# Amicus Curiae Brief — Jefferson v. Hackney > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0021%3A7 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1972 - **Citation:** 406 U.S. 535 ## Text 8 Supreme Curt of ‘he Unite Sate Gr US k sED. Geivbes Term, 1971. 0 iL i972. No. 70-5064 | RUTH J. JEFFERSON, et al., Appellants, ' VS. . BURTON G. HACKNEY,.et al., | es a Appellees. ° - On Appeal From the United States District Court for the ——— District of Texas. ‘Brief of the State « of California Amicus Curiae | in Support of a EVELLE J. YOUNGER, ~ ‘Attorney General of the State of California, ELIZABETH PALMER, Deputy Attorney General, . ~ JEROLD A: PROD, | . 8 ots ' Deputy Attorney General, E. ee 600 State Building, 7 Los Angeles, Calif. 90012, __ (213) 620-2954, 2 , Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of California. ' Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622 7 ay Sma LMA EL GEE ERM METAR RS ANS PIRI PONTE LG LT ELIF NES LAE DIOL MENS ELM I SUBJECT¢INDEX ie : | —— . . Page “« Interest of the State of California 0.00... 1 California’s Payment Plan ...........--t.---:---+-e+--0---« a 2 Argument ee eee een ae 5° oo California arid Other States Will Never Be Able to More Equitably Apportion Limited Welfare - Resources in Favor of the Most Needy — | _.jlents Unless the Decision. Below - Affirmed - 5S \ ._ + Conclusion ..... Sse ea aaa eee geepes tet eaten eeepoea 7 ‘INDEX TO: APPENDICES : j Appendix A. Opinion of. the ‘Supreme Court of the State of California -......2....2..2.......--- App. p. 1. * Appendix B. Welfare and. Institutions Code, Sec- tion 11452 as Amended ........................ App. p. 17 Appendix C. Welfare and Institutions Code, Sec- » 11450 as Amended .............22.2.2../..2....-.- App. p. 19 | Appendix. D. Welfare and Institutions Code, Sec- tion 11453 nee ceeeeeeeeeeee .-App. p.-20 ‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED”. + . Cases . oe Page Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) -......-- 6 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) ...... 1,5, 6. +. Regufations - Code of Federal Regulations, Title 45, Sec. 233. 20° (a) (3) (wilt) Soest ereeaten taped ensansees wesecseeseeceneeseseetees 6 Statutes = California Statutes of 1971, Chap. 578, Sec. 28. 3 California Statutes of 1971, Chap. 578, Sec: 28.5... 2 California Statutes of 1971, Chap. 578, Sec. 29.1. 3 ~ California?Welfare - and Institutions Code, Sec. EAS) esters eee seeseecie 3 California Welfare and. “Institutions Code, Sec. * 1452 ee cee eee 2 California Welfare and Institutions - Code, Sec. LE493 ». ccbccccsscsee a re a D., : Social ‘Security Act, Sec. 402(a)(8) - A ae ool Social Security Act, Sec. 402(a)(23) 2... 5 Welfare Reform Act, Sec. 28 0.0... as wee 6 Sn curt a ‘the United Sate, October Term, 1971 No. 70-5064 — | RUTH J. JEFFERSON, et al., OS | 2 Appellants, : . : ; . VS. . - BURTON G. HACKNEY, et al., a | | : Appellees. On-Appeal From the United States District Court for the Northern Districtof Texas. . as 2 Wo ' Brief of the Statéof California Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees. , - Interest of the State of California. On December 6, 1971, the California Supreme ‘Court decided’ ‘the case of Villa v. Hall, judicially directing © - that the California State Department of Social Welfare could compute welfare grants only by deducting non- exempt outside income directly from the . unadjusted standard of need. A copy of that opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A. A petition for rehearing was - filed by respondents (Hall, state welfare officials), and: denied January 5, 1972. Respondents plari to appeal to this Court since the California Supreme Court held that California’s welfare payment. plan was cohtrary to — __ this Court’s decision in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 US. . 397 (1970), and the Social Security Act. po Qe 9) The sole issue in Villa v. Hall is the method of com-.” puting welfare grants at a level. lower than the stand-- ard of need. The method used in California varies only slightly, if ‘at all, from that used in- Texas. The issue in this case is essentially the same as that in Villa v. Hall, ' to wit, the extent of a state’s ability to control its: wel- ‘fare policies and tera in light of limited re- sources. The State of -California enters ‘this case as amicus - Curiae urging affirmance in support of the argument and position of Texas, to the end that the states might: ' reserve to themselves the making of some of the de- “cisions as to how to. apportion limited ‘monies ariong needy citizens. “D4 California’s Payment Plan \. California has a- state-supervised coun \ adfaciniecad Aid:to Families With. ‘Dependent Children program fed- \ . erally assisted putsuant to provisions of th Social Se- \curity Act. Eligibility for participation: is. ased on. a _ standard of nged. The standard. of need,- recently re- vised upward, is found in California Welfare and In- stitutions Code section 11452, as amended by the Wel- fare. Reform Act of 1971; Cal. Stats. of 1971, chap- ter 578, seetion 28.5, (Attached hereto as Appendix ian e ‘ “B.) All. of those considered’ needy according to the measure - of the standard of need are included_in the program. This is~so, even though the: Welfare Reform Act of 1971 provides that-some families only marginal-. ly needy receivé a zero cash grant. Those marginally needy families entitled to a zero cash grant other prograrh benefits, ‘including . mei stamps, ‘social services, grants. and/or services pertain- ing to recurring: and non-recurring special needs, and. \ __ lated to the WIN (work incentive) program.’ 4. | Computations of cash grants or money. payments on. “the other hand are accomplished according to a sepa- . fate formula. After determining need and eligibility, re- ' Sort is had to a table indicating ‘the maximum extent to which the st&te “will participate in fulfilling unmet - needs by way of a cash grant. This table, recently ‘re- | vised upward, is found in Welfare and Institutiohs’ Code, section 11450(a), as amerided by the Welfare Reform Act of 1971, Cal. Stats. of 1971, chapter 578, section 28 (attached hereto in pertinent part as Ap- - pendix C.)* It pfovides for maximum cash assistance . . by the state ranging from 92.2 to 84.7 percent of the standard of need. Both the standard of need. and the _ table of “maximums” are keyed to the cost of, living and therefore to each.other. They fluctuate with the cost of living, and thus the system operates in the same manner as a ratably reduced standard of need such as used by Texas and other states. (See Welf. & Inst. Code § .11453, added by the Welfare Reform Act of 1971, °°. Cal. Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 29.1, attached hereto. in pertinent part as Appendix D..) He 1The California Supreme Court based its’ decision in Villa v. Hall in large part on the erroneous assumption that many fam- standard of . ilies, although marginally needy by’ measure of the need and entitled to a zero cash grant, would be deemed in- | eligible for inclusion in the program. See Appendix“A, pp. 9-11. This mistaken assumption was the chief basis for the petition for rehearing, and will “ams of the bases upon which review in this _ 3This section“is the subject matter of Villa v. Hall. At. this writing, vit cannot be determined in precisely what manner, if at all, it will. be imptemented in the immediate future. However, it répresents the expressed intentions of the California Legislature — | which it is hoped will be sustained by. the courts. . -— , _” ithe cash sh (a (as opposed to eligibility for inclusion ‘ia the overall [program ). . . California’s S * method of giant computation: secliels . is the same as the Texas method now before this Court ’ with Wo possible differences, one purely technical, -the other potentially meaningful. . ses o's Tenas. deducts non-exempt outside income from a -, figure uniformly pegged at 75 percent of the standard ’ of need. The resulting figures are nowhere set forth in — “~~ a table corresponding: to the standard of. need. Califor- ~ nia’ deducts income. from a table. which represents 84.7 ‘> to 92.2 percent of: the ‘standard Of need.. This- difference - ‘is purely technical. The fact that Texas has not set forth :.. sits reduced standard of need‘in a table. broken down by. - ' family size makes no practical difference | in the. ap- ;pheaien of the grant computation method. _In. California; the... fact that ‘the use. of ae above described method’ of payment computation may result. ina zero.cash grant: for soine marginally needy families in no way affects the initial and continuing eligibility of those families for inclusion’ in the overall benefits of ” » the Aid to Families With ‘Dependent Children program. | - It-is not clear -to California at ‘the time of. this writing whether or not the same is true in 1 Texas. ~— |. Nee .* ay eaten of exempt ingome under section 402(a) (8) of the ' “Social Security Act is the work incentive of $30 plus one-third Of the balance of the earned income plus —_ related. expenses. ee ~. s*-ARGUMENT, California and Other States Will Never Be Able to | More Equitably Apportion Limited Welfare Re ‘sources in Favor of the’ Most Needy Recipients -, Unless'the Decision Below Is Affirmed. , | Section: 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act re- ..° quires “that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the - * state to determine the needs of individuals will have a “been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs | since such amounts. were established, - and any maxi- mums that the State imposes pale ies will have : been - proportionally. adjusted.” - | NO - In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 US. 397 (1970), this 7 _ Court characterized section 402( a) (23) as having “the. effect of requiring the States to recognize and accept the ‘ responsibility for those additional individuals whose income falls short of the standard of need as computed. _ in light of economic realities and to place them among those eligible for thé case .and training provisions.” [397 US. at'413.} | . If: this is ‘a binding construction of section 402(a) (23), California has complied by including “all families newly eligible by the measure of its raised. standard of need in every aspect of the Aid to Families With ' Dependent Children program related to care. and train- ing, no. matter now small their unmet needs. However, another purpose of section 402(a) (23) | recognized by: this Court in Rosado was “to prod the ' ° States to apportion their payments on a more equitable — - basis.” Ibid. States were also encouraged to abandon . maximums in favor of ratable reductions by the device of requiring an upward adjustment of maximums while ‘ allowing a‘ decrease in expéefiditures by adjustment of © the ratably reduced percentage of. the standard, of need. a _ Id. at.413-14. California did not choose to abandon its statutory. table of maximum assistance but ‘rather’ raised it substantially. Section 28,of the Welfare Reform Act: has the effect of increasing grants to about 80 poe ‘of its recipients.* California’s proposed Welfare Reform Act is an ex- ‘ cellent example of a state apportioning ‘its welfare pay- .” ments on a moregequitable basis. The schedules (Ap- pendices B and C) are constructed in such a way ‘that ‘total experiditures. for the progtam remain’ constant. The most neédy majority of recipients receive increased grants, and new marginally needy families are included ' in the care and training provisions To defray the increased cost of these f 7 tained in the care and training aspects of the program, _ but receive reduced cash grants. California, like Texas and most other states, i is faced : with a total demand for welfare payments © that its overburdened fiscal resources prevent. it ‘from meeting — in full. The states are clearly not obligated to. pay full needs. ‘Rosado v. Wyman, supra, 397 U.S. at 413;. . Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US. 471, 478-79 (1970). If full individual payments are precluded by maximiims or insufficient funds, adjustments may be made accord- ing to a state-wide formula. 45 C.F.R. §233:20(a)(3) (viii). Texas’ plan for calculating cash grants, like |. that of-Califorrfia, has the advantage of allocating the . largest portion of those resources to those who need — .. assistance most. *All recipients with no. - outside income, and all those with outside income Jess ‘than the difference between the standard of need and the maximum would receive increased payments. . g —)]— é . If the decision below is reversed, it may not be pos- sible for -California to ever give increased aid to the _ most needy of her citizens without also giving in- creased aid to the least needy. In light of fiscal and budgetary realities, neither California nor any. other ,state may, under that circumstance, be able to increase aid to their truly-destitute. Coiiclusion. The recognizable inequities in public assistance will not be remedied but exacerbated by this Court’s re- versal of the decision below. The executive and legis- lative branches of the federal and state governments are studying. these problems. Judicial interference at this point will serve only to confuse rather than “clari- fy the traditional responsibility of the legislative branch of the government. Surely if the “separation of pow- : ers” doctrine: has any. meaning the state and federal legislatures should be unimpeded -in their search for — equitable solutions realistically gauged. to the fiscal reso 2S available to accomplish this end. For the foregoing reasons the State of California ‘adopts and joins in the argument of thé State of Texas for. the affirmance’ of the decision of the three judge - trial court. Respectfully submitted, . EVELLE J. YOUNGER; . Attorney General.of the State of California, ° ‘ELIZABETH PALMER, _ Deputy Attorney General, _' JEROLD A. PROD, a Deputy Attorney General, . Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of California. oes % ~ bed . . > . ‘ . ‘ , ° . , rr + = * « > - . - : e . . ’ ' : of benefits to be paid. First, standards ‘of need must be established; i.e., a yardstick ; for ascertaining. who is eligible for public assistance. ' Second, states must then decide how much assistance will in fact be given: (Rosado v. Wyman (1970) 397 US. 397, A08; King v. Smith, supra, at - PP: 318- 319.) The provisions of California’s AFDC program cor- - responding to the two factors identified in Rosado and King are found in sections 1!50 and 11452-of the — ~ Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 11452 establishes “minimum basic standards of adequate care,” i.e., - standards: of need. Such ‘Standards are ee to in- | - 2The four major programs are Old Age Assistance (42. U. S.C. § 301 et seq.); ‘Aid ‘to Families with Dependent Children (42 U.S.C. § 601 et’ seq.); Aid to the Blind (42 U.S.C. § 1201 - et seq.); and Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled ( 42 “Use § 1351 vy bed) a, re sure safe = healthful housing; minimum othinig 1 for health and decency; adequate food; utilities; certain household, personal, and miscellaneous -needs; and /es- sential medical and. dental care not otherwise provided ‘by the public. A monetary schedule for these stan- dards of need was, until the Welfare Reform Act of 1971, contained in regulations promulgated by the. State Department of Social Welfare. (State Department of Social Welfare, Manual ‘of Policies and Procedures: Eligibility and Assistance Stagdards, §. 44-212.) Under ‘the new act, the amounts are set forth in the Welfare _ and Institutions Code (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11452, __as amended by Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 28.5.) 9) ‘It is well settled, however, that the states are not re- quired to pay full needs: individual needs may be made subject to the statewide application of either a per- centage figure (i.e.,.a “ratable reduction”). or*a flat - statutory maximum. California has chosen the latter - method and has established such maximums in section 11450 of the code. Thus under section 11452 as ‘amended a family of two needs $210 a month to secure _ adequate care, but the amount of aid that will actually be paid is limited to $190 by the. statutory maximum provided in section 11450; corresponding figures for a - 4 family of three are $255 and $235; of four, $314 and $280; of five, $362 and $320; et cetera.. | Prior to the Ree ne of the Welfafe Reform Act,: any outside incOme earned by the recipient and not exempted’ was deducted from the standard of need to ; deterthine the — fe BS ‘of the individual re- _ SSee Social Security Act, sections 402, ‘subdivision (a) )). 402,. subdivision (a) (8) (42 U.S.C. §§ 602, subd. (a)(7), 602 - subd. (a)(8)); County. of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal. - 3d 730. - . a ‘cipient.‘ The new law, however, provides that incomes, _. _ be subtracted not from the standard of need but from,’ the lower statutory maximum.” Petitioners contend. that the Social Security Act compels income to be deducted from the standard .of need and not from the statutory ‘maximum, and hence the. new. California statute is to. that extent incompatible with federal law. . _ Any analysis of federal law requirements neces- sarily must begin with the Social Security Act itself. In ‘section 402, subdivision (a)(7), Congress has © specifically recognized that: the income of a recipient relates to his or her need. “IT ]he State. agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other . income and. resources of any. child or relative claiming. aid to families with dependent children . ...” (Italics added: 42 U.S.C. § 602, subd, (a)(7).). a The. rationale of this statutory provision appears em- inently ‘sound. . The first stage in: the two-step process identified by hte Supreme’ Court in Rosado v. Wyman, Supra, is to ascertain ‘the general minimum needs of -- ‘the community. Naturally, those in otherwise. equiva- Ss 4Prior to the new law, section 11450, subdivision (a); read in part: “For each needy family which includes one or more needy children qualified for aid . . ., thete shall be paid the . sums specified in the following table, or so much thereof as is _ necessary for the adéquate care of the needy family. . . .” ; ‘Pursuant to that statute the Department of Social Welfare issued Eligibility and Assistance Standard section 44- 315.51, which provides in part: “[T]he budget deficit is determined by . . ..[s]ubtractihg the rounded current income :-from the . rounded total need. The amount of the AFDC monthly payment _ is the budget deficit, or the [statutory maximum], whichever is less.” 5“(Tjhere shall be paid, notwithstanding minimum este standards of adequate care established by the department under Section 11452, an ammount of aid each month which when added to. his income . . . is equal to the sums specified in the Jstatutory maximum] table. . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11450, as ‘amended _ by Stats. 1971, ch. ‘578, § 28.) f “ e@ , wroetee repent wr 4 | a lent categories wil] require greater or, lesser aid de- pending on the amount of income, if any, which they earn. If state budgets were designed so that 100 percent of .need were paid to those on the AFDC ‘program, there would be no dispute before us: clearly. income -would be subtracted from the statewide standard in | order to ascertain an individual’s actual need, and that © amount would be paid.* However, Congress chose not . ‘to. rigidly require the states to pay full need, and the - gocial Security Act specifically recognizes the validity - of statutory maximums. (See 42 U.S.C. §602, subd. (a)(23).) Nevertheless, this recognition does-not alter the fundamental. concept; as exemplitied by section 402, subdivision (a)(7), that income of 2 recipient relates to his or her need,’ not to a designed statutory. maximum the only support for which is found in budge- ‘tary limitations® . 7 | “Published HEW -interpretations. of section 402, sub — division (a)(7), moreover, bolster the conclusion ‘that _. ®As of July 1971, HEW figures indicate that 14 states were paying 100 percent of the standard of need to those without income or 100 percent of the ‘deficit (standard of need less. in- come) to those with income. (See “Summary. of Payment Methods”, July 1971, attachment to amicus curiae brief of HEW, Whitfield v. King (M.D. Ala.) Civ. No. 3330-N.). THEW regulations stress that itis income or’ resources ac- tually available to the recipient that is + ape (45 C.F.R. § 233.20; subd. (a)(3)(ii)(c).). The emphasis appears to require the state to ascertain the amount of aid the recipient in fact needs for adequate care by subtratting income and/or resources actually, not supposedly, received, from the standard of need. Thus child support due, ‘but not actually received, is not con- . sidered income for this purpose. - Another provision of the federal act (42 U.S.C. § 602, subd. ~ (a)(8)) compels the conclusion that income is to be subtracted from need rather than from the. statutory maximum. The ‘pro- vision allows a recipient to disregard a certain portipn of his or © her income in determining actual need. However, this “disregard” . (This footnote is continued on next page) . — ee income is re be. related to eur “Provision must be - made that in arriving at .the amount of assistance needed, the State will compare all income and resources » found to be available to the individual for his use in meeting his current needs with the amount arrived at through the application of the’ State-wide standard.” | (Fed. Handbook of Pub. Asst., pt. IV, § 3120.) 6 | that the current HEW @ttitude . Respondents conte on: the role*of outside income in the computation of _ AFDC payments .is indicated in the amicus brief the agency submitted to-the United: States Supreme Court ‘in Jefferson v. Hackney, No. 6553, Oct. Term 1970.”. . There HEW takes the position that a Texas plan which subtracts income from a ratably reduced standard (not: _ a statutory maximum) rather than from the full _stand-. ard of need does not conflict with federal require- ments. HEW’s position in‘ Jefferson is not controlling | . here for. two reasons, in addition to the prevailing rule of administrative law that the ultimate authority of statutory interpretation rests in the judiciary. ( Volks- wagenwerk, etc. y. FM@ (1968) 390 U.S. 261, 272; 1 Davis, Administrative Law. (1958) § 506, pp. 326-_ 2 | irst, the complaint in Jefferson was based on section — 402, subdivision (a)(23), of the det, whereas the cur- rent challenge is founded in part on section 402, subdi- vision (a)€7). The former provision requires states to increase their standards of /need and-any statutory max- imums to reflect cost of living. rises; it makes no refer- provision is generally not available to pram persons ‘whose total income exceeds their need, not merely the statutory maximum. (See County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 739.) *As of this writing, the c has. not been decided by the Supreme Court. However, the p t made: by respondents is not . the ultimate result but the HEW Dosition. : ae ae : ence to the use of income in the ‘determination of pay- ments: Because the court in Rosado v. Wyman, supra, — narrowly viewed thé Social Security Amendments of ~ 1967, adding section 402, subdivision (a)(23), as not: _ requiring an- overall increase in benefit- levels, HEW might reasonably conclude that (section alone does not prohibit any decreases ‘in aid occasioned. by: subtract- ing income from ‘a. ratable reduction rather than the . standatd of need.# Second, Jefferson involves ratablé reductions parm _ ‘than statutory maximums, Both the Social Security Act | (see 42 US.C. § 602, subd. (a)(23)) and the United States Supreme Court in Rosado make crucial distirictions between maximtms and ratable reductions. The former is: disfavored; the latter preferred. After Rosado, states could effectuate downward adjustments in welfare payments only. by means of ratable reduc- tions; -they could not achieve the same result by de-° creasing applicable stdtutory maximums. (397 USS. at . pp: 413-414.)° Rosado emphasized that one of she aims of the 1967 amendment was to koala dh the: 10The New York: statute ‘under scrutiny in iat fst | an individualized computation of a recipient’s standard _ with a scheme based, in part,.on a flat allowance for certain needs according to average age. The high court held the new law inconsistent with section 402, subdivision (a)(23), which, it” said, “invalidates any: state-.program that substantially alters the content, of the standard of need in such a way that it is less than it was prior to the enactment of § 40n(a)(23 unless a.state can demonstrate that the items bcc Bi ed no longer constituted part of the reality of existence, for thefmajority -of welfare recipients.” (397 U.S. at p. 419.) The of the -new statute’ was not necessarily that it provided for. averag- . _ ing of certain needs but that “special grants” were ‘eliminated from the computation of the need standard without a showing that such grant no longer represented a = of “the — of | existence” for the recipients. — 67 7 _, States. to adopt ratable reduction plans. (Id. ks Thus, in light of the different ‘treatment afforded. statutory ‘ maximums and- ratable reductions, it ddes- not neces- * « sarily follow from. HEW Ss position in Jefferson (i.e., h—~__ to allay income ‘to be subtracted from. table reduc- tion at income may also be deducted\from statu- tory maxi | More significantly, Triage j in Rosado dirs con- - flicts with the HEW: position in Jefferson a us _ créates considerable doubt as to’ the tenability— of er spondents’ reliance on that HEW position, In, defining __ Fatable reduction the court'.in Rosado’ said: “A ‘ratable o reduction’ represents a fixed. percentage ‘of the stand- . ard of ‘need that will be paid to all recipients. In the event that there is some income ‘which is first de-_ ducted, the ratable reduction is applied:to the amount by which an individual or family falls short of need.” osa( Italics added) 397 US. at p. 409, fn. 13.) (ne “The advantage’ of a single ratable. reduction which applies to all welfare recipients regardless of their specific needs, is | that all recipients receive the same percentage of their need. Comparing ‘the standard of need table-in the Welfare Reform Act with the “act’s statutory maximum table shows that, before. income is subtracted, a family of three needy persons will receive © * 92.2 percent of the minimum requiréd for its care whilé, a family with 10 or more will receive only 84.7 percent. (Welf. & Inst. . Code, §§ 11450, 11452, as amended.) pl Of equal significanée is the fact that. “subtracting income _from ratablé ‘reductions does. not violate another principle of Rosado, namely, that°the states may not obscure the ‘standard . Of need. (397-U.S. at p. 413.) Under the Texas plan challenged -. in Jefferson, ‘the standard of need remains crucial because it. is _ to ‘that figure. which the percentage is applied. Increasing the - . standard of need ‘increases the amount of aid received, assuming the ratable reduction percentage is not lowered. Even though ° * income is subtracted from the reduced figure, the standard of. _ need continugs. to be relevant. Subtracting income from the ‘+ statutory maximum relegates the standard of need to a virtually . irrelevant position: it does not Serpe ag the basis for determining ~~ * a. 4 at | | lit sn . Both HEW in Jefferson and respondents here char- - . acterize the quoted | statement of the Supreme. Court as dictum. Closer ‘analydis, however, reveals that this de- scfiption of the mechanics of the ratable“reduction Pro- . cedure was hecessary to the court's interpreta the 1967 amendment. which requires ‘standards of need and statutory maximums to. be increased to reflect cost of living. rises. The petitioner in Rosado argued : that the amendment compels an increase in the level of i | benefits actually. paid. The court rejected ‘that conten- tion, and sat that subsequent to the amendment the — states could ne ertheless reduce the amount’ of aid by — lowering the ratable reduction percentage by chang- ~ ing from a statutory maximum. to a relatively low ratable reduction; only maximums could. not be low- ered. The court stated, however, that its conclusion did not render the amendment “a meaningless exercise - “in ‘bookkeeping.’ ” (397 U.S. at p. 413.) Instead, it _- discerned two. congressional purposes from. the: new © provision, one of which was: “It has thé effect of re- . quiring the States to recognize.and accept responsibility _ for those additional individuals whose’ income. falls — short of the standard of need as computed in: light of economic realities and to place thefi_ among those eli- , gible for the care ar ining provisions.” (Id.) . _. Thus, as long ashe standards of need were increased, ) additional individuals would be included in the program, © notwithstanding the fact that payments might be reduced — _ pursuant to ‘lower tlds ndash percentages. How- ever, the col rt also: recognized inNits_footnote 13 that an increase ih the number of recipients could be assured actual need of a recipient, or any other meaningful purpose. * As long as the maximum remains constant,’ increases in the sanderd of need would not affect the ein of benefits paid. aad _ only if: income was’ to be acted’ from the standard | a - of need before the ratable“Muction was applied. At ' least according. to. the interpretation in Rosado, the 1967 amendment was not concerned with the i@vel ‘of | -behefits pajd to , the truly destitute, those. without outside ” Tesources. The court therefore refused to require an increase in benefits; instead, it concluded that the in- *- tent of the amendment was to reach an additional grobp of recipients, all of _ nal outside income or re~ sources, | | : _ § "yy The following hypothetical inecipie demonstrates _ \ethat by subtracting | income, from a= ratably reduced figure or from a statutory maximum, a state could suc- ° cessfully avoid the court’s interpretation that the > ad amendmént was designed to increase. the number of : people eligible for aid: Assume that prior to: the 1967 amendment the standard of need: for a family of two _was $200 and tha statutory maximum .was $170 ‘(or the. ratable reduction for—all’ need levels was 85 per-- cent). The amendment inandated the states to in-| = crease both the: standard of need and the statutory z maximum. Thus, ‘at the very least, families of two with outsidé income -of $201 per month would ac- _ cordingly become’ eligible for aid. Assume, pursuant to the amendment, that the standard of need- was in- ~ creased, to $250 and ‘the. statutory maximum. t to $200 | (or that the. state changed its ratable reduction to 80 percent): Under California practice prior to the Wel- fare Reform Act an individual with outside incdne of e° Po. * a. Se ts ee $201 would a4 an actual need of 3849. ($250 less $2017 which would. be paid. in full because it was _ less than the applicable maximum ($200): Under the procedure adopted by\ the Welfare Reform Act, a however, an individual earning $201 would stilt be in- | eligible because when the outside ‘income ($201), is * subtracted . from the statutory maximum - ($200). no — “actual n need” remains. ot gk, ae 4 Thus, a state could completely avoid. the Rosado interpretation of section 402, subdivision -(a) (23), by raising “its post-amendment maximum only ‘to the level of its pre-amendment ‘standard of need or by decreasing ’ its ratable reduction accordingly, and then subtracting | income from the. lower figure. “Such a scheme is incom ~ | ‘sistent. with the. result the Rosado. court said’ (Con. - gress sought to achieve and would indeed render the. amendment a “feaningless exercise in bookkeeping.” In order to insufe the effectuation of the end desired “by Congress, the court concluded in its footnote 13 . . that income must be deducted from the standard of — need and not from the ratably reduced figure (or like- wise a statutory maximum).” ' The conclusion that the Social Security Act requires outside income to be subtracted from standards of >A. 18The court’s conclusion in Rosado was Seceiadk son Sicilads wo - 402, subdivision (a)(23) of the act. Much of. the discussion by. , petitioners and respondents here has focused on section 402, - _ subdivision (a) (7). Our decision, however, is based on both» . sections, on the holding in Rosado. Vv. Wyman, supra, on section (This footnote is continued on next page) > _ Fe j aN - *_,° : _4 ; . | —————— — —— : a —12— e# 4 ® need rither than. from statutory maximums or ratable- ‘reductions is also founded on a. strong public policy’ of. | encouraging welfare recipients to beco fe conitantty | more self-supporting. Yet deducting income from stat . . ca a tory maximums makes gainful employment significe _ | ly less* attractive to the recipient. This ‘follows because | all nonexempt income will be offset directly against the - _~ amount of the ‘grant and not against the standard of need to determine actual’ need; for every nonexempt dollar eafned, the amount of aid will therefore be de- y- oa 7 ‘creased on@dollar..Since the grant is always. less. ‘than . | the standard of’ need, in many instances the: system ot adopted by the Welfare Reform Act will result“in af. ~ individual’s need not being met even after adding both exempt and nonexempt income to the AFDC payment. Such recipients will be forced to exist ‘below the bare | minimum nécessary for adequate care,’ even though, Og _ they have: commenced, by obtaining employment, to — _break free from the debilitating—“welfare” “syndrome.” _ .The practice. thus conflicts with the stated federal policy to provide incentives to obtain and maintain an em-— | ployment status. (See 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. ~ News, pp. 2994-2995; County of Aiameda v. _Carleson (1971) supra, 5 Cal.3d 730, 741-742.) or - . fo —— a We conc clude_that-sectien- 41450;-as "amended by ~~ gection 28 of the Welfare Reform -Act, is inconsistent . - 402, subdivision (aX(8), and on considerations . ‘of employment - incentive. Thus we disagrée with the position of HEW, ‘expressed its amicus brief filed in Whitfield v. King (M.D. ‘Ala.) supra, Gy No- 3330, that section 402, sidhilietalon (a)(7), does not, - ‘at least i in part, compel the result we reach teday. EYELID EIA PO LLL LEI LEE LLG LIE LEB LLNERE LLDPE ae ; —13— * with the Social Secirrity Act insofar as’ it requires in- come to be deducted from statutory maximums and. not from | standards of need. . While manifestly the a ". states are not required to ‘participate in the federal \ = AFDC program, as long as they accept federal funds. for ‘this purpose they must comply. with federal law inthe administration of their programs. - (King v. - Smith, supra; Rosado v. Wyman, ‘supra; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 739.) The acceptance of federal, funds* pursuant to-a state program not in compliance with the Social. Se- 7 curity Act and - the regulations promulgated there- under would violate federal law in an area in which it is supreme. (U.S. Const., art. VI, § 3; see Rosado Vv. | Wyiman (1970) supra’ 397 U.S. 397,- 428 (Rouglas, 4 Fy concurring ) [“The. wrong alleged is the State’s fail- _ 2 + ure to comply with with, federal_requirements in its use of. ot federal funds, not HEW’s failure to withhold funds from the State.”].) - oar .. We thus turn to the remedy to be afforded petition- ers. In re Bell (1942) 19. Cal. 2d 488, 498, declared that California law requires an. unconstitutional por- tion of a statute.be severed and “the remainder [to] ; —.——~‘stand if it is complete in itself and would have been, adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial ‘invalidation of the statute.” (Cf. In re Blaney (1947). 30 Cal.2d 643, 655.) We need. not. .14We do not reach petitioners’ contention that section 11450 as amended denies aid to a number of eligible recipients whereas. federal. law requires some amount of aid to all thos@-eligible. (But see Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 481.) __ 2 2 ; 4. - y ange ot . 9D SLID TONES ORTOP ELE Oe ma eke hes ey | — "speculate as to: what action the "Legislature might have - taken had it foreseen the decision which. we ‘reach: " today. In section 41° of: the new law the ‘Legislature , . has — provided for severance as any provision .. of this act... is held invalid. ” (Stats. 1971, ch. 578, . (841). In Bell we undertook to sever one section of a | county anti-picketing ordinance and several words from -anoth- er section. (19 Cal.2d at P. 497-498.) Section 11450 of the Welfare and Institutions ; Code is, likewise “me- chanically severable” ‘within the meaning of Bell so ° that it conforms to federal law. This can be accom- plished as an administrative. matter without affecting the other policy determinations made by the Legislature in its amendments to section 11450 by deleting the fol- . - lowing provision from subdivision (a) of that section: “when added: to his incomé, exclusive, of ‘any amounts” _ considered exempt as income or paid pursuant to uly : ‘division (4) of this section or Section 11453. 1, ~~ _In view of our interpretation of the mandate. of 18 % € al law, section 11450, subdivision (a), ‘with the’ fore- oe going ‘deletion, can readily be interpreted as _ requiring income. to be subtracted from an individual’s standard " of need; the statutory maximum becomes relevant only after that mathematical process is completed. If, how- , ‘ever, the exact formula for determining aid. to those | - with outside income needs clarification’ in addition to _ that contained in section 11450 aes interpreted herein, respondent | Carleson 16 directed to issue regulations pur- suant to -. statutory authority under wae, and Initi- ‘= ; . Per perigee r cpg ES cae aaa dake pa Gee ae pa « PRL ory 7 . : . - ' . P . “ ‘ . . 7 . s - ” : - 7 o | * Fs ; . “= sé oo. 15 : ao P Canal ; . - tutions Code section 10600 in order 4 167 Secure full com: pliance with federal law. _ ea 7 ‘ 9 Our order of September 30, 1971, stayed the opera- tion a of section 28 of the Welfare Reform Act insofar ‘ ’ ‘gs a. APPENDIX B_ Sec. 28.5. Section 11452 of the Welfare and Institu- a tions Code'i is amended to read: I ae 11452. Minimum basic standards of ndegninte care : shall be distributed to the counties and ‘shall be binding , upon them. Such: standards are hereby determined on the basis of the schedule set forth in this section, as | ‘adjusted: for cost-of-living increases or decreases. pur- - suant to Section. uses, which schedule is- designed to - insure: an (1) Site healthful housing. ~ (2) . clothing ak healthy and decoy. —_—_ , ¢ ' ad . + (3) > Lewis at adequate © food badeit : meeting — 7 recommended. dietary en Re: — Search Council. * (4). Utilities, . Bere {2).. Other items including household operation, . ed- . | : ‘peation ” and incidentals, retreation, personal ‘needs, _ and insurance. te wet ee ee oO ’ (6) > Allowance ‘for “essential medical, dental, or other remedial care to the extent not otherwise pro- ". vided at public expense. 1) - Other recurring special needs. ee gee. ot eS aes quate care is as follows: - The schedule of minimum basic standards of ade 2 | Number of needy’ oe ‘Minimum 3 * persons in the . . basic standards == ~~ ‘. same family og _ ss @f adequate care \ - okey Caries ae eeseepstsenceeceessensens $125 0° Sv BD, ssaniiceins paseucevanya desesanssaanssovevasesestens 210 6s. nT ET vecieegserstien 255, Bh fe 314 - Sea ee OY ae 362. © GB vsesvovsnacisnsverdincs Rivassdeeenseeentnteaaeance 408 Fe Lee een en ee ee . 449 OD cgcs sesihe rag nencenneneeseversevecnetyesnswtouaes 496 DF cca cnces pwn nso ped oe eta sepenesenicevioemnacyins 543 FO ect cag eens ee cae ee ese neenicesegas 590 plus five dollars ($5) for ‘each additional needy person. The department shall establish rules: and revulaiions assuring the uniform -application statewide of- the pro- visions of this section. Ns ~* APPENDIX Cc. Sec. 28. Section 11450 of the Welfard 3 and Institu- -.- tions Code is amended to read: 11456. (a) ‘For each needy family which een one ‘or more needy. children’ qualified for ‘aid under this chapter, except as provided in Section 11403, there ~. shall be paid, notwithstanding minimum basic stand- | , ards of adequate care established by the department y “under: Section 11452, an amount of aid each month which when added to his, income, exclusivé of any - amounts considered exempt as: income or paid | pur- suant: to. subdivision (d) of this. section or Section. _ 11453.1, is equal to the. sums specified in the follow- ing table, as adjusted. for cost-of-living increases or has creases. pursuant to Section 114 3: | : - “Number of eligible needy . * persons in a “J. . Maximum . ‘ the same home, aid . | rn © oo ccoceacecceceaseeceeseseecieees siaatpuaeenes Riaces $1 15 OD rasa cen euraaen gett eee sc rceceecee gent ounce sea seeceee! acescen . 190 Banari ysteipp ee aes ti 235 ee, eT eee Dea eoeenecyeensobeeennews . 280. Lee Fe vectegpeeatgeestseewessseteed :...+320 a rr Eee neE ee ° . ° . = ce ¢ ; - a ~ . ° ’ . . bd - @ . : . > . e ry 7 . . “ bd , . P : . t . . ‘ *. , ; . aw : * ip . . > ; 3 ie a es ‘ ~ - N 4 : , 3 4 . . me ce a ‘= . * d % * e? ‘ .. 7 : . oo JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY _ 535 - Syllabus JEFFERSON ET AL. v. “HACKNEY. COMMISSIONER” OF PUBLIC’ "WELFARE, ETAL, = | APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT. COURT FOR THE ’ NORTHERN ‘DISTRICT OF -TEXAS o~ . : se : No. 70-5064. “Argecd February 22, 1972—Deci a-May .30, 1972 . Appellants, pie nee ore Families With Dependent Childten . (AFDC), challenge the system whereby Texas, in order to allocate its xed-Poo of welfare money among persons with acknowledged Affirmed. need, applies a percentage reduction factor to arrive at a reduced standard of need, the factor being lower for AFDC thai for other categorical assistance programs. Appellants assert that the State’s - method of applying this factor to recipients with outside income contravenes § 402 (a)(23) of the Sacial Security Act, which re- * quired. adjustment,’ by July-1, 1969, of “amounts used . ... to determine the needs of individuals” to reflect increases in living costs, because this method does not increase the welfare rolls to “the same extent as would an _ alternative procedure used by some other States. “They also make an equal protection claim on the grounds that the distinction between:the aid programs is not ra~ | tional and that the Texas system racially discriminates against the proportionately larger number of minority groups in AFDC than _in ‘the other programs. H eld: : The Texas scheme does not contravene § 402 (a) (23). of the ~ = Social Security Act, which does not require use of. a. computation procedure that maximizes. individual cad for subsidiafy . ben- * efits. Pp. 539-545. 2. The challenged system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 545-551. (a) ‘The fact that there are more members of minority groups _ in the AFDC program than in other categories does ‘not indicate . Tacial discrimination, absent any proof of racial motivation in the Texas scheme. There was no such proof here. Pp. 547-549. . _ (b) Texas’ decision to provide. somewhat lower welfare benefits for AFDC recipients than for the aged and infirm who are in other ° categories is not invidious or irtational, and there is no constitu- « tional or statutory requirement that relief categories be treated exactly alike. Pp. 549-551. | procedures. 53. © . OCTOBER TERM, 1971, Opinien of the Court. ee 406.U-S. REHNQuIsT, J., delivered the’ opinion of the Court, in which . Burcer, C..J., and Wurre, Birackmun, and* Powe tL, JJ., joined. Srewart, J., filed a statement joining in Part III of thé’ Court’s opinion, post, p. 551. Dovetas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 551. MarsHatu, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, and in Part I of which STEWART, : aes, post, B. 558. Steven J. Cole anaued the cause for appellants. ‘With - - him on, the briefs were Henry A. Freedman, Ed J. Polk, — ‘ Edward V. ‘Sparer, cand Carl Rachlin. Pat Bailey, Assistant Attorney - General of Texas, : ‘ _ argued the cause ‘for appellees. With him on the-brief were Crawford £. Martin, Attorney General, Nola White, First AssistantAttorney General, Alfred Walker, Execu- . .. tive Assistamt Attorney: General, and. J. C. Davis, Assist- - ant Attorney General. Evelle J. Younger, Attorney Generel and Elizabeth. Palmer and Jerold A, Prod, Deputy Attorneys General, — filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae : urging affirmance. | ‘Solicitor General Griswold! by invitation. of the Court; . filed a memorandum for the United States as amicus © curiae.: ° = ‘ ~ 2 § 2281. - / _ -The Texas State Creeks cascentions a cejling on the amount the State can spend on welfare assistance grants, In order to allocate this fixed pool of welfare money 7 among the numerous individuals with acknowledged need, - the State has adopted a system of percentage grants. ‘Under this system, the State first computes the monetary | needs of individuals eligible.for relief under each | the _ federally aided categorical assistance programs.? Then, singe the constitutional ceiling on welfare is:insafficient ‘to bring each recipient up to this full standard of need, the State applies.a percentage reduction factor * in order . | to arrive at.a reduced standard of need i in each category that the State can guarantee.. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of applying _& lower percentage reduction factor | ‘to AFDC than to | 1 Originally, the Texas. Constitution prohi ited all ‘welfare pro-. grams. -Section 51 of Art. III of the Constitution provided that the legislature “shall have no power to make any.grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, asso- ‘ciation of individuals, . municipal or other corpotations Whatso- ' ever 4...” However, begfnning in 1933, exceptions to this rule were added to. the: state constitutidén in § 51-a, which now. allows participation in‘ the federal welfare programs, but limits state financing to the sum of $80,000,000. The legislature cannot exceed ‘this welfare: budget Without a state co itutional amendment. ?Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42-U. S. C. §30I et seg.; Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U. S. ©. § 601 . et seg.; Aid to the Blind\(AB), 42 U.S. C. § 1201 et seq.; Aid for the Permanently and Totally et seq. 8,At the present time these factors are: GAA—100%: AB—95% ; . . s% id . . . ° . ° . “a ° 7 . ’ . ee e . * é lit, . . " . . ‘. . e yt POEL AON eer ‘ ne, 3 OPM LL PL OO MIEN wmeree six soggy: RARE RAISIN TIEN POP _ JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY = = ——_—3339 535 Opinion of the Court : s sndcifie procedures’ that: Texas, uses for computing that - reduction violate the congressional enactment. '-The Dis- trict: Court rejected this argument and denied without. opinion appellants’ motion to amend the judgment. - -This . appeal under 28 U. S.. C. -§ 1253 then followed, and we ~ noted probable jurisdiction. 404.U. S. 820 (1971).- een ee Naas Appellants’ stat ry argument relftes to the method the State uges to compute the’ petgentage reduc- tok when the acaleas also has some outside igeome. - . Texas, , like many other States, first applies the percent- age reduction factor to the recipient’ s' standard of need, . thus arriving at a reduced standard ‘of need that the State can guarantee for each recipient within the\présent _ budgetary | restraints. After computing this reduced exempt ° income in order to arrive at the level of benefitg that the recipient needs in order to. reach his reduced standard of ‘nella. : This is the ‘amolint, of welfare the . ‘recipient is given: Under an alternative system ‘used by other States, the order. of: computation is reversed. First, the outside in- to determine the recipient’s “unmet need.” Then, the percentage reduction fagtor is applied to the unmet need,” - in order to determine the welfare benefits payable. . The two systems of accounting for outside income yield | somewhat different results." Under the Texas system, all * . ° 6 a ’ - statidard of need, the State then ‘subtracts any non- — Me W : comgewis subtracted from the standard of need, in order - 3 : Ninetess of ‘the 26 States: that use a® percentage rection a system follow the Texas procedure of accounting for outside income. See Memorandum for: the United States as Amicus Curiae 5-16. 5 A certain portion of earned income must be exempted as a work incentive. ‘See 42 U. S7C. § 602 (a¥(8):. . Asnaming two identical. families, cack ‘i a ‘standgrd of need O& i ttle able of, Ne tlt ae i lta etn esa a a te epg ee 6 ‘ ne GS Batra Sates SS Mac ic bE Nyt a ate YA AE 4 (2 540 } + OCTOBER TERM, ‘lot Opinion of the Court’ te 406 U.S. . welfare recipients with the same needs have the same _ amount of money available each month, whether or not they have outside income. Since the outside income is applied dollar for dollar to the reduced standard.-of. need, which the welfare department would otherwise pay in full, it does not result in a net improvement. in the fi- nancial position of the recipient.’ Under the alternative system, on-the other hand, any welfare recipient who also has outside income is in a better financiql position “because of it.. The reason is that the percentage reduc- tion factor there is applied | to the “unmet need,” after the ‘income has been.subtracted. Thus, in effect, the income- earning recipient is able to “keep” all his income, while he receives only 4 percentage of the reniainder of his a standard ‘of need. PO, of $200, and outside, nonexempt income ™ $100, the two sosteene would produce these results: Texas System - ” Albernative Sistem -$ 200 (need) , & $ 200 (need) . x 15 (% reduction factor). —100 (outside income) $ 150 (reduced need) $ 100 (uskenet need) +100 (outside income) A xX .75 (% reduction factor) - $50 (benefits payable) - sf “5 (benefits payable) . _™ Assuming two families with identical standards, of need, but only one with outside income, the alterfative system leaves more money in the hands of the family with outside income: Outside Income ; *No Outside Income $ 200 (need) . $ 200 (need) » ; _ 100 (outside, income) — 0 (outside income) - \ 100 (unmet need) $ 200 (unmet, need) ~« X .75'(% reduction factor) X .75 (% reduction factor) — —_——— 2 —— supports the inference that Congress mandated ‘the States ‘to change their. income- computation procedures in other, completely unmentioned areas. - a, Nor are appellants aided by their reference to Social - Security Act’ § 402 (a)(10), 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(10), which provides that AFDC benefits must. “be mae? 409 n. 13. The Ceurt did not, however, hold that each one of .these effects was intended by Congress. In fact, the Rosado holding © as to the “two broad purposes” of Congress was. stated above, and the Texas system is perfectly consistent with it. The Court men; tioned widened eligibility simply as one of several possible effects that might follow from the statute as so construed. 12 Act of Jan.°2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, Tit. II, § 208, ‘81 ; Stat. 894, repealed 83 Stat. 45. - . "13 See n. 7, supra. we JEFFERSON « v. HACKNEY » (545 535 @ * Opinion of the. Court “ with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” That section was enacted at a time when persons whom the State had determined to be eligible for the payment of benefits were placed on waiting lists, because of the shortage of state funds. The. statute. was intended. to prevent the States from denying benefits, even, tem rarily, to a person who has been found fully qualified for aid. See H. R. Rep. No. 1300 , 8istCong., lst Sess., 48, 148- (1949); 95 Cong. “Rec. 13934 «(remarks of | ‘Rep. _ Forand). Section 402 (a) (10) also prohibits a State from creating certain exceptions to standards specifically enunciated in. the federal Act. See, e. g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971). It doés not, however, en- act by implication a generalized federal: criterion to which States must adhere in their computation of stand- ards of need, income, and benefits.** Such an interpreta- tion would be an intrusidn into an area in which Congress | has. given the States broad discretion? and we cannot - accept: appellants’ invitation to change this longstanding statutory scheme simply for pelicy consideration reasons of which we are not, the arbiter Til We turn, then, to appellants’ claim that the Texas sys- tem of percentage reductions violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellants believe that once the State has computed a standard of. need for each recipient, it.is arbitrary and discriminatory to provide only 75% of that standard to AFDC recipients, while paying 100% of recognized need to the aged, and 95% to the disabled and the blind. They apne that if the State BaOptS a 14 Appellants’ reliance on f guage from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 480-481 (1970), is misplaced. The ‘Court there explicitly failed’ to reach the Stafe’s argument that thep purpose of / § 602 (a) (1Q) was primarily to prevent the use of waiting lists. /d,, at 481 n.- B . i ~ | a lcci TAS gy nC eRe ena alt aa as a pasate inital W eats Ah Re oP - Social Security Act have certain common elements, the the ‘Equal Protection Clause merely because the classi- -. may address.a problem “one step at a time,’ or even ‘neglecting the others.” Williamson v.:Lee Optical Co., ¢ . « . ar inal Sk Pi seh pissadcciaitnd td Bimindela bate tie be iLudin’ ) “ state plan independent of the plans under the other titles. In for the first time.enabled States‘ to combine their plans, but only oe. NON 546 OCTOBER TERM, 1971 . .. Opinion of the Court. ~ 406 U.S. percentage-reduction system, it must apply the - same percentage to each of its welfare programs. . | This claim was properly rejected by the court below. __-It_is-clear_from. the statutory framework that, although ‘the four categories of public seumaice found 3 in the —-- States were intended by Congress.to keep’ their AFDC - plans separate from plans under the- other. titles of the Act.*®. A-State is free to participate in one, several, or all of. the categorical assistance programs, as it chooses. It is true that each of the programs is intended to assist. the needy, but it does not follow that there is only one ~ constitutionally permissible way for the State to ap- proach this important goal. This Court emphasized cnly recently; i in Dandridge ~ Williams, 397 U. S. #44 485 (1970), that in “the area of. economics dnd social. welfare, a State does. not violate g fications made by its laws are imperfect.” A legislature “select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, 348 U. S..483, 489 (1955). -So long as its judgments are rational, -and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not . subject to a constitutional straitjacket. The very com- plexity of the eee suggests that there will be more 15 Each dinedical assistance program is embodied in a separate title of the Social Security Act, see n. 2, supra, and_ requires a 1962, however, Congress enactedi42 U. S. C. §§ 1381-1385, which for the non-AFDC programs. Thus, while Congress has now enabled States to adopt a common. plan for the other programs, it considered . AFDC sufficiently different so as to require an independent plan. ¢ | °. «JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY ae, 535 Opinion of thé Court | ; than | one constitutionally permissible method of ‘solving thent. — : 7 The standard of judicial: review is not slewl because ‘of appellants’ ‘unproved ‘allegations of racial discrimina- * tion. The three-judge court found that the “payment — by Texas of a lesser percentage of unmet needs to the recipients of the AFDC than to the recipients of other — welfare programs is not the result of racial or ethnic prejudice and is not violative of the federal Civil Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend-.- ‘ ment.” The. District Court obviously gave careful con- ° sideration to this issue, and we are cited by its opinion to a number of subsidiary facts to support its principal finding quoted above. There has never been a reduc- tion in the amount of money appropriated by the Jegis- lature to the AFDC program, and between 1943 and the date of the opinion below _there:had been five in- creases in the amopmt-of money appropriated by ‘the | legislature for the program, two of them having occurred since 1959.° The overall percentage increase in appro- priation. for the programs between 1943 and the.time of the District Court’s hearing in this case was 410% for AFDOF as opposed to 211% for OAA and ae for AB. The court further concluded: “The depositions’ of Welfare officials conclusively éstablish that the defendants did not know the racial make-up of the various welfare assistance , categories prior to or at.the time when the orders here under attack were issued.” Appellants. in. their -brief in effect abandop: any + effort 7 16 Since the original opinion ‘below, ‘there has been an additional _ increase. Following a constitutional amendment, see n. 3, supra, the appropriation has risen from 1 150,00 to $23, 100,000. 53° ~~ OCTOBER TERM, 1971 Opinion of the Court — 406 U.S, to show that these findings of fact. were clearly errone- — ous, and we hold they were not. | Appellants are thus left with their naked statistical argument: that there i is a larger pereentage of Negroes and Mexican-Americans in AFDC than in the other progranis;”” and that the AFDC is funded at.75% whereas the other, programs are funded at 957% and 100% of recognized need. As the statistics cited- in .the footnote Aemonstrate, the number of minority members in all _ categories is substantial.” The basic outlines’ of eligi-. bility for the various categorical] granjg are established by Congress, not by the States; given the heterogeneity of the Nation’s population, it would be only an infre- quent coincidence that the racial composition of each ° -grant class was identical to that of the. others. “The acceptance of appellants’ constitutional theor® would render suspect each difference in treatment among the "grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation __ and however otherwise rational the treatment ° might - be. Few legislative efforts to deal with the difficult. ‘problems posed by current welfare programs could sur- oN Percentage of Negroes Percentage of ‘Number of . Program - Year. and Mezican-Americans White-Anglos Recipients OAA — 1969 39.8 602. - 1968 : 38.7 61.3 — 230,000 | 1967 ws 70 63.0 ~APTD 1969 46.9 53.1 : 1968 ° 456 . 544 4,213 ‘1967 4620 53.8. oO .AB 1969 557 4430.0 | : 3968 + gag 45.1 ee? | AFDC 19699 © 870 ~~ 130 7 . 1968 SAG 2. \ * 15.1 136,000. 196% | 80 © 14.0 a JEFFERSON ». HACKNEY = 9 ° 535, ~S ; Opinion of the Court’ | -e. vive wack — and we do not. find it required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Applying the traditional standard of-review under that , amendment, we cannot say that Texas’ decision to,pro-_ vide somewhat lower welfare benefits for AFDC re- cipients is. invidious. or irrational. Since budgetary constraints donot allow the payment of-the full stand- ard of. need for ‘all welfare. recipients, the State may eave. concluded that the aged and infirm gre: the least able of the categorical grant recipients to beat the hard> - ent \policy judgments . are of course possible, it is. hot irrational for the State to believe that the young are more adaptable than the sick and elderly, especially — because the latter have less hope of improving their situation in the years remaining to them. Whether or not one agrees with this state determination, there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids ‘it.’® ey Similarly, we. eannot ‘accept the Seument in Mr. , , ct of an inadequate ‘standard of. living. While differ- 18In James v. : Valieira, 402 U.'8. 137° (1971), it was “contended | that a California- referendum requirement violated the Fourteenth. © ‘Amendment because it imposed-a mandatory referendum in, the case of an ofdinance authorizing low income housing, while referenda with respect to other. types of ordinances had to be initiated by the ac of private individuals: ° The Court responded: ~~ - » * “But of course a lawmaking procedure that ‘disadvantages’ a par-. ticular group does not always deny equal .protection. Under any ‘such holding, presumably a State wouJd not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referendums were required on - all, because they weuld always disadvantage some group. And this*. Court would be reqtjred to. analyze governmental structures to de- : termine whether a gubernatorial, veto provision or a filibuster rule is likely: to. ‘disadvantage’ any of the diverse and shifting groups that make up the American people.” Id., vat 142. : y 19 Just as the State’s actions here do-not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, we punuce that they do not violate Title VI of = _ OCTOBER TERM, 1971 oan, Opinion of the Court _ "4060.8, - JUSTICE Mekngreats s dissent that the Social Sécu- rity Act itself requires equal pertentages for -each. - categorical . assjstance program. The dissent corttedes - _ that a State might simply refuse to participate in.the .: , AFDC . program, while continuing to ‘receive federal - money for the other categorical programs. ‘See post, / ’at.577. Nevertheless, it is argued that Congress intended. to prohibit any middle ‘ground—once the : State « does | participate .in a program it must do so on.the same basis as it, participates.in every other program. Such an all-or-nothing policy judgment may well be. defen-: sible, and the dissenters may be correct. that nothing in : ') - the statute expressly ‘rejects it. But neither. does any- thing in the statute approve or require it.” / | Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200d et seq. ‘The Civil Rights ; 7 Act prohibits discrimination in federally financed programs. . We have, however, ypheld the findings of nondiscriminatory purpose f ” in the percentage reductions used by Texas, and’ have concluded — _ . . that the variation in percentages is rationally related to.the purposes of the separate wefare programs. The Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power €Co,, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), is therefore. inapposite. . In _ Griggs, the employment tests haying racially dischiminatory“effects | _ were found not-to be job-related, and for that re4son were impermis- . sible under the specific language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. . Ps Since the Texas procedure challenged here is related to the purposes of the welfare programs, it is not proscribed by Title VI simply: be- . cause of variances in the racial composition of the different cate-. 7 gorjcal programs. v ‘ + 20Mr. Justice MarsHAv’s dissent cites the 1950 amendments to ‘the Social Security Act as support for its novel statutory theory that: States_must: provide equal aid levels in each welfare ‘category. The 1950 amendments included’ “a tevised method of determining the « Federal: share of assistance costs,” 95-Cong. Rec. 13932, 80 that the Federal Gavernment would. pay a substantially equal, percentage’ of » matching funds to state plans in each of the categorical - -assistance ‘programs. | See S. Doe. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 101. . But this revision of the grant-in-aid formula ‘in § 403 of the. Act was not ac- - companied by any corresponding amendment of § 402, the section, of - the Act: dealing with congressional: limitations on state AFDC ’ . '* 0 - JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY oo 551 585 ss ‘Dovepas,. J., dissenting of In conclusion, we re-emphasize whiat: the Court said in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487: an. “We do not decide today ‘that the [state law} is that it best fulfills the relevant social and eco- objectives.that [the State] might ideally ; or that.a@ more just and humane system , coul&hot be devised. Conflicting claims of morality . and intelligence are raised by opponents and propo- nents of ost every measure, certainly including -. the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfaréassistance programs are not the busi- ness of this Court.‘ ... [T]he Constitution does not empower this Court. to second-guess state offic - ». ¢ials charged with the difficult responsibility of allo- ~ ".. eating limited public welfare funds one the myriad ‘of potential recipients.” : A firmed. Mr. fuerics Smewane joins in Part III of the Court’ s ‘“ opinion. ¢@ . ee 4c Mr: Justice DouG.as, with whom Mr. Justice BREN- NAN. eqncurs, dissenting. | ° __I would ‘read ‘the Act more generously ne does the Court. It is stipulated that 87% of those redeiving AFDC aid are. Blacks pr Chicanos. I: would therefore he programs. Indeed, ciponents. of the 1950 aieincleeiits Aplicitly recognized and endorsed the longstanding policy that thé Federal °° Government sets only © minimum AFDC standards, ‘while Jeavi ‘ing ‘the States “wide discretion both in determining policies and in setting ‘standards of need.” §.,Doc. No. 208, supra, at 101. The enactment of a modified’ graht-in-aid formula hardly suggests Con-° gress’ intent to engage in “extensive alteration of the basie under- lying structure of+an established program.” Rosado v. ‘Wyman, 397 U. &,.at 414 n. 17. 5 | .s th Nhe a | He ~—— 552 OCTOBER TERM, 1971 pomuas, J., dissenting 2 «| - 406:U.S. read the et against the background of rank discrimina- tion against the Blacks and the Chicanos and in light - of the fact.that Chicanos in Texas fare even-more poorly | than the: Blacks. _See L. Grebler, J. Moore, & R. Guz- . _ man, The Mexican-American People, pts. 2 and 3 (1970) ; J. Burma; Mexican-Americans in the United States "143-199 (1970) ; Schwartz, State Discrimination Against Mexicaf- ‘Aliens, 38 Geo. Wash.. L. Rev. 1091 (1970); U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Mexican American (1968); U. S.,Commission. on Civil Rights, Mexican Americans and the Administration of Justice ‘in the Southwest (1970). .In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 _U. 8. 397, 413, we said that i in administering such’a pro- gram a State “may . not obscure the actual standard of ‘need.” Texas does precisely that by- manipulating a mathematical formula. . In "Rosado, we described how some States establish upper limits or maximums of aid, while others, like : Texas, “curtail the payments of benefits by a system. of ‘ratable reductions’ whereby all ‘recipients will receive © a fixed percentage of the standard of need.” Jd., at 409. oa in footnote 13 we described what that meant: “A ble redugtion’ represents a fixed percentage of the | ; stand of need that will be paid to all recipients. In the event ‘that, there i is some income thats first deducted, the ratable eo es to the amount by whith: the individual or fami come falls short of need. : a id, at 409 n. 13 (emphasis added). If Texas first deducted outside i income and then made its ratable reduction, the welfaré recipient would receive * a somewhat more generous payment, as the opinion of the Court illustrates in footnote 6 of its opinion. Not only does the Texas system avoid this generous approach, — ‘but it also impermissibly constricts the standard of need in conflict with Rosado, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. | - a J = JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY 553 , 535 ‘ _Doveras, J., dissenting = | .& 471,-and T@nsend v. Swank, 404 U. 8. 282. Under _Texas’ method of computation, a family—otherwise eligi- ble for AFDC’ benefits but with nonexempt income 3 greater than the level of benefits “and less than the standard of need—is denied: both “AFDC. cash benefits and other noncash benefits such as medicaid.’ It seems inconceivable that Congress could have intended that . noneash benefits be denied those with incomes less than the standard of need solely because that income was earned rather than from categorical: assistance. Yet this is precisely the result sanctioned by the Court today because eligibility for these programs is tied to the receipt of eam pettente a . ee | > : SO STONERS Rep Oy mare ny PV Geren 5 7 ° 1 The Court’s stk owietanient that “[t]he’ Texas computation method eliminates any .°. . financial incentive [for welfare recipi- ents to obtain outside income], so long as .the[ir] outside income a remains less than the[ir] . . . reduced. standard of. need,” ante, at & 541, understates the effect of the Texas system on the Tecipients. The Texas system not only fails ‘to provide an incentive for those ‘ on’ the welfare rolls to break the cycle of poverty by obtaining 5 . employment, but—in certain -cases—it also penalizes those. who'- - | seek employment. The family with nonexempt income equal ‘to za Texas’ level of benefits stands in much the same cash position as the | : - AFDC recipient,- but solely - Because that family: has earned that : _ last marginal . dollar that makes it no longer eligible for categorical . assistance it also is denied. medical assistance, social services, and. training. The Solicitor Genéral tells us that the value of the med- — - ical services alone is worth $50-$60 per. month to the average Texas AFDC: family. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus ~ i Curiae 7.5. 2 . : 2 Eligibility for - family eo elopnient.- services is ‘keyed to the a. “revei[pt], [of] aid to families with depefident, children,” 42 U.S.C. ° § 602 (a) (14); so, too, with employment assistance, id., at § 602 (a) (15) (A). (“receivi ing aid under the plan”) ; protection against child’s £. -““ “neglect or abuse, id, at § 602 (a) (16) (“receiv ing aid”); plans to > , establish paternity and secure support, id., at § 602'(a) (17) (A) (0) § t _ (ii) (“receiving aid,” “receiving such aid”); work incentiv pro- grams, id., at _§ 602. (a)419) (A) (i) (“receivi ing aid to fami les with — “pe ety r ; Cin pace tae ea = ee ee 854 OCTOBER TERM, 1971 Dovetas, F., dissenting . _ 406 U.S. One of the stated purposes of the AFDC program is “to help such parents or relatives [of needy depéndent —¥ ‘children] to. attain or retain capability for the maximum “~ self-support and personal independence.” 42 U.S.C. . §601 (enYphasis added). - The Senate Finance. Commit- tee has stated, “A key element in any program for work. _ and training for assistance recipients is an incentive for people to take employment.” S. Rep. No. 744, 90th © Cong., Ist Sess., 157 (1967) (emphasis added). The ma- jority acknowledges that “[t]he history and purpose of — the Social Security Act . : . indicate Congress’ desire to help those on Welfare becdiie self-sustaining.” Ante, at 544. But it nonetheless i ignores the explicit congressional policy i in favor. of work incentives and upholds a system ’ which provides penalties and disincentives for those who seek empioyrient,- 3. tecendent children”) ; aa medical amuinga plans, id., at § 1396a | (a) (10) (“individuals receiving aid or assistance”). Would Congress have tied needy families’ eligibility for these "programs to the receipt of cash benefits had ‘it foreseen that this _ Court would disregard the statutory mandate “that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with ‘reasonable prompt- . ness to all. eligible individuals’? 42 U.S. C. § 602 (a) (10). 3 Thé. rationale which the Court. uses ‘to. reach this result. is at odds with time-honored rules of statutory interpretation. First, the Court gives but: a grudging ‘interpretation to the recital in § 401-of the | Act, 42 U! S. C. § 601, that one of Congress’ purposes was to’ en- courage welfare recipients to become self-supporting. The Court “in effect. disregards the rule that recitals embody “the general pur- poses which . . . Congress undertook to achieve.” Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298.U. S. 238; 297. . And see Coosaw Mining Co. v. South ‘Carolina, 144 U.-8. 550, 563; United States v. Fisher, 2 Granch 358, 886, Second, the Court attributes té& Congress the purpose of pro- viding work incentives, e..g., 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(8), while at the same time ‘allowing the imposition of penalties and disincentives for obtaining employment. The Court departs from the principle that “ijn the -exposition of statutes,” various sections of the same act | “are: suppdsed to have the same object,” Kohisaat v. Murphy, 96 | 4 Sesto PERLE ob hee tee - ‘ MARE AM OD Coe a! cei teeta JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY - e 6555 535 ; : — J., i 7 7 -_ The California Supreme Court in ‘Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal. 3d 227, 490. P. 2d 1148, struck down the system this Court approves today, where California used a statutory _ maximum of payments rather than:a ratable reduction. The California Supreme Court quite properly said that what the State was attempting was inconsistent, with. Rosado. Moreover it. had an additional reason: = “The conclusion that the Social Security Act re- . quires ‘outside income to be subtracted from stand- ~ ards of need rather than from statutory maximums: or ratable reductions is also founded on a strong public policy of encouraging welfare recipients to - become constantly more self-supporting. Yet de- - ducting. income from statutory maximums makes gainful employment significantly less attractive .to the recipient. This follows. because all nonexempt income will be offset. directly against the amount of the grant and not against the standard of need to determine actual need; for every nonexempt. dollar earned, the amount of aid will therefore-be decreased one dollar. Since. the grant is always less than the _ Standard of need, in many instances the. system adopted’ by the Welfare Reform Act will result in ~ an individual’s need not being met even after adding both exempt and nonexempt income to the AFDC payment. Such recipients will be forced to exist below the bare minimum necessary for adequate . care, even though they have commence , by obtain- ing employment, to break free from the debilitating ‘ ‘welfare syndrome. The practice thus conflicts with U. S. 153, 159-160, and holds ‘instead that Cugion was working at cross-purposes in different subsectiohs of § 402, 42 U.S. C. § 602. Fiffally,‘by giving the Social Security Act a miserly interpretation, the Court disregards -the canon that ‘remedial legislation, such . as. the Social Security Act, is to be interpreted liberally to effectuate its purposes. E. g., Peyton v. Rawe, 391 U. S. 54, 65. “CME WO AIDE PN ERE Oe eee raed ee Le iphs et Paret anions Sgt °o pach hess AME are? Bos siicacnicc s 556° OCTOBER TERM, 1971 Doveras, J., dissenting * 406 U.S. bd 4 the stated federal policy to provide incentives to. obtain and maintain an employment status.” /d., - at 235-236, 490 P. 2d, at 1153-1154. . Moreover, Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, calls for . "a reversal in the present case. It is conceded that plain- tiff Maria T. Davilla and 2,470 other families are denied aid in Texas by reason of its new formula, see 304 F.- Supp. 1332, 1343, despite the fact that their income is below: the standard of need and that of those receiving ~ AFDC aid only 75% of their needs ‘is met.‘ : = Under § 402 (a)(10) of the Social Security Act (which | governs AFDC) “aid to families with dependent chil- ‘dren shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible “individuals.” 42 U. S. C. $602 (a)(10). * In Townsend children 18 through | 20 years of age who attended high school or vocational training were eligible for -AFDC.benefits but such children. in college - were not eligible. We held that “a state eligibility stand- ard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under | federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act — and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” * 404 U, S.,-at 286. *The percentages of ieell that will be met by Texas ones the various heads are as follows: Old Age Assistance...7.............05: ieesendet ees 100% Aid 06 Ghee TRO. 6.500 ccc ces cceccencensacvecsscucs , . NONE IN NENT piekiees sat Seman a ae a -* ° i a . sca cdhllili i ei NNAIM AD pill a alas K stein rane Horecnny oem Ay I BRIE 872 _ OCTOBER TERM, 1971 MarRsHALL, J., dissenting’ - ; 406 U.S. that today’s decision violates the spirit of conn’ as . _ well as the holding of -Rosado. Moreover, ‘in my view, § 402 (a}(7Z) tells the ‘States . “how ‘to compute eligibility, and that section does not allow for the Texas scheme. Despite the position of the Government in this case, I find support for my reading of § 402 (a) (7) in HEW’s own regulations, espe- *. _ cially 45 ‘CFR §§ 233.20 (a) (2), 233.20 (a) (3) (ii), which. indicate to me that income is to’ be subtracted from the standard‘of need before any determination is made as to -how much aid the State will give. . Because I believe the Texas system violates “g 402 (a) 7), it seems to me that eligible persons are being denied ‘aid in violation of § 402 (a)(10), which requires 1 that aid a be furnished to all eligible persons promptly: For me, _, this case is no different from King v. Smith, 392_U.-S. 309 (1968) (striking down substitute-father regulation). | -or Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971) (striking down restriction on receipt of aid by college students). .The state procedure denies eligible persons aid; and, re- gardless of the State’s. purposes, the procedure cannot -stand in conflict with the federal ‘statute. I disagree with the Court a third time. -E..The last portion ef the federal statute that. I be- lieve should -be considered is that portion dealing with” the social services that are available to AFDC recipients. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a) (14), (15) (assistance in family planning atid child-welfare services; assistance in-entering the work force and reducing the incidence of. ' births out of wedlock); 42 U..S. C. §§ 602 (a)(19), 632 _ (employment training programs) ; 42 U.S. C. § 1396a (a)” (10) (medical assistance): Congress keyed all of these provisions: to persons or familie& that were receiving aid. By limiting the number of such ‘persons and families. receiving vm Texas has also limited the valjability of | > _ JEFFERSON, ». HACKNEY - ‘MansHaut, J., dissenting “these social services. At least one other court has con- oe that — oo ie er: . Congress’s major concern. was the provision of aes counseling and rehabilitation services, work ‘ incentives, and family planning programs to reduce out-of-wedlock births, for all persons in the family, - in order to promote self-support and child develop-: - ment and to strengthen family life... By making those with marginal incomés-eligible for AFDC: by raising the standard of need, more persons would be eligible for such services, which Congré&s con- sidered vital to cut down in the long run the numbers - dependent on welfare. ” -(Citation omitted.) Lantp-. ton v. Bonin, 304 F. Supp., at 1389. We suggested’ the same thing in Rosado,.397 u. S., at . 413. While the Court recognizes that the Texas system deprives persons with an “unmet need” of an opportunity ' to utilize these services (n.-10) and thus relegates these persons to perpetual dependence on welfare, the realiza- tion is apparently a source of no concern. But it was a _ source of tremendous concern to Congress. The value of medical assistance alone to an average Texas AFDC fam- ily -is in the range of .$50-$60 per month.. Memoran- dum for the. United States as Amicus Curiae 7 n. 5. Since needy families are i more needy by Texas’ _ system, their ability- to @scape'the confines of the welfare rolls is substantially impaired: At thie same time, the goals of Congress as described in the’ preceding quota- tion are also impaired. There is no reason, nor any . justification, for reading the statute this way. Since‘I believe that. Congress intended that as many — needy persons ag possible be permitted to avail them- selves of the various services provided or improved in the 1968 amendments, I again disagree with .the conclusions of the Court. oe ee ee ee 2S i i 4 b ih Spe nie Babi i PAN Aine prudent geen 574° | +. OCTOBER TERM, 1971: Jf ‘MarsHALL, J., dissenting , _, 4060.8. j- / F. In concluding. my analysis of this aspect of Texas’ percentage-reduction system, I-add one final note. Thus far I have confin rv oga to examining fhe specific provisions of the A legislation. In. attempting to focus on each section individually in order to. determine its role in the statutory scheme, something of the general flavor of the overall legislation is undoubtedly lost. That flavor, it seems to me, is to’assist needy families to main- tain strong. family bonds and to assist needy individuals to realize.their potential as unique human beings by pro- ‘viding them with the basic necessities of life, along with incentives and training to encourage them to work to help themselves. The Texas system negates the salutary ‘aspects -of ‘the legislation by deterring. the needy from . working, by depriving the needy of social services, and _ by excluding some needy from any AFDC. aid. whatso- ever. There is no conceivable reason to permit Texas to’ subvert the. aims of Congress 3 in this way. | II sie also challenge ‘the percentage-reduction figure, itself. It is agreed that Texas has established an identical standard. of need for the four’ social welfare. ; progr that it administers—Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid 4o the Blind (AB), Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), and AFDC; But Texas pro- ' vides 100% of recognized need to the aged and 95% to the disabled and the blind, while it provides ortly 75% to AFDC recipients. It is this disparity to which appel- lants also object: é A. Appellants base their primary attack on the Four- feenth Amendment; they argue that the percentage dis- ctions between the other welfare programs and AFDC reflect a racially discriminatory motive on the’ part of Texas officials. Thus, they argue that there is a vjola- j | - tion of the Equal Protection Clause. I believe that it | JEFFERSON 9. HACKNEY: ~*~ \575 - 535 MarsHALL, J., dissenting _ _ 18 unnecessary to reack’ the: constitutidnal. issue that appellants raise, and, ‘therefore, I offer. no opinion on its | ultimate merits. I do wish to make it clear, however, '. that I do not subscribe in any way. to.the manner in- = issue as to distort. it. | _. BeAppellants also: challenge the. distinction bitwesn 4° programs ‘under Title VI of the. 1964 ‘Civil Rights Act, 42 U8. C. § 2000d: “No person in ‘the United Sta: “Chall, on the ground of race, color, or national-ori . be sub-. jected to. ‘discrimination under ary ‘program or _ activity. receiving Federal financial assistance.” Only last- Term in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. deem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that . operate as. ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority-; groups.” _& 424 (1971), we had occasion to strike down under Title VE of the 1964 Act, 42 U. S. C. $2000e, employment . practices that had a particularly harsh impact on ‘one _ minority racial group and that*cduld not be justified by - businkss necessity. We indicated in that case that “good . - . intent or absence of digeriminatory intent does not re- - _ in one, several, or all of the pro bet JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY = 57 535 | ¢ MarsHaut; J., dissenting 5 a: Id., at 432. We said, in. fact, that “ongresa directed | the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment — practices, not’simply -the motivation.” bid. {emphasis in original). That decision .even placed the burden on > the employer “of showing that any ‘giyen requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment an question.” bid. - used in Title VI cases... This is-a question of first im- pression in this Court, and I do not think we have to - reach it in this case. - I include this section only to nmake - plain that I do. not necessarily reject the argument made by. appellants; I simply do not reach it.- : . _ C. This brings me to what I believe disposes of the question presented : the disparity between the variousa \\ social welfare: programs is not permissible under the fed» _ eral statutory framework. % . The four social welfare programs offered by’ Texas are funded in part by the Federal Government. Each pro- a _ gram is governed by.a separate statute: OAA,42'U.S.C, ' $301 et seg.; AFDC, 42 U. S: C. $601 et seg.; AB, 42 U.S. C. § 1901 et seg.; APTD, 42 U.S. C. § 1351 et seq. . No State is compelled to participate in ahy-program, and - any State that wants to participate can choose to do. sO _ There is no. doubt that States are fr to choose hether | | or not to participate in these programs, and. it %¢_also' clear that each State has gonsiderable fréedom to allo-- . Cate what it wants to one or more programs by-estab-. ~ lishing different standards of need to compute eligibility ' forsaid. King v. Smith, 392 U. es at 318-319. It. also true, however, that the basic aims of the four grams are identical: Indeed, when Congress first enacted -_ pecgrame in 1935, it viewed them all as necessary to: - : o . . et QEM . — ™ "oe ' ar Bi aera Soe ep E -- $ “, . > ht is + _— cat oe ‘OCTQBER TERM, 1931. Ma , J. dissenting ~~ | 406 U. S| provide ‘aid to families unable to obtain income from private employment. The beneficiaries of: fhe various ‘programs shared the basic characteristics of need and. _ > dependence. H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,. » 3. While the programs as they now exist go well beyond — ’ merely furnishing financial. assistance as they did orig- inally, they still maintain similar goals. | a Moreover, all four _ programs were . ‘simultaneously . amendes | in 1956 to provide. for social and rehabilitative . services to enable all. needy individuals to attain? the maximym economic and personal independence of which they were capable. Each program now requires a State, to describe, in its plan for each social welfare program it . administers, the services it offers to accomplish this ob- jective. Seé 42 U.S. C. §§ 3Q2 (a) (11); 602 (a)(14);~ 1202 (a) (12); 1352 (a) (11). Congress has giveri the States authority to set different - standards of need for different programs. But where, ' as here, the State concludes:that the standard of need is — the same fer recipients of. aid under the four distinct statutes, it is my opinion that Congress required that the State treat all recipients equally with respect to actual aid. In other words, as I read the federal statutes, they are designed to accomplish the same objectives, albeit . for persons disadvantaged by different circumstances. States clearly have the freedom to make a bona fide determination that blind persons have a graater need than “ dependent: children, that adults have a higher standard — of need than children, that the aged have,more need {Kan the blind, ‘and sO forth. But, in this. case Sie seacihoy dashed -de- termination of neéd, and it determined that the need of all recipients was equal. In this circumstance, I find nothing in the federal statute to enable a State to favor oneagroup of ‘recipients by\satisfying more of its need, e* : « . _*® b . a. Pe ee eg JEFFERSON vHACKNEY 9-579 535 Mansiss, - disseating ie ene while. at ie same time denying. an equally. ‘great need of another group: The. purposes and objectives of the statutes are the same, those éligible for aid are suffering ‘ equally, and Congress intended that. once a State. chose — - to participate in the programs similarly —_— persons would be treated similarly. Everything in this record indicates that the recipients of the various forms jof aid .are identically: situated. Al- - though the District, ‘Court accepted the State’s conten- « tions that there are/differences between AFDC and other - recipients which warranted different treatment under the: - federal statutes, I find Gch of ‘the reasons offered totally -. unpersuasive. ~ First, Texas argues that, AFDC children can be em- ployed, whereas recipients of other, benefits. cannot be. Assuming arguendo that’ this ‘is true, it is an argument . that falls of its own weight. Whatever incomé the children earn is subtracted from need, or ‘it is excluded Y from consideration. under § 402% a) (8) to encourage self- , help. Thus, income is already, reflected in the computa- © tion of payments, or it is excluded in order that a specific legislative ggal may be furthered. Thus, income is irrele- vant in any explanation of the differences between the - pereentage reductions applied to the various programs: If should also be noted that a recipient’s income is also . taken into consideration in programs other than AFDC. See 42 U. 8..C. ‘8§ 302. (9)(10)4); ae (a) (8); 1352 (a) (8).° \ Second, the State maintains that AFDC families can secure help from legally responsible relatives niore easily than recipients under other programs.’ Assuming again — _ .for purposes of discussion that’ this. is true, it should be plain that any support from any relatives is subtracted _ from the State’s grant. . Moréover, appellants properly point out. that t recipients of aid in now- AFDC Programs *® ~——3 a OCTOBER TERM, 197i “ % MarsHALL, J., dissenting“ .-* . 406U.S. =“ nae @ source of aid ‘unavailable to AFD “ cipients—the federal old age insurance, 42 U. S. $201. et seq. ‘Thus, there is no substance % this argument.. _ Third, Texas points to the likelihood of future employ- - -ment: for AFDC. recipients, ‘a likelihood that it says is “nonexistent for older persons ‘and others who receive aid. _ Federal law provides that a State may only consider in- — come that: is currently. available in allocating funds. 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (ii). This contention is there- _ _ fore @rrelevant. ee \ The State makes nity two other arvunierite. One has - ‘already been rejected.. Texas urges that the purpgses of the federal programs differ, but the history belies. this. contention. “The other is that the numbers. of AFDC 7 recipients is rising and this program should therefore bear | -the burden of monetary limitations.. The obvious prob- © lem with this argument i is that one fundamental purpose of AFDC.-aid. is to enable people to escape the welfare H rolls. But, under the ‘Texas system, the aid is presently insufficient, people are unable to escape from-dependency, and the rolls-become larger. Had Texas not funded AFDC at a lower level-than other | programs, it is possible ‘that the number of recipients would not have grown so large. The State’s argument is a self-fulfilling prophecy © on which it ‘cannot rely to penalize AFDC recipients. | Furthermore, there is nothing in the federal legislation . to indicate that aid is to be reduced in a program ‘merely because the number of ber of beneki@jaries-of that program in- | -ereases at 4 tore rapid rapid rate than in other programs. On _ the contrary, Congress ‘has indicated that increased eli-. - Slit for AFDC is desirable, see 42 U: S. C. § 602 (a) (23); Rosado 'v. Wyman, supra. It. would be extreme |. jrony.if AFDC recipients were penalized by a State be- cause their numbers grew in accordance with congres-". ‘sional ‘intent. . is oe " JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY - eee eS 535. _ . , Marsuan, J,, dissenting - The sibel that I. draw from the. ieee: is that Congress intended equal treatment for all persons ‘simi- ‘larly situated.. Congress geft to the States the deter- “ mination of who was similarly situated by permitting _ ' States to determine levels of ‘need. Since Texas has . decided that AFDC ‘recipients have precisely the ;same . need as recipients of other social welfare benefits, it is my opinion, that the federal: legislation requires —_ , treatment for all. ‘This conclusion finds support i in ‘the legislative Duaory . of the 1950 amendments to the social welfare legislation. _ In those amendments Congress made clear its intent to put AFDC recipients on a&“par hone recipients of other | - welfare aid. . “Today niore tisdin 1.1 milliof children. under 18 : “years of age are receiving aid to dependent children - _ through ‘the Std¥e-Federal program bec: because one or . ¢ both of their parents,are dead;absent frot from the home, |: _.er-ineapacitated. - These children, regardless of ‘the | .Statein which they now live, will someday find their place in the productive activities of the Nation and, - should the necessity arise, will take part in defending , our Nation. Many of these children will be seriously handicapped as adults because in childhood they are hot receiving proper and sufficient. food, clothing, medical attention, and the other bare necessities of : | cat tite “The national interest requires that the Fed- _.. eral Government, provide for dependent children at least on a par with its contributions toward the - ‘ * support of the needy aged and.blind.” S. Doe. No. . 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.; 105 (emphasis added).. Congress recognized that’ “families with dependent chil- | dren need as much in assistance payments as do aged and blind Persons.” Id., at 106. It concluded. thats & oe i. Doe Paes ter inaa 1971 | * Manentin, J,, dissenting : 406 U. S. | ‘sound optional poliey was “for the States ~ genie “payments for aid to dependent children comparable to ° | those for the needy aged and blind.” Ibid, Itisevident . | that Congress rejected the notion that where AFDC re- 4 cipients had the same need as other welfare beneficiaries, ° 4 they should get:less. money. As Senator Bentori said on the floor of the Senate: . ‘ ate = i “There ‘seems no reasonable basis for rn? ‘in-- “equitable treatment of mmothers-anid- of children by the Federal Government. : | Prise seo redial know that it costs as dials _4 .--3f not more to rear children in health, ‘decency, and - self-respect than to.maintain an adult: It is surely no less important ta: make this investment: in our’ . future. citizens ‘than it “is. to provide decently for 4 those who have retired. eo” 96 Cong. ‘Rec. 8813- | In the 1956 ‘ghendrieits Corigress rearanal: the federal’ funding of AFDC so that its beneficiaries would receive treatment: equivalent to that received’ by beneficiaries of _ the other federal-state social welfare ‘legislation. Where - ‘the needs of the people receiving aid under the various - ' programs differed, Congress recognized that the anYéant ~ of aid forthcoming should also differ.’ But where need ~ was determined by the State to be equal for all recipients, - Congress intended that all should receive an equal amount - of aid. S. Doc: No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.,.108. There . is absolutely no indication in any subsequent | congres- sional action that ‘the intent of Congress has changed. ~*~ Avcordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the . _ Distriet Court-and remand. the case for formulation of relief consistent with this opinion. o --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386414_0021%3A7. Public record. Not legal advice.