# Appendix — Swenson v. Stidham

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0078%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 409 U.S. 224

## Text

Al

APPENDIX A

STATE of Missouri, Respondent
v.
James William STIDHAM, Appellant.
No. 45537

Supreme Court of Missouri,
Division No. 2.
Sept. 9, 1957. al

Prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder arising out of a prison riot and based on a theory
of conspiracy. The Circuit Court of Butler County, Ran-
dolph Weber, J., entered judgment of conviction and de-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Bohling, C., held
that instruction concerning conspiracy using the words,
“aid, abet, assist or encourage” in the disjunctive rather
than conjunctively, was proper and did not erroneously
authorize a conviction upon a finding that defendant did
any one of the four acts.

Judgment affirmed.
1. Criminal Law (Key) 736(2)

In prosecution resulting in a conviction of first degree

murder, question concerning the voluntariness of defend-
ant’s confession was for jury.

2. Homicide (Key) 308(3), 309(5)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder, under defense of alibi the only submissible issue
of guilt under evidence was murder in first degree, and
therefore the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on
murder in the second degree and manslaughter. Section
599.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.

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3. Criminal Law (Key) 437

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder arising out of prison riot, diagram of floor plan of
prison basement, which showed location of cells, steel gates
and which was drawn to scale and which was identified
by the person making it as well as others was admissible,
Section 559.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.MLS.

4. Criminal Law (Key) 404(4)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder arising out of a prison riot, 16-pound sledge ham-
mer found at side of victim’s body the night of riot was
admissible. Section 559.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M:S.

5. Criminal Law (Key) 1169(5)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder arising out of a prison riot, court’s instruction to
witness not to testify to any statements made by others
and conveyed to defendant by the witness cured any al-
leged error of police office attempting to explain to de-
fendant that officer had a statement from others.

6. Criminal Law (Key) 432

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder, trial court properly refused exhibits allegedly re-
lating to fact that a witness was of unsound mind and in-
competent since the sources of information and the method
and time of preparation of exhibits were not such as to
justify exhibits’ admission. Sections 490.680, 559.010 RSMo
1949, V.A.MLS.

7. Witnesses (Key) 79(3)

It is court’s function, not the function of jury, to pass
on competency of a witness. Section 491.060 RSMq 1949,
V.A.MS.

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8. Witnesses (Key) 330(3)

Trial courts may exercise a sound discretion as to the
extent of the examination of witnesses with respect to
specific acts on collateral matters affecting their credibility
and not directly connected with the issues on trial.

9, Criminal Law (Key) 1136

Where defendant’s counsel did not avail himself of
court’s offer to recall witness, defendant could not assert
error in that he had been unable to cross-examine a wit-
ness completely in respect desired.

10. Homicide (Key) 308(1)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder, instruction properly required jury to find that the
conspirators willfully killed victim.

11. Criminal Law (Key) 755%, 761(11), 811(3)

Where defense to murder prosecution was alibi and
there was no contention or evidence that the victim had
not been murdered, use of the words “kill and murder” and
“killing and murdering” and their repetition several times
in an instruction did not constitute comment on evidence
or single out and give undue prominence to such words
and did not assume a murder had been committed.

12. Homicide (Key) 305

In prosecution resulting in conviction of defendant of
murder in the first degree based on theory defendant had
conspired with others to kill victim during prison riot, un-
der statute that principals in second degree in the com-
mission of any felony or accessories to any murder or other
felony before the fact may be charged, tried, convicted and
punished in same manner, as the principal in the first de-

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gree, use of words “aid, abet, assist or encourage” in in-
struction concerning conspiracy disjunctively rather than
conjunctively did not erroneously authorize conviction up-
on the finding that defendant did any one of the four acts,
Sections 556.120, 556.170, 559.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.

A4

13. Criminal Law (Key) 64

With respect to convictions of principals in second de-
gree, in absence of statutory provisions, no particular acts
are necessary, nor is it necessary that any physical part in
the commission of the crime be taken; mere encourage-
ment is enough. f
14. Conspiracy (Key) 41 /

Persons entering a conspiracy after its formation ate
deemed in law parties to all acts done by any one of the
conspirators, before or after persons’ entrance, in further-
ance of the conspiracy.

15. Homicide (Key) 234(1)

Evidence justified finding that a conspiracy had been
committed and finding of the actual participation in and
consummation of the conspiracy to murder by defendant
and others named in indictment. Section 559.010 RSMo
1949, V.A.MLS.

16. Criminal Law (Key) 822(1)

An instruction is to be considered as a whole and with
other instructions in the case.

17. Conspiracy (Key) 41
Criminal Law (Key) 64, 69

Act of one of conspirators in the furtherance of a con-
spiracy is the act of the other conspirators and principals

in the
equall:
556.17

18. Cr

In
murde
confes:
effect
or ora
fendar.
gard tl
plete «
1949,

19. Cr

In
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ant’s s
must |
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been u

20. Cr:
Re
in evi

21. Cr

his fai
RSMo
rules

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in the second degree and accessories before the fact are
equally guilty with the principal in first degree. Section
556.170 RSMo 1949, V.A.MS.

18. Criminal Law (Key) 763(19), 781(5)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder, instruction regarding voluntariness of defendant’s
confession was proper and statement in instruction to the
effect that if jury did not believe that a statement, written
or oral and claimed to be a confession made by the de-
fendant, was voluntarily made by him, jury should disre-
gard the statement, was not ambiguous, misleading, incom-
plete or a comment on evidence. Section 559.010 RSMo
1949, V.A.MLS.

19. Criminal Law (Key) 805(3)

In prosecution resulting in conviction of first degree
murder, instruction to effect that if jury believed defend-
ant’s statement, written or oral, was voluntarily made, jury
must consider such statement did not mislead jury al-
though more appropriately the word ‘‘may” could have
been used rather than the word “must”.

20. Criminal Law (Key) 388

Results of a lie detector examination are inadmissible
in evidence.

21. Criminal Law (Key) 900

The statutory right of an accused to no reference to
his failure to testify may be waived by him. Section 546.270
RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; 42 V.A.M.S. Supreme Court Rules,
rules 26.08, 28.02, 28.08.

wach) ee

When an accused takes the stand in his defense, his
failure to testify on specific facts involved in the case is a
legitimate subject of comment by the state in argument.

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22. Criminal Law (Key) 721(2)

23. Criminal Law (Key) 721(2)

Where defendant, accused of murder in first degree,
had taken the stand, defendant’s failure to deny incrim-
inating facts was open to comment whether the denial]
should have occurred in an appearance in chief or in an
appearance in surrebuttal. Section 546.270 RSMo 1949,
V.A.M.S.; 42 V.A.M.S. Supreme Court Rules, rules 26.08,
28.02, 28.08.

eS

Mark H. Hennelly, St. Louis, for appellant.

John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Winston Cook, Sp. Asst.
Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BOHLING, Commissioner.

James William Stidham appeals from a sentence of
life imprisonment for the first degree murder of Walter
Lee Donnell during the riot at the Missouri Penitentiary
on the evening of September 22, 1954, in Cole County, Mis-
souri. § 559.010. (Statutory references are to RSMo 1949
and Y:A.M.S.) The indictment charged defendant, Wil-
liam R. Hoover, Jackie Lee Noble, Paul Edward Kenton,
Rollie Laster, Don Wm. DeLapp and Joseph M. Vidauri
with the commission of the offense. All were inmates of
the penitentiary. Defendant’s case, upon his application
for changé of venue, was tried in the Circuit Court of But-
ler County, Missouri, in July, 1955. Defendant was well
represented by counsel. He has filed no brief. His motion
for new trial presents many issues.

AT

The defense was an alibi; but certain issues: call for
some detail of the facts.

[1] I. There is no merit in defendant's contention
that his written confession was coerced and involuntary
and was admitted in evidence before the State established
that it had been voluntarily given. The court conducted
a full preliminary hearing on the issue, found the issue was
for the jury, and later, after hearing the evidence before
the jury, submitted the issue to the jury for determination.
The testimony was to like effect at each hearing. Two
members of the State Highway Patrol and four members
of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police force, present at the
time defendant claimed physical violence occurred, testi-
fied that no promises had been given, or physical violence,
duress, threats or abuse was offered to defendant, cate-
gorically denying defendant’s testimony. On the conflict-
ing showing the issue of the voluntariness of the confession
was for the jury. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.
2d 88, 93 [3, 4]; State v. Laster, Mo., 293 S.W.2d 300, 303
(1, 2]; State v. Sanford, 354 Mo. 998, 1006 [4]. 193 S.W.2d
31, 37, 38 [2]; State v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440,

448 [12]. ‘tan!

Defendant stated, among other things, in his confes-
sion, written in his own hand, that several prisoners broke
into death row and Paul Kenton unlocked his cell door.
He and several other prisoners then went to Creighton’s
cell to attack him but he had his lock blocked and they
could not enter. They then entered Donnell’s cell, and,
quoting: “Kenton held Donnell while Laster stabbed him
several times with an ice pick, at the same time I slashed
at him three or four times around the face and neck with
a knife that Kenton gave me when he opened the door.
When Donnell fell to the floor Linder and Thompson each
said get Donnell with the sledge and they proceeded to

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hit him with a sledge hammer and a crowbar.” Defend-
ant also orally stated that he did not like Donnell because
Donnell had snitched in regard to a riot in July and caused
defendant to be punished; that Donnell had snitched on
some of the boys and they had received a lot of time; and
that he was living his life under a different code than the
officers. |

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ea ee
ey

The jury could find, aside from defendant’s confession,
the following outlined facts from the evidence.

The homicide occurred in what is known as “death
row.” Death row, consisting of thirty-two cells, was lo-
cated in the basement of “B” Hall. Three heavy steel
gates or doors separated death row proper from other
parts of the building. B Hall proper, above death row,
housed a cell block.

The riot started about 6:30 p. m. September 22, 1954.
Nine inmates, for various reasons were confined in death
row that evening. Defendant, who was known as “Slick,”
and his co-indictee Laster occupied adjoining cells, having
been transferred to death row about July, 1954. Donnell,
the deceased, and James M. Creighton also occupied ad-
joining cells in death row, some distance from defendant
and Laster.

BS BR ARRASES BRAA RII

From the date defendant was placed in death row he
would “holler down” and curse and ridicule Donnell,
threatened to kill Donnell if he ever got to him, said that
“when they come in here and get us out, we are going
down there and kill” Donnell and Creighton; and that they
should have killed Donnell over in E Hall when they
broke out over there.

Clarence Dietzel was on guard duty in death row the
night of the riot. He noticed the disturbance and started
closing the windows to death row. Defendant and Laster

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demanded that the windows opposite their cells be left
open.

About 7:00 or 7:30 p. m. some of the rioters tried to
break into B Basement. While the prisoners were trying
to break into death row, defendant and Laster “hollered”
that they would be down to kill Donnell and Creighton as
soon as they got out of their cells. Defendant said he was
going to kill Donnell because Donnell took the stand against
one Thompson and some others.

DeLapp, known as Curley, Kenton, Noble, Hoover, and
Vidauri, were among the number trying to break in. They
worked on the first door with a sledge hammer, crowbars,
pick and other small tools. DeLapp called to defendant,
saying: “Slick, this is Curley DeLapp. We will be in to
get you out if it takes, costs us hell and high water.” “We
are coming down to get you out. We are going to get you
out.” Defendant answered: “Hurry up, Goddamn it, I am
waiting for you.” DeLapp sent Hoover and Kenton out
to burn the buildings. They returned. Vidauri guarded
a paint bucket containing knives, having 5 or 6 inch blades,
used in the twine plant. After working on the door for a
while, DeLapp called to defendant that they could not
make it and were going to try something else. Defendant
told DeLapp to come around to the south windows and said
he might make it there. DeLapp, Noble, Hoover and Ken-
ton went out and tried to make an entrance through the
wall into death row with the sledge hammer. Defendant
and Laster talked to DeLapp through the open windows
and had him go hack and work on the door. They again
started to work on the door and DeLapp called to defend-
ant saying: “We are going to try again.” Then, in a short
time someone produced a key and the men came into B
Basement proper. DeLapp and also Kenton demanded
Dietzel’s keys, threatening to kill him if he refused to hand

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\\ them over. Dietzel insisted he did not have the keys and
‘ did not give the keys to them. DeLapp with the help of
others, then broke the lock on the second door with a
sledge hammer. DeLapp, Noble, Kenton and Hoover im.
mediately entered to where guard Dietzel was. They
placed Dietzel on a small table and searched him for the
keys, Kenton pulling the lining completely out of his coat.
DeLapp ordered Dietzel to call the warden’s office and im-
mediately took the telephone from him. About this time
the door to death row proper opened. Noble and Kenton
placed Dietzel in one of the death row cells, where he re-
mained for about twenty minutes, and was then taken up
the steps and placed in the mop room in B Hall.

DeLapp, Noble, Kenton, Hoover, Vidauri and one
Miller finally released defendant and Laster, as well as
other prisoners who desired to be released from their cells
in death row. DeLapp led them up the aisle and said to
the onlookers: “Get back men, they are coming out now”;
and when they came out and stopped, DeLapp put his arm
around defendant’s shoulders and said: “Gentlemen, I have
brought you this far, this is your leader from here on.”
Defendant answered: ‘Well men, I am ready to work.”
They then went into the room where Vidauri was guard-
ing the knives and returned to death row armed with
weapons. Defendant told Vidauri to go ahead but Vi-
dauri answered, “No, I am going with you. I am all the
way with you guys.” They thern»went back into death
row. DeLapp had the other inmates go upstairs in B
Hall.

Defendant, Laster, Hoover, DeLapp, Kenton, Noble and
Vidauri tried to break into Creighton’s cell. They had a
sledge hammer, a pole and other weapons. Creighton had
jammed his lock with concrete and a comb. Defendant
said he was going to settle the score with Donnell and

3 All

Creighton, They broke Creighton’s jaw in two places, using
apole. He got the pole away from them, and started using
iton them. Defendant told Donnell they would be over to
get him next. They could not get Creighton’s cell door
open and started working on Donnell’s door. Creighton
heard Donnell’s door go back and saw the seven men walk
up to go into Donnell’s cell. ‘He could not see through the
‘cell walls. He heard Donnell hollering: “I ain’t no rat, I
ain't no snitch. And I ain’t never harmed you boys,” and
he was begging them. Pretty soon Donnell was going Oh,
oh, and he hollered real loud and got to kind of gurgling.
The men then ran out of Donnell’s cell and up the aisle.
They went to a wash basin and each washed his hands.
Defendant and Noble took off their undershirts and dis-
carded them.

Donnell received a multiplicity of wounds. He had
five stab wounds in the front and four stab wounds in the
back on the left side in.the region of the heart and lungs.
Two of the front wounds passed completely through his
heart and two of the back wounds penetrated his heart.
His skull had sustained an egg shell type fracture, three
or four inches in area, a multiple crushing type fracture of
many small fragments, which could have been made by a
bloody, 16-pound sledge hammer found alongside hi® body
about 10:30 p. m. that day by an officer. He had other
wounds on his body. :

[2] II. Defendant contends error resulted from the
court's failure to instruct on murder in the second degree
and manslaughter. The defense was an alibi. The only
submissible issue of guilt under the evidence was murder
in the first degree. State v. Taylor, 347 Mo. 607, 148 S.W.
2d 802, 805 [5]; State v. Clymer, Mo., 159 S.W.2d 808, 812
[9]; State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362, 80 S.W.2d 865, 868 [1,
2]. See State v. Laster, Mo., 293 S.W.2d 300, 302, and §

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559.010. It also follows that error was not committed in
overruling defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal
and judgment of acquittal as to murder in the first degree.

[3,4] III. Defendant’s contentions that State’s Ex.
hibits No. 1 and No. 9 should not have been received in
evidence because hearsay, not properly identified and be-
cause such action violated his constitutional rights are
without merit. The testimony established that Exhibit 1
was a diagram of the floor plan of B Basement, showed the
location of the cells, steel gates, et cetera, was drawn to
scale, and it was identified by the person making it and
others. State’s Exhibit 1 was admissible. State v. McGee,
336 Mo. 1082, 83 S.W.2d 98, 107 [26]; State v. McHarness,
Mo., 255 S.W.2d 826, 829 [6]. Exhibit 9 was a bloody
16-pound sledge hammer found at the side of Donnell’s
body by W. S. Barton of the State Highway Patrol about
10:30 p. m. the night of the riot. It was also identified by
a number of other witnesses. Defendant’s confession re-
fers to the use of a sledge hammer in the killing of Donnell.
There was no error in the admission of Exhibit 9. State
v. Hopkins, 278 Mo. 388, 213 S.W. 126, 128 [5]; State v.
Wilson, 223 Mo. 173, 189, 122 S.W. 671, 676 [5].

{5] IV. During the examination of Officer Eitzman
of St. Louis, who was present at the time defendant gave
his written confession, the officer stated he talked. to de-
fendant “and explained to him that I had a statement
* **” Defendant’s objection to the remark was sustained
and the witness was instructed not to testify to any state-
ments made by other prisoners and conveyed to defendant
by the witness. Notwithstanding the court’s ruling, de
fendant’s motion for new trial asserts the court could not
cure the alleged error. A more questionable situation
arose under similar circumstances in State v. Vidauri, Mo.,
293 S.W.2d 955, 956 [2,3], and was ruled against defend-

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ant’s contention. See State v. Montgomery, Mo., 223 S.W.
2d 463, 466 [11,12]. The point is ruled against defendant.

[6,7] V. Defendant claims error in the exclusion of
his Exhibits B, C, C-1, and D. Exhibit B was never of-
fered in evidence.

Defendant objected to James M. Creighton being sworn
as a witness on the ground he was of unsound mind and
incompetent. The jury was excused and a voir dire hear-
ing was conducted at which Mrs. Alma Miller, the Medical
Records Clerk of State Hospital No. 1, at Fulton, and
Creighton were examined. Mrs. Miller produced a file of
a number of pages marked defendant’s Exhibit B for iden-
tification, and out of the file defendant offered and the
court accepted in evidence at the voir dire examination two
typewritten sheets marked defendant’s Exhibits C and C-1;
and another typewritten sheet marked defendant’s Ex-
hibit D.

Creighton testified on voir dire that he had been in
“solitary” for about eighteen months and “played crazy,”
put on a good act to get out of solitary and be sent to the
State Hospital and after thirty-five days was returned to
the Penitentiary; that he had never been before a Probate
Court and committed as an insane person; and that he had
been in a mental institution only that one time. The court
found that Creighton was a competent witness.

Later, upon Creighton’s cross-examination before the
jury defendant developed that Creighton had put on a
pretty good act and had been transferred to the State Hos-
pital at Fulton, where he remained five or six weeks be-
fore being retransferred to the Penitentiary, and placed
in death row in May, 1954. Upon an objection being in-
terposed to a question, counsel for defendant, out of the
presence of the jury, stated he was asking the court to

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make Creighton’s competency as a witness a jury question,
The court informed counsel the jury passed on the cred-
ibility of witnesses but not their competency and counsel]

was entitled to examine the witness on any matters affect-

ing his credibility. Counsel stated he would not pursue the
matter further. His subsequent offer of said Exhibits C,
C-1, and D in evidence before the jury was refused.

Mrs. Miller testified that Exhibits C and C-1 were
attached to a Missouri Penitentiary letterhead; that she
did not know who made the record or when it was made,
and could not say it was a record of State Hospital No. 1;
and with respect to Exhibit D she was not willing to swear
it was correct because it was not signed. The showing was
such as to permit of a finding that the sources of infor-
mation, and method and time of preparation of the exhibits
were not such as to justify their admission before the jury.
$ 490.680; Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 363 Mo.
864, 254 S.W.2d 577, 579 [1]. In addition, it was the court's
function, and not the function of the jury, to pass on the
competency of the witness. § 491.060; State v. Whitsett,
232 Mo. 511, 526(IV), 134 S.W. 555, 560(4); Kleinschmidt
v. Bell, 353 Mo. 516, 183 S.W.2d 87, 91 [4,5]; State v. Herr-
ing, 268 Mo. 514, 188 S.W. 169, 172 [3, 5-8]; 97 C.J.S. Wit-
nesses § 119 f, p. 541; 2 Wigmore on Evidence 523, §§ 487,
497(c).

[8.9] VI. The court sustained an objection to de-
fendant’s offer of proof at the close of the cross-examination
of witness Creighton that he had access to one Mary Annis,
they both being confined in the Cole County jail at the time
of trial. Thereafter and prior to the calling of the next
witness the court made it clear to defendant’s counsel that
he was at liberty to show the interest of the witness in
testifying in the case and to develop any arrangement
made covering any special privileges in connection with

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his testimony, and offered to recall the witness for further
cross-examination. Defendant’s motion for new trial states
the court erred in not permitting him to cross-examine the
witness completely with respect to his association with
Mary Annis. Trial courts may exercise a sound discretion
as to the extent of the examination of witnesses with re-
spect to specific acts on collateral matters affecting their
credibility and not directly connected with the issues on
trial. Adriance v. Arnot, 31 Mo. 471; State v. Nasello, 325
Mo. 442, 30 S.W.2d 132, 139 [26]; State v. Brotherton, Mo.,
966 S.W.2d 712, 714 [2]. Counsel did not avail himself of
the court’s offer to recall the witness and may not now
successfully urge reversible error.

VII. Defendant makes many attacks on the State’s
main instruction, Instruction No. 4, which, after defining
“felonious,” and other terms, reads, in so far as ques-
tioned:

“Bearing in mind these definitions and those included
in the other instructions, the court instructs the jury that
if you believe and find from the evidence, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that Rollie Laster, William R. Hoover, Paul
Edward Kenton, Jackie Lee Noble, Don William DeLapp,
and Joseph M. Vidauri entered into a conspiracy and agree-
ment to act in concert and together to kill and murder
Walter Lee Donnell at the time and place and in the manner
and by the means hereafter set forth in this instruction,
and if you believe and find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that pursuant to such a conspiracy and
agreement those aforesaid persons, acting in concert and
together, on September 22, 1954, in Cole County, Missouri,
wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice
aforethought did make an assault upon Walter Lee Donnell,
and then and there did wilfully, deliberately, premedi-
tatedly, and with malice aforethought forcibly strike, hit,

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stab, cut, and beat Walter Lee Donnell in and upon his face,
head, and body, with a sledge hammer, and a knife, and
another sharp instrument or dagger, if you so find, thereby
giving Walter Lee Donnell about his face, head, and body,
mortal wounds from the effects of which he died on Sep-
tember 22, 1954, if you so find, and if you further believe
‘and find from the evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant, James William Stidham, at the time of
such killing and murdering, was a member of the con-
spiracy and agreement aforesaid and theretofore had con-
spired and agreed with Rollie Laster, William R. Hoover,
Paul Edward Kenton, Jackie Lee Noble, Don William De-
Lapp, and Joseph M. Vidauri, to aid, abet, assist or en-
courage them in the killing and murdering of Walter Lee
Donnell at the time and place and in the manner and by the
means aforesaid, and if you further believe and find from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defend-
ant, James William Stidham, pursuant to such conspir-
acy and agreement, was actually present during the killing
and murdering aforesaid of Walter Lee Donnell, and that
he knew of the felonious purpose and intent of Rollie
Laster, William R. Hoover, Paul Edward Kenton, Jackie
Lee Noble, Don William DeLapp, and Joseph Vidauri to kill
and murder Walter Lee Donnell as aforesaid, and that
James William Stidham then and there knowingly and in-
tentionally aided, abetted, assisted, or encouraged the
aforesaid persons, or any of them, in the aforesaid killing
and murdering, then you should find the defendant, James
William Stidham, guilty of Murder in the First Degree and
by your verdict so say. * * *”

[10] a. The required finding of the instruction that
pursuant to a conspiracy the conspirators acting in concert
“then and there did wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly,
and with malice aforethought forcibly strike, hit, stab, cut,

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and beat Walter Lee Donnell in and upon his face, head,
and body, with a sledge hammer, and a knife, and another
sharp instrument or dagger, if you so find, thereby giving
Walter Lee Donnell about his face, head and body, mortal
wounds from the effects of which he died on September 22,
1954, if you so find,” refutes defendant’s assertion that the
instruction did not require the jury to find that the con-
spirators wilfully, et cetera, killed, Donnell.

[11] b. The use of the words “kill and murder” and
“killing and murdering” and their repetition several times
in the instruction did not, as stated by defendant, consti-
tute a comment on the evidence, or single out and give
undue prominence to such words, under the facts adduced
in evidence by the State and did not assume a murder had
been committed. The instruction required the finding of
the submitted facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The de-
fense was an alibi; and there was no contention or evi-
dence that Donnell had not been murdered.

[12,13] c. Defendant questions the use of the words
“aid, abet, assist or encourage” and “aided, abetted, as-
sisted, or encouraged” in the instruction, contending the
use of the terms disjunctively rather than conjunctively
erroneously authorized a conviction upon a finding that de-
fendant did any one of the four acts.’ Under § 556.170
principals in the second degree in the commission of any
felony or accessories to any murder or other felony be-
fore the fact “may be charged, tried, convicted and pun-
ished in the same manner, as the principal in the first
degree.” Consult also § 556.120 on the offense of con-
spiracy. Blackstone’s Commentaries, Vol. 4, Ch. III, p.
*34, defines a principal in the first degree as “the actor
or absolute perpetrator of the crime; and in the second de-
gree he is who is present, aiding and abetting the fact to

. be done”; and an accessory before the fact “to be one

‘sabia ‘sme

Sep

sli ae ates

AGREE RN Lhe pine PRGA OR FOS

Al8

who, being absent at the time of the crime committed,
doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to com-
mit a crime.” See authorities there cited; also 22 CJS.
Criminal Law §§ 85-93, p. 152; 14 Am.Jur. 820, B, 832, C.
It is stated in 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 88, p. 159, with
respect to principals in the second degree, in the absence
of statutory provisions that “no particular acts are neces-
sary; nor is it necessary that any physical part in the com-
mission of the crime be taken; mere encouragement is
enough.” And see Id., § 93, p. 164, with respect to an
accessory before the fact. McMannus v. Lee, 43 Mo. 206,
208, states: ‘The law is well laid down that any person
who is present at the commission of a trespass, encourag-
ing or exciting the same by words, gestures, looks, or
signs, or who in any way or by any means countenances
or approves the same, is in law deemed to be an aider and
abettor, and liable as a principal * * *.” Approved in
State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 104, 110(11), 9 S.W. 646, 650,
652(11), 11 S.W. 1133, and other cases. See also State v.
Messino, 325 Mo. 743, 766(V), 30 S.W.2d 750, 760(V);
State v. Lawrence, Mo., 280 S.W.2d 842, 848; State v. Ruffin,
Mo., 286 S.W.2d 743, 748 [10, 11]; State v. Murray, Mo.,
193 S.W. 830, 832; State v. Clymer, Mo., 159 S.W.2d 808,
811 [8]; People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 284, 28 N.W.
896, 897. The submission was not erroneous.

[14,15] d. We have hereinbefore stated enough, but
not all, of the evidenze favorable to the State. Generally,
a conspiracy is not shown by direct evidence. It is often
inferred from the circumstances. State v. Parr, 296 Mo.
406, 246 S.W. 903, 906 [8]. in i rstan case there was
ample evidence for a finding of the conspiracy submitted
and the actual participation in and consummation of the _
said conspiracy by the persons named in the instruction.
Persons entering a conspiracy after its formation are

Alg

deemed in law parties to all acts done by any one of the
conspirators, before or after his entrance, in furtherance
of the conspiracy. State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 105, 106,
9 S.W. 646, 650; State v. Crab, 121 Mo. 554, 563, 26.S.W.
548, 550; State v. Richetti, 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S.W.2d 330,
342 [14, 15]; 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy § 75, p. 1107; 11 Am.Jur.

571, § 40.

[16] An instruction is to be considered as a whole
and with the other instructions in the case. Instruction
No. 4 is to be read with No. 5, set out infra. The Missouri
cases cited to Point VII, c. sustain Instruction No. 4. It
was more favorable to defendant than the law required
it to be. We need not detail the other attacks against
it.

VIII. Defendant’s motion questions Instruction No.
5, which reads:

“The Court instructs the jury that, if you believe and
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant, James William Stidham, and William R.
Hoover, Rollie Laster, Paul Edward Kenton, Jackie Lee
Noble, Don William De Lapp and Joseph M. Vidauri en-
tered into a conspiracy and agreement to act in concert
and together to kill and murder Walter Lee Donnell at
the time and place and in the manner and by the means
set forth in Instruction No. 4, then the act of either of them
pursuant to such conspiracy and agreement to kill and
murder Walter Lee Donnell would be in law the act of
each one so conspiring and agreeing.

“The word ‘Conspiracy,’ as used in these instructions,
means a common agreement and understanding between
two or more persons which is formed for the purpose of
committing and doing by their joint efforts some crimiial
act.

A20

“The Court instructs the jury that all persons are
principals who are guilty of acting in concert and together
in the commission of a crime. When a crime is actually
committed by one or more persons and another person is
actually present, and, knowing of the felonious purpose
and intent of the person or persons committing the crime,
he knowingly and intentionally aids, abets, assists or en-
courages the person or persons actually committing the
crime in the commission of the same, then such person so
knowingly and intentionally aiding, abetting, assisting or
encouraging the person or persons actually committing
the crime in the commission of the same is a principal
and he is equally guilty with the person or persons who
actually commits the crime.

“However, you are further instructed that the mere
presence of a person at the time and place of the commis-
sion of a crime by another or others is not alone sufficient
to justify him in any manner responsible for the commis-
sion of such crime. On the contrary, before such person
can be found in any manner responsible for the commission
of such crime, the evidence in the case must show, beyond
a reasonable doubt, not only that such person was
actually present at the commission of such crime, but also
that such person knew of the felonious purpose and intent
on the part of the person or persons actually committing
the crime, and that he then and there was knowingly and
intentionally aiding, abetting, assisting or encouraging the
person or persons committing the crime in the commission
of the same.”

[17] This instruction is to be considered with the
other instructions in the case. The submitted facts of the
first paragraph of Instruction No. 5 were required to be
found beyond a reasonable doubt. The other paragraphs of
the instruction are merely definitive, legal statements of

aed DRAENEI

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——

2 SE ES

Jeph

Bec sch aaa
»

A21

what constitutes a conspirator and a conspiracy, assume
nothing, and are not subject to successful attack on the
ground they are abstract. We have hereinbefore held
there was substantial evidence of the submitted conspiracy
. embracing all the named participants. The conspiracy
was incidental to the offense charged. It is also the law
that the act of one of the conspirators in the furtherance
of the conspiracy is the act of the other conspirators, and
¢ 556.170 makes principals in the second degree and ac-
cessories before the fact equally guilty with the principal
in the first degree. (See instructions in State v. Cantlin,
118 Mo. 100, 107, 111(II), 23 S.W. 1091, 1093, 1095(2),
considered to fairly cover the issue.) What we have
hereinbefore said sufficiently answers defendant’s attacks
against Instruction No. 5. Instructions less favorable to a
defendant have been approved. State v. Walker, supra;
State v. Messino, supra; State v. Murray, supra; State v.
Lawrence, supra; State v. Clymer, supra; State v. Nasello,
325 Mo. 442, 459(IV), 30 S.W.2d 132, 137(IV) (instruction
2 therein being to tHe same effect as instruction 2 set out
in State v. Messino, supra); State v. Williams, 309 Mo.
155, 274 S.W. 427, 434(VII); State v. Dowling, 360 Mo.
746, 230 S.W.2d 691, 694 [6]; State v. Mayberry, Mo., 272
S.W.2d 236, 243 [20].

[18] IX. Defendant also questions Instruction No.
6, which reads:

“The Court instructs the jury that before any alleged
statement can be valid, and before you can even consider
it, it must have been made voluntarily, that is ;to say,
without anyone having offered to the person who. i¢ claimed
to have made such a statement any hope of leniency or
reward of any kind for making such statement, and with-
out anyone making any threat or doing any violence to
the person claimed to have made any such statement in
order to induce or force him to confess.

ORLOV EES OR Se 33.

A22

“If the jury does not believe that a statement, written
or oral, and claimed to be a confession made by the de-
fendant, was voluntarily made by him as defined above,
the jury should entirely disregard such statement in ar-
riving at your verdict.

“If, however, the jury does believe that a statement,
written or oral, and claimed to be a confession made by
the defendant, was voluntarily made by him as defined
above, the jury must consider such statement and you
should give it such weight as you believe it deserves in
arriving at your verdict.”

- We do not agree with the contention in defendant's
motion that the clause “claimed to be a confession made
by the defendant” is ambiguous, misleading, incomplete
and a comment on the evidence. The State’s evidence
was that the statements were voluntary and defendant’s
evidence was to the contrary. No intelligent jury would
be confused. It was proper to instruct on the voluntari-
ness of defendant’s statement. State v. Cunningkin, Mo.,
261 S.W.2d 85, 87.

[19] Defendant contends in his motion the use of the
word “must” in the third paragraph of Instruction No. 6
gives judicial direction to the jury, invades the province
of the jury and is a comment on the evidence. The in-
struction is a cautionary instruction on a collateral issue,
does not direct a verdict, and is not on an issue tbe court
is required to instruct upon as part of the law of the case
under Sup.Ct. Rule 26.02, 42 V.A.M.S. § 546.070(4); State
v. Cunningkin, Mo., supra; State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577,
116 S.W.2d 88, 94, 95; State v. Francies, Mo., 295 S.W.2d
8, 15 [24, 25]. Trial juries “shall be sworn well and truly
to try the case.” Sup.Ct.R. 26.02. See §§ 546.070, 546.220;
State v. Duff, 253 Mo. 415, 424(IV), 161 S.W. 683, 685 (IV).
The oath administered to trial jurors embraces the obliga-
tion to try the case according to the evidence. Consult 50

d

A23

CJ.S. Juries § 296, p. 1088; 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 293.
The instruction made it plain that before the jury could
“even consider” defendant’s statement, the jury should find
“it must have been made voluntarily,” and if the jury did
not so find, the jury “should entirely disregard” it in reach-
ing the verdict. An instruction substantially identical to
the instant instruction was given in State v. Laster, Mo., 293
S.W.2d 300, 304, a companion case, and we stated, no issue
being presented, “an adequate instruction was given on
this subject.” In State v. Stibbens, 188 Mo. 387, 396(III),
87 S.W. 460, 462(3), an instruction told ‘the jury “you
should take such confession into consideration” if volun-
tarily made. See State v. Pillow, Mo., 169 S.W.2d 414,
416; State v. Hostetter, Mo., 222 S.W. 750, 753(II); State
y. Hartman, Mo., 272 S.W.2d 276 [1, 2]. We are not ap-
proving the use of the word “must” in the instruction. A
more appropriate word would be “may.” However, the
jury, if it found defendant voluntarily made the state-
ment, would, unless it violated its oath, consider the state-
ment. The questioned clause was modified by the suc-
ceeding clause; and under the instruction, if the statement
was made voluntarily, the jury was not told how to con-
sider the statement and was free to give the statement no
weight whatever in arriving at the verdict. It stated the
duty the law placed upon the jury. We conclude on the
record before us that the jury was not misled and reversi-
ble error did not occur. Consult State v. Harris, 357 Mo.
1119, 212 S.W.2d 426, 428 [7, 8].

[20] X. Defendant complains of the court’s over-
ruling of his motion for a polygraph examination of him-
self, which he offered to pay for. We see no necessity
for requesting a court to rule on a motion of this nature.
The authorities are to the effect that the results of lie
detector examinations are inadmissible in evidence. 23
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 967, p. 295; 20 Am. Jur. 633, § 762;
Henderson v. State of Oklahoma, 94 Okl.Cr. 45, 230 P.2d

a” |

y

LOA SL GAN pNP 1 ti SDA)

a

A24

495, 23 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1306 (annotation). See State vy.
Cole, 345 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43, 51 [12]; State v. Hud-
son, Mo., 289 S.W. 920 [2].

[21-28] XI. Defendant contends in his motion that
the court erred in not sustaining his objection to the prose-
cuting attorney’s statement in argument that defendant
failed to go back on the stand and.rebut certain testimony
adduced by the State in rebuttal to testimony given by de-
fendant while on the stand. The statutory right of an ac-
cused to no reference to his failure to testify (Sup.Ct.R.
6.08; § 546.270) may be waived by him. State v. Tiedt,
360 Mo. 594, 229 S.W.2d 582, 587 [8]. It is made clear in
State v. Larkin, 250 Mo. 218, 234 (III), 157 S.W. 600, 604
[4], 46 L.R.A., N.S., 13, that when an accused takes the
stand in his defense, as in the instant case, his failure to
testify on specific facts involved in the case is a legitimate
subject for comment by the state in argument. State v.
Pierson, 343 Mo. 841, 123 S.W.2d 149, 157 [14]: State v.
Smith, Mo., 252 S.W. 662, 667 [14].. Having taken the
stand, defendant’s failure to deny incriminating facts was
open to comment whether the denial should have occurred
on an appearance in chief or an appearance in sur-
rebuttal.

The transcript discloses that all matters for considera-
tion here upon the record (Sup.Ct.R. 28.02, 28.08) are in
proper form and sufficient.

The judgment is affirmed.
BARRETT and STOCKARD, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion by BOHLING, C., is adopted as
the opinion of the court. i

EAGER, P. J., and STORCKMAN, J., and BROAD-
DUS, S. J., concur.

LEEDY, J., not sitting.

A25

APPENDIX B
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

Vv.
James William STIDHAM, Appellant.
No. 52406.

Supreme Court of Missouri,
En Banc.
June 5, 1967.

Appeal from judgment of the Circuit Court, Butler
County, Howard R. Maness, J., denying prisoner’s second
motion to vacate judgment of conviction. The Supreme
Court, Storckman, C. J., held that in view of fact that
prisoner would, regardless of judgment on appeal, be im-
mediately entitled to proceed under provisions of not yet
effective amended rule requiring motions to vacate to be
in questionnaire form and providing for appointment of
counsel if motion presents questions of law or issues of
fact and movant is shown to be indigent, prisoner would
be granted maximum relief to which he was entitled so
that further proceedings could be held in compliance with
provisions of amended rule.

Order and judgment reversed and cause remanded
with directions.

1. Criminal Law (Key) 998(1)

Although effective date of newly revised rule requir-
ing motion to vacate judgment to be in questionnaire form
and providing for appointment of counsel if motion pre-
sents questions of law or issues of fact and movant is
shown to be indigent is September 1, 1967, trial courts
may use the new procedure before that date. V.A.M.LR.
S.Ct. Rule 27.26.

Saget incre Ranat tibia tat cinnegehal

Seed

A26
2. Criminal Law (Key) 998(21)

Amended rule requiring motions to vacate judgment
to be in questionnaire form and providing for appointment
of counsel if the motion presents questions of law or issues
of fact and movant is shown to be indigent is intended to
discover and adjudicate all claims for relief in one applica-
tion and avoid successive motions. V.A.M.R. S.Ct. Rule
27.26.

3. Criminal Law (Key) 1189 nee

In view of fact that regardless of whether denial of
prisoner’s second motion to vacate judgment of conviction
was affirmed or reversed, he would be immediately en-
titled to proceed under not yet effective amended rule re-
quiring motions to vacate to be in questionnaire form and
providing for appointment of counsel if motion presents
questions of law or issues of fact and movant is shown to
be indigent, prisoner was granted maximum relief to which
he was entitled so that order and judgment denying mo-
tion were reversed and cause was remanded with direc-
tions that all further proceedings be in compliance with
amended rule. V.A.M.R. S.Ct. Rule 27.26 (c, e, h, i).

Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Walter W. Nowotny,
Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

James William Stidham, pro se.
STORCKMAN, Chief Justice.

The appellant James William Stidham is a prisoner
in the Missouri State Penitentiary where he is serving a
sentence of life imprisonment for murder. The judgment
of conviction was affirmed by this court on September 9,
1957. State v. Stidham. Mo., 305 S.W.2d 7. On March 9,
1964, Stidham, pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R. filed
pro se in the Circuit Court of Butler County a motion to

Be

A27

vacate and set aside his sentence. The motion to vacate
was denied without an evidentiary hearing and on appeal
this court on June 13,1966, affirmed the order and judg-
ment. State v. Stidham, Mo., 403 S.W.2d 616. Thereafter,
Stidham filedi pro se a second motion to vacate under Rule
27.26 which presented claims not made in his first motion.
The trial cowrt without an evidentiary hearing also denied
the second motion to vacate and the prisoner’s appeal from
that order amd judgment is now before us. The movant
filed a brief pro se in this court and made an oral argu-
ment.

[1] On January 9, 1967, this court adopted a revised
S.Ct. Rule 27.26. The effective date of the revised rule is
September 1, 1967, but the trial courts may use the new
procedure before that date. State v. Garner, Mo., 412
S.W.2d 155, 157.

[2] The amended rule was adopted after considerable
study and is intended to provide a post-conviction pro-
cedure in accord with the principles enunciated in the so-
called trilogy of Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83
S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83
S.Ct. 822, 9 IL.Ed.2d 837,.and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770. Further in keeping with
the teachings: of the trilogy, the amended rule is designed
to discover amd adjudicate all claims for relief in one ap-
plication and avoid successive motions by requiring mo-
tions to be in ‘questionnaire form and by ‘providing for the
appointment of counsel if the motion presents questions of
law or issues; of fact and the movant is shown to be in-
digent.

[3] These and other provisions intended to furnish
more adequate post-conviction relief were not provided by
Rule 27.26 im effect at the time the present motion was
filed or when the appeal was argued and submitted in this
court. It is apparent, however, that regardless of whether

Sea i iiidaermccieball

A28

this court affirms the order and judgment, or reverses and
remands the cause, the movant will be immediately en-
titled to proceed under the provisions of amended Rule
27.26 and compliance with the amended rule would be
obligatory after September 1 this year. In these circum-
stances, it would be improvident to process the appeal

_ further and undertake to prepare an opinion on the merits,

The maximum relief to which the appellant is entitled in
this court is a reversal of the order and judgment of the
trial court and a remand for further proceedings under
amended Rule 27.26. Bosler v. Swenson, 8 Cir., 363 F.2d
154; Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18
L.Ed.2d 33. Furthermore, it appears that appellant's mo-
tion raises one or more issues of fact on which »ppellant
would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Accordingly, the order and judgment is reversed and
the cause is remanded with directions that all further pro-
ceedings be in compliance with the provisions of amended
Rule 27.26. If appellant elects to proceed with his motion
in the trial court, counsel must be appointed under sub-
paragraph (h) of the amended rule since appellant has
been shown to be an indigent person. Counsel should file
an amended motion which includes every ground known
to the prisoner for vacating, setting aside or correcting his
conviction and sentence and the prisoner shall verify the
correctness of the motion, including the fact that he has re-
cited all claims known to him, all as required by sub-
paragraph (c) of the amended rule. The trial court then
is required to conduct a full evidentiary hearjng on the
amended motion as required by subparagraph (e) of the
amended rule, assuming that the motion raises questions
of fact as does the present motion, after which the court
then is to decide all issues of fact and questions of law,
making findings of fact and conclusions of law as required
by subparagraph (i) of amended S.Ct. Rule 27.26.

All of the Judges concur.

A29

APPENDIX C

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
James W. STIDHAM, Appellant.
Nos. 45537, 54674.

Supreme Court of Missouri,
Division No. 2.
Feb. 9, 1970.

The Supreme Court set aside its affirmance of prior
postconviction judgment and remanded cause for amend-
ment of motion to vacate in view of revised postconviction
procedure. The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis,
Michael .F. Godfrey, J., and the Circuit Court of Butler
County, Randy Weber, J., entered judgment from which
petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Barrett, C., held
that even though indictment did not charge conspiracy, in-
struction hypothesizing that defendants conspired, acted in
concert, and aided and abetted in killing did not violate due
process on theory that. it violated constitutional proscrip-
tion against jury’s consideration of crime not included in
indictment where evidence supported hypothesis, indict-
ments charged defendants with killing victim by assault
with deadly weapons with malice aforethought and con-
spiracy was inherent and may have been incidentally in-
cluded offense.

Affirmed.
1. Constitutional Law (Key) 268 (2)

Even though indictment did not charge conspiracy,
instruction hypothesizing that defendants conspired, acted
in concert, and aided and abetted in killing did not. violate
due process on theory that it violated constitutional pro-

A30

scription against jury’s consideration of crime not included
in indictment where evidence supported hypothesis, in.
dictments chargec defendants with killing victim by assault
with deadly weapons with malice aforethought and. con-
spiracy was inherent and may have been incidentally in-
cluded offense. V.A.M.S. Const. art. 1, § 18(a); Sections
544.250, 556.120, 56.130, 556.170 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.

2. Constitutional Law (Key) 268(2),

‘Instruction defining conspiracy and stating that all
persons who are guilty of acting in concert and together in
commission of crime are principals did not infringe on due
process by allowing state to prove and jury to be instructed
to consider crime not included in indictment where instruc-
tion was warranted by statute and there was evidence of
conspiracy, actual participation in and consummation, in
conspiracy by defendants even though indictment did not
charge conspiracy. V.A.M.S. Const. art. 1, § 18(a); Sec-
tions 544.250, 556.120, 556.130, 556.170 RSMo 1959, V.A.MS.

3. Constitutional Law (Key) 268 (8)

Record containing corroboration for testimony of two
witnesses, alleged to have given perjured testimony, failed
to establish violation of due process by state’s knowing use
of perjured testimony based on fact that such witnesses
who had been inmates, had had their sentences commuted
and had been released from prison. V.A.M.R. Crim. Rule
27.26.

4. Constitutional Law (Key) 268.1(3)

Where defendant was not prosecuted by information,
but by indictment, eliminating need for preliminary hear-
ing, failure of court to appoint counsel at preliminary hear-
ing, even though defendant requested counsel at such hear-
ings, did not deny defendant due process of law. Section
544.250 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.

PE 2: am " hy

A31
5. Criminal Law (Key) 998 (17)

Record, including many pretrial motions by defend-
ant’s counsel, failed to support defendant’s allegation of
lack of counsel prior to trial.

§. Criminal Law (Key) 531(3)

Record failed to support claim that defendant’s confes-
" sion was extracted through physical force and threats of
physical force by being beaten with cork ball bat and by
not being given any food or water for three days.

7. Constitutional Law (Key) 266

Where, after trial judge overruled motion to suppress
confession, all witnesses testified to same facts and circum-
stances as they had on motion to suppress as it related to
issue of voluntariness, and upon this testimony issue of vol-
untariness was submitted to jury, court’s procedure for de-
termining voluntariness did not fail to comport with mini-
mum standards of due process.

8. Criminal Law (Key) 1172(2)

Instructions on voluntary confession were not prej-
udicially erroneous where there was, at time of trial, only
claim that oral and written confessions were obtained by
physical force and violence, and no claim of mental coercion
and where claim of mental coercion was not raised until
13 years later on motion to vacate sentence. V.A.M.R.
Crim. Rule 27.26.

9. Criminal Law (Key) 998 (6)

Where, at time defendant gave his statements, circum-
stances surrounding victim’s death and defendant’s part
in it were known, and defendant's statements played but
little if any part in his conviction in view Of other testiniony,

A32

claim that statement was not voluntary, on ground that
three errors, one in age, one in place of residence and prior
record, conclusively established that statement was not vol-

untary, was not ground for postconviction relief. V.A.M.R.
Crim. Rule 27.26.

10. Criminal Law (Key) 532

In view of trial court’s opinion that statement given
by defendant “is and should be admissible in evidence”
supported by cogent and convincing evidence, allowing
statement to go to jury did not violate Supreme Court de-
cision establishing procedure for admission of confession.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Kenneth M. Romines,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Mark M. Hennelly, St. Louis, for appellant.
BARRETT, Commissioner.

In 1952 James William (known to one and all as
“Slick”) Stidham was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment
for his part in the armed robbery of the Grapette Pottling
Company in Joplin. For the details of that crime see State
v. Stidham, Mo., 258 S.W.2d 620. On October 3, 1955,
after a jury trial and verdict in July 1955, Stidham: was
sentenced to life imprisonment for his participation in the
slaying of fellow-inmate Walter Lee Donnell on Sep-
tember 22, 1954, at the height of the riot of approximately
800 inmates of the main prison in Jefferson City. In the
trial of the latter case and now, at the behest of Father
Clark, he has been represented by a distinguished lawyer,
Mr. Mz.rk M. Hennelly, then a successful and experienced
criminal lawyer, now a vice-president and general counsel
of one of the larger railroads., The murder conviction was
appealed upon a full transcript of three volumes, there

A33

was a complete appellate review, the opinion was turned
into twenty-three headnotes, after counsel raised what he
deemed, no doubt every conceivable point and error. That
conviction of murder was affirmed on September 9, 1957, in
State v. Stidham, Mo., 305 S.W.2d 7. In view of some of
the problems now raised it should be pointed out that be-
fore the murder case reached trial stage Stidham’s diligent
counsel filed every conceivable motion and plea, including
the right to a change of venue which accounts for the trial
in Butler County, many miles from Jefferson City. Over
the years, following the affirmation of the life sentence,
Stidham has lodged in this court innumerable letters, com-
munications and pro se motions and they have all been
responded to. In June 1966 he personally filed and argued
an appeal from a 27.26, V.A.M.R. proceeding in Butler
County in which he attempted to present several of the
issues now before the court. State v. Stidham, 403 S.W.
9d 616. In the meanwhile the court en banc revised its
post-conviction procedure, and Stidham having unsuc-
cessfully instituted another 27.26 proceeding, this court
set aside its affirmance of the prior post-conviction judg-
ment and remanded the cause for an amendment of the
motion to vacate “which includes every ground known to
the prisoner,” and in the spirit of the rule for “a full evi-
dentiary hearing” on all questions of fact. The order
and judgment in that opinion is reported in State v.
Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297. And on that proceeding, on
Stidham’s behalf, there has been a change of venue from
Butler County and there has been a new and complete
hearing before Honorable Michael F. Godfrey, a circuit
judge in St. Louis. Furthermore, in response to what
was deemed to be the spirit of the Bosler cases, (Bosler
v. Swenson, 8 Cir., 363 F.2d 154 and Swenson v. Bosler,
386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18 L.Ed.2d 33) the court en
bane set aside the judgment of this court upon the original
appeal, 305 S.W.2d 7, and again appointed Mr. Hennelly

Ree Meg eer es RS Cee Sr eee |

A34

to represent Stidham in both cases. As indicated, there
was a full hearing on the 27.26 proceeding, all issues were
found against Stidham and he has appealed the judgment
in that case. In the order setting aside the original sub-
mission the two causes were consolidated and are to be
disposed of in this opinion. It should be stated in this con-:
nection that Mr. Hennelly has raised, extensively briefed,
and orally argued every conceivable claim of error in the
original trial, all of which covers and includes every pos-
sible right to relief in a post-conviction proceeding.

One of the claims of infringement of due process is
that the state was “allowed to prove and the jury was
instructed to consider a crime not included in the indict-
ment.” Const.Mo. Art. I, Sec. 18(a), V.A.M.S. Thus, it
is said, he was indicted for the murder of Donnell, but
he “was not, however, indicted for participating in a con-
spiracy to kill Donnell.” Therefore, it is urged that the
court erred in admitting in evidence conversations and
conduct on the part of others engaged in slaying Don-
nell. By the same token it is contended that the court
prejudicially erred in instructing the jury in referring to
and hypothesizing a concert of action, an aiding and
abetting in slaying Donnell. In the first place the argu-
ment overlooks not only the theory but the specific al-
legations of the indictment. And in the second place
it ignores the facts of Donnell’s killing, the circumstances
in which he was savagely murdered. While Stidham,
as well as his codefendants, was given a severance, the
indictment charged that “William R. Hoover, Jackie Lee
Noble, Paul Edward Kenton, James William Stidham,
Rollie Laster, Don Wm. DeLapp and Joseph M. Vidauri'

1. The details of Donnell’s murder are set forth in the
records and appeals of Stidham’s codefendants: State v. Laster,
365 Mo. 1076, 293 S.W.2d 300 (certiorari denied 352 U.S. 936, 77
S.Ct. 237, 1 L.Ed.2d 167); State v. Noble, Mo., 387 S.W.2d 522;
State v. Kenton, Mo., 298 S.W.2d 433; State v. Vidauri, Mo., 293
S.W.2d 955 and State v. Vidauri, Mo., 305 S.W.2d 437.

A35

+ * * did then and there feloniously, wilfully, deliberately,
premeditatedly, on purpose and of their malice afore-
thought, make an assault upon one Walter Lee Donnell
‘and then and there with dangerous and deadly weapons,
to wit: a sledgehammer, and a knife, and another sharp
instrument or dagger * * * a wooden table leg, and
other blunt instruments * *:’ * and their fists and
hands and feet * * * strike, hit, stab, cut, beat and stomp”
and thereby kill Donnell. The testimony was that
Kenton held Donnell while Laster stabbed him with an
ice pick, Stidham “slashed” him with a knife, and two
others hit him in thé head with a sledgehammer. In ad-
dition to other bruises and contusions an autopsy on Don-
nell’s body revealed “a severe mashed in, or compressed
area in the right side of the face approximately just
underneath the right eye, that extended back, involving
the right ear with separation of the lower part of the
ear, lower part of the ear was torn away from the body
about a third of its normal attachment area.” There was a
multiple, crashing, “eggshell type fracture” of the skull,
two knife-cut wounds of the neck, five puncture or stab
wounds in the chest and four stab wounds in the back.
The doctor said that two of the stab wounds had entered
the heart cavity and of course were fatal. The testimony
showed that until the three doors to Death Row were
forced and Stidham and Laster released and Stidham fur-
nished a knife DeLapp led the group bent on killing Don-
nell. As soon as Stidham was released DeLapp put his
arm around Stidham’s shoulders and said, “Gentlemen, I
have brought you this far, this is your leader from here on.”
And shortly this group gained entrance to Donnell’s cell
and killed him. Prior to the riot Stidham had repeatedly
threatened to kill both Donnell and James M. Creighton.

[1] This briefly narrated record completely refutes
the appellant’s claim of an invasion of due process in

tdi han eet ised

V7

submitting “a crime not included in the indictment.” The
indictment did not in terms charge the misdemeanor of.-
fense of conspiracy (RSMo 1959, §§ 556.120, 556.130,
V.A.M.S.), even though inherent in the circumstances jt
may have been an incidentally included offense. Principal
instruction number 4 hypothesized that the seven named
defendants “entered into a conspiracy and agreement”
and “acting in concert and together” and “aided, abetted,

A36

. assisted or encouraged” in slaying Donnell but, as in-

dicated, the evidence supports the hypothesis. There was
a separate conventional instruction defining “conspiracy”
stating that “all persons are principals who are guilty of
acting in concert and together in the commission of a
crime.”

[2] The latter instruction was not only warranted
by specific statute (RSMo 1959, § 556.170), upon this rec-
ord, as the court held on the previous appeal, State v.
Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 1. c. 15, “there was ample evidence
for a finding of the conspiracy submitted and the actual
participation in and consummation of the said conspiracy
by the persons named in the instruction.” A case directly
in point in every respect is State-v. Holloway, 355 Mo.
217, 195 S.W.2d 662, an instance of a- murder in a jail-
break. Excerpting, the court said, “Goldie and Buster
were co-conspirators with appellant. Their testimony was
competent in establishing the fact of the common design
or conspiracy...* * * Conversations between Goldie and
Buster were competent evidence against appellant although
made outside of appellant’s presence. * * * Furthermore,
proof that appellant and others conspired together to com-
mit an unlawful act and that the killing occurred in .
furtherance of the conspiracy may be shown under an
indictment or information charging first degree murder
only.” (Emphasis supplied. )

A37

Relying on Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct.
1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, appellant contends that due process
was violated in that the state knowingly used perjured
testimony. This assignment is leveled at the state’s use
of Herman Trout and James Creighton, also prison inmates,
as witnesses. (For a partial review of Creighton’s bizarre
life from a sentence of death in 1932 to a commutation of
prison sentence in 1956 see State v. Creighton, 330 Mo.
1176, 52 S.W.2d 556.) The argument now is directed solely
to the fact that the sentences of Creighton and Trout have
been commuted and they have been released from prison.
In the trial of this cause there was first a motion to dis-
qualify Creighton as a witness upon the allegation that he
was of unsound mind. That motion was heard at length,
all medical and psychiatric records from the State Hospital
at Fulton were introduced, and the court found as was all
but obvious that he was indeed not incompetent as a wit-
ness. See State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 1. c. 13. Upon the
original trial and appeal it was sought to establish the claim
of perjured testimony or incompetent witness by offering
to prove that while Creighton was held in the Cole County

‘\ jail he was granted special favors, particularly that “he
\had access to one Mary Annis” (305 S.W.2d 7) despite the
appellant’s proof from the Fulton Hospital records that
Creighton “is a homosexual.”

[3] In any event and apart from the federal cases,
this court has long since “recognize(d) that a judgment
obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony should
be vacated upon a proper factual showing.” State v.
Garton, Mo., 396 S.W.2d 581.. The insuperable difficulty
with this particular claim of infringement of due process
is that it is not supported by the record. Annotation 3
L.Ed.2d 1991. The only circumstance now present as to
both Creighton and Trout is the fact that in July 1955
they did testify as state’s witnesses and subsequently

tenants tintin nt ai ¥

Sh aR

A38

their sentences were commuted by the then..Governor of
Missouri. And again, on this issue, there was a hearing
on the 27.26 motion and aside from the bare fact lof the
commuted sentences the court found as did another court

in 1964 (State v. Stidham, 403 S.W.2d 616) that “(t)he rec-

ord is barren of facts to support such allegations.” It is
not necessary to detail their testimony, their evidence and
that of numerous other witnesses is all set forth in the ap-
peals of at least five of the participants in Donnell’s slay-
ing. On the 27.26 hearing the trial gourt could have added,
after reading the record in Stidham’s original appeal, that
the testimony of Creighton and Trout was cogently: cor-
roborated in every detail by a number of physical facts
and by othex, witnesses, particuJarly by the prison guard,
Mr. Dietzel, on duty in Death Row when Donnell was mur-
dered. In contrast to the testimony of Creighton and Trout
there is no corroboration whatever of Stidham’s testimony
that he went up to B-Hall and spent the night of the riot
innocently listening to the radio, had no knowledge of Don-
nell’s slaying and took no part in the riot. The one in-
criminating circumstance that even he has never and can-
not brush away is the conceded fact that after the three
doors to Death Row were broken open and after his cell
was unlocked he, unlike others and undoubtedly contrary
to prison rules, did leave Death Row. Thus upon this rec-
crd there was no support for the charge of knowing use of
perjured testimony.

A further due process point is the claim of the “court’s
failure to make timely appointment of counsel.” Here the
appellant relies upon Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84
S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 USS.
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 and other landmark cases
dealing with the appointment of counsel. It is not nec-
essary here to again examine those cases, their standards

$

A39

are recognized and applied even though the Miranda and
Escobedo cases are not retroactive. Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882. There is no
factual similarity in this and any of the cited cases, par-
ticularly, for example, as in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59,
83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193, and Arsenault v. Massa-
chusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S.Ct. 35, 21 L.Ed.2d 5, in which
there were pleas. of guilty at the preliminary or “at a
probable cause hearing” and the pleas were introduced in
evidence upon the jury trials. In certain instances in
which there has been manifest injustice, this jurisdiction
recognized the importance of the right to counsel long be-
fore Escobedo and Miranda. See Ex parte Stone, Mo.App.,
955 S.W.2d 155; State v. Jackson, 344 Mo. 1055, 130 S.W.2d

595 and State v. Witt, Mo., 422 S.W.2d 304.

The appellant’s complaint as to counsel arose in and
for the most part is based upon these circumstances:
Initially the prosecution of these seven defendants for this
particular offense was instituted by the prosecuting attor-
ney in a magistrate court and preliminary hearings were
held, a necessary prerequisite and procedure before a for-
mal information could be filed in the circuit court. RSMo
1959, § 544.250. Appellant and his counsel make much ado
of the fact that at one of these preliminary hearings he
demanded counsel and yelled out asking for some lawyer
to come forward. In his brief it is said that there was no
appointment of an attorney “until the second arraignment”
and in this connection stated that he was never advised
of his right to a lawyer—even though he requested one at
the preliminary—and that he was entitled to counsel before
his mental examination at the United States Medical
Center in Springfield. ,

[4] The basic fallacy in the appellant’s contention
on this phase of the case is that again there is no factual

Le yree ee:

A40

basis for his ‘claim of an infringement of rights at a pre-
liminary. In the first place there is neither claim nor proof
that anything done or said at any preliminary hearing or
in any medical or mental examination was employed
against him or that the state even secured any relevant
information. State v. Smith, Mo., 411 S.W.2d 208. But
more important and decisive here as to counsel at a pre-
liminary hearing is the fact that Stidham was not prose-
cuted by information. On November 23, 1954, a grand
jury returned an indictment charging Stidham and his ac-
complices with the murder of Donnell. Thus there was
no Occasion or place for a preliminary hearing. “It is a
well-established law of this State that the grand jury may
investigate and indict one charged with a felony although
he has been arrested and held for a preliminary examina-
tion, and is not bound to await the action of the ex-
amining court, for the reason that the action of the exam-
ining couft is no bar to the right of the grand jury to in-
quire into the case and indict the accused, even though he
has been discharged on the preliminary examination.”
“State v. Gieseke, 209 Mo. 331, 339, 108 S.W. 525, 527.

Su Wests nahh Pa As OAR ca ll ENT

wo Bk

1 Ovo Tah

[5] As a matter of fact, other than appellant’s asser-
tions, there is no record support for his charges of lack
of counsel prior to trial. Whatever may have occurred
at any preliminary has not been made a part of this record.
In any event, as stated, an indictment was returned, the
defendants, the indisputable record recites, were duly ar-
raigned, each defendant was furnished a copy of the in-
dictment and upon the request of Stidham for the appoint-
ment of a certain lawyer, the court appointed Mr. Hen-
nelly. Thereafter there were no motions or proceedings or
even references to a preliminary hearing or to anything
that may have occurred during such a hearing. Mr. Hen-
nelly was appointed to represent appellant on November

A4l1

23, 1954, and on December 6, 1954, a formal plea of not
guilty was entered. Almost immediately, on December 14,
1954, on Stidham’s behalf, there were motions for produc-
tion and inspection of any statements that may have been
given, a motion to dismiss for the reason of two offenses—
homicide and assault with intent to kill, a motion for a
severance, a motion for a polygraph examination and a
motion to suppress any statement he may have given.
These procedures were all considered in turn and disposed
of, including a motion for a continuance and finally an ap-
plication for a change of venue. The cause proceeded to
trial and in the first instance a mistrial was declared when
it was discovered that certain jurors were reading news-
paper accounts of the trial. In the present 27.26 proceed-
ing, after an unrestricted hearing, the court found these
issues with respect to counsel against appellant, that is the
court found that failure to appoint counsel at any prelim-
inary stage of the cause or during his interrogation by
police and prison authorities had not infringed any of ap-
pellant’s constitutional rights and that finding is con-
vincingly supported by the record. State v. Donnell, Mo.,
430 S.W.2d 297; Crosswhite v. State, Mo., 426 S.W.2d 67.
As a matter of fact appellant’s interrogation in connection
with the prison riot and Donnell’s Slaying is more ap-
propriately considered in connection with his assertion of
involuntary confession.

There is a threefold assignment of error in this respect,
neither of which would necessarily result, as the appellant
seems to think, in his exoneration and release from im-
prisonment. It is first urged in general terms that the
court erred in admitting in evidence exhibit 16, his own

_ handwritten confession. It is said that its admission de-
prived appellant “of his liberty ‘without due process of law.”
This allegation is not a briefed and argued point; in con-
nection with it, however, it is contended that the court’s

A42

procedure for determining voluntariness “did not comport
with the minimum standards” of due process in that “no
specific finding of voluntariness was made by the judge
prior to submitting the issue to the jury.” In the second
place it is said that under the evidence “the alleged con-
fession was coerced, involuntary, and taken in violation of
the defendant’s Constitutional rights,” meaning pre-
; sumably, that upon the record the confession was involun-
: tary as a matter of law. A third and connected point is
: that the instruction submitting the issue to the jury was
erroneous “by failing to properly instruct the jury on the
; Constitutional standards to be used in making their deter-
; mination as to the voluntariness” of the confession. The
latter point is not too clear—in some aspects it would seem
to say that, a question of law should have been submitted
to the jury. In the argument of this contention, presented
as a separate point, it 1s said that the jury was given an
“unconstitutional standard.” At another point it is said
that the instruction failed to include or submit “mental
coercion or duress” and, therefore, under State v. Williams,
Mo., 369 S.W.2d 408, was prejudicially erroneous. Thus
the complete gamut of involuntary confessions is sought
to be invoked one way orsanother.

It is necessary at this point and as to all claims of
involuntary confession to have some understanding of the
record and the context and manner in’ which_they arose.
In this case, in addition to all other motions, there was a
separate motion to suppress “any and all statements,” oral
or written, that Stidham may have made for the specified
reason that the “alleged statements were involuntary and
as a result of physical force and threats of physical force
applied against this defendant by police officers of the City
of St. Louis, guards of the Missouri State Penitentiary and
officers of the Missouri Highway Patrol.” (Emphasis sup-

A43

plied.) That motion was filed on December 14, 1954, and
the record recites. that it was overruled on December 20,
1954. That motion was filed and passed on while the cause
was pending in Cole County and it does not appear just
what if any evidence was heard before the court passed
on the motion. Thereafter, when in the course of the trial
in July 1955 it appeared for the first time from the testi-
mony of a highway patrol sergeant that Stidham’s oral
and written confessions were to be employed defendant’s
counsel, even in 1955, and unlike in State v. Williams,
“moves the Court to conduct a preliminary examination
and asks the Court to inquire into the voluntariness of the
statement, and to determine whether the statement was
given voluntarily, either the oral or the written statement.”
Thereupon the court interrupted the trial and out of the
jury’s presence and hearing conducted a hearing on ap-
pellant’s motion.

Highway patrol officers, St. Louis police, prison of-
ficials and all others present when Stidham’s statements
were made or given Were examined at length and in de-
tail as to the circumstances in which they were given.
It is not necessary to detail the circumstances, Stidham
in testifying upon the trial and the motion said that after
he was taken to the field house in the recreation area
where the investigation into the riot and, incidentally,
Donnell’s murder, was being conducted, he was hand-
cuffed, “a rope "(was fastened) between the handcuffs
* * * I was lifted up in the air where all my weight had
to bear on my two arms.” He said that the police officers
and patrol officers, fifteen to twenty, left him thus sus-
pended from the ceiling for fifteen minutes and then be-
cause he refused to give a statement they again lifted
him up and beat him with cork ball bats until he passed
out. And, he said, that as a result of this treatment
“I agreed to write a statement that they dictated to me.”

A44

And so after his oral statements and despite his paralyzed
arm he wréte the statement and the officers, unspecified,
forced him to sign it. )

[6-8] Contrary to Stidham’s testimony the severa]
officers who took part in the interrogation, accounted for
Stidham’s presence, every minute of time, and his treat-
ment from the time on September 22nd he was moved from
Death Row to O-Hall and finally on September 27th when
he was escorted from O-Hall to the recreation area and
his interrogation which lasted less than thirty minutes.
Incidentally Stidham was confined in solitary in Death
Row as punishment and for safekeeping because of an at-
tempt to escape the previous January. Creighton was
likewise an incorrigible and confined in Death Row, a maxi-
3 mum security area, as punishment. And the inference
P is that. Donnell, thought by the prison population in general
and Stidham and his friends in particular to be a snitch
was confined there for his personal safety. In any event,
the officers, one by one, denied the use of force, threats or
violence. Donnell was murdered on September 22nd and
the officers say that except in passing Stidham was not
questioned until he gave the statements on September 27th.
He claims, however, that when he was moved to O-Hall
he was placed in a bare cell, without running water, that
the windows were broken and he was only. allowed “to
keep a pair of pants and shoes on” and he said that he
was not “given any food or water for three days.” All of
this testimony was denied by the prison authorities even
though during a part of the time order had not been re-
stored and some buildings were still burning. Without nar-
rating even briefly, the testimony in contradiction of Stid-
ham’s uncorroborated claims was all but overwhelming
and even giving some credence to his version the circum-
stances do not approach those of Brooks v. Florida, 389

oom ae ae

vee at 08 Te aA

RNa Sin. a ren

| ewes 2

A45

~-y.S. 413, 88 S.Ct. 541, 19 L.Ed.2d 643, which “case docu-
ments a shocking display of barbarism.” And again, after
overruling the latter motion to suppress, all these wit-
nesses testified to the same facts and circumstances and
upon this testimony the issue of voluntariness was submitted
to the jury. There was in point of fact upon the trial
of the cause no claim of mental coercion, the claim was that
the oral and written confessions were obtained by physical
force and violence. And this is what Mr. Hennelly argued
to the jury, it was not until his 27.26 hearing, thirteen
years later, that there was a claim of mental duress. In
these circumstances, as upon the original appeal, the then
conventional instructions on voluntary confession were not
prejudicially erroneous. State v. Laster, 365 Mo. 1076, 293
S.W.2d 300; State v. Stidham, Mo., 305 S.W.2d 1. c. 16-18.

[9] In view of the insistent argument one other mat-
ter should be noted. In addition to his oral statements
this is Stidham’s confession, admittedly written by him:

“Kenton held Donald while Laster stabbed him
several times with a ice pick, at the same time I
slashed at him three or four times around the faee
and neck with a knife that Kenton gave me when he
opened the door, when Donald fell toahe floor Linder
and Thompson each said get Donald with the sledge
and they proceeded to hit him with a sledgehammer
and crowbar; during this time someone was holding
a flashlight that Kenton previously had. When we
left the cell Donald was lying on his back with his
head pointed toward the door. The knife I had was
a regular kitchen knife about six or seven inches. in
length, when I got back upstairs:in B-Hall, I threw
the knife on the floor near the west end on the south
side of the building.” —

In this statement, according to the appellant, there are
three errors which he says demonstrate that the six officers
signing as witnesses dictated the statement thus conclu-

: A46

sively eStablishing that the statement was not volun-
tary. The statement recites his age as 25 when in fact,
as shown by his birth certificate, he was 28. His residence
was given as Kansas City when in fact he had not lived
there and, three, although not to be found in the statement
that he was credited with three prior felony convictions
when in fact he had but two—one, he says, having been
“nullified.” The officers all say that they had no persona]
knowledge of these items except as Stidham wrote them in
his statement. And to further confuse this issue when he
was in the medical center in Springfield the documents
he introduced in evidence show that in two instances he
gave his age as 32. If these details are of any significance
upon the issue of voluntariness it could be pointed out that
in the statement Creighton’s name is misspelled “Crayton”
and repeatedly Donnell’s name is misspelled “Donald” and
he does not claim that the officers directed him to thus mis-
spell these names. And more significantly as to the slaying
of Donnell, the statement says that “Paul Kenton unlocked
my door” but upon his 27.26 hearing, years later, he says
“It was some colored fellow. I don’t remember who it was.
I think it was Ford.” Thus not only is there a direct
conflict in the testimony, upon the appellant’s own version
there looms a large credibility gap. And in this connec-
tion, by the time Stidham was brought to the interrogation
center on the 27th of September there was but little point
in obtaining a statement, let alone a confession, from him.
. By that time the guards had all been released from the
rioters’ custody and the cells, particularly Mr. Dietzel, and
they along with Stidham’s co-defendants had supplied all
the details of the riot as well as the killing of Donnell.
By the time Stidham gave his statements there was no
mystery as to Donnell’s death or as to Stidham’s part in
it and upon this record the statement played but little if
any part in his conviction.

Wines Uneaten eae a aA

eae

ca. ee

2 WY

A47

All that has gone before in this opinion is but back-
ground and preliminary to appellant’s principal claim that
the trial of his case, particularly as to his oral statements
and his confession, does not meet the standards of Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908;
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16
L.Ed.2d 895; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct.
1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Brooks v. Florida, supra,
and numerous other landmark federal cases concerned with
the subject of voluntary confessions. It is not necessary
here to attempt an explication of these cases, that has
been done several times and their mere citation indicates
an awareness of their significance and controlling force.
One of the latest explications of these and numerous other
cases is Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459 and it is sufficient
here to say that the interpretation of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals is accepted.

[10] The first and basic weakness of appellant’s pre-
sentation is his failure to recognize that unlike Jackson v.
Denno this jurisdiction does not apply or follow the so-
called New York rule in determining the voluntariness or
involuntariness of confessions, Missouri employs the so-
called Massachusetts, procedure “impliedly approved in
Jackson v. Denno,” State v. Washington, Mo., 399 S.W.2d
109, 114. Upon the trial of this case, after the appellant’s
motion and the indicated hearing before the court, out of
the jury’s hearing, the court made this order: “* * * it-is
the Court’s opinion that the matters concerning the state-
ment should be offered in the presence of the Jury, subject
of course to any attacks as to its credibility by the De-
fendant. The Defendant has of course the right to pro-
ceed to challenge the voluntariness of the statement and
confession, even before the Jury, but it is the Court’s opin-

5
i
‘
;
4
4

gn GL

A4sS

ion that upon the evidence that has been offered before
the Court and outside of the hearing of the Jury, that the
statement is and should be admissible in evidence.” Only
a single word is missing, the court unfortunately did not
in the italicized clause employ the word “voluntary,”
nevertheless, the meaning and intent are implicitly plain.
“Although the judge need not make formal findings of fact
or write an opinion, his conclusion that the confession is
voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable
clarity.” Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639,
643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593, 598. It is not necessary to again detail]
the conflicting evidence and demonstrate, as indicated from
even a brief recitation upon the “totality of the circum-
stances” (Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18
L.Ed.2d 423) the judge’s finding of voluntary confession,
prior to submission to the jury, was indeed supported by
cogent and convincing testimony. State v. Hester, Mo.,
1425 S.W.2d 110; Crosswhite v. State, Mo., 426 S.W.2d 67;
State v. Williams, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 956; State v. Glenn, Mo.,
429 S.W.2d 225.

And if this does not suffice, thirteen years later, upon
the 27.26 hearing the appellant was again given full op-
portunity to attack the previous finding and record and he
did so but the court on change of venue found the issues
against appellant. It may be interpolated that upon the

latter hearing he for the first time attempted to inject

the issue not alone of a confession produced by “police
brutality” but of mental duress and coercion. But here he
attempts to connect the murder of Donnell and the events
of September 22 and 27, 1954, with his prior confinement
and general treatment for infraction of rules and attempt-
to-escape events and treatment completely disassociated
with the riot and slaying. Needless to say, these are
“scarcely factors of involuntariness in a plea.” Verdon v.
United States, 8 Cir., 296 F.2d 549, 552. But again and

A49

_ -upon this issue and in the new 27,26 hearing the patrol,

police and prison officials were again‘ called, including
Patrolman Barton whom Stidham had accused as one of his
termentors and he denied that he ever at any time inter-
rogated or handled Stidham, although he had talked to
Creighton, Trout, Laster, Noble, Hoover, DeLapp and
Vidauri. In any event all these witnesses, all produced
by the state, categorically or implicitly refuted all of Stid-
ham’s claims of mistreatment, either physical or mental.
And upon this new hearing and record another circuit
judge made another complete finding of law and fact. The
court found, citing the Glenn and Washington cases, supra,
that Judge Randolph Weber in 1954 had “followed the cor-
rect procedure in determining the issue of voluntariness
of the confession and specifically made a finding relative
thereto and this Court now so finds that the correct pro-
cedure was utilized.” And finally the court found, as had
the previous court, that the oral and written confessions
were voluntary and, needless to add, the latter finding is
overwhelmingly supported and procedurally and factually
the cause meets all the requirements of the federal cases
and there has been no invasion of due process. Crosswhite
v. State, State v. Glenn and State v. Williams, supra.

Accordingly the original judgment, State v. Stidham,
Mo., 305 S.W.2d 7, is affirmed and the judgment in the
27.26 proceeding is likewise affirmed.

STOCKARD and PRITCHARD, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:

The foregoing opinion by BARRETT, C., is adopted as
the opinion of the court.

All of the Judges concur.

. PRT Tr |

Ce he,

A50

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THRE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIAM STIDHAM, >

Petitioner,
” : Civil Action
; No. 18121-2
HAROLD R. SWENSON,
Respondent. ;

Memorandum and Order Denying Petition
for Habeas Corpus

(Filed May 15, 1970)

Petitioner is an inmate of the Missouri State Peniten-
tiary serving a sentence of life imprisonment upon convic-
tion of a first-degree murder. Petitioner filed a petition
for habeas corpus asserting that his conviction is void be-
cause it was rendered without due process of law and in
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

In May, 1952 petitioner was sentenced to a 25-year
term in the Penitentiary for robbery. While serving his
term, he was accused and convicted in 1955 of killing
another inmate, for which he was sentenced to a life term.
Petitioner appealed his conviction which was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1957. See 305 S.W. 2d 7.
In 1964 he filed a 27.26 motion to vacate his sentence which
was denied without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. See 403 S.W. 2d 616.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a second 27.26 motion alleging
new grounds, which was also denied without an evidentiary
hearing by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Missouri
reversed and remanded on appeal (415 S.W. 2d 297) and

AS1

on December 5, 1968, an evidentiary hearing was held in
the St. Louis City Circuit Court. This hearing resulted in
3 denial of relief under the 27.26 motion, which judgment
was appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated with
another appeal for-hearing by the court en banc. The Su-
preme Court on Febpiary- 9, 1970 affirmed the decisions
of the lower courts. 449 S.W. 2d 634.

Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus in

" this Court, and on March 2, 1970, a show cause order was

issued, since it appeared that petitioner had exhausted his
available state remedies and might have stated a violation
of one or more of his federally protected rights. ‘The re-
spondent filed with this Court, in response to the show
cause order, the transcripts of the records on appeals (Mis-
souri Case Nos. 45537 and 54674), briefs and arguments of
the parties, and the opinions of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri. It appears to the Court that this record is complete
and that it-fully demonstrates that the petitioner has ex-
hausted his available state remedies.

The petitioner alleges seven grounds for relief: (1)
that he was tried and convicted upon a charge of conspiracy
which was not included in the indictment; (2) that he was
deprived of assistance of counsel at two critical stages of
his trial; (3) that he did not knowingly or competently
waive the assistance of counsel at any stage of the proceed-
ings against him; (4) that certain members of the Missouri
State Highway Patrol and personnel of Missouri State Peni-
tentiary exerted physical and mental punishment upon him
to secure a confession from him; (5) that the trial judge
admitted the confession into evidence without first making
a clear and specific finding that the said confession was
voluntary; (6) that Instruction No. 6 given at the trial did
nct fully set out the constitutional standards for the jury’s
guidance to determine the voluntariness of the said con-

\

0 AR AAD

A52

fession; and (7) that the State of Missouri knowingly useq
perjured testimony of two convicts to obtain the conviction
of petitioner.

The facts are fairly well set out in State v. Stidham,
305 S.W. 2d 7. Very briefly, in 1952 petitioner was sen.
tenced to 25 years’ imprisonment for his part in the armed
robbery of Grapette Bottling Company in Joplin, Missouri,
(See State v. Stidham, 258 S.W. 2d 620.) On October 3.
1955, after a jury verdict of guilty, petitioner was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment for his participation in the
murder of a fellow inmate, Walter Donnell, on Septeinber
22, 1954, during the riot of 800 prisoners in the Missouri
State Penitentiary.

Petitioner’s first contention is that the state was al-
lowed to prove and the jury instructed upon the charge of
conspiracy to murder which was not included in the in-
dictment. The indictment did not charge conspiracy; but
it did charge seven persons- with the murder of Donnell.
Even though petitioner and the other named defendants
were granted severances, the indictments in each trial
named all seven of them. Further, the evidence showed
that the defendants had acted in concert. An objection
was leveled against Instruction No. 4 because it hypoth-
esized that each had entered into a conspiracy and had
acted in concert and “aided, abetted, assisted or encour-
aged” in the slaying. Under Missouri law all persons who
are guilty of acting in concert in the commission of a felony
are considered principals and are charged, tried, con-
victed and punished in the same manner. (See V.A.MS,.,
$ 556.170.) There is no merit to the claim that murder and
conspiracy to commit murder (which was in fact accom-
plished) are such different charges that petitioner could
not have been prepared to defend himself. Furthermore,
there is direct authority for instructing and proving a con-

A53

spiracy to commit murder under an indictment charging
first-degree murder. State v. Holloway, (Mo. Sup.) 195
S.W. 2d 662 (cited by the Missouri Supreme Court) states:

(P)roof that appellant and others conspired together
to commit an unlawful act and that the killing occurred
in furtherance of the conspiracy may be shown un-
der an indictment or information charging first de-
gree murder only.

Petitioner next contends that he was deprived of ef-
fective assistance of counsel at two critical stages of his
trial and that he did not knowingly or competently waive
such assistance at any time. These times were while he
was being interrogated by the police and at his first ar-

raignment.

Factually, there .were two arraignments. The first
was instituted by the prosecuting attorney on an informa-
tion in the magistrate court. There petitioner demanded
counsel, and shouted out in the courtroom for counsel, but
his request was denied. A plea of not guilty was entered
for petitioner. Preliminary hearings were held as required
by V.A.M.S., § 544.250. Petitioner was later rearraigned
on an indictment returned by the grand jury of Cole
County, and at that time counsel was appointed for him.
Petitioner contends that this late appointment of counsel
resulted in the denial of effective assistance of counsel un-
der the standard of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45.

The failure to appoint counsel at interrogation has
been established as a denjal of due process by Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436. However, these cases are not retroactive (Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719) and do not control here.

The more serious question concerns the failure to
appoint counsel at the time of the first arraignment, which

A54

petitioner claims resulted in denial of due process, Pet.
tioner cites Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, White y.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, and Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393
U.S. 5, as authority. The Missouri Supreme Court in their
opinion 449 S.W. 2d 634 distinguished the latter two cases
by stating that “(t)here is no factual similarity in this ang
any of the cited cases... (citing White v. Maryland, Supra,
and Arsenault v. Massachusetts, supra) in which there were
pleas of guilty at the preliminary or ‘at a probable cause
hearing’ and the pleas were introduced in evidence upon
jury trials.’ However, in Hamilton v. Alabama, from
which the holdings in White and Arsenault were drawn,
the petitioner, at arraignment without counsel being ap-
pointed, pled not guilty. The Supreme Court held that the
arraignment is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding,
and the failure to appoint counsel to represent the defend-
ant at that time is a denial of due process. The court
stated at page 55:

When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit
of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prej-
udice resulted. (Citing cases.) In this case... the
degree of prejudice can never be known. Only ‘the
presence of counsel could have enabled this accused
to know all the defenses available to him and to plead
intelligently.

The respondent and the Missouri Supreme Court opin-
ion state that no infringement of rights occurred for two
reasons. The first is that “There is neither claim nor proof
that anything done or said at any preliminary hearing or
in any medical or mental examination was employed
against |Stidham] or that the state even secured any rele-
vant information.” (448 S.W. 2d at 639.) More decisive,
according to the court, is the fact that Stidham was not
prosecuted by information (under which the preliminary
hearings had been held) but rather by an indictment re-

A55

turned on November 23, 1954. “Thus there was no occa-
sion or place for a preliminary hearing.” Petitioner,
along with his six co-defendants, were arraigned under the
information on September .29, 1954; the information was
dismissed and the indictment was returned on November
93, 1954. On this date counsel was appointed, and peti-
tioner was rearraigned with the presence of counsel on
December 6, 1954.

The important question is whether the arraignment and
preliminary hearing are critical stages in the proceedings
in Missouri. Under Missouri law, a defendant is not re-
quired to assert any right, plea or defense at the arraign-
ment in order to preserve any statutory or constitutional
rights. (V.A.M.S., $ 546.020) Moreover, all rights, pleas
or defenses are preserved inviolate. In State v. Benson,
(Mo. Sup.) 415 S.W. 2d 773, it was held that the absence
of counsel during arraignment is not, per se, a violation
of the Sixth Amendment. In Madison vy. Tahash, (C.A.
8) 359 F. 2d 60, the court held that the arraignment was
not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings in Minne-
sota. Donnell v. Swenson, (W.D. Mo.) 302 F. Supp. 1024,
extended the Tahash holding to cover arraignments in
Missouri.

In State v. Patrick, (Mo. Sup.) 420 S.W. 2d 258, the
preliminary hearing was held not to be a critical stage.
This view is also supported by Pope v. Swenson, (C.A. 8)
395 F.2d 320, 322, in which the court stated, ‘“‘We agree that
denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing under Missouri
law was not a constitutional infirmity in Pope’s convic-
tion, where the defendant pleaded not guilty and was
otherwise not shown to have been prejudiced.” See also
Nolan v. Nash, (C.A. 8) 316 F. 2d 777; Cf. Burnside v.
State of Nebraska, (C.A. 8) 346 F. 2d 88; Holland v. State
of Nebraska, (C.A. 8) 416 F. 2d 1007.

fi

- Ad6

Petitioner in this case did not plead, and, pursuant to
V.A.M.S., § 546.020, a plea of not guilty was entered for
him. At the second arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty, was furnished a copy of the indictment and, upon
his request for a certain lawyer, the court appointed that
f attorney who represented him thereafter. Petitioner raises
d no complaints about the efforts of the attorney in his be
2 half. Petitioner has not shown that he was deprived of
any rights by the failure to appoint counsel at the first
arraignment, and, therefore, in line with the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, we hold that the failure to appoint coun-
sel at that time was not a deprivation of rights.

Petitioner further asserts that the state knowingly used
perjured testimony of two witnesses against him. The
state used two prison inmates, Herman Trout and James
Creighton, to testify; as proof of perjury, petitioner states
that both prisoners had their sentences commuted and
were released from prison on the same day.

In making such an allegation, the burden of proof is
on petitioner to show both that the testimony was perjured
and that such testimony was knowingly and intentionally
used by the prosecuting attorney in order to obtain a con-
viction. Anderson v. United States, (C.A. 7) 403 F. 2d
451; Smith v. State of Florida, (C.A. 5) 410 F. 2d 1349, and
cases cited therein; Enzor v. United States, (C.A. 5) 296
F. 2d 62; United State v. Jenkins, (C.A. 3) 281 F. 2d 193.
The petitioner has not met this test. His allegations and
the record are devoid of any proof of perjury or willful
use of perjury by the state. Furthermore, petitioner con-
cedes that he has no direct proof, but contends that the
circumstantial evidence, that of commutation of sentence
less than six months after Stidham’s trial, is sufficient
proof to indicate perjury in line with Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264. That case is not controlling here because there

eee
ie SEE .

AST

was express proof of a “deal” between the prosecutor and
witness in the case. Here there is no such proof.

Petitioner’s three remaining contentions relate to the
issue of voluntariness of his confession. He asserts that
he was coerced by physical and mental punishment to con-
fess, that the confession was admitted without a finding
by the trial judge that it was voluntary, and that the in-
struction given at the trial did not fully set out the con-
stitutional standards for the jury’s guidance in determin-
ing the issue of voluntariness. |

In regard to petitioner’s first allegation, he relies
mainly upon the cases of Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, and
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737. Both cases use the
criterion of “totality of circumstances” in determining
whether the confessions were voluntary. The respondent
and the Missouri Supreme Court opinion lend little
credence to Stidham’s testimony because “Without nar-
rating even briefly, the testimony in contradiction of Stid-
ham’s uncorroborated claims was all but overwhelming .. .”
This not unexpected. The Supreme Court in both Clewis
and Davis, supra, commented, ‘“‘As is almost invariably so
in cases involving confessions obtained through unob-
served police interrogation, there is a conflict in the tes-
timony as to the events surrounding the interrogation.”

It is necessary to review the uncontroverted facts in
order to determine this issue. The murder was committed
on September 22, 1954 and Stidham confessed on Septem-
ber 27, 1954. He was questioned intermittently up until
that time concerning his part in the murder. He had very
little food and very little sleep. At no time during this
period was he informed of his right to counsel or to re-
main silent. In fact, he asserts that an attempt to get an
attorney was thwarted when the prison authorities refused
to allow a letter to be mailed. On the 27th, Stidham was

-
. ae

A58

taken to the Athletic Building and questioned by a number
of officers who had hand guns and riot guns in their pos-
session. Stidham asserts that he was physically abused
and rendered unconscious at this time, and these acts re.
sulted in his confession. Before and after the interroga-
tions Stidham was in solitary confinement and no visitors,
including parents or priest, were allowed to see him
Other uncontradicted facts indicated that Stidham was de
prived of food for two days after his confession and that he
lost 25 pounds during the period of interrogation.

eon pp RR HAE at Nay

He had consistently denied all involvement in the
murder up until the time of his confession.

The most damaging of the factors considered in the
totality of the circumstances is the failure to inform peti-
tioner of his rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, has
been determined not to be applicable retroactively. (See
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719.) However, it still
remains that the failure to inform is a significant factor
in determining the issue of voluntariness, although it is
insufficient in itself to require the voiding of the confes-
sion. Wholly apart from the disputed facts, the statement
of facts established by the record and as found at Stid-
ham’s 27.26 evidentiary hearing do not lead to the con-
clusion that such pressures were applied to Stidham as to
result in overcoming his will to maintain his innocence.

Petitioner next attacks the procedure used by the trial
court in determining the voluntariness of the confession,
alleging that it is in violation of Jackson v. Denno, 378 US.
368. In that case, a constitutional rule was established
that a jury was not to hear a confession unless and until
the trial judge had determined that it was freely and vol-
untarily given. In Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, the court
further extended this holding at page 544:

A59

The rule allows the jury, if it so chooses, to give ab-
solutely no weight to the confession in determining
the guilt or innocence of a defendant but it is not for
the jury to make the primary determination of volun-
tariness. Although the judge need not make for-
mal findings of fact or write an opinion, his con-
clusion that the confession is voluntary must appear
from the record with unmistakable clarity.

Here, in accordance with a request of Stidham’s coun-
sel, the trial court conducted a preliminary examination
inquiring into the voluntariness of the confession out-
side of the hearing of the jury. Witnesses were called and
cross-examined. This hearing satisifed the requirement
of Jackson v. Denno, supra, that there be a (1 ) reliable
nonjury preliminary or post conviction determination of
the issue of voluntariness, (2) uninfluenced by the truth
or falsity of the confession (3) by procedures “fully ade-
quate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination,
including the resolution of disputed facts upon which
the voluntariness issue may depend.”

At the conclusion of the testimony, the court made
the following statement:

THE COURT: Now, at the conclusion of the hearing
held outside of the hearing of the Jury, the request
by the Defendant for a hearing upon the statement
which has been identified as—

MR. RILEY: 16 and 16-1.

THE COURT: 16 and 16-1, it is the Court’s opinion
that the matters concerning the statement should be
offered in the presence of the Jury, subject of course
to any attacks as to its credibility by the Defendant.
The Defendant has of course the right to proceed to
challenge the voluntariness of the statement and con-
fession, even before the Jury, but it is the Court’s
opinion that upon the evidence that has been offered
before the Court and outside of the hearing of the

gsc |

ah

A60

Jury, that the statement is and should be admissible
in evidence, subject to further examinations of the
witnesses which might be conducted, so we may pro-
ceed with Sergeant Little, as to his identification be.
fore the Jury of the statement in question, Exhibit
16 and 16-1.

MR. HENNELLY: In other words, the Court is over-
ruling my Motion, and request of the Court to hold
as a matter of law, that those eetetniente were in-
voluntary, is that right?

THE COURT: That is right. Mr. Sheriff will you
bring the Jury back in?

If the trial court had simply stated that he found the
confession was voluntarily made after hearing the many

witnesses who testified on this score, the matter would have
been settled and this point could™not be raised in this
Court. There are many cases holding that a ruling by the
Court that the evidence heard “makes a jury issue of the
matter,” or words of similar import, do not satisfy the rule
of Jackson v. Denno, supra. And so the precise question

presented here is whether the Court did find the confes-
sion involuntary or whether he failed to rule on that point

- and decided to let that question be decided by the jury.

The evidence in this case on behalf of the defendant,
which the judge heard, was that he was subjected to brutal
physical torture to induce the confession. If the judge
had believed even a part of his testimony, he would have
undoubtedly held the confession involuntary. The trial
court held a full-scale evidentiary hearing on the volun-
tariness of the confession, and without actually using the
word voluntary, directly held that he believed the state's
witnesses and did not believe the defendant’s testimony.
This reasoning was supported by the direct ruling that
he was denying the request of defendant’s counsel to hold
that the contested statement was involuntary.

A61

It would be highly technical, in this day and age, to
hold that the word “voluntary” was a word of art and, in
its absence, a conviction by a jury, after a long trial, should
be set aside because the judge ruled the statement was
not involuntary instead of ruling that the statement was
voluntary. Jt is the opinion of this Court that the state-
ments and action of the judge does clearly indicate a
finding of voluntariness, and is sufficient under the teach-
ings of Jackson v. Denno, supra, and Sims v. Georgia,

supra.

The petitioner’s third attack is related to the second.
Basically, he contends that since the judge made no spe-
cific finding of voluntariness, his instruction which did
not require them to make a specific finding on the vol-
untariness of the confession was violative of Jackson v.
Denno, supra. Since we have held that the trial court
reliably determined the issue of voluntariness, it was not
necessary for the jury to make a specific finding thereon.

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that the petition for habeas corpus be,
and hereby is, denied.

/s/ Wm. R. Collinson
District Judge

Sawin ade

A62

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 20,685

) Appeal from the
Judgment of the
United States Dis.
Appellant, trict Court for the
Vv. | Western District of
Missouri Denying
Appellant’s _Peti-
tion for the Writ
of Habeas Corpus.

James William Stidham,

Harold R. Swenson, Warden,
Appellee.

[May 24, 1971.]

Before Gipson, HEANEY and BriGut, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

On September 22, 1954, an inmate of the Missouri
State Penitentiary was beaten and stabbed to death by
fellow inmates during a riot in that institution. An in-
vestigation was undertaken by the prison authorities im-
mediately after the quelling of the riot. Written confes-
sions were eventually obtained from several inmates, in-
cluding James William Stidham. Stidham’s confession
was used against him in his 1955 trial in state court in
which he was convicted of first degree murder.

A63

Stidham made a number of attempts to obtain relief
in Missouri courts on the ground that the trial judge did
not find his confession to be voluntary, as required by
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964),’ before submitting
it to the jury. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (1957);
State v. Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297 (1967); State v. Stidham,
449 S.W.2d 634 (1970). He was unsuccessful in each at-
tempt.

On November 9, 1970, a habeas corpus petition brought
by Stidham was denied by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri. The District Court
found (1) that the trial court which initially tried Stid-
ham had complied with Jackson, and (2) that on the
basis of the undisputed facts adduced at the state trial
and the subsequent state evidentiary hearing, the confes-
sion was voluntary. Stidham appeals from the denial.”

COMPLIANCE WITH JACKSON

At the initial trial, the state court heard evidence out-
side the presence of the jury on the voluntariness of the
confession. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
court stated:

“* * * [I]t is the Court’s opinion that the matters
concerning the statement should be offered in the
presence of the Jury, subject of course to any attacks
as to its credibility by the Defendant. The Defendant

1. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), is retroactively
applicable. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Parker
v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1969), rev’d on other grounds,
396 U.S. 482 (1970).

2. Stidham also contends on appeal that he was denied
assistance of counsel at two critical stages of his trial, that he
was tried and convicted on a charge not included in his indictment
and that the State of Missouri knowingly used the perjured testi-
mony of two convicts in obtaining his conviction. We affirm
the decision of the District Court on each of these issues for the
reasons given in that court’s memorandum opinion. Stidham v.,
Swenson, Civ. No. 18121-2 (W.D. Mo. May 15, 1970).

ae
A64

has of course the right to proceed to challenge the
voluntariness of the statement and confession, even
. before the Jury, but it is the Court’s opinion that upon
q the evidence that has been offered before the Court
and outside of the hearing of the Jury, that the state
4 ment is and should be admissible in evidence, sub.
5 ject to further examinations of the witnesses which
might be conducted * * *

“MR. HENNELLY [Defendant’s counsel]: In other
words, the Court is overruling my Motion, and request
4 of the Court to hold as a matter of law, that those
} statements were involuntary, is that right?

“THE COURT: That is right. * * *”

The United States District Court found that this ruling
comported with the requirements of Jackson v. Denno,
supra, stating:

“It would be highly technical, in this day and age,
to hold that the word ‘voluntary’ was a word of art
and, in its absence, a conviction by a jury, after a
long trial, should be set aside because the judge ruled
the statement not involuntary instead of ruling that
the statement was voluntary. It is the opinion of this

- Court that the statements and action of the judge does
clearly indicate a finding of voluntariness, and is suf-
ficient under the teachings of Jackson v. Denno, supra,
and Sims v. Georgia, [385 U.S. 538 (19...) ].”

We believe that the District Court’s analysis is incor-
rect. It assumes that Missouri law, at the time of Stid-
ham’s trial, required the trial court to find that a confes-
sion was voluntary before permitting it to be considered
by a jury. Our examination of the Missouri case law con-
vinces us that a trial court had and frequently used the
right to submit the question of voluntariness to the jury
without a prior determination that the confession was vol-
untary.

The following statements of the Pre-Jackson-Denno
Missouri procedure support this view:

atte’
a M ~

A65

«« * * [W]hen there is substantial conflicting evi-
dence and the question is close it is better to refer
the underlying issue of voluntariness to the jury than
to exclude the confession, since there is less chance
of a miscarriage of justice by leaving the question
open to a second determination, before the jury on
a rehearing of the evidence under proper instructions,
than by foreclosing the inquiry. The court then can
still exclude the confession if it finds from all the evi-
dence, including that introduced at the preliminary
hearing, that the same was involuntary. * * *”

State v. Gibilterra, 116 S.W.2d 88, 94 (1938).

“It is my view that we should adhere to the standard
of admissibility of confessions of whether or not the
particular confession is voluntary in fact. That has
always been the rule of this Court. * * * [T]his is a
jury question unless its involuntary character so con-
clusively appears that it must be held to be involun-
tary as a matter of law. * * * If the confession is
voluntary in fact, and is true, the defendant’s rights
are not violated by putting it in evidence. Some one
must determine these fact issues, and our system is
to leave them to the jury, when they must be decided
on conflicting evidence.” (Citations omitted. )

State v. Sanford, 193 S.W.2d 37, 38 (1946) (concurring
opinion ). ,

“* * * Under our system of jurisprudence it is gen-
erally left to the jury to determine whether a con-
fession was voluntary, unless the contrary appears
so conclusively that the confession must be held in-
voluntary as a matter of law. * * *” (Citations
omitted. )

State v. Laster, 293 S.W.2d 300, 304 (1956) .*

3. See also, State v. Bridges, 349 S.W.2d 214 (1961); State
v. Barnett, 338 S.W.2d 853 (1960); State v. Falbo, 333 S.W.2d
279 (1960); State v. Statler, 331 S.W.2d 526 (1960); State v.
Phillips, 324 S.W.2d 693 (1959); State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584
(1953); State v. Cochran, 203 S.W.2d 707 (1947); State v. Ellis,
193 S.W.2d 37 (1946).

nD Nk OLA OAS

>, +.
ODD

A66

Our analysis of the record of Stidham’s trial leads ys
to conclude that the trial judge in this case submitted the
voluntariness issue to the jury without making a prior
factual determination that the confession was voluntary.
His finding, that the confession was not “involuntary as
a matter of law”, was not, under the then existing Mis.
souri law, the same as finding that it was voluntary. |f
the trial judge does not make a factual determination that
a confession is voluntary before submitting it to the jury,
Jackson standards are violated. Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2q
459 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 482 (1970).

The Missouri Supreme Court’s treatment of this issue
on Stidham’s appeals buttresses our view that the require:
ments of Jackson were not met. In its first Stidham opin-
ion, 305 S.W.2d 7 (1957), the court stated:

“There is no merit in defendant’s contention that his
written confession was coerced and involuntary and
was admitted in evidence before the State established
that it had been voluntarily given. The court con-
ducted a full preliminary hearing on the issue, found
the issue was for the jury, and later, after hearing the
evidence before the jury submitted the issue to the
jury for determination. * * * On the conflicting show-
ing the issue of the voluntariness of the confession
was for the jury. * * *” (Emphasis added. )

In its most recent Stidham opinion, 449 S.W.2d 634 (1970),
the Missouri Supreme Court examined its procedure and
determined that ‘“* * * Missouri employs the so-called
Massachusetts procedure ‘impliedly approved in Jackson
v. Denno’ * * *”. In doing so, the court relied upon State
v. Washington, 399 S.W.2d 109 (1966). We point out that
State v. ‘Washington was decided after Jackson became
the law, and a comparison of its standard with those
enunciated in the Missouri cases, above cited, reveals the
difference between the 1955 and 1966 standards.

A67
THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONFESSION

The Supreme Court recently reemphasized that a de-
fective procedure, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis

for habeas corpus relief:

“(Our decisions]* did not establish that an applicant
for federal habeas corpus is entitled to a new hearing
on the voluntariness issue, in either the federal or
state courts, merely because he can point to short-
comings in the procedures used to decide the issue
of voluntariness in the state courts. Our decisions
make clear that he must also show that his version
of events, if true, would require the conclusion that
his confession was involuntary.”

Procunier v. Atchley,... U.S... ., 27 L-Ed.2d 524, 529
(1971).

Stidham alleges: that he was returned to his regular
Death Row cell in the early evening of September 22; that
between September 22 and September 27, he was ques-
tioned intermittently by police officers and state troopers
who threatened him with physical harm if he did not tell
everything he knew about

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0078%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
