# Appendix — Schlanger v. Seamans

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0249%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1971
- **Citation:** 401 U.S. 487

## Text

IN THE

Suprene Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

No. 5481

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,

Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR.,
Secretary of the Air Force, ET AL.,
Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INDEX TO THE APPENDIX

Page

Relevant Docket Entries 5 = neath atedesaretele 1
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. tis 3
Exhibits siechreane Riba ech icles 0 cbiviaassacdsdabdakasien nica cesbSdoarinnd 10
Order Denying Writ ERS ERTL eI OS ae 40
Order of Court of Appeals, setting aside denial §-ss is 41
I a a 42
Order of Court of Appeals, staying petitioner’s removal ___ 43

SRL ar ey Te

ii INDEX TO THE APPENDIX

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, and Memorandum
Exhibit

Respondents’ Supplemental Memorandum _.
Exhibits .

Petitioner’s Motion in Opposition —
Memorandum

Marshal’s Returns SESE SO sisdadehiadiavidadeitiets
Order Denying Writ

Order of Court of Appeals, affirming denial ... -=-»»_»_>> =
EE ere a CT TE
Order of Court of Appeals, denying rehearing

Order of Court of Appeals, staying mandate

Order granting motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and granting petition for -vrit of certiorari

82

1969
Aug. 27

Aug. 28

Aug. 29

Sept. 2

Sept. 5

Sept. 10
Dec. 18

1970
Jan. 8

bo

10.

12.

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

File Petition of Herbert Phillip Schlanger for
Writ of Habeas Corpus

Enter and file Order that petition of Herbert
Phillip Schlanger for writ of habeas corpus is
denied.

File petitioner’s motion for rehearing.

File memo on motion for rehearing, by petition-
er’s counsel.

Minute Entry: Petitioners’ motion for rehear-
ing called. * * * It is ordered that said motion
is denied.

File petitioner’s Notice of Appeal

File certified copy of Order from the Court of
Appeals that the Order denying application of
appellant for a writ of habeas corpus is set
aside without prejudice and the cause is re-
manded to the district court for issuance of an
order to show cause and further proceedings
thereon.

Enter and file Order that the respondents shall
within 20 days from this date show cause why
the application for writ of habeas corpus should
not be granted or why a hearing should not be
held on the merits of said application, by filing
with this court such response as deemed appro-
priate. Further ordered that a copy of the veri-
fied application for writ of habeas corpus, along
with a copy of this order be served upon each
of the respondents and the U.S. Atty. by the
U.S. Marshal.

FELL ESOL IE OE NILE EI Saf PP

GUNTUR EN Oke ana

Jan.

Jan.
Feb.

Feb.

Feb.

Feb.

10

13

13.

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

24.

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

File certified copy of order from the Court of
Appeals that appellees are stayed from remoy-
ing appellant, or ordering or causing his re-
moval, from the District of Arizona until pro-
ceedings in the district court pursuant to this
court’s mandate are completed, or until the fur-
ther order of the district court.

File respondents’ motion to dismiss, with
memo, and affidavits.

File respondents’ supplemental memo.

File applicant’s motion to set for trial, with
affidavit * * *.

File Marshal’s returns showing order and ap-
plication served upon Colonel Homer Baker, Dr.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Colonel Noel B. Red-
drick and US Atty.

Enter and file Order that the respondents’ mo-
tion to dismiss the petition for lack of juris-
diction is granted; that respondents are stayed
from removing petitioner from the District of
Arizona pending a timely appeal to the Ap-
peals court for the Ninth Circuit or until fur-
ther order either of this court or the Court of
Appeals.

File applicant’s Notice of Appeal.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Civ-69-381 Phx.
[File Endorsement Omitted]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL.
HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPLICANT

v.

Hon. Dr. RoBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air
Force, Colonel HOMER BAKER, Commander, Moody
AFB, Valdosta, Georgia, and Colonel NoEL B. RED-
DRICK, Commander, AFROTC Det 25, Arizona State
University, Tempe, Arizona, RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS—
Filed August 27, 1969

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, relator herein,
for his verified application for a writ of habeas corpus
respectfully alleges as follows:

1. This action is brought pursuant to the provisions
of 28 USC 2241 et seq.

2. Relator is being unlawfully detained and restrained
of his liberty in violation of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, as is more particularly alleged in
the remainder of this application.

3. Applicant is a citizen of the United States and is
a resident of the State of Arizona.

4. The Hon. Robert Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the
AF and Colonel Homer Baker, Commander, Moody AFB,
Georgia, are the persons who are at present unlawfully
restraining applicant of his liberty, as is more fully
particularized herewithin. Col. Reddrick is the ROTC
commander at ASU.

5. On December 1962 applicant enlisted in the USAF
for a period of four years pursuant to the terms of a

od

OL OPS RIERA ER RIPE wel NAME CRIN T Cree 8

4

written agreement to which the court’s attention is re-
spectfully referred.

6. During 1965 applicant applied for entrance into
the Airman’s Education and Commissioning Program
(hereinafter referred to as the “AECP”’’) and in or about
October, 1965 was notified by the Air Force Institute of
Technology (hereinafter referred to as “AFIT’’) that he
had been accepted for participation.

7. On November 9, 1965 orders were promulgated
designating the applicant an “officer trainee” and reas-
signing him, effective on or about December 13, 1965, to
Arizona State University for enrollment as a student
under the AECP.

8. On December 8, 1965 applicant was discharged and,
on December 9, 1965, was re-enlisted for a period of six
years; this was accomplished solely that applicant might
meet the retainability requirement for participation in
the AECP.

9. The facts and circumstances leading to and culmi-
nating in the aforesaid unlawful detention have their
genesis in the illegal, arbitrary and capricious enforce-
ment of the aforesaid re-enlistment contract: the court’s
attention is specifically directed to its terms, conditions
and limitations.

10. The re-enlistment contract of December 9, 1965,
identified in paragraph 8 supra, was breached and ren-
dered void by the illegal, arbitrary and capricious acts
of certain Air Force offices, hereinafter identified; spe-
cifically the withdrawal of your applicant from the AECP
on June 17, 1968 in a manner contrary to USAF regu-
lations, directives and manuals, ignoring and violating
applicant’s rights to due process and on grounds which
were factually unsupported, wholly inapplicable and vio-
lative of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Consti-
tution of the United States.

11. Upon registration at Arizona State University a
graduation date of May 1968 was forecast and an edu-
cation plan outlining this proposed course of study was
submitted to and approved by AFIT,

12. In or about February, 1968 applicant submitted
to AFIT a revised education plan, necessitated by an ill-

5

ness which had disrupted applicant’s anticipated prog-
ress, calling for a revised graduation date of August,
1968.

13. After careful consideration and review of appli-
cant’s performance in the AECP to that date and the
request for an extension referred to in paragraph 11
supra, AFIT notified applicant, on March 25, 1968, of
its approval of his aforementioned request.

14. By statement dated April 8, 1968, annexed as
Exhibit 1 and not exhibited to applicant until in or about
December, 1968, recommending applicant’s withdrawal
from the AECP, Major Graham W. Rider, AFIT Liaison
Officer at Arizona State University, alleges that appli-
cant admitted to him that he “had been cutting classes
extensively ever since [applicant] had been [at the Uni-
versity]”; applicant denies ever having made such a
statement.

15. Applicant received, less than twelve weeks follow-
ing the extension approval referred to in paragraph 13
supra, a letter from Colonel Miles R. Palmer, Director,
Civilian Institutions Division, AFIT, dated June 17, 1968
(annexed hereto as Exhibit 1A) informing him that the
Commandant, AFIT, had withdrawn him from the AECP,
ordering him into a state of arrest and severely restrict-
ing his rights of free speech.

16. On June 22, 1968 applicant acknowledged receipt
of Colonel Palmer’s letter and requested clarification of
several points. Annexed hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true
copy of that acknowledgement.

17. Having received no reply to his aforesaid letter,
applicant sent a telegram, dated June 30, 1968 and an-
nexed as Exhibit 3, to Colonel Palmer again requesting
clarification and amplification of the stated reason for
his withdrawal (“lack of officer potential”) and the re-
straints imposed upon applicant’s liberty and freedom of
communication.

18. By letter dated July 5, 1968, annexed hereto as
Exhibit 4, Lt. Col. Franklin Blanton replied to appli-
cant’s telegram; thereupon, applicant requested by tele-
gram on July 12, 1968, annexed hereto as Exhibit 5, an-
swers to ten specific questions relating to the withdrawal

6

procedure, the methods used in reaching the decision to
withdraw him, and the consequences of the action.

19. By order dated July 10, 1968, annexed hereto as
Exhibit 6, applicant was reassigned to Moody AFB and
ordered demoted from his then current grade of E-5 to
E-3 and relieved of duty as an “officer trainee”.

20. The reply to applicant’s telegram of July 12, 1968,
annexed hereto as Exhibit 7, informed him of an alleged
inquiry which had heretofore been purportedly conducted
by the Professor of Aerospace Studies (hereinafter re-
ferred to as ‘PAS”), AFROTC Det 25 at Arizona State
University, its supposed purpose and the authority under
which it was allegedly conducted, to wit, AFR 120-3:
according to said reply, the inquiry was concerned with
applicant’s alleged “lack of officer potential [as demon-
strated] . . . by [applicant’s] not attending all scheduled
classes. . . .”

21. Applicant had no knowledge of any inquiry, hear-
ing, investigation or any other proceeding heretofore de-
scribed until receipt of Exhibit 7.

22. By letter forwarded on or about July 30, 1968
and annexed as Exhibit 10 applicant appealed to the
Commandant, AFIT, for a hearing into the facts of the
matter and for an opportunity to be heard on his own
behalf.

23. By letter dated August 27, 1968 and annexed as
Exhibit 11 the request for a hearing was denied.

24. By letter dated September 4, 1968, annexed hereto
as Exhibit 12, applicant applied through proper military
channels for a discharge and the Chief of Staff, USAF,
in a letter dated October 29, 1968 and annexed as Exhibit
13, stated that this request had not been favorably con-
sidered.

25. The inquiry, referred to in paragraph 20 supra,
could not have been legally or properly concerned with
the matter which it did, in fact, undertake to investigate:
section 1 of AFR 120-3, annexed hereto as Exhibit 8,
specifically exempts investigations into courts-martial
charges from its coverage; AWOL is a court-martial of-
fense (Article 86, UCMJ) and, by directive definition,
annexed as Exhibit 9, non-attendance at class is equiva-
lent to failure to report for duty, ie, AWOL.

7

26. Though AFR 120-3 requires that any inquiry con-
ducted under its provisions be held at an “echelon of
command compatible with an impartial, unbiased and
complete presentation of facts”, the PAS assigned re-
ponsibility for this inquiry had previously demonstrated
his partiality and bias by endorsing Major Rider’s letter
(Exhibit 14) on April 9, 1968, or approximately five weeks
prior to the inquiry, as follows: “I am familiar with
this case and concur with the recommendation.”

27. The reason given by AFIT for applicant's with-
drawal, i.e., “lack of officer potential”, was not a ground
for such a withdrawal in accordance with the directives
in force ai all times relevent to this proceeding. It was
added to the directive (the AFIT Student Manual) as
a ground on July 1, 1968, or two weeks after the actions
of the Air Force as specified above.

28. Since the aforementioned withdrawal applicant
has been awarded an Oak Leaf Cluster (covering the
period from December 7, 1965 to December 6, 1968) to
his Good Conduct Medal, the citation of which commends
his “exemplary behavior, efficiency and fidelity during
the period indicated”; hardly, applicant respectfully
points out, behavior consistent with AFIT’s allegations.

29. On the basis of the foreroing, applicant respect-
fully alleges that the USAF’s removal! of him from the
AECP, and the continuing restraint of applicant’s liber-
ties, was and is unlawful and violative of applicant’s
Constitutional rights in one or more of the following
respects :

LO LEE SEO LILES ELIE AY

FREE REE GRE NON LRN St

i. It was illegal, arbitrary and capricious (para-
graphs 15, 21, 23, 24 and 27)

ii. It followed proceedings prejudicial to the applicant
conducted under wholly inapplicable directives
(paragraphs 25, 26 and 27)

iii. The alleged reason was utterly without basis in
demonstrated fact (paragraphs 14 and 28)

iv. It was conducted in a manner contrary to USAF
regulations, directives and manuals (paragraphs
25, 26 and 27)

v. It violated applicant's rights to due process (para-
graphs 15, 19, 21, 23 and 27)

GOEL ELLIELILLL IMCL OE ILE LE EO LIE LT TE A NS GI

2
. >a co a NE ts ali PERRY OTP AN NRE HEE TE -
asters eer woe

30. By virtue of the foregoing, applicant respectfully
submits that he is under no legal obligation to serve and
that the USAF has * » legal lien on his services and has
had none since June 17, 1968; and that since the USAF
illegally, unilaterally and without cause breached the re-
enlistment contract, referred to in paragraph 8 supra,
the continued enforcement of said contract constitutes an
unlawful detention and restraint of applicant’s liberty.

31. Applicant respectfully requests that upon this ap-
plication this court require the production of the records,
papers, affidavits and exhibits constituting the files and
records of applicant’s case.

$2. All administrative remedies have been exhausted
and no previous judicial application has been made for
the writ herein sought.

33. Applicant is currently temporarily assigned to
Arizona State University which is within the jurisdiction
of the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona; venue, it is therefore submitted, properly is laid
in this District.

Wherefore, applicant respectfully prays that this court
direct the respondent herein named to not remove the
applicant from this court’s jurisdiction pending a final
determination in this matter, and that a writ of habeas
corpus be issued, directing the aforementioned respondent
to show cause, if any he have, why applicant should not
be released from service and honorably discharged,

s/ Herbert Phillip Schlanger
Pro Se
1019 E. Lemon St.
Tempe, Az. 85281

9

All allegations contained in the foregoing application
are made on personal knowledge except those contained
in paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 25 and 26 which are based on
applicant’s information and belief.

/8/ Herbert Phillip Schlanger
HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of
August, A.D. 1969 at Tempe, Arizona.

/s/ (Mllegible}
Notary Public
My Commission Expires
Oct. 30, 1971

NS fen

10

EXHIBITS

Statement of Major Graham W. Rider; April 8, 1968

. Notification of withdrawal; June 17, 1968

Letter of acknowledgement; June 22, 1968
Telegram from applicant; June 30, 1968
Letter—reply to (3); July 5, 1968
Telegram from applicant; July 12, 1968
Reassignment orders; July 10, 1968
Telegram to applicant; July 17, 1968
AFR 120-3, p. 1

Paragraph 2-2, AFIT Student Manual
Appeal for hearing (4 pages)
Letter—reply to (10); August 27, 1968

Application for discharge (5 pages); September 4,
1968

Reply to (12:; October 29, 1968

11
EXHIBIT 1
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GRAHAM W. RIDER

8 Apr 68

1. Attached to this letter are statements from two
officers which report on the conduct of Sergeant Schlanger.
Major Eatinger was my predecessor as Liaison Officer,
and Captain Miner is, and was on one previous occasion,
Chief of a team to which Sergeant Schlanger has been
assigned for administrative purposes. At the time I be-
came Liaison Officer (1 Feb 68), Sergeant Schlanger was
under medical care following an overdose of drugs taken,
presumably unintentionally, during final examination
week of the past semester. At that time I assumed,
wrongly, that AFIT was taking action to remove the
Sergeant from the program.

2. Upon discovering that no such action was being
taken, and upon learning that Sergeant Schlanger was
again failing to attend classes, I began an investigation.
Major Eatinger’s statement furnishes you with the requi-
site background for the case and establishes Sergeant
Schlanger’s history of failure to attend class. Medical
records regarding this case are maintained at Williams
AFB and can be made available upon your request to the
hospital commander there.

3. Little needs to be added to Captain Miner’s report
of his investigation. However, I did interview Sergeant
Schlanger on 2 April 68. His attitude was hardly that
of a loyal, responsible, non-commissioned officer. Fur-
ther, his appearance was disgraceful. He was wearing
a filthy jacket, there was no polish on his shoes, his
trousers were long overdue a pressing, and he required
a haircut. But it was his mental, rather than his physi-
cal condition, which was so out of line with Air Force
requirements. This statement is exemplified by his unique
distinction of AECP goals. He stated that he felt that
the Air Force had sent him here to get a degree; not
necessarily to get an education through attending classes
and doing his assignments. Though he may be intelligent

2
— |

PB LRG PDEA SERENA L GL LNELE SIAM GLIIEE EY BONE

Wi LEU PI OR BL

12

enough to accomplish the former without performing the
latter, I informed him that our primary goal in the AECP
was education and that the degree is considered to be
simple evidence of that accomplishment. Before the in-
terview was terminated he admitted that he has been
“cutting classes extensively” ever since he has been here,
Finally, when I advised him that I would recommend his
removal from the program, his only concern was over
whether or not AFIT would let him finish this semester,
He strikes me as the sort of person who enjoys trying
to “beat the system”.

4. Approximately ten percent of all AECP students
attend ASU. The presence of this man in their midst
is damaging to morale, to say the least. Sergeant Schlan-
ger has not shown the required loyalty to duty as a
student, and I cannot believe that he would perform
differently elsewhere in either a commissioned or a non-
commissioned status. I strongly urge you to remove this
man from the program immediately.

(signed)
GRAHAM W. RIDER, Major, USAF
Liaison Officer, ASU

Ist Ind
AFROTC Det 25, Arizona State University,
Tempe, Az. 85281

TO: Cemmander, AFIT

I am familiar with this case and I concur with the ree-
ommendation.

(signed)
ROBERT W. MCFADDEN, Colonel, USAF
Professor of Aerospace Studies

13
EXHIBIT 1A

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AU)
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO 45433

[DoD Emblem}
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFIT-CI 17 June 1968

SupsJECT: Withdrawal from Air Force Institute of
Technology Program

To: SSgt. Herbert P. Schlanger
1001 East Lemon Street
Tempe, Arizona 85281

1. This letter is to inform you that the Commandant of
the Air Force Institute of Technology has withdrawn you
from the Airman Educational and Commissio®« . ro-
gram for having a lack of officer potential.

2. You are to accomplish the following actions:

A. Withdraw from school immediately if you have
not already done so.

B. Remain at your present resident address pending
receipt of transfer orders. Leave or pass will
not be authorized, except under emergency con-
ditions, until your orders are published.

C. Do not contact Headquarters USAF or any other
organization relative to your assignment.

D. Acknowledge receipt of this letter and your un-
derstanding of its provisions.

E. Furnish us one copy of a final education plan and
an official transcript as soon as possible.

3. You may expect information about your new assign-
ment within the next two to three weeks. You will be
advised of the specific assignment as soon as this infor-
mation is available to the Air Force Institute of Tech-

ER

PLONE MEY TPT OSG SIO IIE OF ELT Te ee,

Sa Se malo oe ee

14

nology and PCS orders will be furnished, as promptly as
possible.

/s/ Miles R. Palmer
MILEs R. PALMER, Colonel, USAF
Director, Civilian Institutions Div.

1 Atch

Blank Ed Plan
ec: AFIT Liason
Officer

PAS

Strength Through Knowledge

PRE OEOI anRIONEY pA NY ELIE ARAN RGSS SCONE nore cient i

15
EXHIBIT 2

From: SSgt. Herbert P. Schlanger 22 June 1968
Subject: Letter of Acknowledgement

To: Colonel Miles R, Palmer
Director, CID, AFIT
Wright-Patternson AFB, Ohio 45433

1. I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 17 June
1968 notifying me of my withdrawl] from AECP.

2. I do not understand the following, and require fur-
ther information:

A. What method and what criterion were used in
determining my “lack of officer potential”?

B. For what reason and under what authority are
leave and pass being prohibited?

C. Please clarify paragraph 2C of your letter.

D. Are there any formal methods of appeal from
this decision available to me?

3. Thank you.

HERBERT P. SCHLANGER, SSgt, USAF

>
A
:
=

ARTES CTL NE I IR

rh ———

16
EXHIBIT 3
TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE

TDPF TEMPE

COL MILES R PALMER DIR CIVILIAN INSTITU-
TIONS DIVN AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECH-
NOLOGY

SIR I HAVE AS YET RECEIVED NO COMMUNICA-
TION FROM YOU AS WAS REQUESTED IN MY LET-
TER OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT DATED 22 JUNE 68,
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED IS THE FOLLOWING 1.
PLEASE INDICATE WHAT CRITERION WAS USED
IN DETERMINING MY QUOTE LACK OF OFFICER
POTENTIAL UNQUOTE 2. PLEASE INDICATE FOR
WHAT REASON AND UNDER WHAT AUTHORITY
LEAVE AND PASS AND BEING PROHIBITED 3.
PLEASE CLARIFY PARAGRAPH 2-C OF YOUR LET-
TER DATED 17 JUNE 68 THANK YOU

Date: C JUNE 30 834PMM
Check: 79 NL PDF 7 EXCFM FURN
Tel. No.: 966-7852
Dest’n.: WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO
Signature: S/SGT HERBERT P SCHLANGER
1002 EAST LEMON ST
TEMPE ARIZ 85281
CHG. TELE.

Cus: LATCHMEN E—SAME ADS.

. ese 8? Gad PREVIOUS COITION BIKA O& USED

EN EE, te ea Nahe MERE BS ee es

——_— AON NARS NERA RIN AG OR EIR ROSIER SNC 8

EXHIBIT 7
WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

WU025 (L PFAO13) GOVT NL PD LUKE AFB ARIZ
JUL 17 1968

SSGT HERBERT P SCHLANDER
1001 EAST LEMON ST TEMPE ARIZ
AFIT CI

SUBJECT: WITHDRAWL FROM AECP. REFER-
ENCE IS MADE TO YOUR MESSAGE, 13 JULY. THE
FOLLOWING RESPONSES CORRESPOND TO YOUR
SIMILARLY NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS. 1. YOU
DEMONSTRATED A LACK OF OFFICER POTEN-
TIAL BY NOT ATTENDING ALL SCHEDULED
CLASES OF COURSES FOR WHICH YOU WERE
REGISTERED AT ARIZ STATE UNIV. 2. AN IN-
QUIRY INTO YOUR CLASS ATTENDANCE WAS
CONDUCTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF AFR
120-3 AT THE REQUEST OF THIS HEADQUARTERS
BY THE PROFEWSOR OF AEROSPACE STUDIES,
AFROTC DET 25.

BASED ON THE REPORT OF THAT INQUIRY AND
ON LETTERS FROM AFIT OFFICERS AT ASU, THE
COMMANDANT CONCLUDED THAT YOUR CLASS
ABSENCES DID IN FACT DEMONSTRATE A LACK
OF OFFICER POTENTIAL AND DIRECTED YOUR
WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PRA
7A, PG 3 AECP-4 AFM 50-5, JUL 67. 3. THE GRANT-
ING OF LEAVE IS GOVERNED BY AFM 35-22. 4.
LEAVE AND POSS PRIVELEGES ARE WITHHELD
FROM STUDENTS FOLLOWING WITHDRAWL FROM
AN AFIT PROGRAM TO INSURE THEIR AVAILA-
BILITY FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER IN CASE HQ
USAF DIRECTS AN EARLY REPORTING DATE

22

T

TO THE NEW DUTY STATION. 5. SEE PARA 3
ABOVE. 6. THE POINT OF CONTACT ON ASSIGN-
MENT MATTERS IS THE MEMBERS SERVICING
CBPO (AFIT-CBO IN YOUR CASE). PARA 1012, AFM
39-11 PROHIBITS SOLICITING OF ASSIGNMENTS,
7, THERE ARE OMSSTATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR
APPEAL OF THE COMMANDANTS DECISION TO
WITHDRAW YOU FROM THE AECP. 8. REPORTS,
LETTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS PERTAINING
TO YOUR WITHDRAWL MERELY FORMED THE
BASIS FOR THE COMMANDANTS DECISION. YOU
HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE DECISION AND OF
THE BASIS FOR IT. WE SEE NO REQUIREMENT
FOR COPIES TO BE PROVIDED. YOUR REASSIGN-
MENT WAS EFFECTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF AFM 39-11. 9. AIR FORCE REGULATIONS AND
MANUALS CITED ABOVE ARE AVAILABLE AT
THE AFROTIC DET AND,/OR WILLIAMS AFB. 10.
PAGE 3 AECP-3, PARA 7:, AFM 50-5 PROVIDES
THAT ELMINESS COMPLETED THEIR SIX-YEAR
ENLISTMENT

MILES R PALMER, COLONEL, UASF DIRECTOR
CIVILIAN INSTITUTION DVISION AFB
(1050A)

23
EXHIBIT 8
*AFR 120-3
1-3
Air Force Regulation Department of the Air Force
No. 120-3 Washington, 11 October 1954

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES
Administrative Inquiries and Investigations

Paragraph

Purpose and Scope
Policy

Definitions

Authority
Responsibilities
Investigative Procedures
Security Classification
Rights and Privileges
Privileged Status

OMAADNS Whe

1. Purpose and Scope:

a. This Regulation establishes policy and responsibili-
ties for all administrative inquiries and investigations
within the Air Force, except as indicated in b below. It
applies to all Air Force activities.

b. When incidents, accidents, or unusual occurrences :
requiring inquiry or investigaiion are not specifically or ,
adequately covered by other regulations, this Regulation
will apply. It will not govern investigations by the Office
of Special Investigations (OSI) or the air police; techni-
cal investigations of fires and aircraft accidents; investi-

ANT OTC RP: R

gations of courts-martial charges; investigations of prop-
erty survey officers; line of duty investigations: griev-
anees of civilian employees having other appeal rights; :
and other investigations governed by specific regulations. :
This Regulation may apply when an investigation re- :
quired by another regulation discloses facts or informa- :
tion beyond the scope of that particular regulation and
indicates the need for further investigation to protect

Be EE ae eee

= re 2 oe eee ©, = 3

the best interest of the Air Force, its individuals or
organizations.

2. Policy. Matters within the following areas will be
properly investigated by an echelon of command compati-
ble with a complete, impartial, and unbiased presentation
of facts:

a. Complaints and allegations indicating that rights of
individuals or groups of individuals have been trans-
gressed, or that the health, welfare, or efficiency of per-
sonnel have been unduly jeopardized. Such matters might
include living conditions, working conditions, individual
assignments, organizational inefficiency, improper super-
vision, misconduct, prejudice, and similar matters unless
limited by paragraph 1b.

b. Unusual incidents, and occurrences resulting in:

(1) Loss of life or injury to personnel.

(2) Considerable loss of or damage to Government
property.

(3) Publicity that might adversely affect Air Force
interests and prestige to a serious degree or
cause unusual interest in Air Force activities
on the part of other governmental agencies, both
foreign and domestic. Such incidents or occur-
rences, which may seriously impair the perform-
ance of the assigned mission, might include
windstorms, floods, fires, explosions, riots, un-
usual behavior, serious lack of discipline, and
low regard for laws, regulations, and customs,
local as well as military.

(4) Added by 120-3A.

e. Complaints of wrongs submitted by individuals and
based on the provisions of Article 188 UCMJ.
3. Definitions. The following definitions apply herein:

a. Inquiry-—A determination of the facts of a matter
by checking records, reviewing applicable directives, ex-
amining material evidence, and interviewing persons hav-
ing direct knowledge of the facts of a particular matter.
Such processes are generally adequate when the subject
of inquiry is not complex or of serious consequence and

EMRE SLE FINE i cre: pm PETA IRENE RL ES RRL ALAN ROR

—

25

the matter can be properly resolved through normal staff
actions and procedures.

b. Investigation—A determination of the facts of a
serious or complex matter. An investigation always re-
quires a written report and a written record of the action
taken by appropriate authority as a result of the investi-
gation. Investigations normally will be supported by ex-
hibits and sworn testimony of witnesses.

* This Regulation supersedes AFR 120-3, 11 April 1951, including
Change 120-3A, 10 October 1951.

26
EXHIBIT 9

Chapter 2
ADMINISTRATIVE

2-1. STATUS OF STUDENTS. Although you are not
in a familiar military environment, you must remember
that you are a member of the Air Force and will conduct
yourself accordingly. Your actions reflect directly on the
image of the Air Force. Civilian clothing will be worn
for class attendance, but the same standard of neatness
as that expected for the military uniform must be main-
tained. When participating in ceremonial functions, such
as commencement exercises, the Class A uniform will be
worn unless it conflicts with the established traditions or
rules of the college or university. The appropriate uni-
form will be worn when conducting official business at a
military installation or when flying.

2-2. ATTENDANCE AT SCHEDULED CLASSES. At-
tendance at scheduled classes is the direct counterpart of
reporting to duty or to a military formation under nor-
mal duty conditions. Each CID student is, therefore,
obligated to attend all scheduled classes unless he has
been excused from doing so. Permission to be excused
must be obtained from a Liaison Officer or from the ap-
propriate AFIT program monitor,

2-3. SIGN OUT RECORDS (PCS, PCA). You must
complete AFIT Form 17, “Sign In Record”, within 24
hours after completion of official travel, and forward it
to AFIT-PD. You will submit AFIT Form 17a, “Sign
Out Record”, to AFIT-PD upon departing PCS or Perma-
nent Change of Assignment (PCA) from your old duty
station (the civilian institution) if you are assigned to
a school where there is no AFROTC Detachment. Other-
Wise, you must sign out at the AFROTC Detachment.

2-4. SIGN IN/OUT REGISTER. AFIT Liaison Officers
are responsible for maintaining a sign in/out register
for all personnel departing on and returning from TDY.
AF Form 1323, “Sign In/Out Register”, or a comparable

so a ec 3) ne ot

27

form, may be used for this purpose. You must notify
your Liaison Officer if you are confined to the hospital.

9-5. RECORD OF EMERGENCY DATA. Upon arrival
at your duty station, and when a firm address is estab-
lished, complete and forward a new AF Form 246, “Rec-
ord of Emergency Data”, to AFIT-PD without delay.
Thereafter, whenever a change occurs in any item on this
form, a new AF Form 246 or 246a will be resubmitted.

2-6. DISPOSITION OF FILED RECORD GROUP. Upon
assignment of a student to AFIT, the orders issuing
agency is furnished instructions for disposal of the stu-
dent’s records as follows:

a. If the student is rated, the AF Form 5, “Pilot
Individual Flight Record’, will be hand-carried to the
operations officer of the base to which attached for flying
proficiency.

b. The Unit Personnel Records Group will be for-
warded to AFIT-PD and must arrive on or before the
Effective Date of Change of Strength Accountability :
(EDCSA) stated in the reassignment orders. *

ce. Health Record Group. Disposition will be made in f
accordance with paragraph 5-1, this manual.

d. Personal Clothing and Equipment Group. Person- E
nel on flying status should turn in AF Form 538, “Per- E
sonal Clothing and Equipment Record”, at the base to
which attached for flying. Other personnel should retain
it in their possession until needed in connection with
issuance of personal clothing or equipment. Upon reas-

PEP ORS

Et MY SMUD BAY ag 4 REI)

LOGOS TERETE QI 40

signment from AFIT, all students will hand-carry their é
AF Form 538 to their new duty stations. F
e. Personal Pay Record Group. Disposition will be ;
made in accordance with paragraph 4-2, this manual.
2-7. TELEPHONE CALLS TO THE AIR FORCE IN- t
STITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Except in emergency b
cases, permission to call AFIT must be obtained from the
5

he

&

;
bes “Gee et cas MR eS RARER en eae
; Se serra etal

ad

28
EXHIBIT 10

From: SSgt Herbert P. Schlanger
1001 East Lemon Street
Tempe, Arizona 85281

Subject: Request for Hearing and Reconsideration of
Withdrawal

To: Major General Ernest A, Pinson
Commandant, AFIT
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433

Dear sir,

The attached summary, originally intended for another
purpose, I feel fairly presents the reasons which lead me
to believe that I should be granted a hearing. That is
the request that I respectfully make, and I hope that, for
the good of the Air Force and of myself, you will see fit
to grant it. Thank you.

Respectfully yours,

/8/ Herbert P. Schlarger
HERBERT P, SCHLANGER

On 20 June 1968, I received notice (appendix 1) of
the Commandant’s decision to withdraw me from the
AECP. This action came abruptly, without notice, just
two (2) months prior to my scheduled graduation. The
reason stated for the withdrawal was that I lacked offi-
cer potential. I have been in the program since January
1966, when an education plan forecasting a graduation
date of May 1968 was submitted to, and approved by
AFIT, and had met all requirements of the program suc-
cessfully, up to at least March 25, 1968. This fact is
substantiated by my continued participation in the pro-
gram and is further reinforced by the fact that on 25
March 1968, less than three (3) months prior to receipt
of the order of 17 June 1968, HQ, USAF and AFIT
approved a revised graduation date of August 1968.

This revision was necessitated by an illness during De-
cember 1967 and January 1968 which disrupted the pro-

2a, nee. ae ae ee 7 SS AM \ “4
IESE LD TELA LO ANG ONLI TO A

29

jected course of study, Before this new graduation date
was approved I am informed, and believe, that perform-
ance in the program, including my officer potential, was
reviewed, and not found wanting.

The order of 17 June 1968 raises very serious ques-
tions including, but not limited to:

1. Whether paragraph 2B was intended, as it does,
to order me into a state of arrest, and if so, on
what “probable cause’, and

2. Why was I ordered (paragraph 2C) not to “con-
tact HQ, USAF or any other organization rela-
tive to (my) assignment”.

In attempting to obtain clarification of the order in
question, I first wrote to AFIT (appendix 3) and, re-
ceiving no reply from that headquarters, sought the aid
of legal counsel at Williams Air Force Base. After a
period of approximately a week I was informed that that
office had determined that they would not render me any
legal assistance in this case. After being denied counsel
I again requested clarification from AFIT (appendix 4)
and was informed that the “lack of officer potential (was)
demonstrated by (my) failure to attend scheduled classes.”
I can categorically assert that between 25 March 1968
and 17 June 1968 my class attendance conformed with
the regulations of Arizona State University governing
academic performance, and this is reflected in the concern
and suprise of the Dean of Students at my withdrawal
(appendix 8).

In examining the charge that I failed to attend sched-
uled classes, the most immediate question, it seems, is
how was this alleged misconduct demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the Commandant, It could not have been
as a reflection of my academic performance, since I am
maintaining a satisfactory average and will graduate
(now at my own expense) in August, as scheduled. It
cannot have been as a result of class attendance records,
since none of my professors took roll calls. AFIT im-
plies (appendix 7) that the results of an inquiry into
my class attendance substantiate the allegations made by
certain officers in the AFIT program at ASU. This in-

ACER enenceerun sogenty

SPIE

MOA PY IY!

30

quiry is of interest for two reasons, First, Major Halley,
the investigating officer, told me, when I inquired two
weeks ago, that he had contacted my professors and, for
the reason indicated above, the results of his inquiry were
“inconclusive’’.

The second point concerns the authority under which
this inquiry was conducted (AFR 120-3). It is contended
that my alleged failure to attend classes constitutes a
refusal to obey a lawful order—a court-martial offense,
AFR 120-3 specifically states that it does not govern the
investigation of courts-martial charges. Also, if such an
order had been given, and I had refused to obey it, and
this refusal had, in fact, been established then the failure
on the part of my superiors to promptly prosecute me
under the appropriate articles of the UCMJ is itself a
violation of the UCMJ. This cannot be the case. There-
fore, it seems inevitable that we must conclude that the
reasons given for my withdrawal do not stand up under
close scrutiny. This fact, and this fact alone, would indi-
cate that I am entitled to a hearing so that the truth or
falsity of the allegations can be ascertained,

But the question remains—why was I withdrawn?
What was it that convinced my superiors that I lacked
officer potential? Only one thing happened this spring
that was in any way different from past semesters—my
participation in an extra-curricular activity that caused
Major Rider, the AFIT liaison officer at ASU, to con-
demn my actions as “inappropriate”, to caution me that
I was getting in with “bad groups”, and to warn me
that my activities might lead to a court-martial. This
activity, my participation in the formation, and chair-
manship of the ASU Civil Rights Board was what ap-
parently marked me as failing “to measure up to the
high standards expected of Air Force officers’ (AFM
50-5). This group, accreditted to the campus of ASU,
engaged in orderly, lawful petition to redress grievances
and was effective in helping insure the civil rights of all.

The evidence strongly indicates that it was this ac-
tivity on my part, not any unsubstantiated “failure to
attend scheduled classes”, that led to my withdrawal
from the AECP. The coincidence in timing of the pub-

31

licity attendant to our CRB activities (see appendix)
and the dates of the approval of my extension (March)
and my withdrawal (June), the comments of Major
Rider and other officers regarding my participation, the
fact that AFR 120-3 does cover investigations concerned
with “unusual occurrences . . . resulting in publicity
that might adversely affect Air Force interests . . .”,
and the lack of any other demonstratable grounds for
such a withdrawal, all point to this conclusion.

I firmly believe that if legal counsel were allowed to
participate and advise me, and to make recommendations
to my commander, such counsel would find that I had
lived up to all prescribed standards, and an investigation
would show that during the period in question this ac-
tivity (civil rights) was the only one which resulted in
cautioning of me by my superiors,

I therefore respectfully request that, in the interest of
justice and noting the press of time, my case be investi-
gated immediately, that I be provided with legal counsel,
and a hearing be conducted to determine the truth and
validity of my statements.

wee

:
i
§
f
#
3
3
y
M4
¥
¢

EXHIBIT 11

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR ForcE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AU)
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR Force BASE, OHIO 45433

{DoD Emblem}
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFIT-G 27 Aug 1968

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Elimination from the
AECP, SSet Herbert P. Schlanger,
AF 12671481

To: A1C Herbert P. Schlanger
3550th Pit Tng We (ATC)
Moody AFB Ga 31602

1, Your request for hearing and reconsideration of with-
drawal from the AECP is denied. Complete review of
the evidence presented in your case shows that you were
capable of attending classes in the Spring semester 1968,
but failed without authority to do so. This failure to
attend all scheduled classes followed a series of unex-
plained, unauthorized absences in preceding terms; ab-
sences about which vou were counseled by both your pro-
fessors and your AFIT Liaison Officer, Failure to attend
classes without excuse is behavior contrary to that expected
of an officer trainee.

2. Your activities with the Arizona State University
Civil Rights Board were not considered to be discreditable
in arriving at the decision to withdraw you from the
AECP. You were withdrawn for lack of officer potential
as demonstrated by unexcused absence from classes under
the authority vested in me by AFM 50-5. You have not
presented any new evidence to either deny or offer a
reasonable excuse for your absence from class. No useful
purpose would be served by a hearing,

ERNEST A, PINSON, Major General, USAF
Commandant

Strength Through Knowledge

EXHIBIT 12

From: SSgt Herbert P. Schlanger
3350 FMS
Moody AFB, Ga. 31601

Subject: Request for Discharge
To: Commander, Moody AFB, Ga.

Sir:

For the following reasons ! request that I be discharged
under the provisions of AFM 39-10:

1, I have served honorably in the U.S. Air Force for
a period of five (5) years, nine (9) months;

2. On 9 Dec 65 I was re-enlisted for a period of six
(6) years in order to enter the Airman’s Education and
Commissioning Program (AECP) ;

3. My selection for the AECP followed an extensive
evaluation of both my potential and attitude;

4. My withdrawal from the AECP was occassioned, it
is asserted, by my “lack of officer potential” and “poor
attitude”;

5. Both my “officer potential” and attitude were com-
mented on favorably by several recommending officers
prior to my entry into the AECP;

6. Therefore it seems logical to conclude that either:

a. The original evaluation of my qualities (i.e,
potential, attitude and abilities) was in error, or

b. AFIT erred in its evaluation which led to my
withdrawal;

7. If 6(a), then it is felt that I should be discharged
in accordance with the provisions of AFM 39-10, para 8,
since, through no fault of my own, I was re-enlisted for
a program for which I was ineligible;

8. If 6(b), then either:

a. I should be reinstated in the AECP, reimbursed
for all expenses incurred in concluding my

Lie
y nT
oan

CFTR NR Ne Re Ne an whe “ Pe eae ne ae i,

bachlor’s degree program, any salary lost due
to my impending administrative demotion be
made up, letters of retraction and correction be
sent to those civilians in contacts with whom
AFIT has impugned my character, the form 785
currently in my personnel file be suitably re-
vised, and I be permitted to attend OTS, or,

b. I should be discharged under the provisions of
AFM 39-10, para 80,

9. It might be contended that both evaluations were
correct, and that my withdrawal was made because of a
change of attitude on my part in the interim or an ac.
tion by me which indicated a “lack of officer potential”,
This conclusion cannot be substantiated and is, in fact,
demonstratably false. On 3 Mar 68 I requested that
AFIT approve a revision of my scheduled graduation
date (from May 68 to Aug 68) since an illness in Jan
68 had disrupted my course of study, This request was
granted on 25 Mar 68. Certainly this extension would
not have been approved had I demonstrated a “lack of
officer potential” or a poor attitude up to that time. Yet
less than ten weeks later I was withdrawn from the
AECP for those very reasons. It seems apparent, there-
fore, that no change in attitude or potential ‘if, indeed,
a person’s “officer potential” can change at ali) was noted
by AFIT in the period from Jan 66 (my entry into the
program) through Mar 68 (‘approval of the extension)—
a period of over two years. Yet just eight weeks prior
to my scheduled completion of the program I was abruptly
ordered to withdraw from school because I “lack officer
potential”; no specifics were given at that time and re
peated inquiries have resulted only in vague generalities
being offered by AFIT, in terms of clarification, leading
to reinforcement of my conviction that 6(b) is the cor-
rect conclusion to be drawn.

10, This being the case, we are left with 8(a) and
8ib) as alternative solutions, if action with justice and
reason is to be taken. It would seem that present cir-
cumstances render 8(b) the more preferable of the two.

35

11. If my request, contained herein, for an honorable
discharge or some other favorable administrative action
is denied, it is my intention to pursue all other remedies
available to me including, but not limited to, iitigation
in the federal courts.

Submitted on 4 September 1968.

s/ Herbert P. Schlanger
HERBERT P, SCHLANGER
SSgt, USAF

From: A1C Herbert P. Schlanger
3550 FMS
Moody AFB, Ga. 31601

Subject: Discharge Application—Additional Information

To: MPC (AFPMAKE)
Randolph AFB, Texas 78148

1. I will not attempt, at this time, to demonstrate the
falsity of AFIT’s charge that I “failed to attend all
scheduled classes” since (a) the burden of proof should
be assumed by the accusing agency and (b) it is virtually
impossible to prove that any student was in any particu-
lar class when, as in this case, the professors did not take
roll; certainly my circumstances at the present time make
this even more difficult. What the following shall attempt
to show is the weakness of AFIT’s contentions and the
arbitrary manner in which this case was handled.

2. I was withdrawn, allegedly, for “having a lack of
officer potential.”

a. This argument is weak as was demonstrated in
my original letter, and

b. “Lack of officer potential” was not among the
possible reasons for withdrawal from an AFIT
program as they were enumerated in the AFIT
Student Manual dated 1 June 1967. This phrase
was added to the list following my elimination

36

from the AECP—apparently as an ex post facto
justification of my withdrawal (Student Manual,
1 July 1968).

3. Paragraph 2B of Col. Palmer’s letter dated 17 June
1968 orders me into a state of arrest (as defined in Art.
9, UCMJ) without probable cause—a violation of Art.
97, UCMJ.

4. Paragraph 2C of that letter has been deemed (by at
least two military lawyers) to be an illegal order—
After I had inquired three times AFIT attempted to
justify the issuance of this order by citing AFM 39-11,
para 1012 as the authority; inspection shows, however,
that this paragraph does not apply nor does it confer
authority to so restrict communication.

5. I was denied legal advice and assistance by JAG at
Williams AFB, Az., HQ AFIT at Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio, and HQ AU at Maxwell AFB, Ala.

6. AFIT contends that “an inquiry into (my) class at-
tendance was conducted under the provisions of AFR
120-3 . . . by the Professor of Aerospace Sciences,
AFROTC Det. 25” ‘at Arizona State University). Ig-
noring, for the moment, the fact that AFR 120-3 does
not cover investigations of this sort, let us briefly exam-
ine the regulation. It states that investigations “will be
(carried oui) by an echelon of command compatible with
a complete, impartial and unbiased presentation of facts.”
It is difficult, in light of the association of AFIT officers
at ASU (including those making the accusations ‘to be
investigated) and the officers of the PAS office, to con-
sider the PAS as “at an echelon of command compatible
with a complete, impartial and unbiased presentation of
facts.” Further, the nature of this case would seem to
warrant an “investigation” rather than an “inquiry”
(AFR 120-3, para 3). The results of this “inquiry” must
also be questioned since, when I asked the investigating
officer (after I had been withdrawn) about the results,
he said his report had been “inconclusive”.

37

7. HQ AU (AUIG) responded to an inquiry I made
through a letter dated 3 Sept 1968 which attempted to
justify AFIT’s withdrawal action. Paragraph la of that
letter states that “the report was conclusive” but in no
way supports this contention. Perhaps AFIT and I differ
in our definitions of “counselling” but I don’t recall be-
ing “counselled by some of (my) professors.” Paragraph
1b simply restates the requirement for attendance. Para-
graph le refers to “counselling” by various officers. I
have been under the impression that at the two 1967
“counselling” (sic) sessions ! had satisfactorily explained
the absences that had occurred. As for Major Rider’s
assertion that I admitted to him “that (I) had been cut-
ting classes extensively ever since (I) had been (at Ari-
zona State University)” I can only say that I never made
such a statement. I should think that it would be obvious
that I would never make such a self-incriminatory state-
ment—even had it been true. Further evidence of the
inadequate nature of the “inquiry” is given by the—let
us say, at best, exaggerated—assertion that I “failed...
to attend the majority of the classes in which (I) was
enrolled.” Paragraph 1d reports that Major Rider felt
that I was not officer material. Paragraph le contains
another false allegation—this one asserting that I was
“maintaining a disgraceful personal appearance.” All I
can say to this is that this charge must never have been
looked into, even though it “contributed to (AFIT-CI’s)
decision to recommend elimination.” Given the oppor-
tunity I could produce scores of witnesses—including the
President of the University, the Dean of Students, mem-
bers of the faculty, clergymen and civic leaders—to re-
fute this damaging, untrue statement. Paragraph 2 does
not exist. Paragraph 3 refers to the aforementioned
“inquiry”. It makes mention of “records” of Arizona
State University from which information concerning my
alleged absences was obtained. It fails to specify what
particular records—perhaps because no records of class
attendance were kept. It should be noted, also, that this
inquiry was supposedly concerned with my attendance
during the Spring semester, 1968, and—contrary to the
implication of paragraph 3—I did not receive three “In-

Oe se
* FEEL GS POL ON SE EE

38

complete” grades that semester. Those grades of “I” were
received in the previous term because I was hospitalized
during the week of final exams. This is but one example
of the apparent confusion as to the focus of the inquiry.
Nowhere in this report is one concrete fact mentioned.

8. The recommendations of me by officers prior to my
entry into the AECP are in my personnel file at the
CBPO, Moody AFB, Ga.

9. Enclosed is a copy of my request for a hearing which
was submitted to General Pinson. It contains much of
the information presented here, along with several addi-
tional points. This request was denied because, according
to the Commandant, a hearing would serve “no useful
purpose”.

10. I shall refrain from elaborating on what I am con-
vinced was the underlying reason for my withdrawal—
my participation in an extra-curricular activity which
Major Rider found objectionable. Despite AFIT’s de-
nials, the evidence still indicated that this was the major
factor in the initiation of elimination action.

11. In spite of repeated requests—both oral and written
—I have been denied access to the “evidence” presented
against me to AFIT. Had I been given an opportunity
I am confident that I could have refuted it.

12. If I can be of assistance in the clarification of any
aspect of this case please contact me. My duty phone is
extension 3836; my mailing address is PO Box 337,
Moody AFB, Ga. 31601.

HERBERT P. SCHLANGER
A1C, USAF

ec: Senator Jacob K. Javits
Representative William F. Ryan
Dr. John Morris

A ks
awe).

a te
pn isd

SEs

39
EXHIBIT 13

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
29 Oct. 1968

REPLY TO USAFMPC (AFPMAKE)
ATTN OF: RANDOLPH AFB TEXAS 78148
SuBJECT: A1C Herbert P. Schlanger, AF 12 671 481

To: Tech Tng Cen (CBPO-SA)
Keesler AFB, Miss 39534

Not favorably considered for the following reasons:

a. After careful review of the entire case file, it is
our considered opinion that Airman Schlanger was prop-
erly eliminated from the AECP.

b. Since Airman Schlanger received over two years of
college education, at essentially no expense to himself,
while drawing pay and allowances from the Air Force,
the Air Force is entitled to expect him to comply with
his December 1965 enlistment contract.

e.. This application cannot be considered as a petition
for a new forum before which he may contest the pro-
priety of his involuntary withdrawal from AECP. This
issue has already been contested, decided, appealed, and
sustained by Air University.

FoR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

/s/ Dale T. Sarrett
DALE T. SARRETT
Lt Colonel, USAF AF Fm 107 w/2 Atch
Directorate of Pers Ltr fr Amn Schlanger,
Program Actions undated, w/Atchs

Atch

tho ee bo

40

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. Civ. 69-381 Phx.
[File Endorsement Omitted |

[Title Omitted }

ORDER—August 28, 1969

The petition of Herbert Phillip Schlanger for writ of
habeas corpus having been submitted and the Court hav-
ing duly considered the same,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Herbert Phillip
Schlanger for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Saunders
v. Crouchley, 274 F.Supp. 505 (1967).

DATED August 28, 1969.

Wo. P. COPPLE
United States District Judge

41

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24826
[File Endorsement Omitted |

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPELLANT
Vv.

Hon. Dr. RoBeERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air
Force, COLONEL HOMER BAKER, Commander, Moody
AFB, Valdosta, Georgia, and COLONEL NOEL B. RED-
DRICK, Commander AFROTC Det. 15, Arizona State
University, Tempe, Arizona, APPELLEES

ORDER—Filed December 12, 1969

Before: HAMLEY, BROWNING and CARTER, Circuit Judges

The order denying the application for a writ of habeas
corpus is set aside without prejudice and the cause is
remanded to the district court for issuance of an order
to show cause and further proceedings thereon.

FREDERICK G. HAMLEY
JAMES R. BROWNING

JAMES M. CARTER

United States Circuit Judges

OR EEN 5 ZETA phone

42

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. Civ. 69-381 Phx.

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER
vs.

Dr. RoBeRT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air Force,
COLONEL HOMER BAKER, Commander, Moody AFB,
Valdosta, Georgia, and COLONEL NoEL B. REDDRICK,
Commander, AFROTC Det 25, Arizona State Univer-
sity, Tempe, Arizona, RESPONDENTS

ORDER—January 8, 1970

Petitioner having submitted herein an application for
writ of habeas corpus, and good cause appearing there-
from,

IT IS ORDERED that the respondents above named
shall, within twenty (20) days from the date hereof,
show cause, if any they have, why the application for
writ of habeas corpus should not be granted, or why a
hearing should not be held on the merits of said applica-
tion, by filing with this Court such response as you deem
appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of the veri-
fied application for writ of habeas corpus, along with a
copy of this order, be served upon each of the respond-
ents and the United States Attorney for the District of
Arizona by the United States Marshal.

DATED January 8, 1970.

Wo. P. CopPLe
United States District Judge

43

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24,826

[Filed Jan. 7, 1970, Wm. B. Luck, Clerk]
HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPELLANT
v.
Hon. Dr. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR.,
Secretary of the Air Force, ET AL., APPELLEES
CORRECTED ORDER

Appellees are stayed from removing appellant, or or-
dering or causing his removal, from the District of Ari-
zona until proceedings in the district court pursuant to
this court’s mandate are completed, or until the further
order of the district court.

JAMES R. BROWNING
United States Circuit Judge

ANT SCN nM: Ort AY.

—

44

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV-69-381-PHX-WPC

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER
vs.
Dr. ROBERT C, SEAMANS, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

MOTION TO DismIss—Filed January 27, 1970

COMES NOW the respondents in the above captioned
matter, appearing specially by Richard C., Gormley, As-
sistant United States Attorney, in response to Order to
Show Cause issued by this Court on January 8, 1970, and
respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the petition for
habeas corpus heretofore filed on the grounds that this
Court lacks jurisdictions.

DATED this 27th day of January, 1970.

RICHARD K, BURKE
United States Attorney

RICHARD C. GORMLEY
Assistant U. S. Attorney

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

It is well settled law that this Court should and must
find that jurisdiction exists first before entertaining any
proceeding. Bookout v. Beck, 354 F.2d 823 (CA. 9
1965).

An indispensable party in any habeas corpus proceed-
ing involving a serviceman is the Commander who has
custody of the petitioner. The petitioner, in Paragraph
4 of his application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleges

oe aks

45

that the Honorable Robert Seamans, Jr., Secretary of
the Air Force, and Colonel Homer Baker, Commander
of Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, are the persons who
are at present unlawfully restraining him of his liberty.
As can be seen by the return of the United States Mar-
shal, neither of these persons were found within the con-
fines of the State of Arizona which comprises the geo-
graphical jurisdiction of this Court.

At the time the petition was filed in this district, the
petitioner was on leave status from the 3550th Air Base
Group, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. Attached to this
motion is an affidavit to that effect executed by the per-
sonnel records custodian of the aforementioned base.

It has long been established that the jurisdiction of a
United States District Court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus is limited to those cases in which the petitioner
is confined or detained within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Court. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948);
Duncan v. State of Maine, 295 F.2d 528 (C.A. 1 1961)
cert. denied 368 U.S. 998. It is likewise beyond argu-
ment that a person on active duty in the armed services
may be “in custody” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
$2241. Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (C.A. 3
1967) cert. denied sub nom; Brown v. Clifford, 390 U.S.
1005 (1968).

In the instant case Sergeant Schlanger was and is on
leave status from his Commander at Moody Air Force
Base, Georgia. It is therefore essential that any action
concerning his alleged detention be brought in the United
States District Court in the State of Georgia. Wurster v.
Perrin, 303 F.Supp. 480 (1969); Rudick v. Laird, 412
F.2d 16 (C.A. 2 1969), cert. denied 38 L.W. 3174.

Attached hereto is a copy of the decision of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
in the case of McKay v. Secretary of the United States
Air Force, Mise. No. 69-80-W. Also attached hereto is
a copy of the decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in the same matter.

SP,

46

Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted
that the petition should be dismissed for want of juris-
diction over the person.

RICHARD K, BURKE
United States Attorney

RIcHARD C, GORMLEY
Assistant U. S. Attorney

Copy of the foregoing mailed this
27th day of January, 1970, to:

Sgt. Herbert P. Schlanger
2419 North Saratoga
Tempe, Arizona 85281

Captain Titsworth
Office of the Judge Advocate General
Williams Air Force Base, Arizona 85027

RICHARD C, GORMLEY
Assistant U. 8S. Attorney

STATE OF GEORGIA )
) AFFIDAVIT
COUNTY OF LOWNDES |)

Before me, BETTY R,. LANGLEY, a Notary Public in
and for said County, personally came LAWRENCE D.
McDONALD, IstLt, USAF, 328-38-7351 FV, Chief, Data
Control Section and the official personnel records custo-
dian of the military records of Sgt Herbert P. Schlanger,
FR 027-382-5213, 3550th Air Base Group, Moody Air
Force Base, Georgia, who, being duly sworn according
to law, deposes and says that the official military per-
sonnel records of Sgt Herbert P. Schlanger, FR 027-32-
5213, reflect his duty status from 4 June 1969 to 21 Sep-
tember 1969 as follows:

ha

be

47
FROM: THRU: STATUS: REMARKS:
4Jun69" 14Jun69 Leave 11 days leave
15 Jun 69 15 Jun 69 TDY 1 day travel as authorized
by AFM 213-1
16 Jun 69 22Aug69 TDY Attending school—68 days
23 Aug 69 19 Sep 69 Leave 28 days leave
20 Sep 69 20 Sep 69 TDY 1 day travel as authorized
by AFM 213-1
N/A Present Returned to Moody AFB
21 Sep 69** for Duty

* Date signed out
** Date signed in

The above 39 days of leave were taken in conjunction
with permissive TDY for the purpose of attending college
at Arizona State University. The two days of travel
shown above were computed in accordance with Table 5,
AFM 35-6. Sgt Schlanger was authorized 70 days TDY,
including two days of travel time based on available air
travel (Paragraph 4-5d, AFM 213-1).

Further, Sgt Schlanger is presently in a leave status
which commenced on 9 December 1969.

/s/ Lawrence D. McDonald
LAWRENCE D. MCDONALD
IstLt, USAF
328-38-7351 FV
Chief, Data Control Section
3550 Air Base Gp, Moody AFB, Ga.

SWORN TO before me and subscribed in my presence
this 16 day of January, 1970.

s’ Betty R. Langley
Notary Public
Georgia, State-At-Large
My Commission Expires May 7, 1973

_

NF er eee

a Pt

PG SP BOP AEF

er

48

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No, CIV 69-381 PHX WPC

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, PETITIONER
vs
Dr. ROBERT C, SEAMANS, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM—Filed January 30, 1970

On January 27, 1970, the Respondents appearing spe-
cially in the above captioned matter filed a Motion to
Dismiss. Attached thereto were certain exhibits. In fur-
ther support of the Motion to Dismiss, the Respondents
attach hereto a duly authenticated certification by Rob-
ert C. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, regard-
ing copies of extracts from the master personnel records
of Sgt Herbert P. Schlanger, 027-32-5213, the Petitioner
herein.

DATED this 30th day of January, 1970,

RICHARD K, BURKE
United States Attorney

RICHARD C, GORMLEY
Assistant U. S. Attorney

Copy of the foregoing mailed
this 30 day of January, 1970

To: Sgt. Herbert P. Schlanger
2419 N. Saratoga, Tempe, Arizona 85281

Captain Titsworth
Office of the Judge Advocate General
Williams Air Force Base, Arizona 85027

RICHARD C, GORMLEY
Asst. U. S. Attorney

er ale rH
49

Suited Diates \ > ef Srrvziza

DEPARTMENT OF TiS AIR FORCE

Hq USAF, Washington, D.C. 20 January | yg 70.
(ewe! ino

JEREBY CERTIFY that I am the Director of Administration, Departaent of the
aie Pee . and as such am the official custodian of all Air Force Records, I Durther
ce that the attached is a trae and exact copy of extracts from the Master
Perteam 1 Records of Sgt Herbert P, Schlanger, 027-32-5213.

Director of Administration
United States Air Force

D WSVULBY CERTIFY that Colemel John F. Rash, USAF . who
read fhe Fcegoing certificate, is the pirector of Adsinistration, Cnived Staves Air Force
. and

hete ha ee:tification as such, full faith 294 credit ave and ouzut to be given.

IN TeSTIMONY Wuscasor't, ROBERT C. SEANANS, Rs

Seert*ry of the Air Force, have bereuato caused the seal of the Department of the

—

Se Aig POtC! to be adined and my ame to be becrbed by the Adsuini Assist:
, ant (9 the Seerctary of the Dep at the city of Washinztoa,
° a ae) | er
Ee me -- n ae. ws Tos
» nT ee eid 8 mh nt .
" ah ‘ err entary of Ae aie force,
® - “a - .
. By “iy ey s errr es
Pe teen doe a oa _

‘ ~
io m eae —— oo ——
uu _ © eeeere
ba ~ - VtOUs BOUTON OF Tone SGNM MEE BE UEEO UNTH BTOCH Hw EAnavETES aad

“RATIVE ORDERS

TRORIZATION S68 CHANSE OF AD

® BEING CHANGED

Seats
Pane © OnveR Tipe end ho) © oate
ms.
v 3G
on. wae Fes
Dd Sms NOMEN s) $ H8Se EO BY THis READQUAKRTERS

a (Type end MS)

came

arON On Pos ONT

Seecke B&B LC aDT NAME

HERBERT P.

SHLANGER
LANGES

Sot So

am niet:

CERT FE CATION OF RODVIDL AL SS TO @mOM CHARGE ACTION PERTA NS
FP RST MP OCOLE NT AR c

a

2) AN
if more space se required continue on coverse plentafi ene
FROM:
>
a FRSC NTO
me PERTAINING TO TRE INDIVIDUALS! LISTED IN TEM 3 ARE
s . 43 sn0en NN Tiw 6
(issued db. this Heart Atuted am ater S& )
No 70 CTD. MCS. Start Tou

on

Cavalien) & Choan ze

D550 Piisg

sn order deine

s ites

S eMERDES TO READ

-aAMeREws
ja ‘Tes

as Beas

£35 cays leave

‘3 Remanne

as>-
wy
ws

Pe cg MEE DE} HRS E-

_—.
wD a eney

PRONE WO

wort
—

cee poe
acer weer ney OLS EOITION Bi BE USES

avis
NOLEN ISLSZC

ova 52S

coDsT04

Faerie) “-9unTo9 fosemmgye 2 8G masemscae
2 - . C “=

awe i

:

pal.

*soramas Aan suewTss. 6771"

watery wre (eteht woe osseminusqy °ee*r1s @ ove

ae A ste
as on — toe oF ve —-
CTE OSE SS VV Torre Vit

mS ULTIMA OcuPr {dirs

397399 [TS ere

‘S57

=

- oman ee” - --— -- - "> ache
SO MEN tL *9 C2 SOTEE O9TSIG FPOTALLES COTSTENS

Z 74 C'S ou
a ee ee

(2 92s os
ye co ce cee tee
foscccncr bb to trl te dia ol od oo" LAT EOE.
CWL*E6002 USTSTEMS pom Ln Tesearz:
LRGt" MER? GOL G96, Ome Y BhORe
nae one * P = oad ated

soreey 9% °vN “egy Leet sosy pe

oo
ro 22% -—2

4947 [os 27

ada one Mined atta al
[Ree pares perwere
eer cme et

§

come forums (atone sng 849 Bree SSSRLITY PAT NT 872°F efon 6% pezsseus"? C= UT
; A SOPRASE® Q°ATEI9 3C% 2909 OF? TET

4 [0 mertrounn? TOMES easy from 04 ure

- 422 50 Peodsns O44

oe - wen ¢
se 39 2A749e°59

e+ passmmsed st uarpen>

:
GGGE “CRG9TCALTD ET TET

DEQ UAT RNS AER

Pak MY SETS

SS

io > 7
4 Saree, eat Lee
F 5 a ~ .
i ae "ee
: bp
2 = A 72 i
: os =
5 a —— —}— - *. -- ° - - i
' tae eh a
a ae a cm ~
§ ™~
ee | bes.
i sa ae >
£ : ~~, ze
- 1/ , # cro Barre i) ~~
| af :
! as O) Did ab. Or 1, 3 ) oak | ys
| Y , fe ™

¢
/

!
| i
|

wa as ii » *f grtarveaiype . aa tw ! °

. “an | '

Sn ee a ee
-

cate G3 Wh PLA OG5E SIULSIIIG 1.9/7 b 198g

ps ¢
CF he 5 EY sa OF GfvFe rt

SJ ALIS Ga Mijas

pe GTI
gate” 2I%y

TY Sided sae

“
ee) Med Be a 08,50 ‘mos ‘a. Bp

55

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Civ 69-381 Phx

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPLICANT
Vv.

Hon. Dr. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air
Force, ET AL., RESPONDENTS

MoTioN—February 2, 1970

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, pro se in forma
pauperis, respectfully moves this court to dismiss respond-
ents’ motion of January 27, 1970 for the following rea-
sons, which are more elaborately set forth in the accom-
panying memorandum:

1. An attack on this court’s jurisdiction is precluded
by previous decisions in this case;

2. This court, as a matter of law and of fact, is the
proper forum in which this controversy should be heard.

Alternatively, the annexed memorandum is submitted
in opposition to respondents’ aforementioned motion and
applicant, then, requests that oral argument be heard at
the earliest possible time but in no case later than Febru-
ary 9, 1970.

Applicant further moves this court, should it sustain
respondents’ aforementioned motion, to continue in effect,
for a period of at least one week following said decision,
the injunction entered on January 6, 1970 in order to af-
ford applicant an opportunity to seek appropriate relief
from the Court of Appeals.

a a al a Sa aS na ee
HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,
Pro Se

P.O. Box 276

Tempe, Az. 85281

Dated: February 2, 1970
Tempe, Arizona

EEE LORI TE POND PGS

EPR SIMI aM tS PRT IEe

OTT ERIN EEN MRE TS TIGER

56

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Civ 69-381 Phx

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, APPLICANT
Vv.

Hon. Dr. Ropert C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air
Force, ET AL., RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM OF Law—February 3, 1970

I. AN ATTACK ON THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION
IS PRECLUDED AT THIS TIME.

Respondent is precluded from attacking the jurisdiction
of this court in the instant matter by the theory of the
“law of the case”, 21 C.J.S. 195, et seq. This court, in
dismissing the application for the second time, said:

“. .. it appears, from the moving papers, that the
(applicant) is in the custody and under the orders
of the commander of the Moody Air Force Base in
Georgia, even though he may be in this area, and I
feel that jurisdiction for the matter is in (that)
a

thus raising the jurisdictional issue on its own motion.
In his brief in support of his appeal (Ninth Circuit,
Number 24,826), applicant quoted the court’s aforemen-
tioned remarks (p. 13) and noted that jurisdiction was
question. As respondent points out in his memorandum
(p. 1), and as this court has demonstrated by its action,
a court must in the first instance, in any proceeding, de-
termine that jurisdiction exists, Bookout v. Beck, 354
F.2d 823 (9 Cir, 1965). The Court of Appeals, having
the issue squarely before it, did just that; by considering
applicant’s argument and remanding “for issuance of
a show cause order and further proceedings” and then,
subsequently, entering an extraordinary order maintain-
ing petitioner’s presence in this district, that Court has

57

decided this issue in petitioner’s favor. Right or wrong, it
is that decision which has become the law of this case.
Further, a ruling of the Court of Appeals cannot be later
attacked in a lower court when, as here, there is an ab-
sence of any change in the circumstances of the case.

II. THIS COURT IS, AS A MATTER OF FACT AND
LAW, THE PROPER FORUM FOR THIS ACTION.

Respondent appends to his memorandum, without elab-
oration, a copy of Judge Wyzanski’s opinion in McKay v.
Sec’y of the Air Force, (D. Mass., 1969). Except insofar
as the opinion indicates that this court is, indeed, the
proper forum for this action, the case cited bears little ap-
plication to the one at bar. First it was pointed out that,
at the time of filing, no custody was being exercised.
While this holding is not undisputed by analagous cases,
eg., Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139, 148 (E.D. Pa.,
1952), custody in the instant case is clear. Applicant
herein was undisputedly subject to respondents’ orders;
that alone is sufficient custody, Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 240 (1963). We need not discuss the alterna-
tive mentioned by Judge Wyzanski—the possibility of ap-
plicant being AWOL and, hence, not in custody—since
respondents’ return concedes that such was not the case
here. Finally it was held, in McKay, that the Massa-
chusettes district court was not the proper forum for the
action since, prior to the filing of the petition, McKay
had had no contact with that district. This fact was
central to the decision. In the instant case petitioner’s
contact with this district has been more than ample—
it has been oevrwhelming; indeed, “lack of contact”
could have been convincingly advanced as a defense
against this action had it been brought in any other dis-
trict in the United States.

Petitioner was assigned to within this district in Jan-
uary, 1966, pursuant to the terms and conditions of his
re-enlistment contract of December 9, 1965, for entrance
into the Airman’s Education and Commissioning Pro-
gram (AECP) at Arizona State University. He was
still assigned here when, in May, 1968 an unlawful in-
quiry into his conduct was allegedly conducted by military
authorities at ASU, and when in June, 1968—in an ac-

RB PIE SE

a ee a

API I ATR RNR GG

greg ¥

58

tion based on this and other unlawful acts—he was unlaw-
fully removed from the AECP. He was re-assigned to
ASU on temporary duty (TDY) in June, 1969 to com-
plete, at his own expense, his college education. While
petitioner concedes that his status was that of “delay en
route”, or “leave”, on the day that the instant applica-
tion was filed with this court, it was leave in conjunction
with the aforementioned TDY assignment, was authorized
in the orders originally promulgated regarding the as-
signment and in no way affects this court’s jursidiction.
At all times petitioner was subject to respondents’ or-
ders; he was sufficiently restrained for habeas corpus to
lieu and he was still at the place of his assignment.

On the issue raised by respondents’ motion, the opinion
in U.S. v. Flint, 54 F. Supp. 889, appended hereto, and
affirmed by the Second Circuit, 142 F.2d 62, is more to the
point. Applicant therein was inducted, transferred to the
Enlisted Reserve and sent home for two weeks furlough
before reporting for active duty. It was during those two
weeks—while he was free to go where and do what he
pleased—that he applied for habeas corpus. Respondent's
motion to dismiss, similar to the instant motion, was
denied on the grounds that the petitioner—even though
on leave—was sufficiently restrained.

In any event, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948),
cited by respondents, was specifically cited by applicant
in his appeal brief, in support of his position that juris-
diction was properly laid in this court—a position that
was sustained by the subsequent actions of the Court of
Appeals. In fact, the Supreme Court’s holding in Ahrens
left petitioner no choice but to file his petition in this
court.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that
respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the applicant should be denied.

/s/ Seon ht ES
HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,
Pro Se
P.O. Box 276
Tempe, Az. 85281
Dated: February 3, 1970

Tempe, Arizona

59
AFFIDAVIT

I, HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER, attest to the
following:

1. That in the spring of 1969 I applied for and was
granted entrance into “Operation Bootstrap”—an Air
Force program which allows a qualified applicant to be
assigned in a TDY status to a university or college in
order to complete, entirely at his own expense, his de-
gree program. I further requested, and was granted,
fifteen (15) days delay enroute in conjunction with this
TDY assignment. The restraints imposed upon me during
both the period referred to as TDY and that of “delay en
route” were, for all practical purposes, the same.

2. I do not contect that August 27, 1969—the day that
my application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed—
was a day chargeable to me as leave; it was, however,
leave authorized in conjuction with the TDY and author-
ized in those TDY orders. Moreover, it fell between two
periods credited as TDY.

3. While not material to the instant issue, I contest
the statement of Lt. McDonald, in his affidavit annexed to
respondents’ motion, that I am currently on leave. I be-
lieve that the period from January 6, 1970 is not charge-
able as leave, since I am present in Arizona pursuant to
an order of the Court of Appeals. Further, I believe that
respondents acted wrongly and unlawfully in changing
iny status, with respect to my entitlement to pay and
allowances, on January 18, 1970.

4. I believe that, as a matter of fact and of law, this
court is the proper forum for the hearing of this con-
troversy. If the court is troubled by the technical distinc-
tion betwen my status when on TDY and when in delay
en route, I request that a hearing be held at which time
expert testimony on this and related points would be
taken.

5. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was made
aware, by me, of the issues raised by respondents’ motion
and, I believe, took them into consideration before enter-
ing its orders of December 12, 1969 and January 6, 1970.

PAS a RTM at Ses

6. I was at all relevant times, and am presently,
physically present within the District of Arizona.

/s/ Herbert Phillip Schlanger
HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER

Sworn and subscribed to before me this fourth day of
February, 1970 at Tempe, Arizona.

/s/ Olivia H. Birchett
Notary Public
My Commission Expires Jan.
23, 1972
OLIVIA H. BIRCHETT

61
an RETURN ON SERVICE OF WRIT RECEIVED
United States of America JAN 3.01970
District OF ATAz0M® UNITED S_ATES anon
i, a Sze
uerbert Paillip Schlanrer Clerk's No, iv. €9+38 Phx
vs.
or. Yobert C. a vr., Sec. of the *ir Force
‘olonel omer Baker, Comm. Moody AFB, /ald sta, WS. Marshal's No. 1141-?
‘olonel Yoel §. Yedirick, Comm. ATROTC Net. 25 Arizona State University Ai
Tenve, Arisona. SERVICE COMPLETED or ENDEAVOR TO SERVE

—
I hereby certify and return that I the annexed Crver ¢ & Applic: tion
on the therein-named _ .olonel Homer eg ttl ‘wpady ASt
(Name of company.

by handing to and leaving a true and correct copy thereof with (if endeavor—describe what was
done in endeavoring to serve) -olonel jomer Saker

(Name of individual or agent of company. corporation. ete |
personally at (if endeavor—show addresses where endeavors made)

Mis Office; “oody ayn, _V ,
Address Street number apartment number. rural route. ete |
Valtosta, Geornia in the said District

at 3330) wmm-pm.onthe — id day of Jar. , 1979

1 hereby certify and return, that on the day of . 19
I received the within : and that after
diligent search, I am unable to find the within named

within said district.

illier 1. “Martin wT.

teryMarshal.

poe —— Med SOE
5 vse — ™ CG: Mteine om Forme

Je3

SS

_patiert Puallar Lea

ves.
Be hebout C. cere

RETURN ON SERVICE OF WRIT

United States of America

District of — *h?:

Ir. ut a)

U.S. Marshal's No.

SERVICE COMPLETED or ENDEAVOR TO SERVE

Thereby certify and return that I aoe the annexed |" *?

on the therein-named

We wot

ret C. &

(Wee

(Name of individual cumpany. corporetian. ete |

, MERREN, - alan:
by Mandi wo and leaving a true and correct copy thereof with (if endeavor —describe what was

done in endeavoring to serve) © CSV ef 8)

Pe a t

certafic! :

lies

Lina mttre.

We Polc BASS
x iS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1970

No. 5481

HERBERT PHILLIP SCHLANGER,

Petitioner,
7s,

ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of
the Air Force, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

OPINIONS BELOW

No opinions in this case have been reported. Contained
in the Appendix are the district court order of August 28,

1969 (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction) (A. 40), the Court

of Appeals order of December 12, 1969 (remanding to the
district court for issuance of a show cause order) (A. 41),
the district court opinion and order of February 10, 1970

BRE ELIS LION PRBS Ea 8 Meet, cll

AOE GEOL FO GSR LIT IIT LOL YO TE BART. ag

% a
2

(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction) (A. 65), and the order
of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1970 (affirming the
dismissal) (A. 68). No evidentiary hearing has been held.

JURISDICTION

The order affirming the dismissal was entered by the
Court of Appeals on May 20, 1970. A timely petition for
rehearing (A. 69-79), including a Suggestion of the appropri-
ateness of rehearing en banc, was denied on June 17, 1970
(A. 80). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
July 2, 1970 and was granted on October 19. 1970. Juris-
diction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does a federal district court lack the power to inquire
into the lawfulness of restraints exercised over a petitioner,
who is a member of the armed forces, present in the
district pursuant to orders issued by his commander who
is in another state?

STATUTES INVOLVED

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391 (e):
i391. Venue generally

* * * * *

(e) A civil action in which each defendant is an
officer of the United States or any agency thereof
acting in his official capacity or under color of legal
authority, or an agency of the United States, may,
except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in
any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in
the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose.
or (3) any real property involved in the action is
situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real prop-
erty is involved in the action.

3

The summons and complaint in such an action
shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the
summons and complaint to the officer or agency as
required by the rules may be made by certified mail
beyond the territorial limits of the district in which
the action is brought.

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241:
2241. Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by
the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district
courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be
entered in the records of the district court of the
district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and
any circuit judge may decline to entertain an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer
the application for hearing and determination to the
district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend
to a prisoner unless—

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the
authority of the United States or is committed
for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or
omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or
an order, process, judgment or decree of a court
or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Consti-
tution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and
domiciled therein is in custody for an act done
or omitted under any alleged right, title, author-
ity, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed
under the commission, order or sanction of any
foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity
and effect of which depend upon the law of
nations; or

TS A
y bye

IEEE GEE TSE REL IEE PSs ae

TARO I Re ees mae LAX

GE TOA NT Pr

4

(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to
testify or for trail.

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2243
2243. Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision:

A court, justice or judge entertaining an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith
award the writ or issue an order directing the
respondent to show cause why the writ should not
be granted, unless it appears from the application
that the applicant or person detained is not entitled
thereto.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed
to the person having custody of the person detained.
It shall be returned within three days unless for
good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty
days, is allowed.

The person to whom the writ or order is directed
shall make a return certifying the true cause of the
detention.

When the writ or order is returned a day shall be
set for hearing, not more than five days after the
return unless for good cause additional time is
allowed.

Unless the application for the writ and the return
present only issues of law the person to whom the
writ is directed shall be required to produce at the
hearing the body of the person detained.

The applicant or the person detained may, under
oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return
or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it
may be amended, by leave of the court, before or
after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the
facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice
require.

SSE

i)
ol

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 7, 1962, SSgt. Schlanger enlisted in the
United States Air Force. Three years later, on December 9,
1965, he re-enlisted for a period of six years, prior to, in
reliance upon and as required for his entrance into the
Airman Education and Commissioning Program (AECP)
for which he had been selected (A. 4, 33). The AECP is a
program which provides “undergraduate education, followed
by officer training and commissioning, for a_ selected
number of carefully screened, career-minded airmen at
selected civilian colleges and universities.” !

In January, 1966, Sgt. Schlanger entered the AECP and
was assigned to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, “with duty at
Arizona State University” (A. 7); that duty was, primarily,
the satisfactory completion of his degree program at the
University.2_ He was progressing satisfactorily when, in June
of 1968, ten weeks before his scheduled graduation, he was
summarily removed from the program, ordered to withdraw
from the University and placed in a state of arrest by AFIT
authorities in Ohio (A. 5, 13); he was, despite his requests,
denied a hearing or access to any evidence which might
have been used in reaching the decision to remove him
(A. 6, 18, 20, 28-31, 32). He was, additionally, informed
that there were “[no] statutory provisions for appeal of
the Commandant’s decision to withdraw [him] from the
AECP” (A. 22). Though he was removed purportedly
for having demonstrated a “lack of officer potential” by
allegedly cutting some classes (A. 6, 17), the removal was
precipitated by Sgt. Schlanger’s formation and leadership
of the Arizona State University Civil Rights Board—a
campus organization which sought to alleviate growing
racial tensions through mediation, communication and
recourse to legal remedies for solution of racial and ethnic
grievances arising on and around the campus (A. 30, 38).

1 “Guidebook for the AECP,” p.1 (AFIT, AU, WPAFB, 0).
2“AFIT Student Manual,” paragraph 1-7.

- aT
6

According to the petition (A. 4, paragraph 10; A. 8, para-
graph 30), it was these actions, ie., the removal of Sgt.
Schlanger from the Airman’s Education and Commissioning
Program (AECP) and the denial of a commission, which
breached and rendered void the re-enlistment contract.

Sgt. Schlanger appealed through command channels for
a hearing, access to evidence and re-instatement (A. 28-31):
while attempting to secure redress through these channels,
his status was changed from that of an “officer trainee,” he
was demoted and re-assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, to
complete the remainder of his six year re-enlistment in a
non-commissioned status (A. 20).

On May 28, 1969, having unsuccessfully exhausted his
administrative remedies and having been denied a discharge
(A. 33-39) and having, in the opinion of his military super-
iors at Moody AFB, performed his duties in an “outstand-
ing manner,”’? he was issued temporary duty (TDY) assign-
ment orders which assigned him to Arizona State University
to complete his degree requirements (under a different
program and at his own expense) (A. 47, 51). These orders
assigned Sgt. Schlanger to Tempe, Arizona, for a period of
85 days (June 4 through August 29, 1969), seventy days
of which were to be considered “duty” days and 15 as
“leave” (A. 47, 51).

On August 27, 1969, Sgt. Schlanger filed his application
for a writ of habeas corpus (alleging that, his re-enlistment
contract having been irremediably breached, he was being
restrained detained unlawfully) in the district court for the
District of Arizona. The action was immediately dismissed
by the court, sua sponte, on August 28, 1969 (A. 40)
and reconsideration was denied on September 5, 1969.
Sgt. Schlanger appealed, requested expeditious action and

>This characterization of the nature of SSgt. Schlanger’s service is
reflected in his performance reports, letters of recommendation and
recognition, and promotion to non-commissioned officer ranks (first
to sergeant and, more recently, to staff sergeant).

7

returned, as ordered, to Moody AFB, Georgia. Granted
leave in December, he argued his appeal before the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; an order was entered
setting aside the order dismissing the petition and the case
was returned to the district court for issuance of a show
cause order “‘and further proceedings thereon” (A. 41). An
order was subsequently entered which stayed the military
authorities from removing Sgt. Schlanger, or ordering or
causing his removal from Arizona (A. 43). Despite this
order, Sgt. Schlanger was informed that should he fail to
return to Moody AFB, Georgia, by January 18, 1970, his
pay and allowances would be terminated (which they were).
Later, Sgt. Schlanger was ordered by the respondents to
report to Shaw AFB, S.C., preparatory to shipment to
Southeast Asia; these instructions were suspended only -
after Sgt. Schlanger moved to have the respondents cited
for contempt of court.

Upon remand, the petition was again dismissed without
a hearing, on respondents’ motion, for lack of jurisdiction
(A. 65-68). An appeal was immediately taken, expeditious
action being requested. Following oral argument, the
Court of Appeals affirmed and, as noted, denied rehearing.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It is now widely recognized that a member of the armed
forces is “in custody” within the meaning of Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2241. It also seems to be
beyond question that, when a serviceman is granted “leave”
from his duty assignment, he remains “in custody”’ during
that period. When a serviceman is physically present within
a district, and petitions for habeas corpus there, he is,
therefore, obviously “in custody” within that court’s juris-
diction. The court must, however, initially decide: (1)
whether he states a cause of action cognizable in a federal
district court, (2) whether the action is properly brought in
that particular district court, and (3) whether the court has
jurisdiction over the parties. In other words, the court

8

must find subject matter jurisdiction, venue jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction.

In this action, the lower courts had subject matter juris-
diction: Sgt. Schlanger is being restrained of his liberty by
officers of the United States Air Force under color of
authority of the United States. This custody is unlawful
since the re-enlistment contract, in accordance with whose
terms Sgt. Schlanger was serving, was breached and rendered
void by the USAF authorities; there is no valid enlistment
agreement in force at this time. Venue was properly laid
in Arizona since Sgt. Schlanger was present in that district
pursuant to military duty orders, the cause of action arose
in Arizona, all relevant witnesses and records not subject to
military custody and control were in Arizona and the
government was not inconvenienced by having to defend
the suit there. Venue and personal jurisdiction over the
respondents is conferred by Title 28, United States Code,
Section 1391 (e).

In Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), this Court
held that, except in the most unusual circumstances, the
presence of the petitioner within a district court’s territorial
jurisdiction is a necessary prerequisite to initiation of an
action for habeas corpus. In 1948, however, there were
very few potential petitioners who would have been unable
to name a proper respondent within the district in which
they were restrained; the expansion of the scope of the
Great Writ, with the changes in the nature and extent of
custody necessary for it to be available which have been
wrought by this Court through its recent decisions, has
created an entirely new class of petitioner. Since many of
these petitioners may not be subject to restraint by anyone
within the district in which they reside, there is compelling
reason to reinforce the holding of Ahrens: the Great Writ.
to fulfill its historic purpose as an easily accessible, expedi-
tious means of testing the lawfulness of restraint, must be
readily available in a forum convenient to the petitioner.
To require a petitioner, who like Sgt. Schlanger is subject

9

to restraint wherever he is, to travel across the continent in
order to contest that restraint is contrary to the spirit of

habeas corpus. Moreover, it is totally unnecessary when the
restraint complained of is imposed by an officer, agency or
branch of the United States since Title 28, United States

Code, Section 1391(e) provides for service of process in

this instance.

ARGUMENT
1. THE QUESTION DEFINED

The principle laid down by the Ninth Circuit in Jarrett
y. Resor, 426 F.2d 213 (1970), and extended to include
this action, presents some conceptual difficulties. Sgt.
Schlanger filed his petition while he was in Arizona, on
leave, following a duty assignment in Arizona and prior to
leaving Arizona for his base in Georgia; yet in dismissing
this action, the Ninth Circuit relied solely on Jarrett, supra,
which held that a member of the armed forces who is
“voluntarily at a place other than his assigned duty station
is not in custody at that place.”

If it is being suggested that Sgt. Schlanger was not in
custody at all at the time that the action was commenced,
then obviously an action in habeas corpus would not lie.
But, as has often been pointed out, this Court has through
its recent decisions (Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236;
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234; Peyton v. Rowe, 391
U.S. 54), significantly altered the concept of the nature and
extent of ‘“‘custody”’ necessary before relief through habeas
corpus would be available. In line with these decisions, it
is now well-established that amenability to military orders
and control constitutes sufficient restraint for habeas
corpus.

If this tenet—that all military personnel are “in custody”
for purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241—is

accepted, then the question of which district or districts
have jurisdiction over this action is essentially one of venue.

10

Once the requisite “custody” is found, then the district in
which the petitioner is actually lawfully physically present
is always at least a permissible jurisdiction: he is in custody
within the juristiction of the court in whose district he is,
cf. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948): 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

2. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: “CUSTODY”

This Court has noted that habeas corpus has been
accepted as the proper vehicle for testing the lawfulness of
induction or enlistment into the armed forces, Jones y
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240. Just as there is by now
no question that the restraints imposed on one’s liberty by
military service are sufficient for habeas corpus to be avail-
able to contest them, Hammond vy. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705,
710, it also seems beyond question that a member of the
armed forces remains sufficiently “in custody” for habeas
corpus to lie when he is granted a period of leave from his
assigned duties, e.g, Lohmeyer v. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3072;
Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F.Supp. 920. While on leave
a serviceman remains subject to military regulations and
authority; his travel is restricted: he must secure permission
to engage in employment (R. 113): he is subject to sum-
mary recall. Moreover, the requirement that he return to
duty at a specific place by a specific date unarguably con-
Stitutes constructive custody. These are all restrains not
shared by the public generally, cf. Jones y. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, and they form a leash which binds the
serviceman wherever he is.

Since Sgt. Schlanger was lawfully in Arizona at the time
of filing, and was “in custody” on that date, then—in order
to sustain the proposition that he was not “in custody
within the jurisdiction of the district court for Arizona—it
must be assumed that, for purposes of habeas corpus,
custody attaches not to where its effects are felt but to the
place where the authority, resulting in those effects, is
exercised.

This interpretation, however, was explicitly rejected by
this Court in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), wherein
it was held that it was the petitioner's presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of the district court which gave the
court jurisdiction to entertain the petition. In that case, as
in the one at bar, the question of the proper respondent
was not reached; it was held that, no matter who the
proper respondent was, that action should have properly
been brought in New York since that was where the effects
of the restraint complained of were being felt, that is,
where the petitioners were in custody. In the instant
action, of course, Sgt. Schlanger did file his petition in
Arizona, while he was lawfully present in Arizona, com-
plaining of the restraints upon his liberty in Arizona.

3. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:
STATING A CLAIM

Beyond determining that it has subject matter jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, i.e., that the petitioner is in
custody within its jurisdiction, a court must initially deter-
mine whether he states a claim on which relief can be
granted. This initial determination, from the face of the
petition, should, of course, be made in the light most favor-
able to the petitioner, cf. Townsend v. Sain, 365 U.S. 866
(1961): Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), but never-
theless it is apparent that Sgt. Schlanger states such a claim.

Though most servicemen seeking habeas corpus relief are
appealing to the civil courts from denials, by the military
authorities, of their discharge applications in which they
claimed status as “conscientious objectors” (which status
would entitle them to be discharged under existing regula-
tions),* Sgt. Schlanger alleges no such thing. To the con-
trary, it appears that he intended to make the Air Force his

“See generally, Hansen, “Judicial Review of In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector Claims”, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 975.

Pt) Oe Re ae as gy toe)

12

career as a commissioned officer.s The unlawfulness of
current restraints upon his liberty stems not from any
change of belief on his part, nor from any irregularity jn
his initial enlistment or re-enlistment, but from the failuye
and refusal of the USAF authorities to fulfill the terms and
conditions of his re-enlistment contract.

That re-enlistment was entered into in accordance with
the regulations governing the Airman’s Education and Com-
missioning Program (AECP) (AFM 50-5) and following the
issuance of written orders (which were to take effect only
if and when Sgt. Schlanger re-enlisted for Six years) which
designated Sgt. Schlanger aii “officer trainee” and assigned
him to the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) with
duty at Arizona State University, for participation in the
AECP (A. 4). Though there is little evidence in the record
at this time as to the effects of this re-enlistment and of
these orders on Sgt. Schlanger’s Status, and as to the terms
and conditions of the re-enlistment contract, it must be
assumed —as alleged and not controverted—that the primary,
if not the sole purpose of Sgt. Schlanger’s re-enlistment
was for him to obtain a commission and serve as an officer
(A. 4, 33).

As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, “Receiving a commission
is clearly not a matter of right; but granting it may be a
condition for retaining a person in the Army,” Orloff y.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 97 (1953). This formulation was
given effect the following year by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit when a doctor, inducted under the
Doctor’s Draft Act (which had been revised, in light of the

SAs previously noted, participation in the Airman’s Education and
Commissioning Program (AECP), for which Sgt. Schlanger re-enlisted,
is offered only to “carefully screened, career-minded airmen”, (em-
phasis supplied).

Though this was pointed out in dissent, it is nowhere even
implicitly disputed by the majority and is not inconsistent with the
Court’s holding, ie., that review of duty assignme.its cannot be
obtained through habeas corpus.

Rao

13

decision in Orloff, supra, to require the commissioning of
those drafted under its provisions), was refused a commis-
sion by the Army; the court ordered him discharged.
Nelson v. Peckham, 210 F.2d 575 (1954).

Certainly an inducement offered by the military (under
existing regulations and, in this case, through promulgation
of written orders whose execution is contingent upon the
re-enlistment} to entice a re-enlistment is no less binding
upon the government, once it is accepted, than the require-
ments of a statute. As the Attorney General has advised:

“Enlistments into the Army made under the
inducements held out by the laws of the United
States are ‘contracts’ and although the government
be a party, still the contracts ought to be construed
according to those well-established principles which
regulate contracts generally.” 6 Op. 187.

It is admittedly rare that the civil courts are asked to
review the obligations of the military under an enlistment
contract. More often than not, the courts will decline to
grant such review; since an enlistment is a contract which
changes the status of an enlistee, United States v. Grimley,
137 U.S. 147, most procedural or non-material irregularities
are insufficient to nullify the agreement. Furthermore, as
this Court has properly pointed out, ““* * * judges are not
given the task of running the Army,” Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 93. But here Sgt. Schlanger is not asking the
courts to review his duty assignments, nor any other matter
which must properly be left to the discretion of the
military authorities. The basic question is whether Sgt.
Schlanger was lawfully denied the status of a commissioned
officer, after having been induced to re-enlist by its offer.
Unless, inducements and promises by the military notwith-
standing, an enlistment gives the military carte blanche to
do what they will with an enlistee, then—if the denial of a
commission to Sgt. Schlanger was unlawful?—the restraints

"In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus, Sgt. Schlanger
contends that: (a) there was no basis in fact for his removal from the

We. a
Re Yet ene

eae nt
oe ae Sa
® Lee
ate. ws

upon his liberty in his current status as an enlisted man are
unlawful.

14

4. VENUE |

The distinction between subject matter jurisdiction ( “cus.
tody”) and venue is basic to this case. To hold that a
serviceman may bring a habeas corpus action only at some
particular place designated by the military authorities as his
“permanent duty station” and at which someone techni-
cally considered his “custodian” resides is to not only
ignore the 1 :lities of military service, but exalts form over

substance and does violence to the spirit and purpose of
the Great Writ.

Too, this policy may well create a judicial vacuum. In
the case at bar the government conceded (Respondents’
appeal brief, p. 8, fn. 5) that Sgt. Schlanger’s duty/leave

Status on the day of filing is not controlling,® and then
asserted:

“* * * even if * * * (Sgt. Schlanger] was not in
leave status but on temporary duty status in Tempe,
Arizona, jurisdiction is wanting. For * * * [he]
was never in the custody of the sole defendant
within the district court’s jurisdiction * * *."°9

commissioning program and for the denial of a commission, (b) that
he was removed as a direct result of his exercise of his first amend-
ment rights, and (c) the removal was based on proceedings prejudicial
to him, carried out in violation of Air Force regulations and violative
of the due process requirements of the fifth amendment.

Sit should be noted that the temporary duty orders assigning Sgt.
Schlanger to Arizona (A. 51) do not specify which of the 85 days are
‘duty” days and which are “leave.” This was a designation made, by

the military authorities, after Sgt. Schlanger’s arrival in Georgia in
September, 1969.

*Colonel Noel B. Reddrick, Commander, ROTC Det. 25, Arizona
State University. Although Col. Reddrick was not in Sgt. Schlanger’s
formal “chain of command,” he did, in fact, have authority over Sgt.
Schlanger both in his capacity as a commissioned officer and as the
commander of the only USAF organization at the place to which Sgt.
Schlanger had been assigned for duty, ie., Arizona State University.

15

A member of the armed forces, assigned to perform duty
at some place other than his “permanent duty station” (as
was Sgt. Schlanger during June, July and August, 1969), is
not free to travel; he cannot, without being A.W.O.L.,
return to his “permanent duty station.” (He may, in fact,
have only nominal contacts with that station. For instance,
Set. Schlanger was assigned to a “permanent duty station”
in Ohio for the entire period during which he was in the
Airman’s Education and Commissioning Program [January,
1966 through July, 1968] and yet he was never physically
in Ohio!) Since his presence, in custody, within the district
is a prerequisite to initiation of an action for habeas corpus,
cf. Ahrens v. Clark, supra, he is left without a forum even
though he is being restrained of his liberty within the juris-
diction of a district court.

Judge Northrop, of the District of Maryland, was faced
with a similar problem in Donigian v. Laird, 308 F.Supp.
449, and decided:

“The Army seeks to exert control over Donigian
in Maryland. It cannot, then, avoid the jurisdiction
of this court merely because such control is exer-
cised from a point located outside this state. * * *
The overpowering factor in this inquiry is that the
Army, regardless of where its physical command is
located, is such a pervasive force that its effects
are felt wherever those under its command are
stationed.’ Donigian v. Laird, at p. 453.

Indeed, the effects of being a member of the armed forces
are felt not only where those under military authority are
stationed but, since the military claims continuous jurisdic-
tion, they are felt at all times and at all places a member
may be.

In the case at bar, a defense of “improper venue” could
have—indeed, should have—been raised had Sgt. Schlanger
commenced the action in any district but Arizona. The
cause of action (his removal from the Airman’s Education

and Commissioning Program) arose in Arizona, cf. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(e)(2), he was a legal resident of Arizona, cf. 28

DIVO FPL LLL Tis THR ene y

16

U.S.C. 8 1391 (e)(4), he had been assigned by the military
to Arizona for 46 of the 62 months preceding the filing
of the action (July, 1963-April, 1965; January, 1966-July,
1968; June, 1969-August, 1969), he was lawfully present
in Arizona, having gone there pursuant to temporary duty
assignment orders, and he had not left the place of that
assignment (Tempe, Arizona) before filing his petition, after
completion of his duty; moreover, all relevant witnesses
and records which are not subject to control of the
respondents were in Arizona. Sgt. Schlanger’s assignment
to a “permanent [sic] duty station” in Georgia is wholly
incidental to this action and should not enter into consider-
ation. Furthermore, the government would be no more
inconvenienced by having to defend this action in Arizona
than they would in any other district. The military has
adequate representation in the district (as they do in all
districts) through the U.S. Attorney, any files are easily
transportable and there was no need to transport Sgt.
Schlanger anywhere—he was already in the district.

5. PERSONAL JURISDICTION; REACH OF PROCESS

While it is obvious that neither Dr. Seamans nor Colonel
Baker, the respondents alleged to be unlawfully restraining
Sgt. Schlanger, reside within the District of Arizona, this
does not deprive that court of jurisdiction over them. They
are being sued not as individuals, but as officers of the
United States; and although unti! 1962, under the then
existing provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1391(b), such officers were
amenable to suit only in the districts of their respective
official residences, this section was amended to add subsec-
tion (e) which provides, inter alia, that:

“A civil action in which each defendant is an
officer or employee of the United States * * *
acting in his official capacity * * * may * * * be
brought in any judicial district in which * * * (2)
the cause of action arose, or * * * (4) the plaintiff
resides * * *.”

17

The import of this change in section 1391 has been con-
sidered by Professor Moore, and he comments:

“* * * This subjection realistically broadens
venue in any civil action (not just mandamus pro-
ceedings) where each defendant is a federal officer,
* * * and is sued for acts done in his official capac-
ity or under color of legal authority; and provides
for extra-territorial service of process, if necessary,
in such an action.

* * * * *

“In brief, the Act added to but did not take
away subject-matter jurisdiction which the district
courts already had. * * * J/ts purpose was to make
it possible to bring a civii action in which each
defendant is an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof acting in his official
capacity or under color of legal authority, or an
agency of the United States, in district cow :
outside of the District of Columbia * * *,°
Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Ed., pp. 1210-121"
(emphasis supplied).

In addition to this authoritative interpretation of the
statute, the judicial trend has been to give effect to this
reading, e.g., Lohmeyer vy. Laird, __ F.Supp. __, 3
$.S.L.R. 3072, 3074 (D. Md., 1970); Metz v. United States,
304 F.Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa., 1969); Silberberg vy. Willis, 306
F.Supp. 1013 (D. Mass., 1969).

Habeas corpus has, of course, long been recognized to be
a “civil action,” e.g., Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174; Ex
parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, but, as has been pointed
out, habeas corpus is unique, Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.
286, 294, and there has been a lack of uniformity in the
application of the procedures used in civil practice to
habeas corpus proceedings, e.g., cases cited in Harris v.
Nelson, supra, fn. 1, at p. 289. There is no doubt, however,
that the federal courts may fashion appropriate procedures
for use in habeas corpus.

A reading of Senate Report No. 1992, 87th Congress,
2nd Session, to accompany H.R. 1960, 2 U.S. Code Cong.

DA aE LC ati) a ee

18

and Adm. News (1962), p. 1784, confirms the view that

subsection (e) of section 1391 is applicable to habeas
corpus, cf. Lohmeyer vy. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3072, 3074. As

Mr. Justice White wrote, while serving as Assistant Attorney
General, “Under [pre-1962] law, after one has exhausted

his administrative remedies, the final decision is generally

made by an official residing in the District of Columbia.
To challenge the legality of that decision, the officer resid-
ing in Washington must be sued in Washington. The
purpose of [section 2 of H.R. 1960] is to have officers who
live in the Capital subject to suit throughout the country to
the same extent that they can now be sued in the District.

in effect, then, this venue provision would do away with

the defense that a superior officer is an indispensible party

because, with a grant of venue, a superior officer can be

made a party.”” 2 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News (1962),
p. 2789.

This is precisely the situation in the present case. Sgt.
Schlanger has been denied a discharge by the Chief of Staff,
USAF, and by the Secretary of the Air Force. Under the
law (10 U.S.C. 88811; AFR 39-10), only the Secretary has
authority to discharge him and is thus an indispensible
party.

There is no suggestion in the legislative history of
H.R. 1960 that habeas corpus proceedings were to be
exempted from the provisions of the bill; the broadened
jurisdiction and venue provisions apply to “‘non-statutory”
judicial review proceedings, and the limitations of the
phrase “‘except as otherwise provided by law” were clearly
intended to apply only to actions controlled by other
explicit jurisdictional statutes, e.g., tax cases, Senate Report
No. 1992, supra. The Justice Department’s suggestion that
the venue provision of this bill should be limited to actions
brought under 5 U.S.C. 1009, the Administrative Procedure
Act, was not adopted and the language of the bill remained
broad, applying to any civil action.

19

6. EFFECTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

There are compelling reasons for this Court to apply the
intentionally broad language of 28 U.S.C. 8 1391 (e) to
actions such as the one at bar. In 1962, when H.R. 1960
was passed, as in 1948 when Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188,
was decided, it was a rare petitioner who could not name
a proper respondent within the district in which he was
being restrained. Commencing with Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, however, this Court embarked on an historic
expansion of the Great Writ’s availability. These recent
decisions have created “an entirely new class of habeas
corpus petitioners * * *,” United States ex rel. Meadows
y. State of New York, 426 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2 Cir., 1970),
and have raised jurisdictional problems not hitherto encoun-
tered, e.g., George v. Nelson, 410 F.2d 1179 (9 Cir., 1969)
(California district court had jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petition brought by a prisoner in California, attacking a
future sentence in North Carolina).

This “new class of petitioner” includes a member of the
armed forces, who is subject not to physical confinement
but to other, less tangible but no less real, restraints. These
restraints are imposed not by steel bars and concrete walls
but by the force of law. They are extant wherever he may
be, subjecting him to a remote control by his superior
officers in the military hierarchy.'® Failure to obey an
order, however received—in person, by mail, by telephone,
renders him liable to trial by court-martial. And this line
of authority forms a two-way street: the military cannot
purport to have jurisdiction over a person, twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week, wherever he may be, and
simultaneously deny that he is in custody within the juris-

This “remote control” is readily evident in the record of this
case. The letter from Col. Palmer in Ohio to Sgt. Schlanger in Ari-
zona (A. 13) amply illustrates the “custody” exercised over a service-
man even from 2000 miles away. There is no doubt that Sgt.
Schlanger’s current commander possessed the same power to control
and restrain his actions at the time this suit was instituted.

a =

TOD AE SROORT NEI REM Ege te pe

egy
20

diction of whatever district court he may find himself, cf.

Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F.Supp. 920; Silberberg v. Willis,

306 F.Supp. 1013; Lohmeyer yv. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3072.
(It is, perhaps, significant that the government filed
notice of appeal in Lohmeyer, but requested dismissal after
the Solicitor General declined to prosecute it.) If, as the
government asserted, Sgt. Schlanger was not in custody in

Arizona, why was an injunction necessary to prevent his
removal (A. 43)? (Similar injunctions were necessary in
Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213, Hammond y. Lenfest,
398 F.2d 705, Laxer v. Cushman, 300 F.Supp. 920, and
Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d 424, among others.)

The lower courts should certainly be wary of forum-
shopping, as they apparently are. (It would seem that the
concern with avoidance of forum-shopping has led unneces-
sarily to a more restrictive attitude when confronted with
active duty servicemen than when petitions are presented
by reservists; compare Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213,
Rudick v, Laird, 412 F.2d 16, and the case at bar
[all active duty petitioners], with Donigian v. Laird, 308
F.Supp. 449 [D. Md., 1969], Hammond y. Lenfest, 398
F.2d 705 [reservist petitioners]). Moreover, the evils of
forum-shopping are hardly serious enough to require fore-
closure of access to all districts but that one in which
a serviceman’s ‘“‘permanent duty station” is located. Since
forum-shopping leads to considerations of venue, rather
than jurisdiction, the district court could exercise its discre-
tion and dismiss or transfer an action as having been
brought in a forum non conveniens; this was the result in
McKay v. Secretary of the Air Force, 306 F.Supp. 1252
(D. Mass., 1969), where the applicant came into the district
with little more than a suitcase and a petition, and had had
no prior contacts. More importantly, however, the Great
Writ “is not now and never has been a static, narrow,
formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand
purpose * * *,” Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243.
To prevent an individual from filing in the district in which

ee:
en

*
ie

21

—

he is, is to add an arbitrary and unnecessary burden to the
shoulders of a petitioner.

This Court should formally recognize that a member of
the armed forces is (so long as he is amenable to the
control, orders and jurisdiction of the military authorities)
“in custody” at all times and at all places; considerations
of venue should determine the proper court in which to
bring an action in habeas corpus. Whatever rational criteria
are applied, though, it is clear that Sgt. Schlanger properly
brought this action in Arizona.

CONCLUSION

The district court for the District of Arizona had juris-
diction over the subject matter under 28 U.S.C. 2241, Sgt.
Schlanger has stated a claim on which relief can be granted,
venue was properly laid in Arizona, and the court had per-
sonal jurisdiction over the respondents, as officers of the
United States. For all the foregoing reasons, it is respect-
fully submitted that the judgments and orders of the courts
below should be reversed and the case remanded to the
district court for a hearing on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

HERBERT P. SCHLANGER

P.O. Box 276
Tempe, Arizona 85281

Attorney Pro Se

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0249%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
