# Motion for Leave — Trbovich v. Mine Workers

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion for Leave
- **Published:** January 1, 1972
- **Citation:** 404 U.S. 528

## Text

47

MOTION FILED

“7 4
i 3

~-
~

Now )

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States 7 ,

Oc TOBER Term, 1971

No. 71-119

—j>__

James Day Hopesoy, Secretary of Labor,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
—and—
Mike TrBOVICH (Proposed Intervenor),

* Petitioner,

4
Unirep Mine Workers OF AMERICA,

| Defendant- Resaondent.

-

mas

MOTION F OR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF AND BRIEF ~

on ” AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
AMICUS CURIAE

Metvin L. WuLr

SanForp Jay Rosen
American Civil Liberties Union }
156 Fifth Avenue '
New York, New York 10010
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

ive

INDEX

| | ‘PAGE
Motion for Leave to File Brief of American Civil
Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae eee 1

Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus

CUTIAE naan = aa en eee 5
Interest of Amicus Curiae ... So eteSaeeesvneease tees 5
Question Presented ae Sueepeceeaen cere 5
Statement of the Case sevttnceceetensseeeeeneeeentnanecenttneeeeeetnqeet 6
ARGUMENT

II. Title IV should be interpreted to allow inter-
._ vention in appropriate cases, such as the present
BS eee eee Neale occas 11

CONCLUSION’ ooo.ceecececceeseeceeenee. Ste ecstatic a

. TaBLE oF AUTHORITIES
Cases: | a

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,

Ine. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 oe 15
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 8, 9, 10
' Cascade-National Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Corp., 386 U.S. 129 satin oebeateasisinvece ented ice. 1D
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 91 S. Ct.
oC LL Ee ea ee: 9
Common Cause v. Democratic National Committeé,
D. Ct. D.C. Civ. Action 61-71 (1971) 15

| Formulabs, Ine. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th |
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 945 11

PAGE

Hodgson v. Steelworkers, Local 6749, 91 S. Ct. 1841 ..: 16
International Union, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 ....15, 16
Office of Communication, United Chureh of Christ vy,

FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 0200... a 15
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Erie Avenue Warehouse Co.,
. 802 F.2d 843 (3rd Cir. 1962) one cece eeeeealeeceeeeeeeee 11
Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 ool cceceeeeee nee 11-

Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258°F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 9
Shultz v. United Steelworkers of America, 312 F. Supp.

538 (W.D. Pa. 1970) occ cece ceecceecceeccoeeceeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeee 10
Wirtz v. Local 153, = Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389
, _US. 463" ae ee en Se ne ee See 16

Constitutional Provisions:

United States Constitution

Article TID oo.c.ccecccccccceiccccccoccccecccccccececceccceceesteeccceeeeeeceee 14
Fifth Amendment 000.002.0000... .ece cece cece cece ececeeeeeeeceeeeceee 14
Rule: |
i) 181 Ae 1, eo ns re 25,141, 1517
Statutes: .

29 U.S.C. §431 (Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, Title IT, $201) 20002... a7
29 U.S.C. §§482-483 (Labor-Management Reporting »
and Disclosure Act of 1959, Title TV, §§402-403) ....5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17
Other Authorities:

Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 Harv. Is. Rev. 1862 (1953) ee eeeeeeeeeeet. 14
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before. .
Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev.
iA CLL cy 9 pee 10:10, 14

IN THE

ni ain Court of the United States

OcToBER Term, 1971
. No. 71-119
;
_JaMES Day Hopecson, Secretary of Labor,

Plaintiff-Respondent™

—and—
Mike TrBovIcH (Proposed Intervenor),
Petitioner,
—V.—
Unirep Mine Workers or AMERICA,

Defendant-Respondent.

<i

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AS AMICUS CURIAE

It is hereby respectfully moved pursuant to Rule 42 of
the Rules of this Court that the American Civil-Liberties
Union be granted leave to file the accompanying brief
amicus curiae in support of the petitioner.

_ The amicus curiae filed a brief in support of the Petition ©
for Writ of Certiorari. Letters of consent were filed with
that-brief from the petitioner and the respondent-plaintiff,

’ the Secretary of Labor. By an oversight, consent was not
requested from the respondent-defendant, United Mine
Workers of America, and service was not made on counsel

r the respondent-defendant. As soon as this oversight

| noticed, counsel for the respondent-defendant was

2

served three copies of the Brief in Support of the Petition
for Writ of Certiorart by first class airmail on October
27, 1971. On, the same day counsel for the amicus curiae
contacted counsel for respondent-defendant, apprised him -
of the oversight, and requested leave to file the attached ~
brief in support of the petitioner on the merits. Consent
was declined. Consent was granted on behalf of the peti-
tioner and the respondent-plaintiff. These letters of con-
sent have been filed with the Clerk.

The American Civil Liberties Union is a nation-wide
“non-partisan organization with approximately 160,000 mem-
bers in the United States. It is engaged-solely in the de-
fense of those principles embodied in the Bill of Rights.
During its fifty-year existence, the ACLU has been con-
cerned with the special responsibility labor unions have to
maintain democratic standards. -In a mempbership ‘organi-
zation, the freedom of election and balloting i is the ultimate
and most important freedom in the democratie conduct and
control of the group. Hence, ACLU is especially concerned
that the election provisions of the Labor-Management Re-
‘porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Title IV, 29 U.S.C.
§$482-483 are interpreted and administered in such a way
as to most assure free and open union elections.

This case raises important questions concerning the
ability of union members to intervene in lawsuits brought
by the Secretary of Labor to enforce the provisions of
Title IV. It concerns, therefore, proper judicial .enforce-
ment of the statutory guarantee of free and open wnion
elections. It also involves compelling issues of fairness,

PTO

= - ¢f
not unlike those of due process of law. The issues in this * :

case go well beyond.the interesty of the direct parties to it.

In the attached brief, therefore, amicus curiae presents . =
argument to place the case in the hpoader context. i
Respectfully submitted, , yo oF

:

Metvin L. WuL¥ | i

SanForp Jay Rosen z
American Civil Liberties Union a

156 Fifth Avenue 1. 3

New York, New York 10010 &

_ Atiorneys for Movant. f

SENECA NEEL R ME SOL LOE NR YP AEE TERN NS

asteeuny
5a

ee,

WRRES /

| “ eg

In THE F

Supreme Court of the United States =
OcTOBER Term, 1971 | L i

No. 71-119 ie / be &

. <- ;

—_$—~——

BS te

JAMES ‘Day Hopecson, Secretary of Labor,
| Plant’ Respondent
, —and aa |

;

Mike: TRBOvICH (Proposed Intervenor), F

: | Pétitioner, e
SS 4

Unitep MINE Worters OF AMERICA, _ é
Defendant-Respondent. ‘ 4

. » 5°
.

. ‘BRIEF OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ’
' AMICUS CURIAE © Lf

'

Intevest of Amicus Curiae
The interest of aniicus curiae is ‘set forth in the pre-
ceding motion.

‘

~

- Question Presented

| Whether a member of a labor organization, who satisfies
all conditions for intervention of right under Rule 24(a),
FRCP, is entitled to intervene, on behalf of himself and
* other members desiring a new election of union officers,
in a civil suit brought by the Secretary of Labor under
. ‘the LMRDA, to set aside a union election.

Statement of the Case

This is one in a series of lawsuits brought or brought
about by the petitioner and others as a part of a coordi-
nated effort to reform and democratize one of the nation’s

‘largest labor unions, the United Mine Workers of Ameriea
(hereinafter referred to as UMW). The history of this

effort and of this lawsuit, is set out in some detail in the

Petition for Writ of Vertiorari, pp. 7-19. Suflice it to say,

this Court is asked to reverse the decisions of the courts
below denying the petitioner, Mike Trbovich, the right to
intervene in the present lawsuit. This particular suit was
brought by the Secretary of Labor, under Section 402())
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as LMRDA), 20 USC.
Section 482(b), to set aside the UMW’s Dece mber 9, 1969,
election of International officers on grounds of massive
election irregularities.

The petitioner was the ‘ampaign manager for the late
Joseph A. “Jock” Yablonski, who unsuccessfully opposed
the incumbent UMW president, W. A. “T ony” Boyle, in the
December 9, 1969 election. Pursuant to Section 402(a) he,
the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Section 482(a), on December 8,
1969, Mr. Yablonski filed timely charges with the Sucedite V
of Labor contesting the election on several grounds under
Title IV of the LMRDA. After the murder of Mr. Yablon- °
ski, and his wife and daughter, in January 1970, the peti-
tioner succeeded to the complaint. He filed a formal com-
plaint on January 20, 1970. Presently, petitioner is Na-
tional Chairman of the Miners for Democracy, a reform
party within the UMW.

. 7

On March 5, 1970, after conducting his investigation of
the December 9, 1969 election, the Secretary of Labor
brought the present lawsuit, based upon petitioner's com.
plaint, in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
In his first cause of action he alleged violations of Title IV
of the LMRDA. In his second cause of action, he alleged
violations of record keeping and reporting requirements

of Title Il of the LMRDA.
e”
On October 2, 1970, petitionér moved on behalf of him-

self and the Miners for Democracy, under Rule « Uda) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for leave to inter-
vene as of right or, in the alternatiy e, for permission to
intervene under Rule 24(b).

Petitioner proposed additional allemtions and claims for
relief, all of which were encompassed within the complaint
filed with the Secret tary of Labor. The additional allega-
tions related to political manipulation of the UMW W el-
fare and Retirement Fund, perpetuation of paper or

“bogus” local unions, and the union's failure to provide
and make available to its members adequate information
about, and records of, its finances as required -by Section
201 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Section 431. As additional
claims for relief, the petitioner requested the District Court
to require: . (1) disbanding of tlie bogus locals; (2) instal-
lation of a Board of Monitors to oversee UMW financial
affairs; (3) publication of a finding that the incumbent
president breached his fiduciary duty to all members of
_the union by manipulating the Welfare and Retirement.
Fund for political adv antage; (4) establishment of rules
for conduct of a rerun election, or appointment of a panel,
to be paid for out of UMW funds, to establish and enforce

8

fair rules for a rerun election; and (5) granting of proposed
intervenor attorney fees and costs.

Intervention was denied by the District Court solely on
the ground that by according the Secretary exclusive power
to initiate suit under Title IV, Congress also precluded in-
tervention by aggrieved union members in such suits as
the Secretary decided to bring. In a per curiam order, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
denial of intervention.

ARGUMENT

I.

The rule of Calhoon vy. Harvey does not preclude in-
tervention in the Secretary’s suits to enforce Title IV.

» |
This Court has held that suits falling “squarely within
Title IV of the [LMRD] Act... are to be resolved by

the admitiistrative and judicial vincedunes set out i that
Title.” Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 141. With certain.
exceptions not relevant here, the statute

:
. sets up an exclusive method for protecting Title.
IV rights, by permitting an individual member to file
a complaint with the Secretary of Labor challenging
the validity of any election because of violations of
Title IV. Upon complaint the Secretary investigates
and if he finds probable cause to believe that Title 1V
has been violated, he may file swt in the appropriate
district court. Calhoon v. Harvey, supra, 379 U.S. at
140. .

9

According to this Court, Congress sought to accomplish
three goals through Title 1V’s exclusive enforcement ma-
chinery. (1) Individuals should not be permitted “to block
or délay union elections by filing federal-court suits for
violation of Title IV.” Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at 140.
(2) “Reliance on the’ discretion of the Seeretary is in
harmony with the general congressional policy to al-
low unions great latitude in resolving their own internal
controversies . . . ” Calhoon vy. Harvey, supra at 140. .
(3) When unions fail to remedy election difficulties in-
ternally, Congress chose “to utilize the agencies of Gov-
ernment most familiar with union problems to aid in bring-
ing about a settlement through discussion before resort to
the courts.” Calhoon vy. Harvey, supra at 140-41. (Em-
phasis added.)

In Calhoon, however, the Court was concerned only with
the exclusivity of the Title LV machinery, and the Secre-
tary’s control over enforcement, “before resort to the
courts,” Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at 140-41. (Em-
phasis added.) Once the Secretary files his suit, a binding
determination has been made that the dispute is fit for
judicial resolution, and the Seeretarv’s exclusive control
ends.* Different considerations govern the question of who
may participate in the proceedings. As Professor Shapiro
observed, just because Title IV vests in the Secretary ex-
clusive authority to bring suit:

*Some courts have ruled that the Secretary’s control is never
absolutely exclusive, and that complaining parties under Section
402 “have a judicially enforceable right to demand that the Secre-
tary exercise his discretionary authority in a manner consistent
with the requirements of the Act an@not arbitrarily or capri-
ciously.”” De Vito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381. 383 (D.D.C. 1969) :
Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705, 708 (S.D.N_Y. 1966). See
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park vy. Volpe, 918. Ct. 814 (1971).

10

?

[I]t need not follow that the complainant who starts
the machinery of the Secretary in motion nay never
intervene to protect his interest once’a case is filed.
That determination may well turn on a number of
factors quite separate from his standing to sue, includ-
ing the nature of his interest and the adequacy of the
protection afforded that interest by existing parties.
Shapiro, Sume Thoughts on Intervention Before
Courts, Agencies, and: Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev.
721, 726-27 (1967).

See Shultz v. United Steelworkers of America, 312 F. Supp.
538, 539 (W.D. Pa. 1970), where a union officer whose elee-
tion was challenged by the Secretary’s suit was held to
have sufficient interest to justify intervention “to protect
lis property interests “—presumably in his job.

None of the policy considerations discussed in Calhoon
pertains once the Secretary has filed suit: (1) If any union
election is blocked or delayed, it is because the Secretary
has exercised his exclusive jurisdiction to bring suit. Inter-
vention by interested parties will not change that fact.
(2) Once the Secretary has filed suit, the time for “allow-
‘{ing] unions great latitude in resolving their own_inter-
nal controversies ... ” (Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at
140) obviously has ‘passed. (3) So has hope of “bringing
about a settlement through discussion before resort to the
courts.” Calhoon v. Harvey, supra at 140-41. (1em-
phasis added.), Further, the legislative history of Title
IV amply supports an interpretation that allows interven-
tion. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 23-29.

11

Il.

Title IV should be interpreted to allow intervention
in appropriate cases, such as the present case.

Intervention is welcome, indeed invited, in federal civil
practice. Thus it is not at all unusual for parties who are
unable to bring suit to be empowered to intervene once
suit is brought. For example, this Court has long held in
diversity of jurisdiction cases that parties may intervene
even though they would have destroved federal court
diversity jurisdiction if they had originally been. parties.
Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236. See Formulabs, Inc. v. Hart-
ley Per Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 945; Pewnss eants R.R. Co. v. Erie Avenue Warehouse
Co., 302 F.2d 843, 845<(3rd Cir. 1962). According to Pro-
on Shapiro:

[T Jo decide whether a particular action may be brought
by this plaintiff against this defendant may require
a determination of whether the controy ersy is ripe for
adjudication, whether the parties before the court are
the real parties in interest, and whether the interests
asserted are sufficient to mobilize the judicial ma-
chinery. When one seeks to intervene in an ongoing
lawsuit, these basic questions have presumably, been
resolved; the disposition of the request, then, should:
focus on whether the prospective intervener has a
sufficient stake in the outcome and enough to contribute
to the resolution of the controversy to justify his in-
clusion. Shapiro, supra, 81 Hary. L. Rev. at 726.

Intervention in civil actions in federal district court is .
governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

Stat Ba ERY oe ale

%

12

dure. It was most recently revised in 1966, seven years
after enactment of the LMRDA. According to this Court,
“some elasticity was injected” in Rule 24.by the 1966 amend-
ment. Cascade-National Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Corp., 386 U.S. 129, 134. In other words, intervention is to
be the rule, rather than the exception.

Rule 24(b) provides for permissive intervention by
claimants in several broad categories. Most pertinent to

this case, Rule 24(a) permits intervention as a matter of

right:

. when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action and he is so situated that the disposrtion

- of the action may as a practical matter impair or im-
pede his ability to protect that interest, unless the ap-.
plicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.

The petitioner satisfies all of the: requisites of Rule
24(a). (1) As the leader of a minority party within the
UMW, he claims a substantial interest in “the subject mat- °
ter of the action.” He is the present successor to Jock
Yablonski, and “the subject matter of the action” is the
legality of the December 9, 1969 UMW election in which
Mr. Yablonski unsuccessfully sought the presidency of the .
Union. He challenges that election; that challenge is the
crux of the lawsuit. (2) Unquestionably, “disposition of
the action” will “impair or impede” the petitioner’s “ability
to protect that interest.” Since the Secretary has “exclu-
sive” control over the decision to bring a lawsuit to enforce
Title IV, to all intents and purposes, “disposition of the.

action’ will result in final adjudication of the petitioner’s

°

13

interest. (3) The petitioner’s “interest is [not] adequately
represented by the existing parties.” The UMW is an ad-
verse party. And there is not merely a “difference of opin-
ion concerning the best method of handling the litigation”
between petitioner and the Secretary. Brief of the Secre-
tary of Labor in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, p. 11. The petitioner differs fundamentally
about whether certain ‘of the Union’s actions are unlaw-
ful, and as to appropriate remedy. In fact, the Secretary
has declined to allege three violations of the statute, or
to request several items of relief that the petitioner con-
siders crucial to:full adjudication of his interest and the
cause of action.

Thus the Secretary’s contention that the petitioner fails |

to meet the requisites for intervention as of right is un-
availing. Equally unavailing is the Secretary’s anxiety that
if the petitioner may intervene “the trial itself would in-
evitably be delayed and protracted by the additional issues
which petitioner seeks to interject.” Brief of the Secretary
of Labor in Opposition, p. 13. Some inconvenience always
results from adding parties to litigation; that is the price
of ever allowing intervention. This is a small price for the
vindication of a real party’s substantial interest. F urther,
this Court is not called upon in the present -appeal to pass
upon all of the issues involved in intervention.

When one is granted intervention, either as of right
or in the exercise of discretion, it does not necessarily

follow that he must be granted all the rights of a_

party at the trial and appellate levels, including full
rights of discovery and cross-examination, the ability
to veto a settlement of the case, and the right to appeal
from a final decision. It is both feasible and desirable

Are AS TINR IRN moe |

14

to break down the coneept of intervention into a mum.
ber of litigation rights and to econelude that a given
peyson has one or some of these rights but not all.

late land

Shfpire, supra, Ste Tanv. La. Rev. at 727) (footnotes

gmitted).

Resolution of these additiogal issues should awaitéhe mak-
ing of a trial reeord.

e

In cases like the present one, denial of the right to inter.

vene offends a healthy sense of fairness, and may raise
serious constitutional questions under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment and Artiele TH. ('/.
Shapiro, supra, St Hany. b Treve at 726: fart, The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
an Bavecreise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. lL. Rev. 1862 (1958).

Affirmative steps taken by the petitioner were jurisdic.
tonal requisites to the Seeretary’s cause of action. Seetion
402, LMRDA, PO UIS.C. $482. The interest being sued upon
is that of the petitioner, and those he represents, not that
of the Seeretary. The petitioner and those he represents
will teel the burden or gain the benetit of any resolution
of this lawsuit, not the Secretary. The petitioner and those
he represents are the experts. about the UMW and its elee-
tion processes (Petition for Writ of Certtorari, pp. 9-17,
35-37), not Che Seeretary. If the petitioner is foreclosed
from intervening, his “private” interest is forever sub-
‘merged and lost in the “pubhie™ interest. This lawsuit will
conclude the eleetion dispute and either vindieate or extin-
guish_ petitioner's interest. With the federal courts increas-
ingly enabling private parties to act as “private attorneys.
general” to enforce laws securing the public interest it
seems strange indeed to preclude interested private par-

¢

|
|
ye 1

15.

ties, like the petitioner, from intervening in public law-
suits: designed more to secure their interests than to secure
those of the publie. See, ee, Common Cause y. Dimocratic
National Committec, D. Ct. D.C Civ. Action 61-7] (1971):
Office of Communication, United Clhaarch of Christ vo FC,
359 IePd 994 (.C. Cir. 1966); see also, Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. y. Camp, 397
US. 150.

A compelling precedent. in a closely analogous area SUp-
ports the right to intervene in Tithe IV actions. In Inter-
udtional Union, UAW yx. Scofield, 382 US, 205, this Court
decided that parties who are successful in unfair labor
practice proceedings before the National Labor Rela-
tions Board have a right to intervene in Court of Appeals
review proceedings. A basis for the Court’s decision was
the desire to conserve judicial energy, for under the
NLRA, the charging party might bring a second appeal if
the Board's decision were reversed, 382 U.S at 212. Never-
theless, the principle of Scofield is applicable to Title IV
actions, as is much of the Court’s analysis. Just as under
Title TV of the LM RDA, the scheme of the National Labor
_ Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA) places in the s0ard and
its General Counsel exclusive power over enforcement of
-the statute and prosecution of violations. Just as under
Title IV, the NLRA is silent with respect to the right of
a private par», who is successful in the administrative
. Process, to intervene in judicial review proceedings. Just
as under Title IV, in the NLRA, publie and private inter-
ests are “interblend[ed] in the intricate Statutory scheme.”
International Union, UAW y. Scofield, supra, 382 U.S. at
220. Yet in Scofield, the Court held in favor of interven.
tion, declaring: “To employ the rhetoric of ‘public inter-

2 Ne ee as

eet ot A.

eer

ere

ets

ASAE RENEY EAP MRP

~~

16 é

est,’ however, is not to imply that the publie right excludes

recognition of parochial private interests.” 382 U.S. at
ole.

Although the enforcement machinery established in Title
IV is exclusive, the provisions for enforcement are to he
construed generously, to assure vindication of “the inter-
ests protected by S401." (These interests are’ both public
and privaft.), Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers
Ass'n, 889 US. 468, 475. Hence this Court has held that an
intervening union election does not moot a suit brought by
the Secretary, to challenge a prior election (Wart: v. Local

£153, supra), and the Seeretary's cause of action under the
. statute is not limited solely to the allegations made in the

union member's complaint to the union and to the Seere-
tary, but may extend to matters of which the union had
constructive notice and opportunity to cure (Wirt: v. Local
125, Laborers’ Intl Crion, 389 U.S. 477). Last Term in
Hodason vy. Steelworkers, Local 6749, 91.8. Ct. E841, the
Court held that the Seeretary may litigate only those al-
leged violations which were raised by the complaining mem-
ber before his union. The claims which the Secretary may
raise are limited to those raised initially by the complain-
ing member betore his union, and brought to the Seere-
tary's attention by the complaining member, and not other

‘possible elaims which the Seeretarvy may discover in the
} * .

course of his own investigation. Thus the Court has, in
effect, recognized the “private” interest and not merely
the general “public” interest to. be enfcreed under Title IV.

The controlling precedents of this Court, therefore, lead

to the conclusion that when a union member-complainant
can expand upon the Secretary’s district court complaint

-

7 ” |

(without going beyond the charges filed with the Union and :
the Secretary) and thereby assure complete vindication of . k
all the interests protected by Title IV (see Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, pp. 35-37), he should be allowed to in. 7
tervene in the Secretary’s suit in a manner consistent with ;
‘Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This ;
analysis is fully confirmed by the legislative, history of ;
Title 1V. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 23-29. 4
. 5
/ CONCLUSION | f
Ho | .f
For the reasons set: forth in this brief, the Court |
should reverse the judgments of the courts below.- .
Respectfully submitted,
Me.vin L. Wutr ;
Sanrorp Jay Rosen ; :
American Civil Liberties Unton
156 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10010
Attorneys forsAmicus Curiae
November 1, 1971 | | \ Z

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