# Brief for the United States — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 412 U.S. 94

## Text

| A. BEM’s request for broadcast time --_-_-__ |

1. The proceedings before the Com-
mission_____________________-_
2. The Commission’s decision in

} B. DNC’s request for a declaratory ruling -__
) 1. The proceedings before the Com-
mission. ____-___________--__-

2. The Commission’s decision on
DNC’s request_________-____--
C. The Commission’s inquiry into access to
the broadcast media by individuals and
GPOUDS.... nwo nn cee wencn nee oenss 5s
| D. The decision of the court of appeals_-_____
| E. Subsequent developments in the Commis-
sion’s inquiry into fairness and access-_-
mmary of argument___-._...-.--------------

e 468-033—72——1

18
20

II

It was reasonable and constitutionally proper
for the Federal Communications Commis-
sion to refrain from recognizing and imple-
menting the right of access claimed by re-
spondents, and to rely, instead, on the exer-
cise of journalistic discretion in this area by
broadcast licensees within the framework of
their obligations under the Fairness Doc-
ics caaiuen ctecm ae haeciuesane

A. The Fairness Doctrine is the funda-
mental safeguard of the public’s
First Amendment interest in

B. So long as the Commission’s regula-
tory program serves the public
interest in ways that are consistent
with First Amendment values, the
Constitution does not require the
Commission to adopt a particular
affirmative regulatory policy that
arguably might further freedom
of speech if the Commission has
reasonable grounds for refusing

C. The Commission’s decisions here
were in accordance with the
regulatory scheme Congress
enacted and were reasonable in
the context of the safeguards
that the Fairness Doctrine affords
itn titadnncnsninnene

1. Broadcasters are not common

Ill

Argument—Continued
2. In the framework of com-
mercial broadcasting pre-
scribed by Congress, the
Fairness Doctrine provides
reasonable public access
without discrimination and
thereby - satisfies First page
Amendment requirements 45
3. In light of the serious prob-
lems in implementing a
regulatory policy requiring
licensees to accept editorial
advertisements, the Com-
mission reasonably refused
to do so at this time-_-_-__- 54
CR id ct tercnectinnianewanscnedeneexnes 62

Cases:
American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571___- 38, 39, 45
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B'rith, 4
F.C.C. 2d 190, affirmed, 403 F. 2d 169,
certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 930__.._______- 33
Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 405 F. 2d 1082, certiorari denied sub
nom. Tobacco Institute v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 396 U.S. 842____-____-_- 60
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, Nos.
71-891, 71-919, O.T., 1971, affirmed per
- curiam, March 27, 1972_-_..------------- 54
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, 454 F. 2d 1018__ 49, 61
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 5386_-.---------- 53
Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P. & F. Radio
Ee CI swe etecce wens vcesscs 29

IV
Cases—Continued me
Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576____- 13,
24, 56, 57, 60

Democratic National Commiitee v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, C.A. D.C., No.
71-1637, decided February 2, 1972, petition
for a writ of certiorari filed April 28, 1972,

No. 71-1405, O.T. 1971._....-------____- 49, 61

Democratic National Committee v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, No. 71-1738, de-

cided February 22, 1972___.........____- 60, 61
Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525_____- 28, 42
Federal Communications Commission v. Ameri-

can Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284_______- 52

Federal Communications Commission v. Poits-
ville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 184____- 27, 28, 37

Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67. _..._--- 53
Friends of the Earth v. Federal Communications
Commission, 449 F. 2d 1164_.......-____- 61

Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann.
Rep. 32 (1929), reversed, 37 F. 2d 993,
petition for certiorari dismissed, 281 U.S.

WOO dp udhiones ceeeanthdssnadebGueenade 28
Green v. Federal Communications Commission,

OOF Fe Besa accedasdnlasecess 61
Healey v. Federal Communications Commission,

C.A. D.C., No. 24,630, decided March 3,

SEEN Gdisk dene ane senda mckeen as 61
Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of

Tacoma, 455 P. 9d 350..... 2.2... -- 48
Jefferson v. Hackney, No. 70-5064, O.T. 1971,

decided May 30, 1972. _.....-.-.-...--.- 36
Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority,

ee i ht eh eck sake 48
Larus Brothers v. Federal Communications

Commission, 447 F. 2d 876__.....-.------ 61

Cases—Continued

Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F.
Supp. 1097, affirmed, 441 F.2d 1257... __
Minshall Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 2d 796.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
a ne

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
1B

39

7,

12, 20, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 44

United States v. Midwest Video Corp., No. 71-

Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dis-
trict, 64 Cal. Reptr. 430, 434 P. 2d 982. _-
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102

a

VI

Constitution, statutes and regulations:
United States Constitution, First Amend- _,,,,
TR oc ccd bacewenednuusenueeeneneoncun 2,
6, 7, 12, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32,
34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 44, 45, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61
Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064,

as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, et seg_______-_- 27
Section 2(a)._........---------------- 40
Section 3(h)..........__------ 2, 22, 40, 43,45
Sections 201-223. _________-__-_-_-__- 40
Section 301_____-____-__-------- ee 27
Section 303____._____---_----- --_ 27
Section 303(g)_._._.....-----------_-- 28
Section 304______._-------- eee 27
Section 307______...--..----------_-- 27
Section 309_____....-.--------------- 27
Section 309(h)(1)_.......------------- 27
Section 315. ....--...---------------- 42, 43
Section 315(a)....2.-..-.--------- 3, 5, 29, 31
Section 326____.......-.------------- 28
Section 390___.......-.-------------- 53
Section 392___....._...---------- eee 53
Section 396(g)(1)(A)_--..------------- 53
Section 397____._._._._.-_-----_-_--- 53
Section 402(a)_..__.__._.-._-____--__-- 15

Federal Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162__._ _ 27,
28, 40, 42
Public Health Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C.
TOR a ikhace de Oe teem einaeeseseds 54
Public Law 92-225, approved February 7,

1972:

Section 103(a)(2)(A)__..-------------- 42-43

Section 103(b)(2)(B)__.....----------- 43

VII

Miscellaneous:
Center for Law and Social Policy, 23 P. & F. aie

Radio Reg. 2d. 187_________.._..___ 51, 52
II Chafee, Government and Mass Communica-

tion (1949)_________-_--_- 34, 37, 58
67 Cong. Rec.:

de ee 27

12501-12505_____...-_-_____.. 41,42

|b | > Ske eee ee eee ee ea 41

BO alg We a i eee 41

BR ade ecu ee tecdieeeneres. 41, 42
En Bane ‘Program Policy Statement, 25 Fed.

Reg. 7291_.........-.._... | 29, 30, 42, 46, 50
Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415________ 46
F.C.C. proposed rules on cable television, 37

Fed. Reg. 3289._....................___ 38
Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33

F.C.C. 2d 554, 37 Fed. Reg. 3883__._____ 18
H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., Ist Sess...._.______ 40
H.R. Rep. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess______ 42

2d 1550 (1971)_____-_------e 52
Note, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532 (1971)______ 56
Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689 61 (p | eee ae 55, 56
Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 30 F.C.C.

2d 26, 36 Fed. Reg. 11825..... 13, 14, 15

Order and Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket
19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 798, 37 Fed. Reg. 4980_ 19
Order in Docket No. 19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 800,
OF Ped: Hee. BOTS ote e oo 20

= ORE EE BLES OLI TELE LGEIO LE NE NETO IEIOELD

VIII

Miscellaneous—Continued
Political Broadcasts—Equal Time, Hearings
before Subcommittee of the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee,
88th Cong., Ist Sess., on H.J. Res. 247, a,

Primer on Ascertainment of Community Prob-
lems by Broadcast Applicants, 36 Fed. Reg.

ne rgccancegcnwsne and enecnnnonan 46
Primer on Ascertainment of Problems by Broad-

cast Applicants, 27 F.C.C 2d 650___...---- 30
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,

13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949)_____- 11, 12, 14, 30, 46, 47
S. Rep. No. 772, 69th Cong., Ist Sess.,p.4-- 41

ee
4 On i ee ,

Gn the Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser TERM, 1971

Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865, 71-866
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS
v.

Bustness Executives’ Move ror VIETNAM PEACE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CoMMISSION AND UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS

Vv.
DEMocRATIC NATIONAL CoMMITTEE

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 446) is
reported at 450 F. 2d 642. The opinions of the Federal
Communications Commission (App. 247, 357) are
reported at 25 F.C.C. 2d 242 and 25 F.C.C. 2d 216.

(1)

2
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (App. 493)
was entered on August 3, 1971, and reissued on Octo-
ber 29, 1971 (U.S. Pet. App. 155a-156a). A timely
petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing
en banc was denied on October 4, 1971 (App. 494).
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on Janu-
ary 3, 1972, and was granted on February 28, 1972.
The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the powers granted to it by the
Federal Communications Act, and in light of the in-
herent limitations on the broadcast spectrum, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, which under its
‘‘Fairness Doctrine” requires broadcast licensees to
present programming involving controversial issues of
publie importance, must, because of the First Amend-
ment, also require that the licensees sell time to indi-
viduals and groups for the advertising of their partic-
ular views.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment to-the Constitution provides
in relevant part:
The Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech * * *.
Section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 1064, et seq., as amended, 47 U.S.C. 153(h),
provides:

* & #

“Common carrier’ or “carrier”? means aly
person engaged as a common carrier for hire.

3

in interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio or in interstate or foreign radio trans-
mission of energy, except where reference js
made to common carriers not subject to this
chapter; but a person engaged in radio broad-
casting shall not, insofar as such person is so
engaged, be deemed a common carrier.

Section 315(a) of the Communications Act -of 1934,
48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 86 Stat. 717, 47 U.S.C.
315(a), provides:

If any licensee shall permit any person who
is a legally qualified candidate for any public
Office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such li-
censee shall have no power of censorship over
the material broadcast under the provisions of
this section. No obligation is imposed under
this subsection upon any licensee to allow the
use of its station by any such candidate. Ap-
pearance by a legally qualified candidate on
any—

(1) bona fide newscast,

(2) bona fide news interview,

(3) bona fide news documentary (if the ap-
pearance of the candidate is incidental to the
presentation of the subject or subjects covered
by the news documentary), or

(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news
events (including but not limited to political
conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadeast-
ing station within the meaning of this subsec-
tion. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall

a aii cs

4

be construed as relieving broadcasters, in con-
nection with the presentation of newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-
spot coverage of news events, from the obliga-
tion imposed upon them under this chapter to
operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.

These cases arose on petitions for review (App.
419, 422) of two orders of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, announced on the same day (App.
247, 357), regarding claims that commercial radio
and television broadcasters cannot refuse to sell any
broadcast time for editorial advertisements concern-
ing controversial issues of publie importance. Both
complainants—Business Executives’ Move for Viet-
nam Peace (BEM), a national organization com-
posed of business executives, and the Democratic
National Committee (DNC), the governing body of
the national Democratic Party between conventions—
urged that broadcasters were required to accept edi-
torial advertisements without regard to whether the
station licensee had otherwise fulfilled its affirmative
and continuing obligation under the Commission's
Fairness Doctrine to inform the public on questions~
of public importance by presenting representative and
contrasting views. The court of appeals reversed the
Commission’s orders denying these claims and re-
manded the cases for further proceedings, holding
that under the First Amendment the Commission can-
not permit broadcasters to maintain a flat ban on

eee age:

ao a Sere

9]

public issue advertisements when other commercial
messages are accepted, notwithstanding the broad-
casters’ coverage of public issues under the Fairness
Doctrine (App. 446). The court directed the Commis-
sion to develop reasonable procedures and regulations
for determining which and how many editorial ad-
vertisements shall be broadcast.

A. BEM’S REQUEST FOR BROADCAST TIME

1. The Proceedings Before The Commission. On
January 22, 1970, BEM filed a complaint with the
Commission alleging that radio station WTOP, Wash-
ington, D.C., had refused to sell it time to broadcast
one-minute spot announcements expressing opposition
to the Vietnam war.’ The station had a general policy
of refusing to sell spot announcement time to persons
or groups desiring to air their views on controversial
public issues (App. 292, 316; 450-451 n. 3), and BEM
claimed that the station’s refusal] to sell time on this
basis violated the First Amendment and the Fairness
Doctrine.” BEM stated, without supporting data, that
the station had regularly presented pro-Vietnam war
views, but had not devoted any significant amount of
time to the other side.

WTOP responded that it had covered all viewpoints
on the war and that although a complete quantitative
evaluation of its coverage of such a long-term issue
was not possible, particularly since WTOP is an al]-
*BEM included sam
(App. 298-306).

*See Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended. 47 U.S.C. 315(a).

ple announcements with its complaint

LEE IES IN ERED LONI ONL LE LIES YOR EEDA pee ge

—

6

news station, a spot check of the three months sur-
rounding BEM’s request showed that the station’s
news reports included on numerous occasions the views
of a variety of critics of the war, in addition to hard
news coverage of the war. Four station commentators
had also reflected various viewpoints on thejgubject
(App. 312-319).’

On March 31, 1970, the Commission requested
WTOP to submit by April 7 a statement on whether
it had presented the viewpoints embodied in the com-
plainant’s announcements (App. 349). In response,
WTOP submitted an affidavit of its Executive Editor
stating that each of the viewpoints in the BEM an-
nouncements had been expressed a number of times
over WTOP (App. 352). BEM commented by saying
that the affidavit added nothing new (App. 353).

2. The Commission’s Decision in BEM. In its deci-
sion of August 5, 1970, the Commission viewed BEM’s
complaint as charging (1) that WTOP had failed
to meet its fairness obligation with respect to the
Vietnam War; and (2) that the station’s refusal to
carry BEM’s announcements violated the Fairness
Doctrine and the First Amendment (App. 357-368).
With respect to the fairness aspect of the complaint,
the Commission found that BEM had not demon-
strated that WTOP had failed to fulfill its respon-

> WTOP also referred to its coverage of particular events
related to the war, such as Moratorium activities in October and
November of 1969; the President’s speech on Vietnam on
November 3, 1969, in connection with which it had presented
critics of the war; and its news interview programs, which
had also presented national figures both for and against the
war policies. (App. 314-315.)

mee
maps EAU et
wegen LES RICRAS adhe

7

sibility to afford a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of significant contrasting views in its
overall programming; the licensee had specified a
number of specific instances in which it had presented
anti-Vietnam war views, while the complainant had
made no more than a general allegation of a failure
to present conflicting views (App. 360-365)‘

The Commission further held that WTOP’s policy
of refusing to sell time for Spot announcements on
controversial issues did not per se violate the Fair-
ness Doctrine or any Commission policy. The Com-
mission noted that a broadcast licensee is not a
common carrier under the Act and therefore is not
required to open its doors to all persons seeking to
use its facilities. Since the licensee had presented
contrasting views on the Vietnam war, including the
viewpoints embodied in BEM’s announcements, the
Commission found no reason to require the station to
present the views of any particular group in any par-
ticular format. It also relied upon the more extensive
analyses set forth in its DNC decision issued the
same day.

As to BEM’s contention under the First Amend-
ment, the Commission ruled that Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,
395 U.S. 367, did not support BEM’s constitutional

*The Commission adhered to its established policy that in the
absence of specific evidence of a failure to comply with fair-
ness requirements, it would not be reasonable to require a
i to prove the contrary by producing transcripts or re-’
cordings of all of its Programs touching on an issue. Here,
BEM had not afforded any basis for its complaint on fairness
(App. 364).

ee EEL L EME NDOIEREA GIR RY I eh ay | + eaeteuedt BOSE DETEA LSA RRS ohm He Hat ny

——

claims and, relying on its decision in the DNC case,
infra, concluded that BEM’s position that WTOP
must sell it time is inconsistent with the system of
broadcasting created by Congress (App. 368):

* * * the Communications Act specifically pro-
vides that a broadcaster shall not be deemed a
common carrier, and thus he may exercise his
judgment as to the particular program matter
he will present. The licensee is thus constantly
called upon to make choices between types and
formats of programming and the persons to
participate therein. If the licensee were re-
quired to present any matter brought to him
which was not obscene, etc., the result would be
not only chaotic but a wholly different broad-
casting system which Congress has not chosen
to adopt. [Citation omitted. ]

Four Commissioners joined in the opinion, two con-
curred in the result, and Commissioner Johnson
dissented.

8

B. DNC’S REQUEST FOR A DECLARATORY RULING

1. The Proceedings Before the Commission. On
May 19, 1970, while the BEM complaint was under
consideration, DNC requested the Commission to issue
a declaratory ruling that (App. 33-34) :

a. A broadcaster may not, as a general policy,
refuse to sell time to responsible entities, such
as the DNC, for the solicitation of funds and
for comment on public issues; or, alternatively,

b. Any such ‘‘general policy’’ will be taken
into consideration—in a manner adverse to the
broadcaster—by the Commission in evaluating

9

whether the grant of a broadeaster’s renewal
application accords with the public interest.

DNC alleged that televised requests for funds were
essential to the integrity of the nation’s political proc-
esses, as well as to relieve its own precarious financial]
situation, and that it must promptly launch a national
radio and television appeal for funds but could not do
so unless “it can be certain that it will be able to
obtain the access to the broadcast media which imple-
mentation of the plan demands” (App. 16-22). DNC
contended that a broadcaster’s refusal to grant access
to its facilities by responsible groups violates the First
Amendment as construed by this Court in the Red
Iton case, and also contravenes the public interest
standards of the Communications Act (App. 25-33).°

*The three major networks, American Broadcasting Co.
(ABC), National Broadcasting Co. (NBC), and the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS), submitted comments in response.

NBC advised in a brief letter (App. 47) that it had no pol-

ABC set forth excerpts from its Standards and Policies in-
dicating that except for religious broadcasts, ABC permitted
wlicitations of funds only with its specific permission; that
it would sell time to candidates, their representatives or politi-
cal organizations upon the opening of an election campaign
as determined on the basis of appropriate election laws, or, in
its discretion, prior to the official opening of a campaign where
it determined that individuals or organizations had a recog-
tized interest in the forthcoming campaign; and that whenever
it permitted its facilities to be used for the presentation of one
viewpoint, it would afford opportunity for the presentation of

468-033—72

2

a

2. The Commission’s Decision on DNC’s Request.
In an opinion rendered on the same day as its deci-
sion in BEM, the Commission upheld DNC’s claims
regarding solicitation of funds by political parties.
The Commission noted that none of the three major
television networks now had a policy against selling
time to political parties for fund raising during non-
campaign periods (App. 269), ‘but that CBS’s previ-
ous policy “‘of confining such sales of time to election
periods would appear arbitrary, since the need for the
widest possible financial support for political parties

10

contrasting views and would itself decide what subjects were
of such interest or importance as to warrant time for their
presentation. In the absence of special public interest consider-
ations, however, ABC would not sell time for comment on con-
troversial public issues or for the solicitation of funds. In view
of the importance of maintaining strong and viable major
political parties, however, ABC proposed to permit fund solici-
tation by the parties on a reasonable basis. In addition, ABC
contended that making time available to any-responsible entity
that wished to advance its views on controversial issues of pub-
lic importance or to solicit funds would raise serious problems
under the Fairness Doctrine. (App. 42-46.)

CBS submitted a lengthy response, with sttechennte (App.
48-242). It stated that it would permit the presentation by
political parties of a special category of spot announcements
for the purpose of fund raising, and that these announcements
would not have to be on behalf of candidates or ballot prop-
ositions (App. 58). As to a right of general access, how-
ever, CBS stated that the public is best served by the presen-
tation of issues and viewpoints within a balanced program
schedule, utilizing newsworthiness as the sole criterion; thata —
regulatory policy imposing common carrier obligations on
broadcasters would be contrary to the public interest; that
there is no constitutional right to compel broadcast stations
to carry programs; and that Congress and the Commission had
specifically rejected such a requirement.

11

is not confined to such periods * * *” (App. 272).
With respect to the question of access, the Commis-
sion’ rejected DNC’s contention that individuals or
groups have a right to purchase time to comment on
public issues—a contention viewed by the Commission
as going “to the heart of the system of broadcasting
which has developed in this country * * *” (App.
256). The Commission reviewed the licensee’s respon-
sibility, as a public trustee, to meet the needs and in-
terests of the public in the various categories of pro-
gramming, including the Special obligation to devote
broadcast time to the presentation of news and public
affairs, and the discretion necessarily afforded the li-
censee in discharging his obligations. This discretion,
the Commission emphasized, must be exercised in a
manner consistent with the ‘public interest (App.
259) : ‘‘representative community views and voices on
controversial issues which are of importance” must be
presented and ‘‘[a] licensee policy of excluding par-
tisan voices and always itself presenting views in a
bland, inoffensive manner would run counter to the
‘profound national commitment that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ”
As stated in the Report on Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.0.C. 1246, 1249 (1949) :
It is this right of the publie to be informed,
ss =Yrather than any right on the part of the Govern-
ment, any broadcast licensee or any individual
member of the public to broadcast his own par-
ticular views on any matter, which is the foun-

dation stone of the American system of
broadcasting.

>
——ee . — ween ora ones ere nye ea
a RP eT IT PR ee , : -—_

a,

Applying these principles to DNC’s request, the
Commission could not find that a licensee fulfilling
these overriding public interest responsibilities none-
theless operates in a manner inconsistent with the
public interest or the First Amendment when it re-
fuses to sell time to individuals or groups wishing to
express their particular views. While “there is of
course no Commission policy thwarting sale of time
to comment on public issues” (App. 265), Congress
had specifically refused to impose common carrier
responsibilities in the broadcast area (App. 260) and
the Court in Red Lion, as had the Commission in its
Report on Edttorializing, stressed “the right of the
public to be informed—not the right of the broad-
caster or any individual or group to speak over

_ broadeast facilities’? (App. 263).

Thus, recognition of “a near-absolute right of any
person who has the money to buy time * * * would
create a common carrier situation which Congress after
due deliberation, specifically rejected * * * (App. 267).
And, in the Commission’s view, it would be contrary to
the public interest to transfer responsibility for what
should be broadeast from the licensees acting as public
trustees to those affluent individuals or groups with
the resources to buy air time (App. 263-264). There
would be serious practical difficulties in administering
such a system, where access would depend on the finan-
cial resources of the person seeking to state his
opinions on public issues. These problems could not
be solved by a “first come, first served platform”
(App. 269), which itself would be against the public

12

13

interest and would tend to undermine the rationale
for the Commission’s requirement that broadcasters
present contrasting views at the broadcaster’s expense
if necessary * (App. 267-268).

The Commission concluded that neither the Act
nor the First Amendment compels such a result. It
pointed out that broadcasting is not analogous to
other government regulated forums such as public
parks or transit systems since in those areas, unlike
broadcasting, there is no independent obligation of a
licensee to present representative views reflecting
opposing viewpoints on public issues.

Five Commissioners joined the opinion; one con-
curred (App. 273) and Commissioner Johnson dis-
sented (App. 274-287).

C. THE COMMISSION’S INQUIRY INTO ACCESS TO THE
BROADCAST MEDIA BY INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

On June 19, 1971, after the argument in the court
of appeals in these cases, but before the court’s deci-
sion, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry in
Docket 19260, 30 F.C.C. 2d 26, 36 Fed. Reg. 11825,
instituting a broad Study into the efficacy of the
operation of the fairness doctrine. The Commission
specifically undertook the study “in the light of current
demands for access to the broadcast media to consider
issues of public concern.” However, the Commission
cautioned that it could not

abandon the fairness doctrine or treat broad-

casters as common carriers who must accept all
material offered by any and all comers. The

* Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576.

i ROSTER RETAIN tans Neonates

14

Communications Act is explicit in these re-
spects (see Section 315(a) and Section 3(h))
and we take the Act as a “given” from which
this inquiry necessarily proceeds. * * * [30 F.C.C.
2d at 26-27.]

Rather, the Commission sought comments on whether
the policies it has developed under the Act are the most
effective means of fostering “ ‘uninhibited, robust,
wide-open’ debate on public issues (New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270)”:

The basic issue we pose here is whether
Commission-made policies indeed promote that
goal to the maximum extent. Or, are there revi-
sions or even entirely new policies that would
serve it more effectively ?

** * Tt is most important to note in this connec-
tion that, toa major extent, ours is a commercially
based broadcast system and that this system
renders a vital service to the Nation. Any poli-
cies adopted by this Commission in the areas
covered in the present inquiry should be con-
sistent with the maintenance and growth of
that system and should, among other appro-
priate standards, be so measured. * * * Pro-
posals that in the short run might afford great
insight into public issues, but in the long run
might tend to undermine the existing broad-
cast system—e.g., nothing but informational
programming in a debate format—would not,
in this view, serve the public interest. [30
F.C.C. 2d at 27.]

Noting that it had been 22 years since the Com-
mission’s 1949 Report on Editorializing, supra, the
Commission observed that it was time for another

ao
—

15

overview: “‘If our policies are sound, they should
have stood the test of time and application. If they
unreasonably restrict the journalistic functions of
broadcasters or permit broadcasters unreasonably to
restrict access—then corrective action is called for.’’
Specifically recognizing that the respondents in
these cases had claimed that the present system of
access under fairness is inadequate, the Commission
devoted Part IV of the study to the question whether
“there is any feasible method of providing access for
discussion of public issues outside the requirements
of the fairness doctrine.” 30 F.C.C. 2d at 33. It called
for comment on the problems raised by paid and free
time, the specific standards for determining how ac-
cess time should be allocated, and the effect of access
by others on the licensees’ general responsibility to
the public and on the licensees’ duties under the fair-
ness doctrine. In sum the Commission addressed its
inquiry to whether criteria or guidelines for public
access can and should be prescribed, or whether the
complex problems in doing so require that decisions
on access be left to the responsible discretion of the
broadcast licensees, subject to correction of abuses on
complaint to the Commission (36 Fed. Reg. 11827).

D. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

Upon petitions for review filed by BEM and DNC
pursuant to Section 402(a) of the Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. 402(a), the court of appeals, with
Judge McGowan dissenting, reversed. The court sum-
marized its holding as follows (App. 449):

16

We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid
public issue announcements is in violation of
the First Amendment, at least when other sorts
of paid announcements are accepted. We do not
hold, however, that the planned announcements
of the petitioners—or, for that matter, of any
other particular applicant for air time—must
necessarily be accepted by broadcast licensees.
Rather, we confine ourselves to invalidating the
flat ban alone, leaving it up to the licensees and
the Commission to develop and administer rea-
sonable procedures and regulations determining
which and how many ‘“‘editorial advertisements”
will be put on the air.

In reaching this result, the court first found “state
action’”’ because of the extent of governmental regula-
tion of broadcasting; the importance of the use of the
licensed broadcasting media for the communication of
ideas; and the Commission’s refusal to disapprove
the policy of some licensees not to accept editorial
advertising (App. 458-464).

The court then discussed the question of access. Al-
though recognizing that the physical limitations of
broadeast time necessarily restrict access to the air-
waves, the court concluded that within these limita-
tions there is nevertheless under the First Amend-
ment “a reasonably regulated, ‘abridgeable’ right to
speak” held collectively by the general public (App.
467). This abridgeable interest, in the court’s view, is
derived from the following: the public’s right to re-
ceive ideas and information (App. 466); the public’s
“First Amendment interest in the mode or manner—
as well as the content—of public debate aired on the

A

17

broadcast media’’ (App. 466-467) ; and “the interest
of individuals and groups in effective self-expression”
(App. 467). Moreover, the court held that if com-
mercial advertising is sold at all, a total ban against
editorial advertising by broadcasters violates the First
Amendment because such a ban discriminates against
controversial speech in favor of commercial speech
(App. 474-480).

The court ordered the Commission to develop rea-
sonable guidelines governing acceptance of editorial
advertisements by broadcasters and remanded the
cases to the Commission for this purpose (App. 480-
489).

Judge McGowan, dissenting, stated that the respon-
sibilities of broadcast licensees to present controversial]
views on issues of public importance, subject to the
fairness doctrine, satisfied the requirements of the
First Amendment. He notéd that “This is the system
which Congress has, wisely or not, provided as the
alternative to public ownership and operation of radio
and television communications facilities. * * * [t is
hardly the path of. wisdom to scrap it for a system
in which money alone determines what issues are to
be aired * * *” (App. 490). He concluded that “with-
in the context of a regulatory scheme which has made
provision for the airing of controversial issues of pub-
lie importance,” the First Amendment permits, but
does not require, licensees to accept paid editorial
advertising (App. 491). On the other hand, under the
majority’s decision, “The Commission has, at the least,
been set a task of heroic proportions, and one whose

a
18

very complexities may undermine the premise upon
which it is founded” (App. 490).

E. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMISSION’s
INQUIRY INTO FAIRNESS AND ACCESS

After denial by the court of appeals of motions for
rehearing (App. 494) and stay of the mandate (App.
496, 498), the government applied to this Court for
a stay of the mandate. When this Court initially
denied that motion on January 24, 1972, the Commis-
sion published a further notice of inquiry soliciting
comments on the procedures and guidelines necessary
to carry out the mandate of the court of appeals.
Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33 F.C.C.
2d 554, 37 Fed. Reg. 3383.’

*The Commission asked the parties particularly to address
the following areas (33 F.C.C. 2d at 555-556) :

a. May a licensee limit the time available for editorial

advertisements and, if so, on what basis?

b. What regulation may the licensee make as to the

placement of editorial advertisements?

c. May a licensee prevent domination by a few groups

or er viewpoints and, if so, by what means?

d. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on
the ground that the particular viewpoint has been sufi-
ciently expressed, short of finding undue dominance?

e. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on
standards of taste and suitability for access to the home?

f. May a licensee reject a proffered advertisement on
the ground that its subject matter is of little or no sig-
nificance or interest to the community ?

g. Are any restrictions on content permissible short of
a finding that the material is outside the protection of the
First Amendment?

h. Should the Commission’s Cullman doctrine be appli-
cable to editorial and controversial issue advertisements

a

7
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19

When this Court granted certiorari on February 28,
1972, it also stayed the mandate of the court of ap-
peals. The Commission then withdrew the above notice.

What policies, if any, concerning access to the
broadcast media might properly and feasibly
be evolved under the public interest standard of
the Communications Act, and what would be
their relationship to, and effect upon, present or
proposed fairness doctrine policies. We, thus,
do not invite comment on what the First
Amendment may or may not require in this
area, but rather on pertinent public interest
considerations, including of course the policy of
fostering robust, wide-open debate. [Order and
Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260,
33 F.C.C. 24 798, 799, 37 Fed. Reg. 4980.] *

Written comments have been filed and oral presenta-
tions were made during pane] discussions and oral

which the licensee would not have aired in the first place

*The Commission confined its inquiry to the non-constitu-
tional aspects of access because the First Amendment issue

tiorari had been granted. It also stated “that final decision
** * may be delayed and made in light of the Supreme Court's

ie eS ELLA RPE ss

_———

20

argument’ before the Commission during the week
of March 27, 1972.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A

The Commission’s Fairness Doctrine, as developed
over many years of broadcast regulation, as approved
by Congress and as sustained by this Court in Red
Lion, requires licensees to operate as public trustees,
giving coverage to public issues that is adequate and
that fairly reflects opposing views. This must be done
at the broadcaster’s own expense if necessary. In addi-
tion, the broadcaster has an affirmative obligation to
discover and fulfill the needs and desires of his par-
ticular service area. Failure to comply with these
duties can result in loss of the license to broadcast.

Freedom of broadcast journalism is thus subor-
dinated to the public interest in hearing diverse views,
although the broadcaster must still exercise discretion
in determining how to allocate broadcasting time be-
tween the various areas of interest to the public. And,
in serving the “paramount’’ right *® of the listeners
and viewers with respect to issues of public impor-
tance, the licensee must use responsible journalistic
judgment in choosing the format for the program and
the spokesmen to present opinions on the question.

* The scheduling of the panel discussions and oral argument,
as well as the agenda, were set forth in an Order in Docket No
19260, 33 F.C.C. 2d 800, 37 Fed. Reg. 4978.

1° Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S. at 390.

ss
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Congress, the Fuirness Doctrine prov

ing prescribed by
ides reasonable publie
access without discrimination and thereby satisfies First
Amendment requirements

When the Commission’s requirements under’ the
Fairness Doctrine are compared with the require-
ments imposed by the court of appeals on the basis
of its view of the First Amendment, it becomes evi-
dent that the court’s disagreement with the Commis-
sion essentially involves policy differences about the
Manner in which broadcasters, as public trustees,
ought to make their frequencies available for the dis-
cussion of public issues. The Commission has long
held that under the Fairness Doctrine, licensees may
not “themselves make radio unavailable as a medium

*° See note 33 supra, discussing American Commercial Lines,
Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571, 591-592.

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46

of free speech.” Report on Editorializing, supra, 13
F.C.C. at 1248. Broadcasters must seek out spokesmen
to present representative and contrasting views on
controversial issues of public importance, although
they may exercise journalistic discretion in selecting
representative spokesmen and in determining what
format shall be used for the presentations. This duty
is a binding condition of the right to broadcast. See,
e.g., Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415; En Banc Pro-
gram Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291; Primer on
Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, 36 Fed. Reg. 4092.

This indeed was the thrust of United Broadcasting
Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515, relied on by the court of
appeals (App. 487). This 1945 decision is among
many that contributed to the still-evolving Fairness
Doctrine. The Commission there emphasized, as it
later observed in the landmark Report on Editorial-
izing, that the broadcaster’s duty includes making

BN ee TN

*°In United Broadcasting a labor organization charged that
a Columbus, Ohio, radio station, WHKC, refused to broadcast
programs which solicited membership or discussed controversial
subjects, such as race, religion, or politics; that it discriminated
in administering this policy, and that it censored scripts. The
case was settled. The station agreed that it would consider every
request for time to broadcast concerning controversial public
issues in an open minded and impartial manner; that requests
for such time would be considered in light of its contribution to
a balanced program schedule; and that the station would make
time available for the full and free discussion of public issues |
on a nondiscriminatory basis. In approving the agreement, the
Commission stated that “operation of any station under the
extreme principles that no time shall be sold for the discussion |
of controversial public issues” was inconsistent with the Com-
munications Act’s public interest standard. 10 F.C.C. at 518.

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responsible provision for the discussion of controver-
sial issues of public importance in the community
served and making sufficient time available for a full
discussion of those issues. 13 F.C.C. at 1249. But as
the Fairness Doctrine developed, the Commission
found that it was not necessarily required, as dicta in
United Broadcasting had indicated, that broadcasters
sell time to private individuals so long as the broad-
easter used his facilities as a forum for discussion of
public issues. Thus, after thorough study of the mat-
ter, the Commission came to the following conclusion
in its Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. at 1251-1252:

It should be recognized that there can be
no one all embracing formula which licensees
can hope to apply to insure the fair and bal-
anced presentation of all public issues. Different
issues will inevitably require different tech-
niques of presentation and production. The
licensee will in each instance be called upon to
exercise his best judgment and good sense in
determining what subjects should be considered,
the particular format of the programs to be
devoted to each subject, the different shades of
opinion to be presented, and the spokesmen for
each point of view. In determining whether to
honor specific requests for time, the station will
inevitably be confronted with such questions as
whether the subject is worth considering,
whether the viewpoint of the requesting party
has already received a sufficient amount of
broadcast time, or whether there may not be
other available groups or individuals who might
be more appropriate spokesmen for the par-
ticular point of view than the person making

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the request. The latter’s. personal involvement
in the controversy may also be a factor which
must be considered, for elementary considera-
tions of fairness may dictate that time be allo-
cated to a person or group which has been
specifically attacked over the station, where
otherwise no such obligation would exist. Un-
doubtedly, over a period of time some licensees

may make honest errors of judgment. But
there can be no doubt that any licensee

honestly desiring to tive up to its obligation to.

serve the public interest and making a reason-
able effort to do so, will be able to achieve a fair
and satisfactory resolution of these problems in
the light of the specific facts.“

Although BEM failed to show.’'that WTOP had not

complied with these standards (App. 362-363), the
Commission stressed that WTOP had a continuing,
duty to present a variety of views on the Vietnam

“1 Because of this duty, the cases involving access to a regu-
lated forum relied upon by the court of appeals are inapposite.
Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097
(W. D. Wis.), affirmed, 441 F. 2d 1257 (C.A. 7); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.); Kissinger v. New York
City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 4388 (S.D.N.Y.); Hill-
side Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma 455 P. 2d
850 (Wash.); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,
64 Cal. Reptr. 430, 434 P. 2d 982 (Cal.). These are all cases
in which those responsible for access to an advertising forum
have no corresponding responsibility to assure balanced cover-
age of contending positions; nor are there special considera-
tions, as here, suggesting that such an obligation should be
imposed. In those cases, the question was simply whether the
ideas expressed in editorial advertising were to be given access
to the forum at all. Under the broadcasters’ public interest obliga-
tions and the fairness doctrine, however, controversial questions
of public importance must be given access to the broadcast
forum, although the format for their presentation is subject to
licensee discretion.

49 -

war, including views such as those advocated by BEM
(App. 361-362). However, the Commission held that
in the absence of a violation of the Fairness Doctrine,
BEM had no “right’’ to buy time and WTOP had no
duty to sell (App. 368). And the court of appeals
itself stopped short of holding that WTOP necessar-
ily must sell time to BEM ( App. 488).

With respect to the DNC case, the networks are
presently under a duty to present the views of major
political parties on national issues, and they have done
so in the context of news broadcasts and interviews,
and in special presentations (App. 252): For example,
in Columbia Broadcasting System, Ine. y. Federal
Communications Commission, 454 F. 2d 1018 (C.A.
D.C.), the court of appeals recently held that the CBS
network acted pursuant to the Fairness Doctrine in
offering broadcast time to the Chairman of DNC to
present the views of the Democratic Party in a for-
mat to be determined by him. Similarly, the court sus-
tained the American Broadcasting Company in its
grant of time to DNC to present its views on the
Vietnam war.“ And as the statement indicates, supra,
p. 9n. 5, the National Broadeasting Company has no
general policy against the sale of time to major polit-
ical parties for broadcasts on public issues (App. 47).
Thus, each of the major national networks, in diverse
ways in fact makes time available to individuals and
groups who wish to speak out on the issues of the day.

“See Democratic National Committee v. Federal Communi-
tations Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 71-1637, decided February 2,
1972, petition for a writ of certiorari filed April 28, 1972. No.
71-1405.

468—033--72—__5

T a
: 50 |
Under the Fairness Doctrine they must do so as part
of their obligation as public trustees.

But the court of appeals concluded “that the fair-
ness doctrine’s goal of full and fair coverage of issues
on normal programming time does not eliminate the

; public’s interest in a further, complementary airing
j of controversial views during advertising time” (App.
473). The court also held that since broadcasters had
j opened “up a forum for some paid presentations, in-

dependently edited and controlled by members of the
public’? (App. 477), it is discriminatory for them not
to sell such time to persons wishing to express their
~ views on public issues, even though a broadcaster
may be permitted under the Constitution to refuse to
accept any advertisements of any sort (App. 475).
The court based these conclusions, however, on the
incorrect premise that there is for this purpose a con-
stitutionally significant distinction between program-
ming and advertising time, that the broadcast day
should be broken down into segments, each considered
: in isolation. The Communications Act makes no such
; distinction ; the broadcaster’s responsibility as a public
| trustee extends to every minute of every hour the
station is on the air.“ And the ‘‘forum” is the entire
broadeast day, of which advertising is simply one
component part. ‘
To be sure, a station will usually exercise less con-)
trol over advertisements than over its own programs,
although when network programs are carried the

: 43 See, e.g., En Banc Program Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg.
4 7291.

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“crucial controls,’’ as the court below put it, are not
in the station’s hands in any meaningful sense even
during regular programming. But the court of appeals
erred in assuming that broadcasters simply turn over
or relinquish advertising time, allowing advertisers to
do as they please, and that every broadcaster should
do the same for editorial advertisements.“

“See, og. Center for Law and Social Policy, 23° P. & F.
Radio Regulation 2d 187, 188 (1971), describing the control
CBS exercises over advertisements:

The CBS Television Network Program Practices Depart-
ment (Department) has general responsibility for ensuring
that “all matter transmitted by the network measures up to
acceptable standards of propriety.” The Department. has
a staff of thirty-four people in Hollywood and New York
with an operating budget in excess of $650,000. The De-
partment is headed by a network vice president, and each
office is headed by a director. Five editors in New York
and one in Hollywood work exclusively on commercial
clearance: one additional person in each office has the
responsibility for avoiding “commercial congestion ;” the
New York Office has four other persons to assist in the
handling of advertising material: and a medical advisor
reviews new medical claims and new presentations of previ-
ously substantiated claims. The clearance procedures are
separate from the sale of advertising time.

CBS states that advertisements are usually submitted in
script or storyboard form: that all product claims are
required to be substantiated; and that its staff, the adver-
tiser and/or agency often meet to discuss the substantiation
or presentation of a claim. After advertisements have been
accepted for broadcast they will again be reviewed based
on complaints from the public, inquiries from affiliates, or
other information. A thorough review, including consul-
tation of the CBS Law Department, is also conducted
when notice of governmental agency action is received.
Other sources utilized by the Department are the CBS
Research Department, which examines the methodology of

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52

Broadcasters do exercise control over advertise-

ments and the Commission itself requires that: “*°
every station * * * have a program to protect
the public in this area. The extent of its pro-
gram will, of course, depend upon the size and
resources of the station, with the larger stations
making a correspondingly greater effort in this
field. However somewhere in every station oper-
ation (whether it be owner, manager, Or staff),
there must be cognizance of problems regarding
deceptive or misleading advertising, familiarity
with the important policies and developments
in this area, and the responsibility for deter-
mining the acceptability of advertising offered
to the station.

Compare Federal Communication Commission Vv.

American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284.

Thus, we submit that given the inevitable limitations
on access to broadcasting, the question whether a li-
censee unconstitutionally discriminates against speech
on public issues is meaningfully viewed in terms of
how the licensee allocates air time between con

Ee ee

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scientific studies submitted to substantiate claims; the CBS
Engineering Department, which reviews such matters as
claims relating to the performance of television sets: the
National Safety Council; the Council of Better Business
Bureaus; the American Dental Association; the Under-
writers Laboratories; and relevant publications of the
Federal Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, etc. CBS also states that it consults with the NAB
Code Authority, although “compliance with the NAB Code
does not assure that a commercial is acceptable under CBS
standards.”
«5 Jd. at 195; see also Licensee Responsibility with Respect to
the Broadcast of False, Misleading or Deceptive Advertising.
93 P. & F. Radio Regulation 2d 1550 (1971).

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mercial uses and public issue speech, rather than in
terms of the format he chooses. The licensees’ public
interest duty under the Fairness Doctrine assures that
broadcasters who derive their basic revenues from

commercial advertising will also devote substantial air
time to fair and balanced presentation of controver-
sial issues of public importance. There is thus no in-
vidious discrimination against the broadcasting of
speech on publie¢ issues.“*

In contrast to the court, the Commission does not
make a distinction between broadcasters who accept
commercial advertising and those who do not. Whether
the broadcaster is serving the public interest depends
on whether he is fulfilling his obligations under the
Fairness Doctrine and that standard applies to com-
mereial broadcasters such at WTOP as well as to non-
commercial broadcasters, which are not covered by the
court's ruling since they accept no advertising of any
kind.’ This overall approach to evaluating the li-
censee’s performance in the public interest has been
consistently followed by the Commission with the ap-
proval of both Congress and this Court, Red Lion,
supra, 395 U.S. at 380, and indicates that, contrary

© For this reason, cases such as Cor v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, Fowler v. Phode Island, 345 U.S. 67, and Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, are inapposite.

"See 47 U.S.C. 390, 392, 397, promoting the operation of
noncommercial broadcasting stations. A federally chartered
nonprofit corporation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
has been created to facilitate the development of educational
broadcasting, “with strict adherence to objectivity and balance
in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature
*** 7 U.S.C. 396(g) (1) (A).

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54

to the ruling below, it does not make a constitutional
difference that a commercial broadcaster accepts prod-
uct advertisements.“ At the least, the Constitution
gives Congress and the Commission enough latitude
to develop a reasonable regulatory scheme that makes
no such distinction.”

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3. In light of the serious problems in implementing a regulatory
policy requiring licensees to accept editorial advertisements.
the Commision reasonably refused to do so at this time
There are further reasons why the Commission

could reasonably conclude, as it did, that although

aes Wi o aa oh Cito NOB 9 sites

: 48 Product advertising, after all, exists in other media of com-
i munication which are not subject to the Fairness Doctrine and
have no constitutional duty not to discriminate against public
issue advertising.

«That. the Commission may properly view the issue as
whether the licensee has presented the point of view advocated
by a particular spokesman, rather than as whether the view-
point was presented in programming initiated or controlled by
the licensee, is shown by this Court’s recent affirmance of the
three-judge district court’s decision in Capital Broadcasting Co.
3 vy. Mitchell, Nos. 71-851, 71-919, affirmed per curiam Mach 2%,
1972.

In that case broadcasters challenged, on First Amendment
grounds, the ban on cigarette advertising in the electronic com-
munications media set forth in the Public Health Smoking Act
4 of 1969, 15 U.S.C. 1835. The court, with Judge Wright dis-
senting, rejected the broadcasters’ claim that the ban suppressed
debate on the smoking issue. Broadcasters could continue to dis-
3 seminate information about cigarettes and were precluded only
‘ from doing so by means of advertisements on the air. Thus, the
4 debate about smoking could continue in other formats of
broadcasting.

Similarly, in this case, even if a broadcaster has a flat ban on
advertisements about controversial public issues. those issues
must nevertheless be presented during normal programming
time and the Commission properly relied on this as adequately
serving the public interest.

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55

there is no policy against selling time for comment on
public issues (App. 265), a licensee need not do so if it
otherwise complies with the Fairness Doctrine. In its
opinions in DNC and BEM, the Commission men-
tioned a number of undesirable consequences _ that
could flow from a regulatory system, such as that con-
templated by the court of appeals, outlawing flat bans
on editorial advertisements.

First, the “‘right’’ recognized by the court of ap-
peals is a constitutional right of access not for all
individuals or groups but only for those wealthy
enough to purchase time. In DNC, the Commission
found this objectionable because “the publie’s agenda
for discussion of public issues would then be set sub-
stantively and increasingly by the affluent—by the per-
son or group which ‘* * * has the financial resources
and interest to purchase sustained access to the mass
communications media * * *’ (Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405
F. 2d 1082 (C.A.D.C. 1968), certiorari denied, 396
U.S. 842)” (App. 263). And in Red Lion this Court
expressed its disapproval of a system wherein the
“highest bidders’’ would get the available time, 395
U.S. at 392, or, as Judge McGowan described it in
dissent, a system wherein “money alone determines
what issues are to be aired, and in what format”
(App. 490). Indeed, one commentator has already
suggested that the regulatory scheme mandated by
the court below on the basis of the First Amendment
is itself unconstitutional because it discriminates
against the poor.”

*° See Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 694 (1972), which proposes a
convoluted solution to this by a “submarket rate system,” id. at

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Next, there is the problem of rationing time among
those with enough money to buy it. Commissioner
Johnson, dissenting in DNC, proposed that this be
done on a first-come, first-served basis (App. 281).
But that would still mean that affluent individuals or
groups could dominate the limited amount of avail-
able time by continued requests for access; moreover,
if there were a long waiting list of persons wishing to
air their views, an issue sought to be addressed might
become stale while other, less-immediate questions
were discussed. It has been suggested that “ [t] hese
problems could be avoided by relaxing to a limited
extent the constitutional principles against content
discrimination and regulatory discretion.”’” But this,
we submit, only serves to illustrate further the reason-
ableness of the Commission’s refusal to embark upon
such a venture, at least not without additional study,
and thereby interject itself, as never before, into the
day-to-day programming decisions of broadcasters.

Moreover, consideration must be given to what
effects such a regulatory system would have on the
Fairness Doctrine, and, particularly, on the Cullman
doctrine, which requires broadcasters to present, at

695. Professor Jaffe criticizes this proposal because it “would
raise incredible administrative problems.” Jaffe, The Editorial
Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and
Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 789 (1972).

51 Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 697 (1972). In seeking to solve such
problems, others have proposed that representative community
boards be set up to decide which persons shall be allowed to
present their opinions. Note, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532, 568

(1971).
52 (yllman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576; see Red Lion,

supra, 395 U.S. at 377.

aT

i

ee

57

their own expense if necessary, opposing views on pub-
lic issues when the licensee has chosen to broadcast a
program giving only one viewpoint. The premise of
Cullman is that the licensee ’s voluntary choice to
present one side of the issue gives rise to an affirma-
tive duty to present opposing viewpoints. If Cullman
nevertheless applied, each editorial advertisement
could generate claims for free reply time and the
licensee would thus become obligated to correct an
imbalance he. had not created. Commissioner Cox,
concurring in BEM, stated: “J fully support the
Cullman doctrine in those cases where broadcasters
elect to accept sponsored controversial issue program-
ming or paid spots, but think that to require them to
accept such matter would unreasonably expose them
to erosion of their advertising revenues”’ (App. 369,
emphasis in original).

It was suggested below that if financial harm or other
problems result, the Fairness Doctrine can simply be
“suspended”’ * in this area or the Commission can make
“necessary adjustments,”’ “ These assertions, we sub-
mit, are a further indication of the imprudence of
the court of appeals’ decision. For if Cullman does
not, or cannot, apply to editorial advertisements, then
the public will hear only one-sided presentations on
public issues by those rich enough to buy time. That
is searcely a “‘better’’ regulatory scheme than, or a
significant improvement in, the: present system which
Tequires licensees to cover publie issues and present

“App. 281 (Commissioner Johnson dissenting in DNC).
“App. 486 (opinion of the court of appeals).

i.

58

contrasting views. At the least, the Commission could
reasonably conclude that the foreseeable dangers mili-
tate against instituting such a regulatory scheme at
this time.

Above all else, one thing is clear: the court below
has required the Commission to embark upon a course
that will involve it to an unprecedented degree in
determining who shall get on the air to present their
particular views. Under the issue-oriented Fairness
Doctrine, this is a matter that traditionally has been
left to the licensee’s reasonable discretion.” But the
court has thrust the Commission into the role of
arbiter, with each refusal to sell time giving rise to a
potential First Amendment question. Perhaps it is not
inevitable that under the court’s decision the Commis-
sion would find itself forced to decide competing
claims to buy limited time on the basis of criteria
that favor one person’s speech over another’s.* But
the possibility is a real one—and one the Commission
has, from the beginning, sought to avoid as it devel-
oped the Fairness Doctrine. Indeed, the needless
assumption of such a role (which amounts to a form
of selective prior restraint) by a government agency
would not be easy to reconcile with the First Amend-
ment. At the very least, we think the Constitution per-

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§ 85In DNC, however, the Commission observed that “[t]here
could be a case where the licensee’s policy in this area would
; be arbitrary (e.g., when he covers the issue, and in announce-
j ments of a few seconds duration, and then refuses to let others
dis¢uss the issue on this basis). No such case is or has been
before us. * * *” (App. 269, n. 13).

56 See II Chafee, supra, at 709, quoted in note 30 supra.

a
Becreresacever SHOEI RONDO LT het YOR CE AGEMENT

—
59
mitted the Commission to choose not to run the risk
of setting out on such a course in these cases,” and to
rely instead on the safeguards of the Fairness Doc-
trine to assure responsible broadcast journalism.

In summary, we submit that the existing public
trustee approach adopted by Congress and the Com-
mission is a proper way of serving the public’s First
Amendment interests in broadcasting, and that it was
thus constitutionally permissible for the Commission
here to decide to continue following that approach,
which leaves the question whether editorial adver-
tisement will be accepted as a matter of journalistic
discretion to be decided by the licensee. Whether
further adjustments and changes are desirable or
possible is a matter under consideration in the Com-
mission’s current general inquiry into the Fairness
Doctrine,” where there will be careful and thorough
study of the evidence and opinions elicited. Whether
and to what degree the licensee would be able to con-
trol the views and the manner in which they are
expressed, the amount of time that should be allocated
to public issue advertising, the experience of licensees
who accept such advertising, how disputes regarding
refusals to sell time to particular applicants would be
resolved, on what basis a licensee could reject certain
controversial advertising—all this and much more
would have to be taken into account in determining

"Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733
(White, J. concurring) ( refusing in another context of selective
Prior restraint to “start the courts down a long and hazardous
road * * * without congressional guidance and direction”).

* See supra, pp. 13-15.

60

not only what kind of regulations the Commission
should adopt to implement any rule requiring that
licensees accept public issue advertising, but also
whether such a rule should be adopted at all.”

The need for engaging in this kind of far-reaching
and thorough inquiry ° before making such a signifi-

°°—In the pending inquiry, the Commission has before it a
wide variety of viewpoints. Some advocate an absolute right
in public issue spokesmen to broadcast their views in a manner
and format of their own choosing without any right of the
broadcaster to reject requests for time except on grounds of
obscenity. Such proposals range from sale of time for paid
spot announcements to sale of time for lengthy public issue
programs and announcements both on a paid and free basis.
Other submissions argue for the maintenance of the status quo.
claiming that any other system would impair the balance of
the Fairness Doctrine in favor of wealthy spokesmen or groups
and would impose an unfair obligation on broadcasters to make
free time available under the Cullman doctrine. Some would
allow the broadcaster to deny access, but only because the par-
ticular mode of presentation does not adequately advise the
public of the issues; or because what is discussed is not 4
controversial issue of public importance. This proposal would
permit rejection of requests in the discretion of the broadcaster
on an ad hoc basis for reasons pertaining to the public interest,
but subject to review under a reasonableness standard by the
Commission.

¢ The Commission had opened its general inquiry into the
Fairness Doctrine before the court’s decision in this case,
because, among other reasons, it had since 1968 “seen the law
in this field explode, as knowledgeable and aggressive parties
recognized the potential, and legal availability, of the broad-
cast media to expound on these public issues.” Democratic Na-
tional Committee v. Federal Communications Commission.
C.A.D.C., No. 71-1788 (decided Feb. 22, 1972). Some of the
more recent court decisions dealing with the Fairness Doctrine
are: Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commission, 405 F.2d
1082 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute v.
Federal Communications Commission, 396 U.S. 842; Retail
Store Employees Union v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 436 F.2d 248 (C.A.D.C.); Neckritz v. Federal Communi-

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61

eant regulatory decision is one of the reasons why
Congress created an administrative agency in this
field to determine whether—as well as how—problems
such as these can be surmounted. But the court of
appeals has ordered the Commission up the slope
without considering whether this is justified in hight
of the dangers and complexities of the climb; and from
that order, purportedly a constitutional command,
there can be no turning back.

The Constitjition does not compel the court’s result,
but requires only that, in the context of an overall regu-
latory program that is consistent with the First
Amendment, the Commission have reasonable grounds
for deciding not to adopt a proposed affirmative pol-
icy that arguably would further encourage freedom
of speech in broadcasting, such as that advocated
by respondents in this case. As we have discussed
above, that standard was met here, since the Com-
mission’s rejection of respondents’ claims was sup-
ported by substantial considerations that have thus
far led the Commission to conclude that First Amend-

cations Commission, 446 F.2d 501, 502 (C.A. 9); Friends’ of
the Earth vy. Federal Communications Commission, 449 F.2d
1164 (C.A.D.C.); Green v. Federal Communications Commis-
tion, 447 F.2d 323 (C.A.D.C.) ; Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc..w. Federal Communications Commission, 454 F.2d 1018
(C.A.D.C.) ; Democratic National Committee v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 71-1637, decided Febru-
ary 2, 1972, petition for a writ of certiorari pending, No.
11-1405, O.T. 1971; Larus Brothers v. Federal Communications
Commission, 447 F.2d 876 (C.A. 4); Democratic National Com-
mittee v. Federal Communications Commission, C.A.D.C. No.
11-1738, decided February 22, 1972: Healey v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, C.A.D.C. No. 24,630, decided March 3,
1972,

a

62

ment values in this area will be better served by con-
tinued reliance on the journalistic discretion of
broadeasters operating in compliance with their obli-
gations under the Fairness Doctrine. Accordingly, the
court below should have affirmed the Commission’s
decisions.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
court of appeals should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
Erwin N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.
WALKER B. CoMEcys,
Acting Assistant Attorney Gencral.
A. RayMonD RANDOLPH, Jr.,
Assistant to the Solicitor General.
Howarp E. SHAPIRO,
Attorney.
JoHN W. PETTIT,
General Counsel,
CuarRLes A, ZIELINSKI,
Counsel,
Federal Communications Commission.
JUNE 1972.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0152%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.
