# Brief for the United States — United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States
- **Published:** January 1, 1970
- **Citation:** 399 U.S. 350

## Text

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Opinion below
Jurisdiction
Statutes involved
Questions presented

INDEX

Statement:

1.
2.

4.

The proceedings .
Bank-customer relations in Phillipsburg-
Easton
The merging banks and the banking structure
in their community
The district court’s decision ..................---------------

Introduction and summary of argument -..................
Argument:

I.

Il.

Ill.

Commercial banking is a relevant product mar-
ket
Phillipsburg-Easton is a relevant geographic
IIE s:oisesedbacsuielionainciietainienen

The district court’s evaluation of the merger’s
effects on competition and on community con-
venience and needs was defective because it ap-
plied erroneous standards ................--.---------------

A. The effect of the merger in Phillipsburg-
Easton may be substantially to lessen com-
petition -.. Jp siainich iaitsiacheenesioaisndcamniivaniee

B. The district court isaciaiialiias and misap-
plied the community convenience-and-needs
I sictiteireeree

1. Community convenience and need should
be evaluated in the same Siento
area as competitive effect

2. The district court misapplied the con-
venience-and-need standard ....................

Page

25

30

41

43

45

47

ate

Argument—Continued

3. The merging banks—and the district
court—failed adequately to consider less
anticompetitive alternatives to this mer-

ger 51
(a) Alternatives to merger were not
seriously pursued 52
(b) The possibility of less anticompeti-
tive mergers was ignored ................ 55
Conclusion 58
Appendix 59
CITATIONS
Cases:
Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294_........... 30, 31,
32, 40
Marion National Bank v. Van Buren Bank, 418
F, 2d 121 (C.A. 7, 1969) 17
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 399 F. 2d 953 44
Transamerica Corp. V. Board of Governors, 206
F. 2d 163, certiorari denied, 346 U.S. 901 ........ 35
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495 32
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441 30
United States v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank, 277
F. Supp. 133 30
United States v. First City National Bank of Hous-
ton, 386 U.S. 361 21, 29, 42, 46
United States v. First National Bank of Jackson,
301 F. Supp. 1161 30

United States v. First National Bank of Maryland,
1970 CCH Trade Cases {73,061 (D. Md.

1970) 30
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546 eh G 31, 40, 44

LQOLIE TN LI OE EOI OM,

Cases—Continued Page

United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374
U.S. 321 17, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29,
32, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46

United States v. Provident National Bank, 280 F.

Supp. 1 30, 39, 44
United States v. Third National Bank in Nash-
ville, 390 U.S. 171 21, 29, 41, 42, 43, 44,

45, 46, 51, 54, 55, 57
United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 US.
270 ... 32, 44, 56

Statutes :

Bank Merger Act of 1966, Sec. 18(c), 12 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV) 1828(c) -.-..-- 3, 5, 29, 41, 45, 46, 51, 57, 59
Clayton Act, Section 7, 38 Stat. 731, as amended,

I eciicnccenntecensninscion $1, 32, 41, 42, 45, 57, 59
12 U.S.C. 24 18

N. J. Stat Ann. § 17:
9A-19(B) (1963) 16
9A-19(B) (3) (1963) 16
9A-19(B) (3) (Supp. 1969) 16
9A-19(F) (Supp. 1969) 16
Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann. 7-904 (1965) .................-.. 17

Miscellaneous:

112 Cong. Rec. 2445, 2457 47

Hearings on S. 1698 Before the Subcommittee on
Domestic Finance of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. -. 26

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary
of Accounts and Deposits in All Commercial
Banks (1968) 8, 22

GB Fed, Beware WT. .nnnncnncacennccccnccnscnscoccccecosersrocsense 26

Kohn, The Future of Small Banks—An Analysis of
Their Ability to Compete with Large Banks
(N.Y. State Banking Dept. 1966) .. 57

1969 Statistical Abstract of the United States........ 7

Te ee me
oie

Ju the Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1969

No. 1093

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANT
Vv.

PHILLIPSBURG NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
SECOND NATIONAL BANK OF PHILLIPSBURG, AND
WILLIAM B. Camp, COMPTROLLER OF THE CUR-

RENCY

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the district court (App. 667) is
reported at 306 F. Supp. 645.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the district court (App. 701) was
entered on October 20, 1969, and a notice of appeal
to this Court was filed on November 28, 1969. Prob-
able jurisdiction was noted on February 27, 1970

(1)

2

(App. 702). The jurisdiction of this Court is con.
ferred by Section 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S¢
29. United States v. Third National Bank in Nash.
ville, 390 U.S. 171; United States v. Philadelphia Na.
tional Bank, 374 U.S. 321.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The pertinent portions of the Clayton Act and the
Bank Merger Act of 1966 are printed in the Appen.
dix, infra, pp. 59-64.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the district court erroneously rejected
commercial banking as a relevant product or service
market in which to test the competitive effect of bank
mergers in small communities.’

2. Whether, in an antitrust action challenging a
proposed merger of banks located in a community in
which the banking business is predominantly local,
the court may properly refuse to consider the mer-
ger’s probable effect on competition in that commv-
nity because, on the basis of evidence of general so-
cial and economic integration, it deems the relevant
geographic market to be a broad multi-community
area,

8. Whether, in such an action, the court’s consid-
eration of the “convenience and needs of the commu-
nity to be served” is legally insufficient if the “com-
munity” whose “needs” are considered is narrower

1 This question was preserved in the jurisdictional statement
(J.S., p. 3, n. 1, p. 19, n. 17).

3

than the relevant geographic market in which the
anticompetitive effects of the merger are measured.

4, Whether, in any event, the court below erred
in its determination of the convenience and needs
issue by failing adequately to consider whether the
same benefits could be achieved by less anticompetitive

means.
STATEMENT

1. The Proceedings

In April 1967, Phillipsburg National Bank and
Trust Co. (“PNB”) and Second National Bank of
Phillipsburg (“SNB”), both with their headquarters
in Phillipsburg, New Jersey (App. 668), agreed to
merge. Phillipsburg is directly across the Delaware
River from Easton, Pennsylvania, its twin city (App.
894). The two cities are in the northeastern part of
the Census Bureau’s Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton,
Pennsylvania—Warren County, New Jersey standard
metropolitan statistical area (hereafter “Lehigh Val-
ley”).

On May 1, 1967, the banks applied to the Comp-
troller of the Currency for approval of the transac-
tion as required by the Bank Merger Act of 1966
(12 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1828(c), App. infra, pp. 59-
60). Pursuant to Section 1828 (c) (4), the Federal Re-
serve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion and the Attorney General each submitted inde-
pendent reports to the Comptroller on the competitive
factors involved.? The Federal Reserve Board concluded

2 Copies of the Application for Approval to Merge, the re-
ports to the Comptroller and the Comptroller’s decision have
been lodged with the Clerk of this Court. All of these are
public documents.

4

that the overall competitive effect of the merger would
be substantially adverse because it would eliminate a
significant degree of competition. in the Phillipsburg.
Easton banking market and would reduce banking
alternatives in Phillipsburg from three to two by
merging that city’s two largest banks (FRB Rep., p.
4). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation re.
ported that the merger would harm competition in
Phillipsburg-Easton, particularly in the Phillipsburg —
sector of the area; it noted that the resulting bank
would be approximately three times the size of the
remaining Phillipsburg bank and that the publics —
banking choices there would be reduced (FDIC Rep,,
p. 2). The Attorney General also concluded that the
merger would have a significantly adverse effect upon
competition in the Phillipsburg-Easton area.

The Comptroller approved the merger on December
18, 1967. He concluded that the other banking agen-
cies and the Attorney General had defined both the
product market and the geographic market too nar-
rowly (Comp. Rep., pp. 3, 7-8). Treating most of the
Lehigh Valley as the relevant geographic market and
evaluating competition from 34 finance companies, 13
savings and loan institutions and insurance compan-
ies as well as 38 commercial banks in this broad area,
he determined that there would be no significant anti-
competitive effect (ibid.). He also concluded that the
merger would provide the resultant bank with an
opportunity for expansion and enable it to hire spe-
cialized management personnel (id. at 9).

On January 16, 1968, the United States filed the
present suit in the district court charging that the

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5

proposed merger might substantially lessen competi-
tion in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act (App.
3-7). This automatically stayed the merger’s con-
summation. 12 U.S.C. 1828(c)(7)(A). The Comp-
troller intervened as a defendant (App. 14). After
an eleven-day trial in September 1968 (App. 1-2),
the district court held that the proposed merger was
lawful (App. 700), and dismissed the complaint.®
The court continued the statutory stay pending dis-
position of this appeal (App. 701).

2. Bank-Customer Relations in Phillipsburg-Easton

Phillipsburg, New Jersey, is an established indus-
trial city of 18,500 inhabitants situated on the Dela-
ware River in the southwestern corner of Warren
County, New Jersey. Including the city’s immediate
environs,‘ the population of the Phillipsburg sector
(hereafter “Phillipsburg”) was approximately 28,500
in 1960 (App. 678-679). While the city’s population
has been static for a long period, the surrounding
suburbs have been growing steadily in population,
commerce and industry (App. 679-680; 261-263).

Easton, Pennsylvania, directly across the Delaware
River from Phillipsburg, is a larger industrial city of
82,000 people. Including the city’s surrounding com-

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* Ata hearing prior to the entry of judgment for the defend-
ants, the record was reopened and evidence was admitted re-
lating to changes in State banking law that took effect since

the trial (App. 580-595).

*Lopatcong, Pohatcong, and Greenwich townships, and
Alpha Borough.

PLD TRY ARETE

aN aR Bo Peel) Dn

6

munities,’ the Easton sector (hereafter “Easton”)
had a total population of 60,000 in 1960. As in Phil.
lipsburg, the city’s population: has remained stabk
while its environs have grown in population, industry
and commerce (App. 679-680; 287-288).

Phillipsburg and Easton are linked by bridges, one
a free bridge directly connecting the downtown areas
of the two cities, and the other a toll bridge located
just north of the main business districts on an inter.
state highway for which ticket books reducing the
toll to less than three cents a crossing may be pur.
chased (App. 45, 115, 229, 435-436). The two cities
were described by a Phillipsburg businessman as “in
effect * * * one town” (App. 287).

The Lehigh Valley, in which Phillipsburg and Eas

ton are located, is an area of approximately 1,000
square miles, which also includes the cities of Bethle.
hem, Pennsylvania (population 55,325), thirteen miles
west of Phillipsburg; Allentown, Pennsylvania (popv-
lation 108,347), eighteen miles west; and Nazareth,
Pennsylvania (population 6,209), twelve miles north-
west (App. 678-679, 803-804, 894).

There is considerable mobility among the residents
of the area. Residents of Phillipsburg shop in Easton
and vice versa, and drive to the larger towns as well
(App. 45, 58, 70, 224-225, 286-288, 291-292, 366-367,
386-387, 499-500, 634-635). The labor force is also
mobile; many residents of Phillipsburg and Easton

‘The townships of Forks, Williams and Palmer, and the
boroughs of Wilson, West Easton, Glendon, Stockertown and
Tatamy, all in Northampton County, Pennsylvania (App.
677).

Prey

—V————e

7

drive to work elsewhere, sometimes across the river
(App. 193-194, 423, 432-433, 814-815). Neverthe-
less, as a Bethlehem banker testified, “the three cities,
Bethlehem, Easton and Allentown have developed
pretty independent cultures, and people do cross lines
and so forth and it is integrated socially and eco-
nomically, but not nearly to the extent that you
might guess” (App. 104).

Although the Lehigh Valley contains 38 banks,*
customer preferences for local service and prevailing
conservative banking practice tend to limit the bulk
of each institution’s business to its primary service
area (App. 29, 57-58, 62, 78-80, 81, 89, 131-132, 258,
399, 468, 554-555, 564-565, 652). Individual de-
positors in this area choose their banks primarily
on the basis of convenience to their residence (¢.g.,
(App. 85, 201, 257, 263, 278, 665); small business-
men also tend to prefer banks in their local commu-
nity (App. 277-278, 290, 326-327, 355, 375, 421-422,
430-431, 434). Large commercial and industrial
borrowers, investors of sums in excess of $5,000 and
settlors of trusts, however, are more likely to shop on
a regional or even national basis; and as the amounts
involved increase, the significance of local preference
declines (App. 90, 100, 165, 235-236, 333-334, 339-
340, 353-354, 355-356, 369-370, 487, 489-491, 510-
512, 528, 600, 653).

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61969 Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 892.

‘For larger investors, significantly higher interest rates
may make a difference. The Girard Trust Bank’s branch in
Riegelsville, Pennsylvania, 10 miles from Phillipsburg, offered
a 5 percent investment bond sold mainly in $5,000 multiples,

8

Small banks, such as PNB and SNB, are patronized
principally by small depositors and borrowers* to
whom the convenience of one-stop banking (App. 181,
653) and the advantages of good relationships with a
local banker are important (App. 58, 106, 114, 271),
A customer who uses one service usually looks to his
bank for others as well, and is encouraged to do so
(App. 63-64, 77, 119, 146, 181, 183; see App. 615).
Checking and savings accounts are likely to be main-
tained in the same local bank even when higher say-
ings interest is available elsewhere (App. 38, 520,
624, 635, 653), and an established depositor expects,
and sometimes receives, favorable consideration as a
small borrower (App. 22, 119, 280).

The merging banks reflect this pattern of predomi-
nantly small customers with a local orientation char-
acteristic of banks in relatively small communities
(App. 83-84, 133-134) and particularly in the Lehigh
Valley trading area (App. 37-40, 83-84, 90, 100, 133-
134, 137-140, 759-760, 788). For example, 74 percent
of PNB’s number of total deposits, and 72 percent of
SNB’s, are less than $1,000; and 96 percent and 97
percent, respectively, are less than $10,000. Simi-
larly, 76 percent of PNB’s number of loan accounts,

and mailed promotional literature to Phillipsburg-Easton at-
torneys, physicians and morticians in December 1967. It is
estimated that this has attracted some 3 percent of total Phil-
lipsburg-Easton deposits. See App. 235-236, 603-604.

* More than 80 percent of the number of all deposit accounts
in banks with total deposits of between $10 million and $25
million are less than $1,000. Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, Summary of Accounts and Deposits in All Commer-
cial Banks, 4 (1968).

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9

and 58 percent of SNB’s, are less than $2,500, and 94
percent and 96 percent, respectively, are less than
$10,000 (App. 725-726, 733-734). Banks elsewhere
in the Lehigh Valley, including banks within 10 or 14
miles of Phillipsburg-Easton, derive relatively little
business—“‘a few scattered accounts” (App. 55; see
App. 74)—from that community (App. 53-57, 64-68,
96-98) ; and the Phillipsburg-Easton banks similarly
do relatively little business outside that area (App. 31-
32, 37-40, 120-125). The vast bulk of the merging
banks’ deposits and loans originate in Phillipsburg-
Easton: 91.6 percent of PNB’s total deposits and
78.6 percent of its total loans; 92 percent of SNB’s
total deposits and 87.2 percent of its total loans (App.
725-738, 817-818; see n. 29 infra, p. 37).

Even within Phillipsburg-Easton, banking is local-
ized in each of the two communities (App. 198-
204). For example, the Easton branch of Naza-
reth National Bank in Forks gets no business from
Phillipsburg (App. 78, 86). Although Phillipsburg
businessmen regard Easton as an alternative credit
source, they strongly prefer to borrow from banks in
Phillipsburg (e.g., App. 421, 434, 490-491, 636).° Of
the merging banks, Phillipsburg National derived
only 10.9 percent of its total time and savings de-
posits from Easton, and Second National only 9.6
percent (App. 731-732).

There are several indications that the banks in
Phillipsburg-Easton enjoy substantial insulation from
outside competition. Nearly every one of the approxi-

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* State boundaries also contribute to localization of banking
business (App. 62, 78, 93, 130, 201, 207, 606-607).

10

mately 8,500 families in Phillipsburg deals with one
of that community’s three commercial banks (App.
176). Banks outside Phillipsburg-Easton rarely go-
licit or advertise there except to the extent that audi-
ences elsewhere are served by media also serving Phil.
lipsburg-Easton (App. 54, 77, 87-88, 99, 252, 266,
559, 604-605). Phillipsburg-Easton banks similarly
rarely solicit outside their area (App. 48, 79, 182.
133, 228, 627, 633).'° Finally, the Phillipsburg-East-
on banks have increased their savings deposit accounts
substantially even though their passbook savings
rates were lower than the rates paid by other banks
in the area (App. 753). As of December 31, 1967,
Easton banks were paying only 3 percent and Phil.
lipsburg banks 3!. percent interest, while banks in
towns within a thirteen-mile radius were paying 4
percent (App. 63, 94, 116-117, 118-119, 198-201, 652-
653).

3. The Merging Banks and the Banking Structure In

Their Community

Phillipsburg has three commercial banks, and Eas-
ton has four.”’ Phillipsburg National, the acquiring
bank, is the largest bank in Phillipsburg and the
third largest bank in Phillipsburg-Easton. As of
1967, its’ assets were $23.9 million, its deposits were
$22.4 million, and its loans and discounts were

© They advertise principally in the Easton or Phillipsburg
local newspapers and generally do not solicit elsewhere for
business (App. 723-724; GX-53 at p. 209; DX-60 at p. 163).

* Six of these seven institutions have their headquarters in
Phillipsburg-Easton; the seventh is a branch of the Nazareth
National Bank of Nazareth, Pa., which has a branch in Forks
Township, a suburb of Easton (App. 740-751).

a

11

$14.5 million. It held 13.7 percent of Phillipsburg-
Easton deposits and 15.8 percent of the community’s
loans and discounts, Between 1957 and 1967, it
doubled its assets, doubled its deposits, and tripled its
loans and discounts (App. 752-753).” in addition to
its main office in downtown Phillipsburg it operates
two branches, both of which were opened in the sub-
urbs of Phillipsburg in 1964 (App. 262, 642-643.
See App. 627-628).

Second National, the acquired bank, is the second
largest bank in Phillipsburg and the fifth largest
bank in Phillipsburg-Easton. It is in direct compe-
tition with PNB (Merger App., n. 2, supra, p. 3).
Its main office is directly across the street from
PNB’s, and its only branch is across the highway
from Phillipsburg’s Hillcrest office (App. 10, 15, 202).
It had assets of $17.3 million, deposits of $16
million, and loans and discounts of $10.5 million in
1967. It accounted for 9.8 percent of Phillipsburg-
Easton’s total deposits and 11.4 percent of its loans
and discounts (see p. 13, infra). It has also grown
rapidly in the last decade, increasing its assets 82
percent and its deposits 86 percent, and tripling its
loans and discounts (App. 752; see App. 775-776).

Both of the merging banks offer the wide range of
services customarily available from commercial banks,
including demand deposits, savings and time deposits,
consumer loans, installment loans, commercial and
industrial loans, real estate mortgages and trust serv-

2 Its rate of growth in the preceding five years exceeded
that of the other two Phillipsburg banks (App. 754-756,
775-776).

‘
Cpemeeressp roe reece errs eeteeen ee ea NHI TL HR

12

ices, safe deposit boxes, escrow services and utility
bill collections (App. 174, 246, 705). The ratio of
their loans to deposits is higher than that of any
other bank in Phillipsburg-Easton (App. 764). As is
true of other Phillipsburg-Easton banks, a substan-
tial volume of their loans is in real estate mortgages
(e.g., App. 39-40, 656-657, 764; see supra, pp. 7-8);
business loans, both real estate and commercial or in-
dustrial, represent 22.2 percent and 21.2 percent re
spectively of each bank’s loans (GX-86 p. 2; see App.
763-764; cf. App. 100).

As previously noted (supra, pp. 8-9), the services of
these two banks are oriented primarily toward small
customers. Phillipsburg National, for example, con-
ducted the local grammar school savings program
(App. 246), and, when other banks were refusing,
offered both FHA and VA home financing and college
tuition loans (App. 21, 73, 246-247, 269, 637). It also
made numerous unsecured loans on the basis of char-
acter, which are very difficult for area borrowers to
get elsewhere (App. 271-272, 280. Compare App. 58,
106, 114, 437-438). PNB increased its install-
ment lending portfolio from $700,000 to $3 million
© within a five-year period, but then stabilized it in
4 1966 when its directors ordered loan officers to con-
‘ centrate again on real estate mortgages (App. 413-
> 414).

The structure of the commercial banking market in
’ Phillipsburg-Easton, as of December 31, 1967, is sum-
* marized in the following chart:

[Dollar a
(App. 739, 7
TOTAL
ASSETS DEPOSITS
No. of Percent Percent Percent ©
BANK Offices Amount Phill.-East. Phill. Amount Phill.-Eas§&
Only y
Phillipsburg
at. 3 $23.9 112 44 $22.4 11.8
Second Nat. 2 17.3 8.1 31.8 16 8.4

[Resulting Bank 5 41.1 19.3 75.8 38.4 20.2
Phillipsburg
rust Co.

2 13.2 6.2 24.2 12.1 6.4
Easton Nat.
Bank & Trust 5 75.6 35.5 — 67.7 35.6
Northampton Nat.
Bank Easton 1 23.2 10.9 — 19 10
Lafayette Trust
Bank 2 27.7 13.0 — 24.3 12.8
Nazareth Nat.
Bank * 1 32.0 15.0 — 28.7 15.1
Forks Township
Branch s e.5
Totals 16 $212.8 100 100 $190.1 100

* While the deposit figures for N’
branch, the assets and loan figur
total assets and loan figures o
the portion attributable to the
somewhat understates the perc
including the appellees.

13
[Dollar amounts in millions]
(App. 739, 740-741, 742-743, 747)
TOTAL DEMAND
ASSETS DEPOSITS DEPOSITS LOANS
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
hill.-East. Phill. Amount Phill.-East. Phill. Amount Phill.-East. Phill, Amount Phill.-East. Phill.
Only Only Only Only
11.2 44 $22.4 11.8 44.3 $6.5 10.1 45 $14.5 15.8 48.9
8.1 31.8 16 8.4 31.7 4.6 7 31.3 10.5 11.4 35.2
19.3 75.8 38.4 20.2 76.1 11.1 17.1 76.4 24.9 27.3 84.1]
6.2 24.2 12.1 6.4 23.9 3.4 5.3 26.3 4.7 5.2 15.9
35.5 —. 67.7 35.6 -_———- 25.4 39.2 — 32.6 35.7 —
10.9 — 19 10 — 6.4 9.8 — 6.5 7.1 —
13.0 — 24.3 12.8 — 10.8 16.7 —. 11.8 12.9 —
15.0 —— 28.7 15.1 — 7.8 12.0 — 10.8 11.9 —.
100 100 $190.1 100 100 $65 100 100 * $91.5 100 100

* While the deposit figures for Nazareth National Bank are segregated by
branch, the assets and loan figures are not. This chart, therefore, uses the
total assets and loan figures of Nazareth National Bank (rather than
the portion attributable to the bank’s Easton branch) and accordingly
somewhat understates the percentages attributable to the other banks,
including the appellees.

15

These figures show that, of Phillipsburg-Easton’s 7
banks, the two largest—Easton National Bank and
Trust Co, and Lafayette Trust Co., both in Easton—
account for 56 percent of the area’s total deposits, 63
percent of total demand deposits and 44 percent (7
out of 16) of the banking offices. When Phillipsburg
National’s share is added, the three largest banks
account for 69 percent of total deposits and 74.2 per-
cent of demand deposits. In the Phillipsburg sector,
which is served only by the two merging banks and
their small competitor, the Phillipsburg Trust Co.,
PNB has 43.9 percent of total deposits and SNB has
32.2 percent; of loans and discounts PNB has 49.8
percent and its-merger partner 34.9 percent. Of the
7 Phillipsburg banking offices, the merging banks
control 5.

The combined bank would be the second largest in
Phillipsburg-Easton with assets of $38.8 million
(19.3 percent), total deposits of $36 million (20.2
percent), and loans and discounts of $22.8 million
(27.3 percent). The total share of deposits held by
the two largest banks would increase by 9 percent
to 65 percent, and the share held by the three largest
banks would increase 10 percent. The two largest
banks would control 10 of the 16 banking offices,
ie, 62.5 percent of the total. The impact in the
Phillipsburg sector would, of course, be much greater
(see App. 205, 207-208, 210). The banking alterna-
tives in Phillipsburg would be reduced from 3 to 2,
the combined bank would be three times larger than
Phillipsburg Trust Co., and all but 2 of the banking
offices in Phillipsburg would be controlled by one
firm.

Qecrenr ere ted

oe

16

The record provides no indication that this sub.
stantia] increase in banking concentration is likely
to be alleviated by new entry into the market. Entry
is restricted by both New Jersey and Pennsylvania
banking statutes, and although recent changes in
New Jersey law have made it possible for banks in
the northern part of that State to enter the Phillips.
burg area by merger, this would not increase the
number of banking alternatives available in the com-
munity.” Expert testimony indicated, moreover, that

** When the complaint was filed, New Jersey law prohibited
the merger of banks located in different counties, and restrict-
ed branch banking to the county in which the parent bank
was located (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:9A-19(B) (1963)). Addi-
tionally, a “home-office-protection” proviso precluded branch-
ing into cities in which another bank had its home office or
into communities in which a bank or branch was already
located (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:9A-19(B) (3) (1963) ). Entry
into “home-office-protected” communities could be effected
only through merger with a bank in the community by a
bank outside the community but in the same county.

Under a New Jersey banking statute, enacted on J anuary 17,
1969, and effective July 17, 1969, that State is divided into
three banking districts (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17: 9A-19(F)
(Supp. 1969) ), of which Phillipsburg is in the first. District
wide de novo branching and merger are authorized, subject
to the retained “home-office-protection” proviso. In addition,
the law precludes branching into communities of less than
7,500 in which a bank branch is already located. N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 17: 9A-19(B) (3) (Supp. 1969).

No community on the New Jersey side of the Phillipsburg-
Easton community is open to de novo branching from outside
Warren County under the new statute because of the “home-
office-protection” provision; entry by merger, however, is now
possible for some 80 New Jersey banks located in the First
Banking District (App. 588-589, 777-780). The question
whether a national bank may avoid the operation of the
State “home-office-protection” proviso by moving its “main
office” into a protected community, while simultaneously
“reopening” the former “main office” as a branch office, is

ihn cc hi aan gi a ;

17

the chartering of new banks in Phillipsburg-Easton

does not appear to be a significant probability (App.
211, 213-215).

There is no evidence that as a group the seven
banks in Phillipsburg-Easton are failing to meet the
community’s banking needs. Four of the banks have
loan limits which approach or exceed one-quarter
million dollars and one has a limit of more than
one-half million.* Requests for loans in the $100,-
000 to $500,000 category are infrequent (App.
137)."° Large borrowers can, and do, satisfy their

before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Ramapo
Bank v. Prospect Park National Bank & William 3. Camp.
In Marion National Bank v. Van Buren Bank, 418 F. 2d
121 (C.A. 7, 1969), it was held that a similar action was
precluded under analogous Michigan banking law.

Pennsylvania Banking Law is similarly restrictive, permit-
ting new branching only in contiguous counties. Purdon’s Pa.
Stat. Ann. 7-904 (1965). See United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank, 374 U.S. 321. Easton, located in Northampton
County, is protected by Bucks County against branching by
Philadelphia banks (App. 402-403).

* The legal lending limits of the commercial banks in Phil-
lipsburg-Easton as of December 31, 1966, computed on the
basis of ten percent of the sum of capital, surplus, and un-
divided profits, were as follows (App. 765) :

PHILLIPSBURG NATIONAL $100,701
SECOND NATIONAL 107,414
Phillipsburg Trust 53,167
Easton National Bank 587,049
Northampton National Bank 369,259
Lafayete Trust Bank 224,362
Nazareth National Bank 294,354

%* PNB estimates that it receives 25 requests per year for
loans which exceed its lending limits ($100,000) and SNB esti-
mates that it receives 12 such requests per year. Only 25 of
PNB’s total of 5,566 loans, and only 17 of SNB’s total of

2,235 loans, were for more thap $50,000. (App. 271, 733-
734.)

TLMETAA fin QI MEE ure Ne

eM aS ENT AF

eo SERNA SCARE RI MSE SP LAER IIE

18

credit needs from outside the Phillipsburg-Easton
area (App. 90, 290, 333, 339, 355, 412, 418, 426
429, 440, 444-445).

Lending limits, which depend to some extent on
the accounting method used to calculate them, are
computed as 10 percent of capital and surplus of
undivided profits and reserves, as approved by bank.
ing authorities (see 12 U.S.C. 24. But see App. 82,
89, 111, 136, 403-404). Using the most conserva-
tive method of calculation, PNB’s lending limit was
$90,000 and SNB’s was $80,000 (App. 670. But see
n. 14, supra, and App. 248, 713). The district court
found that, when combined, the two banks would
have a limit of $250,000 (App. 670), presumably
by reason of changes in accounting metheds relating
to their capital structure.

4. The District Court’s Decision

In dismissing the complaint, the district court held
that the merger would not be anticompetitive in the
broad geographic market it deemed relevant, and
that “any conceivable anticompetitive effect”? was in
any event clearly outweighed by the merger’s effects
in meeting the convenience and needs of the commu-
nity (App. 699).

Treating the product market first, the court recog-
nized that “commercial banking” has been identified
in all previous bank merger decisions of this Court
as an appropriate line of commerce, but decided over
the government’s objection (App. 549-550) that a
“detailed analysis of all the competitive banking serv-
ices offered to the public by the merging banks is nec-
essary in each case” (App. 669). The court excluded

from its consideration services not offered to any
great degree by the defendants as well as services
“in which competition from many sources [such as
savings and loan associations, pension funds, mutual
funds, government bonds, insurance companies and
finance companies] is so widespread that no question
of significant diminution of competition by the merg-
er could be raised” (App. 675).

The lines of commerce selected by the court in-
cluded checking accounts, savings accounts, certifi-
cates of deposit, personal loans, consumer installment
loans and commercial loans of less than 100,000 dol-
lars. Trust services, small real estate mortgage
loans, automobile dealer financing, “large scale com-
mercial inventory financing” and commercial and in-
dustrial loans in excess of 100,000 dollars were
excluded. (App. 670.) While conceding that “[t]he
approach adopted may not be orthodox,” the court
deemed it appropriate because, in light of the small
size of the defendant banks and their high propor-
tion of savings deposits to demand deposits, “this
is not the usual bank merger case” (App. 675).
The court did not, however, make specific findings
as to the effect of the merger in each of the lines of
commerce it had selected. Instead, presumably be-
cause some of the services it selected are unique to
commercial banks, the court analyzed the merger’s
effects on competition only in terms of the product
market it had earlier rejected—commercial banking
(App. 681-689).

Turning to the question of the appropriate geo-
graphic market, the court rejected both of the gov-
ernment’s proposed alternatives, Phillipsburg-Easton

£
F
:

‘
i NSO PERT Ty TPES PE LNT LIT
Qrreseersrerrr ert

——

20

and environs or Phillipsburg and environs (App.
677).** It chose instead an area slightly smaller than
the entire Lehigh Valley (but excluding Allentown),
The area selected encompasses thirteen towns and
cities, including Bethlehem in Northampton County
and five cities and towns in Bucks County, Pennsyl-
vania, plus the southwest half of Warren County and
the northwest portion of Hunterdon County, New
Jersey (App. 678-679). The court treated as not sig-
nificant the government’s statistical showing of the
localized nature of the existing banking business
(App. 681), and the court’s opinion made no mention
of the growth of savings deposits in Phillipsburg and
Easton banks while they were paying a lower rate
of interest than other banks in the Lehigh Valley
(see supra, p. 10). The court relied instead on evi-
dence of population mobility tending toward general
economic integration of the broader area (App. 679-
680), and, apparently, on the court’s expectation
that the increased size of the merged banks would
permit them to offer services in a somewhat wider
area than at present (App. 688).

The court held that the government had failed to
establish that the merger “would have any measur-
able anticompetitive effect” in this broad area (ibid.).

** The advisory banking agencies treated Phillipsburg and
environs as a relevant banking sector or submarket, and the
government introduced evidence below showing banking locali-
zation and concentration in Phillipsburg. After the court made
clear its rejection of Phillipsburg as a relevant market (see
App. 25-26, 567-568), the government relied in its trial
brief upon Phillipsburg-Easton. See Plaintiff’s Trial Brief,
pp. 10-18.

Bitticidivcia sate: ABA Saas ie BR Rr saci ee a SE

21

Moreover, the court stated that under applicable
New Jersey law there were “many locations [in the
New Jersey part of the court’s geographic market]
where either a new bank or a branch bank could be
established” (App. 687).

The court then found that the potential ability of
the merged bank to supply one sector of its geograph-
ic market—Phillipsburg—with commercial loans of
more than 100,000 dollars and trust services (serv-
ices excluded from the court’s lines of commerce)
clearly outweighed any conceivable anticompetitive
effect (App. 689-690). As to less anticompetitive al-
ternatives to merger which might achieve these bene-
fits, the court found that “tentative” exploration of
obtaining qualified officers to specialize in commercial
lending and trust services was properly abandoned
because of the cost of employing such personnel (App.
690) and that meeting local loan needs through
participation with other banks had “disadvantages”
(App. 697).

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The fundamental question in this case is whether
the antitrust standards defined by this Court in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374
U.S. 321, and preserved in the Bank Merger Act of
1966,” apply to mergers of directly competing small
commercial banks * in the nation’s smaller commu-

"See United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville,
390 U.S. 171, 181-182 (hereafter “Nashville Bank’); United
States v. First City National Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 363-364
(hereafter “Houston Bank’).

8 In 1968 there were 13,630 commercial banks in the United
States, of which 11,798—86.6 percent—had deposits of less

iiaiate =

22

nities. The difference between the competitive impact
of horizontal mergers among the great city banks
and the nation’s small town banks is merely one of
scale. Indeed, because there tend to be fewer finan.
cial institutions to provide alternatives in small com.
munities for those in need of their services, the con-
siderations set forth in the Philadelphia Bank opinion
apply a fortiori—including the basis for defining the
product and geographic markets and for evaluating
the competitive consequences of reducing alternatives
in already concentrated banking markets.
Commercial banks, with their unique clustering of
financial products and services in one institution, are
peculiarly significant to the economy of communities
whose population is too small to support a large ar-
ray of differentiated savings and credit businesses,
In such communities, dependence on local bank-
ers for financial services tends to be even greater
than in the city. Convenience of access to a bank is
as important. Small town residents and businessmen
have the same interest in preserving the range of
banking choices in their community as do urban
borrowers and savers. For in the small town as well
as the large, “if the businessman is denied credit
because his banking alternatives have been eliminated
by mergers, the whole edifice of an entrepreneurial
system is threatened; if the costs of banking services
and credit are allowed to become excessive by the
absence of competitive pressures, virtually all costs,

than $25 million. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Summary of All Accounts and Deposits in All Commercial
Banks, 4, 7 (1968).

23

in our credit economy, will be affected * * *” (Phila-
delphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 372).

We shall show, first, that the district court erred
in rejecting the government’s contention that here,
as in the Philadelphia Bank case, commercial bank-
ing is a relevant product market in which to test
the competitive effect of the merger. The merging
banks have all the basic attributes of commercial
banks outlined by this Court in Philadelphia Bank;
hence their unique cluster of financial products and
services “composes a distinct line of commerce” (374
U.S. at 356).

We shall then show that the court similarly erred
in rejecting the government’s contention that Phil-
lipsburg-Easton is a relevant geographic market
within which to assess the effects of this merger on
competition. That this is an area in which the merg-
er’s effects will be direct and immediate is shown by
the application here of a number of factors empha-
sized in this Court’s Philadelphia Bank opinion—
including the importance, especially to small custom-
ers who are principally served here, of convenient
access in banking; the fact that banks in Phillips-
burg-Easton generally compete for deposits within a
radius of only a few miles (and have paid lower
rates of interest to depositors than were being offered
by nearby banks outside of Phillipsburg-Easton) ;
and the fact that the vast bulk of the business of
banks in Phillipsburg-Easton, including that of the
merging banks, is localized within the area.

Finally, we shall show that there were several
legal errors in the district court’s evaluation of the

24

merger’s effects on competition and determination of
whether those anticompetitive effects are clearly out.
weighed by offsetting benefits to the convenience and
needs of the community to be served. First, had the
court considered the merger’s effects in the relevant
geographic and product markets identified by the
government, it should have concluded that this merg.
er, which will substantially increase concentration in
an already highly concentrated market, may sub
stantially lessen competition. Because of this error,
the court balanced the convenience-and-needs factor
against an erroneous assessment of competitive im-
pact. Second, the court balanced competitive impact
in a broad multi-community area against the conven-
ience and needs of Phillipsburg considered in isola-
tion, whereas the Act requires that both factors be
assessed with reference to the same “community” or
geographic market. Third, the court misapplied the
convenience-and-needs standard by focusing only on
the asserted needs of customers for large business
loans and trust services and exaggerating the bene-
fits that the merger would afford those customers.
Fourth, the court and the merging banks failed ade-
quately to consider alternative ways of achieving the
merger’s ‘purported benefits—including reasonably
available internal steps that either bank might have
taken and the possibility of less anticompetitive
mergers. For all of these reasons, the court failed
to balance the factors with the kind of accurate, de-
tailed consideration that the Act requires; and the
case should, therefore, be remanded for further con-
sideration under correct criteria.

———————_

25
ARGUMENT

I
Commercial Banking Is a Relevant Product Market

The term “commercial banking” covers the cluster
of products and services offered by the only institu-
tions permitted by law to accept demand deposits,”
to create additional money and credit, to participate
in and manage the nation’s checking account system
and to furnish short term business loans.” While com-
mercial banks compete with certain other financial in-

#” Mutual savings banks in New Jersey are permitted to ac-
cept demand deposits, but there are no such institutions in
Phillipsburg-Easton or in the Lehigh Valley (App. 175, 453).

*In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra,
874 U.S. at 326-327 n. 5, this Court noted:

The principal banking “products” are of course various
types of credit, for example: unsecured personal and busi-
ness loans, mortgage loans, loans secured by securities
or accounts receivable, automobile installment and con-
sumer goods installment loans, tuition financing, bank
credit cards, revolving credit funds. Banking services in-
clude: acceptance of demand deposits from individuals,
corporations, governmental agencies, and other banks;
acceptance of time and savings deposits; estate and trust
planning and trusteeship services; lock boxes and safety-
deposit boxes; account reconciliation services; foreign
department services (acceptance and letters of credit);
correspondent services; investment advice. It should be
noted that many other institutions are in the business of
supplying credit, and so more or less in competition with
commercial banks (see further, pp. 356-357, infra), for
example: mutual savings banks, savings and loan associa-
tions, credit unions, personal-finance companies, sales-
finance companies, private businessmen (through the fur-
nishing of trade credit), factors, direct-lending govern-
ment agencies, the Post Office, Small Busines Investment
Corporations, life insurance companies.

BLN OVE LOGE POLLS

<2

Sparen eererersess

26

stitutions in seeking deposits or in supplying credit,
their demand deposit functions make them unique in
the cluster of financial services they offer (App. 174-
186). :

The merging banks here have all of the basic at.
tributes of commercial banks outlined in Philadelphia
Bank, supra. In a single institution they offer de.
mand deposits; create credit; pay interest for the use
of other people’s money in time and savings deposits
and lend it at greater interest; and offer short-term
business loans and longer term real estate loans and
even a modest trust service (see Statement, supra,
pp. 11-12; see, also, App. 19, 52, 76, 182, 246)”
This case is therefore governed by the holding in
Philadelphia Bank (374 U.S, at 356-357) that:

the cluster of products (various kinds of credit)
and services (such as checking accounts and trust
administration) denoted by the term “commer-
cial banking,” see note 5, supra, composes a dis-
tinct line of commerce. Some commercial bank-

*1 Accordingly, competition with other financial institutions
does not eliminate the need for competition between commer-
cial banks themselves. See Hearings on S. 1698 Before the
Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 378-379
(testimony of Federal Reserve Governor Mitchell).

22 As is characteristic of banks of their size operating in
small communities (e.g., App. 95-96), their ratio of com-
mercial loans to deposits is low, and a higher proportion
of their loans is in residential and business real estate mort-
gages than is in short term commercial credit. This is
typical of banks in the Lehigh Valley. See App. 83-84, 100,
133-134. See, generally, 55 Fed. Res. Bull. Charts A-20 and
A-24,

27

ing products or services are so distinctive that
they are entirely free of effective competition
from products or services of other financial insti-
tutions; the checking account is in this category.
Others enjoy such cost advantages as to be in-
sulated within a broad range from substitutes
furnished by other institutions. For example,
commercial banks compete with small-loan com-
panies in the personal-loan market; but the small-
loan companies’ rates are invariably much higher
than the banks’, in part, it seems, because the
companies’ working capital consists in substan-
tial part of bank loans. Finally, there are bank-
ing facilities which, although in terms of cost
and price they are freely competitive with the
facilities provided by other financial institutions,
nevertheless enjoy a settled consumer preference,
insulating them, to a marked degree, from com-
petition; this seems to be the case with savings
deposits. In sum, it is clear that commercial
banking is a market “sufficiently inclusive to be
meaningful in terms of trade realities.” Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 296
F. 2d 800, 811 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1961). [Footnotes
omitted. ]

The court below refused to follow this standard.
In a ruling it characterized as “not orthodox” (App.
675), it purported to analyze the product market by
“different groupings within the line of commerce
separating those products and services where ab-
sence of competition may be significant from those in
which competition from many sources is so widespread
that no question of significant diminution of competi-
tion by the merger could be raised” (App. 675).
As previously noted, however, the court did not make
any findings as to the competitive significance of this

ae En
A AUS
Paes? EI EE He ONENESS ENR Ie THe ee TGS Ee tS

28

merger on the fragmented lines of commerce it ge.
lected.

The court’s stated reason for’ refusing to follow
Philadelphia was that the merging banks here have a
considerably smaller proportion of demand deposits
to total deposits, and of commercial and industria]
loans to total loans, and a larger proportion of time
and savings deposits to total deposits, than did the
large city banks in Philadelphia. From this it con-
cluded that competition from other types of institu-
tions was necessarily greater than in large cities and
that the defendant banks were engaged in only lim-
ited activity in fields unique to commercial banking
(App. 672).

This approach disregards the fundamental teach-
ing of Philadelphia: that it is the cluster of products
and services which commercial banks offer, and not
merely the ones that are unique to them, which as a
matter of trade reality make commercial banking a
distinct line of commerce. Commercial banks are to
financial services what super-markets are to food re-
tailing: a place where varied products and services—
some unique and some not—are gathered together at
a point of convenient access. In addition, the banks’
credit-creating and demand-deposit functions, in what-
ever proportion, give them a distinctive role and in-
fluence on the economy of their community. Custom-
ers in small communities desire and utilize this clus-
ter of services no less than city dwellers (see State-
ment, supra, p. 8).

If the district court’s analysis were correct, all of
the banks in Phillipsburg-Easton and most of those

&

EE

29

elsewhere in the Lehigh Valley and in other small
communities across the nation, which have similar
ratios of business to those of the appellee banks (App.
764; see supra, pp. 7-8, 11-13), would be removed
from the category of commercial banking for pur-
poses of antitrust analysis and preserving competi-
tion. The result would be that residents of small
communities would be denied the protection of the
law enjoyed by city dwellers, and would have no
assurance that competitive alternatives in commer-
cial banking would be preserved for them.

The Bank Merger Act of 1966 did not change the
definition of lines of commerce, or draw a distinction
in this respect between city banks and banks in small
communities. Its legislative history largely records a
struggle over the criteria and procedures which should
apply to institutions within the reach of the Philadel-
phia decision—i.e., all commercial banks. The final
enactment continued the antitrust standard for bank
cases that had previously obtained (Nashville Bank,
390 U.S. at 182; Houston Bank, 386 U.S. at 363-364),
and manifested “no intention to alter the traditional
methods of defining relevant markets * * *” (Nash-
ville Bank, 390 U.S. at 182, n. 15).

The court below recognized, with reference to the
appellee banks, that “ ‘commercial banking’ may be
used to designate the general line of commerce em-
bracing all bank services * * *” (App. 669). The evi-
dence showed that the merging institutions were com-
mercial banks (see supra, pp. 11-12), and the district
court made no finding to the contrary. Since it also

OEE LENN DIONE HALES OLE MO TS

made no findings with respect to the fragmented
lines of commerce which it designated as appropriate _
product markets, and since it ultimately considered
only commercial banks in measuring the merger’s im-
pact (App. 681-689), the court seemed tacitly to ree.
ognize the impracticality of analyzing bank mergers
in the manner it proposed.* Although submarkets
such as the court defined are sometimes appropriate
for purposes of Section 7 analysis,* they may not be
utilized to exclude from consideration a more general
distinctive product or service market that is signifi-
cant in terms of commercial realities. Brown Shoe Co,
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326; United States y.
Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 457. According-
ly, commercial banking was a relevant line of com-
merce here.

30

II
Phillipsburg-Easton Is a Relevant Geographic Market

In the district court, the government contended that
the anticompetitive effects of this merger should be

28 Several other district courts, as well as the Comptroller
of the Currency, have also purported to analyze bank mergers
with reference to numerous lines of commerce as proposed by
the district court here. See, e.g., United States v. Crocker-
Anglo National Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 153-162 (N.D. Cal.);
United States v. Provident National Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1, 7-
9 (E.D. Pa.); United States v. First National Bank of Jack-
son, 301 F. Supp. 1161, 1179-1183 (S.D. Miss.); United
States v. First National Bank of Maryland, 1970 CCH Trade
Cases { 73,061, at pp. 88,157-88,161 (D. Md. 1970).

* For example, some of the district court’s individual lines
of commerce would obviously be relevant in analyzing the
effect on competition of a merger between a commercial bank
and another type of financial institution.

_——————

31

judged either in Phillipsburg or in Phillipsburg-Eas-
ton, and that in either market the effect of the merger
may be substantially to lessen competition. The dis-
trict court held, however, that neither geographic area
is an appropriate “section of the country” under Sec-
tion 7; it ruled that “the appropriate geographic
market” was a substantially broader area covering a
major part of the Lehigh Valley (App. 678, emphasis
added). ,

“[W]ithin [a] broad [product] market, well-de-
fined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, con-
stitute product markets for antitrust purposes”
(Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325).
The principle is equally applicable to geographic mar-
kets; there may be several areas in which it is appro-
priate to test the effect of a merger upon competition,
and if the proscribed effect occurs in any one of them,
the merger is illegal. See United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552. For Section 7 bars
mergers that may substantially lessen competition in
“any” section of the country, and “The language of
this section requires merely that the Government
prove the merger may have a substantial anticompeti-
tive effect somewhere in the United States” (Pabst,
supra, at p. 549). Moreover, the size of the particu-
lar area where the merger has an impact is immate-
rial in determining whether that area is an appro-
priate market; Section 7 is designed to preserve and
protect the benefits of competition in small communi-
ties as well as in vast metropolitan and larger regions.
Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,

32

339; United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S,
495, 519.

In defining a relevant market under Section 7, “The
proper question to be asked * *’ * is not where the
parties to the merger do business or even where they
compete, but where, within the area of competitive
overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will
be direct and immediate.'*! * * * This depends upon
‘the geographic structure of supplier-customer rela-
tions.’ * * * In banking, as in most service indus-
tries, convenience of location is essential to effective
competition.” United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357-358.

In selecting the geographic market in this case, the
district court failed to follow the foregoing settled
principles, and as a result made three basic errors:
(1) it improperly assumed that only a single market
exists; (2) it ignored the evidence in the record that
this merger would have a “direct and immediate”
effect upon banking competition in Phillipsburg and
Phillipsburg-Easton; and (3) rather than focusing on
the area where the merger would have such an im-
pact, it instead stressed the economic and social inte-

25 The anticompetitive effect with which Section 7 is con-
cerned is the change in the structure of a market that a mer-
ger causes, rather than the particular anticompetitive prac-
tices, such as price changes, that follow such change. For Sec-
tion 7 is designed to forestall such practices by preventing
the changes in market structure that lead to them. See, e.9.,
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 346; Philadel-
phia Bank, 374 U.S. at 365; United States v. Von’s Grocery Co.,
384 U.S. 270, 277. Accordingly, the area of impact that de-
fines an appropriate geographical market is an area where
such structural changes occur.

TIl——

33

gration among the population and other businesses in
the larger merchandising area that it viewed as the
only appropriate geographic market. Under the teach-
ings of this Court, the record shows that Phillipsburg-
Easton is a relevant market for testing the effect of
this merger upon banking competition.

In Philadelphia Bank, this Court pointed out (374
U.S. at 358-360) :

Individuals and corporations typically confer the
bulk of their patronage on banks in their local
community; they find it impractical to conduct
their banking business at a distance. See Trans-
america Corp. v. Board of Govs. of Fed. Res.
Sys., 206 F, 2d 163, 169 (C.A. 3rd Cir. 1953).
The factor of inconvenience localizes banking
competition as effectively as high transportation
costs in other industries. * * * Theoretically,
we should be concerned with the possibility that
bank offices on the perimeter of the area may be
in effective competition with bank offices within;
actually, this seems to be a factor of little sig-
nificance.

In Philadelphia, this Court held that a four-county
area was a relevant market for evaluating the com-
petitive effect of the merger of the second and third
largest of 42 banks in the Philadelphia metropolitan
area. It emphasized a number of factors:

ON ee ve
a

(1) the particular importance in banking of con-
venient access (374 U.S. at 358, 360-361, 369) ;

(2) the fact that banking offices generally compete
for deposits within a radius of only a few
miles (374 U.S. at 358 n. 35);

ep:
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4
4
5
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34

(3) the principle that a borrower’s or investor’s
market varies directly with his size: “[T]he
smaller the customer, the smaller is his bank-
ing market geographically” (374 U.S. at 359
n. 36);

(4) the fact that the vast bulk of the banks’ busi-
ness originated within the area (374 U.S. 359
n, 36), and that their business from outside
the area was relatively slight (374 U.S. at
360 n. 37);

(5) the view of other federal banking agencies that
the region was an area of effective competition
(374 U.S. at 361); and

(6) the concentration of all the banks’ offices with-
in the area, as required by State law (374 USS.
at 361).

The Court also noted, in defining the product mar-
ket, the importance of habit, custom, personal rela-
tionships and convenience as a factor tending to in-
sulate banks from other competition—even when
higher rates are offered for savings deposits (e.g,
App. 652-653). 374 U.S. at 357, n. 34.

With one exception,” these factors are equally ap-
plicable to the Phillipsburg-Easton area—although

26 When this suit was filed, New Jersey law did not limit
the merging banks to operating in Phillipsburg, but permitted
them to open branches anywhere within their home county
(Warren County). While the case was pentling, New Jersey
law was amended to permit branching on a broader basis.
See note 13, supra, p. 16. Since no one contended that either
Warren County or the broader area in which the merging
banks may now do business was an appropriate geographic
market, this factor is not involved in this case.

35

naturally on a reduced scale—and they establish that
that area constitutes an appropriate section of the
country for testing the effect of this merger upon
competition,

(1) Convenience of access is as important in this
small community as it is in the larger markets (cf.
App. 665).” Thus, although these cities are suf-
ficiently small so that there is easy access to the
center of either town where the banks have their main
offices, the banks found it necessary to establish
branches in surrounding townships within a radius of
a few miles. They opened branches there because
that is “where the customers are (App. 273).”

* This is a general principle of the banking business. Com-
pare Philadelphia Bank, at 358 n. 35. As the Federal Reserve
Board noted in another proceeding, quoted in Transamerica
Corp. V. Board of Governors, 206 F. 2d 163, 167-168 (C.A. 3),
certiorari denied, 346 U.S. 901:

Because of the frequency of need for access to one or
more of the services of commercial banks, such banks
draw their business largely from areas within which
customers may conveniently visit the banks as occasion
may require. Thus, in this aspect of their customer rela-
tions, commercial banks are largely local, and for the
usually needed customer services a distant bank cannot
adequately serve a customer. Very large concerns with
national credit standing have access to credit from banks
in many parts of the country and may also maintain ac-
counts in widely scattered banks. This does not apply,
however, to the great multitude of the customers of com-
mercial banks. The smaller concerns, local business enter-
prises, and ordinary citizens must depend upon their
local commercial bank or banks for the financial services
peculiar to such banks; for all these customers there is no
alternative or substitute, because distantly located banks
do not serve or supply their needs.

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36

(2) As the foregoing facts demonstrate, banking
offices in Phillipsburg-Easton generally compete for
deposits within a radius of only a few miles. More.
over, the merging banks do no significant advertising
outside the area and banks from outside the area
advertise within it only as part of incidental cover-
age utilized to reach other markets (see Statement,
supra, p. 10).

(3) The customers principally served are relatively
small: 74 percent of PNB’s and 72 percent of SNB’s
number of total deposits are less than $1,000; and 96
percent and 97 percent, respectively, are less than
$10,000 (App. 725-726, 733-734). Of total loans, 76
percent of PNB’s and 58 percent of SNB’s are less
than $2,500, and 86 and 94 percent, respectively, are
less than $10,000.*

(4) The vast bulk of the merging banks’ business,
and that of the other Phillipsburg-Easton banks as
well, is localized within the area. For example, nearly
every family in Phillipsburg deals with one of that
community’s three banks (App. 176). The merging
banks’ deposit and loan statistics show that they draw
about 85 percent of their total banking business in
every category from the Phillipsburg-Easton area.
About 90 percent of each bank’s total deposits, de-
mand deposits, and time and savings deposits origi-
nate there; as well as 78 percent of PNB’s total loans

28 Only 25 of PNB’s 5,566 loans, and only 17 of SNB’s
2,235 loans, exceed $50,000 (App. 733-734).

37

and 87 percent of SNB’s.” Indeed, the business is so
localized that the merging banks draw only about 10
percent of their deposits from Easton (App. 731-
732). And, as the district court itself found in as-
sessing the convenience and needs of the community
to be served, Phillipsburg’s businessmen prefer to
deal with one of the three banks in that sector (App.
691, 693-697).

The small amount of business that the merging
banks do outside the area results from special per-
sonal contacts or business relationships (App. 37-38,
40, 41-42, 80, 97, 269, 637). Similarly, banks from
outside the area do relatively little business within
it (App. 53-57, 64-68, 74, 96-98).

(5) The two other banking agencies required by
the Bank Merger Act to comment on the competitive
factors involved in this case also viewed Phillipsburg-
Easton, or the Phillipsburg sector thereof, as the pri-

* DEPOSIT AND LOAN ACCOUNTS OF PHILLIPS-
BURG NATIONAL AND SECOND NATIONAL LOCATED
WITHIN PHILLIPSBURG-EASTON DECEMBER 30, 1967

(Percent of Total)

Phillipsburg National Second National
number value number value

App. 725-726: Total Deposits 916% 874% 92 % 88.8%

App. 727-728: Demand Deposits 88.1 83.7 90.7 84.8
App. 729-730: IPC Demand

Deposits 88.2 83.8 90.8 88.7
App. 731-732:. Time and Savings

Deposits 92.7 89.1 92.6 90.4
App. 733-734: Total Loans 78.6 77.7 87.2 81.6
App. 735-736: Comm. & Indust,

Loans 79.5 86.9 90.9 76.0
App. 737-738: Real Estate Loans 86.8 82.1 87.8 82.5
App. 817-818: Installment Loans 77.2 67.9 88.0 86.2
App. 819-820: Single Payt. °

Loans 73.4 58.5 74.6 69.7

pe SA
38

mary area in which the merger’s competitive impact
would be felt (FDIC Rep., p. 2; FRB Rep., p. 4).
The extent to which the Phillipsburg-Easton banks
were insulated from competition outside the area is
dramatically illustrated by their practice with respect
to interest rates on savings deposits. As of December
31, 1967, commercial banks elsewhere in the Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey sectors of the trial court’s geo-
graphic market—many of them located only a few
miles from Phillipsburg-Easton—were paying 4 per-
cent interest on ordinary passbook savings accounts
(some had been paying this rate since 1962). Com-
mercial banks in Phillipsburg as of that date, and un-
til at least July 1968, paid only 314 percent on these
accounts; Easton commercial banks paid 3 percent.”
Yet Phillipsburg National’s rate of deposit growth
during 1962-1967 exceeded that of most Lehigh
Valley banks known to be paying the higher rates
of interest on such accounts during some or all of
that period, and similar growth was experienced by
Second National (see Statement, supra, pp. 10-11).

8° The president of Easton National Bank testified “3 per-
cent was paid from October 1, 1959 until July 1, 1968. * * *
We were authorized to go to a 4 percent level several years
ago, and the regulations permitted us to, but we chose not to
increase our rate” (App. 117). Phillipsburg National, how-
ever, had paid 314 percent since early 1962. Almost all banks
on the periphery of the Phillipsburg-Easton area were pay-
ing 4 percent during that period. Phillipsburg National’s
president explained that the half-percent differential enabled
them to keep most small accounts because for them it
“doesn’t mean this much” (App. 635). Phillipsburg and
Easton banks, however, almost simultaneously followed
Lafayette Trust’s lead when that Easton bank increased its
rate to 4 percent (App. 118).

tl

39

Despite the demonstrated localization of banking
in this area, it is of course possible for customers
from Phillipsburg-Easton to go elsewhere if they can
afford the time and tolerate the inconvenience, and
if an institution primarily serving another commu-
nity is interested in dealing with them. Cf, United
States v. Provident National Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1,
14-15 (E.D. Pa.) The broader market used by the
district court in effect implies that Phillipsburg-
Easton residents can protect themselves against the
adverse competitive consequences of this merger by
thus banking elsewhere. But as the Court noted in
Philadelphia, this is largely a question of their size.
“Small businessmen especially are, as a practical mat-
ter, confined to their locality for the satisfaction of
their credit needs * * *. If the number of banks in
the locality is reduced, the vigor of competition for
filling the marginal small business borrower’s needs
is likely to diminish” (Philadelphia Bank at 369).
Moreover, small depositors have little reason to leave
their money for safe keeping or checking purposes in
communities they visit only on occasional shopping
trips (Tr. 295). Whatever may be the social and eco-
nomic integration of the larger region, it does not
create the kind of credit relationship, based on inti-
mate local knowledge, that opens the doors of banks to
small businessmen, householders and those whose pri-
mary security is their character (App. 58, 280-
281). Nor does it evidence the kind of convenience
that encourages the residents of an area to use a
bank’s deposit and other services.

FETE ROL RD SEA ERR LR

ae SPUN,

40

The possibility that the resulting bank might com-
pete more vigorously in the future with banks serv.
ing peripheral areas, as a ground for using the
broader area relied on by the district court (compare
App. 29-30, 33-34, 125-126, with App. 688), does
not controvert the government’s proof that in Phil.
lipsburg and Easton the immediate effect of the pro-
posed merger would be elimination of competition
between two substantial firms and a significant in.
crease in an already high degree of concentration,
“[W ]hile there is undoubtedly some commercial in-
tercourse between smaller communities within a single
‘standard metropolitan area,’ the most intense and
important competition * * * will be confined to * * *
the particular communities in such an area and their
immediate environs.” Brown Shoe at 339. As Phila-
delphia Bank makes clear, any area where a merger
has such an impact is an appropriate section of the
country. “Proof of the section of the country where
the anticompetitive effect exists is entirely subsidiary
to the crucial question in * * * every § 7 case which
is whether a merger may substantially lessen compe-
tition anywhere in the United States” (Pabst, supra,
384 U.S. at 549-550)

If the banking interests of residents and businesses
in small communities are to be protected, the localized

81 Moreover, the district court’s stated reason for not ac-
cording significance to the government’s proof that most of the
merging banks’ business is local—that “These percentages
have significance only to the extent that they are considered
in conjunction with concentration of population” (App. 681)
—hardly justified the court’s extension of the market to in-
clude Bethlehem, a city with a larger population than that of
either Phillipsburg or Easton.

————7—_—_-

41

nature of banking must be given primary weight in
defining banking markets, for it defines the princi-
pal area of impact. Otherwise, an effective exemp-
tion from the statute will have been created for hori-
zontal mergers of small banks in small communities,
thereby reducing for the people of those areas the
choice among banking alternatives that Section 7
preserves in the more densely populated areas. This
was not the intention of Congress when it adopted
the original Section 7, extended it in the Celler-
Kefauver Antimerger Act, and reaffirmed this Court’s
application of it to commercial banking in the Bank
Merger Act of 1966.

III

The District Court’s Evaluation of the Merger’s Effects
on Competition and on Community Convenience and
Needs Was Defective Because It Applied Erroneous
Standards
Under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, the determi-
nation of the legality of a bank merger involves a
two-step process. First, the effect of the merger upon
competition must be evaluated, i.e., whether, in the
relevant product and geographic markets, it may sub-
stantially lessen competition. That determination is
made by applying the usual standards under Section
7 of the Clayton Act. United States v. Third Na-
tional Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 181-183. f .
Second, if the merger violates those standards, then f
the district court may approve it only if it finds ;
that “the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public in- :
terest by the probable effect of the transaction in

f
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.

42

meeting the convenience and needs of the community
to be served.” See Nashville Bank, supra, at 183.
184; United States v. First City National Bank of
Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 369-370.

If the district court erroneously evaluates the ef.
fect of the merger on competition—whether by using
the wrong markets or by applying improper criteria
for determining such effect—that error also invali-
dates its conclusion that such effect is clearly out-
weighed by the community convenience and needs,
Nashville Bank, supra, at 188. Similarly, any error
in applying the convenience-and-needs standard nec-
essarily also undermines the balancing of the two
factors involved. “To weigh adequately one of these
factors against the other requires a proper conclu-
sion as to each” (ibid.).

In the present case, the district court erred both
in evaluating the effect of the merger on competition
and in balancing that effect against the meeting of
community convenience and needs. The court’s
threshold error, as we have just shown, was using
the wrong geographic market for testing competitive
impact. As we shall show, under this Court’s Section
7 decisions, the effect of the merger in Phillipsburg-
Easton may be substantially to lessen competition.

The district court’s evaluation of whether the off-
setting convenience-and-needs factor clearly outweighs
the merger’s anticompetitive effects was defective for
a number of reasons: (1) the court weighed this
factor against an erroneous assessment of competi-
tive impact; (2) it failed to balance the factors with
the kind of detailed consideration that this Court’s

43

Nashville Bank decision requires; (3) it determined
competitive effect and community convenience and
needs in different geographic markets rather than,
as the Act requires, in the same market; and (4) it
failed adequately to consider whether the commu-
nity benefits could have been achieved by a less anti-
competitive method than this merger.

A. The Effect of the Merger in Phillipsburg-Easton
May Be Substantially to Lessen Competition.

Under the criteria developed by this Court, par-
ticularly in Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 364-366,
for determining the effect upon competition in con-
centrated markets of so-called horizontal mergers
(those between competitors), the effect of this merger
may be substantially to lessen competition. The de-
terminative inquiry is the effect of the merger on
concentration as reflected in the market shares of
the merging banks and of the remaining banks serv-
ing the community.

In Phillipsburg-Easton, the commercial banking
market is highly concentrated (see Statement, supra,
pp. 18-15). The merger would significantly increase
this concentration. The total deposit shares of the
two largest banks would increase from 56 to 65 per-
cent and the merged bank would control 20.2 percent
of total deposits and 27.3 percent of total loans and
discounts. Its share of overall business would be at
least 24 percent (see Statement, supra, pp. 13-15).
In such a concentrated market, these market shares
show that the effect of the merger may be substan-
tially to lessen competition. Philadelphia Bank (30

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44

percent combined); Nashville Bank (33.6 percent
and 4.8 percent) ; United States v. Von’s Grocery Co,,
384 U.S. 270 (7.5 percent combined) ; United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (4.9 percent
combined); United States vy. Provident National
Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa.) (10 percent com-
bined).

This Court has noted the particular importance of
preserving competitive alternatives in banking mar-
kets which are already concentrated, since they pro-
vide the opportunity for competitive deviations from
the oligopolistic pattern. Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S,
at 365 n. 42. “[E]ven the mere addition of one seller
to an oligopoly market makes the market more
complex and less predictable. Therefore there may
be competitive actions and reactions in an oligopoly
market.” Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 399 F.2d 958, 965-966 (C.A.D.C.). In
banking these competitive reactions may manifest
themselves in deviations from generally prevailing
loan and deposit interest rates (e.g., App. 188, 457-
458, 463) and in improved services such as more
convenient banking hours (e.g., App. 34) or more
conveniently located branches (e.g., App. 273, 398-
399).*

** For these reasons the district court’s view that the gov-
ernment failed to prove its case because it did not show that
the merger would result in immediate adverse consequences
in daily transactions (App. 688) misconceived the significance
of the structural approach to horizontal mergers set forth in
Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 366. The extensive evidence
offered by the defendants to the effect that bank mergers have
no immediate adverse competitive effects is similarly irrele-
vant. Id. at 367, n. 43. See n. 25, p. 32.

45

B. The District Court Misconceived and Misapplied
the Community Convenience-and-Needs Standards

As noted, the district court’s improper assessment
of the competitive impact of the merger vitiated its
weighing of that impact against the benefits to the
community. Nashville Bank, supra, 390 U.S. at 183-
184. Moreover, it conclusory statement (App. 699)
that “any conceivable anticompetitive effect of the
merger is clearly outweighted by * * * the needs and
convenience of the community to be served” does not
reflect the kind of carefully articulated and reasoned
analysis that the Act requires before the court may
find that the anticompetitive consequences are “clear-
ly outweighed” by the community benefits. Nash-
ville Bank at 187-192.

There were also several serious fundamental de-
fects in the district court’s understanding and appli-
cation of the community convenience-and-needs stand-
ards.

1. Community Convenience and Need Should be
Evaluated in the Same Geographical Area as Com-
petitive Effect. By assessing competitive impact in
a broad multi-community market, the court was able
to conclude that the anticompetitive effect would be
insubstantial; turning to the needs of the community,
however, it assessed the present availability of the
two needs it focused on—large loans and trust serv-
ices—only in the Phillipsburg sector of the commu-
nity.

This approach seriously misapprehends the rela-
tion between Section 7 and the Bank Merger Act.
The latter statute, whose history has twice been re-

viewed by this Court (in the Houston Bank and
Nashville Bank cases), was a compromise produced
in an intense legislative struggle. It had three prin.
cipal substantive effects: (1) establishment of a uni.
form standard for the assessment of commercial bank
mergers by courts and banking agencies; (2) con.
tinuation of traditional antitrust standards for test.
ing the anticompetitive effects of such mergers; and
(3) creation of a new affirmative defense to proved
violations of the antitrust standards—convenience
and needs of the community to be served.*

Since the defense depends upon a balancing of
anticompetitive effects against the community’s needs, —
both factors must be assessed with reference to the —
same geographic area if the comparison is to be
meaningful. The reason that a particular area is an |
appropriate geographic market is because it is an
area where the merger will have a direct and serious
impact upon competition, i.e., it will eliminate one
of the reasonably available choices for customers in
the area. Any offsetting benefits that may justify
the merger must be evaluated on the basis of their
effect in the same area. For such benefits relate to
the serving of the same banking needs which under-
lie the selection of the geographic market for deter-
mining competitive impact. Congress manifestly in-
tended the convenience-and-needs defense to legalize
only those anticompetitive bank mergers whose di-
rect benefits to the people to be served clearly out-

46

83 Under the law as it stood prior to the 1966 Act, such a
defense was not available. Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at

371.

— °°

47

weigh the injury those same people would suffer
through the elimination of a significant entity that
regularly had been serving them. In terms of the
statutory language, the “community to be served,”
whose convenience and needs are to be evaluated, is
the same as the “section of the country” in which the
competitive impact of the merger is to be tested. See

112 Cong. Rec. 2445, 2457 (remarks of Rep. Reuss).

In determining the needs of the community when
thus properly defined, it is, of course, appropriate to
focus on a particular sector if the benefit to that
sector will accrue to the entire community. An ex-
ample might be a merger which would confer other-
wise unachievable benefits upon a blighted area of
a city. Although the larger urban area would con-
stitute the relevant market, benefit to the smaller
area within it might be found, in such a case, to
serve the convenience and needs of the city at large.

The district court made no such findings here,
however. It never viewed Phillipsburg-Easton as a
community in which to measure competition or needs.
Although it measured competition in a large multi-
community area, it treated Phillipsburg alone (where
the anticompetitive effect of the merger would be the
most drastic) as the “community” whose banking
needs were to be considered—and it assessed those
needs with reference only to banking services located
in Phillipsburg, while ignoring those available in its
twin city across the river.

2. The district court misapplied the convenience-
and-need standard. In assessing the needs of the
Phillipsburg community, the district court considered
too narrow a segment of that community. It looked

Be ONAN PIL ETSI RII

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48

to the needs of only two groups there—customers for
large business loans or for trust services. The needs
of the smaller depositors and the smaller borrowers,
whose number is far greater, whose banking range
is far narrower, and whose local banking alterna.
tives the merger would reduce, were ignored.

The primary need emphasized by the court, as re
flected in extensive quotations from testimony (App,
691-698), was the desire of some Phillipsburg
businessmen for an opportunity to borrow larger
sums from a bank located in Phillipsburg than any
of the three banks presently located there can directly
supply. But the record shows that in Easton four
banks have lending limits equal to or substantially
in excess of that of the proposed resulting bank (see
n. 14, supra, p. 17). Moreover, the larger borrowers,
who tend to be established businessmen, have greater
access than smaller borrowers to banks elsewhere in
the region (see Statement, supra, pp. 7, 17-18). In
other words, the broad multi-community area used by
the court to measure the merger’s competitive effect
would seem more relevant to assessing this asserted
need of the Phillipsburg community than to the pur-
pose for which it was used.

The other need emphasized by the court related to
improved trust services. Demand for this service,
however, is relatively slight compared with demand
for other banking services, and much of the area’s
need for personal and corporate trust services is
satisfied by large banks in cities as distant as Phila-
delphia and New York, because users of such services
are willing to shop further afield (App. 75, 90, 95,

49

165, 858, 439, 462, 491). Moreover, trust services
are available from most of the local banks (App.
838). Both of the merging banks have small trust
departments (App. 165, 245, 631-633, 710), and
ample trust services are available in Easton from the
Easton National Bank, which handles more than $45
million in both personal and corporate trusts (App.
119), and from the Lafayette Trust Bank (App.
388). In addition, Nazareth National Bank, which
has a branch in Easton’s suburb of Forks, handles
some $20 million in trust assets (App. 77). There
appears to be no serious demand for trust services in
Phillipsburg which cannot be met without difficulty
(App. 50, 627).

The district court also found that the larger bank
resulting from the merger would benefit the com-
munity because it could afford the salaries of a full
time specialist in commercial loans and a trust officer
(App. 689-690). But it is doubtful that the combined
institution would have sufficient business to warrant
this step in the near future. An officer from a large
Bethlehem bank testified that a full time trust officer
becomes justifiable only after trust business ap-
proaches $30 million, which may take nearly a decade
(App. 111-118). Similarly, a substantially greater
volume of commercial loans than either bank pres-
ently has would be necessary to support a full time
specialist in this field (App. 279).

Small banks typically do not have personnel de-
voting full time to any one phase of their varied
operations (App. 92, 281-282, 884, 396-397, 478-479,
540). Their officials become experienced in several
_ fields, and are usually able to specialize in any one of

LEAL ET pe PIPE LEE OPI E 3 thy

- ay
50

them if the need arises. PNB’s vice-president con-
ceded that he could handle all commercial lending if
he devoted full time to it (App. 268-269; Tr. 869.
870), and its consumer loan specialist greatly ex-
panded that department until he was told to con-
centrate on mortgage loans (App. 267-268, 413-414),
Thus the bank’s present officials have the potential for
necessary specialization, if their business warrants it
(see App. 638-639). As a PNB officer recognized
(App. 266-267), however, the merger was not expect-
ed to produce a significant change in the character of
the resulting bank’s business (App. 281-282). While
the merger might increase its ability to handle busi-
ness from outside the community, this is an extremely
attenuated benefit to the convenience and needs of
the people in Phillipsburg-Easton (cf. App. 143-144,
528-529).

We submit that a far more compelling showing of
need would be necessary to outweigh clearly the
merger’s anticompetitive effect in increasing bank-
ing concentration in Phillipsburg-Easton—and this
showing would have to be all the greater if the Phil-
lipsburg sector alone were to be considered the rele-
vant area. An increase in lending limits when there
are other available local sources for larger loans, or
the provision of better trust services in a small com-
munity where there are several banks with estab-
lished trust departments, is not enough “clearly” to
outweigh the anticompetitive impact of this merger.
Undoubtedly the merger would serve the convenience
of larger business borrowers, and those who wish to
establish trusts. But the fact that the merged bank
might be a larger institution which would render

51

better banking services is not in itself sufficient to
establish a defense under the Bank Merger Act. Un-
der that statute a merger cannot be approved unless
the gains in better service to the entire community
clearly outweigh the anticompetitive detriment to it
and the merger is “essential to secure this net gain
** *” Nashville Bank, 390 U.S. at 188-189.

3. The Merging Banks—and the District Court—
Failed Adequately to Consider Less Anticompetitive
Alternatives to This Merger. In determining wheth-
er benefits to the community outweigh the anticom-
petitive effects of a merger, the merging banks must
demonstrate that any overall gain to the public in-
terest cannot be achieved except by merger. For
“{iJf the injury to the public interest flowing from
the loss of competition could be avoided and the con-
venience and needs of the community benefited in
ways short of merger but within the competence of
reasonably able businessmen, * * * we seriously doubt
that Congress intended a merger to be authorized
by either the banking agencies or the courts. * * *
Otherwise, the benefits of competition, acknowledged
by Congress, would be sacrificed needlessly.” Nash-
ville Bank, 390 U.S. at 189. In the present case,
even assuming arguendo that the district court prop-
erly determined convenience and needs by reference
only to Phillipsburg, its ultimate holding on this is-
sue is invalid under the foregoing principle because
of its failure adequately to consider less anticom-
petitive methods of achieving the same benefits.

iciedieibals |

52

(a) Alternatives to Merger Were Not Seriously Pursued,

Both of the merging banks were growing and
profitable. They had increased their assets, deposits
and loans dramatically in the preceding decade, had
financed substantial improvements and new banking
offices internally, and had continued to pay sub
stantial cash dividends (App. 282, 285, 644; Tr.
996; GX-14). Any problems they had resulted
largely from their own commercial success within
their community.

The district court stressed the lack of full time
specialists in their trust and commercial loan depart-
ments. It found that there was only “tentative ex-
ploration of the possibility of obtaining qualified bank
officers,” and that this tentative effort “ceased when
it became clear that the expense was out of reach”
(App. 690). The only evidence of such tentative ex-
ploration, however, was a discussion by SNB with
an officer of one of the nation’s largest banks, Chem-
ical Bank of New York, after the merger had been
announced. He indicated that SNB could not meet
his terms (App. 406-408). The banks apparently did
not investigate whether there were available qualified
bank officers from other parts of the country whose
compensation requirements might be lower. Except
for an occasional casual review of unsolicited place-
ment listings, no effort was made, so far as the ree-
ord shows, to use the various services specializing in
the recruitment of bank specialists and executives.
Yet a PNB officer stated that, because of increased
business, even if the merger were disapproved the
bank would “have to hire somebody * * * [whether
he was a specialist or not” (App. 284; compare App.

285 with App. 540-541).

53

Officers of both banks admitted that one reason
for the lack of serious effort to hire new manage-
ment personnel, during at least the 18 months prior
to the merger, was that the merger discussions were
under way (App. 644-645, 649, 654, 657-658).
These discussions had begun several years before the
merger plan was consummated (e.g., App. 630,
644-645), and they directly affected the way the
banks were operated. For example, they did not re-
tain cash to pay salaries which might attract full
time specialists, although the cash dividends alone
were substantial during this period.™

Nor did the banks explore methods of increasing
their lending limits. They did not seek to enlarge
their capital structure by offering new capital stock
because, as a spokesman for the banks testified, “if
both banks should attempt to sell [new stock] they
would only be fighting for the dollar themselves, one
against the other which would not do anybody any
good” (App. 156). No effort was made to retain cash
dividends to enlarge surplus accounts for the purpose
of increasing lending limits (App. 714-715; Tr. 996) .*

* PNB paid cash dividends of $33,000 in 1967 and total divi-
dends from 1962 to 1967 of $192,000; SNB paid cash dividends
of $36,250 in 1967 and total dividends between 1962 and 1967
of $198,750 (GX-14; App. 285).

** Moreover, lending limits are not an absolute barrier.
Where credit risks are sound, requests for loans exceeding the
limits may be accommodated through participation with other
commercial banks in or outside the area. For example, PNB
financed the construction of the local parochial high school by
participating in loans in excess of its limit (App. 271-272.
See App. 319, 324). It has also accommodated large bor-
rowers by making multiple loans; in 1967 it extended a total

credit of $1.6 million to a single businessman (App. 621).

det e
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ah DS ee OER IL Mh Ns An Ae hak us 6 EA ks Oe ARI Re a, oe

54

The record further indicates that practical alter.
natives to merger were available for achieving the
benefits the banks contended the merger would pro-
duce. A small bank in Easton, Lafayette Trust Com.
pany, demonstrated this by hiring new management,
issuing stock and taking other steps to enlarge its
loan limits and modernize its operations. Internal
development by the defendant banks of the allegedly
needed services, therefore, was reasonably feasible
(cf. Nashville Bank, 390 U.S. at 190-192), though
perhaps less attractive to the defendants than merger.

**In May 1965—shortly before the defendant banks became
involved in their merger plans—Lafayette Trust, then with
“approximately 18 million” dollars in deposits (App. 396),
hired a new vice president for $11,000 salary with “nothing”
in fringe benefits (App. 395). Then, using the methods out-
lined in the text, Lafayette Trust was able to add two addi-
tional branches and a full time mortgage specialist, to build
deposits to 24.3 million dollars in December 1966 and to near-
ly 30 million dollars by September 1968, and to increase its
lending limit. Although Lafayette Trust had no full time
commercial lending officer, it moved aggressively into that
field; it solicited new deposits by boosting passbook interest
rates—forcing other Phillipsburg-Easton banks, after some
delay, to do the same (App. 118)—and in February 1968 it
began computerizing (App. 398). As a result Lafayette
Trust, which has only $4 million more in assets than PNB,
has a loah limit ($224,365) (see supra, n. 14, p. 17) which is
more than twice as great (App. 401), because it took steps
to increase its capital accounts (App. 403-404).

** The merging banks have the financial strength for efforts
similar to those of Lafayette Trust (see supra, n. 36). Both
banks showed substantial growth and considerable profits dur-
ing the decade preceding the merger (see supra, pp. 11, 53, n.
34) and they were able to finance internally the modernization
of the offices, the opening of branches and the purchase of av-

55

(b) The Possibility of Less Anticompetitive Mergers

Was Ignored.

The trial court failed to weigh, as the government
urged (App. 588-589, 593), the possibility of achieving
the same community benefits through a less anticom-
petitive merger. In Nashville this Court ruled “that be-
fore a merger injurious to the public interest is ap-
proved, a showing [must] be made that the gain
expected from the merger cannot reasonably be ex-
pected through other means” (390 U.S. at 190). The
Court held, accordingly, that the owners of the Nash-
ville bank should have made a serious effort to sell
to someone, other than their leading competitor, who
might have been willing to remedy the bank’s diffi-
culties (390 U.S. at 191-192). By the same reason-
ing, the possibility of a less anticompetitive merger
is an alternative which must be explored to satisfy
the convenience and needs test. Yet the district
court’s opinion reveals no consideration of this alter-
native.
At the time of the merger, PNB and SNB were
two of nine banks in Warren County. Under the
existing State law, either could have merged wiih
any of the six Warren County banks outside of Phil-
lipsburg, without the severe loss of direct competition

tomated equipment at substantial costs without reducing their
cash dividend. For example, in 1957 PNB modernized its main
office and added a parking lot at a cost of $120,000. In 1964 it
opened its Hillcrest Branch at a cost of $116,500 and its Alpha
Branch at a cost of $130,000. Since 1958 it has purchased
$48,000 worth of semi-automated bookkeeping equipment.
(GX-14, App. 627, 641-643.)

—

56

that is involved here.** But neither PNB nor SNB
gave “any consideration to contacting any other banks
in Warren County with respect to the prospects of
merging with one of those banks * * *” (App. 327,
662-663). Two of these Warren County banks, lo
cated in the town of Washington, some 12 miles from
Phillipsburg, were approximately the same size as the
two Phillipsburg banks.*® Thus, the asserted “con-

88 The available number of less anticompetitive alternatives
has been greatly increased by the amendments to the New
Jersey Branch Banking Law (see, supra, p. 16, n. 13). Now
either defendant could merge with any of the 86 other banks
located throughout the newly created First Banking District,
covering all of northern New Jersey (App. 868-870). A merg-
er with such a bank located in some other northern New Jersey
community would not involve a loss of existing competition in
Phillipsburg-Easton. We believe that it would be appropri-
ate for the district court to consider, on remand, the wider
range of alternatives now available.

8° The First National Bank of Washington had deposits of
$18.2 million and the Washington Trust Co. had deposits of
$14.5 million, as compared with $22.3 million and $16.0 mil-
ion for PNB and SNB (App. 684).

Subsequently, the First National Bank of Washington mer-
ged with Hackettstown National Bank (deposits of $10 mil-
lion), to form Warren County National Bank. This merger of
two small banks thirteen miles apart was approved by the ap-
propriate federal banking agencies. As pointed out by de-
fendants (Joint Motion to Strike, Affirm and Advance at 17),
Warren County National thereafter became an affiliate of First
National State Bancorp, a Newark-based holding company.

The possibility that larger Newark-based banks may now
enter Warren County by means of such “foothold” acquisi-
tions does not, as appellees suggested in their motion to af-
firm, justify the merger of PNB and SNB to foreclose this
threat of additional local competition. Such a merger might
be justified only where small competitors had to combine to
save themselves from destruction by large firms. United
States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U. S. 270, 277.

tl

57

venience-and-reeds” benefits based on increased size
and lending Jimit might well have been available
through mergé? With either of these banks,

Small bank’S Can compete successfully in small
markets and indeed can compete successfully with
large banks if: they have the will to do so. Nashville
Bank, 390 U.S. at 191, n. 24.” As a class they face
similar problems—difficulty in hiring full time spe-
cialists, lending limitations, and restriction of busi-
ness opportunities because of the small size of the
community they serve. If the common problems of
small banks im small communities were to be a justi-
fication for merger in the absence of significant
efforts to alleviate them by other means, multiple
banking alternatives would be likely to disappear in
many of the small towns of America. But Section
7 of the Clayton Act and the Bank Merger Act were
intended to preserve a diversity of banking oppor-

tunity for all Americans—in small communities as
well as large.

“See Kohn, T d ,
Their Ability tr? Future of Small Banks: An Analysis of

‘ Compete with Large Banks (N.Y. State
Banking Dept. 1966), p. 18.

a
— ee

58
CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court should be re
versed and the case remanded for further considera.
tion under correct criteria. —

Repectfully submitted.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.

RICHARD W. MCLAREN,
Assistant Attorney General,

DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,
Deputy Solicitor General,
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE,
Assistant to the Solicitor General,

HOWARD E. SHAPIRO,
KENNETH G. ROBINSON, JR.,

Attorneys.

APRIL 1970.

59
APPENDIX

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as
amended, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. 18, provides in
pertinent part:

That no corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire
the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly.

Section 18(c) of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 80
Stat. 7, 12 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1828(c), provides:

“(c)(1) Except with the prior written ap-
proval of the responsible agency, which shall in
every case referred to in this paragraph be the
Corporation, no insured bank shall—

“(A) merge or consolidate with any non-
insured bank or institution;

“(B) assume liability to pay any deposits
made in, or similar liabilities of, any non-
insured bank or institution;

“(C) transfer assets to any noninsured
bank or institution in consideration of the
assumption of liabilities for any portion of
the deposits made in such insured bank.

“(2) No insured bank shall merge or consoli-
date with any other insured bank or, either di-

SEP SAS Pe Ee

60

rectly or indirectly, acquire the assets of, or
assume liability to pay any deposits made in,
any other insured bank except with the prior
written approval of the responsible agency,
which shall be—

“(A) the Comptroller of the Currency if
the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank
is to be a national bank or a District bank;

“(B) the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System if the acquiring, as.
suming, or resulting bank is to be a State
member bank (except a District bank) ;

“(C) the Corporation if the acquiring,
assuming, or resulting bank is to be a non-
member insured bank (except a District
bank).

“(3) Notice of any proposed transaction for
which approval is required under paragraph (1)
or (2) (referred to hereafter in this subsection
as a ‘merger transaction’) shall, unless the re-
sponsible agency finds that it must act imme
diately in order to prevent the probable failure
of one of the banks involved, be published—

“(A) prior to the granting of approval
of such transaction,

“(B) in a form approved by the respon-
sible agency.
' “(C) at appropriate intervals during a
period at least as long as the period allowed
for furnishing reports under paragraph (4)
of this subsection, and

“(D) in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the community or communities
where the main offices of the banks involved
are located, or, if there is no such news-

wige Sera

61

paper in any such community, then in the
newspaper of general circulation published
nearest thereto.

(4) In the interests of uniform standards,
before acting on any application for approval
of a merger transaction, the responsible agency,
unless it finds that it must act immediately in
order to prevent the probable failure of one of
the banks involved, shall request reports on the
competitive factors involved from the Attorney
General and the other two banking agencies re-
ferred to in this subsection. The reports shall
be furnished within thirty calendar days of the
date on which they are requested, or within ten
calendar days of such date if the requesting
agency advises the Attorney General and the
other two banking agencies that an emergency
exists requiring expeditious action.

“(5) The responsible agency shall not ap-
prove—

“(A) any proposed merger transaction
which would result in a monopoly, or which
would be in furtherance of any combination
or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt
to monopolize the business of banking in
any part of the United States, or

“(B) any other proposed merger trans-
action whose effect in any section of the
country may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or
which in any other manner would be in re-
straint of trade, unless it finds that the an-
ticompetitive effects of the proposed trans-
action are clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of the trans-

action in meeting the convenience and needs
of the community to be served.

In every case, the responsible agency shall take
into consideration the financial and manageria]
resources and future prospects of the existing
and proposed institutions, and the convenienc
and needs of the community to be served.
“(6) The responsible agency shall immedi.
ately notify the Attorney General of any ap.
proval by it pursuant to this subsection of a
proposed merger transaction. If the agency has
found that it must act immediately to prevent
the probable failure of one of the banks involved
and reports on the competitive factors have been
dispensed with, the transaction may be consum.
mated immediately upon approval by the agency,
If the agency has advised the Attorney General
and the other two banking agencies of the exist-
ence of an emergency requiring expeditious ac-
tion and has requested reports on the competi-
tive factors within ten days, the transaction may
not be consummated before the fifth calendar
day after the date of approval by the agency.
In all other cases, the transaction may not be
consummated before the thirtieth calendar day
after the date of approval by the agency.
“(7) (A) Any action brought under the anti-
trust laws arising out of a merger transaction
shall be commenced prior to the earliest time
under paragraph (6) at which a merger trans-
action approved under paragraph (5) might be
consummated. The commencement of such an
action shall stay the effectiveness of the agency’s
approval unless the court shall otherwise specifi-
cally order. In any such action, the court shall
review de novo the issues presented.

“(B) In any judicial proceeding attacking a
merger transaction approved under paragraph
(5) on the ground that the merger transaction
alone and of itself constituted a violation of any
antitrust laws other than section 2 of the Act
of July 2, 1890 (section 2 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. 2), the standards applied
by the court shall be identical with those that
the banking agencies are directed to apply under
paragraph (5).

“(C) Upon the consummation of a merger
transaction in compliance with this subsection
and after the termination of any antitrust liti-
gation commenced within the period prescribed
in this paragraph, or upon the termination of
such period if no such litigation is commenced
therein, the transaction may not thereafter be
attacked in any judicial proceeding on the
ground that it alone and of itself constituted a
violation of any antitrust laws other than sec-
tion 2 of the Act of July 2, 1890 (section 2 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 2), but
nothing in this subsection shall exempt any bank
resulting from a merger transaction from com-
plying with the antitrust laws after the consum-
mation of such transaction.

“(D) In any action brought under the anti-
trust laws arising out of a merger transaction
approved by a Federal supervisory agency pur-
suant to this subsection, such agency, and any
State banking supervisory agency having juris-
diction within the State involved, may appear
as a party of its own motion and as of right,
and be represented by its counsel.

“(8) For the purposes of this subsection, the
term ‘antitrust laws’ means the Act of July 2,

1890 (the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 USL.
1-7), the Act of October 15, 1914 (the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 12-27), and any other Acts in
pari materia.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0211%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.
