# Appellees Brief — Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0376%3A07 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appellees Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1972 - **Citation:** 405 U.S. 538 ## Text StUnARY, ~SPREME COURT, UBL oO _ INTHE Supreme Court of the Unit No. 70-5058 "DOROTHY LYNCH, et al. _ ; _ Appellants, | 7 | on HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION, et al., | _ | Appellees. - AFFEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES ‘DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT. 3 REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS . . ‘DAVID M. LESSER . KENNETH R. KREILING WILLIAM H. CLENDENEN, Jr 265 Church Street # 808 New Haven, Connecticut 06510 Telephone: 203-787-5861 ALLEN SIMs ; 611 Congress Avenue ng Be New Haven, Connecticut - 06510 - _ Telephone: 203-777-4405. Attorneys for Appellants - (i) «isi. ° ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THIS COURT CORRECTLY NOTED PROBABLE -_ JURISDICTION PURSUANT. TO 28 U.S.C. §1253. : II. DEPUTY SHERIFFS, SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES ARE PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO, WHEN ENGAGED IN THE SERVICE OF PROCESS, ACT UNDER “COLOR OF STATE LAW........ ee eae III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED - JURISDICTION OF THE WAGE-EARNERS’ | : NOOMPEAINIS Sanders v. Dobbs House, 431 F.2d 1097 (Sth.Cir. 1970), 2... 14 : | Santingo.v. MéEEtoy, 319 F. Supp..284 (ED: Pa. 1970) ..... 7515 /. "‘Schackman v. Amnebergh, 387 hs) | ns ee — | ~ "Scott v. Young,"421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir, 1970) > ....... oe BP Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.91 (1945) .2.2..2.,.... 6,8 "Shapiro v. Solman, 396 US. $(1969) .2...... REN 49 Smith v; Board of Commissioners, ‘259 F, Supp. 423 et ~~ (D.D.C, 1966), affirmed, 380 F.2d 632 (DC. Cir, 1967) . -/ 2 ‘Soell v. Wynian, 393 US. ek Ce ee noe =: -Saiadach v. Family Finarice Corp., 37 Wis.2d 163, ee ee _ NW.2d 259 . (vii) | Page . A C27GOD oo vc et ge eh oe cee s need urease 0 40an0 85 “23 S274BS 6 os enters de cditedivsinssnese e-6o OBR aS 23 Books and Articles: _ Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1970 fo Report ...... errs MEEK S ea veavewsheseccedncs UW American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts .......6.0.00000 415 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (1961) ... Comment, The Three- -Judge District Court and — Review, 49 Va. L. Rev. 538 (1963)..:......2....00. a7 Comment, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 284 (1940) 7....... errs: 8 Note, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1939) .............. ..t.. 10 Note, Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings: A Re-Examination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. Chi. L.’Rev. 612 (1971)... eee eee eee eee eeee 2 4 Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. -1323 (1952) © ............0.00% poe te 8 -Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.F. 733 (1964) Pe eereee | Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction. (1965). .2..... geese O85 Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1969) t$¢iveneseg, Oe? ‘Miscellaneous: | . . | Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. ....: i ae we NS | ~. New York Times, May 14,1971 2. ...2.0...5..0..4. .. 16 1963 Connecticut Practice Book: 7 | WMA rng cd chs news ese eee sess hategee ee MM TC) Ty gees eels tele 24 §602.......... chee eee eer rere tr 24 $608A ...... etuebeeses ten rr” wom 6 S20 lenge dies ted cee ceas ct BD? §§751-756 . 2.6... Cr eee Form 532 2.0.02... cece eee eee y nsadaaennl 19 = .. INTHE Supreme Court of the United States No. 70-5058 DOROTHY LYNCH, et al., ; . ap Appellants, . HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION, bt al., Appellees. | . APPEAL FROM THE - UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ~ DISTRICT OF (CONNECTICUT REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 7 I __ THIS COURT CORRECTLY. NOTED PROBABLE JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. $1253 The Brief for Household Finance Corporation and Deputy Sheriff Friedler entirely misconceives this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $1253. The wage-earners’ appeal is properly before this Court since: (a) their cases were “required .. . to be heard and determined by a district court of three inden” 28 U.S.C. $1253; and (b). they appeal “from an order of a three-judge district court ‘granting or denying . . :an- interlocutory or permanent — 2) ‘Gunn v, Univeraiy Committee, 399 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1970). ' . Where these conditions are satisfied, this Court has $1253 © jurisdiction regardless of the grounds. upon which the three- * judge court’ s decision rests. E.g., direct review granted pur- ~ suant to $1253 where three-judge courts dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 | ‘ (1962); Abernathy v. Carpenter, 373 U.S. 241 (1963); Doud. v. Hodge, 350. U.S. 485 (1956); Florida Lime Growers vy. _ Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 85 (1960); direct review where - three-judge .court ‘dismissed on. ground relief barred by 28 U.S.C. $2283: Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (1968); ' abstention: Dombrowski y, Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); failure to exhaust | administrative remedies: Damico v. California, 389 U.S.:416 (1967). -(a) . Since the cases at Bar were required to be heard by a three-judge court, they are directly appealable pursuant to’ 28 U.S.C. 81253. The finance company’s argument, that . direct appealability depends upon “whether the order of “dismissal required the participation of three judges,” (Brief for Appellees, p. 8), was repudiated in ‘Florida Lime’ Growers v. Jacobsen, supra. There Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting but stating the view of the entire Court, explained: “I start with the proposition, as I understand the Court to do, that whether a case is one directly appealable * here under 28 U.S.C. -81253 depends upon the com- plaint, dnd not upon the result in the District Court. If three judges are required to hear the claims which are —_. then we have direct appellate jurisdic- tion....” 362 U.S. at 89." ' See, also, Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v: Epstein,.370 U.S. ; 713, 715 (1962); U.S. v. Georgia P.S.C., 371 U.S. 285, 287-288 (1963) _ (once. [the three-judge court is] convened, the case can be disposed of below or here on any ground, whether or not it would have justi- fied the calling of a three-judge court.”); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 US. 378, 393-94 (1932) (the jurisdiction of the three-judge court “extends: to every question ‘involved . . . and enables the court to rest - its judgment on the decision of such of the me spoamce as. in its. opinion effectively dispose of the case.”). , : mith et ok ae ae {continued |. e reyersed,-383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966), found the constitutional oe ue Bizarre and unprecedented results flow from the. finance company’s contention that direct appealability depends upon the result in the district court. For example, a three-judge court is unnecessary for.the determination of insubstantial. constitutional questions. Ex Parte .Poresky, 290.U.S. 30 (1933). Since the three-judge court in Harper v. Wirginia Board of Elections, 240 F.Supp. 270 (E.D. Va. 1964), issue indistinguishable from Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), an appeal pursuant to the finance company’s proposal*would lie only in the court of appeals. _. The three-judge court below held, assuming the existence 8 of subject-matter jurisdiction, alternatively that 28 U. S Cc. § 2283 barred an injunction. . That holding is reviewable _ pursuant to $1253; Cameron .v. Johnson, supra. The. ~ finance company’s argument must concede the propriety of . direct review: a single judge lacks authority. to determine whether § 2283 bars relief, in a case otherwise appropriate for a three-judge court. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. '_ v. Epstein, supra. (See Brief. for Appellees, p. 10:n.3). The finance company’s proposal-would thus require teview, by the court of appeals, of the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and, by this Court, of the dis- “ _ missal on the ground that § 2283 barred relief. The absurd- ity of such a result demonstrates the speciousness of the finance company’s contention. v3 Direct appealability depends, not lipon the result in elie district court, but upon this Court’s determination as to * “‘whether the three-judge courts in these cases were properly convened.” Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 99 (1967). ee On direct appeal, this Court has jurisdiction “over all grounds of .— attack against the statute.” Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, supra, 362 U.S. at 84. (emphasis in Original). The finance company’s cof- ' tention (Brief for Appellees, p. 29) that this Court may not review the district court’s denial of a declaratory judgment is thus erroneous. Samuels v. Mackell,.401 U.S. 66 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 US. 82, 89-90 (Stewart, J. or 4 “Thus, the correct determination of whether the action — _ should have been heard by three judges cbntrols the disposi- tion of the appeal—whether to the Supreme Court or the | Court of Appeals.” Comment, The Three-Judge District | Court and Appellate Review, 49 Va. L- Rey.” -538, 564 (1963) (emphasis added).? Alleging jurisdiction. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $1343(3), the wage-earners’ complaints sought to enjoin sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, and constables of the State _- of Connecticut’ from levying garnishments pursuant to Sec- tion 52-329 of the Connecticut General Statutes on grounds of its unconstitutionality (App. p. 10, 23-24, 37-38). These allegations meet the requirements for a three-judge court, * Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, siupra, includ- - ing the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. (See Brief — for Appellants, pp. 19-35). Since the three-judge court was properly convened, 28 U.S.C. §2281, a direct. appeal lies pursuant to-§ 1253. 7 (b) The wage-corniens’ complaints were heard by a three- judge court which denied their prayer for a permanent injunction. Holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2283 barred the injung- _ tive relief which the complaints requested (App. p. 10, 26), ‘the court entered judgment “denying all relief sought by o Plaintiffs and dismissing the complaints” (App. p.19): As conceded by. the finance company, “‘the three-judge court itself entered the order of dismissal” (Brief for Appellees, p. 8).?. ‘The finance company’s reliance on Mengelkoch v. ' Industrial Welfare Commission, 393.U.S. 83 (1969), . and Wilson v. City of Port Lavaca, 391 U.S. 352 (1968), is thus misplaced. Courts there held that the requisites of three- - 2See, e.g, Rorick v. Board of Commissioners, 307 U.S. 208 (1939); Jameson Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S, 171 (1939); Bailey v. Patterson, ‘369 US. 31 (1962); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, nich donne Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1968). | 3The three-judge court was designated by the Chief Judge of the: - United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (App. p. 17). In its judgment, the: district court identified itself as acthree-judge - court (App. p. 19. ; C:° General of the State of Co _under color: of law when perving process (Brief of the _ has: certain statutory “duties” in serving ‘protess, and in om judge court jurisdiction were lacking, and orders of dismissal } -were entered by single district judges.4 The finance company’ s ‘contention that: $1253 is unsatis- | fied, on the ground that no “*hearing”’. preceded the denial ofa permanent injunction (Brief for Appellees, p. 9), merits | "little comment. “While no- evidentiary: hearing was conr ducted—as the wage-earners observe in their Brief (pp. 1; 6, 9)—the district court “heard” the causes, as stated in its - _ judgment. (App. p.-19), pursuant to briefs in the Lynch and i: Toro gases and oral argument in the Toro case. ‘Since the wage-earners appealed from the. order ate properly convened three-judge court which denied, their prayer for a permanent injunction, this Court has jurisdic. | tion pursuant to a US. C. eee a : xe - DEPUTY SHERIFFS, SHERIFFS AND CON- STABLES ARE PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO, . WHEN ENGAGED IN THE SERVICE OF PRO- | CESS, ACT UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW. Deputy Sheriff Barrett’s srs , submitted. by the Afto ecticut, denies that he acts Appellee, Charles H: Barrett, Deputy Sheriff of New Haven County, pp. 6-9). Curiously, that Brief itself d€tails Con- necticut’s statutory scheme which regulates every facet of . deputy sheriff Barrett’s office.’ The sheriff, like his deputies, . 364 *This Court’ 's. decisions.£ in Wilson and Mengelkoch repudiate “the finance company’s assertion that “whether a single judge or three judges ordered dismissal does not matter” (Brief for Appellees, p. 8). Those cases illustrate the well-established Tule that no appeal lies to. this Court from the decision of a single: judge, even: where three judges are in fact required. Stratton v. St. Louis Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 15-16 * - -_ .(1930);Schackman'v. Amebergh, 387 U.S. 427 | (1967); Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Commission, No. 23,997, -._ F.2d (9th . Cir. 1971). — that —— court a dissolved aaone’ i . Te ~ ee oe -~ 6 . making oth service is “carrying out the routine functions of his office: ...”. (Brief of Deputy Shgriff Barrett, pp, 6, . 7). As Bart notes,. “service is gen@fally made by the. _ deputy sh (Brief, p. 6) who, with the sheriffs and con-” stables, is thus the State’s agent in effectuating its statutory policies relating to service of writs and garnishment process.‘ A sheriff, like his deputies, is an officer of the Executive branch of government. - Connecticut Constitution, Article | _ Fourth, Section 25 (1965)..He isa. - - “public official under trust from the state, which has ‘ invested him with a portion of its sovereign power to be exercised in- the interest of the public.” - Rogers v. Commissioners, 18 Conn. Supp. 401, 403 (1953), affirmed, 141 Conn. 426, 106 A.2d 1357 (1954).: The deputy sheriff performs | his duties “under color of: _ Office,” pursuant to “power given him by our statutes.” . Coite v. Lynes, 33 Conn. 109, 115, 113 (1865). All society has an interest in the diigecm performance of these duties, since’ : nd “It is the wise policy’ of the law that its process shall be directed to known public officers, and the law sanctions departure from this policy om in cases of supposed necessity.” : Kelley v. Kelley, 83 Cons. 274, 276; 76 A. 291, 292 : (1910). ‘ ~ Ani unbroken line of cases establishes that. a public officer acts under color of law when he performs duties authorized _by statute.. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S..91, 107-108, 111 (1945); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 - (1964);Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S: 471 (1970); Adickes 14 Stat. -27, and the Fourteenth Amendment. ok ae | Wate States v, Waddell, 1.12 U.S. 76, 80.(1884). ee — 8“Taxes beinggthe sole means by whiclht sovepeignties can maintain their existence,*“Bank of Commerce v. Tennegsee,. 161 U.S.. 134, 146 (1896), states have a fundamental interest in revenue collection. While ~ the “civil rights” which 88 1983 and 1343(3) protect, Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co supra, 176 U.S. at 72, included “property rights” (Brief for Appellants, p. 32 n. 21), a common view at the.time of Holt was that ‘political rights” were excluded, United States vy. Arizona, 91 ; _ S. Ct. 260,, 284-85 n. 15 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (“political % 10 over, these cases refused jurisdiction on th litigant was not deprived of a right “secured bf _ tution,” within the meaning of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3), unless * the Constitution “directly secured” the right to the individ- ual. Carter v. Gréenhow, 114 U:S. at. 322, 323;.Pleasants v. Green sr Bowman ¥..Chicago and North western Ry. Co., 115 US. 611; 615-16 (1885);:Note, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1138-9 (1939). Pursuant to this rationale Holt, ‘ rélying’ exclusively on Carter and Pleasants, held that fed- eral courts must refuse §1343(3) jurisdiction when state -. , “laws were alleged to deny equal protection « or to deprive ©~ A. individuals of their property without due process, 176 U.S. — a. at 72.. Compare, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875); United States v. Williams, supra, 341 U-S. -at 73, 77, overruled: United States v. Price, supra, 383 U.S. - + at 7197-98: Hague v. C1.O., 307 U.S..496 (1939) (opinion . of Roberts, J.); SlaughteP-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73-9 (1873).° In Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. at 171,- this Court overruled this narrow interpretation of 8§ 1983 and -1343(3), and held that rights under the entire Fourteenth _—_.. - Amendment were “securéd by the Constitution.” Agreeing : © © “with the Court, Mr. J ustice Frankfurter stated i in his dissent that §1983’s_- patties Se : of * “protection of ‘rights, privileges or immunities secured | by the Constitution’ encompasses what ‘dye process" of law’ and ‘the equal protection of the laws’ of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against action by the States.”” 365 U.S. at 205.'° Tights” are “rights arising, from governmental organization’ Giles v. - Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 497 (1903) (Harlan, J.,dissenting). A federal court’s refusal of § 1343(3) jurisdiction ip. a challenge. toa State’ s tax | 2 | law, at the time of Holt, could thus rest on the ground that only" : ' “political rights” were at issue. a | *By contrast, the test: for whether an action was one “arising under” the’ constitution and laws, within the meaning of 28 -U.S.C. § 1331, was far easier for a litigant to meet. —s v. New York, 115 . ‘US. 248, 257 (1885). : The ‘legislative history of the Act of 4871 domonsimntie that . 8 1983 and — — redress for any violation, by persons _ \ W. - a: Aiipelines? reliance on 1 Holt, Carter and ~—_ is thus -inapposite. io _ Congress enacted $§ 198 83 and 1343(3) in furtherance of its power. to enforce the ourteenth Amendment. Nothing in the language of those statutes suggests that Congress failed) — * fully to exercise its constitutional authority to remedy ee ' deprivations of life; liberty and property which: violate the LNG Fourteenth Amendment. The legislative history of $8 1983 and 1343(3) provides not the slightest basis for departing a from their plain meaning: If such a deviation is deemed _ desirable, however, Congress is the branch of. our govern- " ment which is empowered. so to decide. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 749. (1966); United States v. Price, * supra, 383 U.S. at 789, 806-807; Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 © "U.S. 409, 437 (1968); Griffin’ v. Breckenridge, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 1796 (1971). Courts, by contrast, “are not at liberty ‘to. seek ingenious analytical instruments,” | United States v. Price, supra, .383 U.S, at 801, or “filtering - mechanisms” (Brief for Appellees, p. 15), for denying to $8: 1983 and 1343(3) the interpretation which Congress most reasonably intended. ’ * ‘ ° » & ’ under color of state law, of the Fourteenth Amendment.. £.g., Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. 244 (message from President Grant);—______— 332-34 (Mr. Hoar); 369-70 (Mr. Monroe); 375-76 (Mr. Lowe); 429 | _ (Mr. Beatty); 448 (Mr. Butler); 459-61 (Mr. Coburn); 475-76 (Mr. . _. Dawes);. 482-83 (Mr. Wilson); 501 (Mr. Frelinghuysen); 568 (Mr. _,, Edmunds); 577 (Mr. Carpenter); “607 (Mr. Pool); §50-51 Ot Sum- . “Shellabarger); App. 81-85 (Mr. Bingham) App. .216 Or. Thurman); ° App.\ 310. (Mr. meeess - a £2 ; "ee 2 e | Allegations That a Public Official Has Deprived A . -Plaintiff of Fourteenth Amendment Rights Estab- lish Federal Jurisdiction Pursuant to’ (28 Uz S.C. § 1343 (3). e Despite some lower-court interpretations of Justice Stone’s - concurring opinion in Hague v. C.1.0., 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939), this Court has never adopted the “personal liberty— ‘property rights” test. ‘See, Monroe v. Pape, 365°U.S. at 171 and 205. In fact, recent decisions emphasize this Court's: dis- regard of the test. E.g., Java v. Department of Social Services, 91 S.Ct. 4347 (1971); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 402- “4 . 403, 422-23 (1970); Rinatdi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 (1966). l Repudiation of the.test wquid not, therefore, unsettle any e. . ' established doctrine. To the contrary, its express rejection: © .°-% would clarify the jurisdictional basis of this Court’s decisions 4 . which conflict with the test."?: foe Appellees’ argument that welfare benefits have a “special - §1343(3) status” (Brief for Appellees, p. 21) which is denied Wage-earners surely distorts the legal history of this past — ‘~decade, Until recently, courts held that the denial of welfare benefits; unlike the denial of more traditional property inter- ests, was not even n justiciable. E.g., Smith v. Board of Com- —— ___—"in- Bien'y: Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 566 n. 10 (2nd Cir: 1969), a Judge Friendly suggested that adherence to the “personal liberty- | -. property rights” formula would bar from the federal courts many -actions alleging the unconstitutionality. of a state’s welfare program.. This Court,, of course, has affirmed § 1343(3) jurisdiction of every _ welfare case which it has reviewed, even: when. the welfgre recipient claimed an unconstitutional denial of only three to fur dollars monthly of her “property.” Rosado v: Wyman, 397 U.S. $97, 402- oe 403, 422-23 €1970); Wyman v. Rothstein, 398 U.S. OPO} Vacat- ing and remanding, 303-F- Supp: ‘D. N.Y. 1969); Wyman v. ~\ Boddie, 91 S.Ct. 2168 (1971); affirming, 434 F.2d 1207: (2nd Cir. ~~ 1970); Wyman v. Rosado, 9% S.Ct. 2169 (1971), affirming, 437 F.2d . 619 (2nd Cir. 1970).. See, also, Damico v. California, 385 U.S. 416 "4(1967); Snell v. Wyman, 393 US. 323 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n. 3 (1968);Shapiro-v;Solman, 396 US. 5 (1969), affirming, . 300 F Supp 409 (DB. Conn. 1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254. (1970); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US. 471 (1970); Lewis v Marhis 397. US. 552 iia aren neat ante mec &* . 43 . a rea missioners, 259 F. Suse. 423 (D. D.C. 1966), affirmed, 380. F.2d 632. (D.C. Cir.: 1967). See, generally, Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964). This Court has now atcepted the designation of welfare benefits as “property,” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U:S. 254,262 n.8 (1970); Graham y. Richardson, 91 §.Ct. 1848, 1853 (1971), and has affirmed jurisdiction of all constitutionally-based challenges to: public _ welfare programs. Supra, note.11.. However, this Court has rejected the contention that welfare benefits enjoy a specially - privileged constitutional position distinct from other types of - property. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1930). It would be anomalous indeed if the working poor were now . for the Acts of Re denied access to the federal courts for the ‘defense of their property on the ground that welfare recipients atioy a pecu- liarly favored § 1343(3) status. !?_ Ned ye ; “If anything, the historical he el indicates a eine con- © gressional regard for the working poor. An seeking support anstruction, political advocates frequently ‘minimized distinctiéns between white working men and the recently emancip ed.Negroes. The e Fourteenth-Amiendment : was essential to ‘secure-the rights of b both. Senator — Wilson of | Massachusetts explained: ’ “We have advocated the rights of the. black man, because the black man was the most oppressed type Bees seek to distinguish the welfare cases from the cases at’ . Bar by arguing that welfare benefits are “dispensed as the result. of a legislative determination that, without:such assistance, welfare recipi- - ents cannot exerci tal constitutional rights” (Brief - —for Appellees, p. 21). However, appellees cite no such legislative determination in support of this assertion. Nor do they refer to. any decision of this Court expressing this rationale as the ground for’ . - accepting jurisdiction: in welfare cases. A three to four dollar monthly _ benefit loss, which has been the subject of some welfare litigation, can hardly be said to. directly affect the exercise of constitutional rights. See, note 11, supra. That welfare: benefits have their origin . in a “legislative determination” is not unusual. The Framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments made a “legislative determination” ___ that property is essential to the exercise of constitutional rights (Brief ~ for Appellants, p. 32 n. 21). 14 of the toiling men of this country.... The man who. is the enemy of the black laboring man is the enemy _ Of the white laboring man.the world over. The same "influences that go to keep down and:crush down the . =e rights of the poor black man. bear down and oppress the poor white laboring man.” Stampp, The, Era of, Reconstruction, 102 (1965). See, also, Brief for Appellants, p. 24; Corfield v. Coryell, 6 “Fed. Cas. $46, 551 (C.C. Pa. 1823). Section. 1331 would. hardly be rendered: “virtually mean- | ‘ingless” (Brief of Deputy Sheriff. Barrett, p. 12) by repudiation - a of the “personal liberty—property rights” .test. -E.g:;Bivens © -v, Six Unknown Named ,Agents, 91 Set 1999 (1971).. ; - Clearly, Congress never er intended“that $1331 should bar. fed- eral: courts ts from-entertaining suits which are plainly authorized, __without regard to amount in controversy, by another juris- ~ _ diction-conferring statute... E.g., 28 U.S.C. $8 1337, 1338: ". . Ames v. Hager, 36 Fed. Rep. 129 (C. C. Cal. 1888). Compare, Sanders v. Dobbs House, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (Sth Cir. 1970); Scott v. Young, 421’ F.2d: 143 (4th Cir. 1970) (Scope of 42 - USE. § 1981 undiminished by enactment, of Civil Rights . Act of 1964). See, also, United States v. Jackson, 302 US. 628 (1938); Brief for Appellants, pp. 33-35, 20 n. “V1. Nor wo express rejection of the ‘ “personal liberty: “ property sae test unduly overburden the federal courts. ~ - - Cases challenging’ the constitutionality of ‘state tax laws would continue. to be barred by 28 U.S.C. $1341 (Brief for | _ Appellants, pp: 33-34 n..22).. Indeed, many of the cases which appelkes cite, purportedly to. demonstrate. the vitality — of the test, are such tax cases (see Brief for Deputy Sheriff : . Barrett, p. 14; Brief for ‘Appellees, pp. 16-17).- Since this . : ~ Court hag not adopted: the test; see note 11, supra, a “flood” of cases will not result from its express rejection. . ‘Additionally, some cases in which § 1343(3) jurisdiction has — > been refused must be entertained by the federal courts under | other jurisdictional statutes. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 566-67 aca Cir. 1969). Finally, the inherentsuncer- _— wa ical . . oO. = Sate Potminialiae’ tend NON NANG tid Se eee Ss oS a 1S. ail ‘The finance company’s contention, that federal district - a « tainty: of the “personal liberty-property rights” test has ite" ; . self engendered much needless litigation (Brief for Appellants, ‘pp. 22-27),!3 apa : courts are “overburdened-by the claims of civil rights liti- - _ _" gants” (Brief for Appellees, p. 23), is uninformed.’ Although litigation—involving federal civil rights is increasing, such : _ _actions comprised only 4.6% of the. suits instituted ift dis- trict courts during fiscal year 1970. Administrative Office of the United States-Courts, 1970 Report, p.‘II-31. This figure equals the number of labor relations cases filed, and~ is one-fourth the number of prisoner petitions, By contrast, 19.6% involved: actions on contracts. “10.7% of all cases filed. in.the district courts involved motor vehicle torts, lack- ing any. federal coloration other than the parties’ diverse - _ citizenship. ‘Jd. ‘If federal courts ate carrying an excessive . _ workload, the’ remedy surely does not lie in limiting .federal - civil rights actions. . Indeed, recent proposals havé urged that the‘district courts should entertain all cases involving . cues of federal law, regardless of jurisdictional amount: erican Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdic- tion between State and Federal Courts, 24-5, 172-16 (4969). "'3Compare, McGuire v. Sadler, 337 F.2d 902'(Sth Cir. 1964) - (8 1343(3) jurisdiction in suit to rescind and enjoin sale of public’ land), with, McManigal v.. Simon, 382, F.2d: 408 (7th Cir. 1967) (no 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (§ 1343(3) jurisdiction to determine whether dis- §1343(3) jurisdiction over dispute whether corporation should donate em law library to county}: Compare, Santiago v..McElroy, 319°F. Supp... -tress seizures of property by constables violated due process), with, Howard v. Higgins, 379 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1967) (no § 1343(3) jur- isdiction where sheriff allegedly took $500 of prisoner's property). . to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can-be granted.” Joe Louis . Milk Co. v. Hershey; 243 F. Supp. 351, 354-55 (N.D, Ill.'1965). E.g; Love v. Navarro, 262 F. Supp. 520, 522 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (8 1343(3) jursidiction over controversy as to construction of road; complaint dismissed for failure to state claim’upon which relief could be granted). o ‘ _ “Experience teaches that the wiser and better practice is for. the court — 16 C. Since Summary. Garnishment of. Wage-Edriens’ oe Accounts -Unconstitutionally Deprives Them: of | : Significant Personal Liberties, the District Court’ Erred. in. Refusing Jurisdiction — Pursuant: to 28 U.S.C. 8 1343(3). ee The wage-earners’ Brief demonstrates that summary gar: nishment unconstitutionally deprives wage-earners of signi- = | ficant personal liberties: (Brief for, Appellants, pp. 22-27).. If this Court upholds the “personal liberty-property: rights” test, therefore, the district court nonetheless erred in \ refus- | ing jurisdittion. : Prejudgment garnishment niannety deprives wage-earners , of the means to subsist, impedes their access to courts of law for’ the resolution of controversies, damages their repu- : tations, creates the possibility of criminal prosecution, and - impairs their ability to contract for the purchase of family “Necessities and to earn a living (Brief for Appellants, pp. 22+, : 27, 13-18). As the Rev. Theddore M. Hesburgh, Chairman. a _of the United States Commission on Civil Rights; recently ° stated, civil rights are ““mere shadows” unless the economic rights of the underprivileged are secured, New York Times, “May 14, 1971, p. 32. Surely’ summary garnishment effects : a serious denial of personal liberty. See, Osmond ». Spence, 39 L.W. 2660 (D. Del. 1971) (three-judge court). The garnishment of these. wage-earners’ acconets wreaks - exactly the same havoc upon the working poor as in Sniadach _v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). There _ this Court.recognized that summary garnishment “may asa practical: matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall.” _ Id. at. 341-42. ‘Fhe only possible difference between the ‘= plights of these wage-earners and Christine Sniadach is that =~. « ~ the latter’s garnishee was her employer. e This distinction _ is surely without significance: Capsth ae fee" ~ “Indeed, as the finance company’s brief states; Mrs. ‘trates ‘gar- 7 nishee was “a credit union maintained by Mrs: Lynch’s employer” | ‘(Brief for. Appellees, p.'2). Like Christine Sniadach, these wage- a __ earners relied upon their garnished wages: ‘to meet the common neces- a & = ‘sariés of ned . “(The] mati requiremienstot i process is} that 2 an -individual\ be given“an opportunity for a hearing _ before he-is deprived of: any: significant property: 7 interest, except for extraordinary situations where: tes some! yalid governmental interest is at stake: that -4Fustifies postponing the hearing until after the event. . --Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). aK, _— . ~~ wg in Sniadach, the summary garnishment of wage-earners’ ; accounts may force working persons to abandon defenses and : settle cases without any judicial mediation.. (Brief for Appel- _lants, pp. 13-15,-14 n. 6). In order to exercise his right to a ‘erty which is necessary for subsistense. Compare, Goldberg _ ¥. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at;264. Atccess to the courts, and—, the availability of fair procedu S, are ‘of profound import* : ance in our society’s hierarchy of values. Joint. An ti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. -McGragh, 341 U. S. 123, 171-72 - _ -s . (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); United Transportation i... Union v. Michigan Bar, 91 S. Ct. 1076 (1971).. Their denial 7 a” v, Connecticut, sma 401 U.S, at 3745. 2 8 U. S. C. $2283 Is’ NOT A BAR TO RELIER.. A. ‘Appellees’ Assertion, that Summary Garnishment iv . Appellees have urged this Court te rule that ‘summary : pxsiehebnt | is-a “proceeding in a State court,” within the — meaning. of 28 U.S.C. §2283¢: They rely primarily upon Hill v. Martin, 296 US. 393 (19 5). Appellees made an identical ‘argument to the three-judge court which, in failing even to — _ cite Hill, apparently deemed it inapposite. Indeed, the three- || judge court did: not hold that summary garnishment isa _ state court proceeding. The court recognized that. “no - court’ order i is required” to an a eee account d “| ° ae me ‘ ob a2 day in court, the alleged debtor must forego the use of prop- ia - constitutes the d¢privation of a fundamental liberty. Boddie: pi _ A Proceeding in a State Court, Is Erroneous 7 Sse | 18 (App. p. 23 n. 2).'$ As the wage-earners explain (Brief for Appellants, pp. 13-18, 35-38), garnishment in Connecticut occurs “before and without any judicial proceeding,” Coffin - Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1921), and ‘remains fully — -effective without any “actions by the Court [or] by its ministerial officers.” Hiil v. Martin, supra, 296 U.S. at 403 (see Brief for Appellants, p. 37 n. 24).'> Summary garrjishments are thus not ‘peccsadiogs in the. - _* Connecticut courts: Moreover, the wage-earners in this appeal. have no possibility of instituting ‘proceedings which - _ would lead to. reduction: or release of their garnishments. a The finance company concedes that “state courts may have ~ > no: power to. release good faith garnishments except to the : extent that they . are excessive” (Brief for Appellees, p. 36). s However, state courts 4re barred from: releasing even a gar- - itishment-which is levied as an abuse of process, ‘Csakany y. Fakacs, 143 Conn 485, 128 A.2d 764 (1956), upon exempt . . property. Potter Sa ppleby,,” 136 Conn. 641, 73 A.2d 819 -(1950). _ The court: has no-authority to. ‘inquire into. the ' probable validity of the creditor’s claim; or whether special _ “circumstances warrant provisional security for an alleged : creditor. Sachs v. Nussenbaum, 92 Conn. 682, 689, 104 A. .° 393, 395 (1918). As the District Court of’ Connecticut recently explained: : ; n. 'S Appellees do not claim that the three-judge court held summary garnishment to be @ proceeding: in a state court. Nor do appellees — * refute the wage-earners’ demonstration that, under Connecticut law, , _ garnishment is levied prior to institution of the in personam suit, , (Brief for Appellants, p.,36); that gatftishment may occur nearly two months before a creditor must docket his suit in the state court; and - oo. that distraught debtors may thus be forced to abandon their defenses and settle cases without any judicial mediation (Brief for oe pp. 14, 17 n. 8, 18 n. 9). -_ "© Hill ruled, in: circunistances wholly inipeiuhts to the cases at é Bar, that §2283 prohibited federat courts from enjoining collection of a. judgment rendered pursuant to lengthy state court proceedings. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.‘Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970); Pe ~ Toucey v. New Been tegen Ce oe 118, (136.(1941). ik a . = eee “Prior to - termination ‘ot the litigation, an. n attach? _ ment may be reduced or dissolved only upon a show- - - ing that the attachment. is excessive, §52-302, or _ upon substitution of a bond with surety, § 52-304,” Black Watch Farms v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 101- | 2 (D. Conn. 1971) (emphasis added).: 3 | Since the-garnishments in the cases at Bar are not. excessive within the meaning of § 52-302, and since the wage-earners — cannot afford a bond, they have no grounds for invoking - ' the state Court’s jurisdiction. a7 (See Brief for Appellants, - pp. 13-18). The. appellate division ‘of Connecticut’ s- circuit court; where the in personam actions against Mrs. Lynch. and | Mrs. Toro are pending, ‘has unequivocally ruled that. the ‘circuit court lacks authority to dissolve a garnishment on the ground that it was levied unconstitutionally; and that the refusal to dissolve a garnishment on grounds of uncon- stitutionality is not appealable. Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d a (1969) (Brief for ‘Apogiants, pp. 15- 16). ; Where no court order is necessary to freeze a ‘wage-carner’s: assets from the date of levy until final disposition of the suit,» and where an alleged debtor may not institute state Court proceedings with respect to summarily-levied garnishments, a Connecticut garnishment can hardly be deemed a ““pro- ceeding in a State court.” '® 17In order to chllenge an excessive garpishment, or to substitiite a bond, the alleged debtor must commence 4 proceeding distinct from the - creditor’s suit, Sachs v. Nussenbaum, supra, by serving process upon the - officer who attached or garnished his property, and upon the creditor or his attorney. Conn. Gen. Stats! 8§.52-301, sh 306; 1963 Connecti- cut Practice Book, Forms $32, 534. 4 '8Connecticut appears to be the only state wean an naeey -_ for an alleged creditor to. garnish or attach property without any _ attion by a judge- ~or clerk of court. Other states require the writ to be issued by a judge or clerk of court. E.g., Hawaii Stat. §651-3, 652-2, 633-1; Idaho Code § 8-502; Mass. Laws C. 223 8816, 30, 42, 'C. 246; Mont. Rev. Code § 93-4302. See, also, N.H. Laws §509. 7, oe EX Ve re re: 3 6 5 ae 20 B. The Record in. This Appeal Fails To Support Appellees’ Contention that 28-U.S.C. § 2283 Barred the Award: of Any Relief. ® - Appéllees ‘Wholly ignore the wage-earners’ argument that no evidence in the récord justified the district court’s con- clusion that enjoining summary garnishments would ‘ ‘sub- stantially interfere” with state court proceedings (Brief for _ Appellants, ‘pp. 40-42):. More than fifty years ago, the _ Connecticut. Supreme Court held that the “‘progress of the ~ pending suit . .. was not concerned with or in any way affected by” the dissolution of.a garnishment.” Sachs v. Nussénbaum, supra, 92 Conn. at 686, 104 A. at 394. Appelites’ argument that no plaintiff or defendant class _. Can be defined’ should properly: be made to the district . - court an remand, at a hearing pursuant to Federal Rule 23(c). ty Similarly, this Court carmot affirm, on a barren. seq. (writ must bear the seal of court, test of justice of the court, and facsimile of clerk’s signature.) As a condition to issuance of the writ, the alleged creditor must generally post a bond, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1524; Calif. Code of Civil Proc. §539; Wis. Laws .§ 266.06; New York C.P.L.R. 6212; and must frequently demonstrate the exist- “ence of special circumstances requiring his protection by an. attach- ment or garnishment, é.g., Minn. Stat. 571.41; New York C.P.L.R. . » $6201; Ga. Code 8 8-101, 8-501; Vt. Rules Civil Proc. .§§ 4.1, 4.2; -, Ala. Code, Title 7, 38 846-47. 9 As the wage-earners. explain (Brief for cameras p. 40 and n. . 26), the district court’s erroneous jurisdictional ruling was its exclu- sive reason for stating that no. plaintiff class could be’ defined. The definition of the class in the complaints (App. p. 6, 34) is sufficient to satisfy Rule 23. Swarb, v. Leriméx, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D: Pa. 1970); Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 39:1 F.2d 555,561-63 (2nd Cir. . 1968); Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1969); 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure.(1961), 1969 Pocket Parts, pp. 77-78. See, also, Vasquez v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. : ae. . 796, 484 P.2d 964 (Supreme Court, 1971). Appellees’ arguments as to the alleged lack of definition of the defendant class are similarly groundless. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 330-31 (M.D.-Ala. 1966), affirmed, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). Deputy sheriffs adéquately represent the class of process servers. See note 5, supra, and a text. Not only is : the class of. 21 - record, the district court’s denial of future injunctive relief. - _ The, record indicates that persons claiming to be. creditors ‘of the wage-earners may sye them , exposing them to the . “9 risk of summary garnishment ‘prior to. suit (App. p. 44, 46- - 47). On remarid, counsel for the wage-earners are prepared — to move for the intervention of other persons who similarly — -may be sued in the Connecticut, courts: A hearing in the. district court will demonstrate that irreparable harm will occur to these persons absent injunctive relief, since garnish- . ments are a major cause of personal bankruptcies, particularly * _ in a period of recession; that Household Finance Corpora- . tion and other major Connecticut creditors routinely garnish. . the scarce assets of their alleged debtors prior to suing them; and that the pressure of garnishment forces alleged. debtors. to. settle cases without any opportunity for a judicial deter- . mination of the validity of creditors’ claims. — v. Family Finance Corp., supra. *° , Finally, appellees’ argument that §2283 bars the award . Of declaratory as well as injunctive relief ignores. the plain language of $2283 and the historical context in which $2283 - ' -was.enacted. See, Note, Federal ‘Court Stays of State-Court Proceedings: A Re-Examinatio#® of Original Congressional - BB ~ Intent, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 612 (1971). See, also, Samuels v. Mackell, supra, Perez v. Ledesma, supra (opinion of Bren- ~ nan, J.). Defendants clearly identifiable, bate their financial sakes in ‘serving writs ensures that they will vigorously defend 0 eras of Conn. Gen. Stat. $52- 329. 7 Since Mrs. Toro is entitled to o future injunctive relief, her case is not moot. The district court, it may be noted, did not hold that Mrs: Toro’s complaint should be dismissed on grounds of mootness (App. . p. 22 n. 1): Mrs. Toro’s complai t also requested that the garnished funds be returned to her “without > (App. p. 38). She has not ‘ been reimbursed the $10.00 “ea expenses” which her account was charged as the result of the gar nt (App. pp. 42,43). A?) «aye ‘NO STATE COURT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO CONNECTICUT WAGE- EARNERS Household Finance Corporation and Deputy Sheriff. | Friedler contend. that state court remedies. are adequate for ‘contesting the constitutionality of summary garnishments (Brief for Appellees, pp. 35-38). This argument, which the - | Attorney General of Connecticut has not advanced on behalf: of ee! Sheriff Barrett, is wholly speculative and ‘unfounded. 7 ‘3 Michael 's Jewelers v. Handy, supra, forecloses a constitu- Z | tional challenge to summary garnishment in, Connecticut's circuit court. The finance company states that the decision in Michael’s Jewelers “was apparently not appealed further” (Brief for Appellees, p. 37). However, no appeal lies. as of right to the Connecticut Supreme Court from thé appellate - division of the circuit court. The. Supreme Court reviews a judgment of the appellate division only when the latter cer- _ -tifies that a substantial issue of law warrants the Supreme - _ Court’s consideration; ‘or where the Supreme Court itself decides, in its discretion, that review is warranted. 1963 Connecticut Practice Book 8740-742. In Michael’s Jewelers. Dy, Handy, the appellate division failed to certify the exist- ence. of a substantial issue of law. See 1963 Connecticut Practice. Book 8751-756. Although the alleged debtor in Michael's Jewelers filed a petition for certification -in. the - Connecticut Supreme Court, the petition Was never acted upon sirice the creditor withdrew the underlying in personam 7 action (see Brief of appellants in reply to appellees’ Motion to Affirm and Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, at p. 2 n, 3). ' The court of common pleas and the superior court are, like the appellate division, bound by the Connecti¢ut Supreme Court’s decisions. Those decisions bar courts from dissolving _ or reducinga garnishment except where explicitly authorized by statute (Brief for Appéllants, pp. 14-16). The finance company has offered no authority for the proposition that a “more .apt to deviate from those decisions than was | ‘the "Lane y. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Monroe v. Pape, 365 facts that Wisconsin. courts possess the power, denied to ‘Connecticut courts, to dismiss a garnishment where abuses ——— - come to the ceurt’ ‘s-attention-Sniadach v._ Family Finance - Corp., 37 Wis.2d 163, 173-4, 154 N.W.2d 259, 265 (1967), courts from dissolving a garnishment on grounds of uncon- in Sniadach); and that the refusal to dissolve a garnishment _, persons from redress in its courts. Unless the party appeal- — dollar entry fee, a fifty dollar record fee, and gives security 23 - the court of common n pied’ paula superior court are any appellate division in Michael’ s Jewelers. Aas The Connecticut Supreme Couft is the only state forum . offering the bare possibility that wage-earners might receive a full hearing as to the constitutionality of prejudgment garnishment. But this Court has never required litigants— particularly indigent litigants—to exhaust all state remedies, no matter how time-consuming or speculative, as.a condition of vindicating their federal constitutional rights in a federal forum. E.g., Local Loan Co. v, Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 (1934); U.S. 167:(1961); Wisconsin» Constantineau, 400 U.S. #39: (1971). Despite these obvious barriers to redress; tite finance com- pany chides the wage-earners for not resorting to the state courts:as Christine Sniadach did in Wisconsin (Brief for - Appellees, pp: 37-8). The finance company neglects the reversed on other grounds, 395 U.S: 337 (1969); that no prior decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court barred lower stitutionality (see memorandum of decision of Wisconsin circuit court; pp. 37, 39 of Appendix filed with this Court | in Wisconsin is, unlike Connecticut, appealable. . Mahrie v. Engle, 261. Wis. 485,-53 N.W.2d. 176 (1952); memorandum of decision of Wisconsin: circuit court, supra; Wis. Laws §§ 274.09,. 274. 33. oo The finance company utterly i ignores the pibsaiaitial | mone-_ tary barriers which Connecticut has erected to bar indigent ing to the Connecticut Supreme Court pays a forty-five ‘ ° : s iS oo in. the 1 amount of $150. 00, “the appealshall be void and of - ~ no effect,” 1963 Connecticut Practice Book $602: Conn. . Gen. Stats. 8852-259, 52-269. Costs of transcripts must also -..: ~ be paid. 1963 ‘Connecticut Practice Book § 608A. ; _A party seeking redress in the superior ‘court must pay an _ entry fee of forty-five dollars; in the court of.commen pleas, . _ the fee is thirty dollars. Conn. Gen. Stats. ¥52-259. Trial ~ fees and costs, which the’ ‘legislature has now increased, are ‘ substantial. Conn. Gen. Stat. 852-257, as amended, P-A. 302. ° |. (effective October 1,.1971). Neither of these courts may _ rendé#:a declaratory judgment -unless, as a jurisdictional . requirement, “‘all persons having an interest in the subject “matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof.” 1963 Connecticut Practice Book, _ $309(d). The prohibitive cost of serving process upon such "persons or of: notifying them, National Transportation Co. _v.. Toquet, - 123 Conn. 468, 481-5, 496 A..344, 349-51. _ (4937), renders a “declaratory action a will-o’-the ‘wisp to- low-income wage earners.2* Wisconsin, where Christine Sniadach litigated her claims, requires relatively low entry fees, e.g., Wis. Laws § 271. 21, 251.90,.and permits indigent persons tc to proceed in forma pauperis. Wis. Laws 8 271.29. - ; 21The circuit court is prohibited from rendering. a’ declaratory _ ‘judgment. Conn..Gen. Stat. §52-29. In order to transfer a declara- _ tory action from the cireuit court to’the court of common pleas or _ Superior court, as suggested by the finance company (Brief for ' ~- Appellees, p. 37), a thirty dollar fee must be paid to the clerk of the circuit court. Additionally, the usual entry fee must be. paid ‘to the clerk-of the superior court or common: aa court. Conn. Gen. Stat. ae Gy» ne . - .21963 Cove Phactics Book §28A A (effective Seladie 1, 1974), establishes the procedure to’ be. followed where a plaintiff claims a fight. to proceed in forma pauperis. See, Boddie v. Connecticut, supra. On July 8, 1971, Governor Meskill of Connecticut vetoed Public Act No. 714, “An’ Act Conicerning Waiver of Court Fees and Costs + Payable . to Indigent Persons.” His veto message stated: “In my opinion this legislation gives greater latitude to the court | to waive payment of costs and fees and expenses of services ~ ° than is required by the most recent Supreme Court decision. “In Connecticut, therefore, no remedies are available for - _. challenging the constitutionality of summarily-levied garnish- ment@ . Where the alleged debtor is indigent, the finance . company’s contention that such remedies exist is frivolous. e re .¢ Fe : CONCLUSION } The district court had jurisdiction over the \igewenast complaints. Neither injunctive, declaratory, ‘nor future injunctive relief was barred by 28-U:S.C. 82283. This Court, __‘ pursuant to 28 U-S-C. $1253, — reverse the judgment 7 \ _-of the district court. Respectfully submitted, S* 4 tat lo ® | David M. Lesser ; “ oe = - William. H. Clendenen, Jr. ‘ Kenneth R. Kreiling - S 265 Church Street #808 - New oem apo mart satctli 06510 203-787-5861 “Allen Sims 611 Congress Avenue New Haven, Connecticut 065 19 BD 203-777-4405 or nen id ._ | te Attorneys for Appellants Se “I would prefer to be limited by the opinion of the Supreme ‘Court. concerning the right of an — to — without 7 - the payment of fees.”: : . Letter of Goverhor Thomas Meskill to Hon: Gloria Schaffer, Secretary of the State. | | ° ‘ . ; . » @ . . ° ‘ x « P Aw SE : . hi ? - : : a , a > a Sa ae See eee Pate GR a a eg RR: " < pmreeeey — a oat cial = : ; - e . --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0376%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.