisted that he be kept out of the public eye. He was asked if he cared to testify when the assailant was brought to trial, but could not bring himself to do so, lest others hear of his dishonorable discharge. His children, aged 4 to 12, do not know about his dishonorable discharge. How could he enjoy their respect and love were they to know? Manera’s crime was not one of moral turpitude. Uninten- tional vehicular homicide occurs all too frequently in the civil- ian world, but never results in an equivalent loss of rights, privileges and self respect. Manera was only 17 years old when he was convicted. His record is otherwise unblemished. But he has been forced to live with the burden of his conviction and dishonorable discharge for the past twenty-five years. They will be his cross until death. ‘I’ve been: afraid, more than anything else,” he notes. “I cannot make a move like a normal man makes a move.” 19 VERIFICATION STATE OF NEW YORK _ ) COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) SS: William A. Manera, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read the foregoing account entitled “Effects of a Dis- honorable Discharge: a Case History” and it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief. /s/ WILLIAM A. MANERA (William A. Manera) SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFORE ME THIS 11th DAY OF OCTOBER, 1972. /s/ MARILYN S. BROOK (Marilyn S. Brook) Notary Public, State of New York, No. 31-5463725 Qualified in New York County. Oommission Expires March 30, 1974. [RAISED SEAL } --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0198%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.