# Appendices — Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0152%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendices
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 412 U.S. 94

## Text

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 24,492
BUSINESS EXECUTIVES’ MOVE FOR
VIETNAM PEACE, PETITIONER
v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS

PosT-NEWSWEEK STATIONS, CAPITAL AREA, INC.,
INTERVENOR

No. 24,537

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, PETITIONER
Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC. and
COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., INTERVENORS

Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Federal Communications Commission
Decided August 3, 1971
Mr. Thomas R. Asher, with whom Messrs. Albert H.

Kramer and Michael Schneiderman were on the brief, for
petitioner in No. 24,492.

= LLG LEG ILE ME SI RC TR I po ge

A2

Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., with whom Messrs. David
H. Lloyd and Irvin B. Nathan were on the brief, for peti-
tioner in No. 24,537.

Mr. Daniel R. Ohlbaum, Deputy General Counsel, Fed-
eral Communications Commission, for respondents.

Messrs. John H. Conlin, Associate General Counsel, and
Stuart F. Feldstein, Counsel, Federal Communications
Commission, were on the brief for respondents in No.
24,492. Mr. John H. Conlin and Miss Katrina Renouf,
Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, were on
the brief for respondents in No. 24,537.

Mr. Henry Geller, General Counsel, Federal Communi-
cations Commission, at the time the record was filed, also
entered an appearance for respondent Federal Communi-
cations Commission in No. 24,492.

Mr. Howard E. Shapiro, Attorney, Department of Jus-
tice, entered an appearance for respondent United States
of America.

Mr. Ernest W. Jennes, with whom Messrs. Charles A.
Miller and Henry Goldberg were on the brief, for inter-
venor in No. 24,492.

Mr. J. Roger Wollenberg, with whom Messrs. Timothy
B. Dyk and Daniel Marcus were on the brief, for inter-
venor Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. in No. 24,587.

Messrs. James A. McKenna, Jr. and Vernon L. Wilkin-
son were on the brief for intervenor American Broadcast-
ing Companies, Inc. in No. 24,537.

Before WRIGHT, McGowAN and RoBINSON, Circuit
Judges.

Opinion filed by WRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
Dissenting opinion filed by McGowAN, Circuit Judge.

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WRIGHT, Circuit Judge: In these cases we are asked to
decide whether a broadcast licensee may, as a general pol-
icy, refuse to sell any of its advertising time to groups
or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial public
issues. The Federal Communications Commission con-
cluded that such a policy is permissible.’ We reverse the
Commission’s decision. And we remand for further pro-
ceedings.

The principle at stake here is one of fundamental im-
portance: it concerns the people’s right to engage in and
to hear vigorous public debate on the broadcast media.
More specifically, it concerns the application of that right
to the substantial portion of the broadcast day which is
sold for advertising. For too long advertising has been

effective outlet. We are convinced that the time has come
for the Commission to cease abdicating responsibility over
the uses of advertising time. Indeed, we are convinced
that broadcast advertising has great potential for enliven-
ing and enriching debate on public issues, rather than
drugging it with an overdose of non-ideas and non-issues

Under attack here is an allegedly common practice in
the broadcast industry—airing only those paid presenta-

the broadcaster. In the Commission’s view, an attack on
the permissibility of this practice “goes to the heart of the
system of broadcasting which has developed in this coun-

1 Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d

io ee Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216
0).

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try.” * We disagree. The actual.issue before us is relative-
ly narrow and we decide it narrowly. We do not have to
cut to the “heart” of our system of broadcasting; we leave
undisturbed the licensee’s basic right to exercise judgment
and control in public issue programming and the sale of
advertising time. All we do is forbid an extreme form of
control which totally excludes controversial public debate
from broadcast advertising time.

We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid public issue
announcements is in violation of the First Amendment, at
least when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted.
We do not hold, however, that the planned announcements
of the petitioners—or, for that matter, of any other par-
ticular applicant for air time—must necessarily be ac-
cepted by broadcast licensees. Rather, we confine ourselves
to invalidating the flat ban alone, leaving it up to the li-
censees and the Commission to develop and administer
reasonable procedures and regulations determining which
and how many “editorial advertisements” will be put on
the air.

I

Both petitioners in these cases are organizations whose
primary modus operandi is public persuasion and com-
munication. As a rule, they do not attract attention to
their views by performing newsworthy acts, such as en-
gaging in civil disobedience or organizing mass demon-
strations. They depend, instead, on their ability to get a
hearing—as full as possible and as direct as possible—
from the general public. Surely radio and television would
seem to be the most effective media for their purposes. Yet
they contend that their self-expression on those media—
and, therefore, the public’s access to their views—is signi-
ficantly inhibited by broadcaster policies barring any and

all paid editorial messages from the airwaves.
ex

? Democratic National Committee, supra Note 1, 25 F.C.C.2d at
221.

wn

The Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace
(BEM) is a national organization of over 2,700 business
owners and executives, organized in Opposition to the war.
BEM apparently believes that it is in a position to offer
the public a unique viewpoint on what is no doubt one of
the great political and moral issues of our time. In order
to communicate that viewpoint, it prepared several record-
ed one-minute radio announcements, The announcements
urged “immediate withdrawal of American forces from
Vietnam and from other overseas military installations”
and featured statements by leading businessmen and re-
tired military officers whose views may carry particular
weight with the general public. BEM sought to buy time
to air these announcements on the broadcast media, just as
commercial advertisers do. It must have seemed an extra-
ordinarily effective means of directly communicating its
ideas and sense of urgency to the broad listening audience.

In June 1969 BEM sought to purchase time for its an-
nouncements on WTOP, an all-news radio station in the
nation’s capital. Like most broadcasters, WTOP sells sub-
stantial amounts of time for short advertisements, Yet
over a period of eight months it repeatedly refused to sell
any time to the business executives, WTOP cited. no par-
ticular objection to the planned announcements. Rather,
it relied solely upon an across-the-board policy barring all
editorial advertisements—“its long established policy of
refusing to sell spot announcement time to individuals
or groups to set forth views on controversial issues,” #
BEM then filed a complaint with the Federal] Communi-

Ad

supra Note 1, 25 F.C.C.2d at 242. There is no indication, however
that WTOP’s “long established Policy” of refusing to sell time for
any controversial advertisement would have permitted it to sell
BEM 5 minutes or 10 minutes for a more “in-depth” treatment
of its antiwar views. For a discussion of the Permissibility of a

flat ban on “short” public issue advertisements, see text at page
[A-26] infra.

— STEIN YEN RM EIEN SNC) MARS AON Rm oN AN ARRAN ees MT

——y

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cations Commission alleging violations of both the fairness
doctrine and the First Amendment.

The Democratic National Committee (DNC) came to the
Commission with much the same sort of complaint. It
stated that it was in the process of planning an extensive
media campaign to communicate the Democratic Party’s
views on crucial issues and to solicit funds. In our politi-
cal system, it is of obvious importance that the public have
access—as direct and full as possible—to the views of the
political parties. A party currently out of office may well
regard such communication as particularly vital. Yet DNC
alleged that it confronted several obstacles to direct self-
expression on the broadcast media, among them the re-
fusal of some broadcasters to sell time for comment on
controversial public issues. Unlike the business executives,
DNC did not complain of any individual refusal to sell
time for a particular editorial advertisement. Rather, it
cast the issue in a somewhat different light by seeking a
declaratory ruling from the Commission that “[a] broad-
caster may not, as a general policy, refuse to sell time to
responsible entities, such as DNC, for the solicitation of
funds and for comment on public issues.”

The Commission considered the two cases together and
rejected the arguments of both BEM and DNC on the
same day. The issues involved did not overlap completely.
For example, the Commission found a defect in the vague-
ness and generality of BEM’s fairness doctrine com-
plaint,* and it resolved DNC’s contention concerning fund

*In its original complaint, BEM alleged generally that WTOP
had failed to cover antiwar views fully and fairly. However, it
offered no specific proof whatever of its allegations, and WTOP,
on the other hand, offered a lengthy compilation of news and
interview shows which aired the opinions of some antiwar groups
and individuals. BEM has not pressed its fairness doctrine argu-
ment on appeal, but rather has relied solely upon the First Amend-
ment right-of-access contention which it also made before the
Commission. Therefore, we need not consider here the Commis-
sion’s holding that BEM failed to shoulder its full burden of going
forward under the fairness doctrine.

wu

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solicitation by noting that all three television networks
had agreed to accept such solicitations and by stating that
any broadcaster policy of confining solicitations to elec-
tion periods alone “would appear arbitrary.”* On the
matters central to these petitions for review, however, the
Commission resolved both cases in the same fashion, and
we, therefore, are also considering them as one.

The Commission held that it is permissible for a broad-
cast licensee to follow a general policy of rejecting all
editorial advertisements. The essence of its reasoning in
the two cases: was as follows: First, it interpreted the
fairness doctrine to allow rejection of paid controversial]
announcements. The doctrine, evolved by the Commission
and endorsed generally in the Communications Act, de-
mands that all controversial issues of public importance
be covered both fully and fairly by broadcasters. Yet the
Commission held that it leaves the licensees broad leeway
to exercise their professional judgment as to “the format
for presentation of controversial issues ‘and all others
facets of such programming.’ ” Editorial advertising, the
Commission said, is simply one of several possible for-
mats for coverage of public issues. Under the permissive
“reasonableness” standard of the fairness doctrine, ac-
ceptance of that particular format is by no means com-

pulsory.

‘All three television networks also commented on the sale of
time for editorial advertising. CBS stated it would sell no time
for such advertising, although an exception would be made for
broadcasts on behalf of political candidates or ballot propositions.
ABC said it would not sell time to most groups for public issue
advertising since that would inspire a “flood” of requests, but it
would “be prepared, consistent with its other obligations, to accept
such orders for time from major political parties as can be ac-
commodated on a reasonable basis.” And NEC stated it “has no
Policy which would prevent the purchase of program time en-
visioned by DNC.” We are constrained to note here that any dis-
crimination in the sale of editorial advertising time in favor of
Political parties alone or the “major” political parties—and totally
excluding other more issue-oriented groups or “minor” politica]
parties—would be highly suspect under the First Amendment. See
text at pages [A-30 - A-32] infra.

PI GON] Oe PPO LI Ai ae:

A8

Second, the Commission interpreted the First Amend-
ment to be equally permissive. Its reasoning on this point
was rather sparse. It made no effort, for example, to
identify the peculiar First Amendment interests attaching
to paid editorial announcements as opposed to coverage
of controversial issues on news, interview or discussion
programs. Instead, it was content to raise the spectre of
the “chaos” and other practical difficulties that, it said,
would attend a right of access to the broadcast media.
The Commission concluded that the fairness doctrine’s re-
quirement of full and fair coverage—tolerant as it is of
a flat ban on the editorial advertisement format of ex-
pression—provides as much protection of public debate
as the First Amendment demands.

Before this court, both petitioners make substantially —
the same attack on the Commission’s decision. They do *
not ask for a ruling that all editorial advertisements
submitted to broadcasters must be accepted. Nor do they
seek to foreclose entirely the broadcasters’ exercise of
reasonable discretion. What they advocate is a limited
right of access to radio and television for paid public is-
sue announcements. They attack the Commission’s ruling
that a total exclusion of such announcements is permis-
sible.

II

Petitioners have left no stone unturned in their attack
on the exclusion of editorial advertising. They have in-
voked the Communications Act’s “public interest” re
quirement * and the statutory-regulatory fairness require-
ment ‘—as-well as First Amendment principles—to sup-
port their argument. In other contexts, we might attempt

647 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 309(a) (1964).

747 U.S.C. §315(a) (1964). For a discussion of the regulatory
development of the fairness doctrine and its eventual adoption in
the Communications Act, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.CC.,
395 U.S. 367, 375-381 (1969).

AQ

to avoid the constitutional issue by coming to a decision
on nonconstitutional grounds. But that course is neither
fruitful nor possible here.

Speaking specifically of the Commission, the Supreme
Court has stressed the “venerable principle that the con-
struction of a statute by those charged with its execution
should be followed unless there-are compelling indications
that it is wrong.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,
895 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). Thus the nonconstitutional
question here is whether there are “compelling indica-
tions” that the ‘public interest and fairness requirements
compel some opening for public issue advertisements on
radio and television. In matters of allocating burdens, re-
forming procedures and ensuring full attention to all
relevant factors in agency ‘decision making, we have not
been reluctant to reverse the Commission in order to vin-
dicate “the public interest.” * We have also intervened to
see that broad policies developed by the Commission un-
der the fairness doctrine are applied fully and consist-
ently to all cases.° However, when we are asked to re-
verse major substantive interpretations of the grand and
open-ended statutory requirements, we tread somewhat
more difficult terrain. Obviously, the requirements mean
something and there must be a great range of actions
which they foreclose to the Commission; but, in establish-
ing the necessary guidelines, we must ourselves seek ex-
trinsic guidance.

In these cases, that guidance comes from the Constitu-
tion. Petitioners have presented no “compelling” evidence
: from legislative history to indicate a congressional policy
in favor of, or even a real congressional attention to,
| editorial advertising. Rather, their arguments on the non-

* See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ
V. F.C.C., 123 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994 (1966); 188 US.
App.D.C. 112, 425 F.2d 548 (1969).

* See, e.9., Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880 Vv. F.C.C.,
—— U.S.App.D.C. —, 486 F.2d 248 (1970).

>. RRP SISSY NTE NRO ren Pee

—

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constitutional points closely parallel their constitutional
arguments. The general policy considerations which they
invoke encompass all of the interests that would have to
be evaluated under the relevant First Amendment law.
It would make no sense for us to blind ourselves to the
constitutional status of those interests and to the doctrine
that has been build up around them.

What then might be the “compelling indications” we
are to consider? The ones which seem to us truly “com-
pelling” involve First Amendment principles. Thus we
conclude that the constitutional question must be faced
and is, indeed, the essence of these cases. Whether our
decision is styled as a “First Amendment decision’’ or as
a decision interpreting the fairness and public interest
requirements “in light of the First Amendment” matters
little.

III

It has always been clear that the broadcast media—so
vital to communication in our society—are affected by
strong First Amendment interests.° Yet the nature of
those interests has not been so clear; an evolution of con-
stitutional principles in this area is still very much in
progress. Until quite recently, the only interest raised
to constitutional status was that of the broadcast licensees
themselves. In a leading case, the Commission’s powers
over program content were attacked and upheld with
reference solely to the licensees’ right of immunity from
governmental interference with their “speech.” The scarc-
ity of broadcast frequencies was said to justify some reg-
ulation trenching on the broadcasters’ First Amendment
interests. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943). These cases mark a new effort by men-

10 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 US.
131, 166 (1948). Congress itself has prohibited any interference
by the Commission with “the right of free speech by means of
radio communication.” 47 U.S.C. §326 (1964).

All

bers of the public to assert their First Amendment in-
terests in the operations of radio and television.

There is scant precedent for such an effort. Indeed, the
few previous attempts by individuals or groups to enforce
their First Amendment interests in court have failed. In
each case, the litigants have run up against not only an
| unreceptiveness to their constitutional theory, but also a
| erabbed judicial view of “state action”—a view that the
“[First] Amendment limits only the action of Congress
or of agencies of the federal government and not private
corporations such as [broadcast licensees].” Massachu-
setts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co.,
1 Cir., 183 F.2d 497, 501 (1950); McIntire v. Wm. Penn
| Broadcasting Co. of Philadelphia, 3 Cir., 151 F.2d 597,
- 601 (1945). See also Post v. Payton, E.D. N.Y., 323 F.
| Supp. 799 (1971).

We believe the path is now clear of such doctrinal im-
pedimenta. Perhaps the most important recent develop-
ment is the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co., supra. There the Court upheld another
aspect of the Commission’s regulation of program content
—the fairness doctrine’s personal attack and campaign
editorial rules. However, the Court’s opinion went well
beyond the scarcity rationale of the National Broadcasting
Co. case. It justified the Commission’s interference with
broadcasters’ free speech by invoking specifically consti-
tutional rights of the general public which, it said, under-
lie and support the fairness doctrine rules at issue. Issu-
ing what must become a clarion call for a new public
concern and activism regarding the broadcast media, the
Court stated that “the people as a whole retain their
* * * collective right to have the medium function con-
sistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment.” It went on to say:

395 U.S. at 390.

SOTA ERS RSWS LFA EEE RE TET ms
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«* * * The right of free speech of a broadcaster
* * * does not embrace a right to snuff out the free
speech of others. * * *
2 * * *

«* * * [A] licensee has no consitutional right
* * * to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclu-
sion of his fellow citizens. * * *

* * * *

«“* * * It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.

2 @ #99 12

Of course, the Red Lion Court had to invoke the pub-
lie’s First Amendment interests for a narrow purpose
only—to uphold legislative and administrative action al-
ready taken. It did not have to reach the issue, presented
in these cases, of invoking those interests for a direct
attack on broadcasters’ policies approved by the Commis-
sion. However, the language used by the Court is signifi-
cantly expansive. It spoke of a First Amendment “right”
held by “the people as a whole.” A constitutional “right”
is hardly deserving of the name if it can function only
to permit legislative and administrative action and if its
content depends entirely upon the current policies of the
legislative and executive branches. The First Amend-
ment, after all, contains nothing analogous to the fifth
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorizing Con-
gress to enforce constitutional interests unenforceable by

the courts.*

For many purposes, it is proper to consider broadcast
licensees as “private” businesses. Yet, for purposes of

12 Id. at 387, 389, 390.

13 On the effect of the specific language in the fifth section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Oregon V. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) ; Katzenbach V. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Of course;
the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to federal regulation
of the broadcast industry, since no interference with the states is
involved.

A138

the First Amendment, “ [o]wnership does not always
mean absolute dominion.” Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 506 (1946). “Conduct that is formally ‘private’ may
become so entwined with governmental policies or so im-
pregnated with a governmental character as to become
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state
action.” Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
The Red Lion Court itself commented on the impermissi-
bility of “private censorship” and cited old doctrine that
““{f]reedom of the press from governmental interference
under the First Amendment does not sanction repression
of that freedom by private interests.’”* The reach of
the First Amendment, therefore, depends not upon “pub-
lic”—“private” technicalities, but upon more functional
considerations. They are (1) the governmental involve-
ment in or public character of a particular enterprise,
and (2) the importance or suitability of that enterprise
for the communication of ideas.?*

The last few decades of court decisions expanding the
concept of “state action” have focused on myriad indicia
of governmental involvement and public character. Many

#395 U.S. at 392, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945).

** Most “‘state action” cases, of course, have been concerned with
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment rather
than with free speech rights under the First Amendment. How-

ever, the principle of governmental involvement developed therein
has been applied equally well in the First Amendment context.
See, e.g., Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952);
Farmer v. Moses, S.D. N.Y., 232 F.Supp. 154 (1964). The principle
of “public character” may be found in decisions dealing directly
with application of First Amendment rights to “private” entities.
See., e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 V. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968); Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., D. Ore., 308 F.Supp. 128
(1970) ; Diamond v. Bland, 91 Cal. Rptr 501, 477 P.2d 733 (1970).
The importance and suitability of a particular place for the com-
munication of ideas has been stressed in all of the cases cited
above, as well as in all of the access-to-public forum cases, see
Notes 40-43 infra.

mR. EEE RE LT TT I IE Oe TLE INS POO LILES IE TS

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of them are apparently applicable to the operations of the
broadcast industry. But we need stress only two more
basic factors which, taken together, bring broadcast li-
censees well within the ambit of the First Amendment
for the purposes of these cases. First, the general char-
acteristics of the broadcast industry reveal an extraord-
inary relationship between the broadcasters and the fed-
eral government—a relationship which puts that industry
in a class with few others.’ It is one of “interdepend-
ence” and “joint participa[tion].” See Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
“(T]he [federal] regulatory system,” it has been said,
“is as much responsible for the existence of a broadcast-
ing medium as the Bureau of Engraving is responsible
for the existence of United States currency.” * It has

16 Dissenting in the BEM case now under review, Commissioner
Johnson dealt exhaustively with the Supreme Court’s state action
doctrine, isolating eight separate indicia of “state action.” He
argued very strongly that all eight indicia apply to broadcast
licensees. Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, supra
Note 1, 25 F.C.C.2d at 258-264. Because this highly analytical—one
might say mechanical—approach runs the risk of reading Supreme
Court opinions for more than they mean, we have chosen to paint
with a broader brush. Ours is the approach which the Supreme
Court seems in fact to have used in the past.

17In particular, broadcasting may be easily distinguished from
the newspaper industry in terms of “state action.” In two recent
decisions, courts have held that newspapers are not subject to the
First Amendment. Associates & Aldrich Co., Inc. v. Times Mirror
Co., 9 Cir., 440 F.2d 188 (1971); Chicago Joint Board v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 7 Cir., —— F.2d ——, 89 U.S. L. WEEK 23860 (Decem-
ber 17, 1970). While the governmental involvement in and public
character of newspapers in surely less than that of broadcasting,
we of course need express neither agreement nor disagreement with
the cited decisions here.

18 Pemberton, The Right of Access to Mass Media, in N. DORSEN
(ed.), THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 277, 290 (1971). The Govern-
ment is also directly responsible for the very existence of particular
broadcasters. “[E]xisting broadcasters have often attained their
present position because of their initial government selection in
competiton with others * * *. * * * [Their present] advantages
are the fruit of a preferred position conferred by the Government.”
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., supra Note 7, 895 U.S. at 400.

A 15

long been recognized that the airwaves are “a limited
and valuable part of the public domain,” *° leased out
temporarily by the federal government which retains ulti-
mate control over them.” Federal agency review and
guidance of broadcasters’ conduct is automatic, continu-
ing and pervasive.” For broadcast licensees are consid-
ered the “proxies” or “fiduciaries” of the people.** Al-
most no other private business—almost no other regulated
private business—is so intimately bound to government
and to service to the commonweal.

A second and even more important factor is the specific
governmental involvement in the broadcasters’ action now
under review here. All of the cases in which previous
/ courts have characterized broadcasters as mere “private
| corporations” immune from First Amendment constraints,
gee text at page [A-11] supra, have involved direct suits
against broadcast licensees. In the cases before us now,

1° Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.,
supra Note 8, 123 U.S.App.D.C. at 337, 359 F.2d at 1003.

20 The licensing-out or delegation of governmental] authority has
been an element in some of the Supreme Court’s most expansive
state action decisions. See Evans Vv. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 ( 1966) ;
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) ;
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The mere existence of a
licensing or delegation relationship is not, of course, enough by
itself to establish state action; licensed pharmacists cannot be
equated with licensed broadcasters. The actual] extent of govern-
mental involvement and the public character of the enterprise in
question remain the final tests of state action.

*1 The activities of a governmental regulatory agency have also
been emphasized in at least one of the Supreme Court’s expansive
state action decisions. See Public Utilities Comm’n Vv. Pollak, supra
Note 15, 348 U.S. at 462, citing American Communications Ass’n
V. Douds, 389 U.S. 382, 401 (1950) (“[W]hen authority derives in
part from Government’s thumb on the scales, the exercise of that
power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to
its exercise by Government itself.’’).

22 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., supra Note 7, 395
US. at 394, 396; Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. F.C.C., supra Note 8, 123 U.S.App.D.C. at 337, 359 F.2d
at 1003.

>... ENN EL nee aN RE SI STR I RSTO RTT tic Rac agen

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however, the Commission has given its imprimatur to the
flat ban on editorial advertising. It specifically consid-
ered and specifically authorized the flat ban. Thus we are
called upon to review not simply a private decision, but
a decision by a government agency, a decision which |
must inevitably provide guidance for future broadcaster
action.

There is ample authority for the principle that specific
governmental approval of or acquiescence in challenged
action by a private organization indicates “‘state action.” *
Indeed, in a case similar to ours the Supreme Court held
that a private bus company franchised by the federal gov-
ernment and regulated by the District of Columbia Pub-
lic Utilities Commission could be subject to First Amend-
ment constraints. It emphasized the specific regulatory
acquiescence in the challenged action of the bus company:

“* * * In finding [state action] we do not rely on
the mere fact that Capital Transit operates a public
utility on the streets of the District of Columbia
under authority of Congress. Nor do we rely upon
the fact that, by reason of such federal authoriza-
tion, Capital Transit now enjoys a substantial mo-
nopoly of street railway and bus transportation in
the District of Columbia. We do, however, recognize
that Capital Transit operates its service under the
regulatory supervision of the Utilities Com-

23 The Supreme Court has said that “action of state courts and
judicial officers in their official to

action of the State * * *.” Shelley ¥. Kraemer, 384 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
See New York Times Co. V. 8. (

Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talis-
man of State Action, 1966 Duxe L. J. 219, 227-230. See also this
court's discussion of the Shelley principle—which surely must apply
to actions of a federal administrative agency specifically approving
private action—in Edwards v. Habib, 180 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 397
F.2d 687 (1968). Specific governmental acquiescence, as well as
specific approval, has also been a focus of Supreme Court state
action decisions. See Marsh v. Alabama, supra Note 15, 326 U.S.
at 507 & n.4, 509; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra
Note 20, 865 U.S. at 725.

:

}

Al7

mission of the District of Columbia which is an
agency authorized by Congress. We rely particularly
upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests
against the [challenged action], ordered an investi-
gation of it and, after formal public hearings, or-
dered its investigation dismissed on the ground that
the public safety, comfort and convenience were not
impaired thereby. * * *”

Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462
(1952). (Footnote omitted. )

Broadcasting’s importance and suitability for commu-
nication of ideas need not be labored. Mere presence of
large and appropriate audiences (and thus opportunities
for effective communication) has sometimes been empha-
sized by the courts to show the relevance of First Amend-
ment protections.“ In Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 vy. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968), for example, the Supreme Court held that a
privately owned shopping center was an appropriate place
for the “speech” of labor union picketers. It stressed
“[t]he large-scale movement of the country’s population
from the cities to the suburbs [that] has been accompa-
nied by the advent of the suburban shopping center * * ae
Id. at 324. With this demographic change, the “speech”
that once took place on the public streets around down-
town shopping areas must be allowed to move to privately
owned parking areas in the suburbs, for that is where
the relevant audiences now are. The technological and
cultural changes connected to the current preeminence of
the broadcast media as our primary means of communica-

tion -are no less striking. The soap box orator and the
* See, e.g., Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 2 Cir., 392
F.2d 83, 90-91 (1968) (“The propriety of a place for use as a public

the right to speak on a medium of communication, not in a particu-
lar place. Thus many of the considerations are different; but the
basic concern with the ability to reach the relevant audience applies
in both situations.

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EEE EEE EEE SC CS“=~=~-- “ore

——~nay

A 18

leafleter are becoming almost obsolescent; their Saturday
afternoon audiences have increasingly moved indoors—in
front of their television sets.”

Moreover, unlike most of the private entities held to
be subject to First Amendment constraints, the broadcast
media are specifically dedicated to communication. They
function as both our foremost forum for public speech
and our most important educator of an informed people.
In a populous democracy, the only means of truly mass
communication must play an absolutely crucial role in
the processes of self-government and free expression, s0
central to the First Amendment. That can be said of
almost no other “private” enterprise.

IV

Broadcast licensees, then, serve not only as “speakers
but also as administrators of a highly valuable communi-
cations resource, subject to First Amendment constraints.
Their dual role demands that their own constitutional in-
terests in free speech coexist with those of the general
public. But what are the dimensions of the public’s First
Amendment interests in the operation of radio and tele
vision? And how do they apply to the issue of editorial
advertising?

It is particularly important that these cases deal only
with the public’s First Amendment interests in broad-
casters’ allocation of advertising time. They deal only
with time relinquished by broadcasters to others; peti-
tioners argue only that, in relinquishing that time, broad-
casters must not discriminate against protected expres-
sion. In normal programming time, closely controlled and
edited by broadcasters, the constellation of constitutional
interests would be substantially different. In news and

25 The Supreme Court has noted that broadcast “technology * **
supplants atomized, relatively informal communication with mass
media as a prime source of national cohesion and news * * *.”
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., supra Note 7, 895 US. at

886 n.15.

Al9

Though the broadcasters themselves have no substan-
tial First Amendment interest in the allocation of adver-
tising time, we might expect that the interest of mem-
bers of the public—potentia] advertisers—would be quite
strong. However, the Commission and the broadcaster-

public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral and other ideas and experiences” over the broad-

Working from that premise, the Commission and inter-

venors contend that the public already receives “suitable
* See id. at 396.

"Id. at 390.

_ —
A 20

access” to controversial views on normal programming
time. Application of the fairness doctrine’s requirement
of full and fair coverage of public issues in non-adver-
tising time, they suggest, ensures that all views on these
issues will in fact be presented. They assume that edi-
torial advertising adds nothing new to the debate. The
fairness guarantee alone, they say, is enough to elimi-
nate petitioners’ claim on advertising time—and enough
to satisfy the First Amendment. We disagree.

Surely the public’s interest in free access to the full
spectrum of ideas and controversial views on radio and
television is highly important. The right to receive ideas
and information is deeply rooted in First Amendment
law. The Red Lion Court stressed that right, since it
was the one primarily relevant to the fairness doctrine
rules at issue in the case. But we do not believe that the
Red Lion decision makes the goal of an informed public
the exclusive First Amendment interest constraining
broadcasters. Certainly the Supreme Court has done so
in no other context.

The public has a First Amendment interest in the
mode or manner—as well as the content—of public debate
aired on the broadcast media. The Red Lion Court itself
stated specifically that “[i]t is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas [in the broadcast media].” * This court, similarly,
has said that the Commission is obliged to administer the
airwaves “in such a manner that * * * debate on public
issues is ‘uninhibited, robust and wide-open.’” National
Ass’n of Theatre Owners v. F.C.C., 1386 U.S.App.D.C.

28 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont V.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307-308 (1965) (Mr. Justice
Brennan, concurring); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
1483 (1948). The “right to receive,” however, has not been con-
sidered the central First Amendment interest, and never the only
First Amendment interest.

2° 395 U.S. at 390. (Emphasis added.)

A 21

352, 365, 420 F.2d 194, 207 (1969). The reference to
“uninhibited” debate is, of course, borrowed from the
Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 876 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The Court there
extended First Amendment protection to some forms of
libel on public officials. It made clear that the Amend-
ment’s concern extends beyond the mere fostering of
speech whose content will properly inform the public.
The New York Times decision establishes a strong First
Amendment interest in vigorous, “wide-open” public de-
bate.

Furthermore, we must take note of a third—but, per-
haps, most important—First Amendment interest. That
is the interest of individuals and groups in effective self-
expression. The Red Lion Court did say that “it is idle to
posit an unbridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual] to speak, write,
or publish.” For, as it pointed out, broadcast time is
necessarily limited. But the limited nature of broadcast
time does not dictate that the individual and group inter-
est in self-expression be brushed aside entirely; it allows
for a reasonably regulated, “abridgeable” right to speak.
The First Amendment values of individual self-fulfillment
through expression and individual participation in public
debate have long been recognized.*! We all have an inter-
est in speaking up ourselves as well as in hearing others.
It is too late to argue that the First Amendment protects
ideas but not an individual’s interest in expressing them
and doing so in his own way.

We conclude, then, that the public’s First Amendment
interests constrain broadcasters not only to provide the
full spectrum of viewpoints, but also to present them in
an uninhibited, wide-open fashion and to provide opportu-

——y

Id, at 388,

See, e.g., T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
First AMENDMENT 4-7 (Vintage ed. 1967).

“ ERLE ETE PML NE BONED AN LOD aR ii.ca ne Rene
TILETINTEIS OPT,

— —

nity for individual self-expression.» How do these three
First Amendment interests relate to a more specific inter-

est in the airing of editorial advertisements? The answer
emerges when we understand the special importance of
advertising time to our system of free expression. First, |
the initial decision to produce an editorial advertisement is
in the hands of members of the public. The initiative
to present a particular view does not have to come from a
member of the broadcaster’s staff. Second, a paid ad-
vertisement is basically controlled and edited by the ad-
vertiser. He is allowed to present his views in a fashion
chosen by himself. If an individual is interviewed for a
news program, he may expect his comments to be ab-
breviated and edited; reporters’ commentary will qualify
what he has to say. For it is the broadcasters’ responsi-
bility to be objective, to condense issues into available
time for presentation, and to play up or play down views
according to the broadcaster’s opinion of what is impor-
tant and interesting. But when an individual or group
buys time to say its piece, the crucial controls are in its
own hands. Editorial advertising is thus a special and
separate mode of expression, not simply a duplication of
other expression on the same medium.”

The importance of initiative and control to the First
Amendment interests in wide-open debate and individual
self-expression should be obvious. Vigorous, free expres-
sion is promoted when members of the public have some

82 Of course, all three of these interests apply to non-advertising
time as well as to advertising time. The Commission, in fact,
has encouraged broadcasters to present conflicting views through
partisan voices as well as through predigested commentary. See
Democratic National Committee, supra Note 1, 25 F.C.C.2d at 222-
223. However, as we make clear in text, the selective, edited
presentation by the Government’s licensee of partisan voices on
news shows, for example, does not erase the special advantages of

allowing self-selected partisan voices on advertising time.

33 See text at pages [A-25 - A-26] & Note 37 infra. See also Note,
A Fair Break for Controversial Speakers: Limitations of the Fair-
ness Doctrine and the Need for Individual Access, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
‘REV. 582, 557-560 (1971).

A 23

opportunity to take the initiative and editorial control into
their own hands on the broadcast media. It has tradition-
ally been thought that the best judge of the importance of
a particular viewpoint or issue is the individual or group
holding the viewpoint and wishing to communicate it to
others. In the First Amendment area, our best guarantee
has always been a “free market” in which partisans who
fee] strongly on particular issues may decide on their own
to speak out and to speak out in their own way. The pres-
ent system, allowing a flat ban on editorial advertising,
conforms instead to a paternalistic structure in which li-
censees and bureaucrats decide what issues are “impor-
tant,” how “fully” to cover them, and the format, time
and style of the coverage. ‘

Even if broadcasters were to succeed in presenting a
full spectrum of viewpoints and partisan spokesmen on
non-advertising time, their retention of total initiative and
editoral control is inimical to the First Amendment. The
importance of fair, objective and full treatment of con-
troversial issues on normal programming cannot be doubt-
ed. But, as the Supreme Court has said in the context of
classroom debate, “supervised and ordained discussion” is
hot enough. Tinker vy. Des Moines School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969). “The Nation’s future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust: ex-
change of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude
of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authorita-
tive selection.’ ” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967). In other words, there is always a strong
First Amendment interest in opening up channels for
more spontaneous, self-initiated, self-controlled - expres-
sion.™

of hew rules to “encourage and implement” presentation of Oppos-
ing viewpoints by reemphasizing the obligation to “seek out”

A 24

Even in terms of the public’s First Amendment inter.
est emphasized by the Commission and intervenors—the
interest of “viewers and listeners” in passive access to the
full spectrum of viewpoints on radio and television—
editorial advertising plays an important role. The con-
cept of “full” coverage of “controversial” issues “of pub-
lic importance” is vague to say the least, and leaves much

controversial issues. Obligations of Broadcast Licensee Under the
Fairness Doctrine, 35 FED. REG. 7820 (1970). But, as the Commis.
sion says, the proposed rules would be but a “modest * * * step in
promoting access to the media.” Jd. at 7821. They go little beyond
the present obligation to give “full” coverage to controversial issues,
Such an obligation is inherently difficult to define and enforce. At
best, the Commission can evaluate only the general willingness of a
licensee to “seek out” issues and glaring examples of noncoverage
of obviously important issues. The Commission cannot be expected
to engage licensees in fine debates over coverage of less obviously
life-or-death issues. But the fundamental point—the point we
emphasize—is that no matter how “fully” controversial issues might
be covered in a perfect broadcasting world, the basic initiative and
control remains with the licensee. Because there is ®t even a
partial “free market” opening to the public at large, the crucial
First Amendment interests in decentralized initiative and control
go unsatisfied.

We realize that there is another possible, but purely speculative,
reformation of the fairness doctrine now under consideration which
might be supposed to obviate the need for a measure of “free
market” access to advertising time. It has been proposed that
licensees be required to provide self-edited advertising time to
groups or individuals under the fairness doctrine only when a com-
mercial advertiser has already taken a controversial position in his
broadcast messages. Such an approach has been taken regarding
cigarette advertisements, though that case was said to be extra-
ordinary and not to establish a general precedent. Banzhaf v. F.C.C.,
132 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968). But even if that
principle were made to apply generally, it would leave the initiative
solely in the hands of commercial advertisers: the only issues on
which noncommercial groups and individuals could speak through
editorial advertisements would be those issues which commercial
advertisers had already chosen to raise themselves. Allowing such
a narrow group, motivated largely by business profit, to set the
agenda for editorial advertising is unconscionable and contrary to
First Amendment precepts. It is crucial that noncommercial groups
and individuals have the same rights of initiative as commercial
advertisers.

—

to the broadcasters’ discretion (and possible oversight) .*
Assuming that broadcasters are sometimes fallible, the
goal of a fully informed public is best attained by open-
ing of outlets for members of the public to supplement
the licensees’ assessments of “importance,” “controversi-
ality” and “full” coverage. The Commission’s and inter-
venors’ argument might be somewhat stronger if it were
designed to support a partial ban on editorial advertising
concerning issues and views which have in fact been sub-
stantially aired on normal programming time.** The ar-
gument is unconvincing, however, in Support of a flat,
per se ban on any and all editorial advertisements.

Moreover, even if “antiwar views,” for example, have
in fact been presented on news and interview shows, it
is not necessarily clear that a particular antiwar editorial
advertisement would add nothing to the public’s infor-
mation and understanding. “Viewpoints” cannot be so
neatly and infallibly catalogued as the Commission would
have us believe. Self-expression and public debate are
much more subtle phenomena; matters of style and in-
tensity of feeling are important components.” Again,

A 25

“ The guarantees of full and fair coverage have proved particu-
larly difficult to define and enforce in the past. They have taken
on effective meaning only in the most extreme cases of broadcaster
irresponsibility. For a depressing critique of the Commission’s

* Even then, however, the special attributes of editorial adver-
tising would not be eliminated by the broadcaster’s own coverage.
See text at pages [A-21 - A-23] supra & pages [A-25 - A-26] infra.

In Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, W.D. Wis., 306
F.Supp. 1097 (1969), affirmed, 7 Cir., 441 F.2d 1257 (1971), the
court held that a school newspaper was obliged under the First
Amendment to print antiwar editorial advertising, even though
antiwar views could be printed in the newspaper’s news and letters-
to-the-editor columns. The court stressed the qualitative—and
val ifference in expression of views through an editorial
advertisement. “It is readily apparent,” it said, “that a paid adver-
tisement can be cast in such a form as to command much greater
attention than a letter to the editor. Large type, photographs,

A 26

an across-the-board ban on editorial advertisements—
leaving the quality of public debate in the control of one
licensee, supplemented by no other autonomous inputs—
may well ignore opportunities to enliven and enrich the
publie’s overall information.

We recognize, of course, that the onesidedeness and pri-
vate editing of particular “spot” editorial advertisements
may in the end steer viewers and listeners away from
the “truth” by distorting complex issues. Being brief,
these “spot” messages—no less than normal broadcast
news coverage—may not canvass all possible arguments
or develop all possible implications of the position they
espouse. But that does not mean that they are unpro-
tected by the First Amendment. Our Constitution pro-
tects many forms of misleading and overly simplified
political expression in order to ensure robust, wide-open
debate. “[Nleither factual error nor defamatory content
suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism
of official conduct * * *.” New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, supra, 376 U.S. at 278. Nor does the brevity of the
criticism. We must, then, be very, very slow to judge
any sort of speech on public issues worthless. The mar-
ketplace of ideas protected by the First Amendment,
after all, is not governed by the tastes and intellectual
standards of the universities or the broadcast newsroom
—or even of judicial chambers.

We conclude, therefore, that the fairness doctrine’s
goal of full and fair coverage of issues on normal pro-
gramming time does not eliminate the public’s interest
in a further, complementary airing of controversial views
during advertising time. We must concur in the Su-
preme Court’s only recorded comments on constitutional

repeated publication and full pages of space are some of the modes
of expression available in an editorial advertisement that might
not be available in a letter to the editor.” Jd. at 1101. Another
court has come to the same result in a newspaper editorial adver-
tising case. Zucker Vv. Panitz, S.D. N.Y., 299 F.Supp 102 (1969).
See text at pages [A-27 - A-29] infra.

i
Hi
§

Pr
A

*
13

1 KTR I comeeaee are

82 (1942).

A 27

protection for editorial advertising—comments made in
the context of newspapers, like broadcasting a medium
which may be expected, if not required, to present the
various sides of public issues in its non-advertising space.
The Court said that editoria] advertisements, unlike com-
mercial advertisements,*= are of fundamental First
Amendment concern, since they deal with political ques-
tions. And it protected them from libel law attack to the
same extent as the newspapers’ own editorial] columns,
for

“[a]ny other conclusion * * * might shut off an im-
portant outlet for the promulgation of information
and ideas by persons who do not themselves have
access to publishing facilities—who wish to exercise
their freedom of Speech even though they are not
members of the press, * * * The effect would be to
shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to se-
cure ‘the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources,’ * * *”

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at 266.

Vv

We come now to the aspect of the broadcasters’ policy
which, petitioners Say, trenches on the First Amendment
interest in editorial advertising. The constitutional de-
fect of that policy is somewhat ironic. The New York
Times Court made clear that the fact distinguishing
fully protected editorial advertising from less fully pro-

commercial advertising is that the former deals
with controversial public issues. Indeed, the political na-
ture of editorial advertising places it near the core of
the First Amendment. However, the very characteristic
Which affords it strict constitutional protection is also

the characteristic causing the broadcasters’ challenged

—is less fully protected than other speech, because it generally does
not communicate ideas and thus is not directly related to the central
purpose of the First Amendment. See Breard vy. City of Alez-
endria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.

aay

A 28

policy to single it out and exclude it from the airwaves,
That, we believe, is the crucial aspect of these cases.

It is important to note that petitioners do not attack
the exclusion of editorial advertising by broadcasters who
accept no advertisements whatever.* We do not have to
decide whether the broadcast medium inherently amounts
to a “public forum” on the order of public streets or
parks or meeting halls or even bus terminals.“ We leave
open the possibility that broadcasters may constitutionally
relinquish no time at all for advertising of any sort. For
the issue in these cases is the permissibility of discrimi-
nation, within a given block of advertising time, against
“controversial” speech and in favor of commercial and
“noncontroversial” speech. We deal here with a forum
that already has been opened up by the licensees them-
selves, opened up for direct broadcast presentations by
members of the public.

Fortunately, we do not write on a clean slate in this
area. Six courts have confronted discriminations among
types of speech like the one challenged here. Every one
of them—four federal courts and two state supreme
courts—has held that once a forum, subject to First
Amendment constraints, has been opened up for commer-
cial and “noncontroversial” advertising, a ban on “con-
troversial” editorial advertising is unconstitutional unless

3° DNC’s position is somewhat ambiguous. The ruling which it
requested from the Commission would, by its terms, apply to all
broadcasters, whether or not they accept any advertising. See text
at page [A-6] supra. However, on appeal DNC’s arguments have
been focused entirely on broadcasters who do already accept noncon-
troversial advertising. The interests of particular licensees in keep-
ing all advertising off the air were not explored before the Commis-
sion or before this court—for example, an all music station may have
a very substantial interest in broadcasting no paid announcements.
Because the special issues relating to such licensees were not pre-
sented here, we do not decide them.

40 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague V.
C.1.0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Wolin v. Port of New York Authority,
supra Note 24. See generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1.

| A 29

clearly justified by a “clear and present danger.” Lee v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges, W.D. Wis., 306 F.
Supp. 1097 (1969), affirmed, 7 Cir., 441 F.2d 1257
(1971); Zucker v. Panitz, S.D. N.Y., 299 F.Supp. 102
(1969) ; Kissinger vy. New York City Transit Authority,
S.D. N.Y., 274 F.Supp. 488 (1967) ; Hillside Community
Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, Wash., 455 P.2d 350
(1969) ; Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,
64 Cal.Rptr 430, 434 P.2d 982 (1967). We join this un-
broken line of authority.

First Amendment doctrine governing access to forums
for communication has been elaborated often in recent
years. The essential test is an exercise in balancing,
though weighted in favor of First Amendment values.*'
On one hand, the court must assess the constitutionally
protected interest in the particular expressive activity in
the particular forum. On the other hand, it must assess
the importance of other uses of the forum which may be
threatened and the extent to which they actually will be
disrupted. Access may be denied only if the disruption
caused by a particular type of expression ( €.g., public
speaking, marching, picketing) clearly overrides the “pre-
| ferred” interest in free speech. Thus there is some right
of access by demonstrators to state capitol grounds * but
not to a jailyard.*

Ordinarily, courts have to make the basic balancing
judgment on their own. However, when the administra-

** Most of the cases, other than those cited above in text, have
involved access to particular places in order to perform expressive
activities such as speaking, leafleting, or demonstrating in some
fashion. For general discussions of the cases and the principles
applied, see H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(paper ed. 1965); Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1773 (1967). There is no reason why the general princi-
ples applied in cases involving access to places should not apply to
our cases involving access to a particular medium of expression.
See Note 24 supra.

** Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
* Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).

—~—ay

tor of a forum has determined to grant access to some
speakers or some picketers, he has implicitly made that
basic judgment himself. When some public speaking is
allowed in a park, the park’s administrator has deter-
mined that the normal and proper functions of the park
will not be excessively harmed by public speaking. If
he then attempts to deny access to other public speakers _
he cannot be heard to claim the opposite. The burden is
on him to show some very substantial factor distinguish-
ing the disruption that would cause from that caused by
the speaking or picketing already allowed.

A 30

The same principle applies to broadcasters who have
opened their forum to commercial speech but would close
it to controversial political speech. By opening up a
forum for some paid presentations, independently edited
and controlled by members of the public, the broadcasters
have waived any argument that advertising is inherently
disruptive of the proper function of their stations. The
exclusion of only one sort of advertising—which we have
shown to have great First Amendment value—is then
highly suspect, a prima facie constitutional violation. To
justify the exclusion, there must be a substantial factor
distinguishing the disruptive effect of editorial advertis-
ing from that of commercial advertising.

The content of the idea which the excluded speakers
seek to promote is—emphatically—mnot permitted as a
distinguishing factor in itself. Indeed, the existence of
an exclusionary discrimination apparently based on the
content of ideas presents an additional, or greatly heigh-
tened, prima facie constitutional violation. Both free
speech and equal protection principles condemn any dis-
crimination among speakers which is based on what they
intend to say.** If the First Amendment prohibits any-

“* For discussions of the First Amendment-equal protection inter-
section, see Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 1482, 1492-1497 (1970) ; Kalven, supra Note 40, 1965 Sup. Ct.
REV. at 29-30; Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at Universities:

Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. Pa. L. REV. 328, 337-339
(1968).

_

thing at all, it must be a censoria] discrimination among
ideas. And since First Amendment rights have been held
to be “fundamental rights” triggering the strict standard
of review under equal protection principles, Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968), it is doubly clear that
the burden of justifying any apparent discrimination is
very great indeed.

At least 20 years ago, the Supreme Court began con-
demning discriminations among different exercises of the
same type of expression. Fowler vy. Rhode Island, 354
US. 67 (1953); Niemotko vy. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
272-273 (1951). Both cases involved access to a forum
already opened to others. More recently, the Court in
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), invalidated a
state regulation that permitted labor picketing but not
civil rights picketing. In his concurrence, Mr. Justice
Black stated that this sort of discrimination is “censor-
ship in a most odious form” and violates both the First
Amendment and the equal protection clause. “Jd. at 581.
Similarly, in Adderley vy. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 ( 1966), the
Court upheld a ban on demonstrations in a jailyard, but
was careful to note that “[t]here is not a shred of evi-
dence in this record * * * [the demonstrators were ex-
cluded] because the sheriff objected to what was being
sung or said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed
with the objectives of their protest.” Jd. at 47.

No doubt a discrimination against all controversial
speech—such as we face in these cases—is somewhat less
“odious” than a discrimination among different contro-
Versial viewpoints on particular issues. But it is a form
of censorship just the same. It is a favoritism toward

A 31

““In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 64 Cal.
Rptr 430, 484 P.2d 982, 986 (1967), the California Supreme Court
came to the same conclusion as we do on this issue, saying:

“* * * The vice is not that the district has preferred one

point of view over another, but that it chooses between classes
of ideas entitled to constitutional protection, sanctioning the

A 32

the status quo and public apathy and, in these cases, a
favoritism toward bland commercialism.“ Such favorit-
ism flies in the face of the First Amendment, whose cen-
tral purpose is to protect and promote controversy, “unin-
hibited, robust and wide-open,” on public issues.

Moreover, it is by no means clear that a broadcasters’
ban on “controversial” advertising does not impermis-
sibly open the door to a sub rosa discrimination among
controversial ideas. The term “controversial” is extraor-
dinarily vague. Some advertisements may not be deemed
“controversial”—and may not even be “controversial” for
purposes of the fairness doctrine ““—but may still express
ideas, the negative of which would surely be labeled “con-
troversial.” “ Ads for Radio Free Europe or Army re-

expression of only those selected, and banning others. Thus
the district’s regulation exercises a most pervasive form of
censorship.

“* #* * [T]he district’s policy * * * affords total freedom of
the forum to mercantile messages while banning the vast ma-
jority of opinions and beliefs extant which enjoy First Amend-
ment protection because of their noncommercialism. No sta-
tistical data is required to demonstrate that in the totality of
man’s communicable knowledge, that which bears no relation-
ship to material value preponderates.”

The Supreme Court of Washington specifically adopted this view in
Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, Wash., 455
P.2d 350, 353 (1969).

“Commissioner Johnson commented in his dissent that broad-
casters “have created a system in which immediate access is granted
to one, privileged class of applicants: the commercial peddler of
goods and services. * * * We have an individual right of access, all
right, but only for hucksters of industrial garbage.” Democratic
National Committee, supra Note 1, 25 F.C.C.2d at 233.

** See Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 182 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 405 F.2d 1082
(1968) ; Green v. F.C.C., —— U.S.App.D.C. ——, —— F2d —
(Nos. 24470 & 24516, decided June 18, 1971).

“In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, supre
Note 45, 434 P.2d at 987, the California Supreme Court made
the same point very forcefully, and provided several telling

examples:
{Footnote continued on Page A 33]

A 33

cruiting, for example, may be allowed unanswered on the
air, while ads calling the notion of the “free world” a
sham or ads calling the Army a threat to democracy

one to draw. All too often in our society one particular
ideology—that of passivity, acceptance of things as they
are, and exhaltation of commercial values—is simply
taken for granted, assumed to be a nonideology, and
allowed to choke out all the rest.

Thus the editorial] advertising ban, particularly when
licensees accept advertising generally, establishes an un-
mistakable infringing of First Amendment liberties. The
Commission and the broadcasters, then, bear a very heavy
burden of justification, Whether we require a “compel-
ling” justification, an “overriding” justification, or a
“clear and present danger” is relatively unimportant.

VI

—_——

“ [Continued]

“* * * A lumber company may advertise its wood products,
but a conservation group cannot implore citizens to write to
the President or Governor about protecting our natural re-

its available Policies, but a senior citizens’ club cannot plead
for legislation to improve our social] security program.”

See generally C. WAXMAN (ed.), THE END or IDEOLOGY
DEBATE (1969).

—ay

A 34

of editorial advertising—a sort of harm great enough to
override the First Amendment interests at stake and a
sort of harm not already involved in the acceptance of
commercial and “noncontroversial” advertising. ~ Only
such a showing could convince us that the ban on edi-
torial advertisements is supported by sufficient counter-
vailing values and is not based solely on the content of
the ideas conveyed.

The Commission and intervenors have begun from the
assumption that our holding for petitioners would deprive
broadcast licensees of their highly prized editorial inde-
pendence and control over their frequencies, giving edi-
torial advertisers a right to air time which commercial
advertisers do not presently have. They have argued that
petitioners seek the right to “grab the mike” from broad-
casters’ hands.” The result, they say, would be a three-
fold disaster. First, they foresee “ ‘a return to the chaotic
situation of radio’s early days’ ” “ when too many hands
grabbing for too few mikes made successful broadcasting
impossible. Second, they argue that compulsory accept-
ance of editorial advertising would allow a few rich indi-
viduals or groups to buy up great blocks of time to pur-
vey views on only one side of important issues, thus gross-
ly unbalancing the broadcast station’s treatment of those
issues. And third, they point out that broadcasters com-
pelled to accept editorial advertisements on one side of
an issue would then be required by the fairness doctrine
to accept at least some advertisements on the other side
—free of charge if necessary. Provision of such free ad-
vertising time, they say, would cut into the broadcasters’
revenues and might bring financial collapse.

The arguments of the Commission and intervenors fall
well short of the mark. The reason is that they have

50 Statement of attorney for intervenor Columbia Broadcasting
System at oral argument before this court.

51 Brief for the Commission in Case No. 24,537 at p. 12.

\

\

A 35

apparently misunderstood the narrowness of the issue
here. All that we are considering is the permissibility
of a total, flat ban on editorial] advertising. All petition-
ers ask is that broadcasters be required to accept some
editorial advertising. They do not advocate an absolute
right to air their advertisements. As the Red Lion Court
made clear, there could not be any such absolute right
because advertising time, like all broadcast time, is sev-
erely limited. See text at page [A-21] supra. Under the
Communications Act, broadcasters are not “common car-
riers” obliged to accept any advertising message that is
submitted. And petitioners do not argue that they should
be. What petitioners do argue is that editorial advertise-
ments should at least be considered and that some should
be aired.

Such a modest reform would not substantially under-
mine broadcasters’ editorial control over their frequen-
cies. For broadcasters would retain full latitude to con-
trol the content of their programming. Their editorial
control over non-advertising time would not be disturbed
whatever. All that would be affected is their allocation of
advertising time—an area in which editorial control over
content has never been of major importance. The interest
in deciding which advertisements to accept is not as great
as in deciding what public issues to cover and how to
cover them on news presentations, for example. See text
at page(s] [A-18-A-19], supra. It surely cannot be

"47 U.S.C. §153(h) (1964). The Commission and intervenors
argue that this “common carrier” provision would be declared
unconstitutional if we were to decide for petitioners in these
cases. That, of course, is absolutely incorrect. The Commission
and intervenors also point to a part of the Communications Act
providing that if a station Permits one candidate for office to use
its facilities, it must then permit others equal time, but providing
also that “[n]o obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the
use of its station by any such candidate.” 47 US.C. §315(a)
(1964). This statutory provision squares perfectly with our hold-
ing that a broadcaster is not necessarily obliged to provide any time
for advertisements, but that if he does sell some advertising time
he may not totally exclude editorial advertising.

A 36

equated, as the Commission and intervenors suggest, with
the interest of law review editors in deciding what ar-
ticles to publish. See Avins v. Rutgers, State University
of New Jersey, 8 Cir., 8385 F.2d 151 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968). A broadcaster traditionally is not
nearly as involved in the preparation and editing of ad-
vertisements as a law review staff is in the preparation
and editing of articles.

Within the affected block of advertising time, neither
chaos nor anything approaching chaos would follow the
modest reform at issue. For, again, broadcasters would
retain wide-ranging control. It is well established in
First Amendment law governing access to forums that
“reasonable. regulations” may be promulgated and en-
forced to limit the exercise of free speech. At the least,
there may be regulations determining the time, place and
manner of speech. They may not be used to stifle speech,
but they are absolutely necessary to see that too many
groups speaking at once do not drown out one another or
trench overly much on the normal uses to which the
forum is put by the public in general. The same principle
applies to broadcasters’ methods for allocating advertising
time. All that petitioners condemn here are regulations
providing that public issue advertising may be aired “at
no time, in no place and in no manner” over the broad-
cast media.

Clearly, for example, broadcasters are entitled to place
an outside limit on the total amount of editorial adver-
tising they will sell. To fail to impose some such limit
would be to deny the public the other sorts of program-
ming which it legitimately expects on radio and televi-
sion. Similarly, “reasonable regulation” of the placement
of advertisements is altogether proper. No advertiser has
a right to air his presentation at any particular point

83 See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 V.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 320 (1968) ; Note, supra
Note 15. ‘

_—_

in an evening’s programming. Nor does he have a right
to clog a particular time segment with his messages. A
relegation of all editorial advertising to non-“prime time”
or any other major discrimination in the placement of
editorial advertisements would no doubt go too far. But
there is still room for broad exercise of the broadcasters’

discretion.

We need not define the precise control which broad-
casters may exercise over editorial advertising. Rather,
the point is that by requiring that some such advertising
be accepted, we leave the Commission and licensees broad
latitude to develop “reasonable regulations” which will
avoid any possibility of chaos and confusion. The spectre
of chaos and “mike grabbing” raised by the Commission
and intervenors here is, as petitioners say, a “bogus is-
sue.” Broadcasters, after all, have dealt quite success-
fully with the scheduling problems involved with com-
mercial advertising. We require only that noncommercial
advertisers be treated in the same evenhanded way. Al-
though many broadcasters already do allow editorial ad-
vertisements on the air, we have not been shown one rea-
son, drawn from their experience, to suggest that chaos
has resulted.

Beyond the mistaken. suggestion of administrative
apocalypse, the Commission and intervenors have raised
a more plausible and important claim, involving the dang-
er that a few individuals or groups might come to domi-
nate editorial advertising time. Of course, the mere fact
that wealthy people may use their opportunities to speak
more effectively than other people is not enough to justify
eliminating those opportunities entirely. It takes more
money to operate a magazine or newspaper—or, for that
matter, a broadcast station—than to buy a segment of
time for an editorial advertisement. Yet we are not re-
luetant to provide strict First Amendment protection for
the operators of magazines, newspapers and broadcast
stations. The real problem, then, is not that editorial ad-

A 37

A 38

vertising will cost money, but that it may be dominated
by only one group from one part of the political spec-
trum. A onesided flood of editorial advertisements could
hardly be called the “robust, wide-open” debate which the
people have a right to expect on radio and television.

Again, however, invalidation of a flat ban on editorial
advertising does not close the door to “reasonable regula-
tions” designed to prevent domination by a few groups or
a few viewpoints. Within a general regime of accepting
some editorial advertisements, there is room for the Com-
mission and licensees to develop such guidelines. For
example, there could be some outside limits on the amount
of advertising time that would be sold to one group or to
representatives of one particular narrow viewpoint. The
licensee should not begin to exercise the same “authorita-
tive selection” in editorial advertising which he exercises
in normal programming. See text at pages [A-22 - A-23]
supra. However, we are confident of the Commission’s
ability to set down guidelines which avoid that danger.

We are no less confident of its ability to deal reason-
ably with the final problem it has raised—that relating to
licensees’ fairness obligations. Invalidation of a flat ban
on editorial advertising, of course, leaves the Commis-
sion the power to require that if editorial advertisements
are accepted on one side of an issue, then broadcasters
must also accept at least some advertisements on the oth-
er side of the issue, free of charge if necessary. See Cull-
man Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963). The result
of such a reasonable regulation, however, need not be f-
nancial disaster. Indeed, it is incredible that the Commis-

54 In the context of regulating demonstrations or picketing, guide-
lines which limit access because the same or similar groups
already had substantial access would be unusual and perhaps im-
permissible. However, the interest in maintaining some degree of
balance on the broadcast media is particularly great. And “the
characteristics of news media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. F.C.C., supra Note 7, 395 U.S. at 386.

—

sion would enforce a rule so rigid that licensees would be
driven out of business. If the obligation to provide some
free time for answering editorial advertisements were
shown to threaten actual financial harm to particular
broadcasters, the Commission could make necessary ad-
justments.*

A 39

We conclude that none of the Spectres raised by the
Commission and intervenors—spectres of chaos, grossly
unbalanced programming and financial disaster—is
enough to justify a flat ban on editorial] advertising. What
real problems there are may be dealt with while the ac-
ceptance of some editorial advertisements is required. The
keynote must be a scheme of reasonable regulation, ad-
ministered by the licensee and guided by the Commission.
At least in the past, the Commission has not considered
this task so impossible. Twenty-five years ago it decided
a case in which a union charged that a broadcaster was
violating free speech rights by refusing to sell program
time for the airing of controversial views. The Commis-
sion stated:

“* * * The spirit of the Communications Act of
1934 requires radio to be an instrument of free
speech, subject only to general statutory provisions
imposing upon the licensee the responsibility of op-
erating its station in the public interest. * * *

“* * * No single or exact rule of thumb for pro-
viding time, on a non-discriminatory basis, can be

55 We note that the Commission’s requirement of free time for
antismoking was administered generously toward the financial con-
cerns of licensees and, indeed, few broadcasters seem to have been
deterred from accepting cigarette commercials as @ result. See
National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 947 (1969).

56 See Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of
Ideas, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1222, 1249 (1970). We must be somewhat
skeptical of the talk about financial disaster. For, according to
Commissioner Johnson, television broadcasters at least “average
a 90 to 100 percent return on tangible investment annually.” N.
JOHNSON, How To TALK BACK TO YOUR TELEVISION SET 65 (1969).
(Emphasis in original.)

A 40

stated for application to all situations which may
arise in the operation of all stations. The Commis-
sion, however, is of the opinion that the operation
of any station under the extreme principles that no
time shall be sold for the discussion of controversial
public issues and that only charitable organizations
and certain commercial interests may solicit member-
ships is inconsistent with the concept of public inter-
est * * *. The Commission recognizes that good
program balance may not permit the sale or dona-
tion of time to all who may seek it for such purposes
and that difficult problems calling for careful judg-
ment on the part of station management may be in-
volved in deciding among applicants for time when
all cannot be accommodated. However, competent
management should be able to meet such problems in
the public interest and with fairness to all concerned.
The fact that it placed an arduous task on manage-
ment should not be made a reason for evading the
issue by a strict rule against the sale of time for
any programs of the type mentioned.”

United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515, 517-518 (1945).
We agree with those views, and see no reason why the
Commission and broadcast licensees should be any less
competent in 1971 than they were in 1945. Given a
scheme of reasonable regulation, there is no reason why
acceptance of editorial advertising should cause any sub-
stantial harm or disruption not already involved in the
acceptance of other advertising. Therefore, to single out
and exclude editorial advertising is to violate the First
Amendment of the Constitution.

VII

On the basis of the foregoing, we reverse the Commis-
sion’s decision that a flat ban on all editorial advertising
is permissible. However, we remand these cases to the
Commission for further consideration. On remand, the
Commission should develop reasonable regulatory guide
lines to deal with editorial advertisements. Petitioners

A4l1

should be allowed to reapply for advertising time ; and,
unless their presentations are found to be excludable und-
er the Commission’s guidelines, their applications should
be accepted. Since the issues on which BEM and DNC
seek to speak are current and changing, it is essential that
regulations be developed speedily and that the affected
broadcasters pass promptly upon petitioners’ applications
to buy time.

In the end, it may unsettle some of us to see an anti-
war message or a political party message in the accus-
tomed place of a soap or beer commercial. But we must
not equate what is habitual with what is right—or what
is constitutional. A society already so saturated with
commercialism can well afford another outlet for speech
on public issues. All that we may lose is some of our
apathy. That is a small price to pay. For, as the Su-
preme Court has said, “a function of free speech under
our system of government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a con-
dition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).

Reversed and remanded.

4

McGowan, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The majority do
not hold that petitioner in No. 24,492 is entitled to have
its proposed spot announcements carried by the intervenor-
licensee there involved, or that the petitioner in No.
24,587 is assured of being able to buy time for its pro-
grams on public issues. What is held is that the Consti-
tution commands that “some”, but not all, editorial ad-
vertising be accepted; and the Commission is directed to
embark upon rulemaking to determine how a licensee is
to differentiate the “some” from the all.

——y

A 42

The majority appear to believe that this assignment will
not prove difficult. I am not so sure, particularly when
I note that the only Commissioner who has perceived the
same constitutional requirement as the majority responds
to the practical problems by suggesting that sales of a
significant proportion of the total broadcast time be made
on a first-come, first-served basis, accompanied by a pos-
sible suspension of the fairness doctrine. That approach
does not seem to me a promising one in terms of the
public’s right to know.

The difficulties derive, of course, from the physical pe-
culiarity which distinguishes radio and television commu-
nication from all other forms, namely, the limited number
of frequencies and the impossibility of accommodating all
who may wish to be heard over them. This, so the Su-
preme Court has said in Red Lion, makes it “idle to posit
an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of each individual to speak, write
or publish.” The majority, in recognition of this fact, do
not purport to discern other than an “abridgeable” or
“limited” First Amendment right to initiate paid edi-
torial advertising. Petitioners themselves, it is said, may
conceivably never be able to insist that their particular
advertising be accepted. That will depend upon the rules
which the Commission propounds.

The Commission has, at the least, been set a task of
heroic proportions, and one whose very complexities may
undermine the premise upon which it is founded. The
question is whether the Constitution requires that it be
undertaken. I am not convinced that it does. It is pres
ently the obligation of a licensee to advance the public’s
right to know by devoting a substantial amount of time to
the presentation of controversial views on issues of public
importance, striking a balance which is always subject to
redress by reference to the fairness doctrine. Failure to
do so puts continuation of the license at risk—a sanction

-

of tremendous potency, and one which the Commission is
under increasing pressure to employ.

This is the system which Congress has, wisely or not,
provided as the alternative to public ownership and op-
eration of radio and television communications facilities,
This approach has never been thought to be other than
within the permissible limits of constitutional choice. Its
existence provides a mechanism for implementation of
the public’s right to know which, by and large, has been
effective. Indeed, the loudest voices in criticism of it com-
plain that it has been working too well for the comfort
of governmental policy makers in the areas of greatest
current concern.

It is hardly the path of wisdom to scrap it for a sys-
tem in which money alone determines what issues are to
be aired, and in what format, even assuming, as is likely
to be the case, that those issues, whatever they may prove
to be, compare favorably with the intellectual content of
the great bulk of commercial advertising. The responsi-
bility for informing the public is now squarely on the li-
censee. That responsibility will only be diluted and ob-
scured by requiring the licensee, against his own better
judgment, to accept paid editorial] advertising. I do not
think the First Amendment requires that result, at least
not within the context of a regulatory scheme which has
made provision for the airing of controversial issues of
public importance.

Of course it is true that licensees are currently free to
accept paid editorial advertisin , and some do, subject al-
ways to the limitations of the fairness doctrine. It may
well be that a detailed inquiry and investigation by the
Commission of this area, by formal rulemaking or other-
wise, would be both useful and consonant with the Com-
mission’s continuing obligation to see to it that the public
interest obligations of the licensees are being met in the
most effective way. The Commission’s currently an-
nounced purpose to undertake a comprehensive and wide-

A 43

~

ranging review of the operation of the fairness doctrine
might well include the subject of paid editorial advertis-
ing. But, believing as I do that the First Amendment
exerts no compulsion to the contrary, I would not order
the Commission to undertake that review in a constitu-
tional strait jacket which dictates the result in advance.

A 44

Bl
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1970

No. 24,492
BUSINESS EXECUTIVES’ MovE FoR
VIETNAM PEACE, PETITIONER
v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS

PosT- NEWSWEEK STATIONS, CAPITAL AREA, INC.,
INTERVENOR

No. 24,537
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, PETITIONER
Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS

AMERICAN BROADCASTING Co., INC., INTERVENOR,
COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., INTERVENOR

Petitions for Review of Orders of the Federal]
Communications Commission

Before: Wright, McGowan and Robinson, Circuit Judges.

B2
JUDGMENT

These cases came on to be heard on the records from
the Federal Communications Commission, and were argued
by counsel. On consideration thereof, it is

<r
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court that the
orders of the Federal Communications Commission on
review herein are hereby reversed and the cases are re
manded to the Federal Communications Commission for
further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of the
Court filed this date.

Per Curiam

For the Court:
Nathan J. Paulson
Clerk

Dated: August 3, 1971

Opinion by Circuit Judge Wright
Separate dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge McGowan

Cl

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1971
No. 24,492
BUSINESS EXECUTIVES’ MOVE FOR
VIETNAM PEACE, PETITIONER

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS

PosT-NEWSWEEK STATIONS, CAPITAL AREA, INC.,.
INTERVENOR

No. 24,537

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, PETITIONER
Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS

AMERICAN BROADCASTING Co., INC., INTERVENOR,
COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., INTERVENOR

Before: Wright, McGowan and Robinson, Circuit Judges.
| ORDER

On consideration of tlie petitions for rehearing filed by
Post-Newsweek Stations, Capital Area, Inc., American

. —ay

C2

Broadcasting Companies, Inc., the United States of Amer-
ica and Federal Communications Commission, and Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc. for rehearing, and of
the brief of amicus curiae National Broadcasting Com-
pany, Inc. in support of the petitions for rehearing, it is

ORDERED by the Court that the aforesaid petitions
for rehearing are denied.

Per Curiam

October 4, 1971

_—

D1

APPENDIX D
F.C.C. 70-861
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20554

IN RE DEMmocrRATICc NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Request for Declaratory Ruling Concerning
Access to Time on Broadcast Stations

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
(Adopted August 5, 1970; Released August 12, 1970)

BY THE COMMISSION : COMMISSIONER Cox CONCURRING
AND ISSUING A STATEMENT; COMMISSIONER JOHNSON
DISSENTING AND ISSUING A STATEMENT.

BACKGROUND—REQUEST AND PLEADINGS

1, On May 19, 1970, the Democratic National Com-
mittee (DNC) filed with the Commission a request that
the Commission issue a declaratory ruling that

. “A broadcaster may not, as a genera] policy, refuse to
sell time to responsible entities, such as DNC, for the so-
licitation of funds and for comment on public issues,” 1

tion, some of which would be devoted to the solicita-

—s

*Comments with respect thereto were filed by the American
Broadcasting Company (ABC) on June 11, 1970 and by the Co-
lumb Broadcasting System (CBS) on June 22, 1970 and a state-

ment by the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) was filed on
June 22, 1970. ;

Pa.

D2

rious controversial issues of public importance. The cam-
paign envisioned will, according to DNC, require the ex-
penditure of “thousands of dollars” and thus it seeks as-
surance that it will be able “to obtain the access to the
broadcast media which implementation of the plan de
mands.” It appears that in the latter part of March,
1970, CBS rejected a request by DNC to purchase one-
half hour of prime time for the presentation of an issue
—oriented program which would have included an appeal
for contributions to the Democratic Party. It is said that
CBS’ position at that time was that it would sell time
for political purposes only during election campaigns.
DNC also approached NBC and was told that that net-
work would make available prime time for purchase by
the Committee for a program presenting the views of
the party on important public issues and including a so
licitation of funds for the party. It is not clear that
DNC approached the ABC network in view of the latter’s
alleged general policy against solicitation of funds other .
than for charity and with network approval. By reason
of the foregoing and the alleged common policy of indi-
vidual broadcast stations to decline to sell time for spot
announcements or programs for the broadcast of views on
controversial issues of public importance or for the solici-
tation of funds, DNC states that its problem—access to
broadcast licensees for the presentation of its programs—
can be resolved only through the issuance of the blanket
declaratory ruling described in paragraph 1, supra.

3. We believe that the policy matters raised by DNC
are, to a substantial extent, appropriate for consideration
and that a full statement of our views will provide help-
ful general guidance for the public and Commission li-
censees. We, however, do not believe that all of the va
rious matters raised by DNC are susceptible to the de
claratory order sought and we cannot at this juncture
rule upon every conceivable factual situation which may
arise.

ge

4. In support of its request, DNC has set forth some
pertinent financial considerations of present-day political
campaigning and the development of a narrow rather
than a broad-based financial support of political parties.2

D3

and seek the support of potential small political contribu-
tors. It is only in this way, DNC contends, that a healthy
political system can function. DNC urges that its pro-
posed broadcast campaign should not be precluded by a

groups should be subject to a uniform national policy.
The arguments advanced by DNC are based upon con-
stitutional, statutory and public policy grounds.

5. The constitutional argument advanced by DNC is
essentially that the Supreme Court’s decision in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 ( 1969) re-
affirmed the public’s First Amendment right to hear con-
trasting views on issues of public importance and “em-
Ployed language that would extend to members of the
public the right of access to broadcast facilities,” DNC

* For example, in 1968, $90 million was expended on political use
of radio and television (equaling about 1/3 of the total expenditure
on political campaigning for the year). See Alexander and Myers,
A Financial Landslide for the GOP, Fortune. March 1970, pp. 104,
189. Another indicative statistic is the fact that in 1956, only

D4

tion against use of facilities for libelous presentations or
those in bad “taste.”

6. According to petitioner, the overriding public policy
consideration requiring the declaratory ruling is that the
public airwaves—the most powerful communications me-
dium in our society—which are used to solicit funds for
“soaps, brassieres, deodorants and mouthwashes” should
be utilized to solicit funds to enhance the exchange of
ideas. DNC contends that regardless of whether the
Commission issues the declaratory ruling requested, the
refusal of a broadcaster to sell time to DNC should be
evaluated. adversely to such broadcaster at time of re
newal. The reason for this, DNC urges, is the importance
of the broadcast media to political expression (Farmers
Ed. and Coop Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 529-30
(1959)); the public interest consideration inherent in
broadcasters making time available for political broad-
casts (Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission
En Banc Programming Inquiry, 20 RR 1901 (1960) );
the Commission’s prior holding that an arbitrary limita-
tion of coverage of an election campaign prior to the cam-
paign was contrary to the public interest (Citing Homer
R. Rainey, 3 RR 787 (1947); City of Jacksonville, 12
RR 118, 180j (1959); and Loyola University, 12 RR
1017, 1099 (1956)) and that the Commission’s ruling in
Women’s Strike for Peace (letter of November 22, 1965)
predates Red Lion and, to the extent it conflicts with that
decision, is no longer controlling. Finally, DNC _ notes
that it is seeking not a ruling which would require a
broadcaster to accept particular programs or announce
ments, but only that broadcasters may not establish arbi-
trary barriers to access by responsible groups, such as
DNC, contrary to the First Amendment and Red Lion,
supra, or that the establishment of such barriers is con

trary to the public interest.

7. Response of the Networks: In response to the DNC
request, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC)

=

D5

submitted portions of its “standards and policies” (The
complete version has been filed in BAL-5733, Exhibit I-B,
Attachment B, Section III). ABC recites its standards
relating to solicitation connected with appeals for charity
(no solicitation without specific permission of ABC) and
appeals related to religious broadcasts ( solicitation per-
mitted in prescribed manner not here relevant), but states
that its policy is not to sell time for solicitation of funds
in other situations, absent special public interest consid-
erations. It is ABC’s judgment that DNC’s request is con-
eerned with “the continued strength and viability of our
two party system” and is thus a “special public interest
consideration” justifying an exception to its normal policy
of not selling time for solicitation purposes.

8 ABC states that with respect to controversial issues
of public importance, there are “dozens” of “responsible
entities” who would wish to purchase time to present
their views “were we to open the door.” ABC contends
that it would be “reasonable to anticipate a flood of such
requests.” Thus, ABC states, it will adhere to its general
policy against the sale of time for controversial issue pro-
grams and announcements. However, ABC under its
“special public interest consideration” standard would
“... be prepared, consistent with its other obligations, to
accept such orders for time from major political parties
as can be accommodated on a reasonable basis.”

a. CBS’ lengthy response to the DNC complaint ad-
vances three major arguments: (1) that DNC has mis-
understood CBS’ policies relating to presentation of con-
troversial issues and that CBS’ policies. insure ful] and
fair presentation of Such issues; (2) that a regulatory
policy which imposes common carrier obligations on
broadcasters would be contrary to the public interest;
(3) that there is no constitutional or statutory right to
compel broadcasters to carry the DNC programs; and,
(4) that such obligation would be contrary to the Commu-
nications Act and Commission precedent,

an

D6

9. With respect to the first major argument, CBS
argues that DNC has not alleged violation of the fairness
doctrine but rather seeks to take presentations of contro-
verial issues away from the control and supervision of
the licensee. CBS states that if licensees were required
to permit the purchase of air time for the presentation
of views on controversial public issues, the nature of
broadcasting would be radically altered to the detriment
of fair, objective and balanced information available to
the listening public.* CBS has followed a policy of re-
fusing the sale of broadcast time for presentations of
controversial issues in favor of providing “significant
opportunities” for such discussions without charge to
proponents of various viewpoints through news and in-
formation broadcasts. To sell time for presentations on
public issues, argues CBS, would result in the preemption
of the limited broadcast frequencies by those with strong
financial resources which would “necessarily distort the
manner in which issues were presented” to the public.
CBS asserts that under its present policies, it provides a
“high proportion of direct presentations of views” by “the
actors in the events of the day” and thus, aside from
fully informing the public of differing viewpoints on con-
troversial issues, also provides an opportunity for those
holding differing viewpoints to present their own views.
These direct presentations, CBS notes, are part of its
overall effort to inform the public fully and fairly and

* CBS asserts that it has served the public by presenting issues
and viewpoints within a balanced program schedule utilizing news-
worthiness as the sole criterion. CBS emphasizes the growth of
public affairs and news presentations during the 1968-69 v. 1956-57
—e.g., total hours of news and public affairs broadcasting—1,354
v. 675; prime presentations—192 v. 34; regularly scheduled hard
news 6:00 p.m.—11:00 p.m., 838 v. 180; and total hours of news
documentaries 100 v. 37. In addition, CBS also presents a compre-
hensive exhibit to demonstrate the coverage given one of the major
issues of the day by CBS and WCBS-TV—the Indochina War and
domestic reaction to it. This Indochina exhibit includes a minute
and second analysis of CBS’ total coverage of this issue and runs
over 100 pages.

D7

are not permitted to become an instrument of “partisan
advocacy.” The First Amendment, CBS argues, is pri-
marily concerned with the right of the public to be in-
formed—as opposd to the right of the public to speak or
to be heard.

10. CBS’ policy against sale of time for the presenta-
tion of views on controversial issues does not apply to
broadcasts on behalf of political candidates or ballot prop-
ositions. This exclusion is based upon CBS’ belief that the
intent of Section 315 is to facilitate the discussion of
political issues’ by legally qualified candidates; such poli-
tical broadcasts may include a direct appeal for funds so
long as CBS is not involved in the collection or handling
of such funds. CBS also states its intention to permit the
purchase of a special category of spot announcement (up
to one minute in length) for the purpose of political fund
raising which need not be on behalf of political candi-
dates or ballot propositions,

11. With respect to the common carrier argument,
CBS states that such a policy would be contrary to the
public interest because partisan presentations would di-
minish the time available for other news, sports and en-
tertainment programs and would result in an “auction”
to the highest bidder to determine what issues will be

i and how such discussion wil] be conducted.
Moreover, CBS queries, would the broadcaster then be
responsible for restoring the balance? How would a net-
work choose among competing bidders if not enough time
Were available for all? What standard is to be used to
determine “responsible entities?” CBS argues that DNC’s
Proposal would divest the licensee of responsibility for
controversial issue programming and would ultimately
require the Commission to make judgments as to the spe-
cific programs which are presented or rejected.

12. The legal arguments which CBS advances—i.e.,
that DNC’s request is without constitutional or statutory

ae

D8

basis, that Commission compulsion to carry DNC’s pro-
grams is barred by the Communications Act, and that the
action which DNC requests of the Commission is con-
trary to the Commission’s own policy and precedent—
are based primarily upon the assertion that no particular
person or group has the right to speak over broadcast fa-
cilities and that to assert such a right would ultimately
require the Commission to assume the role of a censor or
arbitor of specific programs, contrary to its long-estab-
lished policy of avoiding such governmental involvement.
CBS asserts that the McIntire case* stands for the propo-
sition that “broadcasters, though licensed by the Commis-
sion and subject to its valid regulations, are not publicly
owned facilities, and there is no First Amendment right
to purchase time on radio or television stations.” CBS
further asserts that nothing in Red Lion® indicates that
McIntire is no longer good law or that, apart from Sec-
tion 315, there is any legal obligation for broadcast licen-
sees to sell time. Rather, CBS says, Red Lion merely sus-
tained long-standing Commission policies which are wholly
inconsistent with DNC’s request.

18. To accede to DNC’s request, CBS argues, would
violate Sections 3(h) and 326 of the Communications
Act, which taken together establish that the licensee—not
the Commission—is to exercise the power of program se
lection. The right of personal reply to material pre
viously selected for broadcast is limited to equal opportu-
nity for political candidates, replies to personal attacks
and replies to station political endorsements. CBS con-
tends that the legislative history of the Communications
Act supports its assertion that the statutory scheme en-
visions a system in which the broadcaster is left with the
initiative of assuring that programs presented are in the
public interest.

*MclIntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (8rd
Cir. 1945) cert. den. 327 U.S. 779 (1946).

’ Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. vy. F.C.C., 895 U.S. 867 (1969).

=

D9

14. Finally, CBS asserts, DNC’s request is “funda-
mentally inconsistent” with the concept of licensee re-
sponsibilities and specifically, contrary to the Commis-
sion’s prior holdings that “the Commission has no power
to require a broadcaster to carry or refrain from carry-
ing any particular program, or to prescribe the content
of any program presented over the air.” Letter to
Women’s Strike for Peace, November 22, 1965.° Nothing
in the Red Lion decision, supra, states CBS, indicates that
the Court contemplated the abandonment of “traditional
FCC fairness policies” and the adoption by the FCC of a
common carrier theory as set forth in the DNC request.

15. NBC has no policy which would prevent the pur-
chase of program time envisioned by DNC or the solici-
tation of funds for the party during such a program.
DNC states that it is not clear whether NBC would per-
mit short spot announcements designed for the solicita-
tion of funds for a party, but this simply points up the
desirability of a concrete factual situation—namely, of
DNC making a specific request, instead of the general,
more vague approach which it has taken here.

DISCUSSION

Part I. The right of responsible entities to purchase time
for comment on public issues

16. The DNC petition raises two separate questions:
(i) the asserted right of political parties to purchase
broadcast time to solicit funds, and (ii) the asserted right
of responsible entities to purchase time for comment on
public issues. In this Part I, we deal with the second
question.

*To support this proposition, CBS also cites McIntire v. Wm.
Penn Broadcasting Co., supra; 1949 Editorilizing Report, 138 FCC
1246; 1960 Report and Statement of Policy in the En Bane Pro-
gramming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (August 8, 1960) ; and letter
to Judy Collins, March 24, 1970.

D10

17. That question goes to the heart of the system of
broadcasting which has developed in this country—i..,
the licensing of private entities under the public interest
standard. While the issues raised by the DNC petition
are fundamental, they are not open. They have long been
settled adversely to the DNC position, by the statute, by
the Commission, and by the Courts. We shall discuss the
present system and its statutory support, the relevant
precedents, and the policy considerations.

18. The system which Congress has evolved has been
described in full in the landmark decisions in this field—
NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943), and Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. Inc. v. F.C.C., 895 U.S. 8367 (1969). We shall
not repeat that discussion here. It is sufficient to note
that it is based upon the unique nature of radio—that
“unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not
available to all. Because it cannot be used by all, some
who wish to use it must be denied.” (NBC v. U.S., supra,
at 226.) To resolve the chaotic situation which had re-
sulted, Congress decreed a system of licensing private
entities for short terms, upon the condition that their
operations serve the public interest. It is thus incumbent
upon these public trustees to fashion schedules which do
meet the needs and interests of the public. To do 80, the
broadcaster mustsallocate programming among the sev-
eral categories -» entertainment, instruction, news,
public affairs) and, within those categories, must choose
among the many competing requests for air time. See
Report on Editorializing, 18 FCC 1246, 1247-48 (1949).
However, there is one special obligation which the Com-
mission has stressed—that broadcasters must “. . . de
vote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to

* The Court recently reaffirmed this vital distinction in Red Lion
(supra, at 388): “Where there are substantially more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is
idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or
publish.”

D11

the presentation of news and programs devoted to the
consideration and discussion of public issues of interest
in the community served by the particular station” (id.
at p. 1249). Indeed, the Commission has stressed that it
has allocated so much spectrum space to broadcasting,
basically because of the great contribution which broad-
casting can make to an informed public opinion on the
vital public issues of the day. Ibid., Storer Broadcasting
Co., 11 FCC 2d 678. It follows that the Commission can
and must require the achievement of that allocation pur-
pose by its broadcast licensees, See Section 303(b); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. F.C.C., supra at p. 394. In
short, as stated by the Court in Red Lion, supra, at p.
394, the licensee is “, . . given the privilege of using
searce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire commu-
nity, obligated to give suitable time and attention to mat-
ters of great public concern.”

19. The Commission has consistently made clear that
with some exceptions not here pertinent, the licensee has
discretion in discharging that obligation. Thus, in its
basic Editorializing Report, the Commission stated:

exercise his best judgment and good sense \in deter-
mining what subjects should be considered, the par-
ticular format of the programs to be devoted to each
subject, the different shades of opinion to be pre-

sidering, whether the viewpoint of the requesting
party has already received a sufficient amount of
broadcast time, or whether there may not be other

Gs

D 12

available groups or individuals who might be more
appropriate spokesmen for the particular point of
view than the person making the request... .

This same policy is set out in the Commission’s 1964
Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10416; cf. also
1960 Programming Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960).
In line with these general pyecepts, we have consistently
held, in case after case, that with certain exceptions not
here involved, no individual has a right to express his
particular views by means of a broadcast facility.*

20. While the licensee thus has considerable discretion
in discharging “the twofold duty” stated in Red Lion,
supra, at 377—to devote a reasonable amount of time to
public issues and to do so fairly—that discretion must be
exercised consistent with the public interest standard,
The most basic consideration in this respect is that the
licensee cannot rule off the air coverage of important is-
sues or views because of his private ends or beliefs. As
a public trustee, he must present representative commu-
nity views and voices on controversial issues which are of
importance to his listeners (Red Lion, supra, at 389, 390,
394). This means also that some of the voices must be
partisan. A licensee policy of excluding partisan voices
and always itself presenting views in a bland, inoffensive

- Manner would run counter to the “profound national
commitment that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Lines Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. F.C.C., 895 U.S. 367, 392 (n.
18) (1969); Storer Broadcasting Co., 11 FCC 2d 678
(1968) ; Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 9 FCC
2d 190, 191 (1966), affirmed Anti-Defamation League v.

® Dowie A. Crittenden, 18 FCC 2d 499 (1969); Mrs. Margaret
Z. Scherbina, 21 FCC 2d 141 (1969); Democratic State Central
Committee of California, 19 FCC 2d 888 (1968) ; Boalt Hall Student
Association, 20 FCC 2d 612 (1969); Mrs. Madalyn Murray, 40
FCC 647 (1965).

—,

F. C. C., 403 F. 2d 169. 170 (1968) (C.A.D.C.), cert.
den. 394 U.S 980 (1969). In sum, as stressed in the
Editorializing Report, supra, at p. 1249:

It is this right of the public to be informed, rather
than any right on the part of the government, any
broadcast licensee or any individual member of the
public to broadcast his own particular views on any
matter, which is the foundation stone of the Ameri-
can system of broadcasting.

See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. F.C.C., supra, at
eee

It is the right of the public to receive suitable ac-
cess to social, political, @sthetic, moral and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here. :

21. With this as background, we turn to the DNC pe-
tition, That petition seeks to overrule the above policy
and to require licensees to sell time to any responsible
entity to comment on a public issue. Using the CBS re-
sponse as an example, we note that it would require a
holding that CBS’ policy in this area is inconsistent with
the public interest, because although it recognizes its ob-
ligation to devote a reasonable amount of time to contro-
versial issues of public importance (and has submitted a
showing of its increasing efforts in this respect, includ-
ing during prime time hours), and to do so fairly by pro-
viding “. . . significant opportunities for such [broadcast]
discussion without charge to partisans of various view-
points in [its] news and information broadcasts” (p. 3,
CBS Response), CBS will not sell time for the expression
of viewpoints on public issues (with the exception of
political broadcasts). It is important to bear in mind
that DNC has not alleged that CBS or any other licensee
has failed to discharge the above-noted obligations of the
fairness doctrine. Thus, what is involved in the DNC
request is a question whether there is a right of access
to broadcast facilities by “responsible entities" over and

\

if

D13

——ay

available groups or individuals who might be more
appropriate spokesmen for the particular point of
view than the person making the request... .

D 12

This same policy is set out in the Commission’s 1964
Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10416; cf. also
1960 Programming Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960).
In line with these general precepts, we have consistently
held, in case after case, that with certain exceptions not
here involved, no individual has a right to express his
particular views by means of a broadcast facility.’

20. While the licensee thus has considerable discretion
in discharging “the twofold duty” stated in Red Lion,
supra, at 877—to devote a reasonable amount of time to
public issues and to do so fairly—that discretion must be
exercised consistent with the public interest standard,
The most basic consideration in this respect is that the
licensee cannot rule off the air coverage of important is-
sues or views because of his private ends or beliefs. As
a public trustee, he must present representative commu-
nity views and voices on controversial issues which are of
importance to his listeners (Red Lion, supra, at 389, 390,
394). This means also that some of the voices must be
partisan. A licensee policy of excluding partisan voices
and always itself presenting views in a bland, inoffensive
manner would run counter to the “profound national
commitment that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Lines Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. F.C.C., 895 U.S. 367, 392 (n.
18) (1969); Storer Broadcasting Co., 11 FCC 2d 678
(1968) ; Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 9 FCC
2d 190, 191 (1966), affirmed Anti-Defamation League v.

8 Dowie A. Crittenden, 18 FCC 2d 499 (1969); Mrs. Margaret
Z. Scherbina, 21 FCC 2d 141 (1969); Democratic State Central
Committee of California, 19 FCC 2d 838 (1968) ; Boalt Hall Student
Association, 20 FCC 2d°612 (1969); Mrs. Madalyn Murray, 40
FCC 647 (1965).

aa

F.C. C., 4038 F. 2d 169, 170 (1968) (C.A.D.C.), cert.
den. 394 U.S 930 (1969). In sum, as stressed in the
Editorializing Report, supra, at p. 1249:

It is this right of the public to be informed, rather
than any right on the part of the government, any
broadcast licensee or any individual member of the
public to broadcast his own particular views on any
matter, which is the foundation stone of the Ameri-
can system of broadcasting.

See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. F.C.C., supra, at
p. 390:

It is the right of the public to receive suitable ac-
cess to social, political, esthetic, moral and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here.

21. With this as background, we turn to the DNC pe-
tition. That petition seeks to overrule the above policy
and to require licensees to sell.time to any responsible
entity to comment on a public issue. Using the CBS re-
sponse as an example, we note that it would require a
holding that CBS’ policy in this area is inconsistent with
the public interest, because although it recognizes its ob-
ligation to devote a reasonable amount of time to contro-
versial issues of public importance (and has submitted a
showing of its increasing efforts in this respect, includ-
ing during prime time hours), and to do so fairly by pro-
viding “. . . significant opportunities for such [broadcast]
discussion without charge to partisans of various view-
points in [its] news and information broadcasts” (p. 3,
CBS Response), CBS will not sell time for the expression
of viewpoints on public issues (with the exception of
political broadcasts). It is important to.bear in mind
that DNC has not alleged that CBS or any other licensee
has failed to discharge the above-noted obligations of the
fairness doctrine. Thus, what is involved in the DNC
request is a question whether there is a right of access
to broadcast facilities by “responsible entities” over and

a meee VOI ROTI SILI PND le eG ae ee he Tee CPL? Byes

D13

a

D14

beyond the fairness doctrine right of the public to be
informed.

22. The DNC position—that the licensee, upon request,
must sell time to any responsible entity for comment on
public issues—runs counter to the statutory language
and the legislative history. That history shows ‘that Con-
gress specifically debated and rejected the idea of the
licensee being required to act as a common carrier with
respect to transmission of comment on public issues. See
Sen. Rep. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess, p. 4; 67 Cong.
Rec. 5560-5561, 12501-12504. The Act reflects this. Sec.
tion 3(h) states that a broadcaster shall not be deemed
a common carrier. Section 315(a) sets out the pertinent
statutory standard—that the licensee must operate in the
public interest and must afford reasonable opportunity
for the discussion of conflicting viewpoints on controver-
sial issues of public importance. This language cannot be
squared with the DNC position; had Congress adopted
such a position, the statutory prescription would have been
entirely different (eg., .. . “including the sale upon re-
quest of time to responsible entities for presentation of a
viewpoint on controversial issues of public importance”).
The legislative history makes clear that the language of
Section 315(a) is a “restatement of the basic policy of
the ‘standard of fairness’ which is imposed on broadcast-
ers under the Communications Act of 1934” (H. Rep. No.
1069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5 (1958)—that is, as the
legislative history shows, the principles set forth in the
basic Editorializing Report. That this is the statutory
scheme is further shown by the consideration of the
second sentence of Section 315(a)—that “no obligation is
hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its
station by any such candidate.” The purpose of this pro-
vision is to make clear that the broadcaster is not a
common carrier as to political broadcasts—that he may
exercise discretion as to the time to be afforded broad-
casts by candidates. See Memorandum of F.C.C., Hear-

D15

ings before the House Subcommittee of the Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. on
H. J. Res. 247, pp. 84-90 (1968) (to the effect that while
the licensee has discretion, he cannot adopt a policy of
not devoting a reasonable amount of time to political
broadcasts). It would make no sense to hold that.the li-
censee has discretion whether or not to sell time for the
most important controversial issue programming of all—
the political broadcast by the candidate (see discussion
within as to the preferred position of such programming),
but has no such discretion as to other controversial issue
programs (e.g., by a candidate’s supporters; by partisans
of a particular viewpoint on some public issue).

23. The administrative and judicial precedents reflect
the statutory scheme. The Commission’s pronouncements
are long establishe

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0152%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
