# Appellants Brief — Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0140%3A09 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appellants Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1973 - **Citation:** 411 U.S. 624 ## Text . Violation of Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amend- . Griggs v. Allegheny County a Posture of the Federal Aviation Administra- National Uniformity The Burbank Ordinance Is Not Preempted .. The Conflict Issue Runway Preference Order : Interference With Federally Certificated . Rights Interference With Use of the Navigable Air- ‘Need for Single Authority Violation of Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amend- ment Rights . Griggs v. Allegheny County ... The Solution | Relief at the Federal Level Interim Measures _ Injunctive Relief Through the Courts Reversal of Griggs v. pee: County -. ioe Scarce Foes Senate Report No. 1353, 90th: Congress, Second Session ------APP Pp. _ Excerpt From 34 Federal Register 18355-18356 Nov. 18, 1969 ._.... Inthe Mater of th ein of Foran A Drei 4 iii. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED 2 rt i Cases Page Aaron y. City of Los Angeles, 11 Avi. 17, 642 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1970) . 78 Air Transport Association of America, et al. v. City “of Inglewood, et al. (No. 71-1153-CC) __. 31 Allegheny Airlines Inc. v. Cedarhurst, 238 F. 2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956) ide 33 American Airlines Inc. v. Audubon Park, 297 F. * Supp. 207 (W.D.Ky. 1968), affd per curiam, 407 F. 2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, "396 US. 845 (1969) 33 American Airlines, Inc. v. Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), affd 398 F.2d ¢ 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 _ (1969) 33 Batten v. United States, 306 F. 2d 580 (1962) _ ett. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963), rehear. den., - 372 US. 925 (1963) 78 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) 68 Bibb y. Navajo Freight Lines Inc, 359 US. 520 ~ (1959) - 58 Boyd v. City of Sierra Madre, 41 Cal. App. 520, 183 Pac. 230 (1919) 37 Airways v. Nebraska State Board, 347 S. 590 (1945) 33, 34 Recta 62 hood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago ck Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 382 US. (1966) 81 dod of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville - inal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969) 83 iv. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S, 553 (1957) 81 California v. Zook, 336 U.S, 725 (1949) 37 Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 75 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) 75 City of Detroit v. Murray Corporation of America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958) 2 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Continental Adar Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963) ......44, 46, 82 Dreifus, In re) FAA Regulatory Docket No. 9071 (7/10/69) 6, 28, 41, 45, 52, 53, 55 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) Buclid v, Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 356 (1926)... 57 Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, Nov. 6, 1972, Sacramento 7924 .. 75 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) Gibbons v, Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) 71 U.S. 424 (1963) _ wessoeesnnseoneeensess . 35, 36, 46, 63, 82 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 US. . 330 (1960) -... 34, 47, 62,°81, 82 - Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street R. Co. | 273 US. 45 (1927) . . ¥. 3 3h +o. ae 4 > BSA we Page ‘Local 24 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. © Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) 81 Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., ~ 61 Cal.2d 582, 39 Cal.Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (1964) 28, 35, 36, 50, 56, 77 Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P. 2d 40 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 » (1965) 78 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 272 US. 605 (1926) 82 Nestle’v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 101 Cal, Rptr. 568, 496 P. 2d 480 (1972) .......... 67, 68 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) .... 75 Northern States Power Company v. State of Minne- £ sota, 447 F. 2d 1143 (1971) 84 ‘Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) .... 69 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) ............ 50, 58 Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Airlines, 259 F. Supp. 142 (1966) 14 Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947) ..48, 49 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) 36, 48, 64 peas ‘Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. “337 (1969) 68 ‘South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell ‘)Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) 65 i ig aan Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 58 Stag y. Municipal Court of Santa Monica Judicial +) District, 2 Cal.App.3d 318, 82 Cal.Rptr. 578 (9969) 32, 41 vi aa Page Terminal Reilsoad Ass’n‘of St. Louis v.:Brotherhood — of Railroad Trainmen, 318 US. 1°(1943) ...81, 82 Thain-¥. City’ of Palo‘ Alto, 207.:Cal. pp. 20.278, i 24 Cal. Rowe 15 (1962) | 57 -y. Port of rented 233 Ore. 178, 376 Pi 2d 100, (1962) -. 78 Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 244 Ore. 69, 415 P. '2d-750 (1966) = 78 Toviiship ‘of Hiinover v: Town of Morristown, 108 ‘NE tal #64, 261 Atl. Rptr. 2d:'692 (1969) oiiui.32, 60, 77, 78 Udall ¥y, Federal Power Commission, 387 U: = 428 . (1967). 75 Liatandut@be:- Pigs: ine, Co. v. Ideal Cement ‘Co, 52369. U.S. 134 (1962) 2 United States (Federal Aviation Administration) v. «City of Inglewood, et al. (No. 71-1632-CC) .. Virginians for,.Dulles v. Volpe, ats F, Supp. — (1972) set pani 32,55 Watson Vi Employers. Liability Assurance Corp., : 348 US, 66. (1954) 2 cs 3 __ Miscellaneous Aviation Week ion Technology, Nov. 6; 1972, op. 19. : 32, 71 Aviation tek: &Gyche: Technology, Nov. 6, 1972, Op. 27. Califofnia’ Department of Public Health, A Repost “* to, the. 1971 Legislature on the Subject of Noise — _ Pursuas sto, Assembly » Copourrent Rendiation z Edy 19TO: CAOTAY -1-s---1,2--18- iB Cleat Air. ‘Amendments of. 1970,. PL No. Of608 _ (December 31, 1970) ( { Vii. Page 118 Congressional Record (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1972) No. 29; p. H 1509 22 118 Congressional Record (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1972) No. 29, pp. H 1510, H 1518, H 1534, 23 118 Congressional Record (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1972) No. 29, pp. H 1512,-H 1515-16, H 1519, ‘H 1520 26 118 Congressional Record (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1972) No. 29, pp. H 1523, H 1530, H1531 .... 27 118 Congressional Record (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1972) No. 29, p. ‘H 1534 55 118 Congressional Record (daily ed. February 29, 1972) No. 29, p. H 1538 30 118 Congressional Record (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) ~ No. 169, pp. S 18638-S 18643 86 Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority a _ Of Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (3972)... BE 61, es House of Representatives Bill No. 11021, 92nd , Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 86 ST he Stine of tc Sucecems Satan Court of Massachusetts, 271 NE 2d 354 (1971) ie pe 31 ‘Panel on Noise Abatement, Dept. of 4 The Noise Around Us (1970), p. 2 .............. 23 “Benate Bill No, 3342, March 14, 1972 .....__ 22 ie Bill 3755, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. .............. 80 i Report No. 1353, 90th Cong, 2d Sess. 8), pp. 6-7 6, 28, 40 bas ae Report} No. WOR” 703 (RY), 9A ssn... Pablication Burbank Daily Review (Ota a2, 1972). .. 78 ¥ Birbank Muni Code,- Sec. 20-32.1 ae California’ Public Resources Code, Sec. 21000 _... 75 California Public Resources Code, Sec. 21151 ... 76 Califotnia Public Utilities Code, Sec. ara ) City. of Burbank Ordinance No. 2216 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Part.36 .. Come Fogees Regulations, Title 14, Sec. 36.5 .. F SSE 28, 29, 40 Code ‘of Federal Regulations, Title 14, ‘Sec. “91. = 87; Part 91 . Céde of FFéderal Regulations, Tite 14, See.'91.87 “(dy Godenel Radstht Reghlatins; ‘Pise'14, ‘Sec. 91.87 © (3 cannes Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Sec. 101(24) . Federal “Aviation ‘Act ‘of 1958, Sec. 104 30 596, Cn Federal--Aviation “Act-of 1958; Sec.°202(b)(2) .. Federal: Aviation Act of 1958, Sec. 401. -... Federal Aviation ‘Act of 1958, Sec."401 (i) \.14, 54 eiga ausn ted ie Sec. 611 215,20 -éated—ine>-—bifat 22n..40; 48,51 ation. ‘Act of 1958, Sec. G42 iscsi : i viatic "At 858, Ss 1106 _ Federal, Aviation Act,of 1958, ‘Sec. 139A{6).. a e-3 Se Se se ix: Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Sec. 1374(b) _. 44 Noise: Control. Act of 1972, Sec. 17(c)(2) i... 86 Noise Control Act of 1972, Sec. 18(c)(2) 86 199 Statutes at Large, Ch. 313, 486. 37 “48 Statutes-at Large, p. 1064 ..... siseccincss 3S 49 Statutes at Latge, Ch. 945, p. 1491 BES 48 ‘States Code, Title 20, Sec 1531 56 United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1254(2) .......... 2 States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1331... 7 United. States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1337 ........ 7 United States Code, Title 42, Sec. 1857 ............56, 85 United States Code, Title 42/ Sec. 1857f-6a(b) .... 85 ilited States Code, Title 42, Sec. 1857611. 80 United States Code, Title 42, Sec. 4321 56, 74 United States Code, Title 42, Secs 4371-4374 ___ * United States Code, Title 42, Sec. 4371(b)(2) ... ‘Waited States Code, Title 42, Secs. 4372-4374 6 tanker Steen nat 35 | Code, Title 49, Sec. 1102 ievteoeee 67 oe Title 49, Sec. 1301 .....16, 34 States Code, 38, 43, 71 States Code, Title 49, Sec. 1304 veinnses56, 71 ec ‘ound Code, Title 49, Sec. 1350... 14 fd States Code, Title 49, Sec..1371 53 Code, Title 49, Sec. 1371(i) . .14, 54 & Code, Title 49, Sec. 1431 15, 22, 40 48; 51 United States Code, Title 49, Sec. 1432 Untiited States Code, Title 49, Sec. 1506 -........... United States Code, Title 49, Sec. 1701 et a eee Duids United States Constitotion, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 11-14 7, United States Constitution, Art. VI, Cl. 2 . 8 3 5, 4, 8 United ‘States Constitution, Fourth Amendment .... 69 United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment 19, 66, 67, 69, 70 United States Constitution, Ninth Amendment . 4 ie Si. IBS 26;:21, 66, 70, 87 United States Constitution, Tenth Amendment 19, 20, 21, 66,: 70, 87 United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment. 7, 8, 68 st Textbooks ) Beckman, The Right. to a Decent Environment “Under the Ninth Amendment, 46 Los Angeles » - Bar Bulletin 415 (Sept. 1971) 70 Berger, | Nobody ‘Loves an ‘Airport, 43 So.Cal_L.R. ~ 631° (1970); p. 724 27 Berger, Nobody Loves An Airport, 43 So.CalL.R. %:1631. (1970), pp. 771-774 29 Berges, Nobody Loves An Aipor, 43 SoCal LC | is 6 es ceede eaieun “= 1ePinees Ace Fiving: 4 Urban. Lawyer: 1/ (1972) .. *, im Page Branch and Beland, Outdoor Noise and the Metro- politan Environment—Case Study of Los An- geles with Special Reference to Aircraft, 1970 (Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 72- 126027 ; 73 Branch and Beland, Outdoor Noise and the Metro- politan Environment—Case Study of Los Angeles _ with Special Reference to Aircraft, 1970 (Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 72-126027 ), p. 21 waz BD Fadem & Berger, A Noisy Airport Is a Damned Nuisance! 3 Southwestern Univ.L.R. 39 (1970) 27 34 Federal Register, Nov. 18, 1969, pp. 18355- 18356 6, 15, 40 35 Federal Register 16,980 (Nov. 4, 1970) .... 30 Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An Introduction to the Problem and an Outline for Future Legal 2 Research, 70 Colum. L.Rev. 652 — Kanner, Some of My Best Friends Use Airports, 12 California Trial Lawyers Journal, Spring, 1972, No. 2, pp. 61-87 >. ‘Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problem: Federal Power _ But Local Liability, 3 Urban Lawyer 175 (1971) 27 rs Le 72 #sser, The Airport Noise Problem: Federal Power * Sut Local Liability, 3 Urban Lawyer 175 at p. 204 (1971) 29 h, Are There Certain Rights . . . Retained the People? 37 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 786 (1962) .... 70 An Environmental Lawyer Urges: Plead he Ninth Amendment, Natural History, 26 ig.-Sept. 1970) 70 ‘Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1972 No, 71-1637 ANDREWS, Chief of Police of the City of Burbank, LOCKHEED AIR TERMINAL, INC, a corporatica, PACIFIC SOUTHWEST AIR LINES, a corporation, and AIR TRANS. PORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, hee A ps On Appeal From the United States Court of Appeals ? for the Ninth Circuit. BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS. ——— Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals ‘Ninth Circuit is reported in 457 F. 2d 667 included in the Appendix (A. 410). The opinion United States District Court for the Central Dis- California is reported in 318 F. Supp. 914 lt included in the Appendix (A. 341). se, a JURISDICTION. The *judgment..of the’ United States Court of Ap peals was entered on March 22, 1972 (A. 5, 428). Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed with the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 15, 1972 (A. 5). The Jurisdic tional Statement was filed with the Clerk of this Court on: June 17,1972. This Court noted probable juris diction’ on October 10, 1972. Since this is an appeal froma judgment of the United States Court of Ap peals which held invalid an ordinance of the City of Burbank, as repugnant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States (Art. VI, Clause 2), the jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. §1254(2). The following “decisions sustain the juris diction of this Court to review the judgment in this case on appeal: United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 135 (1962); City of De troit vy. Murray Corporation of. America, 355 U.S. 489, 492 (1958); Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70.(1954); Dutton v. Evans, 40 9 74,77 C1990). ORDINANCE INVOLVED: — The ordinance involved in this case is Ordinance No. 2216 of the City-of:Burbank passed and adopted on March 31, 1970, which added Section 20-3211 to the. Burbank Municipal Code providing as follow he 378):. ba a “Sec, 20-32.1. Aircraft Take-Otfs. : ma) "Put ets Prohibited from Taking Off © Between 11:00 P.M. mt 0 AM ee ® «o°Sit shall be unlawful for any person at the con- trols of a pure jet aircraft to take off from the ‘Hollywood-Burbank Airport .between 11:00 P.M. ui Lea 00 AM, Se mest day 1 *(b) "Airport Operator Prohibited from Allow- ing Take-Offs. voi At, Shall _be unlawful for the operator of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport to allow a pure jet j=, Siteraft to take off from said airport . between ee _ 11:00 P.M. of one day and 7:00 A.M. the next pe, i ie Play Saceptiiar: Eesarpincies. “This Section shall not apply to flights of. an _ emergency nature if the City’s Police Department 4 is contacted and the approval of the Watch Com- re mander on duty is obtained before take-off.” CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED. - The. provisions of the Constitution of. the United he aaa teaaRt " (1) The Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, Clause 2) which provides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United Fe alte made in Pursuance there- ot; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority. of the United States, Sched be, fo. gupeeme, Lay of, the Land: and the ce Fades. in very State. shall be bound thereby, ‘i ll ac a ila aia sal tien (2): The Commerce Clause» wees I, Section 8 Clause 3),-which provides: (“Phe Congress shall have power . . .”] “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, “'/ and: athong ‘the several States, ‘and' with the Indian Tribes;” 3) That portion of the Fifth Acieiidcoent: Wilh (a le iif ary potson] Wo dope ot liberty, or property, without due process of lav; nor shall private property be taken for public ws without just compensation.” : * (4) The Ninth Amendment which provides: ie “The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dit parage others retained by the people.” (5) ‘The Tenth Amendment which provides: xa “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, of to the people.” The questions presto review are as follows (A. 55,342): (1) Whether the ‘Federal government has so pt empted thé fields of regulation of the use of aif spac doormat ele ert ‘ili (2) Whether the ordinance is in conflict with Fed- eral statutes or Federal regulations and is rendered void and unenforceable by the Supremacy Clause (Ar “(3) Whether enforcement of the ordinance would result in an intolerable and unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8,'Clause 3). (4) Whether the ordinance constitutes an attempted fegulation of a phase of the national commerce which, becausé of the need of national uniformity, demands that regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single au- thority. “In the terms and circumstances of the case the question presented for review is whether the City of Burbank is powerless to restrict departures of pure jet “titeraft ‘from’ Hollywood-Burbank Airport, a privately owned and operated airport within its boundaries, be- fween the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. under the © €@) To accommod late jet ‘aircraft the private ai Hoprietor’ (Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.) has extended fhe “2irpo runways to the maximum limits of its at low a'titudes over. adjacent residences, with resulfant Gist vance of the occupants of such residences, par- Sasi minations in the hands of individual airport proprie tors.’ etiye ite ‘ (c) Airport proprietors, without violating any Fed. eral statute or regulation, may exclude any airctaft om Sie , Kas 393°U.S. ; Airlines, ; woe F. 2d 812 American Airlines Inc. bon Park, 1968), affd per 107. F 2d. 1 a a scl aie a ichlieeaee “— “These Federal ‘Acts regulating air commerce are bottomed on the commerce power of Con gress, not on national ownership of the navigable gt wigodm pews sma ptm dl _e & & * “The commerce power, since Gibbons v. Og den (US) 9 Wheat. 1, 193, 6 L ed 23, 69, has comprehended navigation of streams. Its breadth covers all commercial intercourse. But the fedenl commerce power over navigable streams does not prevent state action consistent with that power. Gilman v. Philadelphia (US) 3 Wall. 713, 729, 18.L, ed 96, 100. Since, over streams, Congres acts by virtue of the commerce power, the sr ereignty of the state is not impaired.” - Likewise forgotten is the fact that this Court has been less willing to find preemption where the state action or regulation is designed to protect the health or welfare of those who reside or work in a particular State or community. This was amply demonstrated in the decision of this Court in Huron Portland Cement Co..v. Detroit, 362 U.S, 440 (1960). | With these preliminary observations, we will proceed with an examination of the preemption issue. No Express Preemption. There is nothing inthe Federal Aviation ~Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. §1301, et seq.) which would suggest that Congress intended to preempt the regulation airport proprietors. In fact the Act/itself rose ar WN the-contrary.=Section 1106 of that Act (49 US.C. §1506) provides as follows: ¢22: “Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at ss Uisileas Wik ft by tntehc. nt Che perelaicns ot , this. chapter are in addition to such remedies.” ii ‘Head vy. Board of Examiners, 374 US. 424 (1963), Mr. Justice Brensian, in commenting on an identical provision contained in the Communications Act.of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§151 et seq., stated (separate concurring opinion 374 US. pages 443-444): . ; “Rather than mandate ouster of. state regula- __,, tions, several provisions of the Communications Act suggest a congressional design to leave stand- “ing various forms of state regulation, including “© the fom embod in the New Meco state First, the: Act contains a ‘saving clause,’ 47 U.S.C. A414, providing that ‘Nothing in this chapter con. tained shall in any way abridge or alter the rem- _., dies now existing at common law or by statute, ., but the provisions of this chapter are in addition Es Sh tare Of course, such a general pro- ae eo am eta pace po Transp, Co. y. Southern R. Co., 372 US 658, 671, ¢ 22, 10 L ed 2d 52, 60, 83 S Ct. 984, but inclusion. in the statute plainly is inconsistent t congressional displacement of the state stat- emer rest tt memo, smote 1 Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, tes yea 2d 582, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P. 2d a 548 (1964), the California Supreme Court took a sim ilar view of the effect of the “saving clause” (49 U.S.C. 81506) in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (394 P, 2d 548 at page 555): “Here we have an expression of the intent of Congress. The Federal Aviation Act expressly de- clares that ‘Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now isting at common law or by statute, but the pro visions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies” (49 U.S.C. §1506.) Thus, it is. clear ’ that ‘the federal legislation was not intended to be exclusive.” ; , ~ ‘The validity of a claim of Federal preemption car not be judged by reference to broad statements. about the “comprehensive” nature of Federal regulations ut der a particular Act or the “exclusive jurisdiction” of Congress. Thus in Head v. Board of Examiners, supra, it is stated (374 U.S. at pages 429-430): “In dealing with the contention that New Met co’s jurisdiction to regulate radio advertising has. been preempted by the Federal Communications Act, we may begin by noting that the validity of ~ this claim cannot be judged by reference to broad ‘statements about the ‘comprehensive’ nature of federal regulation under the Federal Commumict tions Act. ‘[T]he “question whether Congress and its commissions acting under it have so far exc cised the exclusive jurisdiction that belongs tot as to. exclude the State, must be answered by! —37— _«/ iconcerning the “exclusive jurisdiction” of Congress «+ dbeg the only controversial question: whether Con- ewo.gress intended to make its jurisdiction exclusive.’ California v. Zook, 336 US 725, 731, 93 L ed «>» 1005, 1010, 69 S Ct 841. Kelly v. Washington, , 302 US 1, 10-13, 82 L ed 3, 10, 12, 58 $ Ct Was 28” Earlier, in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), gressional intent. There with respect to the “coincidence ions, the Court stated (336 U.S. at pages 729 and 732- 733): 7 ~~ * “Fhe Court could not have intended to enunci- | “ate a mechanical rule, to be applied whatever the feat. ae * ee & ~~ “In short, we would be setting aside great num- bets of state statutes to satisfy a congressional pur- pose which would be only the product of this ‘ourt’s imagination.” : M8.(1947) is misplaced. Involved in that case te United States Warehouse Act (39 Stat. 486, ), a8 amended. It was expressly declared in Sec- tm -\short of the type attempted by Santa Monica, » # that will satisfy the needs of the neighbors of =; the airport or supply the relief requested.” (Italics $0 in this case, the efforts in this regard of the FAA Chief of the Airport Traffic Control Tower at the Holly- “wood. Airport were likewise unsuccessful (A. HY, 319). As in the case of the Santa Monica Air. ‘Petty the only feasible means of satisfying the “needs” ‘Whose who resided in the vicinity of the Hollywood- Barbank Airport was to impose the time restrictions @@ jet aircraft takeoffs as specified in the Burbank —~46— ordinance (which conformed to those specified in th Santa Monica ordinance). If the power to impose such restrictions resides in the Federal Aviation Adminis trator, it remained “dormant and unexercised."“ . . - Accordingly, at least until the Administrator act, "On this point Head v. Board of Examiners, supra" has further relevance. Before the Court in that cas ‘was the Constitutional validity of a statute of the Stat of New Mexico which prohibited certain price adver tising methods in the sale of glasses over radio ste tions and in newspapers which also served the ad joining State of ‘Texas. At issue, among ‘others, was whether the’ statute was preempted by the Feder Communications / Act. It appears from the opinion but that since World War II it had largely left thes matters in the hands of the Federal Trade Commission. In holding that the New Mexico statute had not beea preempted, this Court stated (374 U.S. at p. 432): -. . “As in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Com. ¥. Continental Air Lines, Inc. 372 US 714, at 724, —_» 10,L ed 2d 84, 91, 83 S Ct 1022, we are satit .. fied thatthe state statute ‘at least so long as any power the [Commission] may have remains “dor - mant and unexercised,” will not frustrate any pat of the purpose.of the.federal legislation.” - . “Colorado Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Continental Aivinn, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963) at p. 724. 374 U.S. 424 (1963). —47— bi Haron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), the very issue was whether the City of Detroit by ordinance would require boilers, which had been approved and licensed by the Federal Govern- ment for use on navigable waters, to be replaced by other equipment in order to relieve that City from the diects of air pollution. In holding that it could and that the ordinance was not Preempted by -Federal legis- lation, this Court first observed as follows (362 U.S. at = _°“The ordinance was enacted for the manifest dines, of promoting: the ‘health: and ‘welfare of _ the city’s inhabitants. Legislation designed to free “from pollution the very air that people breathe Clearly falls within the exercise of even the most ‘traditional concept of what is wn as the police power. In the exercise of ‘that power, the states and their instrumentalities we. MY act, in many areas of interstate commerce ~~ and Maritime activities, concurrently with the fed- ~ “eral government.” It then pointed out that Congress had for many years Maintained an extensive and comprehensive set of con- ttols over ships and shipping, including the inspection steam vessels, and that these inspections were broad ‘M Mature, including, among other things, boilers. It con- das follows (362 U.S. at pages 445 and 446): “The thrust of the federal inspection laws is a, limited to affording protection from the Perils of maritime navigation.” * * *& es as 6 bis the elimination of air pollution to protect “a ae3 ea ate, PS wise 48 the health and-enhance the cleanliness of the local community.” “3 see “We conclude that there is no overlap between the scope of the federal ship inspection laws and that of the municipal ordinance here involved. For this ‘reason we cannot find that the federal inspection legislation has pre-empted local action ‘To. hold ‘otherwise would be to the teach- ing of this Court’s decisions which enjoin secking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists.” Totally apart from this view of the matter is the fact that Congress, in adding Section 611 to the Fed eral Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. §1431), left air tion of the permissible level of noise that could b created by aircraft using their airports and, as already indicated, the discretion of airport proprietors in thal regard has been repeatedly affirmed by the Federal Aviation Administrator.“ This, in and of itself, is suf ficient to validate the Burbank ordinance. Thus in Rice vy. Board of Tradé, 331 U.S. 247 (1947), companion cases. to Rice v: Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, the ing the Commodity Exchange Act, 49 Stat. 1491,’ $45, had preempted the ability of the Illinois Com merce Commission to regulate the Chicago Board of ‘Frade, 2 commodity xchange. In holding that th Illinois Commerce Commission had the power to rege late the Chicago Board of. Trade in those areas wher & c Bee ——i— that Board had freedom to act, this Court stated (331 7****Tnsofar as those rules are concerned, all that “®" the’ Act’ ‘and the regulations of: the Secretary do s vide standards ‘for warehouses whose receipts are ‘lacceptable’ in satisfaction’ of futures contracts. “SS eretion. ° "2 “Hetice it’ seems to us that no action of the “Illinois Commission within the zone where the " Botrd tide freedom to act would contravene the federal scheme of regulation. It would be quite i - the Secretary. But such collision is not necessary; ta “> 7 Toh aA) - 2* w & wie af * .5 a : Rie 0 e ti 7 ‘> a rg roe The comments of the California Supreme Court Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc; supra," on the effect of a holding of Federal preemp tion are worth repeating. In that regard the Court stated (61 Cal. 2d at pages 591-592, 39 Cal. Ree at page 714, 394 P. 2d at page 554): “A holding of federal.preemption would hav the effect of disabling thé state from any action in the entire field, and placing in the federal gov ernment complete and sole responsibility for regu lation of all aspects of that field. Such a holding by a single state court would have, of course, no effect on the conduct of other states with respect to regulation of that field, and unless Congress had in fact intended such preclusion of state regule tion and were to carry out its responsibilities, there would. result within that state a lacuna which the state would be powerless to fill.” In this Gase we have a “lacuna” which the Burbank ordinance has attempted to fill. 3. The Conflict Issue. The Court of Appeals resolved the conflict iswe against the Appellants by concluding that the Burbant ‘ordinance “stands as an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” citing Perez v.. Campbell, 402 US. 637 (1971). The conflict which it found was with respec to-# Ra-msandisey9. renway preference order of 6 mie FAA official in charge of the Air Traffic Contd ; Tower at Holywood Barvank Airport (A- 426). By R61 Cal 2d 582, 39 Cal. Rot. 708, 394. P. 2doM (1964). ay oe also stated that the Burbank of flight of prospective night flight Airport} of (A. 427, fm. 12). On the ‘Testriction imposed by the Federal Aviation the Hollywood-Burbank Airport. Neither was it vt lation by the Federal Aviation Administrator of be. contemplated by Section 611 (49. U.S.C: of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. It was Memnably issued under the authority of FAA order 700.13." There was obviously no conflict between it - wurdank ordinance. Nevertheless the Court of itlusion of Law No. 17 (A. 404-405). Betusion of Law No. 18 (A. 405). Bx 30 (A. 453-455). iiding of Fact No. 56 (A. 392). a), ee reduce the community exposure to noise to the lowelt practicable minimum”, and then went on to state tht “This assertion represents a considered determination by ) _ an authorized representative of the FAA that measur of the magnitude of that taken by the City of Burbank are beneath ‘the lowest practicable minimum’.” A com plete answer to this assertion is found in our discussion of the Preemption Issue under the hearings “National Uniformity” and “The Burbank Ordinance is Not Pre empted”, wherein we pointed out that this so-called “determination” was in conflict with the determination of: the Federal Aviation Administrator in the Dreifus matter, namely, that when noise abatement and other procedural regulations had: failed to provide needed te lief, “further relief should involve airport use restrictions similar to those” imposed by the Santa Monica ordi- nance.” In making this statement the Administrator observed that, as the proprietor of the Washing National Airport he had imposed restrictions on its use.” Time limitations, however, are not the only approved method of reducing the effects of aircraft noise. There was yet- another measure available to © duce the community exposure to noise below this “low est practicable minimum”, namely, the exclusion of air craft from Hollywood-Burbank Airport on the basis o noise considerations. This likewise had the specific ap proval. of. the Federal Aviation Administrator in Dret fus™ and had earlier been asserted as a means of alleviating the adverse effects of aircraft noise-by th "Appendix to this Brief at p. 7. eteiay: — "8d. at pp. 5, 12. er "jd, at p. 11. | Ré a a ae Seqretary of Transportation.” It should be noted that the ponmandatory..runway preference order on which the ‘Gourt.of Appeals relied was issued September 4, 969." The Dreifus opinion was issued July 10, OG TT: _—s - Ih view of the foregoing, the only weight that can p properly accorded to the FAA Tower Chief's de- ttxipination is that of all noise abatement runway pro- cedures he had attempted,” this last one had the best prospects. of achieving the greatest reduction of noise. 7" Interference With Federally Certificated Rights. attempt to overcome the absence of any 2 - toga SB a sa € of conflict with any Federal statute or regu- f, the argument was advanced in the District ‘and carried over into Conclusion of Law No. 17 t is easily demonstrated. Under Section 401 of the ra Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. §13%)) the Sie hereby authorized ». .” [Pl. Ex. 8, A. 104]. Under Subsection (i) of Section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 US.C. §1371(i)) a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board does not “confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive right in the use of any airspace, Federal airway, landing area, or air-navigational facil ity”: (Italics added). The Civil Aeronautics Board itself has recently recognized the limitations imposed by this subsection in its decision in Pacific Northwest-Califor- nia Investigation, Docket 18884 of May 12, 1970 [PL Ex. 35, A. 118] when it granted to Continental Air Lines, Inc. a route which involved the use of Ontario International, Long Beach Municipal, Hollywood-Bur- bank and Orange County Airports, As appears from its decision, the City of Long Beach and the County of Orange were unwilling to allow Continental to use their airport facilities and, in that connection, the Civil Aero nautics Board stated at page 13: “Since cooperation of the local airport author ities will be needed before any service can be it augurated, it will be up to the satellite carrie [Continental Air Lines, Inc.]. we have selected convince these authorities that their express fear are exaggerated or are outweighed by affirmative sderations.” ’ At the time of trial in this case Continental. had bees unsuccessful in persuading these local airport author ities to accept their aircraft and as a e. wag not providing any service to ot, from these Ps ticalar airports (A. 239°242). : * power; without violating any Federal statute or regula- tion, t0 exclude aircraft on the basis of noite considera. fe nities es s ‘Admittedly it precludes entry into the navigable air- space from }the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. except in emer- fetcies. That there is nothing unusual or unreasonable out this is attested by the fact that the Federal Avia- —$6— raceme pepe aciheopniieattomebedogsenatiage: Act of 1958." Nav abet ‘cb ie Cicclh ot he Cay ol Beene enacting the ordinance in question, clearly accords with and implements the policy of Congress as expressed in its more recent legislative enactments, (e.g., The Ne tional Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4321; Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1531; Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §1857 et seq.; Environ mental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 om §§4372-4374). Of importance for the purposes of this discussion are the observations of the California Supreme Court in Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. (1964), 61 Cal. 2d 582, 592, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 714, 394 P. 2d 548, 554: “Moreover, we note that noise abatement is a fed- ‘eral as well as a state aim, and when not incon ‘sistent with safety . . . would not necessarily preserit a conflict with federal law but might well Hiferce te™ The Court of Appeals, in its statement that the effect of the Burbank ordinance “was to terminate the right . of flight of prospective passengers [approximately 80] through this portion of the airspace at this time,” was obviously attempting to bring its’ prohibition within the language of Section 104 (49 U.S.C. §1304) of the Federal Aviation Act;of 1958 which declares “a public tight of freedom of fransit through the navigable air space of the United States” (Italics added). In actuality ths ‘onrtinince' dit “sot deny ‘freedom of transit theca ~ Appendix to this Brief at pp. 11-12. / is silica ‘the navigable ‘airspace. What it did was prohibit entry p:the navigable airspace from the land on which the wi irbank Airport is located during the pro- Where is: nothing in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which confers on the public or anyone else the fight 10 enter the navigable. airspace from land where such entry has been prohibited by an ordinance or land ise tegulation adopted by a municipality. It is well settled in California that, in the exercise of its police power, a municipality may enact ordinances the ob- jectiof which is to abate or prevent nuisances caused by businesses located within its boundaries. Thain v. City 0 Palo Alto, 207 Cal. App. 2d 173, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515, 523 (1962) [Hearing denied by Supreme Court]; Boyd ¥. City of Sierra Madre, 41 Cal. App. 520, 183 Pac. 0, 232 (1919). It is also well settled that municipal- $ may enact land use regulations which have the : Hollywood- 4 Ow) airport. Bet m, it is i —,) = use by every typeof aircraft, no matter what the effect may ‘be on:those who reside.in the surrounding ares, To tlevate ‘the ‘possible convenience of 80 persons departing from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport for San Diego once a week on a Sunday night at 11:30 p.m fo a point of constitutional significance, is to us a perver sion ‘of this Court's teachings in Perez (402 U.S. 637) and other decisions. The same may be said of the nop mandatory runway preference order. It is clear from the Perez decision that if the majority of this Court had been convinced that the Arizona statute would serve to promote the health, safety or welfare of the citizens of Arizona, the constitutionality of the statute would have been sustained. The same observation is applicable to Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945' and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). | Magnifying the possible convenience of these 80 per sons and disregarding the need of thousands of person who reside in the vicinity of Hollywood-Burbank Air port for uninterrupted sleep on a Sunday night prior to a Monday morning, does not comport with a proper cannes ag ae ey ee Pele dinance, -- : : Thi. the ‘iiaace wad reaicnebla' and neceaneyh attested by the fact that the Due Process issue (XI Amendment) was withdrawn by the Plaintiffs from th District Court’s consideration (A. 66-67), and further statements made:-by the counsel for the plaintiffs during the Course of the trial [R. Tr. pp. 437-438], The nec and fiecessity for providing some relief for those who reside in the vicinity of Hollywood-Burbank Airports further demonstrated by the fact that in the area i pean) ome Be ene ypc Op —59— - has decreased by 11.1% since 1960" and in area immediately to the east of that area by ‘152%. As to the area immediately to the east of f i, “East-West” runway, the population has decreased fen, 1960 by TA%” All of the areas referred bo Ie Js in excess of 100 plus PNdb.” This indicates that those who have been able to move from these | done so. The rest, presumably unable to do $9, continue to remain subject to the severe noise pol- lution created by operations at the Hollywood-Burbank hirport. The only real relief that these residents have ii is that provided by the Burbank ordinance during ie short period of time that it remained in effect prior 9 the issuance of the restraining order and during the ~ od from July 13 to November 30, 1970, as a result F Aviation Administration could have pro- pd this needed reliet, not by regulation of the airport ietor (Lockheed), but through operational regula- i ed upon the aircraft which it controls. In- »$. Census, Burbank Code Area 3111: 1960 popula- 3286; 1970 population, 4,012. P See coe Aree 3110: 1960 population, ) population, 3,6 $. Census, Burbank ‘Cle Area 3105: 1960 population, 19 Be epi Si anch ; ay epee Noise and the Metropolitan «i vt Lie Angeles with Special Reference pf, 170 ayo Congress Catalog Card No. 72- ‘te otnc 8, supra, The Court of made no specific of corporate jet aircraft, other to note that such j (This footnote is continued on next page) iq —0— 4. Burden on Interstate Commerce. sage * Although the Court of Appeals declined to consider the issue as to whether the Burbank ordinance const tuted an unreasonable burden on interstate comment, the District Court concluded that it did. This concly sion ‘was reached, not because the ordinance did in fact burden interstate commerce, since it only affected ont regularly schetuled intrastate flight and flights of cor porate jet ‘aircraft, but! rather on the basis of ATA} contention that the ordinance had to be viewed as if it were adopted by all major airports within the United States. A similar approach was attempted by the airlines in the recent case of Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District of Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 70 (1972). There the airlines contended, as to the pe aircraft were go emg pager tint off during the ' v. Town of Morristown, 1% = oe ‘tapita charges imposed on airline passengers by State port.proprietors, that “If such levies were imposed ‘Byeach airport along a traveller's route, the total ef. fecton.the cost of air transportation, could be pro- itive, the competitive structure of air carriers could ‘beaaffected, and air transportation, compared to other fos. of transportation, could be seriously impared” 05 USS. at page 721). In rejecting this contention i: that these charges were constitutionally miss this Court stated (405 U.S., at page 722): » =“But there is no suggestion that the Indiana. and New Hampshire charges do not in fact advance he constitutionally permissible objective of having >, iMterstate commerce bear a fair share of the costs ..#0 the States of airports constructed and main- for the purpose of aiding interstate air In that circumstance, *[a]t least until Con- Gress chooses to enact a nation-wide rule, the power will not be denied to the State[s].’ Free- than v. Hewit, 329 US, at 253, 91 L Ed at 272; te also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 US 761, 775-776, 89 L Ed 1915, 1928, 65 S$ Ct 3 ‘1515 (1945).” se @We.should note here parenthetically that the -airlines [the passengers which utilize the Hollywood-Bur- pAirport are not bearing their “fair share” of the mt their use of this airport. It is the owners of erty and residents under the necessary approach- @nd departure paths of that airport who bear a tial cost of its operation. Not only are the air- tnd their passengers enjoying a “free ride” at the aan a —§2— op ee ‘ : ¥ > 5 x v de oe 4 ts Ss * Pe aes f oer f o.2 *_ 4s * . t . I f nf 1uga | C I oI is: ‘ i PPA Sy ag 4 ught 4 " the. taking of air or. noise easements, such litigation is painfully slow and in the end probably serves fx the. most.part to-benefit the attorneys.involved. As was observed in the New. Jersey case referred to above,” pollution, caused by jet aircraft.” Not everyone liviag lives: and. property: are so severely affected by noix er, £¥ per : —79— ‘jaethevicinity: of an airport owns the property on Wiehe ‘resides, It probably matters little to the land- od wh: thereffect of such noise pollution may be on iiitenants, since he would be looking shead to the ks nm fez oning to ial or i j trial use ‘Weuld’enable him to achieve a handsome profit. The Witedy"Of damages serves no useful purpose to a senior c: izen:who has witli considerable agony observed theiproliferation and increase in jet aircraft noise. The valusiof his ‘property has either remained static or de- eased in spite of the inflationary trend. It would do legood to seck damages since even if he were lely' successful, and after payment of the fees of ttorney, he would be unable to duplicate what he emption and conflict doctrines of this Court at a sufficient area in which interim measures, ‘ch as the Burbank ordinance, can fit without viola- S08.of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Con- tition, where, as here, Congress has not clearly in- intent to preempt the area of jet aircraft sment. Any thoughts that Congress may have ction is tempered by the knowledge that if it Will eliminate the shield from liability pro- Should Griggs —80— preemption of this field. To support this assertion» quires’ nothing: more, than 4-reference to this Courts decision: in - ee ‘ Z of if 2 Taylor; 353 US. (7 —82— ways been so. In the earlier case of Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), which involved the ability of States to prescribe automatic fir doars on railroad engine fire boxes and engine cab cu tains, regulations, admittedly designed to protect the health, safety and welfare of those involved in ther ) operation, this Court flatly declared that the States'in volved could not do so because of Federal preemption, There is some language in that opinion out of harmony with the opinions in Colorado Anti-Discriminatio Com. and Head.™ A later decision of this Cour, Terminal Railroad Association v. Brotherhood of Rait road Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1942), appears to ha ignored Napier, even. though it was cited in the briels, and sustained a regulation of the Illinois Commer: Commission which required cabooses on trains operat ed in interstate commerce to protect the health, safety and welfare of those involved in their operation, ln Huron,™ although Napier was cited in the majority opinion,’ it was chiefly relied upon by the dissent s support for the view that the Detroit air pollution ont nance had been preempted.’ Notwithstanding ths trend, the Court has continued to at least state the ruk that if Congress has clearly expressed its intent to cupy a particular field, State or local regulation in that field will not be permitted. 1429372 U.S. 714 (1963). 108362 US. at p. 443. e362 US, at pp. 452-453. CE OS ae eee eee ae a “08: Beh Be 2 1 vi + the States to legislate and thus has permitted e euations to mesh with federal controls. i¢ Federal Compress ress Co. v. McLean, 291 US 17, kt Ct 267; Townsend v: Yeo- : 54, 81 L Ed 1210, 1220, 57 a om | SCt842; Penn Dairies: v. Milk Control Comfy : Ail BERNE O61, EA. Ba: 248, 63 S Ct 67, ‘ : “Even: here, (there have been: dissents when it naan rpm cenmemtaetom: ) _ the facts of a case.” coe | Some. judges of the lower Federal hea cated..a similar reluctance in applying an alin Glusive doctrine in.areas where health, safety and we fare are. involved. An example of this is found in the ing opinion in Northern States Power Company v,,.State of Minnesota, 447.F. 2d 1143 (1971), a caw which, is presently before this Court for review. Whik the. dissent in that case recognizes the existence of the preemption. and conflict. doctrines. which would pre clude a State orlocal regulation if Congress so declares, nn ompine eisketts:© dagirine which would be sem mh St this country, and cookd jpell. be. doctine which ait be .adopted. if the legitimate interests of States and local governments. and their citizens are to be protected against the continuing encroachment of Federal powe. It is there stated (447 F. 2d at pages 1157-1158): _ “The majority opinion also. observes that state _. might. adopt overprotective environmental coat aor ns which would go the extent of stultify _ ing the industrial development and use of ston nergy. I agree that such a possibility exists, How Spt dn ape tiene fase fae tral conc’ ae othe case-on the. basis of absolute preemption as 4 fatter of Jaw.and refused to permit. testimony 0 -; the reasonableness of the state regulations or th , balancing of environmental protection against the peed tevelopment othe wo} atomic a. LF “ 4 by the framers of the United States Consti- fe’ Was necessity then to protect the Federal “from those who would have preferred ue Whider the Articles of Confederation. But tion has changed. Now the States and local fal grants’ such as those authorized under the Air. ind’ Airways Development and Revenue Acts of me insidious trend is noted in recent Federal in. In the Air Quality Act of 1967 Con- has delegated to the Administrator of the Environ- I Protection Agency veto power over State air pol- tegulations pertaining to. motor vehicles.” The rusion was achieved in the Noise Control Act — of 1972, just recently enacted.” Abnsoguesiciaille tirely ‘clear, it would appear that no State or political subdivision can establish: -and enforce standatds or cop trols om-environmental noise emitted by railroad equip ment or facilities and motor carriers, or control their use, operation or moyement, unless first approved by. the dmir Pav, ge, Yo nom have fee, legtimat, ag cise of the police powers of States and local gover es, Bee sites abet to the shin or taal of whoever may be occupying the position of Adminis trator in that Federal agency, or his subordinates. The quality of our environment has deteriorated such an extent. that the freedom to live in an atmos ig Ae GRR eda The,.“domestic tranquility” which the framers of the titution, sought to promote is no. longer with u, not,only in the area of noise but also in other areas of citizen. need... a ” ‘The: primary-ceason. for-this is that. Congress has y and: large ceased to. be responsive to the will of the people; To a large degree needed legislation is under the control.of committees of the House and Senate. Indivi¢ ual smembers-of:Congress.can, by delaying tactics and ’ other. means, frustrate the passage of necessary leg ition... Special interest groups, such as the airlines, ap pear to have am. unusual ability to block legislation ia ae area of concern to them. : i. We, therefore, respectfully urge this Court to © examine the preemption and conflict doctrines as pe IHS eh iHouse of Representatives Bill No, 11021, 92nd 2d Sess.; 118 ry. Fae (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) x at pp. S 18638-S 1 181See Section 17(c)(2) “Wy Seon 18(6)(2), Noise: Gis trol Act of 1972, footnote 130, +. : aS ae m; Ot aa t eee on a ‘such State and local governmental enact- on of the foregoing, it is respectfully sub- at the decisions of the Court of Appeals and ict Court in this case should be reversed and ction issued by the District Court dissolved. SAMUEL GORLICK, City Attorney, RICHARD L. SiG, JR., Assistant City Attorney, Counsel for All Appellants Except Samuel Gorlick, RICHARD L. S1gG, Jr. Counsel for Appellant Samuel Gorlick. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0140%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.