# Appendix — Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 409 U.S. 363

## Text

COPY :=_ joo
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1971

Nos.7/-£27and

Huaues Toot Company and
Raymonp M. Hotimay,
Petitioners,

v.

Trans Worn Aries, Inc.,
Respondent.

Traws Wortp Armt.ines, Inc.,
Cross-Petitioner,
v.

Hvueues Toot Company and
Raymonp M. Hotumay,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AND

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO ACCOMPANY BRIEF
IN OPPOSITION .

Explanatory Note

The Report and Award of Hon. Herbert Brownell, Special
Master (the “Brownell Report”), was filed herein with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in printed form on September 21, 1968. A copy
of the original 323-page Brownell Report was bound into
the Joint Appendix filed with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second ‘Circuit on the appeals to that
Court, and in both courts below references were made to
the original pagination of the printed Brownell Report.
Cross-Petitioner and Respondent Trans World Airlines,
Inc. (“T'WA”) is filing the Brownell Report in this Court,
in the form in which it was originally submitted to the
District Court in 1968, as an Appendix to TWA’s own
Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in
No. and to supplement the Appendix filed by

Petitioners and Respondents Hughes Tool Company and
Raymond M. Holliday with their Petition in No.7/-f27 .

ees... eee

Sovurnern District or New Yorre

61 Civ. 2324

—>—

Anited States Bistrict Court
Trans Wort ‘Amunzs, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
—against—
Howarp R. Hucues, Hucues Tooi Company, and
Raymonp M. Hotimay,

Defendants.

_—————eeeelele
REPORT OF HERBERT BROWNELL,
SPECIAL MASTER

———

| Dated: September 21, 1968
SSS

Yuited States Bistrict Court

Sovruern District or New Yorr
61 Civ. 2324

—— >

Trans Wortp Arrives, Inc.,
= Plaintiff,
—against—
Howarp R. Huaues, Hucues Toot Company, and

Raymonp M. Hotumay,
Defendants.

——

REPORT OF HERBERT BROWNELL,
SPECIAL MASTER

Introduction—Prior History of the Case

This is an action by plaintiff Trans World Airlines
(“TWA”) against Howard R. Hughes (“Hughes”), Hughes
Tool Company (“Toolco”), and Raymond M. Holliday
(“Holliday”), an officer of Tooleo and a director of
TWA at the time of the filing of the complaint. The
complaint was filed on June 30, 1961. Service was made
o Tooleo at that time, but service of process on Holliday
was not made until January, 1962. Both Toolco and Hol-
liday appeared and answered the complaint. Hughes was
never served, and he has not appeared in the action.

The complaint sets forth three claims, The first claim
alleges violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act

2

and Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act. The second claim,
based on certair. of the acts alleged in support of the first
claim but only those acts committed since December 3l,
1960, also alleges violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act and Section 7 (but not Section 3) of the
Clayton Act. These two claims allege that TWA is a
major U. S. air carrier with both domestic and interna.
tional routes, that Toolco “was and is engaged . . . since
in or about 1939 in the development, manufacture and
acquisition of aircraft and related equipment from the
manufacturers thereof . . . and in the sale or lease of such
aircraft to air carriers”, and that Toolco has acquired
78% of the common stock of TWA. The first two claims
further allege that through various acts the defendants
and Atlas Corporation (named as a co-conspirator but not
as a defendant) required TWA to acquire all of its jet
aircraft from Toolco and to boycott all other suppliers,
provided financing for the acquisition of jet aircraft only
on the condition that TWA purchase all its jet aircraft
from Tooleo, and sold and leased jet aircraft on the con-
dition that the purchaser would not buy or lease from any
competitor. The third claim, based on pendent jurisdic-
tion, alleges malicious and wilful interference with the
business of TWA through the same acts pleaded in sup-
port of the first two claims. The complaint seeks treble
damages and also injunctive relief requiring defendants
to divest themselves of all stock in TWA and to refrain
from acquiring any interest in TWA or secking to exer
cise control or domination over TWA. In its answer to
the complaint, Tooleo asserted various counterclaims
against TWA and also against others.

In August 1961, the case was assigned to Judge Charles
M. Metzner for all purposes, pursuant to Rule 2 of the

3

General Rules of the District Court. On February 7, 1962
Judge Metzner appointed J. Lee Rankin as Special Master
to supervise the discovery proceedings.

Simultaneously with filing the complaint, TWA moved
by order to show cause on June 30, 1961 to take the depo-
sition of Hughes. This motion was denied, however, and
Tooleo was allowed priority in the taking of depositions.
On February 7, 1962, in the same order appointing the
Special Master, Judge Metzner established a schedule of
depositions, which was subject to change by the Special
Master upon application of either party. This schedule
called for Toolco to continue with the depositions of some
twenty-four witnesses which had then been noticed, with
the plaintiff to commence depositions immediately upon
completion of Toolco’s schedule. The last deposition by
Tooleo was set for April 19, 1962, and the depositions
noticed by TWA were to commence with the deposition
of Hughes on April 23, 1962.

This schedule was subsequently amended by the Special
Master. The deposition of Hughes was set for Septem-
ber 24, 1962, then adjourned to October 29, 1962, and finally
set for February 11, 1963. Although Hughes himself was
never served with process as a party, the Special Master
ruled that Toolco would be responsible for his appearance
at the deposition, and Toolco did not contest this ruling.

On January 10, 1963, Judge Metzner denied an applica-
tion Tooleo to further postpone the deposition of
Hughes, so that Toolco might continue with its own depo-
sitions, On January 14, Toolco moved to have the deposi-
tin of Hughes taken only on written interrogatories, and
in the event that this was denied, further moved to have
set down for hearing a motion which it had originally made
in August, 1961 to dismiss the complaint. Characterizing

+

this motion as appearing to be “another attempt to put off
the deposition of Hughes”, Judge Metzner denied the re.
quest to have the deposition taken by interrogatories, As
to the second branch of the motion, Judge Metzner ob-
served that the case “is not in a posture for a meaningful
disposition of the motions to dismiss the complaint or for
summary judgment” and noted the agreement of Tooleo
on several occasions that such a motion was premature.
However, the Court further stated that it “cannot prevent
defendant Toolco from pressing these motions at this time”
and set the motions down for argument.

After oral argument on February 6, 1963, Judge Metzner
denied Toolco’s motion from the bench and entered a for-
mal opinion and order the following day. (Reported at
214 F. Supp. 106). In that opinion, Judge Metzner stated
that “as to the merits of the motion, there is no doubt that
the complaint on its face sets forth a claim against the
defendants and is not subject to dismissal under rule
12(b)(6)”. Judge Metzner further ruled that the acts of
the defendants alleged in the complaint were not exempted
from the antitrust laws by virtue of certain orders of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, and that the C.A.B. did not have
exclusive primary jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the complaint.

Almost immediately thereafter, at a pre-trial conference
before Judge Metzner on Friday, February 8, 1963, counsel
for Tooleo announced that Hughes would not appear for
the deposition scheduled for the following Monday, Feb-
ruary 11. Toolco also declared its unwillingness to pro-
duce as previously ordered certain income tax returns, 88
well as certain other documents for which a claim of at-
torney-client privilege had been made but rejected by the
court. Toolco also filed a written “Notice of Position’
dated February 8, which recited in part that:

5

“Tooleo hereby elects, subject only to whatever relief
it may hereafter obtain, to rest on the merits of its
positions as heretofore taken so that it may avoid the
burdens and expenses involved in further pre-trial and
trial proceedings prior to the time that an appellate
court has had the opportunity to rule upon the deci-
sions and orders heretofore made herein.”

Counsel for Toolco elaborated on this position at the
pre-trial conference on February 8. Adverting to the
eatlier ruling of the Special Master that Toolco would be
responsible for Hughes’ compliance with the deposition
subpoena, with the possible sanction of a default if the
subpoena were not complied with, counsel stated that “the
Tool Company did not seek a review of those rulings of
the Special Master by the Court and accepted in effect the
responsibility placed on it by that ruling.” (Tr. of Feb. 8,
p. 9), He also stated Toolco’s awareness of the possible

ns of a failure to comply with the discovery

~ “*T have also had occasion to describe to my client,

the Hughes Tool Company, the sanctions available
“ander the Rules by reason of a respectful declination
“orelection to stand on the questions of law which have
been decided to date and not to proceed any further
with respect to discovery proceedings. I have particu-
larly called to their attention the provisions of 37(d)
—Rule 37(d)—of the Federal Rules, with respect to
the sanctions which could be applied by the Court on
the Tool Company. [Tr. of Feb. 8, p. 9]

__“The Tool Company does want to rest on the merits
‘st its position, and it does so fully aware of the sanc.
‘fions which the Court, in its discretion, may impose
“Hoon the Tool Company... . [Ibid., p. 11]

6 |
“We are fully aware—my client is fully aware—that by
insisting on a right to obtain a review on the legal
questions which have been decided to date, and should
it develop that they are in error, as indicated by your
Honor’s decisions and rulings, as a consequence they
may be deprived of further defending on the merits,
‘other than on the question of damages.” [Ibid., p. 12)

In response to questions from the Court, counsel advised
that embraced within the contemplation of the “notice of
position” was an advice to the Court that Hughes would
not appear for the deposition on February 11, and that
plaintiff could take any proceedings it is advised to take
by way of sanctions under Rule 37. (Tr. of Feb. 8, p. 2]
When counsel for TWA questioned whether Hughes
would be bound by the anticipatory default, Tooleo further
waived the right to any defense against sanctions should
Hughes in fact appear for the deposition :

“The Court: * * * Now, Mr. Davis says that as far
as the defendant Hughes Tool Company is concerned,
they will admit today that Mr. Hughes will not appear
on Monday and that as a result you may then take
whatever steps you wish to pursuant to Rule 37 [sie].

“T would also like Mr. Davis to state for the record
that if by chance Mr. Hughes should appear at the
courthouse on Monday, despite what has transpired
here this afternoon, that will be no defense to any
proceeding taken by T.W.A. -

“Mr. Davis: I will so state, your Honor.” [Tr. of
Feb. 8, pp. 48-49]

Toolco also re-iterated its intention not to produee the
documents which it had been ordered to produce, and the
Court summarized the state of the proceedings to counsel
for the plaintiff and the defendants on the counterclaims
as follows:

7

“The record is now set for you to take whatever action
you wish to take on the counterclaims and for Mr.
Sonnett to take whatever action he wishes to take on
the claims based on the default of Mr. Hughes on
Monday.

“Secondly, you have the failure to produce the tax
documents, which is an individual and separatr [sic]
ground for proceeding; and you have the failure to
produce the attorney-client documents, which are a
separate and individual ground for proceeding.” [Tr.
of Feb. 8, pp. 59-60.] —

After counsel for Toolco again stipulated as to the binding
nature of these acts, the hearing was adjourned.
Thereafter, on February 15, 1963 TWA moved to
amend the ad damnum portion of the complaint and for-
mally moved for default judgment pursuant to Rule 37.
At the hearing on February 8, counsel for TWA had in-
timated an intention to increase the amount of damages
which TWA was seeking. On May 3, 1963 Judge Metzner
granted the motion to amend the complaint and directed
that default judgment should be entered for TWA, with
a hearing to be held to determine the amount of damages.
The question of “the amount of the damages to be paid”
was referred to the Special Master previously designated
to preside over the discovery proceedings. The counter-
daims were also dismissed with prejudice. The opinion is
reported at 32 F.R.D. 604. As will appear hereafter, the
commencement of the damage hearings was long delayed.
In granting this relief to plaintiff, Judge Metzner re-
viewed the history of the proceedings to date, and stated:

“It is clear that the deposition of Hughes is essential
for the proper presentation of TWA’s case. It is also
Clear that the failure of Hughes to appear on February

8

11th for his deposition was the result of a clear and
studied determination by Toolco after all efforts tp
postpone the appearance of Hughes had failed. The
default was deliberate and willful and justifies the
court in entering a default judgment....” 32 FRD,
at 607.

The order was certified by Judge Metzner for immediate
appeal.

On June 2, 1964, the Court of Appeals, Second Cirenit,
affirmed the propriety of the entry of the default and also
the earlier decision of Judge Metzner relating to the
Court’s jurisdiction. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reported at 332 F. 2d 602. After ruling that the Civil
Aeronautics Board did not have primary jurisdiction over
the anti-trust activities alleged and that prior orders of
the C.A.B. did not immunize the acts alleged in the com.
plaint from the operation of the anti-trust laws, the Court
went on to uphold the complaint as stating a cause of action
under the anti-trust laws:

“The defendants maintain that in any event the com-
plaint fails to state facts sufficient to establish the
jurisdiction of the district court. They claim that the
allegations of antitrust violations in the complaint are
wholly conclusory and that the specific transactions
alleged to have been effected by the defendants do not
state a cause of action under the antitrust laws. We
do not agree. We cannot say that the specific trans-
actions alleged in TWA’s complaint—that Toolco re-
fused to finance aircraft acquisitions by TWA unless
TWA agreed to purchase planes from no supplier
other than Toolco; that Tooleco required TWA gen-
erally to boycott all other suppliers of aircraft; that
the defendants have attempted through various means
to monopolize a substantial segment of interstate and
foreign air commerce—are on their face insufficient to

9

‘support a claim of antitrust violations, a claim which
_ surely falls within the jurisdiction of the district court.
The allegations state the outlines of a tying arrange-
ment, an economic boycott of the defendants’ competi-
tors, and an attempt to monopolize commerce, all
unlawful under the antitrust statutes. It would be par-
ticularly inappropriate to find these allegations insuffi-
cient to establish the district court’s jurisdiction inas-
much as the defendants denied the plaintiff the right
through pre-trial discovery to add more detail and
substance to the allegations set forth in the complaint.

“We are satisfied that the complaint sufficiently states
& cause of action and establishes the district court’s
jurisdiction.” 332 F. 2d at 610-11.

With respect to the dismissal of the counterclaims with
prejudice, the Court held that one such counterclaim
against additional defendants should have been dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed the dismis-
sal of the counterclaims with prejudice as a consequence
of the default. In doing so, the Court affirmed the rulings
of the District Court that required production of the tax
documents and those documents as to which the claim of
attorney-client privilege had been claimed, and affirmed the
propriety of granting a judgment by default in view of
the‘non-compliance with these orders and the failure of
Hughes to appear as ordered.

“The sanction of judgment by default for failure to
tomply with discovery orders is the most severe sanc-
tion which the court may apply, and its use must be
tempered by the careful exercise of judicial discretion
‘40 assure that its imposition is merifed. However,
‘Where one party has acted in willful and deliberate
Gist of reasonable and necessary court orders

10

and the efficient administration of justice, the appli.
eation of even so stringent a sanction is fully justified
and should not be disturbed. [citations omitted]

“Hughes’ deposition was absolutely essential to the
proper conduct of the litigation. Yet he and Tooleo
seized upon every opportunity to forestall this event.
To this end they demanded the production of a multi-
tude of documents by TWA and the additional defen.
dants and secured successive adjournments of the dep-
osition. Indeed, Hughes and Toolco seemed to look
upon the entire discovery proceedings as some sort of
a game, rather than as a means of securing the just
and expeditious settlement of the important matters
in dispute. It was only at the very eve of the Hughes
deposition—after the other litigants had been put to
much delay and expense—that the defendants made
‘business decision’ to terminate discovery.

“Hughes’ conduct is particularly intolerable in a
large and complex litigation such as this one. The
protracted antitrust suit taxes the energies and re-
sourcefulness of each party to the litigation; and it
consumes much time of the court and the special
masters it appoints. Tactics such as Hughes’ serve
only to frustrate the implementation of the discovery
machinery devised by the federal judiciary to expedite
the handling of such complex litigation. See Hand-
book of Recommended Procedure for the Trial of Pro-
tracted Cases, Report of the Judicial Conference Study
Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation, 25 F.R.D.
351 et seq. (1960).

“In the light of all these circumstances, the district
court was not obliged to employ sanctions less severe
than the dismissal of the counterclaims with prejudice.
Whatever lesser sanctions might have sufficed with
regard to the documents withheld by the defendants,
it seems to us that a dismissal of the counterclaims was
appropriate, in view of Hughes’ intransigence after
intensive and expensive discovery proceedings
protracted for more than one year.” 332 F. 2d at 614-15.

iy

11

The Supreme Court granted certiorari as to the decision
of the Court of Appeals, but the writ of certiorari was
subsequently dismissed as improvidently granted. 380
U. 8. 248-9 (March 8, 1965).

On May 10, 1965, TWA moved before J. Lee Rankin,
the Specffl Master, for an order adopting certain interim
findings of fact, based on the allegations of the complaint.
The interim findings were sought by TWA “as a basis
for the submission of its further evidence as to the amount
of its damages.” On July 30, the Special Master entered
anorder which outlined the effect of the default and which
tentatively adopted some of the proposed interim findings
while tentatively refusing to adopt others.

The failure of the Special Master to adopt the omitted
findings was appealed by TWA to the district court. On
November 16, 1965, Judge Metzner entered an opinion and
order which did not deal with specific findings but which
farther stated the law pertaining to the effect of the de-
fault and returned the matter to the Special Master. 38
FRD. 499 (1965). These two decisions by the Special
Master and Judge Metzner, as well as a subsequent de-
cision by Judge Metzner noted below, are described more
fully elsewhere in this opinion.

Shortly thereafter, Tooleo moved before J udge Metzner
for'an order calling on TWA to set forth the facts which
would preclude a finding that Tooleo had never been en-
gaged in the manufacture or supply of aircraft in competi-
tion with any other manufacturer or supplier. This motion
was denied by Judge Metzner on January 4, 1966.

A, Lee Rankin, who had been appointed Special Master
ine the amount of damages, resigned this position
we bing appointed Corporation Counsel of the City of

12

New York. The undersigned was appointed as Special
Master under the same terms as the original reference,
On May 2, 1966, the hearing on damages formally com.
menced with the submission of the plaintiff’s direct tegtj.
mony on damages in written narrative form. Defendant’
direct testimony was also thereafter submitted in written
narrative form. All witnesses were subjected to thorough
cross-examination, which (together with the oral testimony
of one rebuttal witness for plaintiff) covers nearly 11,00
pages. More than 800 exhibits were also introduced by
both parties. The hearings closed on April 9, 1968, and
printed briefs have been submitted by both parties.

Effect of the Default

The first question which must be considered is the effect
of the default on plaintiff’s case and the extent of the bur-
den which plaintiff must still meet in order to justify
recovery. Despite prior rulings in the case, this has been
the subject of continuing disagreement between the parties
in the damage hearings.

Prior to the commencement of the hearings on damages,
plaintiff moved before Special Master Rankin, as noted
above, for certain findings of fact based on the allegations
of the complaint, which were requested on an interim basis
as a foundation for the submission of its evidence on dam-
ages. Plaintiff took the position that the default justified
the entry of such findings without further offer of proof by
plaintiff. After full written and oral argument, Special
Master Rankin entered on July 30, 1965 an opinion and
order which discussed in detail the effect of the default
and which adopted certain of the proposed findings on an
interim basis. However, Special Master Rankin declined,

13

dsp 6n an interim basis, to adopt the balance of the pro-
peed findings. A full statement of his opinion is required
‘properly evaluate the positions of the parties in the
mage hearings. The Special Master described the effect
of the default as follows:

Sarthe default having been entered for the reasons
“Fndicated above, the question remains as to its effect. _
“The default is an admission implied by law as a result
“of the default, which thereupon dispenses with any
“proof of the facts alleged in the complaint, except as
“to unliquidated damages. The default not only has
“the legal effect of an admission of the allegations, but
“precludes any showing of defensive matters in regard
“thereto except as to damages. When the damages are
not liquidated, there is no admission as to the damages
by reason of the default, and proof thereof is required.
(See 3 Freeman, Law of Judgments, Secs. 1281-1282,
‘pp. 2662-2664 (Tuttle’s Ed. 1925).

“All parties agree that Thomson v. Wooster, 114
U.S. 104 (1885) is the leading case by the Supreme
Court of the United States on the effect of a default.
‘It is recognized in that decision that upon the entry
“of a decree pro confesso all matters alleged with suffi-
“dent certainty are admitted. However, it is as to those
“matters not adequately alleged with regard to cer-
“ainty, or subjects which from their nature and the
« of the court proceedings require an examination
¢f details imposing an obligation on the complainant

“to furnish proof, that differences arise.

~ “While conclusions of law are for the cpurt in the
determination of any judgment to be awarded and it
; decides whether the damages proved did in fact
from the violations of law alleged, the defendants
their default no longer have the right to contest

14

whether the asserted violations did in fact occur. They
are limited to pointing out such information or evi.
dence as may be in the record where the court should
take judicial notice of records or facts which show
that the allegations could not be true.

“When the plaintiff has pleaded a ‘statement of
claim’ showing that he is entitled to relief (FRC.
P. Rule VIII (a)), he may yet be unable to prove the
case alleged. But that is not a problem in a default
where the allegations are, in legal effect, admitted
Defaulting defendants are allowed to raise questions
as to allegations contrary to judicially known facts
because when a pleader states matter as facts which is
not out of harmony with that which the court judicially
knows, such averments in the pleading are disregarded.
Greeson v. Imperial Irrigation District, 59 F. 2d 529
(9th Cir. 1932); Interstate Natural Gas Company v.
Southern California Gas Company, 209 F. 2d 380 (9th
Cir. 1953). See also In Re: Woodmar Realty Com
pany, 294 F. 2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961); Cert. Denied,
369 U. S. 803 (1962) and Glen Coal Company v. Dicken.
son Fuel Company, 72 F. 2d 885 (4th Cir. 1934).

“Thus, at this stage of the case, the court is obli-
gated to arrive at a judgment and that judgment must
be just. Therefore, whenever a court would take judi-
cial notice of the proceedings of public bodies such as
the Civil Aeronautics Board or other Federal commis-
sions or the files of the court or any similar matters
and such records and information would satisfy the
court that any allegation of the complaint or any part
of an allegation could not be true, the court is not
required by reason of the default to accept such alle-
gation, or such part of it.

“The effect of information appearing in the ened
up to this date, or as hereafter developed, bearing
upon the truth of the allegations of the complaint, is
somewhat different. Where such evidence clearly shows

15

. that the allegation or part of an allegation could not
possibly be true, the court will not stultify itself by
» geoepting such allegation or part of it in the face of
such evidence. Where, however, the evidence merely
may tend to show that the allegation may not be main-
tained and the defendants by reason of the nature of
- their default have materially interfered with the plain-
» tiff’s ability to produce evidence which might support
‘the allegation or disprove such record evidence, the
eourt is not required to reject the allegations. Such
@ result would reward the defendants for their inter-
‘ference with the processes of the court.
~ “For the reasons indicated the defendants, at this
‘point, do not have the right to produce evidence to try
‘to establish in any manner that the allegations of the
‘eomplaint other than as to damages cannot be main-
“tained. That opportunity was given up by their deci-
sion to default. The rights of plaintiff resulting from
the default should not be taken away by any refine-
ments and legalistic reasoning of any considerations
that do not reach to the level of necessary and proper
requirements for a fair and just hearing on the ques-
tion of damages.
. “On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that
»the court in entering a judgment of default is per-
forming ‘a. judicial act’. Pope v. United States, 323
~¥U.8.1. Furthermore, Rule 55(b)(2), under which the
~eourt directed that this hearing be held recognizes
“that such is the nature of the responsibility, at this
point in the default proceeding, by stating:

ae we Pet at Sy Be ee is

f Bileytiaise-:

95

amount of operating expenses (dependent variable) for
several airlines, one can connect the dots on the graph
with a straight line which represents an average relation-
ship between the points. There are various standards for
placing the straight lines, but the method of least squares
fits the line to the various observations (dots) so as to
- reduce the squares of the deviations (differences) to a mini-
mum. It produces a line showing the average of the vari-
ous lines that might be fitted to the observations. If one
squares the deviations and divides by the number of ob-
servations, one gets the standard error of estimate; and,
given a normal distribution of errors, 68% of the observa-
tions should fall within one standard of error and 95%
of the observations should fall within two standard errors.
Relationships based on fewer observations tend to be more
untrustworthy, and results showing a large proportion of
observations outside the standard error of estimate like-
wise tend to be untrustworthy unless validated by inde-
pendent means.

No claim was made by Simat that regression analysis
was anything more than a statistical method useful in test-
ing the validity of assumptions made by non-mathematical
observations and raw data and conclusions based there-
upon, Nevertheless Simat was of the opinion that the sta-
tistics produced by regression analysis under the assump-
tions made in his report confirmed his expert opinion as
to the financial results that would have been obtained under
the relevant equipment assumptions.

The average stage length estimated by Simat for the
added B-331 domestic flights are set forth below, and are
compared with the stage lengths used by Coverdale, which
were based on the average stage lengths which TWA actu.
ally experienced with B-331 jets for that year (DX 271B,
Ex. A-D):

x
Bene ee cenper ee cat ERT LORE ENT ME ntras Ye YED AFR ae PRESS oy Sane eS :

96

Coverdale Simat
1959 1869 miles 1047 miles
1960 1869“ 1047.“
1961 1389“ 1009.“
1962 920 “ ssl “
1963 799 848 “

The number of flights that would be performed with the
added aircraft miles was obtained by dividing the added
plane miles by Simat’s estimated average stage length of the
added services:

Net Added B-331 Flights
1960 1600
1961 3122
1962 1613
1963 855

In obtaining his trip length dlata for added and deleted
traflic, Simat noted that TWA’s average passenger trip
length historically trended steadily upward during 1959-
1963—from 892.6 miles,per passenger to 942.3 miles per
passenger. TWA would have added 499,000 passengers
and 725 million passenger miles during this period, giving
an average trip length per added passenger of 1,453 miles,
This is 1.6 times the 914 mile average stage length of
TWA’s domestic traflic in this period. Simat then derived
a relationship between the stage lengths of added and de-
leted flights and the trip lengths of passengers added and
deleted as a consequence of the flight changes. Separate
ratios were established for jet and piston services, using
various assumptions that Simat considered reasonable on
the basis of his experience. Using these ratios, he esti-
mates the average trip length of added jet passengers by
increasing the estimated stage lengths of the added flight

ene
prage nse ahem &

97

by 144% and of deleted piston passengers by applying
168% to the stage lengths of the deleted piston flights.

He stated that the reason why revenue passenger yield
realized by domestic air carriers varies with distance
traveled is because the fares contain a fixed component in
the form of a charge per ticket, which is intended to cover
such costs as ticketing and handling of the passenger and
haggage at airports (not dependent on length of trip) and
a variable component in the form of a charge per mile. As
the length of trip increases, there results a “fare taper.”
Adding to the effect of taper are such factors as that pas-
sengers on longer than average trips get a disproportionate
part of fare discounts. By use of regression analysis
Simat obtained a relationship between yields and trip dis-
tances on an industry basis for the years 1959-63. These
figures were adjusted to TWA yields by comparing the
actual passenger yield for TWA at an average trip length
ineach year with the yield estimated for the same trip
length using the industry relationship.

The estimated revenue yields were applied to the esti-
mated adjusted marginal load factors, computed as above
described, and transportation revenues were obtained.

We now show the results of the methodology in the origi-
nal Simat Report under subdivision (a) :

i
&
4
%
‘
‘
$
;
t

te B89 Apt he»

The seat miles for the added B-331 planes are the same
as under Coverdale assumptions. The adjusted marginal
load factors and added passenger miles are (DX 271B, p.
IV-25) :

Added Seat Miles Marginal Load Added Revenue

(Millions) Factor Passenger Miles

1960 241.6 32.4% 78.3 million
1961 418.1 22.7 94.9 '
1962 180.9 49.2 89.0 7

97.7 49.5 48.4 ™

98

“The average stage lengths, passenger trip length, and
added passengers are (id., p. IV-27):

Average Added Average Added
Stage Length Trip Length Added
(Miles) (Miles) Passengers
1960 1,138 1,633 47,449
1961 1,009 1,447.9 65,543
1962 881 1,264.2 70,400
1963 848 1,216.9 39,773

Applying the yields for passenger revenues, computed
as set forth above, the following estimated added revenues
are obtained (id., p. 1V-29):

Passenger Revenue Total Added

Yield Per Mile Revenues
1960 §.342¢ $4.39 million
1961 5.685¢ $5.67 million
1962 5.979¢ $5.59 imillion
1963 5.768¢ $2.93 million

As to displaced piston aircraft service, Simat noted that
Coverdale had based its estimate on the experienced ratio
of total such miles deleted to total jet miles added in each
year, and had assumed that all the additional plane miles
deleted in domestic service were flown with L-1649As or
L-1049Gs. Simat disagreed with this latter assumption,
and stated that by eliminating the piston aircraft with the
largest number of seats, Coverdale had overstated the
number of piston seat miles to be eliminated. Simat accord-
ingly computed the additional piston miles deleted accord-
ing to the type of piston plane proportional to the plane
miles of each type actually deleted in the year in question.
The results, applying marginal load factors, gave the esti-
mated deleted. passenger miles as follows (id., p. IV-31):

99

Deleted
Deleted Available Passenger
Seat Miles Marginal Load Miles
(Millions) Factor (Millions)
\-404— 1960 22. 63.2 13.90
1961 38. 57.3 21.77
L-049/749

1960 52.88 63.8 33.74

1961 63.39 58. 36.75

1962 50.78 72.6 36.87

1963 5.01 69.4 3.82

L-1049 1960 33.51 64.4 21.58
L-1049G 1960 61.16 63.1 38.59
1961 43.66 57.1 03.15

1962 1.60 72.7 1.16

1963 2.39 69.4 1.66

L-1049H 1960 97 | 66. .64
L-1649A 1960 10.09 | 63.5 6.41
1961 80.24 63.4 50.87

1963 9.10 84.8 7.72

The average stage lengths and average trip length of
deleted passenger traffic having next been obtained, the
numbers of deleted passengers were computed. The reve-
nue yields were computed for each type of deleted piston
and the resulting deleted revenues, were as follows (id., p.

IV-35) :

Deleted Revenues
(Millions)
M-404 1960 $1.02
1961 $1.67
L-049/749 1960 $2.08
1961 $2.42
1962 $2.64
1963 $ .26
L-1049 1960 $1.30
L-1049G 1960 $2.23
1961 $3.39

Pew. BAITS Biter 28 Se GS REC Bec ate

100

Deleted Revenye
(Millions)

L-1049G (cont.)

1962 $ .07

1963 $ 11
L-1049H 1960 $ .03
1,-1649A 1960 $ .37

1961 $3.21

1963 $ .47

The methods used in the original Simat Report for
estimating changes in operations from the earlier delivery
of certain B-131 and B-331 aircraft follow the procedures
described above in respect of the changes from failure to
receive certain B-331s, and the detailed figures appear in
DX271A, Chapter V.

The original Simat estimate for subdivision (a) is that
the total revenues would have been strikingly less than the
Coverdale estimate if the Boeing jets had been introduced
and operated under the posited equipment assumptions.

Discussion of costs relating to this subdivision (a) and
my decision as between the methodologies of the plaintiff
and defendants are deferred until later.

Twenty Convair 880°s—Plaintiff’s Position

Subdivision (b) of the plaintiff’s claim for loss of profits
in the Domestic Division is based upon the delayed delivery
of twenty of the thirty CV-880 aircraft originally ordered
by Toolco from Convair. On this subject paragraph 19 of
the complaint states:

“During the period 1956 to 1960, the defendants re-
quired Convair to make certain changes in the design
of Model 880 aircraft on order by Toolco, but the de-
fendants prevented TWA from arranging with Con-
vair for certain design modifications which were de-

101

sired by TWA and which would not have interfered
with the scheduled dates of delivery. During the year
1960 the defendants also prevented and restricted
TWA from making acceptance and test flights from
time to time of various specific Convair model 880
aircraft then on order with Convair by Toolco.”

Paragraph 18 of the complaint provides, in part, with
respect to the Convair 880’s:

“Despite repeated requests by TWA Toolco refused
throughout the period 1956 to 1960 to assign to TWA
the rights to acquire such aircraft.”

The background facts are that Toolco, in April 1956,
contracted with Convair for thirty medium, range CV-880
jets, a newly developed model. At or about the same time
Delta contracted with Convair for ten of the CV-880 jets.
These contracts provided for a subsequent allocation of
delivery dates for the 40 planes between Toolco and Delta,
which was to be worked out between the parties at a later
late. The selection of CV-880 jets by Toolco for medium
range operations was on Rummel’s recommendation. He
favored concentrating on pure jets in preference to buying
urbo-prop aircraft for medium range operations. The
umber ordered by Tooleo—i.e.—thirty aircraft, was also
sased upon Rummel’s recommendation.

The plaintiff does not contend that a medium range jet
could or should have been ordered at an earlier date. After
a succession of modifications in the original Tooleco and
Delta contracts, Convair agreed in the final contract to the
irst delivery to be made in November 1959 and the fortieth
in September 1960, with the allocation of specific dates still
‘0 be made by mutual agreement.

PR ET LN ANP WG omttad

In the fall of 1958 when the production of the CV-880s
had reached a point where it became essential to allocate
particular aircraft between Toolco and Delta, so that the
configurations would meet the respective requirements of
the two airlines, Tooleo refused to agree to any proposed
allocation of delivery dates and Convair finally made a
specific allocation on its own initiative (Rummel, TWA
Ex. 2, p. 15; Tr. 1094-1095, 1108, 1552-1553). Delta executed
a contract amendment incorporating the delivery schedule
provided for it (TWA Ex. R10). Toolco never executed
such an agreement, but the evidence shows that Tooleo
could have contracted for the contract delivery dates as-
signed to it by Convair. The plaintiff has accordingly
assumed delivery dates so assigned by Convair (original
contract delivery dates) in measuring the delays in delivery
of twenty of the CV-880’s.

Rummel testified (Tr. 307, 321, 444, 1538) that defendant
Hughes assumed personal control of all matters connected
with Convair deliveries; that no one else in TWA was
permitted to become involved on matters of delivery; that
in the fall of 1959 defendant Hughes instructed him that
he was not to proceed with any acceptance procedures or
even to continue acceptance flights without receiving per-
sonal clearance from defendant Hughes (Tr. 2949-50, 2987).
The evidence as a whole bears out this Rummel testimony.

Rummel also testified that in December 1959 Toolco sent
armed guards to the Convair plant who actually took con- |
trol over the first four CV-880’s coming off the production
line and scheduled for delivery to TWA or Toolco; that
these planes were subsequently bailed to Toolco and re-
mained in that condition for many months, unavailable for i
final inspection test flight or acceptance procedures (Tr.

102

, RSE SOT Oe eS ES PO i Tee ba rhs are aS Fe igi

103

9788-90, 2810-17, 2839-40). The effect of this incident is
discussed later.

Rummel also testified that removal of other CV-880’s
from the production line came as a direct result of\the
actions of defendant Hughes (Tr. 2836-37). Rummel also
testified that when Convair subsequently tendered approxi-
mately seven or eight completed aircraft, they were refused
because “we had not been cleared by Hughes to do so”
(Tr. 2763-66).

Rummel also testified that Convair claimed damages
from Toolco for delay in delivery and storage costs on
nineteen of the twenty planes which eventually went to
TWA and that in 1963 (when TWA purchased six addi-
tional CV-880s from Convair after repossession from
Northeast Airlines) that Toolco agreed to credit Convair
with a substantial sum in recognition of these claims (Tr.
2757-65; DX 145; TWA Ex. 21).

Delta during this period was accepting deliveries of air-
craft under the contract with an average delay of 1.4
months per plane subsequent to the various contract de-
livery dates. Rummel testified that if TWA had been the
purchaser, independent of defendants Hughes and Toolco,
it was his opinion that Convair would have delivered the
aircraft to TWA on a schedule at least closely approxi-
mating that of Delta (Tr. 1129-1139).

TWA’s claim for damages under this facet of the case
is based on the original Toolco-Convair contract delivery
dates, as stated above. Its theory of damages is that by
reason of the actions of Toolco, it is entitled to rely upon
the schedule of deliveries which Convair was willing (prior
to these events) to contract to meet.

4
AG NT ESSA OM INNS PUN CN RMR CRS Lek be NTT, _
—_— GEIR LE: LS GRAIL IP LR, ee TS MES Pits te ee ee ai

- a

Following is a table showing the original contract de-
livery dates, the actual receipt dates and the months dif-
ference (TWA Ex. 4(c)(1), p. 52):

Actual Receipt Date Contract Delivery Date Months Difference

104

5/18/60 11/59 6

1/ 1/61 1/60 12

1/ 5/61 2/60 il

1/ 6/61 3/0 —— 10 )
1/ 8/61 3/60 10
1/12/61 4/60 9
1/21/61 4/60 9

2/ 2/61 5/60 9
2/15/61 5/60 9
3/15/61 6/60 9
3/18/61 6/60 9
3/20/61 7/60 8
4/26/61 7/60 9

5/ 6/61 7/60 10
5/25/61 7/60 10

6/ 9/61 8/60 10

7/ 9/61 8/60 11
8/10/61 8/60 12

9/ 2/61 9/60 12
10/13/61 9/60 13

The Coverdale Report computed the increase in annual
average CV-880s which would have been available for com-
mercial service if the original contract delivery dates had
been met under this portion of the case, as follows (id,
p. 53):

1960—10.3 planes

1961— 5.2 planes

assuming the aircraft would have been received on the
15th of whatever month was specified in the contract for
each aircraft.

SecA TENA LEY LEE UTR LEAL OER RNIN NE PES BS DOES ah ad 2s ga prs

105

Using TWA historical data for 1961 operation of CV-
880s, Coverdale calculated the additional] plane miles would
have been 5.9 million for 1961; and again using 1961 data
(since TWA was not operating CV-S80s in 1960), it cal-
culated the additional plane miles for 1960 as 11.6 million.

Using TWA’s average of 88.3 seats offered for sale per
CV-S80 in 1961, it then caleulated the additional seat
miles as (id., p. 54):

1960—1,024 million additiona! seat miles
1961— 521 million additional seat miles

Using TWA’s 1961 average CV-880 passenger load fac-
tor, the resulting munber of additional] jet passenger miles
for 1961 is 341 million miles. Since TWA did not have
CV-S80s to operate in commercial service in 1960, Cover-
dale took average load factor for 1960 for TW.A’s Bocing
331s and 131s used in the Domestic Division and thus com-
puted additional jet passenger miles for 1960 for the CY-
880s as 702 million miles. (Jd., p. 55.)

To obtain the corresponding reduction in piston plane
passenger miles a complicated formula was used: An ex-
amination was made of the historical service patterns for
the thirty specific pairs of cities in which TWA historically
employed its twenty CV-880s when they were put into
service in 1961 and for the six additional pairs of cities
served by the six additional CV-880s when they were put
into service in 1963. The historical decrease in piston
service on those particular segments was totaled and was
related to the amount of jet service introduced on such
segments. It was found that the average decrease in piston
plane miles was 52% of the increase in jet plane miles be-
tween the same cities. It was assumed that this percentage
would be applicable to any carlier service and to any fur-
ther increase in CV-880 service in similar operations; and

WR

iota see

106

that in any given year the kinds of operations in which
TWA would have used additional jets of a given type
would have been essentially similar to the operations in
which aircraft of the same type were used by TWA his.
torically in the same year. Applying the 52% reduction
factor to the additional CV-8S0 jet plane miles the addi-
tional reduction of piston plane miles becomes (id., p. 62):

1961—3.1 million
1960—6.0 million

More than half of the reduction shown above was in
flights of L-1049G aircraft, and the Coverdale Report used
the average number of seats offered for sale in L-1049Gs
for cach of the two years in question, and the average load
factor for such piston plane for each year, and thereby
arrived at the following figures for reduced piston pas-
senger miles (ibid.) :

1960—286 passenger miles
1961—134 passenger miles

The above changes in jet and piston passenger miles and
TWA’s actual yields (computed as set forth above, at
pp. 84-86) gives estimated net increase of passenger rev-
enues as follows (id., p. 63):

1960—$23.5 million
1961— 12.2 million

Adding tlie 5% estimate for non-passenger revenues these
figures become (ibid.):

1960—$24.8 million
1961— 12.8 million

for the net estimated additional revenues under subdivi-

sion (b).

107

Twenty Convair 880’s—Defendants’ Position

The defendants take the position that there is no posi-
tive and distinct allegation in the complaint that the delays
in delivery of the CV-880s were caused by the defendants ;
and that the plaintiff has failed during the damage hear-
ings to introduce evidence to link the delays sufficiently
with actions of the defendants. The defendants claim that
the proof indicates that the delays were due primarily, if
not exclusively, to Convair—i.e—the manufacturer. The
defendants cite at pages 142-150 of their brief the refer-
ences to various contemporaneous documents which were
introduced as exhibits in which TWA’s representatives de-
scribed actions or failures to act, on the part of Convair,
which might have contributed to delays.

There is an allegation in the complaint that “during the
period 1956 to 1960, the defendants required Convair to
make certain changes in the design of Model 880 aircraft
om order by Tooleo. ...” (Paragraph 19). Ilowever, this
paragraph in the complaint does not allege that these
changes in design resulted in any delays in the delivery
of any aircraft, and no a of any such delay was
introduced. The only specifié action of the defendants prior
to May 1960 (when the first 880s were delivered to plain-
tiff) cited by the plaintiff as being active interference by
Tooleo and defendant Hughes with the deliveries of the
planes was the setting aside of three of the 880s from the
production line in December 1959 and the stationing by
Toolco of armed custodians to guard the planes. But it is
ear from a contemporancous document (Deft. lex. 127)
that Rumunel did not consider this action by Tooleo in it-
vif to have delayed) Convair’s production. schedule, al-
‘hough it was probable by this time that Convair was not
wong to be able to deliver on the original schedule,

3 Ya ale 5

108

In an inter-office memorandum written by Rummel ty
Mr. Charles Thomas, then President of TWA, under date of
February 8, 1960, he stated:

“Setting aside the three, now two, aircraft has not
adversely affected the Convair production line. In faet
this may have helped Convair materially by (1) bene.
ficial reassignment of personnel, (2) permitting more
timely completion of engineering, and (3) permitting
more orderly, i.e., less out of station construction. Of
course, delivery of the two aircraft now set aside is
affected. They have been rescheduled for substantially
later delivery * * *. Certification has not been ad.
versely affected by setting aircraft aside.”

I conclude that the defendants are not chargeable with
responsibility for delays in delivery by reason of the De-
cember 1959. incident.

On March 2, 1960, the purchase agreement between Con-
vair and Tooleo covering all thirty of the CV-S80s was
changed by amendment No. 4 which established a new sched-
ule for delivery of the planes as follows:

May 1960—4 planes

June 4 *“
July ae
August 5
September 4 “
October 5
November 3.8

In my opinion the plaintiff's position that it was entitled
to take the original contract delivery dates in measuring
the amount of damages is not valid. Rather it should be
bound by the revised delivery dates established in Amend-
ment No. 4.

109

The evidence clearly shows, however, that commencing
about May 1960 when Convair was able to offer deliveries,
the defendants, as alleged in the complaint, prevented de-
liveries from being made and caused substantial delays
in deliveries, .

I have heretofore set forth the references to the testi-
mony of Rummel showing that Ilughes assumed personal
control of all matters connected with Convair deliveries
and that no one else at TWA was permitted to become
involved on matters of delivery or acceptance procedures
or even to continue acceptance flights. Rummel also testi.
fied that after TWA was rendered unable by Hughes to carry
out final inspection procedures, numbers of additional air-
craft were removed by Convair from the production line
ina semi-complete state (Tr. 2807-8). This occurred pro-
gressively as TWA could not proceed with acceptance pro-
cedures (Tr, 2808). In “the summer” of 1960 Convair
tendered seven or eight completed aircraft and Rummel
testified that, “We didn’t proceed with the flight testing
because we hadn’t been cleared by Hughes to do so.” (Tr.
2166). Also, it is uncontroverted in the evidence that Con-
vair Claimed damages from Tooleo for delay in delivery and
storage costs on nincteen of the twenty planes which eventu.
ally went to TWA (Tr. 2757-58, 2764-65): and in 1963
Tooleo settled Convair’s damage claims for disruption of
its business and delays in deliveries by crediting Convair
with $3,750,000.

We turn now to the defendants’ computations set forth
inthe Simat Original Report. Using his methodology de-
tribed above for Boeing planes in domestic service, Simat
reached the following results in respect of the assumed
‘arlier delivery of 20 CV-880s:

ee pe

ss tse Cano lar oe

110

Simat assumed the Coverdale estimates of 10.3 added
planes for 1960 and 5.3 added planes for 1961; and the
estimate of 11.7 million added jet plane miles for 1960 and
6.0 million jet added plane miles for 1961. By analysis of
TWA doniestic schedules for CV-880s over the period 1961-
1963, Simat established by regression analysis the esti-

_mated stage lengths of added CV-SS0 jet service to be 752

miles, although the historical average stage length of ex.
isting CV-880 flights was 819 miles. The number of added
flights becomes 15,558 for 1960 and 7,978 for 1961.

To the net assumed added seat miles, Simat then
applied the “estimated adjusted marginal load factors”
(32.3% for 1960 and 22.5% for 1961) and obtained added
revenue passenger miles of 333.7 million miles for 1960
and 119.2 million miles for 1961. Since the average stage

Jength of added service was estimated at 752 miles for

both years, the number of added passengers becomes :
309,239 for 1960 and 110,462 for 196]. TW2A’s actual aver-
age passenger revenue yield per mile was then adjusted
proportionately in the same proportion as the actual aver-
age trip length bears to the adjusted trip length, and the
total added revenues were (DX. 271A, p. VI-16):

1960—$19.5
1961—$ 7.3

As for piston aircraft operations, by regression analysis
the estimated stage lengths of each type of displaced piston
plane was calculated, and the number of deleted piston
flights and miles was also estimated for cach type of piston
plane. The total deleted revenues from piston operations,

\ ~

Ja ReeASS~

¥ 111

similarly computed for each type of piston, and then com-
bined, were (¢d., p. 20):

1960—$41.3

1961—$20.0
Simat, it will thus be seen, estimated very substantial
losses in revenues for both years from the assumed addi-
tional operations of the twenty 880s.

Discussion of estimated changes in expenses under sub-
division (b) is deferred until later. However, the figures for
loss of revenue, apart fromi’ costs, are significant. In view
of the clear preference by airline passengers for jets over
pistons, it is almost impossible to accept the conclusion that
replacements of piston flights by jet flights would have
caused net revenues to decline from $41.1 million to $19.5
million in 1960 (more than 50%) and from $20.0 million to
$7.3 million (more than 65%) in 1961. These figures should
be contrasted with the views of the Civil Aeronautics Board
as expressed in Order No. B-16195 (December 29, 1960,
TWA Ex. 315.4, also reported at 32 C.A.B. 1363). That
Order approved the loan agreement which substituted con.
trol by independent voting trustees for control by Hughes.
Noting that the loan would enable TWA to take delivery
of the 20 Convair °880’s, the C.A.B. stated:

It appears that the failure to receive this equipment
as planned may have played a_ substantial part in
TWA’s recent inability to maintain its traffic position
relative to its principal competitors. Thus, we note,
for example, that the carrier’s preliminary traffic re-
ports for the month of November 1960 show that
TWA’s share of the Big Four domestic passenger
market has declined from 23 to 20.2 percent. By way
of contrast, United, which was behind TWA, has

,
eras capes aileiliaial

112

caught and passed it, increasing its share from 213
percent to 29 percent. It appears to be significant
that TWA’s major competitors have already taken de.
livery of much larger jet fleets than TWA is operat.
ing and have firm orders for delivery of more. [Foot.
notes omitted. ]

Thus, the C.A.B., an impartial body which is certainly
experienced in matters such as these, was of the opinion
that the delay in delivery of the Convair S80’s had proba-
bly resulted in a heavy loss of traffic to TWA, rather than
a preservation of traffic as Simat asserts. Simat’s con- -
clusion that replacing piston flights with jet flights would

result in a heavy loss of traffic can only be viewed with
disbelief and reflects on the credibility of his entire
approach.

Ten Convair 880°s—Plaintiff’s Position

Subdivision (c) of the plaintiff's claim for loss of profits
in the Domestic Division is based upon the failure to re-
ceive ten of the thirty CV-880s originally ordered by
Toolco from Convair.

In addition to the more general allegations of the com-
plaint (see Par. 52) the following statements appeared

“therein:

“In or about April 1956 the defendants arranged for
Toolco to place orders for at least 30 Model 880 jet

powered aircraft to be manufactured by Convair (par.
ig

“In November 1960 while the proposal for merger was
~ pending, the defendants arranged for the lease by Con-
vair to Northeast of six of the Convair model 880
aircraft which Tooleo had ordered from Convair.

SPELT LI Ne ae eed I
Ree wee - a ile it Las! al

113

Among the aircraft so leased to Northeast were three
aircraft which Tooleo previously by an agfcement with
TWA of May 9, 1960 had assigned to TWA (par. 22).”

There is no disagreement over the fact that the remaining
four SSOs out of the ten involved in the claim under sub-
division (¢) Were retained by Toolco for some time and
later leased by it to Northeast (TWA Ex. 2, p. 10), and
were never released by Toolco to the plaintiff.

Earlier we described the main major provisions of the con-
temporaneous contracts between Toolco and Convair, and
Delta and Convair, for a total of forty CV-S80s (pp. 101-
03), Rummel testified that as a result of this and other
reductions in the jets available to the plaintiff, caused by
actions of ‘Tooleo, TWA was unable “to provide the sehed-
we coverage that was advisable because of lack of equip-
ment for a number of years” (Tr. 1085-86).

Rummel was informed on March 5, 1959 by Toolco rep-
resentatives that FWA was not to receive ten of the Con-
vair 880s which had been previously ordered (TWA Ex. ya
pO; R. Tr. 147). It appears that Tooleo had had nego-
tiations with Capital Airlines about selling six to ten of
those CV-SSOs in January 1959 Rimmel protested about
the euthack in the Convair fleet (Tr. 762-65) as did other
TWA officials (Tr. 1165-74, 1193-94). The opposition to
the reduction was communicated to the executives of Tooleo
and to Hughes personally, but Hughes dismissed TW A’s
objections “summarily” (Tr. 1178-81).

The original contract delivery dates for the ten planes
which the plaintiff takes as being the dates when it would
save received the ten planes but for. the aforementioned
actions of Toolco, are as follows (TWA Ex. 2, p. 18; TWA
Ex. 4(¢) (1), p. 65):

Ung esIN

114
December 1959
February 1960
April 1960
May 1960
June 1960
June 1960
July 1960
August 1960
August 1960
September 1960

and in each case it is assumed by Coverdale for damage
computation purposes that the aircraft would have been
received on the 15th day of the applicable month.

The additional annual average number of CV-880s avail-
able for commercial service was computed on this basis as
(TWA Ex. 4(c)(1), p. 66):

1960 5.1
1961 9.9
1962 10.

1963 7.9

(The reduced figure for 1963 results from the fact that,
as noted above, TWA actually purchased six of the ten
planes in question from Northeast Airlines in the last
quarter of 1963, and it was assumed that these six CY-
880s would have been among the thirty aircraft in the
original Toolco order for such planes).

The Coverdale calculation of additional passenger miles
TWA would have recorded each year is similar to the
calculations described above (pp. 104-06) for the twenty CV-
S80s involved in the delayed deliveries. It results as fol-
lows (id., p. 67):

=i nomen S athe +3
SEER SRT I EP PONE OP OEP SPORTS ee ae ere

115

1960—351 million additional jet passenger mien
1961—648

1962—599 “cc “ “ “ “
1963—506 ‘“ of “ “ “

It was assumed that service by TWA for the additional
ten CV-S80s would have been similar to that which it ac-
tually operated with a fleet of twenty CV-880s in 1960
and with a fleet of twenty-six commencing in 1963.

The Coverdale Report then took thirty-six pairs of cities
where most of the CV-SS0 service was concentrated and
found that the reduction of piston aircraft service for such
pairs of cities was 51% of the jet aircraft service added.
Using this ratio, the report then calculated reduction of
piston aircraft service as follows (id., p. 70):

1960 — 123 million miles
1961 — 235 *
1962 — 247 * 96
19638 — 195 * -

At TWA’s average annual yields, computed on the basis
above described, the following are the Coverdale caleula-
tions for net increase of passenger revenues (ibid.):

1960 — $12.9 million
1961 — $243 “*
1962 — $215 “
1963 — $182 “*

Using 5% additional revenue for non-passenger revenues
the total additional revenue figures become:

1960 — $13.5 million
1961 — $255 “
1962 — $226 “
1968 — $191 “

HEC ORES 2 POINTE RSE

116

In considering whether to allow the full amount of the
plaintiff’s claim under this subdivision (c) relating to the
failure to receive ten CV-880s, the question arises as to
whether the plaintiff is justified in using the original con-
tract delivery dates or whether (as in the case of the
calculation of damages in respect of the delays in delivery
of the twenty CV-880s considered under subdivision (b)),
the plaintiff should be required to use the amended de-
livery dates set forth in Amendment No. 4 of the contract
between Toolco and Convair.

For the reasons stated above, it is my opinion that it is
reasonable to use the contract delivery dates in Amend.
ment No. 4 in computing its damages under this subdivi-
sion (c).

Ten Convair 880’s—Defendant’s Position

The original Simat estimates in respect of the failure
to deliver the ten additional CV-880s are now considered.

Simat assumed the estimates of added planes and added
plane miles as computed in the Coverdale Report. By re-
gression analysis the stage lengths for the assumed added
service were obtained, as were the stage lengths of the
assumed deleted piston service, by types of planes. To
the added seat miles assumed, Simat then applied the
“estimated adjusted marginal load factors” (32.3 for 1960,
22.5 for 1961, 48.7 for 1962 and 49.4 for 1963) and obtained
added revenue passenger miles of (DX 271A, p. VII-15):

1966 — 165.4 million miles
1961 — 2245 * *
162 — 519.1. “ a
1968 — 4352 “ *

FOE RES TET IN TOT ERLE TT TED

117

The assumed added passengers were (ibid.) :

1960 — 163,487
1961 — 211,693 ;
1962 — 494,193
1963 — 422976

The average passenger revenue yield per mile (adjusted
as described above) then produced total added revenues

of (id., p. VII-17):

1960 — ¢ 9.7 million
1961 — $13.7 *
1962 — $33.
1963 — $266 «

The total deleted revenues from piston operations, sim-
ilarly computed for each. type of plane, and then com-
hined, were (7d., p. VIT-21):

1960 — $21.0
1961 — $37.8
1962 .— $22.3
1963 — $10.2

Discussion of changes in costs under subdivision (c) is
leferred until later.

I now take up the Simat Supplemental Report.

During the Simat cross-examination on the original
Simat Report, plaintiff’s attack was directed primarily to
the validity of the concept of a marginal load factor—both
before and after adjustment for economic growth. The
use of this factor, more than any other, accounted for the
wide variation in the estimate of the experts covering doe
mestie operations.

The defendants countered with the statement that with
the data then available to them they were confined to

11S

pointing out the “fundamental errors” of the Coverdak
Report—that they needed additional data from TWA ree.
ords if they were expected to produce the best judgment
of their expert (Simat) as to changes that would have
occurred in operating profits.

‘The testimony of the defendants’ experts was that any
realistic estimation of the change in net operating profit
requires the construction of an articulated TWA oper.
ating plan in which specific consideration is given to how
the added jet capacity would be integrated with existing
operations, to what types of service would be added, to
what existing services would be eliminated in their en.
tirety, and of what shifts in aircraft usage would occur
as added jet aircraft displaced other aircraft from their
existing usage to displace, in turn, other aircraft in a chain
reaction. Since the scheduling and integration of new air.
craft capacity is one of the most complex functions per-
formed in the operation of an airline, Simat stated, it
cannot be dealt with in generalities but an extensive bank
of background information is needed to make appropri-
ately informed judgments concerning the most probable
and suitable use of additional aircraft on a route system
as heterogeneous as that of TWA, and the resulting effect
on operating profit.

The defendants accordingly made a demand for massive
additional production of TWA’s operating records to en-
able their experts to construct an operating plan for TWA
for the years in question and thus test the validity of their
underlying damage theories. This demand was vigorously
contested by the plaintiff as unnecessa d too late. It
was my opinion that because of the iner large spread
between the estimates of the experts as to operating results
to he expected from the assumed added jet fleet, the Special

119

Master and any court reviewing the matter were entitled
to the best judgment of all the experts, based on every
available T'WA record, as to the factors involved in their
jydgment. The defendants’ admission that the original
imat Report did not reflect the best judgment of their
expert because of the limited source material available,
also influenced me. Accordingly, the defendants’ belated
request was granted as to the production of all available
records sought by it affecting the Domestic Division Op-
erations of TWA.

I decided that corresponding figures for the Interna-
tional Division operations need not be produced because
of lesser complexity of the factors involved in the opera-
tions of that Division. For example, the computations of
transatlantic load factors were basically disputed, and
the stage lengths of the flights of coursé/did not vary to
any considerable degree in the International operations.

This demand for preduction entailed a substantial delay
in the completion of the damage hearings but resulted in
a Supplemental Simat Report reflecting, in conjunction
with its original report, its final revised estimate of
changes in plaintiff's domestic operating revenues. The
Supplemental Report did not change estimates of costs,
so the Simat cost estimates for the Domestic Division are
found in the original Simat Report.

The mass of material furnished by the plaintiff as a
basis for the Simat Supplemental Report consisted mainly
of TWA’s routing charts and on-board reports and on-line
passenger revenue yield information for the five-year pe-
riod 1959-1963. Traffic and financial data for all scheduled
fight services were made available by individual flight
egments. For each segment of each flight, the informa-
‘ion was converted into a form considered suitable by Simat

BSI Dy

sinters

RP a

$ 120

for computor processing. This information included flight
itinerary, departure and arrival time, number of flights
per month, type of equipment, classes of -service and num-
bers of seats in each class, and distances between points
served,

Basically the differences in method from the Original
Report may be summarized as follows:

1. Rather than estimating the average stage length of
added and deleted operations by the use of Domestic Divi.
sion average relationships between stage lengths of ex.
isting added and deleted services, the report estimated
directly the changes in flight operations hy segments and
derived the stage lengths from individual flight segment
data.

2. Rather than estimating passenger miles on the basis
of average divisional marginal load factors, the Report
estimated them on the basis of individual segments.

3. Rather than estimating passenger trip lengths on
the basis of divisional averages, the Report estimated them
likewise on data from the individual flights.

Following is a more detailed description of the method.
ology used in the Simat Supplemental Report:

The routing charts show the flight patterns over a twenty-
four hour period for each aircraft. The on-board reports
provide monthly summarics of data by flight number, seg-
ment and type of equipment for all revenue flights. They
show number of departures and numlir of revenue pas-
sengers, From the origin and destination points, data were
obtained for computing aircraft miles and block hours.
Block hours are defined as the elapsed time between de-
parture from the gate position before take-off to arrival

TS, Recs! cai nba Ld cot USSG eR ARN aca at GS Gam RR EA WEL EAS

121

at the gate position after landing. From these figures, seat
miles were obtained for each aircraft in each segment for
each month. Simat then computed the average monthly
stage length (aircraft miles divided by departures) and the
average monthly load factor (revenue passenger miles di-
vided by seat miles).

The annual average stage lengths resulting were (DX
971A, p. II-12):

Pistons 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
M-404 161 155 141 vie oan
049/749 366 318 265 199 191
L-1049 532 445 426 eS aie
L-1049 G/H 722 567 375 336 322
L-1649A 1,414 534 311 299 ome
Jets

('V-880 — —_— 821 790 767
B-131 1,888 1,533 1,207 892 648
B-131 B — — — 1,509 1 303
B-331 — 2,027 1,572 1,007 827
B-331 B — = — 479 340
B-720 B — 1,010 967 —

For All Fleets 440 445 489 552 591

The load factors shown were (id., p. I-20):

Pistons

M-404 64 61 59 a =
L-049 66 59 58 _— —
L-749 64 63 61 64 63
L-1049 64 59 niite ile a
L-1049 G 70 60 60 61 57
L-1049 H 73 56 — — ow
L-1649 A 70 59 54 59 56

J+ TRAC Ae gpa

ARNT Ot RO

122
Jets 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
CV-880 — — 66 56 57
B-131 83 69 53 49 56
B-331 — 64 49 42 43
B-331 B — — — 37 44
B-720 B — — 48 50 —_
For All Flects 71 64 57 51 53... §

Simat next determined his estimate of the monthly op.
crating profit or loss, based on’ distances actually flown
and number of passengers actually carried. He did this
first computing revenues and costs under the methodology
used in his Original Report and second by computing them
under the Coverdale methodology. Ile summarized his
results in the following language:

“While the profit or loss determined under the Simat
procedures is, in our opinion, substantially more accu-
rate, the difference is not significant to the present
analysis. For both methods demonstrate, with equal
certainty, although in different degree, that individual
aircraft in each of TWA’s jet fleets varied strikingly
in their earning capacity, depending upon their sched-
uling. and they also demonstrate that, as jets were
added, the additional jets were placed on routes where
they began to contribute not profits, but losses.”

The Supplemental Report does not make separate esti-
mates according to categories of assumptions, as did the
Simat Original Report and the Coverdale Report.

In deploying the assumed additional jet fleet, Simat
built a constructive schedule just as TWA historically
scheduled such equipment when it in facet received the
additional equipment (with certain adjustments not ma-
terial for understanding the methodology). It selected as

2 EE

123

a basis for the schedule of the constructive fleet in each
month (“constructive fleet month”) the schedule pattern
adopted by TWA: in the “guide” month, i.e., a subsequent
month when the actual jet fleet was closest in number to
the constructive fleet.. The average jet stage length was
computed for each guide month and applied to the total
jet miles in the constructive fleet month, to obtain total
constructive jet departures. Piston fleet miles and depar-
tures were similarly constructed. To determine the traffic
carried by the “constructive” fleet, Simat did not use the
on-board data furnished by TWA but chose instead an
intricate method of computing passengers from data from
a competition study of the CAB made in 1966, which tabu-
lates from samples the number of passengers who pur-
chased tickets for travel on TWA, or other airlines, be-
tween each combination of cities served by TWA and other
airlines. By regression analysis Simat then related the
change in the volume of passenger miles between each two
successive years, for each flight segment, with the cor-
responding changes in the volume of seat miles scheduled
with jet and piston aircraft. Further regression analysis

| was used to convert the relationship between changes in

i
:

non-stop on-line passenger traffic service (traffic carried
between a point of origin and a point of final destination)

as reported in the CAB Competition Survey, and changes

in aircraft services to a relationship between changes in

on-board traffic and changes in aircraft services.

Passenger yields were then applied. (varying with the
estimated length of passenger trip to show.“taper” as de-
scribed in the original Report). The ratio of length of
passenger trip to stage length was also computed as in
the original Report, with some refinements statistically.

Operating revenues resulted from this application of

»

124 :

yield figures to the passenger miles. The results showed
an even greater net loss of revenue for the Domestic Divi-
sion than shown in the original Report. Total revenues
were estimated at $79.79 million.and total costs at $191.74
million, or a net loss estimated for operating with the
assumed additional Domestic fleet of $111.95 million. Some
“alternative” computations are also set forth in the Sup.
plemental Report to “validate” the findings of the Report,
but are not otherwise relied upon (DX 371) and accord.
ingly are not discussed in this Opinion.

Conclusions

I have described above the claims of the plaintiff for
Domestic Division losses resulting from inadequacy of
its jet fleet. I have also examined the methodology used
in the reports of the plaintiff’s expert witness (Wemple of
Coverdale) and the defendants’ expert witness (Simat)
and their estimates of the financial results to TWA if the
hypothesized jet fleet had been received and operated in
the years 1959-63. Since the conflicting results as to the
amount of damages are based largely upon three assumed
factors, the reasonableness of those factors will now be
discussed as a preliminary to award of damages under
this part of the case (Section IB-Domestic).

The greatest portion of differing results stems from the
use. by Coverdale of the historical annual average load
factor (percentage of available Seats which are occupied)
for each type of plane to compute the number of net addi.
tional passenger miles that would have been flown if the
additional planes had been available; and from the use by
Simat of the marginal load factor (ratio of the net trafh
added by an added flight to the seat capacity added by th

t:

125

flight) in his computation of the number of net additional
passenger miles. (In his Supplemental Report Simat did
not denominate this factor as marginal load factor, but
for purposes of this discussion the term is applicable to
both of his Reports.) In my opinion the historical average
. annual load factor of the same or similar ty pe of plane
involved in the computation is the proper measure to be
used. Since it is computed separately for each year it
adequately takes into account the steadily decreasing load
factors experienced by TWA and by the industry during
most of the period covered by the damage claims.

The defendants quite properly state that use of the
annual average load factor would not be valid if applied
to unlimited assumed additions to traffic. However, the
Coverdale report was based upon a limited assumed in-
creas in traffie—limited by the amount of increased traflic
assumed by the equipment assumptions of the posited
hypothetical TWA jet fleet.

The percentages of seat miles of all types of aircraft
assumed to be added by TWA domestically in 1959-63
measured against the total of TWA, American and United;
and the percentage of seat miles so added by TWA meas-
ured against TWA’s historical jet domestic seat miles is
shown in the following table (TWA Ex. 444):

gee g OR ae
i
am
$

Le PRY STERN OC eR A Nae le TL OF th FEN E D EOE

126

TOTAL AVAILABLE SEAT-MILES OPERATED
DOMESTIC SCHEDULED SERVICE ONLY
TWA, UAL AND AAL
ALL AIRCRAFT TYPES, 1959-1963

TWA, UAL TWA
and AAL Estimated
Historical Additional Percent
Seat-Miles Seat-Miles Additions
- Year (A) (B) by TWA
(Millions)
1959 21,738 105 0.5%
1960 24,827 910 3.7
1961 29,020 1,018 3.5
1962 34,613 774 2.2
1963 37,969 638 17
TWA
TWA Only Estimated
Historical Additional ae
Seat-Miles Seat-Miles Additions
Year (A) % (B) Percent
(Millions)
1959 6,492 105 1.6%
1960 6,962 910 13.1
1961 7,487 1,018 13.6
1962 8,623 774 9.0
1963 10,042 638 6.4

(A) Source: CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics (1965 Edition).

(B) Source: C&C Report (May 2, 1966) Volume I, Chapters II-V; Exhibits
TWA 42, 42A, 43A and DX 262. ¢

As applied to this posited increase in traffic, T am of the
opinion that use of the annual average load factor in the
Coverdale Report is reasonable.

A comparison of industry average load factors (scheduled
operations of the trunk line air carriers) for the years in
question with the TWA average load factors used by

127

Coverdale also tends to confirm the reasonableness of the
Coverdale computations. The industry figures are as fol-

lows (DX 271B):

Jets Non Jets
1959 - 79.9 59.7
1960 69.6 59.3
1961 59.5 53.
1962 53.6 52.6
1963s 54. 53.3

The use of the marginal load factor by Simat to measure
increase or decrease in number of passenger miles is, in
my judgment, inappropriate. I note that Simat throughout
his testimony refers to the marginal load factor as being
appropriate to determine whether an assumed added flight
would be profitable. That may well be so for an individual
fight under normal industry conditions which do not in-
volve a transition period in which there is introduced into
the market a highly preferred new type of equipment. But
it seems to me to erroneously exclude from consideration
the probability that passengers would be diverted from
competitors, who would not lave had, under the assump-
tions here applicable, as great a quantity of jets as they
had historically, to TWA which, under said assumptions,
would have had more of the jet equipment so highly pre-
ferred by the traveling public. Indeed Simat stated (Simat
Tr. 9123) “A truly accurate measure of marginal load fac-
tor should consider not only the competitive factors but also
the other factors I mentioned of increased public acceptance,
changes in quality and quantity of air services, and inde-
pendent of the change in capacity alone.” As applied in

" the Simat Report, these factors have not been sufficiently

recognized. I am strengthened in my opinion by the follow-

m
e
«
&
+1960° 196| 1962 1963 1964
. °°

; -3% - Ss. o”

r

-10%-

140

From this it can be seen that TWA’s performance in 1960 .
and 1961 was significantly worse, when compared to its
1959 performance, than that of the other trunk carriers.
In 1962; it turned the corner of recovery, and by 1964 had
nearly reached the same level of performance, vis-a-vis
1959, as-the other trunks. This strongly suggests that
TW4A’s shortage of jets in these years had a significantly
adverse effect on its competitive position. Had TWA’s
performance been maintained at the’ same level as the
other trunks, its pasSenger traffic would have been far
greater than the levels which it actually experienced. In
view of TWA’s excellent route structure and its strong
performance in 1959, the inference is strong that its failure
to maintain its position in 1960 and the subsequent years
was due to its shortage of jet equipment, which affected its
ability to compete for the available passenger traffic. These
statistics make it almost impossible to accept the Simat |
‘thesis that TWA would have suffered further drastic de-
clines in passenger traffic if it had replaced piston flights
with jets. Rather, the inference is that TWA would have
obtained far higher levels of passenger traffic. Therefore,
the Coverdale use of TWA’s historical average figures to
project the additional traffic from the jets would appear to
be a conservative estimate.

As to the Domestie Division claims, the plaintiff’s proof
is sufficiently certain and direct to meet the standards in
default situations (Bigelow v. RKO Radip Pictures Inc.,
~ 997 U.S. 251 (1946)). The defendants, while raising doubts
- as to certain aspects of the claims which could undoubtedly
have been cleared up if Hughes had been willing to testify,
have failed to disprove these claims by any method open to
them in the light of their default. Accordingly, I find as
follows: , .

SSS:

me Caine

141

Subdivision (a). The plaintiff’s estimates of revenues are
reasonable and are adopted by me.

Subdivision (b). The plaintiff’s use of original contract
delivery dates in the Convair contract is not reasonable.
Its estimates of revenues if computed instead on the basis
of using the delivery dates provided for in Amendment _
No. 4 to said contract are reasonable and as so changed
(as hereinafter: set forth) are adopted by me. After ap-
propriate adjustment of assumed changes in expenses, the
net dollar reduction from plaintiff’s claim is hereafter
shown.

Subdivision (c). The’ plaintiff's estimates of revenues, 2
modified similarly to use the delivery dates provided for F
insaid Amendment No. 4, are reasonable and as so changed

| (as hereinafter set forth) are adopted by me. The appro-
priate related adjustment in expenses is hereafter shown.

As to costs of operation of the assumed added plane miles
under subdivisions (a), (b) and (c),.I find that if the
methods of computation thereof, used by Simat, were ap-

plied to the increased traffie and revenue estimates by
Coverdale, and which T have adopted as reasonable, they
would produce at least as low expense estimates as those
of Coverdale, and accordingly I adopt the Coverdale esti-
mates of expenses applicable to subdivision (a), (TWA Ex.
49; Tr. 10,679-82) and the estimates of expenses under
subdivisions (bh) and (ec) modified as above stated; pro-
vided, however, that a change in the applicable amount of
net interest costs (hereafter discussed), is to be given effect.

After the record in the case was closed I requested
counsel for the plaintiff to recompyte the damage claim
in respect of failure to receive and delay in delivery of
the Convair 880s on the basis of using the delivery dates
vt forth in Amendment No. 4 to the Convair-Toolco.con-

tract instead of the original contract delivery dates. The
recomputation, with copy to counsel for defendants, has
now been submitted to me. Since I have now decided
(supra, p. 141) that the Amendment No. 4 dates are prop.
erly used for computation of damages, I set forth below
the amount as computed by the plaintiff to be deducted

from the plaintiff’s claim in respect of the Convair 880s;
and I have arranged to have the recomputation (Letter of
Dudley B. Tenney to the Special Master dated August 30,
1968, with enclosures) filed with the Exhibits:

142

SUMMARY OF EFFECT OF APPLICATION OF RE.
VISED ASSUMPTION THAT DELIVERY DATES FOR
THIRTY CV880 AIRCRAFT WERE THOSE SET
FORTH IN AMENDMENT NO. 4 IN LIEU OF
THOSE SET FORTH IN ORIGINAL
TOOLCO-CONVAIR CONTRACT

For THE Pertop SerTEeMBER 30, 1955—DecemBerR 31, 1963

(Amounts in millions)
Increase in income and special items be-
fore provisions for income taxes (Price
Waterhouse & Co. report, Vol. Tp. 9,
as revised by $.2 million in TWA Exs.
42 and 43 and DX262) ; $71.9

Adjustments—Add (deduct) (Note 1):—
Decrease in gain from operations he-
fore provisions for depreciation, obsoles-
cence and amortization, per Coverdale

& Colpitts ($3.6)

Reduction in provisions for depreciation
of airframes, engines and rotable parts
: due to later timing of the fleet, $1.9
i million in 1960 and ($.1) million’ in
4 1962 (Note 2) 1.8

aes Sh

—

143
Decrease in proceeds relating to earlier
sale of 103 piston aircraft:
Per R. Dixon Speas Associates (.8)

Less—Reduction in “bad debts”
(Note 3) ‘z

Decrease in reserve for overhaul of jet
aircraft, eliminated at December 31,

1963, resulting from reduced mainte-

nance expense (Note 4) (.7)

Total adjustments (3.1)

Increase in income and special items be-
fore provisions ‘for income taxes, as
adjusted to reflect delivery of thirty
CV880 aircraft on dates set forth in
Amendment No. 4 of Toolco-Convair
contract $68.8

Since, however, I have elsewhere rejected the plaintiff's
aim in respect of the earlier sale of piston aircraft, I
diminate from the foregoing recomputation the items

Decrease in proceeds, ete. $(.8) million
Less reduction in “bad debts” 2 ”

Accordingly the recomputation, as so changed, results in
areduction of the plaintiff’s claim in respect of the Convair
880s of $2.5 million.

(C) B331B’s

An additional point is raised by the defendants in con-
nection with the pJaintiff’s claim under this Section I. It
asserts that the cost of operation of the five fan-jet B-331Bs

Soest kent aeMea

Se AAT AS TOI EOS Dig SA? OF

144

which were leased by the plaintiff from Boeing was less
than the cost of operations of the additional B-331s it would
have had in the assumed additional fleet underlying the
plaintiff’s damage claim. The defendants claim that the
savings in operating the B-331Bs in the post-1963 period
until the end of the leases in 1971 and 1972 should accord.
ingly be deducted from any damages awarded under this
Section I. They estimate such lease period for the five
planes at 40.33 aircraft years. On the basis of a historically
determined production rate of 4,000 block hours per air.
craft, and applying a “conservative” cost advantage of $100
per block hour, the savings would aggregate $16.1 million
(DX 271A, pp. VIII—10-12; Tr. 8818-19). The defendants
state that it is the rule in both tort and contract cases —
that a plaintiff may recover only for the net effect of defen-
dants’ acts after deducting the value of any benefit caused
by such acts.

The plaintiff points out that insofar as savings from the
operation of the B-331Bs (as against the assumed addi.
tional B-331s) for the 1959-1963 period is concerned these
estimated savings were deducted fully in the Coverdale
computations. And the plaintiff makes no claim for dam-
ages based upon operations of its jet fleet in the post-1963
period.

The plaintiff further points out that the defendants had
nothing to do with the decision to lease the B-331Bs; it
was the Voting Trustees, after the defendants’ control of
the operations of TWA had ceased, who ordered them; and
accordingly the rule of law cited by the defendants has
no application to the facts in this case.

The plaintiff finally points.out that if one were to attempt
to calculate the relative benefit of operating the B- 331Bs
and the assumed jet fleet in the post-1963 period, it would

145

be necessary to take into consideration many additional
factors ignored in the defendants’ calculation. Four such
items are listed in the plaintiff’s reply bricf at p. 130, as
follows:

“(i) During the period within which the six owned
B-331s would have been fully depreciated, the rental
expense for the five leased B-331Bs would have ex.
ceeded total depreciation upon the six B-331s by some
$9.5 million [TWA Ex. 353; Simat Tr. 8805-06}.

“(ii) If TWA wished to continue operating the five
B-331Bs at the end of the lease period, when recon-
struéted TWA would have owned six fully depreciated &
B-331s, historical TWA would either have to exercise a
its option to buy the planes at a substantial figure or
have to enter into a new lease [TF. 8813-15].

SNe on eG ed

“(ili) Six B-331s would have earned mor revenue
than five B-331Bs, but Simat made no allowance at all
for such additional revenue although he thought it
‘appropriate to consider the earnings power of the
additional B-331, that is, the sixth aircraft’ (Supat Tr.

- §8806,8810].* - oe , 4

“(iv) No account was taken of the resale value of

_ the six owned B-331Bs [Simat Tr. 8814-16] despite the

defendants’ statement that airplanes ‘cannot be thrown
away’ [Def. Br., p. 275].*

“*Defendants also take no account of either the ultimate resale value
or the post-1963 earning power of the: four additional CV-880s which

all 30 CV-880s.”

Tam of the opinion that the defendants have failed to
state any claim for a benefit due to their actions; that their
computation of the value of the alleged benefit is fatally
deficient; and accordingly no deduction should be made
fom damages awarded to the plaintiff by reason of the

}

146

alleged savings in operations of the B-331Bs in the post.
1963 period.

(D) Mitigation Claim

Defendants also claim that the plaintiff should have miti-
gated its damages by “picking up the four unassigned 880s
in 1961”; by accepting the opportunity, which it allegedly
rejected, to acquire seven 880Ms available for delivery
from Convair from June through December 1961 in Capital
Airlines’ configuration (or from October 1961 through April
1962 in plaintiff’s configuration), and thirteen fan-jet 990s
available from Convair for delivery from December 1961
through April 1962 in American Airlines’ configuration.
The citations in support of the mitigation claim (DX 56;
DX 62 pp. V-4, V-9-10; DX 72; DX 74; Tr. 2332-33, 2351-
52, 2364-67; DX 78, p. 4; Tr. 2405-08) are generally too

" indefinite or too incomplete to form a basis for a specific
mitigation claim. ,Evidence from the defendants to com-
plete the picture as to the underlying facts was not avail-
able to the plaintiff due to the defendants’ default. Indeed,
defendants do not even compute the dollar value of their
mitigation claim.

The plaintiff correctly points out that Tooleo owned the
four unassigned 880s and had the rights to the seven 880Ms
and the thirteen fan-jet 990s (Rummel Tr. 1534-37) so that
Tooleo’s agreement would have been required ‘to consum-
mate any of the transactions. The independent Trustees
of TWA were engaged in a series of bitter controversies,
including threats of litigation, with Toolco in 1961-1962
(complaint, paragraphs 35, 37, 38, 39, 40-46), so that no
transactions of the kind which the defendants envisage in
their mitigation claim would have been feasible as a busi-
ness matter, especially since the policy of the Voting Trus-

:
te cents —

147

tees favored buying Boeing planes rather than additional
Convairs. The defendants’ mitigation claim is accordingly
rejected.

(E) Adjustment to Reconstructed Interest Cost

The interest cost of the funds that would have been ap-
plied to the timely acquisition of a sufficient number of
- gireraft must next be determined.

TWA introduced the testimony of John C. Biegler, a
partner of Price Waterhouse, who used the Drexel Harri-
man Ripley financial plan (TWA Ex. 5,. Part II) and a
reconstructed flight equipment fund take down schedule
(TWA Ex. 7(b) 2, VI, B, Schedule B-3) to compute the
total interest cost that would have been incurred by Re-
constructed TWA during the period October 1, 1955-
December 31, 1963 (TWA Ex. 7(b) 2, VI, B, Schedule
B-1). This figure was compared with the actual interest
cost incurred by Historical TWA (TWA Ex. 7(b) 2,
VI, C, Schedule C). After appropriate adjustments
Price Waterhouse found that there would be an increase
in gross interest cost for, Reconstructed TWA over His-
torical TWA in the amount of $9.9 million. In addition.to
this increased cost,.Reconstructed TWA would also have
incurred added expense to the extent of $1.0 million, a
premium for its early payment of the $35 million 334 per-
cent Equipment Mortgage Sinking Fund Bonds in July,
1955 (TWA Ex. 7(b) 2, VI, A, Schedule A). These costs
appear in the plaintiff’s “Condensed Summary of Effect of
Application of Assumptions” as deductions from the alleged
werall reconstructed gain in operating profits (TWA Ex.
0).

har

_—

NAS RRR

aT
148

The defendants have not attempted to fix the appropriate
interest cost. Since I have not accepted the Drexel Harri-
man Ripley financial plan (see pages 257-264) on which
the Price Waterhouse computation relied, I have indepen.
dently calculated the appropriate cost of interest. The
testimony of Biegler indicated that a separate calcula.
tion of reconstructed interest expense would be feasible,
granting certain additional assumptions. (Tr. 6361). I be.
lieve the record is sufficiently complete to allow these as-
sumptions to be taken. However, in my opinion it is not
necessary or feasible for me to construct a complex finan-
cial plan on the order of that presented by Drexel Harri-
man Ripley. Also, I do not find it necessary or feasible to
extend my determinations by making detailed calculations
reflecting complex and minor accounting adjustments,

In reconstructing the interest expense associated with
the additional and earlier purchase of jet flight equipment
I have assumed that funds were available at the time of the
delivery of each aircraft. Except with respect to an
representing accrued interest,on deposits for the purchase

of twenty CV 880’s, which is a matter of historical record
and which is discussed hereafter at page 155, I have not
made provision for funds for advance deposits and prog-
ress payments on aircraft purchases. For me to do so on
a reconstructed basis would involve elaborate calculations
and several speculative assumptions not required in recog-
nizing the historical item of accrued interest on deposits
for the twenty CV 880 aircraft. For similar reasons I have
not considered any commitment fees and short-term invest-
ment returns that might be experienced with certain types
of financing. The proceeds from the sale of piston aircraft
were determined to have no material impact on the calev-
lation of interest. In my opinion, these procedures and
assumptions are fair and reasonable, and they avoid the

il

—

+

149

substantial amount of speculation or guesswork that would
be involved with a more complex calculation. .

In arriving at an appropriate deduction for cost of cap-
ital, I find that two components must be determined : (1)
the amount of funds needed and the timing of the take-
downs; and (2) the rate at-which the funds are obtained.

(1) The amount of funds needed and the timing of the take-
downs.

(a) siz additional B-331 aircraft—The six B-331 aircraft
that were diverted became historically available to Pan
American on the following delivery dates.*

Aircraft No. Date Receiwed A
N701 November 5, 1959 3
N702 December 15, 1959 ¢
'N703 December 30, 1959 Fs
N704 March 23, 1960 :
N705 April 29, 1960 , x
N706 ! June 8, 1960 3

&

To avoid undue complexity I assume that one-third of Fa
e funds) required for the purchase of these aircraft and =
related Spare parts and equipment would be needed by e
TWA4s of October 1, 1959, one-third as of January 1, 1960 a
and the balance as of April 1, 1960. As stated in the Price r
Waterhouse Report, the full purchase price of these air- k

craft and related spare parts and equipment would amount
oa capital expenditure of $43.1 million (TWA Ex. 7(b) 2,
VI, p. 35). I accept this figure.** Accordingly, I assume

* Source: Coverdale Report, TWA Ex. 4-e(1), p. 10. The impact of delivery
t TWA at dates earlier than the above dates which Coverdale in its report
described as “assumed receipt dates” is considered hereafter at pp. 150-155.

* Defendants’ expert, Simat, relied on the Price Waterhouse Report. for
basic data in computing the cost of capital to effect purchase of the leased
treraft (Simat Report, DX 277A, IX-B-3).

Sr AM

st

SL ge Pag eeebgagln ree SOAR AR eRe ae
LEAT AAEM LE
Sh ae wan ~

~ 150
that $14.4 million would be required as of the beginning
of the fourth quarter of 1959, $14.4 million as of the begin-
ning of 1960 and $14.3 million as of the beginning of the
second quarter of 1960.

(b) ten additional CV880 aircraft—It was my deterni-
nation above at page 141 that TWA would have acquired
ten additional CV880 aircraft during 1960 and that delivery
would have occurred from May through November of that
year, As stated by Price Waterhouse, the full purchase
price for these aircraft and related spare parts and equip-
ment would have amounted to $48.1 million (TWA Ex
7(b) 2, VI, p. 43). I accept this determination. Accord.
ingly, I assume that one-third of this total amount, $16.1
inillion, would be needed as of April 1, 1960, one-third of
$16.0 million as of July 1, 1960, and the balance of $16.0
million at October 1, 1960.

(c) earlier delivery of jet aircraft—I determined above
at pages 52, $7 and 141 of this Report that TWA would
have acquired its jet fleet prior to the historical delivery
dates. With respect to the Boeing fleet, eleven B-131 air-
craft and seventeen B-331 aircraft would have been ae-
quired an average of 1.63 months earlier, and nineteen
CV880-aircraft an average of 7.74 months earlier as shown
in the calculations below.

pare er AP a 3 rt
er

151

AVERAGE DeLay IN PURCHASE OF
FirTeen B-131 anp EigHtTeen B-331 AIRcrAFT

Actual and
Assumed Receipt

B-131 Aircraft

1-29-59
3-17-59
3-30-59
4- 3-59
~ 4-18-59
4-29-59
5-10-59
5-13-59
5-24-59
9-28-59
6-13-59
7- 1-59
7-10-59
7-14-59
8- 1-59

B-331 Aircraft

11- 5-59
11-10-59
11-10-59
11-25-59
12-15-59
12-23-59
12-30-59
1-18-60
3-23-60
4- 1-60
4- 5-60
4-14-60

Reconstructed
Delivery Date

11-30-58
12-31-58
1-31-59
2-27-59
3-30-59
4. 3-59
4-18-59
9-10-59
9-13-59
0-24-59 «
9-28-59
6-13-59
6-29-59
7-10-59
7-27-59

7-19-5
8-29-59
8-28.59
9-22-59
10- 6-59
10-27-59
11- 5-59
11-10-59
12-15-59
12-30-59
1-18-60
2-29.60

1 See determination pp. 52 and 87 this report.

Months
Difference

3
a
x
2
3
%
a

152
Actual and Reconstructed Months
Assumed Receipt Delivery Date Difference
4-29-60 3-23-60 1.0
5- 9-60 4-26-60 0.5
5-25-60 4-29-60 1.0
6- 8-60 5- 9-60 1.0
7- 1-60 6- 8-60 1.0
7- 1-60 7- 1-60 0.0

Total 45.5
Average Delay:
Total Months Delay 45.5
= = 1.63 Months
# of Aircraft Delayed 28

1.63
== —— = .1354 Year
12

. ewe Soh SENS RE DRAIN TE “?
», et + - —_ = .
3 Right «

he te Oe rk

153

AVERAGE DeLay IN PURCHASE OF
Twenty CVS880 AIRCRAFT

’ Delwwery Date Months
Actual Receipt Reconstructed Difference

5-18-60 5-15-60 0.0
1- 1-61 9-15-60 7.5
1- 5-61 5-15-60 7.5
]- 6-61 6-15-60 - 6.5
1- 8-61 6-15-60 7.0
1-12-61 6-15-60 7.0
1-21-61 7-15-60 6.0
2- 2-61 7-15-60 6.5
2-15-61 7-15-60 7.0
3-15-61 8-15-60 7.0
3-18-61 8-15-60 7.0
3-20-61 8-15-60 7.0
4-26-61 9-15-60 7.5
D- 6-61 9-15-60 7.5
)-25-61 9-15-60 8.5
§- 9-61 10-15-60 8.0
7- 9-61 10-15-60 9.0
8-10-61 10-15-60 10.0
9- 2-61 11-15-60 9.5
10-13-61 11-15-60 11.0

Total 147.0
Average Delay:
Total Months Delay 147.0 =- 7.74 months

# of Aircraft Delayed 19
= 7.74 = .6450 vear
12

1 See determination page 141 this report.

154

For the-purpose of calculating the effect on cost of cap.
ital with respect to the delayed Boeing aircraft I find that
a determination that the aircraft would have been delivered
earlier requires a matching determination that funds would
be needed carlicr to effect purchase. As above, in deter.
mining the capital amount needed I rely on those figures
provided in the Price Waterhouse Report.

As stated by Price Waterhouse the initial cost of fifteen
B¥131 aircraft would have been $71.6 million and the cost
of related spare engines $5.9 million or a total of $775
million (TWA Ex. 7(b) 2, VI, pp. 30 and 32). The sched.
ule of reconstructed deliveries above indicates that only
eleven of the B-131 aircraft were delayed. On a prorated
basis the cost of these eleven aircraft would amount to
$56.8 million.* Price Waterhouse also indicated that the
total reconstructed cost for eighteen B-331 aircraft and
related spare parts and equipment would have been $1293
million (TWA Ex. 7(b) 2, VI, p. 35). Seventeen of the
eighteen B-331 aircraft were delayed and the prorated
cost of these aircraft is $122.1 million.** On a fleet basis,
the total cost of delayed Boeing aircraft and related spare
parts and equipment thus amounts to $178.9 million. Accord-
ingly, I determine that TWA would have to have had this
amount available an average of 1.63 months earlier in
order to take delivery at the reconstructed earlier dates.

* 15 aircraft = $77.5 million = $5.16 million per aircraft \
x 11 delayed aircraft ‘

15 $56.76 million for 11 aircraft

** 18 aircraft = $129.3 million = $7.18 million per aircraft
x 17 delayed aircraft

3

;

S

3

18 $122.06 million for 17 aircraft
;

4

155

Similarly, on a reconstructed basis the funds necessary. to
effect the purchase of the delayed CV880 aircraft would
have had to be available to pay for the aircraft on the
earlier reconstructed delivery dates. I have determined, as
set forth above that these aircraft would have been de-
livered an average of 7.74 months earlier than the historical]
delivery dates, and accordingly, actual funds would have
had to be available more than seven months earlier.

As stated by Price Waterhouse, the initial cost of the
nineteen CV 880 aircraft that would have been acquired
earlier would be the historical capital outlay of $83.0 mil-
lion, plus a reconstructed amount of $.5 million for the
earlier purchase of spare parts (TWA Ex. 7(b) 2, VI, pp.
43 and 46). This total figure of $83.5 million includes a
$4.1 million historical payment for interest on an advance
deposit. Since I have determined that the funds to pay for
the earlier purchase of these aircraft would have been
available 7.74 months earlier it is reasonable to assume that
the accrued interest on the advance deposit would be re-
duced. Therefore I determine that instead of the $4.1 mil-
lion interest payment, TWA would have paid $3.5 million,
a difference of $.6 million.* Such an adjustment reduces
the total sum needed to purchase the nineteen delayed
CV 880 aircraft from $83.5 million to $82.9 million.

(2) The rate at which the funds are obtained.

In Section IT pp. 183-84 I have determined that the
Hanover Shoe case is controlling on the question of the

* 1. Interest Payment of $4.1 million at 5.5% (TWA Ex. 7(b)2, VI,
p. 44) indicates time period of 51 months.

2. Adjusted period:
51 — 7.74 = 43.26 months

3. Adjusted interest payment on advance deposit:
$4.1 million x 43.26 — $3.5 million

——

i) |

CRW NSE Se INE? OASIS Ete

156

proper cost of capital to employ in measuring damages in
antitrust cases. According to Hanover, the proper rate to
employ is the company’s external borrowing rate. ,

In examining the record I find that there is enough evi-
dence of borrowing rates for the period in question to fix
an approximate constructive rate for TWA which is both
fair and reasonable under the facts and circumstances de-
veloped at the hearing. The record discloses that TWA
historically negotiated major debt financings on several
occasions during the general period in question, 1955-1963,
The significant independent borrowings involved the follow.
ing debt.*

1957 Chattel Mortgage Notes, 514% $ 20.7 million

due December 1, 1960

1957 Bank Loan, 514% $ 12.0 million

1960 Equipment Mortgage Notes, $114.8 million
614%, due December 31, 1972

1960 Equipment Mortgage Serial $ 85.4 million
Notes, 6%

1961 Equipment Mortgage Notes, $ 57.0 million
Series B, 6% due December 31,
1977

1961 Equipment Mortgage Serial $ 21.9 million
Notes, Series B, 51%

1961 Subordinated Income Deben- $111.9 million
tures, 614% due June 1, 1978

1963 Convertible Subordinated De- $ 32.5 million
bentures, 5°49¢ due October 1,
1983

Interest rates for these actual borrowings range from
514-614 percent. Reference to long-term borrowings by

* Source: Price Waterhouse Report, TWA Ex. 7(b)2, VI, Schedule C4.

¥

s 1v revi See SEER EL OOS ee
ala pic 5 a ONE :

e

157 ft

, z

other airlines at or about this time ( 1957-1960) indicates 3

that rates on debt financings generally ranged from 5-614 :
percent.* Those straight financings (no convertible fea-

ture) of more than $25 million with indicated borrowing

rates are listed below: ; é

1958 Delta
—Debentures due Oct. 1, 1974, $25.0 million
0%
Northwest
—Credit 414-454% due 1965 $32.5 million
Northwest
—Notes due October 1, 1978, $40.0 million
6% .
1959 American
—Dromissory Notes due Noy. $30.0 million
1, 1996, 5%
1960 Pan American
—Promissory Notes 1st install- $50.0 million
ment due 1967, 6%
Capital
—Secured Notes Series A due $25.5 million
September 30, 1965, 514%
American
—Notes, 534% $60.0 million

Talso take note that one aspect of the Drexel Harriman
Ripley financial reconstruction was a $90-100 million debt
fnancing scheduled for May 1959 (TWA Ex. d, Part II,
p. 70). Drexel Harriman Ripley made the following ap-
raisal ax to the interest rate on this proposal:

“Source: Loeb, Rhoades Report DX270, Part II, Exhibit A.

158

“We believe that institutional investors, in the sec.
ond quarter of 1959, would have charged TWA an in.
terest rate of 690 on the used portion of the Series B
Flight Equipment Notes, and a commitment fee of 14%
per annum on the unused portion.” (Drexel Harriman
Ripley Report, TWA Ex. 5, Part U1, p. 70)

The Rate Applicable to the Reconstructed Purchase of
the Boeing Flcet—On a reconstructed basis TWA would
have purchased its entire Boeing fleet: between Novem.
her 30, 1958 and July 1, 1960.

The record discloses no large-scale financing by TWA at
or about the time when arrangements for funds cer.
tainly would have been made to effect purchase during the
above period, i.e., 1958-1959. Therefore I have looked to
those points in the record that suggest a rate that might
have been obtained at this time by an independent manage.
ment seeking funds to purchase a substantial jet fleet. Con-
sidering the evidence on airline borrowings recited above on
pages 155 through 157, I believe that it is fair and reason-
able to fix TWA’s borrowing rate for funds needed to pur-
chase the Bocing aircraft on the reconstructed delivery
dates at 6%.

The Rate Applicable to the Reconstructed Purchase of
the Convair Fleet—However, | find a different interest
rate should be used in respect of the thirty CV 880 air-
‘eratt. | have previously determined that the reconstructed
and timely delivery of a fleet of thirty CV 880 aircraft
would have occurred between May 15, 1960 and Novem-
ber 15, 1960. These deliveries would have occurred sub-
sequent, in point of time, to the deliveries of the Boeing
fleet. Of the total reconstructed Boeing fleet of thirty-three
aireraft only two were delivered after delivery of the first
Convair aircraft.

‘s a DSPOOTT RE
OLED ELI ALLL PAI AAGEADLE SIA SELES AE VOCED RISI
LP MLOL DOE AED ELIE ND ™

159

Unlike the case with the acquisition of the Boeing fleet,
where there is no evidence in the record of financings di-
rectly related, in point of time, to the acquisition of the
fleet, TWA did undertake large scale financing approxi-
mately seven months subsequent to the first delivery, on a
reconstructed basis, of the Convair fleet. From the finan-
cial statements submitted in evidence it is reasonable to
conclude that the historical purchase of twenty CV 880
aircraft was largely financed by the historical borrowings
arranged in December, 1960, referred to above on page 156.
Aside from the training aircraft which was delivered in
May 1960 the first deliveries of the CV 880 fleet histor-
ically commenced immediately after the December 1960
financings.

Under the December, 1960 financing agreements provi-
sion was made to sell Equipment Mortgage Notes (of which
$114.5 million were sold) at 6145%, and Equipment Mort-
gage Serial Notes (of which $85.4 million were sold) at 6%.
The weighted average interest rate for these external bor-
rowings is 6.3%.° There is no significant evidence that
TWA could have borrowed at a lower or higher rate at or
about the time of the reconstructed delivery dates. Accord-
ingly, 1 determine that 6.3% should be the rate applicable
incomputing the additional interest cost that would be con-
nected with the additional and earlier need of funds for
the reconstructed acquisition of the CV 880 aircraft.

* Weighted Average interest rate (x)
$114.5 million x% 6.5% = 7.443
$ 85.4 million x 6.0% = 5.124

199.9 x = 12.567
x = .063

PRLS AEE SION STI

ee ae eee ee ee eee rene 7

160

Reconstruction of Interest Cost

The basie components determined above, i.e., the amount
needed, the timing of the take downs, and the rate, allow a
computation of an interest cost that is an appropriate de-
duction from the overall increase in operating profits re-
sulting from the reconstruction of ‘TWA to include the
additional and earlier use of jet aircraft. In computing
interest charges, an adjustment should be made, however,
to the gross capital investment required to give effeet to
the cash throw-off in the form of depreciation and amor.
tization from the added capital investment. I note that

such an adjustment was an integral part of the calculation
introduced by Simat with respect to the constructive pur-
chase of the leased aircraft (DN 271A, LX-B), and that
plaintiff’s counsel in their brief adopted this calculation
(Plaintiff's Brief, p. 227). The depreciation and amorti-
zation figures associated with the reconstructed additional
and earlier use of jet flight equipment have been calculated
hy Price Waterhouse. They were not materially challenged
by the defendants and [ accept them as stated. T have
used them below in column 2° of Calculations A and B
and also in Caleulations C and D. Finally, it is assumed
that the reconstructed borrowings necessary to finance the
purchase of the additional jet equipment will not be paid
off prior to December 31, 1963.

Proceeding on the foregoing assumptions and evidence,
I have determined that Reconstructed TWA would have
incurred additional interest cost over the period 1959-1963
in the amount of $8.3 million for adding six B331 aircraft,
and $8.7 million for adding ten CV 880 aircraft, or a total
of $17.0 million. The details of these determinations ap-

pear in Calculations A and B below.

161

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}

163

«

Since historically TWA had the benefits of the earnings
generated by the twenty-eight delayed Boeing aircraft and
the nineteen delayed CV 880 aircraft after their historical
acquisition, in determining damages for delay in receipt of
these aircraft, I am concerned only with the loss of profits
in the period between constructive deliveries and actual
deliveries. I have determined, as stated above, that the
average delay in acquisition of the Boeing aircraft was 1.63 .
months and that the average delay of the CV 880 aircraft
was 7.74 months, I find that these are fair and reasonable -
periods to use in determining the additional interest cost to
TWA which would be incurred in financing the earlier ac-
quisitions. Accordingly, I determine that the additional in-
terest cost related to the earlier ownership of the delayed
Boeing aircraft would be $1.4 million, as shown in Caleula-
tion C below. The additional interest cost related to the
earlier purchase of the delayed CV 880 aircraft amounts to
$3.2 million as shown in Calculation D below.

ars oe

B- ito ig 0 AN hie OOS
te
BE

164

CALCULATION C

Interest Cost 1958-1960

Earlier Purchase of Twenty-Eight Boeing Aircraft
($ millions)

Cost of 11 B-131 Aircraft delayed? ...............----- 56.8
Cost of 17 B-331 Aircraft delayed? .............-.--------- 122.1

a. Total cost of earlier Bocing Aircraft

Less increase in depreciation as a result of
the earlier purchase*®

b. Net value of earlier investment

ce. Average earlier investment
(a + b = 2)

X annual interest rate®

Increased interest cost for one year

x average delay

1 See determination page 154 above.
Source: TWA Ex. 7(b)2, VI, pp. 30, 32 and 35.

2 Source: TWA Ex. 7(d).
3 See page 158 above.

165

CALCULATION D
Interest Cost 1960-1961

Earlier Purchase of Nineteen CV-880 Aircraft
($ millions)

). Cost of 19 Aircraft delayed’ oo $ 82.9

Less increase in depreciation as a result of the
earlier purchase? occ eee $ 68
| Net value of earlier investment 0 $ 76.1

Average earlier investment

EY eects ete hee Po $ 79.5
X Average annual interest rate’ $ .063
Increased interest cost for one year oo. $5.0085
X Average delay eee .6450
$3.2305

‘See determination page 155 of this report.
Source: TWA Ex. 7(b) 2, VI, p. 46.

‘Source: TWA Ex. 7 (d) as amended by letter of Price Waterhouse to
(atill, Gordon of August 30, 1968, Note 2.

See page 159 above.

166

The total increase in interest cost caused by the addi-
tional and earlier purchase of jet flight equipment aggre.
gates $21.6 million as shown in Calculation E below.

CALCULATION E

Summary of Adjustments to Interest Cost

1958-1963
I. Additional Purchase ($ millio
Six B-331 Aireraft ............-...0.....cccssscerssssecsessseseegesseess $ 8,
Ten CV-880 Aircraft ...............---c:ccec ee teeeceneeteeeeseeees 8,

Il. Earlier Purchase

Eleven B-131 Aircraft and
Seventeen 4 a | | crear $1

Nineteen TOV BO AGPORAE oociccne eres

167

~

As shown by the above table the proper amount to be
deducted from the damages under Section I in respect of
interest cost is $21.6 million. This represents an increase
of $10.7 million over the deduction made by Price Water-
house (TWA Ex. 50).

(F) Damages under Section I

For the reasons above stated, the amount of the dam-
ages under Section I is as follows:

A. International Division $22,400,000.

'B. Domestic Division $29,300,000.
Less adjustment
as to Convair
880s : ($ 2,500,000.) $26,800,000.

Total Net Revenues $49,200,000.

Less adjustment
relating to

interest rate: , ($21,600,000. )
Damages under Section I $27,600,000.

An accounting adjustment related to the above damages
is made in the final award in Section VIII.

168

II.

Losses due to being required to lease jets.

The following allegations in the complaint underlie
the claim considered in this Section II:

“9. Beginning in or about the year 1939 and con.
tinuing up to and including the date of the filing of
this complaint, the defendants, Atlas and other per.
sons acting for each of them have been and are now
engaged in:

“(f) Sales and leases of jet-powered aircraft on the
condition, agreement and understanding that
the purchaser or lessee shall not buy or lease
the goods of a competitor or competitors of the
vendor or lessor, in violation of Section 3 of
the Clayton Act; and

“10. Each act of the defendants and Atlas herein-
after alleged was done in furtherance of the offenses
charged in the preceding paragraph and was a part
thereof and was done with the primary purpose of
restraining and monopolizing the trade and commerce
described above. It was the intent of the defendants
and Atlas, inter alia:

“(h) That the defendants and Atlas would obtain
substantial profits for themselves, at the ex-
pense of TWA and other air carriers, as the
result of restrictions upon competition in the
trade and commerce hereinbefore alleged.

an Rh AA INES

169

“20. During the period 1959 to 1960, defendants ar-
ranged for the lease to TWA by Tooleo of certain jet-
powered aircraft on a day-to-day basis. Such aircraft
were the first and only jet-powered aircraft made avail-
able to TWA by the defendants during the years 1955
to 1960 and the number of aircraft so leased by Toolco
to TWA was inadequate for the needs of TWA. Such
leases were given on a continuing condition, agreement
and understanding that TWA would not purchase or
lease aircraft from any other potential supplier there-
of. The effect of such continuing condition, agreement
and understanding was to foreclose, to all potential sup-
pliers of jet-powered aircraft to TWA other than de-
fendants, the opportunity for selling or leasing jet-
powered aircraft to TWA.”

The specific allegations set forth in Paragraph 20 ahove
concern a fleet of fifteen B-121 jet aircraft and four B-331
yt aircraft that were historically leased by TWA from

Tooleo according to a schedule of delivery dates commenc-

ing in January, 1959 and ending in December, 1959. These
nineteen leased aircraft are among the fleet of sixty-three
ets considered in Section I. Except for two B-131 aircraft
vhich were purchased in May, 1960, they were historically
purchased by TWA on December 30, 1960.

The plaintiff and its experts contend that the defendants
foreed TWA to lease these jet aircraft from Tooleo in-
stead of permitting it to own them, with the result that
TWA had to pay far more to have the use of these air-
craft than it would have paid if it had originally bought
the aircraft itself. TWA further contends that

“Toolco, on the other hand, not only profited through
the receipt of rental payments but also, by taking de-
preciation on an accelerated basis, created a tax gain
for which it claimed capital gains treatment upon ulti-
mate sale.” (Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 220.)

170

Proof of Damages

TWA through its financial expert, Morehouse of Drexel
Harriman Ripley, included among the “Fundamental Prin.
eiples of Airline Finance” that an airline should own its
flight equipment rather than lease it from other parties,
Two minor exceptions to this general principle, the “sea-
sonal interchange” type of lease and the “through run
interchange” type of lease were stated. (Drexel Harriman
Ripley Report, TWA Ex. 5, Part II, p. 4)

The cross-examination of Morehouse developed the fol-
lowing points:

{ The equipment represented by the two exceptions, i.e,
the “seasonal interchange” and the “through run inter.
change” type of lease, is a comparatively small part of
the total fleet of any airline. (Tr. 3991-3992).

{ In the opinion of Drexel Harriman Ripley an airline
is not soundly financed if its major income producing
facilities, as contrasted with what might be described as
servicing equipment such as hangars and airport facilities,
are not owned. (Tr. 3995).

{ The principal distinction between the popularity of
railroad car leasing and the unpopularity of airplane leas-
ing is the much more rapid development of the state of
the art in the aircraft field, but it might be appropriate
for an airline to lease rather than buy if it thought that
the particular aircraft which it needed presently might be
outdated quite shortly. (Tr. 3996).

{ There has been interest in the use of equipment trust
financing for airlines. Equipment trust financing is not
particularly germane to the leasing problem, but it is
somewhat “in the same ball park.” (Tr. 4000).

171

{ There are under certain conditions tax advantages
such as the investment credit which make it a good busi-
ness decision to enter into leasing arrangements. The in-
vestment credit was not a factor, however, during 1955-
1960. (Tr. 3997, 4020-1).

j After the investment credit became effective United
Air Lines leased a sizeable number of airplanes through a
third party group of commercial banks to whom the credit
was more valuable than if United had owned or leased
directly. (Tr. 4029).

Among the factors to consider in a comparison of the
cost of ownership with the cost of leasing would be an esti-
mate of the cost of the capital involved in the purchase
of an airplane, and the depreciation on the airplane, when
owned, compared with the gross rentals involved in the
lease alternative. (Tr. 4013-4014).

{ Drexel Harriman Ripley believe that it is in the best
interests of an airline to retain the greatest degree of
control of its income-producing property. Ownership gives
that greatest degree of control. A very long lease with
reason

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0039%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.
