# Opinion — Flood v. Kuhn > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0042%3A09 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opinion - **Published:** January 1, 1972 - **Citation:** 407 U.S. 258 ## Text a Ses, -octomer TERM, 197. , Teague draft of potential: new players; and the forma- in 1966.7 : ‘ Henry, Chadwick, Eddie Colli | Cleveland Alexandér, Rogers ney, Harry ‘Hooper, ~ Goose Goslin, Jackie Robinson, Hons Wagner, Joe Mc- _. .Big Dan Brouthers, Wahoo Sam Crawford, Wee » Satchel Paige, Hugh Jennings, Fred Merkle, Iron Man _ ° McGinnity, Three-Finger Brown, Harry and Stan* ~ >, Coveleski, Connie Mack, AI Bridwell, Red Ruffing, Amos. _* » Rusie, Cy Young, Smokey Joe Wood, Chief Meyers, ~~ Joe Tinker, Roy. Campanella, Miller Huggins, Rube. * Opinion of the Cour | a 407 U.S. Series } in 1903, 5 dieription ' in 1904, and the Soedea? resump- tion ‘in “1905; the short-lived Federal » League on’ . the majors’ scene during World War I years; the trouble--. some and discouraging episode of the 1919. Series ; the “home run ball; the shifting of franchises ; the expansion. of the leagues; the installation in 1965 of the major. tion of the: Major League Baseball Players Amoenton Then there are the many names, Gatehathad for one reason or another, that have sparked the diamond and © its environs and that ve provided tinder for recaptured thrills, for reminiscence\and cémparisons, and for con-. -. versation and anticipatidn in-season and off-season: ‘Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Tris\Speaker, Walter Johnson, ala Gehrig, Grover | Carthy, John McGraw, Deacon Phillippe, quard, Christy Mathewson, Tommy Delahanty, Davy Jones, ‘Germany Schack, I Keeler, Big Ed Walsh, Jimmy Austin, Fred Snodgrass” : Chief Bender, Bili Klem, Hans ‘Lobert, Johnny Evers, Bressler, Dazzy Vance, Edd Roush, Bill Wambsganss, Clark Griffith, Branch a, Frank Chanee, Cap Anson, ® See generally ‘The Baseball Encyclopedia (1969) ; L. River, The a # Glory: of Their Times (1966); 1 & 2 H. Seymour, ‘Baseball (1960, 1971); .1 & 2 Dz Voigt, American Baseball (1966, 1970): s . FLOOD v. KUHN 268 e Ne ap ‘Lajoie. Sad Sam Jones, Bob O'Farrell, Letty O’Doul, Bebby Veach, Willie Kamm, Heinie Groh, Lloyd and Paul Waner, Stuffy McInnis, Charles Comiskey, Roger Bresnahan, Bill Dickey, Zack ‘Wheat, George Sisler, Charlie Gehringer, Eppa Rixey, Harry Heilmann, Fred Clarke, Dizzy Dean, Hank Greenberg, Pie Traynor, Rube ' 258 - — Opinion of the Court, | @ Waddell, Bill Terry, Carl Hubbell, Old Hoss Radbourne, _ Moe Berg, Rabbit Maranville, Ji immie Foxx, Lefty Grove.° The list seems endless.: And one recalls the appropriate reference to the ow orld _ Serious,” attributed to Ring Lardnér, Sr.; Ernest L. - Thiyer's “Casey at the Bat”; * the ring of “Tinker to These are names only from earlier years By mentioning some, one risks unintended omission of others equally celebrated. * Millions have known and enjoyed baseball. One writer knowl-. “I knew'a cove who’d never heard. of Washington’ and Lee, Of Caesar and Napoleon from the ancient jamboree, - . But, bli’me, there are queerer things than anything-like that, For mare's a cove who never. heard of hase at the Bat’! “Ten million never rielind of Kisste, or Shelley, Burns or ie: But they know ‘the air-was shattered by the foreé-of Casey’ blow’; Pir never heard of-Shakespeare, nor of Dickens, like as not, a en er old. Mudville’s haunted a Ri Say ipuek: Se Case “Am Y dreaming? Is it true? Is fame but windblown ashes when the summer day is | - through? : Does _ greatness fade so quickly oat is winder anced to ‘die That bigomed in early morning, ere the dusk rides down the cr sky?” \ nies en “He Never Heard of Casey” Grantland Rice, ‘The Sprig a York Herald _—— June 1, 1926, p. 23. ‘_ edgeable in the field of sports almost assumed that everyone did © until, one day, he discovered otherwise: . 264. OCTOBER TERM, 1971 Opinion of the ‘Court 407 U:S. | "Evers to Chance”; * and all the other happenings, habits, and superstitions about and around baseball that made it the “national pastime” or, depending upon the pon : of, view, “the great, Americar. tragedy. ag I : -The Petitioner The. silliest: Curtis Charles Flood, born in 1938, 7 began his major. league career in 1956 when he signed a contract with the.Cincinnati Reds for a salary of $4,000 ~ for the season. He had no attorney or agent to advise him on that occasion. He was traded to the St. Louis Cardinals before the 1958 season. Flood rose to fame as a center fielder with the Cardinals during the years. 1958-1969. In those 12 seasons he compiled a batting average of .293. His best. offensive season was: 1967 - . when he achieved .335. He was- .301 or better in six of the 12 St. Louis years. He participated i in the 1964, 1967, and 1968 World Series. He played errorless ball in the field in 1966, and once enjoyed 223 corisecutive errorless games.. Flood has received seven Golden Glove Awards. He: was ¢o-captain of his team from .1965- : - 1969.. He ranks among the. 10 major league outfielders possessing the highest lifetime fielding averages. 5 “These are the saddest of possible words, - “Tinker to Evers to Chance.” ‘Trio of bear cubs, and fleetgg, tha than birds, ‘Tinker to Evers to Chance. - Ruthlessly pricking our gonfalon bubble, a = ‘Making a Giant hit into a double— , Words that are. weighty with nothing but touble: re to Evers to Chance.’” - “a . Pigrce Adams, Baseball’s Sad Ladies. . ead rnard Shaw, The Sporting News, May 27; 1943, p. 15, ‘col. 4. > _ FLOOD v. KUHN , +265 . >? > 7 " 258 - Opinion of the Court. °s - Flood’s St. Louis compensation for the years shown _ was:, 1961. . $13,500: Cneluding* a bonus for signing) 1962 $16, 000 ° . | . 1964 $23,000 aren 1965 $35,000 “1966 . $45,000 7 7 1967 $50,000 ~ 1968 - $72,500 = | 1969 $90,000. _ These figures do not include any ‘so-called fringe ben- efits or World Series shares. © But at the age of’ 31, in October 1969, Flood was: _traded to the Philadelphia Phillies of the National . League in.a multi-player-transaction. He was not con- _ sulted about the trade. -He was informed by telephone and received formal notice only after the deal had been ‘consummated.’ In December he complained to the Commissioner of Baseball and asked that he be made ~ a free agent and be placed at liberty to strike his own ‘ bargain — with ‘any other major league- team. ‘His re- ° quest. was denied. Flood then instituted this antitrust suit ’ in eJeauas 1970 in federat court for the Southern. District of New . York. The defendants (although not all were named: in each cause of action) were the Commissioner of Base- ball, the presidents of the two major leagues, and the 24 major league clubs. In general, the complaint charged | violations of the federal antitrust laws’ and civil rights _ ‘ statutes, violation of state statutes and the common law, "and the imposition of a form of peonage and involuntary — “"f Concededly wesostted by the Major a Baseball Players ' Association, the players’ collective-bargaining representative. -Tr. -’ of Oral Arg. 12. ‘ pods Micaela) . De SR Re eee Tg Us , OCTOBER TERM, 1971 Opinion of the Court _ : 407 U.S. — servitude castes to the. Thirteenth Amendment i -~ 42 U.S. C. § 1994, 18 U.*S. C. § 1581, and 29 U.S. C. §§ 102 and 103. Petitioner sought declaratory and in- junctive relief and. treble damages. - Flood declined to play for Philadelphia in 1970, despite a $100,000 salary offer, and he sat out the year. After the season was concluded, - Philadelphia "sold its rights to Flood to the Washington Senators. Washington and the petitioner were able to come to: terms for 1971 at _@ salary of $110,000. Flood started the season but, : apparently because he was dissatisfied with. his per-_ formance, he left: the Washington club on April 27, early’ - -in the campaign. ‘He has not —— er since then. a | 100 {.. The Present Litigation Judge Cooper, in a detailed opinion, first denied a preliminary injunction, 309 F. Supp. 793 maid 1970), observing on the way: “Baseball has been the national pastime for over one -hundred years and enjoys a unique place in our American heritage. Major league profes- . sional baseball is avidly followed by millions of fans, looked upon .with fervor. and pride and provides @ special source of inspiration’and —_— team spirit especially for the young. “Baseball’s’status in the life of the nation is sO @ pervasive that it would not strain credulity to say the Court can take’ judicial notice. that baseball is - -everybody’s business. To put it mildly and’ with restraint, it-would be unfortunate indeed if a fine _ sport. and profession, which brings surcease from . daily travail and an escape from the. or to ® The parties agreed that Flood’s “sntthigttion in baseball in oid would be without prejudice to’ his case. . _ FLOOD v. KUHN 267 258 - ' Opinion of: the Court a , & ‘most inhabitants of ‘this ‘land: were » to suffer in the least because of undue concentration by any one or any group on commercial and profit con-. _. ‘siderations. The game ‘is on higher ground; it . behooves every. one to keep it there.” 309 F. - Cupp. . at 797. Flood’s. application, for an ‘early trial was , granted. The court next deferred’ until: trial its decision | on the de- fendants’ motions to dismiss the primary causes.of action, but granted 7 aa motion for summary judgment on - an additio 1970). An extensive record was. developed. In an ensuing -opinion, 316 F. Supp. 271 (SDNY 1970), Judge Cooper _ first noted that: “Plaintiff’s witnesses in the main pens that some form of reserve on players is a necessary ele- - ment of the organization of baseball as a league sport, but contend that the present all-embracing . ‘system is needlessly: restrictive and offer various alternatives which in their view might loosen the bonds without ante to the on =. | “Clearly the bopoederanes of credible ae dos not favor elimination of the. reserve clause. With the sole exception of plaintiff himself, it shows that _even plaintiff’s witnesses do not*contend that ‘it is wholly undesirable; in. fact they regard -substantial portions meritorious. ....” 316 F.Supp., at: 275-276. He then held that Federal Baseball Club v.. National . League, 259 U. S. 200 ( 1922), and Toolson v. New York - Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), were controlling; that . it was not necessary to reach the issue whether exemption ‘from. _ antitrust Jaws would result; because aepects of use of action. 312 F. Supp. 404 CDNe 7 Trial to the court took place i in: May and Fuiie 1970. | 2 REO SRM INGA SRN sp Come re! SRLS : e 268, 272. 268 “OCTOBER TERM, 1971 + Opinion of the Court | 407 U.S. . baseball now are a subject of collective bargaining; that the plaintiff’s state law claims, those based on common law - as well as on statute, were to be denied because baseball . was not “a matter which admits of diversity of treat- . ment,’ 316 F. Supp., at 280; that the involuntary servi- _ tude elaim failed because of the absence of “the essential element of this cause of action, a showing of compulsory service,” 316 F. Supp., at 981-282; and that judgment was to be entered for’ the defendants. Judge Cooper included a statement of personal conviction to the effect that “negotiations could. produce an. accommodation on - the réserve system which would be eminently, fair and ~ equitable to all concerned” and that “the reserve clause -can be fashioned so°as to. find ‘acceptance by player _ and club.” 316 F. Supp., at 282 and 284. - On appeal, the Second Circuit felt “compelled to af- firm.’ 443 F. 2d 264, 265 (1971). It regarded. the issue of state law as one of first impression, but con-— cluded that the Commerce Clause precluded its applica- tion. Judge Moore added a concurring opinion in which eer srs with respect, to the suggestéd overruling ederal Baseball and Toolson, that “there is no like- lihood, that such an event will occur. ~— “And semaine: so. Baseball’s’ welfare and future should “not «. be for politically insulated interpreters of technical antitrust stat- _ jutes but ’ rather should be for the voters through their elected » “representatives. At baseball is to be damaged by statutory: regula- ‘tion, let the congressman face his constituents the next November and also face the consequences of his baseball — record.” 443 F. 2d, at 272.. Cf. Judge Friendly’s comments in Salerno v. American loam, 429 . F..2d 1003, 1005 (CA2 1970), cert. denied,-sub nom. Salerno v. Kuhn, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971): “We freely acknowledge our: “belief that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes’ happiest days, that the rationale of Toolson i is ae dubious and that, to use the mene: Court’s e v "* 443.8. 2d, at 970 °° ~~~ OCTOBER TERM, 1971 Opinion of the Court _ — 407 U.S. must arrange and pay for their doing. so is not ‘ enough to change the character of the business. . . . [T]he transport is a mere incident, not the essen- tial’ thing. That to which it is incident, the ex- - hibition, although made for money would not be _ called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted © use of those words. © As it is put by the defendants, | . personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce. ‘That which in its consum- 7 mation is not - commerce does not become commerce among the States ‘because the tratisportation that we have mentioned ‘takes place. To repeat the illustrations given by’.the Court below, a firm of lawyers sending out’ a member to argue a case, or the Chautauqua lecture: bureau sending out lec- | turers, does not engage in -such’ commerce because _ the lawyer or lecturer goes to another State. “If we are right the plaintiff's business is to be described in the same way. and the restrictions. by contract, that prevented the plaintiff from getting — . -players to break their bargains and the other con- duct charged agairist the ‘defendants were not an interference with commerce among the States.” 259 | U. S., at 208-209. : . 10 ‘What really .saved baseball, ‘legally at least, for the: next half‘century was the protective canopy spread over it by the United.. _ States Supreme Court’s decision in the Baltimore Federal League anti-trust suit against Organized Baseball in 1922. In it Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous court, ruled that the business of. giving baseball exhibitions for profit was not-‘trade or commerce ‘jn- the cornmonly-accepted use of those words’ because ‘personal effort, ‘not related to production, is not a subject of commerce’; nor was _ it ‘interstate, because the movement of ball clubs across state lines was merely ‘incidental’ to the business. It should be noted that, . contrary to what many believe, Holmes: did call baseball a business; time and again those who haye not troubled to read the text. of the decision have claimed incorrectly that the court said baseball was 4 sport and not a business.” 2 H. Seymour, Baseball 420 (1974). '? FLOOD v. KUHN ¢ ; 258 Ot : © “Opinion of the Court . ‘The Court thus chies not to be persuaded by oppos- | ing - examples proffered by the plaintiff, among them _ (a) Judge Learned Hand’s decision on a demurrer to_ a Sherman Act complaint with respect. to vaudeville . entertainers traveling a theater circuit covering several States,. H. B. Marienelli; Ltd. v. United Booking Offices, | (227 F. 165 (SDNY. 1914); (b) the first Mr. Justice Harlan’s opinion in International Textbook Co. v. Pigg,. 217 U. S.-91 (1910); to the effect that correspondence _. courses: pursued through the mail constituted commerce ‘among the States; and (c)} Mr. Justice Holmes’ own opinion, for. another unanimous Court,. on demurrer in _ a Sherman Act case, relating to cattle shipment, the - interstate movement of which was intefrupted for the finding of purchasérs at the stockyards, Swift & Co. v. United: States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905). The only earlier case the parties were able to locate where the © question was raised whether organized baseball was within the Sherman Act was American League Base- ball Club v. Chase; 86 Misc. 441, 149 N. Y. S. 6 (1914). ‘That court had answered the: question in the negative. B. Federal Baseball was cited @ year ‘later, and with- out disfavor, in another opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes for a unanimous Court. ‘The complaint charged anti- . trust violations with respect to vaudeville bookings. It -was held, however, that the claim was not frivolous’ — and that the bill should not have been ‘dismissed. Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville. Exchange, 262 U. S. 271. (1923) .* It has also been aed. not cational with respect | “to the practice of law, United States v. South-Eastern’ --110n remand of the Hart case the trial court dismissed the com- plaint at the close of the evidence. The Second Circuit affirmed . on the’ ground that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to establish that the interstate transportation was more than incidental.. 12 F.2d - 341 1 (7828). This Court denied certiorari, 273 U. S: 703 (1926). meneTe SEM GOEL PR TR PO TARY aD i i m8 ~. OCTOBER TERM, 1971 ‘Opinion of the Court . ., 07,8. Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533, 573 (1944) (Stone, C.-J., dissenting); with. respect, to outsof-state con- tractors, United States .v. Employing Plasterers Assn., __ 347 U.S. 186, 196-197 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting) ; and upon a general comparison reference, N orth Amer: \ican: Co. v. SEC, 327 VU. S. 686, 694 (1946). : ‘ \In the years, that followed, baseball continued to be \. - subject to intermittent antitrust attack. The courts, ° however, rejected these challenges on the authority of Federal Baseball. ‘In‘some cases stress was laid, although © -unsuc sfully, on new factors such as the development ‘of radio and: television ‘with their substantial ‘additional revenues to baseball’? For the most part, however, the Holmes opinion: was generally and. necessarily accepted as controlling adthority.* And. in the 1952. Report of © the Sybcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee onthe Judiciary, H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 229, it was said, in conclusion: “On the’ other hand the overwhelming prepon- “derance.of the evidénve “established baseball’s need for some “sort-of reserve clause. Baseball’s history shows that chaotic conditions prevailed when there ~ was no reserve clause. Experience points to no feasible substitute to protect ,the integrity of the . game or to guarantee a comparatively even com- , a2 Toolson: ¥ v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 P, Supp. 93 (sD Cal. 1951), aff'd, 200 F. 2d 198 (CA9 1952): Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 . F. 2d 413 (CA6 1953). See Salerno v. Ametican League, 429 F.2d - 1003 {CA2 1970), cert. denied, sub nom. ‘Salerno v. Kuhn, 400 U: S. 1949) (this case, we are advised, was. subsequently settled) ; Martin v. National League, Baseball Club, 174 F. 2d 917 (CA2 1949). 13 Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F. 2d 428 (CA6 1953); Portland Base- | ball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 282 F. 2d 680 CAQ 1960); Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier ‘Baseball Club, Inc., 67 F. Supp. ‘705 (WD Wash.. 1946). ‘See State v. Milwaukee Braves, an ‘ 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N. W. 2¢ 1, cert. scam Ss. 900 (1966)... Oe 1001 (1971). But ef. Gardella v.. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (CA2 ~ FLOOD v. KUHN - Opinion of the Court petitive ‘struggle: The ‘evidence adduced at. the hearings would clearly not justify the. enactment: » of legislation flatly condemning the reserve clause, cst ag The Gia granted certiorari, 345 U.S. 963 (1953), in the Toolson, Kowalski; ‘and Corbett cases, cited in _: ——tn. 12 dnd 13, supra, and, by a short per curiam (Warren, C. J., and Black, Frankfurter, Dovatas, J n, Clark, ° and Minton, JJ.), affirmed the judgments of thé respective ; _ courts of appeals in those three cases. Toolson v. New .. | York Yankees, Inc., 346 U. S. 356 (1953). Federal , Baseball was cited as holding “that the business of. -pro- - viding public baseball games for profit between clubs of © eee -- professional baseball. players was not within tt 5 ove . oe ‘* ef the federal antitrust laws,” 346 U. S., at 357, ; 4 “Congress has had the ruling “under Kieihgit. but has not seen fit to bring such business under- |. these Iaws by legislation having prospective éffect. Se The business has. thus been left for thirty years | 4 to develop, on the ‘understanding that it was not Ae subject to existing antitrust legislation. The pres- ok ent cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, - S| ” with retrospective effect, hold the legislation appli- « ~ _ cable’ We think that if. there are evils in thi ig which now warrant application to it o ~ antitrust laws.it should be by legislation. : re-examination of the underlying issues, ‘the judg- ments below are affirmed on the uthority of Fed-. a eral Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National’ League - +} -- of Professional Baseball Clubs, supra, so far as that oot decision determines that Congress had no intention” - wee B _. of including the business of baseball within the’, g ' . geope of the federal antitrust laws. Ibid. This quotation reveals four reasons for the Court’s se affirmance of Toolson anu its companion Cages: (a) Con- . — : gressional awareness for three decades of the Court’s. » * Fs 4 . 5 : s ° : ° i ¥S Sz : : vs . . : : 4 : j “f et r ° : Bd eee ‘ RAEN oe ¢ “ ; 7 @ ; .. : 3 Eye ithout;..- - aa Opinion of the ian 4070.8. ling . " coupled with ‘ ‘congressional i tion. 3 ‘(b) The. fact: t iat- baseball was. left. alone to - develop for that. period « pon’ the understanding that "the reserve system was ‘pot subject: to existing federal “(c) Afeluctance to.\overrule Federal . quent retfoactive effect. ‘(d) A’ pro- . fessed desire that any needed remedy. be provided. by ‘on *\ Jegislation rather ithan B court decree. The emphasis — Nn Toolsén. was ‘on the de ination, ‘attributed even to Federal Baseball, that’ Congress had no intention to a inélude baseball. within the. reach . of the.federal anti- "trust laws. ‘Two: Justices; (Burton- and Reed, JJ.) dis- sented, stressing the “factual aspects, revenue sources, and. _ oy -the absence of an express exemption of organized base- Ce from: the Sherman Act. 346 U.'S., ‘at 357. The z ee - 1952 nagreations andy. was mentioned. Id, at: 358, : 359, 361." - ' it is of intgatet to puke: hati in. Toolson thé petitions \ chad argued flatly ‘that Federal Baseball “is wrong and. must be overruled” Brief. 19, and that ‘Thomas Reed ‘powell, a constitutional scholar of no. small stature, urged, “fees “Counsel for an ‘amicus, that “baseball is 4 unique / | —— i Amicus Brief 2, and that “unbridled. com- Ke tition as applied to’ baseball would not be i in the public sid jae in terest. ie, ae : . “United : States v.Shubert, 348° U.S. 222 (1955), Ms oe Was ‘a civil. antitrust ‘action against ‘defendants eng cin the, production ‘of legitimate theatrical — ——- _ ‘throughout the United’ States and in operating th - for) the: presentation of. such -Attraotions. The. District ee ah Court. had dismissed the- complaint ‘on. th@ authority Oe ets Federal Baseball and Toolson., 120 F. Supp. 15 (SDNY *.- )..: This Court reyersed. Mr. Chief Justice Warren ted the Court’s broad conception of “trade or com- — i ~ mereo” in. the ‘arititrust stataites and the types of enter- » prises already i siasi to, be within the reach of, that oe. ee ae: - * gy oe ee re coe 288 PO EO TOR os Opinion of the Court ie stated that Federal Baseball and Sorteen: afforded ~ no basis‘for a conclusion that businesses built. around os the performance of local exhibitions are‘exempt from . e antitrust laws. 348 U. S.,'at 227. He then went n to elucidate the holding in: ‘Toolson by meticulously S spelling out the factors mentioned above: A) | oped. . . .. And Congress, although it had actively | ? conaidetse: the ruling, had not seen fit to-.reject _ it ‘by amendatory legislation. Against this back- ?- ' “Tn Federal Baseball, the Court, speaking deseniah Court a, was ‘a mere incident, not the tial ane. Federal Baseball, the Court was confronted with a unique combination ‘of circumstances.,°For over "80 years: there had stood a decision of this Court specifically fixing the’ status of the baseball business ” -under the ‘antitrust laws and. more particularly. the he. validity of *the so-called ‘reserve clause.” During -~°._ this period, in. reliance on the Federal Baseball preee- é “In Posted where the issue was a the same as in ~ dent, the baseball business .had.. -grown and devel- - ground, thé Court it Toolson was asked to overrule - Federal Baseball on the ground that it was out of. ie step with subsequent decisions reflecting present-day | -coneepts of. interstate comme * The Court, in view of the circumstances. of. ie case, declined to ° far as that decision. determines that Congress had no intention | of including the business. of baseball. wens: the’ seope of the federal antitrust laws.’ 346 . ‘do so. But neither did the Court necessarily re-_ _ affirm ll that was said in Federal Baseball. In- | » Stead, _Lwlithout re-examination of the underlying . issués,’ the Court adhered -to Federal Baseball ‘so Mr. Justice Holmes, was dealing with the business —-_—— . of baseball and nothing else. .... The’ a = ee — 5 ar = SPT GP Pe g8 . Bi eT TE CONICS pl ome oo - 2h6 ‘- OCTOBER TERM, a971 “Opinion of the Court . 407 U.S. .ULS., at £357. In has, Toolson was a narrow — cation of the = of stare decisis.” . . If the Poolson holding is to be pe Or. contracted-r-the appropriate remedy lies wits Congress.” 348 U."S., at 228-230. E. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955), was a companion to Shubert and was decided the same day. This was a civil antitrust action against defendants engaged in the business of promoting professional championship boxing contests. Here again | ) the District Court had dismissed the coinplaint in reli- ance upon ‘Federal ‘Baseball and Toolson. The Chief. Justice observed that “if it were not for Federal Baseball and Toolson, we think that it would: be too clear for. dispute that the Government’s allegations bring the - defendants within the scope of the Act.” 348 U. S.,. at 240-241. He-pointed out that the defendants relied on the two baseball cases but also would have been con- - tent with a more restrictive interpretation of them than the Shubert defendants, for the boxing defendants.argued ~ that the cases immunized‘ only businesses that involve’ _exhibitioris of an athletic nature. The*Court accepted - neither argument. It again noted, 348 U. S., at 242, that: “Toolson ne overruled Federal. Barbell nor nN necessarily reaffirm all. that was said in Federal Base- — - \ball:” It stated: ey “The controlling . nbd in Pederd Base- ‘ball and Hart was, instead, a tery practical one— the degree ‘of interstate activity involved in the particular. business under review. It follows that stare. decisis ‘cannot help the defendants here; for, x” contrary ‘to their argument, Federd Baseball did - not’ hold that all businesses ‘based on «professional sports were outside the scope of the antitrust laws. - The issue con ing us is, therefore, not whether _@ previously Zranted conaaian should continue, . - FLOOD ». KUEN | 277 « 258 Opinion of the Court but whether an exemption should be Samia in the first instance. And that issue is for. Congress to . resolve, not this Court.” 348 ‘U. S., at 243. -The Court noted the’ presence then in Congress. of various bills forbidding the application of the antitrust — laws to “organized professional sports enterprises”; the holding of extensive hearings .on ‘some of these ; sub’ ' , committee opposition; a postponement recommendation as to baseball; and the fact that “Congress thus left ‘intact the then-existing covangy of the antitrust laws.” 348: ULS., at 243-244. . "> Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Minton, © dissented. “It would baffle the subtlest ingenuity,” he said, “to find a single differentiating factor between other _ sporting - exhibitions’. . . and baseball insofar as the conduct of, the sport is relevant to the criteria or con- siderations by which the Sherman Law becomes. appli- _‘eable to a ‘trade or commerce. 7” 348 U.S., at 248.. He went on: “The Court decided as i did in the Toolson case as an application of the doctrine of stare decisis. , That doctrine is not, to be’ sure, an imprisonment of reason.. But neither is it a whimsy. It can hardly be that this Court gave a preferred posi- ° tion to baseball because it is the great American "sport. - If stare decisis be one .aspect-of-taw, — | as it is, “to disregard ‘it. in identic situations i is mere caprice. “Congress, on ‘the other hand, may yield to senti- > Ment and be capricious, subject amy to due _ process. “Between them, this case and ‘Shubert illustrate that nice but rational distinctions are inevitable in adjudication. I agree with the Court’s opinion. in . Shubert for precisely the reason: that constrains me to dissent in this case.” 348 U. S., at 249-250. | geo VA Sr oa Ly ae ea YI Peet eS HANH a air 5 INGEN INN ag PRT TE a ale Oar granrer _ OCTOBER TERM, 1971 “Opinion of the Court oo "407 U.S. Mr. Justice ‘Minton. also separately dissented on the - ground that boxing is not trade or commerce. He addéd. the comment that. “Congress has not attempted” to ‘eontrol baseball and boxing. - 348 U. S., at 251, 253. _ .The two dissenting Justices, thus, did‘ not’ call for the overruling of Federal Baseball and Toolgon; they merely felt that boxing should be under the same unsbfella, of | freedom as. was baseball. and, as Mr. Justice Frank- -furter said, 348 U. S., at 250, they could hot exempt ‘baseball “to the exclusion of every other sport different pot one legal ‘jot or tittle from it.” ™* _. F. The parade marched on. Radovich v. National . Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), was a civil Clayton”: Act case testing the application of the antitrust laws to professional football. . ‘The District. Court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part on the basis of Fed- eral Baseball and Toolson. .The court did not hesitate “ro «confess that’ the strength of the pull” of the baseball cases and of International Boxing “is about equal,” but then observed that “Tf Jootball is a ‘team sport” and — boxing an individual one.’ . 231 F. 2d. 620, 622. This Court reversed with an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark. -He said that the Court made its ruling in Fool- son “because it was concluded that more harm woul be done in overruling Federal Baseball than in uphold- ing a ruling which. at best was of dubious validity.’ 352 -U. S, at 450. He noted that Congreas had net ‘acted. He then said: | “All this, combined with’ ‘tite flood of litigation 3 ‘that would follow its repudiation, the harassment: that would” ensue, and the retroactive effect of such * decision, led the Court to. the practical result that 14 The case’s final chapter is » dabermtionsl Bozing Club v, United States, 358 U. S. 242. ees ; > 258 FLOOD ».KUHN. | ..__.279 Opinfon of the Court a it. should sustain the unequivocal line of authority reaching over many years. ' - Gited as controlling: authority in antitrust actions *— “TS]ince Toolson and Federal Baseball.. are still ' involving other fields of business, we now specifically limit the rule there established to the facts there involved, i. e., the business. of organized professional © baseball. As long as the Congress continues to acquiesce we should adhere to—but not extend—. -. the interpretation of the Act made in those cases. . . . - “Tf this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent; or il- - logical; it is sufficjent. to answer, aside from the distinctions between the businesses, that were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate we would have no. doubts. But Federal Baseball held the business of baseball ° - outside the scope of the Act, No other business . claiming the coverage of these cases has such an adjudication. ‘We, therefore, conclude that. the or- " derly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if * any there be, is by legislation and not by- court decision. Congressional processes are more aeeom- modative, affording the whole industry hearings and - an opportunity to assist. in the formulation of new législation. . The resulting product is therefore more ‘likely to protect the industry and the public alike. The whole scope of congressional action would be known Jong in advance and effective dates for the Mr. J ustice™ ‘Frankfurter dissented. dbeanitally 4 for the. reasons stated in his dissent in Rites 2 Boxing, legislation could be set. in the -future without the’ injustices of retroactivity and syrprise which might follow court action.” 352 U. S., at mdien io note omitted). : 8 ‘ . . ON PERRI Ores, POP ORATOR ATEN gE REESE ME TET STOTT 6 Mg ie PRIN INN oI SELON ve aE KN . , . . ~ ° % 280 - _ OCTOBER TERM, 1971 "Opinion of ‘the Court 407 U.S. - 352 U. S.,-at 455. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice: BRENNAN, also dissented: because he, too, was “unable to distinguish football from baseball.” 352 U.S.,; : at 456. Here again the dissenting Justices did not call a: for the overruling of the baseball decisions. They merely — 4 could not distinguish the two sports and, out ‘of respect "oe gem decteis,. weted to Mami Be . G. Finally, in Haywood vy. National Basketball: Assn.,° - ..401 U. S. 1204 (1971), Mr. Justice.’ Dovetas, ‘in his eapacity as Circuit Justice, reinstated a District Court’s~ injunction: pendente lite in favor of a professional basket- _ ball player and said, “Basketball . . . does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws.” 401 U.S., at 1205.” H. This series of decisions understandably spawned ~ extensive commentary,” some of it mildly critical and | 15 See also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F.. - _ Supp. 1049, 1060 (CD Cal. 1971); Washington Professional Basket- '- * “ball Corp. v. National Basketball Assn., 147 F. Supp. 154: (SDNY. +1956)! : hie me . _. 18 Neville, Baseball and-the Antitrust Laws, 16 Fordham L. Rev. : 208 (1947); Eckler, Baseball—Sport or Commerce?, 17 U: Chi. L. - sie, Rev. 56 (1949); Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Base- ball ‘Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 Yale L. J. 576 (1953); P. Gregory, The Baseball Player, An Economic Study, c. 19 (1956) ; Note, The ' Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional ‘Team Sports and the “Antitrust Laws, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 418 (1967); The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 105, 136-138 (1954); The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 94, 170-173 (1957); Note, 32 Va. L. Rev. 1164 (1946); Note, 24 Notre Dame-Law. 372 (1949) ; Note, 53 Col. L. Rev. 242 (1953) ; Note, 22 U: Kan. City L. Rev. 173 (1954); ‘Note, 25 Miss. L. J: 270 (1954) ; Note, 29.N. Y. U. L- Rev. 213 (1954); Note, 105. U. Pa. L.’ Rev. 110 (1956); Note, 32 Texas L. Rev. 890 (1954); Note, 35 B. U. L. Rev. 447 (1955); - Note, 57 Col. L. Rev. 725 (1957) ; Note, 23.Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 606 (1955); Note, 1 How. L. J. 281 (1955); Note, 26 Miss. L. Py . these circumstances, there is merit in consistency even o° * - The petitioner's argument as to- the application of state antitrust laws deserves a word. Judge Cooper re- ° Sc “jected the state law claims, because state antitrust regu- lation would conflict with federal policy and because . national “uniformity [is required] ‘in any regulation of” * baseball and its reserve system.” 316 F. Supp., at 280. _ Ie * The Court of Appeals, in affirming, stated, “[A]s the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the states _— interests in regulating baseball’s reserve system, the Com-_ .- merce -Clause precludes the: application here of state | antitrust law.”. 443 F. 2d, at 268. As applied to orga- nized baseball, and in the light of this Court’s observa- ~ 2 tions and holdings in Federal Baseball; in Toolson, in - Shubert, in International Boxing, and in Radovich, and '_° despite “baseball’s allegedly inconsistent position taken — in the past’ with respect to the application of state law,” "2 See Respondent’s. Brief 67 in Federal Baseball and Respondent’s . Brief 30 in Toolson. See also State v. Milwaukee Braves, The, -:, 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144°N. W. 2d, cert. denied, 385 U. S. 900 (1966) - though some might claim ‘that beneath that-consistency __. is a layer of inconsistency. - ie ae eee . ae 7” 258 ; "A Bunarn, ©. J, concurring ae ‘ Lar nad a these statements adequately “dispose of the state law ~~ - claims. aa. And whai the Court ee in Fedéral Bosctall ' in 1922 a The conclusion wé have tanitvet inaliiass it unnecessary, for us to consider the respondents’ additional. argument — that the reserve system is a mandatory subject of col- lective bargaining and that federal labor policy there- — fore exempts the reserve. —_ from. the operation of federal antitrust laws.” . We repeat for this case what ie said in Toolson: “Without re-examination of the underlying issues, ‘7° the [judgment] below [is] affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National : League of Professional Baseball Clubs, supra, so far. as that decision determines that Congress had no - _ intention of including the business of baseball within _ the scope of the federal antitrust laws.” 346 U. S., at 357. what’ it said in Toolson i in 1953, we say again here in _ 1972: the remedy, if any. is indicated, is for rr and fot judicial, action. . The iene . the Cour af Appeal is . : . Se Affirmed. ‘Tae Cuier Justice and Mn. Justice WHITE join in - the judgment of the Court, andi in all but Part I of. the Court’s opinion. ‘ Mr Justice PowEt1 t ok no Part in the consideration or decision of this case. * - Mr. CHIEF ‘Josrice Bimaen, mcurring. | concur in all but Part. I of the Court’s opliton bal,” like Mr. J USTICE Dovetas, have grave reservatio ‘22See Jacobs &, Winter, ‘Antitrost. Principles and Collective: ' ‘Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale_L. J. a (1971), suggesting ‘present-day irtelevancy of the antitrust issue. a ee FLOOD #. KUHN a aes Ae ee, . oe . ’ . . es TRINA A aR ia er eet Per pa ony 3 , i . e . « id i a kd OR De a ale ss . . - ° _ 4 . > . ° ~ & ? . ° ; ‘ ‘ ‘ e - i 6 | le sien fe eae Ta ne ae eee Ri : iiss ' : . ' a #. . * , al = o ee a] 5 eee ‘No -- “Inc., 346 U. S. 356 (1 hes J * a8 Ae ° ee a ta c - oe" \ = : his 7 = ey . ve ‘ mee a= “4 ‘ : — . we a , we ee : 3 } z : % ‘ Pint 3 tg “as sas hi Guccabaa’ Poolson v, tcueicka sent, he jdined that holding ba : "regret “it.” = e. error, if stich it. be, is one the -affairs bf « & great | y people have. rested for along time: “Cowts- fot the forum in which ‘this ‘tangled web ought to be unsnarled. I agree-with Mr. JUSTICE Dovetas that congressional inaction is pot. 4 | -” solid. base, but the least undesirable course now is to let ep aeatten seit Sieh Oonertet So .Se he Coren __-Seted to solve this problem. . aa ee os Mr Justice Dovetas, with whom Mr. Justice BREN- NAN. ‘concurs, dissenting: This Court’s fst gi GOD aig ale es “National League, 259 U.S, 200,‘ made in 922, is a ,derelict: in the stream. of the Jaw that we, its creator, ‘should. remove. a romnantic view* of a rather. : dismal business. ‘Saal over the last, 50 years’ would — .” “fg Gah Sleatot ke sakdabreda.” ‘° Ap 1922 the Court had a narrow, peradhial view of * cophmeree. With the.demise of the old landmarks of #1 era, particularly United States v. Knight Co., 156. U: _ Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, and Paul v Vir. _” ginia, S Well! 168, the whole concept of commerce has = > Chianged. _Under-the Sableek. decisions anes as “Maiievitle Island - FaPms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. Ss. 219; United States y. Darby, 312 U.S. 100; Wickard v. Fi- es burn, 317 U.:S..111: United States v. South-Eastern - Underwriters ‘Assn., 322 U. S. 533, the power of Congress "was recognized as broad enough to reach~all phases of ” . the vast. operations of our national. Industrial aystem. _ +S While I joined the Court's opinion, in Toolson +. New York . Yankees, Inc., 346 U. S. 356, I have lived to regret it; and I would — Bow convert what I believe to be ite fondamental error. . a -- equities. The.equities are with the victims of the reserve - Clauise. I use the word “victiins”. in the Sherman Act - of trade.* Gardella v.‘Ghandler, 172 F. 2d 402 (CA2). - - . And see v. National Basketball Assn., 401 U.S. _ * . upon -thé fact that Congress has refused to enacf bills bers}; Radovich v. National Féotball League, 392 U.S. 445; United ~ * ty in sustaining petitioner's claim,. 7 35 asd ‘Deomse, 1, Ueentiog. cee : . pre ee dependest: on iatio and ‘@levision as in. s ‘baseball and | vast-interstate revenues (see H.R... - Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 5 (1952)) would be _ hard put today to say with: the Co ‘in the Federal Baseball Club case that baseball. » onthe loner: See ficii cs ofthe Federal Baseball Club decision ste ~ t @ Babe Ruths, Ty Cobbs, and Lou Gehrigs. : _. The owners, shbsie: sennehs aus: iat Ml acres : clivity for predatory practices, do not come-to us with - "sense, since .a contract which forbids anyone to practice _ ~hid calling is commonly called an unreasonable restraint " -1204.(DosGias, J, in chambers).” oe | If congressional inaction is Sur guide, swe ‘should rely. | oat broadly averting professional sports from .antitrust _ regulation.» H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Seas. - ? Had this, sosen, gfomp, bapentscoeteied ik-ansthellldediy, _ Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359, U: S. 207; United. - . States v. Shubert, 348 U. S. 222; or even in another sport, Haywood v. National Basketball Assn, 401 U, S. 1204 (Dovetas, J., in cham- States v. International’ Boxing Club, 48 U. 8/236; ‘we would have” 3 ’s reliance upon congressional inaction disregards the: _, Wisdoni of Helvering v. ‘Hallock, 309 U. S.. 106, yer, where we said:- “Nor does want of specific Congreesionsl repadiations-. . serve as-. - ‘an implied instruction by Congress to us riot to reconsitler, in the ; ‘light of new experience . . those decisions . a It would require. aes Ni persuasive circumstances enveloping’ Congressiong] silen¢e to — + pamcncene & rere deeating . : 4070.8. (1952): The aiily atatutory. exesnption granted ly: Con- pa. y _gfeas to professional sports: concerns broadeasting rights. 45 U. SeC.,$§ 1291-12985. « I would noteascribe a broader _ “exemption through inaction than Congresi has: seem fit to grdnt explicitly: . 6 | Meee cs bie aie “that -were considering; the ‘ ile - juestion of baseball for the first time upo e-clean slate” * : * we would hold it:to be subject. to federal titrust regu- _ ait Sualatbie, After receiving formal notification of ‘the a petitioner wrote to the Commissioner of | baal that he was tot ~ paca paar Later geo 7g aay non “only be suificient to indieste that we walk én quicksand when we try = ti Wi the aloreet ef, chereative gba»: SSE principle.” And_ see United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters haiZ 522 U...S. 533, 556-561. aie isc gr he ine al rd sing he reserve claiee in sctial operation. ; baie & yer od 7 . e 4 os . oe . . ° Ad - of my wishes,”* and poe “phon KUEN ae a. A a as , 259 U. S. 200 (1922), and v. New York Yankees, -* - | Inc., 346 U. 8..356-(1 ), are totally at vids rsh: more é », a team in the Federal League 42 | | brought an antitrust actio mm against - the National and — . | American Leagues and ers. In his’ opinion fi rai - ,; Unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Holmes ‘wrote that the "| business being ebnaidered. was: “giving exhibitions | .of -. base ball, which are purely state affairs.” - 259 U. S.,. at : .. 208. _ Hence, the Court held that baseball-was not within" ‘the purview of the antitrust laws. Thirty-one years , later, the Court reaffirmed this decision, without re- me examining it in -Toolson, a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. Like this case, Toolson involved an. attack . on the reserve system. ‘The Court said:, Sa “The business has... . beef left, for thirty: years Bs to develop, on the understanding pe it was not ___ “ Pe of state xntitrust ida, eats ie ~ “6 Gt Sigiiie Melk aia: ib’ Selina ie: and clainied that he was forced into peonage and involuntary servitude in violation of the - Thirteenth Amendment to the United States ‘Constitytion. Because _ I believe that federal antitrust laws govern baseffall; I that | " state law has been pre-empted in this area.. Like the lower courts; oe i Ge Sas Galore tat theto hes been vintnthon: wie Yhliteenth aspera unccis t - ”.* adhere to the reasoh of Toolson—i. é . examine the uaderiying basis of Federal Baseball Club— . vale: ERMA genes / oe i a Stee? x ~ PS EOE ietice Ay ent. cases ask us to r the ‘prior decision ‘and, : . Py. | laws it should ‘be" by legislation.” Td., at 387. A racer _ gress has ‘not -We must. now: e~. whether to . refuse to re or-to proceed with a re-examination -and let the chips fall where they may, _ In his answer to petitionel’s oi complaint, the Commis: - "sioner of Baseball “admits.that ‘under present concepts _ / of interstate commerce defendants are engaged ‘therein.”. _ State commerce,” if. we: re-exarnine baseball’s~ antitrust — a ee. “decisions in. United States ee ~~~“ Shubert, 348 U. 8. 222 (1955), United States v, Inter- _ national Bozing Club, 348. U: S. .236 (195 ), and Rado- vich v. National Football League, 352 U. 8, 445 (1957), =A ee App. 40. There’ can be no. doubt that the admission Oe | ah Ge hee ee ve - ° Tequire that we bring baseball within: the co coyprage of ’ the ‘antitrust laws. , See also, Haywood v. National | 3, 1204 (Dovauis, J, in“ it aay .- ° Basketball ° Assn.; 401. -U, clisimbtts). We on to comment that: as Wee ee - im particular, are the. Magna Carta of free ‘enter- . Aes ‘Antitrust laws in general, andthe Sherman “Act. ae prise. They are as important to the preservation . — es of economic freedom an n free-enterprise system. * * ‘as the Bill of. Rights 4s to the protection of our ~ _ fundamental pefsonal. freedoms. . « .- Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot’ be fote- ys closed with eucnt to one sector of the eared CEE * -OCTORIER TERM, 371 « 2 a. ae | Ce if | oe “Mansnans, J, diwenting Re rts a9 eis ‘ies Sauce svat: citigess v= groupe: believe « ie *. that such’ fore i “might promote greater com-. ‘ aS ey : pétition in a more important ‘seetor of the eeonaniy.” : United States v. ‘eat men gsemwe. Sa 405° U; 8. 2 = om 596, 61061972). ° i portance ‘of. the: aoliicwsk liws i oa citize ae noe he cheek They are as“important'to se- | _ ball ‘players as they ‘are to football players, lawyers, > . ‘oa lopecaniy SanAerpyanes kein Re “anata bles Cid ‘other economic interests — _, a8 being x iportant, elise Cinieear bt sc AES, ee | _. Has Congress. acquiesced in our decisions in/Federal ~. '. Baseball lub and Toolson? ¥ think not: Had.the © ‘Court been consistent: and ‘treated all sports in the same ~ _ way baseball was treated, Congress might have become _ 7 concerned enough \to take action. - But, the Court was - "+ inconsistent, rohan gested gree So gee urge es ae + from all other “In; Toolson the, Court refused to vee act because Co d had (eae silent.” But the Court y have read too much ‘i into this legislative inaction. oe: '. Americans love baseball a ey love all sports. | Per- haps we become so enamored of athletics that we assume: 3 : ‘that théy are foremost ‘int the minds of legislators as _ well as-fans. -We must -not.-forget, however, that there. Po are only some 600 major league baseball players. “‘What- ever muscle they might. have been able to muster by ~ ~ ‘combining forces with other athletes has been greatly © 7/7 .. impaired by the manner “in which this Court has iso- - | *: dated them. It: is this Court that has made them im- ze ‘potent, and this Court should correct its.étror- - ere We do. not lightly overrule our prior constructions | * of federal statutes, but when our errors. deny substanti@™, federal rigitts, like the right to compete freely and effec. Se so 2s the - - > . . . - f . as o - y : F% . f . c LiSeen til e. . » 5 ; SoareN efi We kaaiinns tare and we should do-s6 again : here? See, e. g-., Blonder-Tongue_ babe ortiborpe , Inc. a University of Minois Roundagioti 402-U. 8. $13 (1971); Dou Martel: Ine. v.. Retéil Clerks: Union, 3 sisagctaoes 241 {19 Jo Hay Aas a4 Bee: 5 is Cent think ‘there fo coneern ‘over-any.relienee 3 : interests ‘that club owners may asset, they casi be satis / ' ~- fied by making our-decision prospective only. pal er ye __ should be covered by the antitrust laws beginning Wi ee “this case and henceforth, unless - Boog ceo pathos ce ie - otherwise:* bs . Bre ese ae ik Ws not’ inean that. | pe Goner would necessarily ): J ° 6 ‘ * - A id . “. = ” | © en dg : rt ; ° 2 3 ; . : ; : “ ® r ° pnt igh e _ @ ‘ ge 3 ’ ; : ‘ a aS Fs ‘sions’ make several things clear. First, “benefifs to a employer’s chestnuts out of the antitrust fires.” United _ Mandates that the parties be able to. “restrain” trade _ laterally. United States v. Hutcheson, 312. U: 8.219 ' - “AN Sint dati inini seca: % é' _ lective-bargaining relationship of the parties, the issues ~ ue ": | #urrounding that ‘relationship ‘have’ not been’ fully ‘ex: | plored. . As one.commentator has suggested, this case. “has been litigated with the implications for the institu- * labor law iues have een in the corter® of the case-—— “. the courts below, for example, did not reach them— - Se yipeie: hae dosnsy erp Prayer all ae £58 OER, OS ne SNE GR as ; expel.” *. Y fhe¢ . . pe Tt is true shat ir NRadovich v. National Football League ee _ supra, the Court rejected a claim that federal Isbor st A > utes’ governed: the relationship between a professional Beds . athlete and the professional sport: But, an: examination” oe . of ‘the. briefs and record in‘ that case indicates that the _ a . . issue was not squarely: faced. The’ issue is once again + before this Court without being clearly‘ focused, It -.’ should, therefore, be the subject. of fu er inquiry in. | the District Court. : bz ae . Sen okie al that petitioner's sole remedy died in filing a claim with — the National Labor Relations Board, but- this argument is premised on- the’ notipn that-management and labor _ have-‘agreed to,actept the reserve clause. This notion is contradicted, in part, y the record in this case. Peti- - tioner suggests that the system: was thrust upon - "the players by thé’ owners and that the recently formed Players’ union -has not had time to modify or eradicate * . jt. “If this is true, the question arises.as.to whether there - -. would then’ be any. exemption from theantitrust laws in ° : +, this dase. Petitioner. sleo suggests thet there are: mite ‘ 7 . 3° oe “8 Jacobs & Winter, Antitiust Priddiples anit Colicetive : ‘by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale L. J: 1, 22 rong .- “to 296 cee \y OCTOBER TERN, 1971 2 . = : 1 EL Manastatas J, dissenting | aS anus: the antitrust ak CR ont manage-" ee "ment can agree. These limits shoulti, also} oS olored. ‘In light of these considerations, I ‘would retnand this" _ ¢ase to the District Court for consideratior ef ‘whether | |, Petitioner can state a.claim under the antitrust laws. |. despite the collective-bargaining agreement, *and, ‘if. so, © *.* for, g detérmination of .wheth or there has been an: anti. ’ trust violation i in this case... “4 > . . 2 . : . . oe. ° _ ' e . » a . ‘ cs : $ t ee ~ . - A a : . ‘ ° “6 , ‘ . y : . . ‘ . .* eo; - . t os yet . oe : ‘. : . dl : irl ay ° wr ¥ my e = P . 5 . . oy e | om . - - {-*, . of . : ° . ” . i . “4 . , e ‘ - a = * - . is S » at ; a 5 &* . ; -. Sr - ° a e. =) ; ' ? . . ° . $ / - t . : . t. : ~~ . . . i : - - e ‘ . . 6 id ; . mJ 4 ° % e - < ° . 4 - ° / ry 2 7 . e Pd *. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0042%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.