# Amicus Curiae Brief — Goldstein v. California

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0167%3A07

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 412 U.S. 546

## Text

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1971

No. 71-1192

——_

MOTION OF RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, INC. FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE

The Recording Industry Association of America, Ine.
(“RIAA”) hereby respectfully moves for leave to file the
attached brief amicus curiae. Counsel for respondent has
consented to the filing of this brief, but counsel for peti-
tioners has declined to consent.*

—

* The letter from counsel for respondent giving consent to the
filing of this brief is on file with the Clerk of this Court. The letter
m counsel for petitioners also is on file.

.
Se 1 tee me arene. Pm aie =

The Interest’ of the Amicus Curiae

RIAA is a non-profit New York corporation, whose mem-
bership consists of sound recording companies which to-
gether account for close to 90% of all authorized phono-
graph records and prerecorded tapes manufactured and
sold in the United States. Among RIAA’s basic purposes
is the representation of its membership before legislative,
regulatory and judicial bodies with respect to federal, state
and local legislation and regulations affecting the entire
sound recording industry.

RIAA has urged the adoption of state legislation de-
signed to eliminate the manufacture and sale of unauthor-
ized duplications of sound recordings, including Section
653h of California’s Penal Code which is under attack in
the instant case. RIAA also has been active in representing
the sound recording industry before the Congress of the
United States. The testimony and detailed information
provided to Congress by RIAA were instrumental in the

passage of Public Law No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (October
' 15, 1971), which provides federal statutory copyright pro-
tection for sound recordings made after February 15, 1972.
RIAA’s status as an appropriate representative of the
sound recording industry was specifically recognized by
the granting of its motion to intervene as a defendant in
the case of Shaab v. Kleindienst, 174 U.S.P.Q. 197 (D.D.C.
1972),** which upheld the constitutionality of Public Law
No. 92-140.

* The Membership List of RIAA is set forth as Appendix A to
the Brief annexed hereto.

** The report of this case in the advance sheets contains an error
in the name of RIAA and also identifies it incorrectly as an amicus
curiae instead of an intervenor-defendant.

-

eg

3

Thus, RIAA is intimately acquainted with the legislative
history and purposes of the state statute which petitioners
assert is incompatible with federal copyright policy, and
also of the federal act which petitioners claim has a pre-
emptive effect. It also has developed an extensive knowl-
edge of the economics of the industry and the working
operations of the pirates.

While the respondent has a specific interest in upholding
the validity of the statute under which petitioners pleaded
nolo contendere, RIAA represents the broader interests of
the sound recording industry. These broader interests are
intimately involved in this case, because a decision that See-
tion 653h of the California Penal Code is unconstitutional
would, by implication, invalidate all state law in this area,
both civil and criminal. The result would be to permit the
unrestricted duplication of the vast majority of sound re-
cordings now in existence. These sound recordings, which
constitute the very life blood of RIAA’s members, have
been protected in an almost unbroken line of decisions for
“well over half a century. Such a decision would have a
direct and devastating impact upon the members of RIAA,
as well as on many other individuals and enterprises con-
nected with the production and sale of sound recordings.

Accordingly, because of its extensive knowledge of and
direct interest in the issue presented for decision in this
case, RIAA requests permission to file the attached brief
amicus curiae in support of respondent herein.

Respectfully submitted,

Siwyey A. Diamonp
425 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
wi (212) PL 9-8400

Y

Ernest S. Meyers
74 Trinity Place
New York, New York 10006
(212) HA 2-0081
Counsel for Recording
Industry Association
of America, Inc.,
Amicus Curiae

>

Dated: New York, New York
September 20, 1972

To: a

ArtTHuR LEEDS
Paut T. Locke
DanieEt M. Gorr.ies
9229 Sunset Boulevard
Suite 306
Los Angeles, California 90069
(213) 278-3232
Counsel for Petitioners

Roger ARNEBERGH :
Davi M. ScHacter ©
Steven A. ScHWABEP
205 South Broadway
Suite 500
Los Angeles, California 90012
(213) 485-5483
Counsel for Respondent

cat

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OcroBer TERM, 1971
No. 71-1192

—<>—

DonaLD GoupsTeIn, RutH Koven and DonaLp Koven,

Petitioners,
—against—

State or CaLirorNi,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

po

BRIEF OF RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, INC., AMICUS CURIAE

Siwney A. Diamonp
425 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) PL 9-8400

Ernest S. MEYERS
74 Trinity Place
New York, New York 10006
(212) HA 2-0081

Counsel for Recording Industry
Association of America, Inc.,
Amicus Curiae

Kaye, ScHouer, FIERMAN,
Hays & HanpLER
David Goldberg
William M. Borchard
Ronald S. Kadden

Laporte & MEYERS
Of Counsel

————————

mets? PPT RE RR OTE eR mer

eS

A. The Interest of the Amiicus Curiae
B. Summary of Argument ..

C. Factual Background ...
I. The Sound Recordiing Industry

II. The Production of Sound Recordings ................
III. The Operation of Rtecord and Tape Pirates .... 10

‘D. Argument
I.

IT.

ITT.

INDEX

Reversal of the Judigment Below Would Have
the Effect of Owerturning Long-Standing
Principles of State Law on Which the Owner-
ship of Sound Recordings Is Based, In-
cluding Various Recent Decisions Distin-
guishing Sears amd Compco. The Conse-
quences to the Recording Industry Would Be
Disastrous. No Overriding Considerations of
Public Policy Comprel Such a Result.

States Can Protect Sound Récordings Under
Unfair Competition Principles.

States Also Can Protect Sound Recordings
Under Common Law Copyright Principles. ....

The Sears and Compco Cases Are Distin-
guishable.

17

17
24
29

38

li

PAGE

V. The California Statute Is a Proper Exercise
of the State Interest in Punishing Conduct
Equivalent to Larceny. 42

E. Conclusion 45

Appenpix A—Recording Industry Association of
America, Inc., Membership List .............. 1-A

APPENDIX B—Glossary 1-B

AUTHORITIES CITED

: CasEs
A&M Records v. Northwest, Inc., (Ore. Cir. Ct.), in
Casx Box, Sept. 2, 1972, at 7 22n
Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.
N.Y. 1912) 2in
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d
99 (2d Cir. 1951) , 38n
American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740 (2d
Cir. 1956) 32n
Artia v. Colosseum Records, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 550
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) 21n
Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Magnitron, Inc., No. 72 CH
3431 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Jun. 13, 1972) ... 22n
Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Superba Tapes, Inc., No.
995811 (Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 19, 1971) 21n
Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. 537 (Cal.
Super. Ct., 1964) 2in
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) 38n

Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Publishing Co., 25 App.
Div. 2d 158, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 944 (1st Dept. 1966) .......... 27n
\

a

PAGE

California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) .. 48n
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Campoy, No. 191454 (Cal.

Super. Ct., Aug. 28, 1967) 22n

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526,
82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960
(1970) 15n, 21n, 40n
Capitol Records, Ine. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43
Mise. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ..22n, 32n
Capitol Records, Ine. v. Hollywood Music Program-
mers, Inc., No. 944640 (Cal. Super. Ct., Dee. a,

1968) 21n
Capitol Records, Inc. v. International Tape, Inec., No.
72 CH 301 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 1972) =
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MeGettigan, No. 359-225 (Ore.
Cir. Ct., June 21, 1971) 22n
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221
: F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) 21n, 30n, 32n
: Capitol Records, Inc. v. Muntz, (Cal. Super. Ct.), in
- Brtpoarp, Mar. 7, 1970 2in
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Schaak Electronics, Ine., No.
671559 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Jul. 21, 197 1) 22n
Capitol Records, Ine. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264
N.E. 2d 874 (1970) 9n, 23n, 40n
Capitol Records, Ine. v. Winokur, (Cal. Super. Ct. hi in
_ Bazpoarp, Mar. 7, 1970 21n
CBS, Ine. v. Cartridge City, Ltd., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. yin
155 N.Y.L.J. 113, at 10 (1966) 22n
CBS, Ine. v. Custom Recording Co., S.C. , 189
S.E. 2d 305 (1972) 23n
CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967) 27n

iv

PAGE

CBS, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Mise.
2d 723, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964) 00000... 27n, 30n

CBS, Inc. v. International Tape, Inc., No. 72 CH 302
(ill. Cir. Ct., Feb. 17, 1972) 29n

CBS, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
1970) 9n, 22n, 26n

CBS Records v. Johnson, No. 4-71 Civil 255 and No.
4-71 Civil 436 (D. Minn., Jun. 20, 1972) 22n

Columbia Records, Inc. v. Nance, (Mo. Cir. Ct.), in
CasxH Box, Nov. 13, 1971, at 7 22n

Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964) : 2, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 33, 34n,
35, 37, 38, 39, 39n, 40, 41, 43, 44n

Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969) ........ 40n
Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 331 F. Supp. 127 (D.
Ariz. 1971), rev’d, 458 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1972) ........ 12n

Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass.

351, 197 N.E. 2d 886 (1964) 30n, 31n
Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) 32n
Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y.

1924) 39n
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373

U.S. 132 (1963) 42n

Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) .. 21n
FTC v. Orient Music Roll Co., 2 F.T.C. 176 (1919) ..10n, 2in

Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Mise. 2d 1034,
155 N.Y.S. 2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956) 21n, 32n

.

PAGE

Greater Recording Co. v. Stambler, 144 U.S.P.Q. 547
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) 22n

G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.
1952) 21n, 41n

Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir.
1946) 32n

Independent Tape Merchant’s Ass’n v. Creamer, No.
72-73 Civil (M.D. Pa., Jul. 24, 1972) 23n

Independent Tape Merchant’s Ass’n v. Martin, Civil
Action No. 3-5536-A (N.D. Tex., Feb. ae, 2078) 3... 23n

International News Service v. Associated Press, 248

U.S. 215 (1918) 2, 24, 25, 26, 26n, 27, 29
International Tape Mfrs. Ass’n v. Gerstein, 174 U.S.

| P.Q. 198 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (appeal pending) .............. 23n
King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.

Mt MD Siesta os eh ee 32n
Kortlander v. Bradford, 116 Mise. 664, 190 N.Y.S. 311

(Sup. Ct. 1921) 29n

Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) . 39n
Lennon v. Pulsebeat N ews, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. 309 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct. 1964) 27n

Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App.
20, 180 S.E. 2d 414, appeal dismissed, 278 N.C. 702,
mm OS. OU Ls 12n, 22n
Liberty/UA, Ine. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 70 CVS 15108,
71 CVS 2579, 71 CVS 4602, and 71 CVS 15105 (N.C.
Super. Ct., Jul. 14, 1972) 22n

PAGE
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) 38n, 39n

Mercury Records, Inc. v. McKenna Indus., Inc., (Il.
Cir. Ct., Mar. 22, 1972), in Reconp Wor.p, Mar. 25,
1972, at 4 22n

Metropolitan Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Mise. 786, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 483 (Sup. Ct.
1950), aff’d per curiam, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S. —
2d 795 (1st Dept. 1951) 15n, 25n, 32n

Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 47,
201 N.Y.S. 2d 632 (1st Dept. 1960), aff’d, 10 N.Y.
2d 972, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 662, 180 N.E. 2d 248 (1961) .... 40n

Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177
Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941) 200.. 25n

NBC v. Aiello, No. 970398 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 13,
1970) 21n

National Tel. News Co. v. Western Tel. Co., 119 F. 294
(7th Cir. 1902) 20n

New York World’s Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpic-
ture Publishers, Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 885 (2d

Dept. 1964) 27n
Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872) 29n
Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24

F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) 25n

Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown
Broadcasting Co., 247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa.
1965) 27n, 38n

Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196 (2d Cir.), appeal
dismissed, 164 U.S. 105 (1896) 29n

a

PAGE

Rare Earth Corp. v. Lear Jet Corp., No. 71 75821
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Jul. 1, 1971) 22n

RCA v. Premier Albums, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 62, 240
H.Y.5. 2d 906 (ist Dept, 1968). 15n, 21n

Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935) .... 26n
Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200

N.E. 2d 615 (1964) 28n
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964) 2,17, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34n, 35,

35n, 37, 38, 39, 39n, 40, 41, 41n, 43, 44n
Shaab v. Kleindienst, 174 U.S.P.Q. 197 (D.D.C.

1972) 19n, 30n
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Remington. Records, Inc.,

265 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1959) 44n
Shaw v. Williamsville Manor, Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 442.

330 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (4th Dept. 1972) 31n
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49

(2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 SN veiisunisdaitecs 39n
Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711

| (9th Cir. 1970) = 39n-

Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P.2d 546

(1959) 31n
Supreme Records, Ine. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F.

Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ....- 40n

Tape Head Co. v. RCA Corp., 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir.
1971) 37n
Tape Indus. Ass’n of America v. Younger, 316 F.
Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401
U.S. 902 (1971), appeal docketed, No. 26-628, 9th Cir.,
Oct. 22, 1970 4n, 7n, 9n, 11n, 21n, 23n, 40n

PAGE

Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio
Press Service, Inc., 165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y.S. 159

(Sup. Ct. 1937) 25n
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S!
90 (1918) 26n
Uproar Co. v. NBC, 8 F.Supp. 358 (D.Mass. 1934),
aff’d as mod., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936) .................... 32n
Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Armstrong, 132 F. 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1904) 21n
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433,
194 A. 631 (1937) 26n
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. David, (Cal. Super. Ct.),
in Brzgoarp, Sept. 2, 1972, at 66 /21n
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Elliott, No. 378-969
(Ove. Chr. Ob, Fabs Dh, TTS) ccccicscisscepeentcciovinoncnnstienpharsiitih 22n
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941) 44n
Werckmeister v. American Lithograph Co., 134 F. 321
(2d\Cir. 1904) 32n
Werckmeister v. Pierce and Bushnell Mfg. Co., 72 F. 54
(1st Cir. 1896) 31n
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) ............ 29n
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
. US. i (es) 35n
Woolsey v. Judd, 11 N.Y. Super. (4 Duer) 379, 11
How.Pr. 49 (1855)- 29n

Wright v. Eisle, 86 App. Div. 356, 83 N.Y.S. 887 (2d
Dept. 1903) 31n

=

ix
Unrrep States Constitution
PAGE
US. Const. art. I, §8, el. 8 33n
INTERNATIONAL AGREEME
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phono-
grams against Unauthorized Duplicatidn of their
Phonograms 24
Unitep States Statutes
Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, DO ietenccicd 29n
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, 4 Stat. 436, ¢ 9 : 29n
Act of Jul. 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 230, 4102... 29n
Act of Mar. 31, 1891, 26 Stat. 1106, OO vets 29n
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §1, et seg.
Section 1(e), 17 U.S.C. §1(e) .. dn, 35n
|... - Section 2, 17 D.B.C. 42...) 2, 29, 30, 30n, 34n, 35, 41n
Section 5, 17 U.S.C. §2 31n
Section 8, 17 U.S.C. §8 34n
etien 10, UO CS 31n
Section 12, 17 U.S.C. § 12 \ :. 30n
Section 19,-17 U.S.C. § 19 ae Ser 31n
Section 26, 17 U.S.C. § 26 .... 33n
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
SIL BUA SM ‘.. oon
Section 154, 35 U.S.C. § 154 aa 38n
Section 271, 35 U.S.C. § 271 oa . 38n
Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971) ....2, 18n, 28n,
33n, 36n, 40n, 41n, 42n
‘Rev. Stat. § 4967 (1875) 29n
18 U.S.C. § 2318 19n

x

State STATUTES

PAGE
Aniz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1024 (1971-2 Supp.) ............ 23n
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-4617 (1971 Supp.) -...-..-.-...220e--000 23n
Cat. Penau Cove § 653h (West 1970) .............-.....-2-000-+ 23n, 42
Pia. Beae. Ae. 4 Gee oes C19t2) 0, 23n
La. Act 350 (Reg. Sess., 1972) 23n
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law art. 12-E, § 224 (McKinney 1968) .. 44n
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §$ 561 (McKinney 1968) ............ 23n
N.Y. Penat Law § 155.30 (McKinney Supp. 1971) .... 44n
N.Y. Prenat, Law $165.07 (McKinney 1967) ................ 44n
N.Y. Pena Law $170.15 (McKinney 1967) .................... 44n
Pa. Star. tit. 18, § 4878.1 (1972-3 Supp.) ........................ 28n
Tenn. Cope ‘Ann. § 39-4244 through § 39-4250 (1971
Supp.) hecinis
Trex. Penat Cope Ann. art. 1137r (1972 Supp.) ............ 23n

Va. Cove § 59.1-41.1 through § 59.1-41.6 (1972 Supp.) .. 28n

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Ahrens, The Misappropriation Doctrine After Sears-
Compco, 59 TrapemarkK Rep. 88 (1969) ............ 26n, 27n, 48n

Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protections Afforded by
Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Unfair Cumpeti-
tion Law: The Sources and Nature of Product Simu-

lation Law, 54 TrapEeMarK Rep. 413 (1964) ................ 34n
BILLBOARD

Jan. 1, 1972 ao

Jul. 22, 1972 ... 19n

BuLBoaRD INTERNATIONAL Buyer's Guiwe 1971-72, Sept.
18, 1971 ; dn

_ ae

xi

PAGE

Boye, H., How to Make Money $ELLING THE $oncs You

i 5n
Brief for Petitioners (Appendix), Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, No. 71-1192, U. S. Supreme Court ............. dn, lin

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Ine., 376 U.S. 234
(1964) and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376

ee Oe NN 40n
CattMann, R., Unrair Competition TRADEMARKS AND
ee ee ee SS 27n
CasH Box
a 8) SSO Stebel ORG Serna 14n
May 27, 1972 sso ensttdlswhernatweiiensenicownnstanitGnissiilins oe 14n
ee ee 19n
Chapman, The Supreme Court and Federal Law of ae
fair Competition, 54 TrapemarKk Rep. 573 (1964) .... 34n
Comment, 43 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 178 ee ee

Comment, Performers’ Rights and Copyright: The
Protection of Sound Recordings from Modern
Pirates, 59 Cauir. L. Rey. 548 (1072) 9n, 31n

Copyricut (Monthly Review of the World Intellectual
Property Organization)

RS BP dee SE re OE ona 24n
i 24n

Copyright Law Revision, Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R.
5680, IT.R. 6831, and II.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No.

3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciara y, 89th Cong.,

ist CO 4n, 5n, Gn

i,

—

PAGE

Copyright Law Revision, Hearings on §. 597 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) .......6n, 7n, 8n

Corry, C., The Phonograph Record Industry; An Eeo-
nomic Study, ‘Feb. 9, 1965 (Library of Congress
Legislative Reference Service) ..................------ 3n, 4n, 6n, 7n

DELLER’s WALKER ON Patents (2d ed. 1964) -200022..... 38n
Derenberg, Consumerism and “Old-Fashioned Com-
mercial Honesty,” 15 IDEA 45 (Special Conference

TI TPE: ecanct besirccts vinccncsosiamonenstehopnsctnanceirenncition 27n, 38n
Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Rec-
ord Industry, 15 Vanp. L. Rev. 419 (1962) ............ dn, 36n
Diamond, Sound Recordings and Copyright Revision,
53 Iowa L. Rev. 839 (1968) 30n
Diamond and Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and
Phonograph Records, 11 Arr L. Rev. 29 (1940) ........ Sn
Hearings on H.R. 11258 Before the House Comm. on
Patents, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925)... 36n
Hearings on H.R. 10431 Before the House Comm. on
Patents, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. (1926) ... 36n
Hearings on H.R. 9636 Before the House Comm. on
Patents, 7ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) 7 36n

Hearings on Revision of Copyright Laws Before the
House Comm. on Patents, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) .. 36n
Hearings on H.R. 1268, H.R. 1270 and H.R. 2570 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights of the House Judiciary Comm., 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1947) .. . 36n
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) ........ 29n, 35n
H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ........ 36n, 37n

—

xiii
PAGE
H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ....15n, 23n,
30n

Kalodner and Vance, The Relation Between Federal
and State Protection of Literary and Artistic Prop-

erty, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1079 ( 1959) ooo. 31n, 34n
Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stiffel

Case, 54 Trapemark Rep. 731 (1964) oon. 34n
Livingstone, Piracy in the Record Industry, STEREO

Review, Feb. 1970 srenennanAuhintnsitanessnncebesatacnensneninesatncdtansscves l1n
Murray, D., THe Wortp or Sounp REcorDING (1965) .. 8n
N.Y. Times, Jul. 17, 1972 ooo. 19n
Nimmer, M., Tue Law or Copyricut (1972) oo... 33n, 34n

Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings, Hearings on

S. 646 and H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
UPC hip ere seine sence aterne 4n, 7n, 9n, 12n, 13n,
14n, 15n, 16n, 18n

Report OF THE RecisTer oF CoryriGHTs ON THE GEN-
ERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. Copyricut Law, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. (196L) o.oo ecccccceeccceseeeeeeee 36n

Rincer, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Re-
cordings, U.S. Copyricut Orrice, GENERAL REVISION
OF THE Copyricut Law (Study No. 26, 1957) .......: 30n, 36n

S. 644, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) 29n, 33n

S. Rep. No. 92-72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ..15n, 19n, 23n

SHEMEL, S., and M. W. Krasttovsky, Tus Business oF
Music (Rev. ed. 1971) oo 3n, 4n, 5n, 7n

PAGE

Statement of Henry Brief, Executive Director, RIAA,
Before the Commerce and Industry Committee, Ari-
zona House of Representatives, Feb. 15, 1971 ....14n, 15n,

16n

Statement gf Henry Brief, Executive Director, RIAA,
Before the Criminal Procedures Committee, Cali-

fornia State Assembly, Mar. 26, 1968 0. 14n
Symposium, Product Simulation: A Right or a
Wrong?, 64 Cotum. L. Rev. 1178 (1964) ............ 27n, 28n
Tex. Att’y Gen. Opinion No. M-1114, Apr. 3, 1972 ...... 23n
VARIETY
May 10, 1972 7n
Ftd, 26, 1972 nn iecccececesnceccceccececereresesese -19n ~

Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An In-
quiry Into the Constitutional Distribution of Powers
Over the Law of Literary Property in the United
States, 9 Buty. Copyricut Soc’y 102 (1961) ........ 29n, 34n

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctoBer Term, 1971

No. 71-1192

——
DonaLp Gotpstern, RutH Koven and Donatp Koven,

Petitioners,
—against—

State oF Carirornia,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

i

BRIEF OF RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, INC., AMICUS CURIAE

e

A. THE INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

The interest of the amicus curtae is set forth in the mo-
tion to which this brief is appended. |

B. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The piracy of sound recordings is an anti-competitive
activity that would virtually destroy the recording industry
if this Court were to legalize it by reversing the judgment
below. That such pernicious conduct cannot be condoned

{ i

2

is the substantially unanimous view of numerous judges
in many jurisdictions, of various state legislatures, of the
Congress and Executive branch of the United States, and
of the international community.

Sound recordings have been protected under the “mis-
appropriation” unfair competition doctrine enunciated in
the INS case. This doctrine evolved on a case-by-case basis
to deal with a variety of blatantly inequitable practices,
such as record and tape piracy. The Sears and Compco
decisions relied on by petitioners did not even mention
INS, and we cannot believe that the Court could have in-
tended to overrule all misappropriation law sub silentio.

In addition, sound recordings are unpublished works
which are protectable under common law copyright. Sears
and Compco cannot be read so as to declare that state pro-
tection of unpublished works is constitutionally preempted
because this interpretation is contrary to accepted canons
of construction. Nor could Sears and Compco have de-
creed statutory preemption in view of the explicit Con-
gressional recognition of state power in Section 2 of the
Copyright Act of 1909, as later confirmed in Section 3 of
the sound recording amendment to the Copyright Act,
effective February 15, 1972. Petitioners were convicted
prior to that date for acts committed much earlier, and
the application of the California statute to recordings made
after the effective date of the amendment is not an issue
here.

In any event, Sears and Compco are distinguishable in
that they dealt with patent questions which differ signifi-
cantly from copyright questions; they dealt with the imi-
tation of physical objects as distinguished from exact

3

electronic duplication of the performances comprising
sound recordings; and they dealt with plaintiffs who had
chosen to rely on a federal statutory form of protection
to which they subsequently were held not to be entitled,
while there was no possibility of federal statutory pro-
tection for the sound recordings duplicated by petitioners
in this case.

Moreover, there is a legitimate state interest in protect-
ing sound recordings from predatory activity which is
equivalent to larceny. Therefore, the validity of this state
criminal statute should be upheld and the judgment below
should be affirmed.

C. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. ”
The Sound Recording Industry

The sound recording industry of the United States “has
assumed a major role in the world of music, entertainment,
and communication. Its product has an almost universal
audience... .”?

Retail sales of recordings rose from $48,000,000 in 1940
to almost $200,000,000 in 1950, $600,000,000 in 1960 and
approximately $1,700,000,000 in 1970.2 An increasingly
large proportion of these total sales is attributable to
prerecorded tapes—mostly in the form of tape cartridges

*C. Corry, The Phonograph Record Industry; An Economic
Study, Feb. 9, 1965, at 1 (Library of Congress Legislative Reference
Service) [hereinafter cited as Corry].

*S. SHEMEL aNnp M. W. KrasiLovskKy, THIs Business or Music
xvii (Rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as SHEMEL].

4

or tape cassettes. In 1966 sales of prerecorded tapes
accounted for only approximately $40,000,000 at retail;
by 1970 sales of prerecorded tapes had increased to
$428,000,000, or 26% of the industry’s total sales ;* and by
1971 sales of prerecorded tapes accounted for approxi-
mately $507,000,000.°

Not only is the market vast, but access to it is relatively
easy because recording studios and manufacturing facilities
are available on a contract basis. New recording companies
accordingly are constantly making their way into the in-
dustry. In 1965 it was reported that the market share of
the five largest recording companies had been declining
steadily since the early 1950’s, a decline attributed in part
to “the ready availability of processing facilities to small
companies.” * In 1970, hundreds of record companies were
in operation in the United States.’

* For definitions of these and other terms commonly used in the
sound recording industry, see the Glossary set forth as Appendix B
hereto.

* SHEMEL, supra, at xviii; Statement of Stanley M. Gortikov on
Behalf of RIAA, Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings, Hearings
on 8. 646 and H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. [hereinafter cited as Piracy
Hearings], ser. 7, at 25 (1971).

5 BILLBOARD, Jan. 1, 1972, at 29.

* Statement of John Desmond Glover, Professor of Business Ad-
ministration, Harvard University Graduate School of Business
Administration, on Behalf of RIAA, Copyright Law Revision, Hear-
ings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
Ist Sess. [hereinafter cited as House Revision Hearings], ser. 8,
pt. 2, at 913-14 (1965). Glover’s study is the most recent industry-
wide economic study available. See also Corry, supra, at 48.

* Tape Indus. Ass’n of America v. Younger, 316 F.Supp. 340, 343
(C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1974), appeal
docketed, No. 26-628, 9th Cir., Oct. 22, 1970 [hereinafter cited as
TIAA v. Younger].

—

Many producers entering the market with a minimal:
investment have been able to produce “hit” recordings
which provide the basis for growth into a major record
company. A well-known example is A&M Records, which
started in 1962 with an investment of $200 to make one
recording that became a great commercial success and
supplied the capital for expansion. A&M Records went
on to become an established member of the industry.®

5

The consuming public has benefited from the large num-

‘ ber’ of recording companies. Every year approximately

6,000 singles and 4,000 long-playing records are released

in the United States.° Furthermore, because of special

provisions in the Copyright Act, everyone—large and small

producer alike—has the right to use the musical composi-

tions (as distinguished from the identical performances)

recorded by any competitor.”® As a result, the public often

| is given a choice between several versions of the same
song.”

*H. Boyz, How Tro Make Money $ELLING THE $oNGs You WriTE
22-3 (1970). A&M Records is the very company whose recordings
were the subject of Counts I—X of the Misdemeanor Complaint
against petitioners. Appendix to Brief of Petitioners at 15-23.

*SHEMEL, supra, at xix—xx; BILLBOARD INTERNATIONAL BuyEr’s
Guwe 1971-72, Sept. 18, 1971, at 8.

* Copyright Act §1(e), 17 U.S.C. §1(e). Whenever the copyright
owner of a musical composition permits it to be recorded, anyone
thereafter may make his own independent original recording of the
composition upon payment of a statutory royalty to the copyright
proprietor. See Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph
Record Industry, 15 Vanp. L. REv. 419, 420-29 (1962).

» Between 1953 and 1964, 62 domestic record companies made at
least 207 different releases of the song entitled “I Believe.” Several
companies released a number of ‘different recordings of the same
composition by different artists and musica] groups. Statement of
Glover, supra, House Revision 'H earings, ser. 8, pt. 2, at 785 (1965).

} a

6

“Although the industry is easy to enter and a newcomer
may make fantastic profits through a record hit, it is also
a highly competitive and risky business.” ?* Competition
within the industry and from other sources of entertain-
ment led to a continuous decrease from 1909 to 1963 in the
average price paid by consumers for sound recordings.”

Intense competition and the risks inherent in a business
appealing largely to the popular taste have put constant
pressure on profits. In 1964, only 300 of the approximately
3,000 individuals and companies who had phonograph rec-
ord labor contracts with the American Federation of Musi-
cians reported a profitable year.** In 1965, the net profit
of the industry, after taxes, was calculated at 1.7 percent
of net sales.’

It was estimated in 1965 that 60% to 70% of all long-
playing albums lost money.’* More recent industry esti-
mates indicate that as many as nine out of ten albums

A

12 Corry, supra, at 247; see also Statement of Robert R. Nathan
on Behalf of Music Publishers Protective Association, Inc., House
Revision Hearings, ser. 8, pt. 3, at 1740 (1965).

18 Statement of Clive J. Davis, Vice President and General Man-
ager of CBS Records, Copyright Law Revision, Hearings on 8S. 597
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. [herein-
after cited as Senate Revision Hearings], pt. 2, at 516 (1967). See
also Statement of Glover, supra, House Revision Hearings, ser. 8,
pt..2, at 822-823 (1965).

14 Statement of Alan W. Livingston, President of Capitol Records,
Inc., Senate Revision Hearings, pt. 2, at 495 (1967).

* Statement of Glover, supra, House Revision Hearings, ser. 8,
pt. 2, at 801 (1965).

16 Td, at 797-799.

ee

i as

7

currently lose money.” “It is the small percentage of hits
that pays the tab for all.” * In the field of classical music,
the number of successful recordings is even smaller than’
one in ten. Yet, established recording companies continue
to produce classical records, even though they must be
subsidized from other revenues.”

The increase in the number of unprofitable recordings
is attributable in part to increased production costs.2° An-
other reason obviously has been the increase in the para-
sitic practice of record and tape piracy.”

Statement of Gortikov, supra, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 25
(1971) ; Statement of Hon. Richard H. Fulton, Congressman from
Tennessee, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 6 (1971).

* Statement of Isabelle Marks, Assistant Secretary of Decca
Records, a division of MCA, Inc., Senate, Revision H earings, pt. 2,
at 527 (1967). :

* Statement of Davis, supra, Senate Revision Hearings, pt. 2, at
516-517 (1967).

*° For a more complete discussion of production costs, see Section
C.II entitled “The Production of Sound Recordings”, infra. More
sophisticated recordiftg techniques and increasingly expensive equip-
ment and technicians are one component of this increased expense.
Another well-known component is the ever-growing expense of re-
| cording artists. An often overlooked factor is the increased cost of
musicians who provide musical accompaniment. As of 1963, ac-
cording to Corry (at 211), the minimum wage rate for American
Federation of Musicians members was $56 for a 3-hour recording
session. As of October 1, 1970 this figure had jumped to $90.
SHEMEL, supra, at 53.

"1 See Vartery, May 10, 1972, at 71. “Piracy” has become the
term normally used by the courts and the public to describe the
type of conduct for which petitioners were convicted. See TIAA
v. Younger, supra, at 351: “Plaintiffs in this action are known in
the record industry as ‘tape pirates’ and rightly so, for to the best
of our knowledge all other courts that have had occasion to consider
the conduct of such ‘tape pirates’ have sanctioned state limitations

upon their piratical activities.” See cases cited in footnotes 51 and
52, infra. :

aaa

II.
The Production of Sound Recordings

The production of an original sound recording is an
intricate and expensive process. Typically, it begins with
the selection of several musical compositions determined
to be suitable for performance .by a particular vocalist.
‘Special instrumental arrangements of these compositions
are written and musicians are engaged to perform the
orchestral accompaniment. Numerous rehearsals take place
in the recording studio. The placement of microphones
is critical and hours of experimentation may be required
to achieve the desired tonal balance. During the recording
process itself, adjustments constantly are made in the con-
trol room where the sounds of the performance are
converted electronically into impulses on magnetic tape—
sometimes on 16 or more separate tracks. The results of
a successful “take” must then be edited into a master tape,
and further electronic and mechanical processing are re-
quired before a finished disc record or prerecorded tape
can be manufactured in quantity for sale to the public.”

In addition to the obvious costs involved“in the use of
skilled personnel, studio facilities and manufacturing
plants, there are other expenses peculiar to the recording
industry. Featured artists receive royalties based on the
number of records sold. Other performers are paid for
their services at rates not less than those fixed in union

22.2). Murray, THE Wor_”p or Sounp Recorpine 44-6 (1965);
Statement of Livingston, supra, Senate Revision Hearings, pt. 2,
at 494 (1967); Diamond and Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision
and Phonograph Records, 11 Air L. Rev. 29, 47 (1940).

—

contracts, and recording companies also are required by
contract to make continuing royalty payments to trustees
for the benefit of performing artists. Finally, when copy-
righted music is used (which is the normal situation), the
recording company must pay royalties to the copyright
proprietor for every record sold.”*

5 »

Even though the initial investment to produce a record-
ing for a single can be small, the cost of producing a
recording for a long-playing album with an established
artist can be staggering. Pre-release costs (z.e., prior to

any manufacturing or advertising expense) run from a
minimum of $50,000 or $55,000 to $75,000 or $80,000,
according to various informed estimates.* The total ex-
penditure involved at the point where manufacture, dis-
tribution and promotion have been undertaken is from
$180,000 to $200,000.27 And the continuing royalty pay-
ments outlined above must be paid even though total sales
may be insufficient to recoup the recording company’s
investment.

** CBS, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492, 493 (Ill. Cir. Ct: 1970) ;
Comment, Performers’ Rights and Copyright: The Protection of
a Recordings from Modern Pirates, 59 Cau. L. Rev. 548, 562

1971).

** Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d
874, 875 (1970) ; Statement of Gortikov, supra, Piracy Hearings,
ser. 7, at 26-8 (1971) ; TIAA v’ Younger, supra, at 344.

aes of Gortikov, supra, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 26
as

| oy

10

III.
The Operation of Record and Tape Pirates

Record and tape piracy has grown at an alarming rate
in recent years due to advancing technology. However,
the activity in which petitioners and others like them are
engaged has an ancient if not honorable history. In 1919,
when player pianos were in vogue, the Federal Trade
Commission issued a cease and desist order against the
unauthorized duplication of perforated paper music rolls,
based on the ultimate finding that:

“the effect of the practice on the part of the respondent
in making said duplicated or copied rolls from the
original rolls of competing manufacturers and the
sale of the same in interstate commerce in competition
with competing manufacturers or wholesalers or re-
tailers of the products of competing manufacturers is
to secure to the respondent an undue advantage over
competitors by appropriating the results of competi-
tors’ ingenuity, labor, and expense, and thus avoiding
the cost of producing the aforesaid master rolls.” *

The techniques of modern-day pirates are simple and
inexpensive:

“[They] purchase on the open market long playing
disc phonograph records which have been manufac-
tured and sold through the usual commercial channels
by record companies. Such dise phonograph records
are generally referred to as albums and they usually
contain 10 to 12 performances of one artist or group of
artists. ... After purchasing an album, [they] make
a tape recording of the exact sounds recorded on the

26 WTC vy. Orient Music Roll Co., 2 F.T.C. 176, 179 (1919).

—-

11

album. The tape is made by playing the album on a
record player connected to a tape recorder which turns
out a tape. When this master tape is finished, it is
played on a machine known as a ‘tape playback deck’.
The ‘tape playback deck’ is connected to machines
known as ‘tape slaves’ which in turn make additional
tape recordings of the sound which have been trans-
ferred from the record album to the master tape. A
large number of ‘tape slaves’ may be connected to one
‘tape playback deck’ so that a correspondingly large
number of tape recordings can be made at one time.
After the tapes have been made by use of the ‘tape play-
back deck’ and the ‘tape slaves’, each of the new tapes
is placed on a hub. Each hub is placed into a plastic
cartridge, and the ends of the tape are spliced together
so’ that it forms a continuous ‘loop’ in the cartridge.
The cartridge is sealed, tested, packaged, and labeled.
... Other than the small sums required to make and
distribute their tapes, [they] do not pay any other
expenses.” *”

With the increased popularity of tape cartridges and
cassettes, would-be pirates need not invest in the costly
metal presses and other equipment required to produce
dise phonograph records. All that is needed is the rela-
tively inexpensive machinery to produce tapes.?® This has

* TIAA v. Younger, supra, at 342-3 (emphasis added). The spe-
cific method of operation used by petitioners is summarized in the
Affidavit in Support of and Petition for Search Warrant. Appendix
to Brief of Petitioners, at 41-2. ,

8 “THlegally duplicating tapes turned out to be much simpler
than pirating dises. The necessary equipment was less bulky and
far quieter than the large presses needed to stamp out discs; it could
be set up in a garage, a basement or the back room of a shop.”
Livingstone, Piracy in the Record Industry, STEREO REviEw, Feb.
1970, at 63. This compactness and quietness are important to the
illegal operations, which are generally clandestine and highly mo-
bile. For descriptions of pirate enterprises utilizing such devices

12

made piracy even more profitable and easy to undertake,
and has further underscored the fact that pirates “circum-
vent a great portion of the costs of engaging in the record.
ing business.” *°

Indeed, compared to the costs of the producer of the
original recording, the pirates have virtually no expense,
and their profits reflect this fact. “The unauthorized re-
cordings are generally sold by the manufacturers at a
profit of at least 200% ....”* Naturally, the recording
industry cannot match the pirates’ costs: “The pirate can
go into business for as little as $500. Yet, we can’t even take
one artist into one studio for one hour for $500.”* As a
result, the price of the pirated article typically is far below
that of the original.

“Tilegally duplicated material is being supplied to re-
tailers at a price sometimes as low as $2.00, which is
about half the cost to the wholesaler of the legitimate
product. The reasons for this are clear—minimal in-
vestment by the pirate as against significant costs to
the legitimate manufacturing company which pays the

as armed guards, dummy names, telephone answering services which
do not know the identity of their clients, post office boxes and other
such devices, see Statement of Gortikov, supra, Piracy Hearings,
ser. 7, at 26 (1971) ; Statement of Robert C. Osterberg on Behalf
of The Harry Fox Agency, Inc., Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 64
(1971) ; see also Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 331 F.Supp. 127,
128 (D. Ariz. 1971), rev’d, 458 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1972).

2° Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N. C. App. 20, 21,
180 S.E. 2d 414, 416, appeal dismissed, 278 N.C. 702, 181 S.E. 2d
600 (1971).

8° Statement of Osterberg, supra, Piracy Heorings. ser. 7, at 64
(1971).

‘1 Statement of Gortikov, supra, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 25
(1971).

<a

13

performers, musicians’ expenses, costs of promotion
and the like. As a result, pirated merchandise ean be
sold, as, for example, in the case of a single tape
cartridge, at retail for two or more dollars less than the
legitimate retailer must obtain for his merchandise.”

The avoidance of production costs and the resulting
profits obtained by pirates is only part Of the story. Pirates
not only circumvent costs; they eliminate risks because
“the illegal duplicator reproduces only the hit recordings
so that he severely injures the sales of those products
which must make up for the substantial investments made
by the legitimate record companies in records which prove
unsuccessful.” ** Some pirates have sought to justify their
activities as a service to the public because they make
available a collection of hit recordings by various different
_ artists at a bargain price. This argument is specious be-
} cause the alleged “right” to duplicate sound recordings
for which all pirates contend is not conditioned on a par-
ticular type of end product. Either the “right” exists or
it does not, irrespective of the form of the reproduction.
In any event, the collection of hit recordings and the bar-
gain price become possible only because the pirates avoid
the costs and risks incurred by the makers of the original
recordings. Any stolen product, for which the basic costs
are not paid, can be offered to consumers at a bargain
price whether it is a pirated recording or a stolen tele-
vision set. .

*? Statement of Jack Grossman, President of the National Associa-
tion of Record Merchandisers, Inc., Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 47
(1971).

*SId. See also Statement of Gortikov, supra, Piracy Hearings,
ser. 7, at 25 (1971).

14

The minimal investment, exorbitant profits, and avoid.
ance of risks have caused piracy to grow to alarming pro-
portions in recent years. In 1960, the annual sale of pirated
sound recordings was estimated at $20,000,000.** In 1968,
the year in which California passed the anti-piracy statute
under which petitioners were convicted, the figure was esti-
mated at $30,000,000.** In 1971, the figure was put at
$100,000,000.*° Current estimates place the sale of pirated
recordings at $150,000,000 a year.**? Recording companies
producing prerecorded tapes have been particularly hard-
hit; it is estimated that one of every four tapes produced
is pirated product.**

The victims of piracy are not limited to producers of
original recordings. The pirate does not pay royalties to
artists, to the trustees of performers’ funds_or, with rare
exceptions, to music copyright owners. Furthermote, cities,
states and the federal government all lose revenues be-
cause pirates, again with rare exceptions, do not pay

** Statement of Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House J udiciary
Comm., Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 4 (1971).

*° Statement of Henry Brief, Executive Director, RIAA, Before
the Criminal Procedures Committee, California State Assembly,
Mar. 26, 1968.

** Statement of Celler, supra, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 51971) ;
Statement of Henry Brief, Executive Director, RIAA, Before the
Commerce and Industry Committee, Arizona House of Represen-
tatives, Feb. 15, 1971.

** CasH Box, Editorials of Feb. 5, 1972, at 3, and May 27, 1972,
at 3. .

** Statement of Celler, supra, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 5
(1971) ; Statement of Gortikov, supra, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at
25 (1971).

ae

15

taxes.*° Countless wholesalers and retailers also are being
victimized by having their business siphoned off. It has
been estimated that music publishers and the songwriters
they represent are losing more than $10,000,000 a year in
copyright royalties due to pirated tapes alone (not inelud-
ing dises),‘° and that in 1969 the musicians of the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians and the vocalists of the
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists lost
nearly $20,000,000 in income as a result of the sale of
pirated tapes and discs.*

Still another adverse consequence of piracy frequently
is the dissemination to the public of recordings which are
inferior to the originals from which they are taken.*
The reasons for the inferior quality of the pirated product
are several:

“[F ]Jirst, because each generation of transferred re-
corded sounds will inevitably reduce the quality of the
sound ; second, because . . . pirates do not have access
to the highly trained personnel or the sophisticated

* H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1971) and S.
Rep. No. 92-72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971) ; Statement of Henry
Brief, Executive Director, RIAA, Before the Commerce and In-
dustry Committee, Arizona House of Representatives, Feb. 15,
1971; Statement of Albert Berman, Managing Director of The
Harry Fox Agency, Inc., Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 58 (1971).

*° Marketing—The $100-Million Market in Bootleg Tapes, Busi-
ness Week, May 15, 1971, reprinted in Piracy Hearings, ser. 7,
at 44, 46 (1971). ;

“Statement of Hal C. Davis, President, American Federation
of Musicians, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at 59 (1971).

* See, e.g., Capitol Records, Ine. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d
526, 530, 82 Cal. Reptr. 798, 800 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
960 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Capitol Records v. Erickson] ;
RCA v. Premier Albums, Inc., 19 App. Div.2d 62, 63, 240 N.Y‘S.
2d 995, 996 (1st Dept. 1963) ; Metropolitan Opera Ass’n vy.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Mise. 786, 790, 101 N.YS.
2d 483, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 279 App. Div. 632.
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dept. 1951).

16

electronic equipment employed by the legitimate in-
dustry; and third, because they don’t care about qual-
ity—they just want to cash in on the quick buck.” *

Among the principal victims of the inferiority of pirated
recordings are the performers, because consumers attribute
poor quality to their inadequacy.** Where the original
manufacturer is known, that company may well be blamed
by the consuming public for the poor quality of the pirated
product.

From the foregoing it is clear that the recording industry
is an economically complex one, in which the compensation
of vocalists, musicians and composers for their artistic
contributions (as well as payments to trustees of per-
formers’ funds) is based in large part on sales. of the
finished product made by manufacturers of the original
sound recordings. Sales made by tape and record pirates
obviously do not contribute to the payment of the numerous
creative interests affected. Furthermore, the recording in-
dustry is a risky and competitive one, in which profits from
the relatively few “hits” are necessary to pay for the wide
variety of sound recordings now enjoyed by the consuming
public, and to make possible the entry of new competitors.
It is these very profits which are siphoned off by the
pirates, who, by appropriating the expenditures and talent
of others only after they have proved successful, circum-
vent most of the costs and all of the risks of the producers
of the original recordings.

** Statement of Henry Brief, Executive Director, RIAA, Be-
fore the Commerce and Industry Committee, Arizona House of
Representatives, Feb. 15, 1971.

** Statement of Grossman, supra, Piracy Hearings, ser. 7, at
49-50 (1971). The titles of the performances and the names of
the performing artists invariably appear on the pirated repro-
ductions without authorization.

L

za

17

D. ARGUMENT

1,

Reversal of the Judgment Below Would Have the Ef.
fect of Overturning Long-Standing Principles of State
Law on Which the Ownership of Sound Recordings
Is Based, Including Various Recent Decisions Distin-
guishing Sears and Compco. The Consequences to the
Recording Industry Would Be Disastrous. No Over-
riding Considerations of Public Policy Compel Such a
Result.

Reduced to its essentials, petitioners’ position is that
the decisions of this Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sti ffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) prohibit the states from
protecting sound recordings against unauthorized dupli-
cation. This specific question, of course, was not raised in
the Sears and Compco cases, which dealt with lighting fix-
tures, a totally different kind of product. Moreover, as we
shall demonstrate, the policy considerations of insuring a
competitive market which supported the result in Sears and
Compco are absent here, and those identical policy consid-
erations require affirmance of the judgment below.

In Sears and Compco, federal patent policy was invoked
to prevent a state from interfering with free competition
in unpatentable objects. Although petitioners seek to hide
behind the facade of alleged competition, it has been widely
recognized that the piracy of sound recordings is essen-
tially anti-competitive in nature. The position of the De-
partment of Justice on that issue was stated in its

18

comments on the recent sound recording amendment to
the Copyright Act which provides statutory protection for
sound recordings against unauthorized duplication :*°

“The competition provided by the pirate record indus-
try does not promote any of the traditional benefits of
competition. Although the pirate record companies
may greatly undercut the prices charged by the crea-
tive industry, their ability to do so results in large
part from the fact that they do not compensate the
creative writers and artists involved. Such practices
discourage the investment of money and talents in new
performances and ha[ve] the potential to gravely in-
jure creative recording.” *°

A similar view was expressed by the three-judge Dis-
trict Court which upheld the constitutionality of the recent
amendment, even though the argument there was based
on a claim that there should be a compulsory license to
duplicate sound recordings (implying the payment of some
compensation) :

“Consumer choices would not be broadened since identi-
cal interpretations would be supplied first by the origi-
nator and later by the licensee. Equally important,
competition and the creative aspects of the industry
would be impaired since established recording firms
would be discouraged from investing in new arrange-
ments and performers, if they were compelled to li-

** Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971) made avail-
able for the first time federal statutory copyright protection for
sound recordings. The statute went into effect on February 1),
1972 and applies only to protect sound recordings “fixed” (i.e.,
the recording process was completed) on or after that date.

** Letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst
to Hon. Emanuel Celler, Jun. 29, 1971, in Piracy Hearings, ser.
7, at 122 (1971).

Pr

19

cense their successful interpretations to those desiring
to take advantage of the originator’s initiative and to
add nothing themselves.” *

Nor did the Sears and Compco decisions destroy an
entire industry. Here, the only commercial value in a
master sound recording is the ability to profit from the
exclusive right to duplicate it for sale to the public—and
acceptance of petitioners’ view would nullify that right.
As a result, the inestimable value of untold numbers
of sound recordings produced over many years with
great effort, expense and artistry would be completely
destroyed.“

If the decision below were to be reversed and piracy of
sound recordings thus permitted to flourish unhindered,
the economic and creative effects on the industry would
be disastrous.*® Increased concentration of economic power

“‘Shaab v. Kleindienst, 174 U.S.P.Q. 197, 198 (D.D.C. 1972).
If this Court were to permit the unauthorized reproduction of:
sound recordings, it would be tantamount to requiring recording
companies to grant royalty-free compulsory licenses for their
recordings. Congress specifically considered and rejected any form
of compulsory license for “the finished product.” S. Rep. No.
92-72, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1971).

“The following recent news headlines indicate the tremendous
current commercial appeal of catalogs of existing sound record-
ings: Pubs Comb Files for “Golden Oldies” As Yesteryear Rock
Hits Click Again, Variety, Jul. 26, 1972, at 47; “Oldie” Pioneer
Taps New Marts, Bripoarp, Jul. 22, 1972, at 1; “Oldies” Are
the New Sound as Radio Turns Nostalgic, N.Y. Times, Jul. 17,
1972, at 1; Only 1 New LP, But Catalog Gives London Its Top
June Sales in History, CasH Box, Jul. 8, 1972, at 7. It is common
knowledge in the industry that concert tours by well-known record-
ing artists revive interest in their previously recorded albums.

“’Shaab v. Kleindienst, 174 U.S.P.Q. 197 (D.D.C. 1972) is on
appeal to this Court; if that decision as well as the decision below
should be reversed, then the commercial value of all sound record-
ings would be destroyed. Although 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1964)

—~

20

would be inevitable because the smaller companies would
not be able to withstand the effects of piracy of their
recordings. Established recording companies might be
forced to resort to piracy themselves in order to operate
profitably and to avoid criticism from their shareholders,
and this would contribute further to the elimination of the
smaller companies. Production of expensive recordings for
specialized audiences in marginal markets, especially re-
cordings of classical music, would be sharply reduced
because they could no longer be subsidized by other re-
cordings. With fewer creative enterprises in operation,
the consumer would be faced with a smaller selection of
recordings from which to choose. The end result would
be that “The parasite that killed, would itself be killed,
and the public would be left without any service at any
price.” *°

These effects are diametrically opposed to the aims of
free competition. Unlike Sears and Compco, a reversal
here would not foster the competitive free enterprise sys-
tem; it would have precisely the opposite result.

The ownership of the sound recording—not merely the
physical property, but the exclusive right to duplicate
the recorded performance embodied in it—obviously is
the economic foundation of the recording industry. In the
absence of federal legislation, the basis for such ownership

provides criminal penalties for interstate traffic in phonograph
records bearing forged or counterfeited labels, that statute in no
way protects against the vast bulk of unauthorized duplicated
recordings which are sold under the pirate’s own label or no
label at all.

50 National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F.
294, 296 (7th Cir. 1902).

w—

21

has been found in state law. Prior to Sears and Compco,
challenges to the rights of the owner of the sound record-
ing were rare; and they were uniformly unsuccessful.”
More recently, the increased piracy resulting from tech-
nological developments and the legal arguments supplied by
the Sears and Compco decisions have enlarged the volume
of such litigation. It is a striking fact that, even after the
decisions in Sears and'Compco, virtually every one of the
dozens of courts faced with the question of unauthorized

duplication of sound recordings has declared it to be un-
lawful.*?

*! Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657
(2d Cir. 1955) ; Artia v. Colosseum Records, Inc., 150 F.Supp. 550
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Aeolian Co. v. Royal Musie Roll Co., 196 F.
926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912); FTC v. Orient Music Roll Co., 2 F.C,
176 (1919); RCA v. Premier Albums, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 62,
240 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1st Dept. 1963); Gieseking v. Urania Records,
Inc., 17 Mise. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956). Fono-
tipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1909), the earliest
record piracy*case, was stated in G. Ricordi & Co. v. ITaendler,
194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952), not to extend to published works
capable of copyright protection. In the instant case, however, we
are dealing with sound recordings which were not capable of
statutory copyright protection and which were unpublished, Cf.
Vietor Talking Mach. Co. v. Armstrong, 132 F. 711, 712 (S.D.N.Y.
1904) where the court noted this “novel and interesting question”
but found no need to discuss it.

52 California —TIAA v. Younger, supra; Capitol Records
v. Erickson, supra; Baez v. Fantasy Records,

Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. 537 (Cal. Super. Ct.

1964) ; Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. David

(Cal. Super. Ct.), in Brutpoarp, Sept. 2,

1972, at 66; Atlantic Recording Corp. v.

Superba Tapes, Inc., No. 995811 (Cal. Super.

Ct., Feb. 19, 1971) ; NBC v. Aiello, No. 970398

(Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 13, 1970); Capitol

Records, Inc. v. Winokur (Cal. ‘Super. Ct.),

~ in Bitipoarp, Mar. 7, 1970; Capitol Records,
Ine. v. Muntz (Cal. Super. Ct.), in Brt-

BOARD, Mar. 7, 1970; Capitol Records, Inc. v.

Hollywood Music Programmers, Inc., No.

a

In addition to these numerous judicial decisions, ten
states have enacted criminal statutes outlawing record and

22

944640 (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 27, 1968);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Campoy, No. 191454
(Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 28, 1967).

Illinois —CBS, Ince. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492 (IIL.
Cir. Ct. 1970); Atlantic Recording Corp. v.

. Magnitron, Inc., No. 72 CH 3431 (Ill. Cir.

Ct., Jun. 13, 1972); Mercury Records, Ince.

v. McKenna Indus., Inc. (Ill. Cir. Ct., Mar.

22, 1972), in Recorp Wor.p, Mar. 25, 1972,

at 4; CBS, Inc. v. International Tape, Inc.,

No. 72 CH 302 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Feb. 17, 1972);

Capitol Records, Inc. v. International Tape,

Inc., No. 72 CH 301 (Ill.- Cir. Ct., Feb. 23,

1972).
Michigan —Rare Earth Corp. v. Lear Jet Corp., No.
71 75821 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Jul. 1, 1971).
Minnesota —CBS Records v. Johnson, No. 4-71 Civil 225

and No. 4-71 Civil 436 (D. Minn., Jun. 20,
1972) ; Capitol Records, Inc. v. Schaak Elee-
tronics, Ine., No. 671559 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Jul. 21, 1971).

Missouri —Columbia Records, Inc. v. Nance (Mo. Cir.
Ct.), in Cas Box, Nov. 13, 1971, at 7.
New York —Greater Recording Co. v. Stambler, 144

U.S.P.Q. 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43
Mise. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct.
1964); CBS, Ine. v. Cartridge City, Ltd.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), in 155 N.Y.L.J. 113, at 10
(1966). ;

North Carolina—Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11
N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414, appeal dis-
missed, 278 N.C. 702, 181 S.E.2d 600 (1971);
Liberty/UA, Ine. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 70
CVS 15108, 71 CVS 2579, 71 CVS 4602, and
71 CVS 15105 (N.C. Super. Ct., Jul. 14,
1972).

Oregon —A & M Records v. Northwest, Inc. (Ore. Cir.
Ct.), in Cash Box, Sept. 2, 1972, at 7;
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Elliott, No.
378-969 (Ore. Cir. Ct., Jul. 11, 1972) ; Capi-

23

tape piracy."* The constitutionality of the California
statute involved here has been sustained by a three-judge
federal district court; attacks on the constitutionality of
the Pennsylvania and Texas statutes have been dismissed ;**
and the constitutionality of the Texas statute has been up-
held in an opinion by the Attorney-General of that state.*
After both Houses of Congress, with support from several
Executive Departments, had issued reports condemning the
practice,*’ Congress enacted an anti-piracy bill (which has

tol Records, Inc. v. McGettigan, No. 359-225
(Ore. Cir. Ct., Jun. 21, 1971).

Two contrary decisions refusing temporary injunctions were re-
versed on appeal. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 III. App.
2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970); CBS, Ine. v. Custom Recording
Co., S.C. ——, 189 8.E.2d 305 (1972). The single exception
is a very recent decision concerning the Florida statute in which
appeal presently is pending. International Tape Mfrs. Ass’n v,
Gerstein, 174 U.S.P.Q. 198 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (appeal pending).
Compare Independent Tape Merchant’s Ass’n vy, Creamer, No.
72-73 Civil (M.D. Pa., Jul. 24, 1972) and Independent Tape
Merchant’s Ass’n v. Martin, Civil Action No. 3-5536-A (N.D.
Tex., Feb. 29, 1972), where the district courts left interpreta-
tion of the Pennsylvania and Texas anti-piracy statutes to the
state courts in the first instance.

* Ariz. Rev. Star. ANN. §13-1024 (1971-2 Supp.); Ark. Srar,
Ann. §41-4617 (1971 Supp.); Cav. Penau Cope §653h ( West
1970); Fua. Star. ANN. §543.041 (1972); La. Acr 350 (Reg.
Sess. 1972); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §561 (McKinney 1968); Pa.
Sra. tit. 18, §4878.1 (1972-3 Supp.) ; Tenn. Cope ANN. §39-4244
through §39-4250 (1971 Supp.) ; Tex. PenaL Cope ANN. art. 1137r
oo Va. Cope §59.1-41.1 through §59.1-41.6 (1972

upp.). '

* TIAA v. Younger, supra.

Independent Tape Merchant’s Ass’n y, Creamer, No. 72-73
Civil (M.D. Pa., Jul. 24, 1972); Independent Tape Merchant’s
Ass’n v. Martin, Civil Action No. 3-5536-A (N.D. Tex., Feb. 29,
1972).

°° Tex. Att’y GEN. Oprnion No. M-1114, Apr. 3, 1972.

*' H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); S. Rep.
No. 92-72, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ; see note 45, supra.

24

only prospective effect). A diplomatic conference on record
and tape piracy in October 1971 in Geneva, Switzerland,
attended by more than fifty nations, adopted a “Convention
for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against
Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms.” *

This substantially unanimous agreement that the piracy
of sound recordings is pernicious and unlawful conduct that
cannot be condoned, reached by so many judges in so many
jurisdictions, by state legislatures, by the Congress and
the Executive branch of the United States, and by the
international community, shows clearly shat basie con-
siderations of public policy dictate affirmance of the
decision below.

II.

States Can Protect Sound Recordings Under Unfair
Competition Principles.

The law of unfair competition has evolved over the
years to meet changing business developments and mal-
practices. Beginning in 1918 with the landmark decision
of this Court ip Jnternational News Service v. Associated
Press,® courts fave applied the doctrine of “misappropria-
tion” to particular fact situations in which (1) time, effort
and money have gone into something of value, generally an
intangible creation, (2) there has been appropriation of

°sThe text appears in Copyright (Monthly Review of the
World Intellectual Property Organization), Dee. 1971, at 240-242.
The treaty has been signed by 31 countries (Copy RIGHT, May 1972,
at 110), and will go into effect 3 months after formal ratification,
acceptance or accession by 5 countries. 7d. Article 11(1).

5° 248 U.S. 215 (1918).

Sie a kt

Ty

25

that “quasi-property” at little or no cost to the male-
factor; and (3) there has been a direct diversion of profits
from the creator to the appropriator. INS involved the
pirating of the substance of complainant’s news reports
(concededly not within the coverage of the Copyright
Act). The Court, in granting relief against this activity
which it characterized as a “misappropriation,” analyzed
the situation as follows:

“Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an
unauthorized interference with the normal operation of
complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point
where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a ma-
terial portion of the profit from those who have earned
it to those who have not; with special advantage to
defendant in the competition because of the-fact that
it is not burdened with any part of the expense. ...
The transaction speaks for itself, and a court of equity
ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair
competition in business.” ®

Courts repeatedly have applied this doctrine to redress
obvious inequities involving various similar practices,
including record piracy—a totally analogous situation
squarely meeting the three criteria mentioned above.”

° Id. at 233.
* Id. at 240.

“E.g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24
F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (unauthorized sportsceast) ; Metro-
politan Opera ‘n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Mise.
786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd per curtam, 279 App.
Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dept. 1951) (opera performances
recorded off the air and incorporated in phonograph records) ;
Mutual Broadcasting System, Ine. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Mise. 489,
30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (sportscast taken off the air and
transmitted by telephone lines); Twentieth Century Sporting
Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press Service, Ine., 165 Mise. 71, 300

26

Thus, the misappropriation doctrine grew in responge to
the ethical as well as the economic needs of society, and it
developed separately from the patent and copyright laws
and from other common law rules concerning unfair com-
petition.*

Sears and Compco did not obliterate all state unfair
competition law. For example, the Court specifically
endorsed the right of the states to enjoin imitation of trade-
marks, labels or distinctive packaging**—all of which are
types of unfair competition.** ‘Sears and Compco thus do
not automatically exclude relief for misappropriation,
which is another type of unfair competition.®

The ZJNS decision was not even cited in Sears and
Compco. Despite the sweeping language of those decisions,
the Court surely could not have intended to destroy the

N.Y.S. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (sportseast taken off the air and
retransmitted) ; Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa.
433, 194 A. 631 (1937) (unauthorized radio broadcast of record-
ing). For record piracy cases, see notes 51 and 52, supra.

68 See, e.g., International News Service v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 235 (1918); CBS, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492, 499
(Ill. Cir. Ct. 1970); Ahrens, The Misappropriation Doctrine
After Sears-Compco, 59 TRADEMARK Rep. 88, 92 (1969). See
also Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A.
631 (1937).

* 376 U.S. 225 at 232 (1964); 376 U.S. 234 at 238 (1964).
See also 376 U.S. at 239 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring).

65 “The law of trade-marks is but a. part of the broader law of
unfair competition. ...” United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).

66“Tn recent years, its [unfair competition’s] scope has been
extended. It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well
as misrepresentation, to the selling of another’s goods as one’s own
—to misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor.”
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 532 (1935).

aiid ns eT Se OED Feo ae gh as LS MEO RE F

27

entire body of misappropriation law without expressly say-
ing so.” The continuing vitality of the misappropriation
doctrine has been accepted by the numerous federal and
state courts which have continued to apply it after Sears
and Compco, not only to combat record and tape piracy,
but also in various analogous situations involving blatantly
inequitable conduct. The one federal appellate court
decision which construes Sears and Compco as having
overruled NS has been severely criticized by leading com-
mentators.

Sears and Compco were product simulation cases, a well-
recognized category in unfair competition law.”? The Court

* The commentators are in agreement. E.g., Handler, in Sym-
posium, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 CoLum.
L. Rev. 1178, 1190 (1964); 2 R. CaLLMANN, UNFAIR CoMPETITION
TRADEMARKS AND MOoNOPOLIES §60.4(c), at 519 (3d ed. 1968) ;
Ahrens, The Misappropriation Doctrine After Sears-Compco, 59
TRADEMARK Rep. 88, 104 (1969).

**E.g., Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Publishing Co., 25 App.
Div.2d 158, 267 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1st Dept. 1966) (wire service ma-
terial incorporated in newsletter) ; CBS, Ine. v. Documentaries
Unlimited, Inc., 42 Mise.2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
(news announcement recorded off the air and incorporated in
phonograph record) ; Lennon v. Pulsebeat News, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q.
309 (N:Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (taped interviews incorporated in
phonograph records); Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v.
Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965)
(newspaper items incorporated in news broadcast) ; cf. New York
World’s Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc.,
141 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251
N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dept. 1964) (photographs of fair grounds
buildings used in postcards and the like). For record piracy
cases see note 52, supra.

* CBS, Ine. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). See Derenberg, Consumerism and
“Old-Fashioned Commercial Honesty,” 15 IDEA 45, 56-7 (Special
Conference Issue, 1972); 2 R. CaLLMANN, Unrair CoMPeETITION
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 61.3, at 550-551 (3d ed. 1968).

" See, e.g., Derenberg, in Symposium, Product Simulation: A
Right or a Wrong?, 64 Cotum. L. REV. 1178, 1204-08 (1964).

28

left no room for Illinois to use state unfair competition
law to avoid paramount federal patent policy as applied
to product simulation. But that does not oust state
power to repress all other types of unfair competition,
whether under the rubric of misappropriation or otherwise.
With specific reference to sound recordings, Congress
clearly felt that protectable rights do exist in recordings
fixed prior to the effective date of the recent amendment to
the Copyright Act. Section 3 of that amendment states, in
part:

“,. nothing in title 17, United States Code, as amended
by section 1 of this Act, shall be applied retroactively ,
or be construed as affecting in any way any rights
with respect to sound recordings fixed before the ef-
fective date of this Act.””

The universal condemnation of record and tape piracy
compels its classification as a form of unfair competition.
“Competition is a desideratum in our economic system but
it ceases to serve an economic good when it becomes unfair.
The concept of fair play should not be shunted aside on the
theory that competition in any form serves the general
good. Only fair competition does that. Unfair competition
is not competition at all in the truest sense of the word.” ”
The public interest without question would best be served
by safeguarding the legitimate interests and property
rights of the sound recording industry from destruction at
the hands of the pirates, and the equitable misappropria-

7 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971).

72 Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 NE.
2d 615 (1964). See also Handler, in Symposium, Product Simula-
tion: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 CoLtum. L. Rev. 1178, 1187 (1964).

3 A
SEE TALIS SEEM CII REE EI SI NIT Bi

29

tion doctrine of unfair competition developed from ]NS
is perfectly suited to provide protection in this unique
situation.

III.

States Also Can Protect Sound Recordings Under Com-
mon Law Copyright Principles.

Unpublished writings always have been accorded pro-
tection against unauthorized use,’* and in 1909, when the
present Copyright Act was enacted, Congress specifically
preserved common law rights in unpublished works by
stating in Section 2:

*’ Sce Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). The early
federal copyright statutes, unlike the present Copyright Act, pro-
vided a statutory remedy against the printing or publishing of any
manuscript whatever without the prior consent of the author or
proprietor. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, §6; Act of Feb. 3,
1831, 4 Stat. 436, §9; Act of Jul. 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 230, §102;
Rev. Stat. §4967 (1875); Act of Mar. 31, 1891, 26 Stat. 1106, §9.
This provision was interpreted not to preempt the states from
concurrently protecting the common law copyright in unpublished
works. Sce, e.g., Kortlander vy. Bradford, 116 Mise. 664, 190
N.Y.S. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 535-
36 (1872) ; Woolsey v. Judd, 11 N.Y. Super. (4 Duer) 379, 385,
11 How. Pr. 49, 55 (1855); sce also, Press Pub. Co. vy. Monroe,
73 F. 196, 199 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 164 U.S. 105 (1896) ;
Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry into
the Constitutional Distribution of Powers Over the Law of Lit-
erary Property in the United States, 9 ButL. CopyriGut Soc’y
102, 146 et seg. (1961) [hereinafter cited as Whicher].

*“Tt was thought best by the committee to insert the provision
in this form in order that it might be perfectly clear that nothing
in the bill was intended to impair in any way the common-law
rights in respect to this kind [unpublished] of work.” H.R. Rep.
No. 2222, GOth Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909). Under the current Copy-
right Revision Bill, Congress would reenter and specifically pre-
empt the field of protection for unpublished works. S. 644, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. §104(a) (1971).

7

“Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul
or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an
unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to pre-
vent the copying, publication, or use of such unpub-
lished work without his consent, and to obtain damages
therefor.” **

The Sears decision, citing Section 2 of the Copyright Act,
recognized the continuing power of the states to give
common law copyright protection to unpublished writings.”
Sound recordings are “writings” in the constitutional
sense and constitute works of creative authorship that are a
proper subject for copyright protection.” Thus, by virtue
of Section 2 of the Copyright Act, any sound recording
fixed before the effective date of the recent amendment to
the Copyright Act can be protected under state common
law copyright principles if it remains unpublished.

“Publication” in copyright law is a technical concept
which varies in meaning according to circumstances and
whether the issue presented involves the divesting of
common law copyright or the investing of statutory copy-

17 US.C. §2. Section 12, 17 U.S.C. §12, continues to per-
mit, but does not require, registration of copyright in several types
of unpublished works (not including sound recordings).

76376 U.S. at 231 n. 7. Accord, Edgar H. Wood Associates,
Ine. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 355, 197 N.E.2d 886, 890 (1964);
CBS, Ine. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Mise. 2d 723, 726,
248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1964).

*Shaab v. Kleindienst, 174 U.S.P.Q. 197 (D.D.C. 1972); see
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657,
660 (2d Cir. 1955); H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
5 (1971); Diamond, Sound Recordings and Copyright Revision,
53 Iowa L. Rev. 839, 861 (1968); Rineer, The Unauthorized
Duplwation of Sound Recordings, U.S. Copyricut Orrice, GEn-
ERAL REVISION OF THE CopyRiGHT Law 11 (Study No. 26, 1957).

Ss ve PG RIT ae ON ne RIES NINE OTT LOO EC LEO BOIS nO nay career

aa

31

right.” This dichotomy is necessary because publication
destroys common law copyright; it may be replaced by
statutory copyright if the work is eligible under the
categories established by the Copyright Act and if it bears
the correct notice in the proper place at the time of publica-
tion.” In order to avoid the drastic result of an unin-
tended forfeiture of rights, the identical activity has been
held to be a publication investing statutory copyright
protection in one case but not to be a publication divesting
common law copyright protection in another case. “In

*8 See Kalodner and Vance, The Relation between Federal and
State Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 1079, 1092-96 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Kalodner and
Vance] ; Comment, Performers’ Rights and Copyright: The Pro-
tection of Sound Recordings from Modern Pirates, 59 Caur. L.
Rev. 548, 561 (1971).

While the question of what constitutes publication investing
federal statutory copyright is a matter of federal law, the con-
cept of publication divesting common law copyright is governed
by the case law of the particular state in which protection is
sought. Thus, in a case of first impression in California, a state
District Court of Appeal declined to follow an old decision of a
New York court in Wright v. Eisle, 86 App. Div. 356, 83 N.Y.S.
887 (2d Dept. 1903), and held instead that the mandatory filing of
architectural plans, drawings and designs with a county building
department did not indicate an intent to dedicate the plans to
the public and was not a publication divesting common law copy-
right in the plans. Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App.2d 744, 345 P.2d
546 (1959). As this issue has subsequently arisen in other state
courts, the California decision in Smith v. Paul has come to reflect
the increasingly accepted view. See Edgar H. Wood Associates,
Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886 (1964). The chang-
ing concept of publication is further demonstrated by the fact that
a New York appellate court recently overruled the earlier decision
in Wright v. Eisle and accepted the Smith and Skene cases as the
prevailing view of publication. Shaw v. Williamsville Manor, Inc.,
38 App. Div.2d 442, 330 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dept. 1972).

917 U.S.C. §§5, 10, 19.

*° Compare, e.g., Werckmeister v. Pierce and Bushnell Mfg. Co.,
72 F. 54 (1st Cir. 1896) (holding that exhibition of a painting in a

32

each case the courts appear so to treat the concept of
‘publication’ as to prevent piracy.” *

A number of courts have analyzed the protection of
sound recordings under common law copyright doctrines
and have held that the sale of the physical object (the
record or tape) does not divest common law copyright and
forfeit the right to duplicate the intangible recorded per-
formance embodied in it.*? This is consonant with a long
line of authority that a performance, even before thousands
of people, does not constitute a divestitive publication.”
The record or tape is a device that is meaningless as a
physical object but possesses the capability of reperform-
ing the captured sounds. Accordingly, the sound record-

public art gallery constituted publication which invested statutory
copyright protection), with Werckmeister v. American Lithograph
Co., 134 F. 321 (2d Cir. 1904) (holding that exhibition of a paint-
ing in a public art gallery did not constitute publication divesting
common law copyright protection).

*1 American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 744 (2d
Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.).

82 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657
(2d Cir. 1955) ; Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43
Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Gieseking v. Urania
Records, Inc., 17 Misc.2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ;
Metropolitan Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff’d per-curtam, 279
App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 795 (1st Dept. 1951).

83 F.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (performance of
a stage play, held not divestitive publication) ; Heim v. Universal
Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946) (playing of a musical
composition, held not a divestitive publication) ; King v. Mister
Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (public delivery
of speech before 200,000 people, over radio and television, and
after distribution of advance copies to the press, held not a divesti-
tive publication) ; Uproar Co. v. NBC, 8 F. Supp. 358, 362 (D. Mass.
1934), aff'd as mod., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936) (broadcast of a
radio script, held not a divestitive publication).

DEE te CLL ETE OLE IIE LON MELE ELUTE SEITEN TIE at pO I: age 2s Ae
g PGA f Fy

33

ing—the intangible work embodied in the record or tape"
—remains unpublished.* It is not in the public domain; to
the contrary it is subject to state protection, and its un-
authorized duplication is an obvious infringement of the
owner’s common law copyright.

Petitioners argue that Sears and Compco held the states
to be preempted from protecting materials (such as sound
recordings) that are constitutionally capable of copyright
protection but for which Congress has not granted
statutory copyright protection.*® This argument seems to
rest on the theory that the copyright clause of the Constitu-
tion*’ operates, of its own force, to make the protection of
all writings an exclusively federal function. The short
answer to this contention is that, as noted above, Sears
specifically recognized the continuing validity of state
protection in the field of common law copyright.

** For the distinction between intangible works and material
objects, see the definitions of “sound recordings” and “reproductions
of sound recordings” in §1(e) of Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391
(Oct. 15, 1971); cf. the definitions of “sound recordings” and
“phonorecords” in S. 644, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. §101 (1971).

*° The reference to “publication” in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C;
§26, insofar as it applies to sound recordings, concerns the invest-
ing of statutory copyright, and in any case it relates only to post-
February 15, 1972 recordings. For both reasons, it has no bearing
on this case.

** Professor Nimmer, upon whose views petitioners rely to support
their argument that under Scars and Compco states are preempted
from protecting sound recordings, has changed his position in the
1972 version of his text, based upon Congressional enactment of the
sound recording amendment to the Copyright Act. 1 M. NIMMER,
THE Law or Copyricnt §35.225 (1972).

87 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, el. 8.

*° 376 U.S. at 231 n.7. Moreover, any other construction of
Sears and Compco would lead to bizarre and disastrous results. If
the constitutional preemption theory were correct, Congress could

7T

Petitioners also assert that the “limited times” phrase in
the copyright clause precludes state common law copyright
protection of writings for unlimited times.*® However,
review of the historical background of the copyright clause ,
makes it clear that the “limited times” phrase was intended
only as a restraint on federal power and does not limit the
states with respect. to common law copyright in un-
published works.” Furthermore, the “limited times” phrase
implies an affirmative policy of giving an author some
period of protection to derive a significant economic return
from his creation.”' Since record piracy precludes even a
minimum period of protection, application of the “limited

34

not leave protection of unpublished writings to the states, as it has
attempted to do in Section 2 of the Copyright Act. See 1 M.
NimMer, THE Law or Copyriaut §35.225, at 146.25 (1972). Un-
published writings of all kinds thus would be in the public domain
since the states could not protect them and Congress has failed to
do so. The logical extension of this line of argument is that all
statutory copyrights would be invalid because Section 8 of the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §8, provides that no statutory copyright
can be procured for any work in the public domain—and a work
could hardly be published if it did not first exist in unpublished
form. The Court could not have intended Sears and Compco io
lead to such absurd conclusions, especially in light of the long his-
tory of judicial protection of unpublished works under common law
principles. See also authorities cited in footnote 89.

*° The copyright clause of the Constitution does not of its own
force preempt state law. See Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protec-
tions Afforded by Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Unfair Com-
petition Law: The Sources and Nature of Product Simulation Law,
54 TRADEMARK Rep. 413, 420-21 (1964) ; Comment, 43 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 178, 183 (1968). Cf. Chapman, The Supreme Court and
Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 54 Trapemark Rep. 573, 579
(1964) ; Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stiffel Case,
54 TRADEMARK Rep. 731, 744 (1964).

“eo supra, at 151; see Kalodner and Vance, supra, at

* See Kalodner and Vance, supra, at 1083-84.

enact ONE MEG SOO OO" LLL TOO SLE FEIT CTS 4 ME LR NE RDS MM

35

times” phrase to permit piracy manifestly would be incon-
sistent with the underlying policy of that phrase.

An alternative basis for petitioners’ argument appears
to be that Sears and Compco declare the states to be
prohibited by virtue of the supremacy clause from granting
protection to writings that Congress has not covered by
the Copyright Act. This theory implies that Congress
has occupied the field by enacting the Copyright Act of
1909 because an affirmative state grant of protection would
conflict with the exercise of Congressional power under the
copyright clause. But Congress has not occupied the copy-
right field (as distinguished from the patent field) ;” this
is clear from its explicit recognition of state power in
Section 2 of the Copyright Act.

In 1909, wheh Congress last adopted a complete revision
of the Copyright Act, consideration was given to sound
recordings as infringements of the musical compositions
embodied in them. This Court had previously decided that
a player piano roll was not a “copy” of the recorded music
embodied in it and hence could not infringe the copyright
in the musical composition under the existing statute. In
order to rectify that manifestly unjust situation, Congress
gave to copyright proprietors of musical compositions the
right to control the manufacture of “mechanical repro-
ductions” of their works but specifically did not grant
separate copyright protection to the mechanical reproduc-
tions themselves.** No reason was given for this omission.

” “Patent rights exist only by virtue of statute.” Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n. 5 (1964).

** White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
17 U.S.C. § 1(e).
* H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1909).

36

However, many efforts have been made over the past half-
century and more to enact another complete revision of the
Copyright Act, and most of these revision bills contained
provisions protecting sound recordings.®* The task remains
uncompleted because of the diverse interests and _tech-
nological developments involved. When the House of
Representatives in 1967 did pass a copyright revision bill,

*° A study of the legislative history of the various bills for general
revision of the Copyright Act makes clear that there has never been
opposition to the principle of protection of sound recordings against
unauthorized duplication, The reason why sound recordings were
not until recently covered by federal law is that provisions for the
protection of sound recordings were submitted to Congress as part
of each successive bill for the general revision of the Copyright Act.
The failure of Congress to enact these revision bills was due to
controversies over issues unrelated to the protection of sound re-
cordings against unauthorized duplication. Rinaer, The Unauthor-
ized Duplication of Sound Recordings, U.S. Copyriaut OFFICE,
GENERAL REVISION OF THE CopyriGHT Law 37 (Study’No. 26, 1957) ;
Report OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT ON THE GENERAL REVISION
or THE U.S. Copyricut Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at x (1961);
H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1966).

Furthermore, from the very earliest attempts to revise the Copy-
right Act, it was accepted by the recording industry and by Con-
gress that state law protected sound recordings from unauthorized
duplication. Hearings on H.R. 11258 Before the House Comm. on
Patents, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 303 (1925) ; Hearings on H.R. 10431
Before the House Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 319
(1926); Hearings on H.R. 9639 Before the House Comm. on
Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, 27, 29 (1930) ; Hearings on
Revision of Copyright Laws Before House Comm. on Patents,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 113, 639, 653, 1181 (1936) ; Hearings on H.R.
1268, H.R. 1270 and H.R. 2570 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the House Judiciary Comm., 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. 54 (1947). See also Rincer, The Unauthorized
Duplication of Sound Recordings, U.S. Copyriaut OFFICE, GENERAL
REVISION OF THE Copyright Law 17-20 (Study No. 26, 1957);
Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Record Industry,
15 Vanp. L. Rev. 419, 429 (1962). When it became clear to the
Congress that piracy had grown to such proportions that federal
copyright protection was needed in addition to state law, it dealt
with sound recordings separately by passing Public Law No. 92-140.

ROM CTRL II SALE ALAR ER NERS BYR UTR Gy anipends wey bE ORE

37

the accompanying committee report took pains to point out
that the extension of copyright protection to sound record-
ings was “overdue,” ” and Section 3 of the recent sound
recording amendment completely dispels any doubt about
the absence ‘of Congressional intent to preempt the field
prior to the effective date of that amendment.* The pirates
therefore are mistaken when they attempt to draw a
negative inference from the failure of Congress to enact
copyright legislation covering sound recordings until the
passage of the sound recording amendment in 1971.

Thus, at least with respect to unpublished constitutionally
copyrightable works such as sound recordings, Sears and
Compco cannot properly be construed as precluding state
protection against unauthorized duplication. We find
nothing in Sears and Compco, or elsewhere, that would
require the Court to ignore the manifest Congressional
intent to preserve common law rights in unpublished
writings—including sound recordings—and the power of
the states to give protection to such rights.

” H.R. Rep. No, 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1966).

* See Tape Head (Co. v. RCA Corp., 452 F.2d 816, 819 n.1 and ac-
companying text (10th Cir. 1971).

38

IV.
The Sears and Compco Cases Are Distinguishable.

Sears and Compco are specifically distinguishable from
the instant case on several significant grounds.

First, they dealt only with patent questions; therefore,
all references to copyright were obiter dicta.” Although
patents and copyrights are mentioned in the same clause of
the Constitution, there are vital differences between them,
notably in terms of the scope of protection. An invention
must be novel to be patentable." A patent confers upon
the inventor the right to exclude others from making, using
or selling the invention.” As a result, a patentee can
prohibit everyone from practicing his invention whether
or not the same idea is independently discovered. On the
other hand, a writing need only be original to be copyright-
able. A copyright confers only the right to prevent copy-
ing of the form of expression of the idea;' the basic idea
in the copyrighted work is fully usable by anyone.’* The
author or proprietor can prohibit direct copying of his

*° F.9., Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broad-
casting Co., 247 F. Supp. 578, 580-581 (E.D. Pa. 1965) ; Derenberg,
Consumerism and “Old-Fashioned Commercial Honesty,” 15 IDEA
45, 56 (Special Conference Issue, 1972).

200 35 U.S.C. §101; see 1 DELLER’s WALKER ON Patents §54 (2d
ed. 1964).

101 35 U.S.C. §§154, 271.

102 F.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99
(2d Cir. 1951).

108 F'.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
104 F'.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-04 (1879).

39

work, but the public is not deprived of the right of inde-
pendent recreation of a substantially identical work not
copied from his.’** Accordingly, there can be only one
validly patented version of an invention, but there can be a
plurality of identical validly copyrighted works each of
which was independently created.’ Thus, patents and
copyrights are distinguishable to such an extent that,
despite the sweeping statements in the Sears and Compco
opinions, the Court’s discussion of policies applicable to
the patent system in those opinions cannot be applie

automatically to the copyright system.’ ;

Second, in Sears and Compco, the defendants made “sub-
stantially identical” ** or “very similar” *”. copies ° of
physical objects. A record or tape, however, is meaningless
as a physical object. It is merely a carrier for the in-
tangible recorded performance. Sound recordings are not
substantially copied by pirates in the sense of simulating
them; they are exactly duplicated by electronic means.’

*6 “(T]he law imposes no prohibition upon those who, without
copying, independently arrive at the precise combination of words
or notes which have been copyrighted.” Fred Fisher, Inc. v.
Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand. J.).

6 Id. at 150-51; see, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218
(1953) ; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54

.

(2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).

**" See text at note 112, infra. The rule of Sears and Compco was
elucidated further by the Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 668 (1969), which declared that “federal law requires that all
ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless
they are protected by a valid patent.” The idea in a sound record-
ing, like that of any other copyrightable work, is not restricted by
either common law or statutory copyright.

78 376 U.S. 225 at 226.
10° 376 U.S. 234 at 235.

"0 Tmitation of a recorded performance, as distinguished from its
appropriation, is permissible. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber

40

As has been pointed out in numerous cases, the unau-
thorized copying of an article is distinguishable from the
unauthorized appropriation, reproduction or duplication of
the very article itself—the actual performance comprising
the sound recording embodied in the record or tape."

The situation here is completely unlike that presented in
Sears and Compco. A customer for lighting fixtures wants
something esthetically satisfying and functionally capable
of supplying illumination; Sears’ version of Stiffel’s pole
lamp may very well suffice. But a customer for a record or
tape wants a particular version of a certain musical com-
position performed by specific artists; and that is precisely
what the petitioners supply—not their own version, but
the identical performance created by the original producer.
Although it may also be denominated “copying” for want
of a better word, this is a totally different kind of activity
from that which was involved in Sears and Compco.":

Third, in Sears and Compco the plaintiffs had obtained
patents that subsequently were ruled invalid. It was logical

Co., 485 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp.
1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969) ; Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records,
Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; Miller v. Universal Pictures
Co., 11 App. Div.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1st Dept. 1960), aff'd,
10 N.Y.2d 972, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 662, 180 N.E.2d 248 (1961) ; cf. Pub.
L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, §1(a).

11 See, e.g., TIAA v. Younger, supra; Capitol Records v. Erick-
son, supra; Capitol Records v. Spies, 130 Ill. App.2d 429, 264 N.E.
2d 874 (1970).

2 The Solicitor General explicitly recognized this distinction in
his brief for the United States as amicus curiae in Sears and
Compco, at 11-12, 28.

41

to hold them to their choice of method of protection.
There is no parallel with sound recordings because there
was no possibility of federal statutory protection for those
works as an alternative."* In Sears and Compco, the
articles were “too slight an advance” ™* and “too lacking in
novelty” * to be entitled to patent protection; but it is
acknowledged that sound recordings constitute works of
creative authorship which constitutionally qualify for eopy-
right protection.” Thus, the facts presented in Sears and
Compco made them relatively easy cases to decide since
state protection was substantively inconsistent with the
federal statute—the state sought to protect something the
federal law dictated as being unprotcctable. In the instant
case, State protection is consistent with the federal statute
—the state seeks to protect something the federal law
specifically leaves to the states to protect."* Moreover, as
discussed above, the basic policy considerations arising
from the tenets of our free enterprise economic system led
to reversal in Sears and Compco, but should lead to
affirmance here.

_

“8 In this respect, G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914
(2d Cir. 1952), which was cited in Sears, is properly analogous
because that case refused to protect the typography of a book after
copyright in the text had been obtained and had expired.

™ Under Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, only sound recordings
fixed and published on or after February 15, 1972 are eligible for
federal copyright protection.

18 376 U.S. 225 at 232.

116 Id.

"7 See note 77, supra.

"817 U.S.C. §2; Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, §3.

42

Vv.

The California Statute Is a Proper Exercise of the
State Interest in Punishing Conduct Equivalent to Lar.
ceny.

Despite the broad formulation of the question presented
by petitioners, this case actually deals only with the narrow
issue of the validity of the state penal statute under which
they were convicted and it can be decided on that ground
alone. This Court often has recognized that in our dual
system of government, “federal regulation of a field of
commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regula-
tory power in the absence of persuasive reasons—either
that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no
other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably
so ordained.” *® There are persuasive reasons why states
should be permitted to continue to protect their citizens
from the effects of predatory theft of valuable property
rights in sound recordings, as has been demonstrated above.
Moreover, the state penal statute here in issue deals with a
subject matter long left untouched by Congress, and there
is no need to speculate about the fact that Congress ex-
pressly stated its intention not to preempt state action with
respect to sound recordings fixed prior to February 15.
1972."

This Court has specifically rejected the notion that mere
coincidence of subject matter of federal and state statutes
is enough to support a finding of preemption:

19 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963).

120 February 15, 1972 is the effective date of the sound recording
amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. Petitioners were con-
victed much earlier (June 28, 1971) for acts obviously committed
prior to that date. Thus, the application of the California statute
to recordings made after February 15, 1972 is not in issue here.

43

“Respondent’s automatic coincidence means _in-
validity theory, applied in an area as imbued with the
state’s interest as is this one, ... would lead us to the
conclusion that a state may not make a dealer in perish-
able agricultural commodities respect its laws on the
fraudulent nonpayment of an obligation, if that fraud
occurred after an interstate shipment, 7 U.S.C. §499
(b)(4), for Congress has not expressly saved such
prosecutions. We would hold, too, that extortion or
robbery from interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C.
§1951 or 18 U.S.C. §2117 is immune from state action;
that the wrecking of a bridge over an interstate rail-
road is an ‘exclusively federal’ offense, 18 U.S.C. §1992;
that the transmittal of a ransom note in interstate com-
merce cannot be punished by local authorities, 18 U.S.C.
§875. And see 18 U.S.C. §4331, 472, 479. In short, we
would be setting aside great numbers of state statutes
to satisfy a congressional purpose which would be only
the product of this Court’s imagination.” #2

Similar consequences would result from a holding that
Sears and Compco dictate copyright preemption:

“If the rationale of the CBS case that Sears-Compco
was a constitutional decision remains unchallenged, the
only conclusion would be that because of an alleged con-
flict with constitutional copyright policy, many tortious
competitive practices such as bridery, breach of eon-
fidence, and enticing away customers cannot be en-
joined if they concern materials which may be copy-
rightable subject matter but which are not in fact so
protected under the present copyright laws. The equit-
able doctrine of misappropriation which allowed the
courts to do justice in situations not covered by the
federal statutes or common law would be overruled.” 3?

™ California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1949).

* Ahrens, The Misappropriation Doctrine after Sears-Compco,
59 TRADEMARK Rep. 88, 113 (1969).

44

Surely it could not be seriously asserted that just because
a work of fine art can be protected under the federal copy-
right law, a state cannot statutorily regulate the transfer
of reproduction rights in works of fine art;’* that just
because a corporate stock certificate is a “writing” that
could be protected under the federal copyright law, a state
cannot statutorily outlaw counterfeiting of such certifi-
cates;'** that just because secret scientific material,
although constitutionally capable of copyright protection,
may be ineligible for protection under the federal copy-
right law because it is still unpublished, a state cannot
statutorily outlaw its unauthorized reproduction’ or even
its physical theft.*** The control of such activities un-
questionably comes within legitimate state interest.’”
Similarly, California has a legitimate interest in punishing
record and tape piracy, an activity which “might better be
described by other terms connoting larceny.” ?**

123 F.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law art. 12-E, §224 (McKinney 1968).
124 F.g., N.Y. Penau Law §170.15 (McKinney 1967).

128 F.g., N.Y. Penau Law §165.07 (McKinney 1967).

126 F.g., N.Y. PENAL Law §155.30 (McKinney Supp. 1971).

127In Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941), Justice Black, who
later wrote the Court’s opinions in Sears and Compco, found that
Florida had the power to prohibit an organization of copyright
proprietors from setting license fees for the federally copyrighted
works of its members. “We are pointed to nothing either in the
language of the copyright laws or in the history of their enactment
to indicate any congressional purpose to deprive the states, either
in whole or in part, of their long-recognized power to regulate
combinations in restraint of trade.” 313 U.S. at 404. Clearly, if
federal copyright law allows states to prohibit anti-competitive
conduct in the marketing of federally copyrighted works, a fortiori,
states may also prohibit anti-competitive conduct in the marketing
of works whose regulation has been left by Congress to the states.

128 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Remington Records, Inc., 265
F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1959) (Chief Justice Burger, then sitting by
designation as a Circuit Judge of the Second Circuit).

45.

E. CONCLUSION

The amicus curiae respectfully submits that, because
there are no persuasive reasons calling for preemption and
to the contrary there are particularly strong reasons
against it, because Congress has expressly stated its intent
not to occupy the field, and because this state statute would
complement rather than contravene federal policy favoring
the maintenance of the competitive system, the judgment
below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Sipney A. Diamonp
425 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) PL 9-8400

Ernest S. Meyers
74 Trinity Place
New York, New York 10006
(212) HA 2-0081

Counsel for Recording In-
dustry Association of
America, Inc., Amicus
Curiae

Kayr, Scooter, Fierman,
Hays & Hanpier
David Goldberg
William M. Borchard
Ronald S. Kadden

Laporte & MEvErs
= Of Counsel

=,

1-A

APPENDIX A.

Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.,
Membership List

AA Records
250 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019

ABC/Dunhill Records

8255 Beverly Boulevard

Los Angeles, California
90048

ABKCO Records
1700 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Abnak Music Enterprises
825 Olive at Ross
Dallas, Texas 75201

A & M Records
1416 North La Brea Avenue
Hollywood, California 90028

Ameret Records
1717 North Highland Avenue
Hollywood, California 90028

Ampex

2201 Lunt Avenue

Elk Grove Village,
Illinois 60007

Ansonia Records
802 Columbus Avenue
New York, New York 10025

a

Atlantic Records
1841 Broadway
New York, New York 10023

Aveo Records
1301 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019

Bee Gee Records

6430 Sunset Boulevard,
Suite 1013

Hollywood, California 90028

Bell Records
1776 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Black Jazz Records

9255 Sunset Boulevard

Los Angeles, California
90069

Buddah Records
810 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Capitol Industries
Hollywood and Vine
Holtywood, California 90028

CBS/Records Group
51 West 52nd Street
New York, New York 10019

2-A

Copley Record Productions

P. O. Box 517

Manchester, Pennsylvania
17345

Crescendo Records
9165 Sunset Boulevard
Hollywood, California 90069

Disneyland/Vista Records
800 Sonora Avenue
Glendale, California 91201

Elektra Records
15 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10023

Famous Music
One Gulf + Western Plaza
New York, New York 10023

Folkways Records
50 West 44th Street
New York, New York 10036

G RT Corp.
1286 Lawrence Station Road
Sunnyvale, California 94086

GSF Productions
888 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Icka-Delick-Music & Record
P.O. Box “C”
Chicago Ridge, Illinois 60415

Jamie Records

919 North Broad Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
19123

Kelit Aurora Records
239 West 18th Street
New York, New York 10011

London Records
539 West 25th Street
New York, New York 10001

Longines-Symphonette
Recording Society —

200 Myrtle Boulevard

Larchmont, New York

MCA Records

100 Universal City Plaza

Universal City, California
91608

Mercury Records
35 East Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Metromedia Records
1700 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

MGM Records
7165 Sunset Boulevard
Hollywood, California 90066

Monitor Records
156 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10010

Musicor Records
240 West 55th Street
New York, New York 10019

Nashboro Records
1011 Woodland Street
Nashville, Tennessee 37206

fe a8 AK acetate DG NL”

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ne ene in’

Ovation Records
1249 Waukegan Road
Glenview, Illinois 60025

Pickwick International
135 Crossways Park Drive
Woodbury, L.I., N.Y. 11797

Platinum Records (The
Music Factory)

567 N. W. 27th Street

Miami, Florida 33127

Poison Ring Records

10 George Street

Wallingford, Connecticut
06492 -

Polydor Records
1700 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Project 3 Records
1270 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

Ranwood International

9034 Sunset Boulevard

Los Angeles, California
90069

RCA Records
1133 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

Request Records

66 Memorial H ighway

New Rochelle, New York
10801

Shelby Singleton Produe-
tions

3106 Belmont Boulevard

Nashville, Tennessee 37212

3-A

Silhouettes in Courage
22 East 40th Street
New York, New York 10016

Starday-King Records
3557 Dickerson Road

P.-O. Box 8188

Nashville, Tennessee 37207

“~—Phomas J. Valentino, Ine.

151 West 46th Street
New York, New York 10036.

United Artists Records
6920 Sunset Boulevard
Hollywood, California 90028

Vanguard Recording Society
71 West 23rd Street
New York, New York 10010

Vantage Recordings

P. O. Box 212

Pottstown, Pennsylvania
19464

Warner Bros. Records
4000 Warner Boulevard
Burbank, California 91505

Word Records

P. O. Box 1790
4800 W. Waco Drive
Waco, Texas 76710

Young People’s Records
225 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10003

APPENDIX B

Glossary

1. Sound Recording—An intangible work that results
from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other
sounds regardless of the nature of the material object
(such as a disc, prerecorded tape, player piano roll or
other record) in which the sounds are embodied.

2. Record or tape—The material object in which sounds
are fixed by any means and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Records
and tapes are the reproductions of sound recordings and
include phonograph records (discs) and various configura-
tions of prerecorded magnetic tapes.

3. Phonograph Record—One of the forms in which
sound recordings are embodied. Today, phonograph
records are flat discs made of various types.of vinyl and
plastic into which grooves have been pressed. Sounds are
reproduced when the phonograph record revolves on a turn-
table and a stylus passes along the grooves, creating
mechanical vibrations within the stylus which are then
transformed into electrical impulses, amplified and re-
produced audibly through a loudspeaker. Phonograph
records are sold commercially as single records and as long-
playing records (albums).

4. Single or Singles—A phonograph record consisting of
a flat disc 7 inches in diameter, which, when played on a
Phonograph, revolves at 45 revolutions per minute. Each

———

2-B

side of a single customarily contains a performance of one
musical composition and this form of phonograph record
today is limited to popular as distinguished from classical
music.

5. Long Playing (LP) Record or Album—A phonograph
record consisting of a flat disc 12 inches in diameter, which,
when played on a phonograph, revolves at 3314 revolutions
per minute. Each side of an LP or album can carry
approximately thirty minutes of recorded sound. An LP or
album of popular music usually contains performances of
between nine and twelve musical selections and customarily
runs twenty minutes on each side.

6. Prerecorded Tape—Another form in which sound
recordings are embodied. Electrical impulses are impreg-
nated magnetically within the moleewlar structure of the
tape compound. Sounds are.reproduced when the tape
moves across a tape head ‘and the electronic signals are
picked up, amplified and reproduced audibly through a loud-
speaker. Prerecorded tape commonly is sold in three forms:
reel-to-reel, cartridges and cassettes.

7. Reel-to-Reel Tape—A prerecorded tape sold com-
mercially in 14 inch width, wound upon a reel 7 inches in
diameter. The tape is played by threading it through a tape
recorder so that it runs from the full reel, over the tape
head, and on to a take-up reel. The tape moves at a speed
of either 334 inches. per second (i.p.s.) or 7% i.p.s.

8. Tape Cartridge—A prerecorded tape sold com-
mercially in 1% inch width, packed permanently in a
rectangular plastic device. The tape is wound upon a hub

3-B

to form a continuous loop so that it can play continuously
over and over again without the need to change direction
of the tape or to turn the cartridge over. The cartridge is
played by inserting it into a playback device, whereupon
the tape moves at 334 i.p.s. past the tape head. The tape
customarily embodies four pairs of individually recorded
tracks and the tape head moves into four different positions
to play each pair in sequence giving a stereophonic effect.

9, Tape Cassette—A prerecorded tape sold commercially
in ¥% inch width, packed permanently in a rectangular
plastic device which is thinner and smaller than a tape
cartridge. The tape is not in a continuous loop; rather, it
moves from one reel to another within the plastic device
and needs rewinding to be played again. The cassette is
played by inserting it into a playback deyice, whereupon
the tape moves at 1% i.p.s. past the stationary tape head.
Newer cassettes customarily embody four stereophonic
tracks, two of which are reproduced when the tape is
played moving in one direction and two of which are re-
produced when the cassette is turned over and the tape
is played moving in the opposite direction.

10. Phonogram—A term which has come into use in
international conventions to describe sound recordings
regardless of the physical form of the material object in
which they are embodied.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0167%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.
