# Appendix — Dandridge v. Williams > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0173%3A01 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1970 - **Citation:** 397 U.S. 471 ## Text Docket Entries Complaint . Complaint — Exhibit A Exhibit B! Exhibit Bz Exhibit B® Exhibit B- Exhibit B5 Exhibit B® Exhibit B/ Exhibit B® Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order and A Prelimi- nary Injunction Supplementary Memorandum in W of Plain- tiffs’ Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order and A Preliminary Injunction Amended Motion To Dismiss Memorandum or Law in Support of Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dismiss r Stipulation of Facts Stipulation — Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Proceedings in Open Court, June 24, 1968 Proceedings in Open Court, June 25, 1968 Initial Opinion Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment or in the Alternative to take Additional Testimony, or for A New Trial, or in the Alternative to Alter or Amend the Judgment ii PAGE Exhibit to Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Judg- ment or in the Alternative to Take Additional Testimony, or for a New Trial, or in the Alterna- tive to Alter or Amend the Judgment— Exhibit A (Excerpts from) 100 Exhibit J to Exhibit ....................... 116 Exhibit K to Exhibit 3 119 Exhibit C 120 c ͤͤ TT 126 Exhibit E (Excerpts fromm) 127 OE PRS ˙ AAA PEERS 147 Exhibit A to Exhibit F. 163 Exhibit 6 ae 165 r „ wen eae Cc Proceedings in Open Court, January 3, 199 195 Exhibits to Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion Exhibit A! (Excerpts from) 203 Exhibit A? (Excerpts from) 204 00 ˙ A — dawtheudts 206 Exhibit B? (Excerpts from) 208 NS a i otra acct ckinccsapatinerindsiics ccaaninaes 208 %%% 209 , ̃ tet 213 Supplemental Memorandum of Defendants in Sup- port of Motion for Reargument 9 214 Attachments to Supplemental Memorandum of De- fendants in Support of Motion for Reargument— ment— Excerpts from: Cohen, Factors Influencing the Content of Federal Public Welfare Legisla- Cohen & Ball, The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means Supplemental Opinion on Motion Order DOCKET ENTRIES United States District Court for the District of Maryland 1968 Feb. 28—Complaint, request for a Three-Judge Court and Exhibits A, and B-1 through B-8, inclusive, filed. Feb. 28—(Issuance of process withheld — see letter on file). Feb. 28—Points and Authorities in support of Applica- tion for a Three-Judge Court, filed. Feb. 28—Motion of Plaintiff, Linda Williams, and her minor children, Affidavit and Order (Thomsen, C. J.) grant- ing leave to file in forma pauperis, filed. Feb. 28—Motion of Plaintiffs, Junius Gary and Jeanette Gary, and their minor children, Affidavit and Order (Thomsen, C. J.) granting leave to file in forma pauperis, filed. Feb. 28—Motion of Plaintiff, Linda Williams and her minor children, for temporary restraining order and pre- liminary injunction and Affidavit in support thereof, filed. Feb. 28—Motion of Plaintiffs, Junius Gary and Jeanette Gary, and their minor children, for temporary restrain- ing order and preliminary injunction and affidavits (2) in support thereof, filed. March 1—Request of Plaintiff to issue summons as to Defendant, Esther Lazarus, filed. March 1—Summons issued as to Defendant, Esther La- zarus. (Summoned — 4 March 1968). March 1—Notification and Request of the Court (Thom- sen, C. J.) for designation for Three Judge Court, filed. 2 March 18—Designation of Haynsworth, C. J., Fourth Cir., of Three-Judge District Court, designating Winter, Cir., J., and Thomsen and Harvey, JJ., filed. March 21—Answer of Defendant, Esther Lazarus, Direc- tor of Public Works, etc., filed. March 21—Motion of Defendants, Edmund P. Dandridge, Jr., Chairman of the State Board of Public Welfare; Ra- leigh C. Hobson, Director of the State Department of Pub- lic Welfare; and Mrs. Barbara Stevenson, Howard W. Mur- phy, Julius O. Shuger, Dr. W. Richard Ferguson, Lester S. Levy, Nicholas C. Mueller, Calhoun Bond and Mrs. Charles D. Harris, members of the State Board of Public Welfare, to Dismiss, and Memorandum in Support thereof, filed. March 21+-Answer of Defendants, Edmund P. Dan- dridge, Jr., Chairman of the State Board of Public Wel- fare; Raleigh C. Hobson, Director of the State Department of Public Welfare; and Mrs. Barbara Stevenson, Howard W. Murphy, Julius O. Shuger, Dr. W. Richard Ferguson, Lester S. Levy, Nicholas C. Mueller, Calhoun Bond and Mrs. Charles B. Harris, members of the State Board of Public Welfare, filed. March 25—Amended Answer of Defendant, Esther La- zarus, Director of Public Works, etc., filed. April 1—Memorandum of Plaintiffs in opposition to De- fendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed. June 7—Memorandum of Plaintiffs in support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 8 tion, filed. June 21—Amended Motion of Defendants to Dismiss, and Memorandum in support thereof, filed. June 24— Hearing on Motion of Defendants to dismiss and to abstain, before the Court, Winter, Circuit J., Thom- sen, C. J. and Harvey, J June 24—Argued and held sub-curia. 3 June 25—Stipulation of counsel re Statement of Facts, filed. June 25—Oral opinion of the Court rendered. June 26—Order (Winter, Cir. J., Thomsen, C. J., and Harvey, J.) denying Amended motion to dismiss, filed. July 16—Supplementary Memorandum, Attachment and Amended Affidavits (3) in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary In- junction, filed. Aug. 6—Appearance of Sheldon London, Esquire, as co- counsel for Defendant Esther Lazarus, Director of Public Welfare for the City of Baltimore, filed. Aug. 6—Reply Memorandum of Defendants, State Board of Public Welfare and Raleigh C. Hobson, State Depart- ment of Public Welfare, filed. Sept. 11—Transcript of Proceedings before the Court (Winter, Circuit, J., Thomsen, C. J., and Harvey, J.) on June 25, 1968, filed. Dec. 13—Opinion (Winter, Cir. J., Thomsen, C. J., and Harvey, J.), filed. Dec. 23—Motion of Defendants to amend Findings of Fact and Judgment, or in the alternative to take additional testimony, or for a New Trial, or in the alternative to alter or amend the Judgment, filed. - 1969 Jan. 2—Answer of Plaintiffs to Defendants’ motion to amend findings of fact and Judgment, etc., filed. Jan. 3—Hearing on Motion of Defendants to amend Find- ings of Fact and Judgment, or in the alternative to take additional testimony, or for a New Trial, or in the alterna- tive to alter or amend the Judgment, and Answer of Plain- tiffs, thereto, before (Winter, Cir. J.) (Thomsen, C. J.) and (Harvey, J.). Jan. 3—Argued-held sub-curia. Briefs to be submitted. 4 Jan. 10—Memorandum of Plaintiffs in opposition to De- fendants’ Motion to amend Findings of Fact and Judgment, etc., and Exhibits A through G, filed. Jan. 13—Stipulation of Counsel, re: Facts, and attach- ments, filed. Jan. 20—Motion of Sheldon London to strike his appear- ance and to enter the appearance of J. Warren Eberhardt, Esquire, as attorney for Mayor and City Council of Balti- more; and Order (Thomsen, C. J.) granting leave as prayed, filed. Jan. 24—Reply Memorandum of Defendants in support of motion for Re-Argument, etc. and attachments, filed. Jan. 27—Motion of Defendants to Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment or in the Alternative to take additional testimony, or for a New Trial, or in the Alternative to alter or Amend the Judgment, and Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H. I, J, and K,. attached thereto, filed. (Filed separately). Feb. 6—Supplemental Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Motion for Reargument, and Attachments, filed. Feb. 25—Opinion and Order of Court (Winter, Circuit Court Judge), (Thomsen, Chief Judge United States Dis- trict Court) and (Harvey, Judge U. S. District Court) granting in part and denying in part the Defendants mo- tion to amend findings of facts and judgment, grant a new trial. Or receive additional evidence and alter or amend judgment, filed. March 5—Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Proposed Order and Proposed Order attached, filed. March 11—Memorandum of Plaintiffs in opposition to Defendants proposed order, filed. March 14—Appearance of J. Michael McWilliams, Esq. co-counsel for defendants (except Esther Lazarus), Order of attorney, filed. 5 March 18—Order of Court (Winter, Circuit J., Thom- sen, C. J. and Harvey, J.) permanently enjoining the De- fendants as set forth etc., filed. March 21—Notice of Appeal of Defendants, to the Su- preme Court of the United States, filed. (copies mailed by counsel. ) April 3—Motion of Plaintiff Linda Williams to amend title of action to include additional members of the Mary- land State Board of Social Services (formerly Maryland State Board of Public Welfare) as named parties defend- ant herein: Julian P. King, Lester S. Levy and Howard H. Murphy and to correct all further entries in the case to conform to said amendment, etc. and Order (Winter, J.) Circuit Court, Judge granting leave as prayed, filed. May 15—Tanscript of Proceedings before the Court (Winter, Cir. J., Thomsen, C. J. and Harvey, J.) on June 24, 1968, June 25, 1968 and January 3, 1949, filed. (filed separately ). United States District Court for the District of Maryland Civil Action No. 19250 Linda Williams, et al., — Plaintiffs. v. Edmund P. Dandridge, Jr., Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, et al., Defendants. COMPLAINT The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§2281, 2284, and 1343(3). This is a suit for injunctive relief authorized by Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 to be commenced by any citizen of the United States or 6 other person within the jurisdiction thereof to redress the deprivation under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of those rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. The rights, privileges and immunities sought herein to be redressed are those secured by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. SS60 1-609. This is also a suit for a declaratory judgment, pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §2201 of rights established by the aforementioned constitutional and statutory provisions. This is a proper case for determination by a three-judge district court under 28 U.S.C. §2281, since it seeks an in- junction to restrain the enforcement, operation and execu- tion of the regulation set forth in the Maryland Manual of the Department of Public Welfare, Part II, Rule 200, Sec- tion VII,1. commonly referred to as the “maximum grant” regulation (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A) by restraining certain officials of the State of Maryland from the enforcement and execution of such state-wide administrative regulation on the ground of its unconsti- tutionality under the Constitution of the United States and on the ground of its conflict with the aforesaid federal statutes. II. This is a proceeding for an injunction enjoining the defendants from continuing to enforce or otherwise apply its maximum grant” regulation. This is also a proceeding for a declaratory judgment that defendants’ “maximum grant” regulation: (A) Contravenes the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and (B) Is contrary to the purposes of the federal and state Aid to Families with Dependent Children program as expressed by the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §601 et seq.) and the statutes of the State of Maryland. (Article 88A, §§44A, and 49, Ann. Code of Md., 1957 ed.). III. This is a class action authorized by Rule 23 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class which plaintiffs represent are all persons similarly situated who are needy parents of dependent children and their needy dependent children eligible for Aid to Families with De- pendent Children (hereinafter referred to as AFDC) and who are or may be subjected to the onerous limitations of the “maximum grant”. This class is so numerous as to make joinder of all members impracticable; there are questions of law or fact common to the class; the claims of the plaintiffs are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and the plaintiffs will protect and represent the interests of the class. The defendants in their administra- tion of the “maximum grant” have acted in a way gen- erally applicable to the class plaintiffs represent. IV. The named plaintiffs in this case are: A. Mrs. Linda Williams, a Negro adult, 33 years of age, and a citizen of the United States and Maryland, residing in the City of Baltimore, who is entitled to receive AFDC from the State of Maryland. She is the sole support of her eight children: Name Age Date of Birth Dorothy 16 November 1, 1951 Linda Gayle 14 October 11, 1953 Mildred 11 May 6, 1956 James 10 June 1, 1957 Anthony 0 October 18, 1958 Ronnie 7 October 9, 1960 Angela 5 October 29, 1962 Wanda 4 June 4, 1963 All of these children, live permanently with Mrs. Wil- liams in a place of residence maintained by her as their home. The father is continuously absent from plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's health is very poor, and she is presently suffering from a serious breast condition that has already required five surgical procedures. In addition, one of her children, Ronnie, has required hospital care and attention and continuing medical supervision, for convulsions from which he has suffered since his early childhood. B. Junius Gary and Jeanette Gary, his wife, are Negro adults and citizens of the United States and Maryland, residing in the City of Baltimore, who are entitled to re- ceive AFDC from the State of Maryland. Mr. Gary is the sole support of his eight children: Name Age Date of Birth Junius 11 February 20, 1957 Catherine 10 January 8, 1958 Anthony 9 November 4, 1958 James September 21, 1959 Lynn Dora November 29, 1960 Pamela November 18, 1961 Mark November 23, 1962 Thelma November 14, 1963 All of the children of Mr. and Mrs. Gary live with them in their place of residence maintained as their home. Mr. Gary suffers from a severe neurological condition, which causes him to have seizures, lose consciousness, and is completely disabled from working. Mrs. Gary is required at home to care for her children, and is also in ill health, being treated at a hospital clinic for hypertension and painful conditions of her arms and legs. The only source of income for Mr. and Mrs. Gary and their children, is the maximum grant of $250 per month which they receive from AFDC. V. The named defendants are: Mr. Edmund P. Dandridge, Jr., Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Wel- fare; Mr. Raleigh O. Hobson, Director, State Department of Public Welfare; Mr. Calhoun Bond, Mrs. Ralph O. 9 Dulany, Dr. W. Richard Ferguson, Mrs. Charles D. Harris, Mrs. Julian P. King, Mr. Lester S. Levy, Mr. Howard H. Murphy and Mr. J. O. Shuger, members of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, and Esther Lazarus, Di- rector of Public Welfare for the City of Baltimore. VI. At all times hereinafter mentioned, the State of Mary- land in order to receive federal funds for the AFDC programs, was required by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§601-609 to have formulated and submitted to the Secre- tary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare for his approval a “state plan” for AFDC consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§601 et seq.). VII. Part II, Rule 200, Section VII 1. of the Maryland Manual of the Department of Public Welfare provides that “(T)he amunt of the grant is the resulting amount of need when resources are deducted from requirements as set forth in this Rule, subject to a maximum on each grant from each category:” The maximum grant permitted under AFDC in Baltimore City is $250 per month regardless of the size of the family unit and its actual need. Public assistance standards applicable to the City of Baltimore have been formulated (these schedules are attached hereto as Exhibit B). These schedules provide, inter alia, a standard for determining the cost of subsistence needs, shelter, insur- ance premiums, school supplies, laundry and clothing. The Department of Public Welfare uses these standards in determining the amount of an AFDC grant. VIII. Defendants acting under color of authority vested in them by the laws of the State of Maryland in the enforce- ment, operation and execution of the maximum grant regulation have pursued and are presently pursuing poli- 10 cies and practices which violate the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and the class they represent and which are contrary to the expressed policy of the Federal Social Security Act as follows: A. Under the maximum grant regulation a family no matter what its size may receive no more than $250 per month in AFDC benefits. Thus the maximum grant regu- lation prevents the satisfaction of the needs of all children in a family of seven persons or more, as plaintiffs herein. For example, according to the standards of subsistence (food, clothing, and household supplies) and shelter for- mulated by the Maryland Department of Public Welfare a family of seven persons ‘should receive $254. per month and a family of eight should receive $280. per month. This does not include the cost of insurance premiums, school supplies, and laundry since the amount would vary with the age of the children; the amount of need would be greater if these items were included. This disparity be- tween the amount that should be received according to the standards of subsistence and shelter and the amount actually received because of the limitation of the maximum grant increases with the size of the family. Children in smaller families of six persons or less are not so affected by the maximum grant e.q., the family of six persons may re- ceive the full amount determined by the Department of Public Welfare to be necessary to satisfy their subsistence and shelter needs since this amount ($229) is less than $250. Plaintiffs and their children and the class they represent are denied rights guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the maximum grant regulation has the effect of treating needy children dif- ferently based on an arbitrary standard not related to the purpose of AFDC — the size of their family. B. The express policy of the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§601 et seq.) is to “strengthen family life.” This maximum grant regulation fails to effectuate this policy and indeed it encourages the disruption of families, since (as will hereafter be demonstrated) the needs of a child in a large family can best be satisfied if the child were to leave the family and live with a relative. 11 C. The maximum grant regulation complained of herein contravenes Maryland’s expressed purpose of AFDC, which is to strengthen family life (Article 88A, §44A, Ann. Code of Md., 1957 ed.) since it encourages the disruption of families. Its limitation makes the amount of assistance insufficient to provide each child receiving AFDC with a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health as required by Article 88A, §49 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. IX. Under the maximum grant provision, plaintiffs are de- nied an amount of assistance commensurate with the standards of need established by the Maryland Department of Public Welfare. (The schedules are attached hereto as Exhibit B). A. Mrs. Linda Williams, according to the standards of need formulated by the Department of Public Welfare, including the cost of insurance premiums, school supplies and laundry, should receive $296.15 per month for herself and her eight children, $46.15 more than the maximum grant of $250 per month which she actually receives. B. Mr. Junius Gary and his wife, Jeanette, according to the same standards formulated by the Department of Public Welfare, including the cost of insurance premiums, school supplies and laundry, should receive $331.50 per month for themselves and their eight children, $81.50 per month moré than the maximum grant of $250 per month, which they actually receive. Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per month is insuffi- cient to provide plaintiffs with a reasonable subsistance compatible with decency and health and is inadequate to meet their minimum financial needs. After the payment of their rent each month, the Garys have a mere $175 per month to meet all of their needs for food and clothing and heating of their home and this amount is grossly inade- quate, often leaving Plaintiffs with no money to purchase food, and putting their children to considerable embarass- ment and disadvantage in school activity because of their 12 cast-off clothing and the other effects of poverty, which sometimes causes them to miss school. The family has no money, automobile, or other property of any kind save a few items of old furniture and the inadequate clothing they have been able to purchase. They are in serious debt, particularly in regard to public utilities companies, which has caused their gas and electricity to be shut off on numerous occasions for failure to pay current charges, Their home is heated by gas space heaters, and the cut off of their utilities often leaves them with no heat in their home. X. The maximum grant regulation denies to plaintiffs and members of their class equal protection of laws in violation of the Constitution since they are given : smaller assistance grants per person than are other recipients under the program on a basis wholly unrelated to the purpose of the program. The amount a needy child receives varies with the size of its family, so that children in smaller fami- lies are in the preferred position of receiving much more per child than children in larger families receiving AFDC. Unhampered by the maximum grant, in a family of four (one parent and three children), on the basis of subsistence and shelter standards (since the cost of insurance and school supplies varies with the age of the child) the parent and each child receives assistance at the rate of $44.50 per month; in a family of five persons (one parent and four children), $41.50 for the parent and each child; and in a family of six persons (one parent and five children), $38.50 for the parent and each child. Since Mrs. Williams’ chil- dren are in the position of being members of a large family, each person receives assistance at the rate of $27.78 for the parent and each child, although according to Maryland’s standards of subsistence and shelter they should receive assistance at the rate of $32.16 per person. Each person in Mr. Junius’ family receives assistance at the rate of $25.00 per person although according to Mary- land’s standards of subsistence and shelter they should receive assistance at the rate of $33.15 person. (The parents in each family receive the identical amount as each child.) 13 XI. The maximum grant regulation encourages the disrup- tion and separation of families in the following ways: A. Mrs. Williams receives $250.00 per month in AFDC payments. Divided by the number of persons in the assist- ance unit, this amounts to $27.78 per person. If, however, she were to place two of her children of 12 years of age or over with relatives, each child so placed would be eligible to receive $79.00 each as an assistance unit, in accordance with schedule AA, attached hereto; with two of her chil- dred out of her family, she would still be eligible to receive the maximum grant of $250.00; however, each of the remaining children would receive aid at the rate of $35.71 per child. Thus, she and her eight children would then be receiving over-all benefits of $408.00; $158.00 above the maximum grant, constituting an anomolous situation of benefits accruing as a result of the break-up of the family. B. Mr. and Mrs. Gary receive $250.00 per month in AFDC payments. Divided by the number of persons in the assistance unit this amounts to $25 per person, per month. If, however, they were to place two of their children be- tween the ages of six and twelve with relatives or strangers, each child so placed would be eligible to receive $65 each as an assistance unit, in accordance with schedule AA, attached hereto; with two of their children out of their family, they would still be eligible to receive the maximum grant of $250; however, each of the remaining members of the assistance unit would receive aid at the rate of $31.25 per person. Thus, Mr. and Mrs. Gary and their eight children would then be receiving over-all benefits of $380, $130 above the maximum grant, consti- tuting an anomolous situation of benefits accruing as a result of the break-up of the family. Because of the operation of the maximum grant regula- tion, families are rewarded if they break up their families and place their children outside the home with relatives or others, since the amount received per child is increased and the maximum grant may be circumvented. Plaintiffs 14 and the class they represent have the option of keeping their families together, the goal expressed by the Federal Social Security Act, or placing their children with relatives or strangers in order that their needs be satisfied. Failure by the Maryland Board of Public Welfare to accommodate the actual needs of children of necessity, results in the disruption of family solidarity. XII. Under the Maryland AFDC status and the “maximum grant” provisions complained of, enforced, applied and implemented by defendants, plaintiffs are denied a minimal standard of living commensurate with the minimum standard of need established by the State of Maryland Department of Public Welfare for a family of eight children, as prescribed in the standards established by the Department of Public Welfare, which sets said minimum for Linda Williams and her family at $296.15 per month for herself and her eight children, and at $331.50 per month for Junius Gary and his wife and eight children, as more particularly described in the schedules attached hereto as Exhibit B. The “maximum grant” provisions herein complained of as enforced, applied and implemented by the defendants, their predecessors in office, agents and employees, bear no reasonable relation to and contravene the purpose and intent of the Federal Social Security Act, Title 42, United States Code, Section 601, which is to furnish assistance to needy dependent children, to maintain and strengthen family life, and to help the parents of such children to attain personal independence and self-support, in that said provisions: (a) result in a discriminatory lack of uniformity in the amount of assistance available to individual children and parents with similar needs; (b) penalize children and parents in large families and encourage the break-up of such families into small units; 15 (c) deny large families a standard of living commen- surate with the minimum standard of assistance and standard of need as promulgated by the Maryland State Welfare Department as determined by its own economic calculations. (d) deny plaintiffs and other large families receiving public assistance even sufficient assistance as will meet minimum nutritional standards and thereby gradually ef- fect a program of starvation. The “maximum grant” herein complained of, enforced, applied, and implemented by defendants, their predeces- sors in office, agents and employees, violates and is re- pugnant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that by imposing an arbitrary restriction on the amount of assist- ance available to any family regardless of the individual needs of particular children or parents said provisions discriminate against plaintiffs and all others similarly situated, because of the size of their families, in a manner which bears no substantial, reasonable, or fair relation to the purposes and intent of the federal and state AFDC legislation under which said provisions operate, and there- by create arbitrary, irrational, and discriminatory classi- fications which deprive plaintiffs and members of their class of equal protection of the laws. Defendants’ enforcement, application, and implementa- tion as to plaintiffs of the “maximum grant” provisions herein complained of has caused plaintiffs extreme hard- ship, suffering, and anxiety, including inadequate food, clothing, and shelter, and will continue to suffer severe and irreparable injury to their health and well-being, and to their family life, as a result of the enforcement, application, and implementation of the “maximum grant” provisions until said provisions are declared unlawful and unconstitu- tional and their enforcement enjoined by this Court. XIII. Finally, the enforcement, application and implementa- tion of the “maximum grant” provisions by the defendants, 16 has violated and continues to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con- stitution, as applied to the plaintiffs, in that it violates the due process guarantee of marital privacy. All of the children of the plaintiffs, Junius Gary and Jeanette Gary, his wife, and the plaintiff, Linda Williams, were born be- fore application was made for welfare benefits, and no additional children have been born to the plaintiffs since they began receiving an AFDC grant from the defendants; nevertheless, the amount of their grant is less than the adequate assistance for minimal food and shelter needs as computed by the defendants, even though the plaintiffs freely choose a large family before receiving AFDC assist- ance. Thus the “maximum grant” provision intrudes on the right of marital privacy of the plaintiffs both before and during the period of AFDC assistance hy imposing an un- constitutional burden on the exercise of a constitutional right by the plaintiffs, by denying an amount of assistance equal to the actual needs of the families of the plaintiffs. XIV. No adequate administrative remedy, or adequate remedy at law, is available. Wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully request the Court, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, to: 1, Convene a three-judge district court to determine this controversy pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§2281 and 2284; 2. Enter a preliminary and permanent injunction: (a) prohibiting, restraining and enjoining defendants, their successors in office, and all of their agents from enforcing, applying or implementing said maximum grant regulations; (b) prohibiting payments of assistance which are less than the minimum subsistence and shelter needs as estab- lished by the Maryland Board of Public Welfare, and 17 ordering and requiring defendants to make welfare pay- ments to plaintiffs and members of the class they represent in accordance with minimum subsistence and shelter needs as established by the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare; and (c) ordering and requiring defendants, their successors in office, all of their agents, to furnish AFDC assistance to Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated without regard to said maximum grant regulations: 3. Enter a declaratory judgment pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §2201, declaring that said maximum grant regula- tions: (a) contravenes the purpose and intent of the AFDC Program as explained in the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§601 et seq.), and the Maryland Public Legislation (Article 88A, §§44A and 49); and (b) contravenes the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for such further or alternative relief as this Court may find to be just and equitable. (Signatures of counsel and certificate of service.) EXHIBIT A Public Assistance Rule 200 VII — Amount of Grant and Payment 1, Amount — The amount of the grant is the resulting amount of need when resources are deducted from requirements as set forth in this Rule, subject to a maximum on each grant from each category: A. For local departments under any “Plan A” of Shelter Schedule B $250 For local departments under any “Plan B” of Shelter Schedule B $240. Except that: a. If the requirements of a child over 18 are in- cluded to enable him to complete high school or training for employment (III- 3, C), the grant may exceed the maximum by the amount of such child’s needs. If the resource of support is paid as a refund (V-2, F), the grant may exceed the maximum by an amount of such refund. This makes con- sistent the principle that the amount from pub- lic assistance funds does not exceed the maxi- mum. B. A grant is subject to any limitation established by any existing rule on insufficient funds. . GPA or ADC-E is not Apailable — To supplement full-time wages. To meet need due to being disquali- fied for unemployment insurance. To supplement un- employment insurance; except when the individual receiving it is enrolled in an educational and/or train- ing program to learn a skill needed to have oppor- tunity for employment, acquire a new skill which is in demand in the labor market, or improve an exist- ing skill. . Period Covered and Method of Payment — The period covered by a grant shall be the calendar month. The amount of the grant is calculated on a monthly basis and is paid by check, unless otherwise specified by local policy. It is paid for current need and may not be paid for a past period excepting as specifically permitted by the State Manual. R. #312 5/67 II — Rule 200 — Page 20 19 EXHIBIT B. Public Assistance ScHEDULE A STANDARD FOR DETERMINING COST OF SUBSISTENCE NEEDS I 11 111 IV * Number of persone in — MoNTHLY Costs WHEN assistance unit ve heat or Light 4% r Heat with Heat, cook- Heat 4 ou (include unborn child wtttities cooking fuel or without ing fuel 4 utilities aa an additional t luded light water heat- included person) with with included ing included with shelter shelter with shelter with shelter shelter 1 person living— Alone ‘ oa $ 51.00 $ 49.00 $ 43.00 $ 40.00 $ 38.00 With 1 person 42.00 41.00 38.00 36.00 35.00 With 2 persons 37.00 35.00 34.00 33.00 With 3 or more per- aS N 35.00 34.00 33.00 32.00 2 persons tiving— Alone “a 82.00 76.00 70.00 With 1 other person 74.00 70.00 66.00 With 2 or more other persons 70.00 68.00 3 persons living— 1 110.00 With 1 or more other persons 106.00 1 . 140.00 5 persons 3 . 162.00 6 person . 181.00 235.00 231.00 259.00 256.00 284.00 281.00 24.50 24.50 Modification of Standard for Cost of Eating in Restaurant Add $15.00 per individual. R. #314 11/67 II — Rule 200 — Page 27 20 EXHIBIT B? Public Assistance Rule 200 ScHEpuLe AA STANDARD FOR ROOM AND BOARD ARRANGEMENT FOR A CHILD Modrury ALLOWANCE* Kind of Care Room & Pre-added Board Clothing Totals Regular Care Infant up to 6 $50.00 $ 9.00 $59.00 6 up to 12 50.00 15.00 65.00 12 and over 60.00 19.00 79.00** Special Care N Infant up to 6 $75.00 $ 9.00 $84.00 6 up to 12 75.00 15.00 90.00 12 and over 75.00 19.00 94.00** Regular Care — t which requires the usual and ordinary supervision in the home. Special Care t which requires unusual supervision and attention from a home 1 No other items allowable in the grant. ** When calculating need for mother of unborn child, add to maximum $24.50: $20.00 additional food allowance; $4.50 towards cost of layette. R. #314 11/67 II — Rule 200 — Page 28 EXHIBIT B Public Assistance Rule 200 Scuepute B — Pran A STANDARD FOR DETERMINING COST OF SHELTER Pian A to be used by the following local departments : Allegany Baltimore City Cecil Prince George’s Anne Arundel Baltimore County Montgomery I 11 111 IV V MonTBLY Costs WHEN “Ne heat or Light 4% r Heat with Feat, cook- Heat 4 an Boater of percene utilities cooking fuel or without 4 utilities * 3 — — light sis bam included with with included ingincluded with shelter shelter with shelter with shelter shelter 1 or 2 persons $ 35.00 $ 37.00 $ 43.00 $ 46.00 $ 48.00 1 — —ů 35.00 38.00 43.00 47.00 49.00 1 35.00 38.00 43.00 47.00 50.00 5 or 6 persons 45.00 48.00 53.00 57.00 60.00 7 or more persons 45.00 49.00 53.00 57.00 61.00 R. #307 2-66 II — Rule 200 — Page 29 21 EXHIBIT B. ScHepute B — Pian B STANDARD FOR DETERMINING COST OF SHELTER Plan B to be used by the following local county departments Calvert Frederick Caroline Garrett Carroll Harford Charles Howard Dorchester Kent Public Assistance 1 No heat or Light 4% Heat with — of 8 utilities cooking fuel or without assistance included included light wnit with shelter 1 or 2 persons 5 IE: — e 5 or 6 persons 7 or more persons R. #307 2-66 II — Rule 200 — Page 30 EXHIBIT Be Scuepute E STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE COST OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS : Insurance “as paid” not to exceed a Age of Individual maximum monthly cost per individual $0.25 65 1.10 Public Assistance ™ Scuevute F STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE COST OF SCHOOL SUPPLIES Monthly Cost Per Child in School $0.50 1.00 II — Rule 200 — Page 32a EXHIBIT Be Scuepute G STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE COST OF SPECIAL DIETS Monthly Cost $19.00 Moderete fat high carbohydrate high protein Scuepute H STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE COST OF LAUNDRY Cost of laundry may not be added to Standard for Nursing Home Care Size of Family Monthly Cost One or two persons $2.00 Three or more 4.00 R. #306 11-65 II — Rule 200 — Page 32b 23 EXHIBIT B7 Public Assistance ScHEDULE J STANDARD FOR DETERMINING AMOUNT OF RESOURCE IN FOOD MONTHLY AMOUNT OF RESOURCE For Specified Food Groupe Milk Mak 4 Milk Eggs Only $ 6.75 $ 5.25 6.25 4.85 5.40 4.15 Each additional person over 10 person R #312 5-67 24 EXHIBIT B Public Assistance Rule 200 ScHEDULE K STANDARD FOR DETERMINING AMOUNT OF RESOURCES IN CLOTHING Number of Persons in Assistance Unit Monthly Amount of Resource One person 8 8 4.50 2 persons 9.00 39 —96—ͤÄ2ͤð—, 3 14.50 4 persons 2 20.00 5 persons 24.00 6 persons — 28.00 7 persons LU 8 . 31.50 8 persons : 35.00 9 persons 2 38.50 10 persons a 42.00 Each additional person over 10 persons 3.50 R. #307 2-66 II — Rule 200 — Page 34 25 United States District Court for the District of Maryland MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MO- TION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION I. INTRODUCTION This is a class action for declaratory and injunctive re- lief brought by Plaintiffs who are recipients of public as- sistance under the Maryland Program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, against public welfare officials of the State of Maryland challenging the constitutionality of the maximum grant provision, Rule 200 VII, 1. of the Manual of the Department of Public Welfare. Rule 200 im- poses an absolute limit on the amount of AFDC assisvance to a family unit regardless of the actual need of the family as computed under schedules issued by the State Board of Public Welfare of the State of Maryland. This court has jurisdiction to entertain this action since plaintiffs seek to have a state-wide regulation declared un- constitutional and to enjoin its operation on the grounds of its repugnance to the United States Constitution. The Court’s attention is also respectfully directed to the cases cited in Plaintiffs’ Points and Authorities In Support of Ap- plication For A Three-Judge Court, and in particular the case of Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Alabama, 1967), probable jurisdiction noted, 390 U.S. 903 (1968), also a suit for injunctive relief against enforcement of a state- wide regulation, set forth in the Alabama Manual for Ad- ministration of Public Welfare. II. STATEMENT OF Facrs Plaintiffs are members of a class composed of needy par- ents of dependent children and their needy dependent chil- dren, residing in the State of Maryland and eligible to re- ceive public assistance under the Maryland Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program. The amount of this aid is and has been restricted and limited by the application and enforcement of the “maximum grant” pro- visions hereby complained of, to wit: Rule 200 VII 1., Mary- land Manual of the Department of Public Welfare. Plaintiff, Linda Williams, is an adult citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of Baltimore, State of Maryland. She is the mother and sole support of the Plain- tiff children: Dorothy, age 16; Linda Gayle, age 14; Mil- dred, age 12; James, age 10; Anthony, age 9; Ronnie, age 7; Angela, age 5; Wanda, age 4; all of the children named live with her in a place of residence maintained by her as her home. The Plaintiff’s husband, Willie Williams, the father of all the named children, is continuously absent from the plaintiff's home, having deserted her after the birth of their last child. Plaintiff has no income, resources, sup- port or maintenance other than the public assistance which she receives in the amount of $250 a month, which is the maximum grant permitted under AFDC in Baltimore City, regardless of the size of the family unit and its actual need. The plaintiffs, Junius Gary and Jeanette Gary, his wife, are adult citizens of the United States and residents of the City of Baltimore, State of Maryland, and Mr. Gary is the sole support of the Plaintiffs’ children: Junius, age 11; Catherine, age 19; Anthony, age 9; James, age 8; Lynn Dora, age 7; Pamela, age 6; Mark, age 4; Thelma, age 4. All of the children of Mr. and Mrs. Gary live with them in their place of residence maintained by them as their home. Mr. Gary suffers from a severe neurological condi- tion, which causes him to have seizures, dizzy spells and loss of consciousness. He has been found to be completely disabled from working. Mrs. Gary is required at home to care for her children, and is also in ill health, being treated at a hospital clinic for hypertension and painful condi- tions of her arms and legs. The Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Gary, have no income, resources, support or maintenance other than the $250 a month they receive in public assist- ance, which is the maximum grant they are entitled to under the Maryland Aid to Families with Dependent Chil- dren Program (hereinafter referred to as AFDC program). 27 The effect of applying the maximum grant” regulation by the State of Maryland is to reduce the Plaintiffs and their families to a standard of living substantially belew that established as a minimum standard of need by the State of Maryland Department of Public Welfare; the minimum standard of need formulated for Mrs. Williams and her eight children by the Department of Public Wel- fare, including the cost of insurance premiums, school sup- plies and laundry, is $296.15 per month, $46.15 more than the maximum grant of $250 per month which she actually receives; the standard of need formulated by the Depart- ment, including the cost of insurance premiums, school supplies and laundry, for Mr. and Mrs. Gary and their eight children is $331.50 per month, $81.50 per month more than the maximum grant of $250 per month which they actually receive. (The above needs are determined in ac- cordance with the schedules attached to the Bill of Com- plaint as Exhibit B, representing the schedules for estab- lishing need in the Maryland Manual of the Department of Public Welfare.) III. ARGUMENT Introduction This court “* * * may, at any time, grant a temporary restraining order to prevent irreparable damage Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2284 (3). As to the standards for the granting of a preliminary injunction, these have been clearly stated in Embassy Dairy v. Cammalier, 211 F. 2d 41 (1954). In that case it was stated on page 48: % * Whether or not a preliminary injunction should issue is ordinarily a matter for the discretion of the District Court to be exercised upon this series of esti- mates: ‘The relative importance of the rights asserted and the acts to be enjoined, the irreparable nature of the injury allegedly flowing from denial of prelimi- nary relief, the probability of the ultimate success or failure of the suit, the balance of damage and conveni- ence generally.’ (Quoted from Communist Party v. McGrath, 96 F. Supp. 47, 48 (D.C. D.C., 1951).” A. Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable injury because of the enforcement by the Defendants of the “mazxi- mum grant” regulation in the payment of welfare assistance. Where issues raised by attack on the constitutionality of a state statute or regulation discloses that something more than a frivolous or unreasonable attack is being made on the regulation and where continued enforcement will re- sult in greater injury to plaintiffs than to Defendants, should the regulation ultimately be held invalid, enforce- ment of the regulation should be temporarily enjoined pending determination as to its constitutionality. Traffic Tel. Workers Federation of N.J. v. Driscoll, 71 F. Supp. 681 (D.C. N.J. 1947). It is conceded that in any motion for a preliminary injunction, the court must find as a condi- tion of granting the relief requested that irreparable in- jury will be suffered by the Plaintiff if relief pendente lite is not granted. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed- deral Power Commission, 259 F. 2d 921 (C. A. D.C. 1958). The plaintiffs and their minor children are in great, immediate and continuing need of public assistance com- mensurate with the minimal standards of need as estab- lished by the Defendant Department. The Plaintiff parents have no other source of support to provide their families with food, shelter and the other necessities of life. As set forth in greater particularity in their Bill of Complaint, and in their affidavit in support of motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs are faced with a difficult choice. They must choose be- tween keeping their families intact, an express purpose of the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq.) and Article 88A of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 ed.) sec. 44A, with inadequate food, clothing and shelter; or separating their families by placing some of their children in institutions or foster homes, since the present provisions enable the needs of a child in a large family to be met if the child is so placed. Each choice means immediate and certain irreparable injury to the families’ cohesiveness and unity. The plaintiff parents wish to keep all of their children at home and to provide them with the basic necessities of life. B. Defendants will suffer no substantial damage or in- convenience if assistance is granted to Plaintiffs pendente lite, whereas Plaintiffs and their children will suffer substantial and irreparable harm. If the plaintiff parents would receive public assistance payments in the amount determined by the Defendant De- partment of Public Welfare, to be the minimal standards required for the support of the families of the Plaintiff parents, which is in excess of the maximum grant of $250 per month, the amount that they now receive, the State of Maryland would suffer de minimis injury. The plaintiff, Linda Williams, would be eligible to receive $296.15 per month for herself and her eight children, $46.15 more than the maximum grant of $250 per month which she actually receives. The plaintiffs, Junius Gary and Jeanette Gary, his wife would receive $331.50 per month for themselves and their eight children, $81.50 per month more than the maximum grant of $250 per month, which they actually receive. Although the amounts received in excess of the maximum grant by the plaintiffs represents for them their only possibility of retaining their family unit, in terms of the effect it would have upon the Defendant, State De- partment of Public Welfare, when compared to the more than $89,396,891.43 which was spent in the year ending June 30, 1967, by the Department of Public Welfare, the additional grant to the Plaintiffs of $46.15 per month for the Williams family and $81.50 per month for the Gary family is so inconsiderable as to be de minimis. Such a temporary restraining order was granted by this Honor- able Court in the case of Mantell v. Dandridge, (Civil Action #18792, Dec. 4, 1967) to prevent irreparable injury to Plaintiffs as a consequence of the State of Maryland’s statutory requirement of one year’s residency for public assistance. A finding of de minimis damage was explicitly made by the three-judge court in a number of the other residency cases in other federal district jurisdictions. 30 A three-judge court in the District of Columbia stated: “* * * Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable loss, injury and damage without comparable loss to the public un- less preliminary relief is granted * * *.” Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.C. D.C. 1967), compare also the case of Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967), Ramos v. Health and Social Services Board, 276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Wisc. 1967) (preliminary injunction granted); Denny v. Health and Social Services Board (Civil Action No. 67-C-426, E.D. Wisc., temporary restraining order granted De- cember 22, 1967); Johnson v. Robinson (Civil Action No. 67-C-1883, N.C. 111, preliminary injunction granted December 28, 1967); Porter v. Graham (Civil Action No. Civ. -2348- Tucson, D. Ariz., ꝓreliminary injunc- tion granted January 24, 1968.) There, as in the present case, the record disclosed on its face that something more than a merely capricious or wholly unreasonable attack was being made on a state regulation, that important rights were at stake, and that denial of relief would result in greater injury to applicants than would be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief, and in those courts, temporary or preliminary relief was granted. Compare also Traffic Tel. Workers v. Driscoll, supra. In Woods v. Wright, 334 F. 2d 269 (5th Cir., 1964) the Circuit Court of Appeals held that where Negro children were expelled from school without a hearing after being arrested in a civil rights demonstration, the District Court should have issued a temporary restraining order pro- hibiting the expulsions and ordering the children read- mitted to school. In so doing, the court stated: When there is a clear and imminent threat of an irreparable injury amounting to manifest oppres- sion it is the duty of the court to protect against the loss of the asserted right by a temporary restraining order. 334 F. 2d at 374. 31 If expulsion of children from school is sufficiently seri- ous harm to require a temporary restraining order, how much more warranted is such an order in this case to pro- tect the minimal subsistence level of life and health of the plaintiffs. As was stated in the case of Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 154 F. 2d 450, 453 (6th Cir., 1946), cert. denied. 329 U.S. 761 (1946): „A court of equity will not gamble with human life, at whatever odds and for loss of life there is no remedy that in an equitable sense is adequate. * * *” C. The Temporary Restraining Order and Prelimi- nary Injunction Should Be Issued Since Plaintiffs Will Likely Prevail On The Merits. 1. The Maximum Grant Provision of Rule 200, Sec- tion VII 1. in Maryland’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been stated to mean that: “The courts must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are rea- sonable in light of its purpose * * *.” McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 189 (1964). While the government may classify people for various purposes it may not classify on arbitrary or irrational grounds. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), Car- rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). In the instant case the classification is subject to even closer scrutiny because it is created by administrative regulation under Rule 200 VII 1., issued by the Maryland State Department of Public Wel- fare. The same deference to legislative judgment is not due to administrative rule-making and it is clear that an agency may not make rules or regulations which are out of har- mony with the act being administered. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Ad- ministrative Law, Section 132, and cases there cited. The 32 classification created by Rule 200, VII 1. is unreasonable in light of the purposes of the Aid to Families with De- pendent Children (hereinafter referred to as AFDC pro- gram). The most accurate guide to those purposes in Mary- land is the statutory declaration of purpose in Section 44A of Article 88A of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 ed.): “* * * It is hereby declared that the primary purpose of aid given under this subtitle is the strengthening of family life through services and financial aid, whereby families may be assisted to maximum self-support in homes meeting the requirements of child care estab- lished by law in this State * * *.” (Emphasis supplied). This statutory declaration of purpose implicitly refers to the social, evil that the AFDC prograrfi reaches: the insta- bility of family units that lose the support of one parent. This declaration is reinforced by a similar federal decla- ration of purpose in the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §601: “* * * (to encourage) the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by en- abling each state to furnish financial assistance and re- habilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such state, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living, to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of con- tinual parental care and protection * * *.” (emphasis supplied). The AFDC program in Maryland is required by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §602, to implement these federal policies in order to qualify for federal grants to its AFDC program. Rule 200 VII 1. provides that: “1. Amount — the amount of the grant is the result- ing amount of need when resources are deducted from 33 requirements as set forth in this Rule, subject to a maximum of each grant from each category: A. For local departments under any “Plan A” of Shelter Schedule B $250 For local departments under any “Plan B” of Shelter Schedule B 5240 (emphasis supplied). Rule 200 VII 1. imposes an absolute maximum limit on AFDC assistance regardless of the actual need of the re- cipient family unit. For example, the Department of Pub- lic Welfare of the City of Baltimore computes the costs of subsistence needs of a family of seven persons at $254.00 per month. For a family of eight persons subsistence needs are calculated to be at least $280.00 per month.( See sched- ule attached to Bill of Complaint as Exhibit B.) The maxi- mum grant permitted in Baltimore City is $250.00 per month. In effect the maximum grant provision of Rule 200 VII 1. limits AFDC assistance to an amount less than actual need in family units of seven persons or more. Obviously, the disparity between actual need and the amount of AFDC assistance increases in larger family units. Rule 200 VII 1. creates two classes of needy dependent children and their parents. The first class, families of six persons or less, is granted AFDC assistance equal to actual need; the second class, families of seven persons or more, receives an amount of assistance which not only is insuf- ficient to meet actual need but also is unrelated to actual need. The ctassification created by Rule 200 VII 1. is based solely on the size of the family unit. In the instant case the minimal standard of need for the family unit of the plaintiff, Linda Williams, is $296 per month according to the schedule issued by the Maryland State Board of Pub- lic Welfare. The application of the arbitrary maximum grant of $250 denies plaintiff’s family the basic necessities of adequate food and shelter. None of the purposes of the AFDC program is served by the classification created by Rule 200 VII 1. Instead of strengthening family life, large family units are encour- aged to separate in order to meet their needs. If plaintiff, 34 Linda Williams, placed two of her eight children who are 12 years of age or over with eligible relatives, each child so placed would be entitled to receive $79 per month as an assistance unit. In addition, the rest of the old family unit would still qualify for the maximum grant of $250. The family unit would thus be receiving a total amount of AFDC assistance of $408, as a result of the dissolution of the family unit. However, the dissolution of family units prompted by Rule 200 VII 1. defeats the very purpose of the AFDC program. As an economy measure Rule 200 VII 1. still lacks a con- stitutionally permissible purpose. This issue was squarely faced in Collins v. State’ Board of Social Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81 N.W. 2d 4 (1957) in which the court held that the Iowa maximum grant provision violated the equal pro- tection clause of the Iowa Constitutioh. Equal protection under the Iowa Constitution is identical with the federal guarantee. Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393 at 400, 35 N.W. 2d 66 at 77 (1948). The court stated in the Collins case at p. 7 of 81 N.W. 2d: “The books are replete with cases dealing with the above constitutional provision both here and else- where. The general rule is that if there is any reason- able ground for the classification and it operates equally upon all within the same class, there is uni- formity in the constitutional sense Under the record it appears that the State Board in the administration of the Act and to insure a uniform state-wide program for aid to dependent children (Section 239. 18, Code, 1954) has established a stand- ard schedule of amounts necessary for the minimum of subsistence, which amounts are based upon the needy-per-child basis . . . Under the chapter prior to the amendment each child receives such amount irrespective of the number in the home. Undgr the chapter as amended each child may receive the mini- mum amount without regard to the number in the home, up to the point where the sum total reaches $175, at which point additional assistance to that home 35 terminates. Stating it an ther way, under the amend- ment assume that the minimum amount per child is $47 per month. Each child receives the amount pro- vided the total amount paid to any one recipient does not exceed $175. If in excess of this amount, the pay- ment to such recipient is on a pro-rata basis per child in the home. However, if the instant children should be distributed among the homes of various relatives named in Section 239.1 (4), and nothing in the chap- ter seems to prohibit such distribution, each of the in- volved children would be entitled to the minimum allowance. The amendment on its face appears to be, and was, we think, intended as an economy measure. In effect it is a sub-classification of the original classification, i.e., dependent children, based solely on the number of children in the home, with no consideration as to need, a circumstance completely disconnected with the basic classification and the purpose and reason therefore. See Keefner v. Porter, 228 Iowa 844, 293 N.W. 501. We think the amendment is clearly dis- criminatory between dependent children as defined in Section 239.1 (4) and is purely arbitrary and un- reasonable in view of the announced purpose of the act.” (emphasis added). In the welfare residency cases courts have stated re- peatedly that the preservation of the public purse does not justify separate treatment of persons similarly situated. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), probable jurisdiction noted, 36 L.W. 3286 (1968); Green v. Department of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967); Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.C. D.C. 1967). In Green the court stated, at p. 177 of 270 F. Supp., that, “The protection of the public purse, no matter how worthy in the abstract, is not a permissible basis for dif- ferentiating between persons who otherwise possess the same status in their relationship to the State of Delaware.” In other words, the arbitrary selection of a class which bears the burden of state economizing is constitutionally impermissible. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Green v. Department of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967), Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967). The governmental economizing is even more arbitrary here because, unlike the invalid residency re- quirement, the maximum grant provision does not even arguably protect against unscrupulous recipients. Furthermore, in light of our expanding economy, it is fallacious to assume that welfare expenditures are rising. In Research Report Number 2, July, 1967, published by the defendant, State Department of Public Welfare of Maryland, it is stated on p. 6: Costs and numbers of recipients of assistance have risen due to the extension of Public Welfare services and benefit levels; it must be noted however that while actual dollar costs have risen, blic Welfare ex- penditures have decreased as a percentage of both Na- tional Personal Income and Gross National Product. 2. Rule 200 VII 1. violates Section 601 of the Fed- eral Social Security Act which requires that as- sistance meet basic needs in order to strengthen the family unit. The federal policies of the Social Security Act of 1935 are expressed in Section 601 of Title 42 of the United States Code: „. . to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capa- bility for the maximum self-support and personal ir: dependence consistent with the maintenance of con- tinual parental care and protection .. (emphasis sup- plied). The administrative interpretation of basic federal policy which is binding on the states is set forth in regulation 3401, Part IV of the Federal Handbook of Public Assistance Administration: “To live in the family to which he belongs is the foun- dation of a child’s security. The public has an inter- J ' : 4 ö a 7 f 5 . : F 3 : 3 3 37 est and an obligation in sustaining the contribution which parents and immediate family make to the de- velopment of a child. Financial inability to meet a child’s needs, therefore, should not be allowed to force a parent to surrender responsibility for bringing up the child.” Section 601 clearly expresses a legislative intent to strengthen family life through AFDC assistance. The federal statutory policy of Section 601 of the Social Security Act is binding on the states. Cf. State v. Band- jord, 92 P. 2d 273, 279 (Mont. 1939). See also, Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board, 54 C. 2d 184, 353 P. 2d 33, 35, 39 (1960); Fenton v. Department of Public Welfare, 182 N.E. 2d 528, 530 (Mass. 1962). Maryland statutes require that the State Department of Public Welfare comply with all pertinent federal requirements in order to qualify for federal grants to its AFDC program. Section 15, Article 88A of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Moreover, the State of Maryland has adopted the very language of sec- tion 601 as its AFDC policy in Section 44A of Article 88A of the Annotated Code of Maryland which states that: It is hereby declared that the primary purpose of aid given under this subtitle is the strengthening of family life through services and financial aid, whereby fami- lies may be assisted to maximum self-support in homes meeting the requirements for child care established by law in this state.” Rule 200 VII 1. imposes an arbitrary limit on the amount of AFDC assistance regardless of the actual need of the family unit. It ignores the clear legislative mandate of Section 601 to meet actual need. Furthermore, it encour- ages the dissolution of family units in violation of the fed- eral and state policy of strengthening family life. The policies of meeting actual need and strengthening family life are interwoven for surely a healthy family environ- ment is possible only if actual needs are met. Administrative rules and regulations must conform to legislative policy. SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943), 38 Thomas v. Owens, 4 Maryland 189 (1853). In the ancient and authoritative case of Thomas v. Owens the court dealt with a suit to compel payment to a comptroller that the Maryland Constitution and law said he should receive. The court so ordered, noting that legally defined amounts of payment could not be reduced by agencies or officials any more than payments could be withheld. To the offend- ing official the court at p. 225 of 4 Md., stated that. this fiat of the Supreme Will is not to be nullified by the mere ipse dixit of a mere ministerial officer.” Nor should the legislative command to aid the individual need of needy dependent children and their parents be nullified by the arbitrary regulation of the State Board of Public Welfare. A similar question of ultra vires administrative action was raised in Staub v. Department of Public Welfare, 198 P. 2d 817, (1948). The welfare department fixed a ceiling on the amount of assistance to a needy blind person even though that amount did not meet the recipient’s needs as computed by the department itself. The court reviewed pertinent state statutes and regulations which required assistance to meet actual need. The court set aside the ad- ministrative action of the welfare department as “arbi- trary and capricious” (at p. 825 of 198 P. 2d). 3. The Maximum Grant Provisions of Rule 200 (VII) (1) Violates the Right of Marital Privacy of AFDC Recipients Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Even if the Court rules that the maximum grant provi- sion of Rule 200 (VII) 1. does not deny plaintiff the equal protection of the laws and does not violate Section 601, of 42 U.S. C., the maximum grant provision punishes AFDC recipients with large families in violation of their right of marital privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The state cannot require that recipients of public assistance relinquish a cherished constitutional right as a condition of eligibility. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967). The condition of family size is completely irrele- 39 vant to the purposes of AFDC assistance. In welfare resi-. dency cases courts have invalidated provisions that condi- tion assistance on the relinquishment of the constitutional right of interstate travel. Thompson v. Shapiro, supra, Green v. Delaware, supra, Harrell v. Tobriner, supra. In our hierarchy of constitutional values surely the marital right of procreation ranks just as high. And, its relinquish- ment as a condition to equal AFDC assistance is equally repugnant to the Constitution. The Supreme Court has recognized a penumbral right of marital privacy in Gris- wold v. Connecticut, supra. The right of procreation has traditionally been zealously safeguarded against govern- mental interference. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Griswold v. Connecticut, supra. The government must show a compelling interest in order to justify the in- fringement by Rule 200 VII 1. of this fundamental consti- tutional right. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). A money benefit cannot be denied a person solely because he exercised a constitutionally protected right. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965), Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), Thomp- son v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), Sherbert v. Verner, supra. Rule 200 (VII) 1. punishes AFDC recipients who exer- cise their freedom of choosing a large family. A family unit that decides to have a large number of children is denied an amount of assistance equal to its actual needs. This denial penalizes the birth of additional children in family units of six or more persons by withholding ade- quate food and shelter, even though they may all have been born before the family was ever required to apply for welfare benefits. For example, all of the children of Mr. and Mrs. Gary were born before Mr. Gary was forced by his illness to apply for welfare benefits and they have not had additional children while receiving AFDC assist- ance. Likewise, Mrs. Williams’ children were all born prior to her need for welfare benefits. Nevertheless, they re- ceive less than adequate assistance for minimal food and shelter needs even though they chose a large family be- 40 fore receiving AFDC assistance. Thus, Rule 200 (VII) 1. intrudes on the right of marital privacy both before and during the period of AFDC assistance. It imposes an un- constitutional burden on the exercise of a constitutional right. Sherbert v. Verner, supra, Collins v. State Board of Social Welfare, 248 Iowa 269, 81 N.W. 2d 4 (1957). The right of plaintiffs as married persons, to freedom of choice in procreation and reproduction is firmly established, Gris- wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). A state may not penalize the exercise of a constitutional right by withhold- ing benefits. Sherbert v. Verner, supra. See also the case of Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), in which the court held that a state may not punish the exercise of the freedom to travel from state to state by imposing an arbitrary durational residence requirement asa condition of receiving public welfare benefits. 4. The Maximum Grant Provision of Rule 200 (VII) (1) Violates the Right to Life Guaranteed to the Plaintiffs Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States Senate in 1868 Senator Howard of Michigan, stated: “* * * The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a state from depriving * * * any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or prop- erty without due process of law, or from denying him the equal protection of the laws of the State. * * * It establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty * * * Without this principle of equal justice to all men and equal pro- tection under the shield of the law, there is no republican government and none that is really worth maintaining.” William D. Guthrie, Lectures on the 14th Article of Amendment To The Constitution of the United States, Little, Brown and Co., 1898, p. 22. 41 In their often cited dissent Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Strong, in the case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142, defined the meaning of the term “life” as used in the 14th Amendment. They stated: “* * * by the term ‘life’, as here used, something more is meant then mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and facilities by which life is enjoyed. * * * The depriva- tion not only of life, but of whatever God has given to everyone with life, for its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question, if its efficacy be not frittered away by judicial decision.” The maximum grant provision of Rule 200, contained in the Manual for the Department of Public Welfare of the State of Maryland strikes at this most basic right of all, the right to life itself. It allows the Department of Public Welfare to determine the minimal subsistence needs of a family, and then to deny any family consisting of more than six units this minimal subsistence that the Department has itself defined to be necessary to life. The State of Mary- land has established a system to provide for the necessities of life for the less fortunate members of its society, and then has placed in the balance “* * * all that makes life worth living.” Cf Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 98 N.Y.S. 145, 150 (1906). The tragi@ effect of the denial of the minimal subsistence benefit necessary for life was recently recognized in the report of the President’s National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. In recognizing that the national average grant for welfare recipients was well below the poverty subsistence level of $3,335 for an urban family of four, the commission reported the effect of this inadequacy. It quoted the Advisory Council of Public Welfare, in stating that these inadequacies: “* * are themselves a major source of such social evils as crime and juvenile delinquency, mental illness, illegitimacy, multi-generational dependency, slum en- ee 42 vironments, and the widely deplored climate of unrest, alienation, and discouragement among many groups in the population.” Report of the National Advisory Com- mission on Civil Disorders, Bantam Books, 1968, p. 460. This description is borne out in the instant cases. In her affidavit, the plaintiff, Linda Williams, states that she is constantly in debt because of her inability to meet the bare necessities of life, and that her children are presently without adequate shoes and clothing, and sometimes are required to stay home from school, because they do not have the necessary clothes to wear, especially in the winter- time. Her oldest daughter has just stopped going to school because she does not have the right kind of clothes to wear and is ashamed to go with what she has. Mrs. Williams states in her affidavit that if she could simply afford the necessitids of life for her children, she could provide the kind of home life that they need to grow up to be “good people.” She is constantly faced with the worry of having to break up her family because of her inability to meet her expenses. The plaintiffs Junius Gary and his wife, Jeanette Gary, point to the same difficulties in their affidavits, concerning their children and their inability to clothe them properly for school. They also point out that in the wintertime their gas and electricity bill is always behind because of inade- quate funds, which causes the gas and electricity to be shut off, leaving them without heat and light in their home. They are not even left with sufficient money to participate in the food stamp program which would allow them to purchase more nutritious food in greater quantity. The situation that the Williams family and the Gary family are left in certainly violates that constitutional pro- tection to a life of more than “mere animal existence”. Munn v. Illinois, supra, at page 142. The deprivation here is of everything necessary to the growth and development of life. Moreover, the administrative classification deprives the plaintiffs of other liberties secured by the due process j | ... CE OEE 43 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Without the bare necessities of life the full exercise of freedom of speech, for example, is curtailed. As a result poor persons have not fully participated in the political processes. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 513 (D.C. D.C. 1967). When a legislative classification has the effect of placing such additional burdens on a class of persons characterized by its extreme poverty and a practical inability to escape from the problems which the classification creates, the court gives close scrutiny and requires full justification before permitting such a result. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Hobson v. Hansen, supra at 513. The right to life guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes that man is not a mere animal but a political and social creature as well. Munn v. Illinois, supra. The City of Baltimore, in which the maximum grant regulation is most harshly felt, has itself acknowledged the complete inadequacy of the welfare grant. In submitting its application to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, for a grant to plan a comprehensive city demonstration program, the city, in its application, com- mens on the public welfare program as follows: Public welfare has the mission of providing a guar- antee against economic poverty and related social deprivation. This guarantee means that public wel- fare should be available to all who need its protection, be adequate to their needs consistent with the stand- ards of this society for minimum decent living, and available as a matter of legal right. (Emphasis sup- plied. ) Public assistance payments are so low in Baltimore (as elsewhere in the United States) that the public welfare program itself can be termed a major source of poverty. Part III, Page 3 of 1 Planning Grant Application: Title 1 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966. 1 ae 44 The application concludes that: At this stage in the planning process, it does not appear that there are local laws, regulations or requirements which are glaringly inconsistent with the objectives of the program, with the exception of public welfare laws, and regulations which are primarily national and state laws and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.) Part III, Page 1 Planning Grant Application, Title 1 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966. It is apparent that the inadequate welfare grant which is magnified by the maximum grant regulation under at- tack here, could well cause the City of Baltimore serious difficulty in obtaining approval of its application for a model cities program, and thus further penalize the poor of the inner: city. CONCLUSION John Adams, one of the founders of the American Re- public once wrote: “The poor man’s conscience is clear yet he is ashamed * * * he is not disapproved, censured or reproached; he is only not seen * * * to be wholly over- looked, and to know it, are intolerable.” The poor of our society, created and perpetuated by a welfare system which is characterized by inadequate grants and unrealistic regulations are no longer hidden, however. And as the court stated in the very recent case of Edwards v. Habib: opinion of May 17, 1968, (C.A. D.C. No. 20,883) : As judges, “we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blind- ness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as men.” Ho Ak Kow v. Nunam, C.C.D. Cal. 12 Fed. Cas. 252 (No. 6546) (1879). This court cannot fail to take judicial notice of the vicious cycle of poverty created in our cities by the ille- gality and unfairness of our present welfare system. The 45 maximum grant provision, Rule 200 VII 1, creates an arbitrary classification that penalizes recipient family units of more than six persons. A classification based on family size is totally unrelated to the purpose of the AFDC program. According to the schedules of the defendant, State Department of Public Welfare, the amount of assist- ance granted to Plaintiff Linda Williams and her family, and plaintiffs Junius and Jeanette Gary and their family, is inadequate to sustain even a minimal standard of life. If this Honorable Court enjoins the operation of Rule 200 VII 1. plaintiffs could provide for the minimal subsistence needs of their families. For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs respectfully request that their motion for a pre- liminary injunction and a temporary restraining order be granted to the plaintiffs and their children. (Signatures and Certificate of Service.) United States District Court for the District of Maryland SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RE- STRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNC- TION. I. Legislative History and Administrative Interpreta- tion Regarding the Maximum Grant Regulation. At the Court’s request, counsel for Plaintiffs have re- viewed the legislative history of the Social Security Act of 1935, Title IV, Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children. The Senate and House Reports since the initial enactment of the Act, and testi- mony that was given concerning the various enactments, as well as the administrative interpretation of the act, have been examined, to determine congressional concern, if any, with a “maximum grant” regulation, such as the one here under attack. The original act and the subsequent amendments to it, while they do not speak directly to the 46 problem of maximum grant regulations, contain considera- ble language which support the position that a maximum grant regulation, such as the one here under attack, does defeat the purposes for which the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 USC, Sec. 601, et seq. were enacted. The language referred to is contained in the legislation itself, relevant reports from congressional committees connected with the promulgation of such legislation, HEW interpretation of the Social Security Act, and statements of members of Congress which appear in the congressional record. All of the sources support the position that the original congressional intent was clearly to meet the ob- jectives of the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act, as presently set forth in 42 USC Sec. 601, to “* * * strengthen family life and to help such parents or rela- tives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self - support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protec- tion * * *” and to encourage “* * * the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of rela- tives 8 * 92 Senate Report No. 628, 74th Congress (May 13, 1935) states: Through cash grants adjusted to the needs of the family it is possible to keep young children with their mother in their own home, thus preventing the necessity of placing children in institutions. This is recognized by everyone to be the least expensive and altogether most desirable method for meeting the needs of these families that has yet been devised.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Report goes on to note that because in many States the aid is inadequate to meet the objective of providing for the needs of families, there was a requirement for Federal aid to States. The initial House version of the Social Security Act reiterated the viewpoint of the Senate committee. It emphasized “* * * it has long been recognized in this country that the best provision that can be made for families of this description (without a potential bread- winner) is public aid with respect to dependent children 47 in their own homes.” House Report No. 615, 74th Con- gress (1935). (Emphasis supplied.) Congressional testimony at the time of the consideration of the original Social Security Act adds considerably to the argument that a maximum grant regulation is incon- sistent with the legislative intent of the Social Security Act. Senator Harrison of the Senate Committee on Fi- nance, in explaining the House Ways and Means Commit- tee’s proposals of Title IV stated during the Senate debate: the provisions are not for general relief of poor children but are designed to hold broken families together.” (Emphasis supplied.) 79 Cong. Rec. 9269 (1935). Senator Wagner of Mississippi, the sponsor of the Social Security legislation, emphasized the need for flexibility in allocating funds, by commenting that: “* * * These grants will be extended primarily upon a matching basis in order to stimulate the States to action, but they will take full account of the special needs of those localities which are genuinely without capacity to help themselves.” 79 Cong. Rec. (1935). The present objectives of the Social Security Act were reaffirmed by the Act of August 1, 1956, which amended Title IV, by restating the purposes to include encourage- ment of care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives with the same objective of “strengthening family life.” August 1, 1956 c. 936 Title II. Section 312 (a), 70 Stat. 848. Discussing the 1956 Amendments to Title IV of the Social Security Act, Senator Byrd, of the Senate Commit- tee on Finance, stated that: “* * * Services that assist families and individuals to attain the maximum economic and personal independence of which they are capable provided a more satisfactory way of living for the recipi- ents affected. To the extent that they can remove or ameliorate the causes of dependency they will decrease the time that assistance is needed.” 102 Cong. Rec. 13034 (1956). In the same vein, Senator Magnuson proposed to liberalize the grants to dependent children “* * * to a level commensurate with other social security benefici- 48 aries * * *” (in order to alleviate) “* * * one of the significant deficiencies in our present social security legis- lation.” 102 Cong. Rec. 13081, (1956). Similar sentiment was voiced by Representative Knox in commenting on the conference report of public assistance titles: “* * * I am gratified to observe that the amendments provided in the conference agreement to these public-assistance titles will insure to * * * our dependent children a liberalized benefit level that more realistically recognizes the cost of even the barest subsistence today. It should be recognized that people who are compelled to avail themselves of public assistance are entitled to an adequate benefit commen- surate with the costs of their living requirements in our present-day economy.” (Emphasis supplied.) 102 Cong. Rec. 14835 (1956). That , an arbitrary maximum grant regulation on the amount of a grant to a family defeats the purposes of the Social Security Act, concerning AFDC, is further high- lighted by examining the 1965 Amendment to the Act, subsection (a)(1) public law 89-97, Sec. 122, 401 (c), which increased the share of the average monthly assist- ance payment from 14/17 of the first $17 of assistance to a recipient, to 5/6 of the first $18 of such payment, thus raising the ceiling for federal participation from $30 to $32 a month per recipient. See 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 603 (1967 Com. Annual Pocket Part) and Annotation thereto, con- cerning the 1965 amendment. The purpose of the 1965 amendment was to improve and expand the public assistance program by increasing the federal matching share for cash payments for the needy aged, blind, disabled and families with dependent children. 1965 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, at page 1944. It is of course noted that the method of improving and expand- ing the assistance to families with dependent children was by increasing the matching funds from $30 to $32 per recipient, not by giving an increase to the family as a whole. Such a method of increase makes sense when one finds that the amount of payments is based on the indi- vidual’s need and on the cost for meeting that need. Thus, for the State arbitrarily to set a maximum grant for 49 family, without regard to the number of dependent chil- dren in the family, patently defeats the very purpose of the 1965 amendment and all the prior provisions of the Social Security Act which conipute the amount of payment to the States on the basis of the number of recipients eligible for assistance. This viewpoint is further reinforced by the 1967 amend- ment to the Social Security Act, Public Law 90-248, 90th Congress, H.R. 12080. While not specifically passing upon the matter of meeting the full needs of welfare recipients, the amendment does require in Section 402 (a) (23), that the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs, since such amounts were estab- lished * It also requires adjustments of any maxi- mums imposed by a State on the amount of aid paid to families in proportion to the rise in living cost. Thus for the State arbitrarily to set a maximum grant per family, without regard to the number of dependent children in the family, patently defeats the very purpose of the Social Security Act, which has consistently com- puted the amount of payment to the State on the number of recipients eligible for assistance, and has amended the Act so as to meet the rise in the cost of living be determin- ing how such rise has effected the needs of individuals. In the testimony that was given, concerning the 1967 amendments to the Act, Wilbur J. Cohen, the present Sec- retary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, had an interesting exchange with Senator Ribicoff, a member of the committee on finance, concerning the effect of fail- ure to meet minimal needs which directly results from maximum grant regulations: Senator Ribicoff: I know, but you take all that into account in the standards that are being set. What they are receiving is not just a question of the amount they receive from the welfare agencies, you take into ac- count all they receive. What happens to the child or the adult who receives so much less than what you consider or what is considered a proper standard? How do they live? Mr. Cohen: They have to live on the lesser amount. Senator Ribicoff: How do they live? Mr. Cohen: They have to cut back on their food and clothing and other needs to live on the amount that the state gives them. Senator Ribicoff: Well, is not a study made or do not you know what happens to these people? I mean just what is happening to them? Mr. Cohen: Well, I think that the evidence shows — I do not have it immediately before me — that many of these children and these families grow up without adequate food, without adequate medical care, and certainly their whole aspirations for improving in their education status are stunted, and I think that the evidence from the State administrators when you hear them will bear that conclusion out. Secretary Gardner: It shows up most clearly, I think, in the medical data. You will find a higher in- cidence of just about every kind of medical disorder and physical handicap in these youngsters — malnu- trition and everything else. Senator Ribicoff: Well, in looking to the cost to so- ciety ultimately, the people who are below standard cause a greater drain eventually upon what the society has to pay out in every conceivable way, is that not right? Senator Gardner: No question about that, Senator. Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate 90th Congress, First Session on H.R. 12080, August 22, 1967. In initially establishing the Act, Congress recognized that in the long run the least expensive and altogether most desirable method of providing for needy families was 51 cash grants adjusted to individual needs, and such failure, which directly results from a maximum grant regulation, in regard to large families, not only defeats the very pur- poses of the Act, but also may well result in a greater ex- pense to the State, apart from the tragic cost in human resources to society and to the individuals in question. An examination of what the Department of Health, Edu- cation and Welfare has said in this regard is also illumi- nating. The policies and standards for the public assist- ance program as administered by the states are set forth in the Handbook of Public Assistance Administration and related releases (hereinafter referred to as Handbook) issued by the Department. This Handbook describes its functions as follows (Pt. 1, Sec. 4210): “* * * The policies and standards are set forth in the form of interpretations of the Social Security Act, requirements for State plans, criteria for the adminis- tration of State plans, conditions for Federal financial participation, and recommendations for improving public assistance programs and administration * * * The Handbook constitutes the principal means of in- forming the States regarding official policies and stand- ards * it * * * * * * 1. The Federal requirements described in this Hand- book are based on the pertinent provisions of the So- cial Security Act, and on the intent and purpose of the law as identified in official statements and as derived from the history of the legislation and from other available evidence.” (emphasis supplied). Thus, in the Handbook of Public Assistance Administra- tion, Supplement A, Pt. II — A — 3000, it is stated: “* * * Sufficient funds should be made available by the State to meet need in full in accordance with the State standards of need and to assure that for the es- tablished State fiscal period, there will be continuity of operations under the plan throughout the State.” (emphasis supplied). 52 HEW, in another section, Pt. IV, Sec. 42231, of the Hand- book goes on to actually define what is meant by the phrase “Strengthening Family Life” which appears in 42 U.S.C. 8602: Strengthening family life means sustaining and in- ereasing the ability of parents to carry their parental responsibilities in the care, protection, and support of their children; and to sustain and increase the capaci- ties of children to carry their appropriate role in total family life, to the end that children may have a home life conductive to healthy physical, emotional, and so- cial growth and development. Families have the right and responsibility to provide for adequate health care, education, and vocational training in accordance with the capacities of their children; and to provide for their participation in community life. Thus, while Congress has not spoken definitively, concern- ing its viewpoint of the effect of maximum grants on the purposes of the Social Security Act, statements contained in the Congressional Reports and testimony at Congres- sional hearing, as well as the administrative interpreta- tion in the Handbook, certainly support the conclusion that accomplishment of the primary purpose of aid under Title IV, the “strengthening of family life through services and financial aid,” can only be met adequately by meeting all needs of all individuals in all families, whether they be large or small families. Nowhere in the Social Security Act and its various amendments or in the Handbook, is there any justification for a discrimination between large and small families. The maximum grant regulation here in question defeats the very purposes of the Social Secur- ity Act, “to encourage the care of dependent children in their own homes” by establishment of such a regulation. In the very recent case of King v. Smith, No. 949, Octo- ber term, 1967, 36 L.W. 4703, the Supreme Court opinion in- cludes extensive research on the Social Security Act, inso- far as it touched upon the Alabama welfare regulation dealing with the so-called “substitute father.” 53 While the regulation there is not related to the maxi- mum grant regulation here under attack, there was a rec- ognition of the importance of the legislative purposes of the act as further interpreted by the Handbook, which is frequently cited. There, as in this case, the Supreme Court found that the regulation itself is unrelated to need, because the actual financial situation of the family is irrel- evant in determining the existence of a substitute father.” 36 L.W. 4706. The Court went on to state, at 36 L.W. 4709: “A contrary view would require us to assume that Congress, at the same time that it intended to provide programs for the economic security and protection of all children, also intended arbitrarily to leave one class of destitute children entirely without meaningful pro- tection. Children who are told, as Alabama has told these appellees, to look for their food to a man who is not in the least obliged to support them are without meaningful protection. Such an interpretation of con- gressional intent would be most unreasonable, and we decline to adopt it.” (Court’s emphasis). The Court concluded that the purpose of the AFDC pro- gram was to provide economic security and services to needy children who lost the support of a “breadwinner”. Parents of a large family are required to completely ignore children beyond the sixth individual in a family, which is humanly inconceivable, or to spread already inadequate resources thinner. The effect of the maximum grant regu- lation, as in the King v. Smith case, is to arbitrarily leave one class of destitute children entirely without meaningful protection, and is equally unreasonable in view of the pur- poses of the Act. II. Supplemental Argument That the Maximum Grant Provision of Rule 200 VII 1. Violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs contend that there is enough evidence on Con- gressional intent and administrative interpretation to war- 54 rant a finding by the Court that Rule 200 VII 1. violates Section 601, 42 U.S.C. the Federal Social Security Act, and is the very antithesis of the purposes of the Act. However, even if the Court should not reach this conclusion, the regu- lation in question must still fall, as a clear violation of plain- tiffs’ constitutional rights under the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs have already filed an extensive memorandum in support of their argument on this point. By way of fur- ther supplementation of that memorandum, plaintiffs main- tain that the application of the maximum grant to children of large families is a denial of equal benefits to them. on a wholly arbitrary standard or on a consideration that of- fends the dictates of reason.” Schward v. Bd. of Bar Exami- ners, 358 U.S. 232, 249 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The children of the plaintiffs and all children of families belong- ing to the class here represented are thus denied rights on the basis of a status which they are powerless to influence, 1. e., that they are members of a family of more than six persons. The very recent case of Anderson, et al. v. Schaefer, Civil Action No. 10443, (D.C. N.D. Ga. April 4, 1968) is close on the point to the instant case. For the Court’s convenience a copy of the opinion and order, findings of fact and conclu- sions of law are attached hereto. In that case, the state of Georgia promulgated an “employable mother” regulation which discriminated between AFDC recipients in the cal- culation of their grants on the basis of the sources of their income. Thus, under the regulation a family whose income resulted from employment would in most cases receive less in AFDC supplementary benefits than a person whose in- come came from other sources. The Court in Anderson, found that the regulation bore “* * * no reasonable relationship to plaintiffs’ financial needs, and therefore to the purposes of the Social Security Act * * *”. (emphasis supplied). We would submit that the regulation here challenged bears even less reasonable a relationship to the plaintiffs’ needs, arbitrarily discrmi- 55 nating against the child or children of a large family. The members of the Gary family receive assistance at the rate of $25.00 per person although according to Maryland’s mini- mal standards of subsistence and shelter they should re- ceive assistance at the rate of $33.15 per person. Likewise, the members of the Williams’ family receive assistance at the rate of $27.78 although minimal subsistence standards calculated for them by the defendant call for payments of $35.71 per person. A family of six persons, unhampered by the maximum grant regulation receives assistance at the rate of $38.50 per person, the full amount calculated to be their minimal subsistence needs. Thus, as in the Anderson case, the maximum grant regu- lation penalizes the plaintiffs on a basis which “bears no reasonable relationship to their financial needs and there- fore to the purposes of the Social Security Act.” Anderson v. Schaefer, supra. The Court in Anderson held that the defendants shall not give any force or effect to the regulation in question. It is respectfully submitted that the court should likewise en- join any enforcement of the maximum grant regulation herein under attack. (Signatures and Certificate of Service.) United States District Court for the . District of Maryland AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS Now come the Defendants Edmund P. Dandridge, Jr., Chairman of the State Board of Public Welfare; Raleigh C. Hobson, Director of the State Department of Public Wel- fare; and Mrs. Barbara Stevenson, Howard W. Murphy, Julius O. Shuger, Dr. W. Richard Ferguson, Lester B. Levy, Nicholas C. Mueller, Calhoun Bond and Mrs. Charles D. Harris, members of the State Board of Public Welfare, by Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Frank A. DeCosta, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, their attorneys, and by x way of an Amended Motion to Dismiss, by leave of this Court, respectfully say: 1. That this Court is without jurisdiction by reason of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution because the Plaintiffs, residents of the State of Maryland, assert a monetary claim against the State of Maryland to which it has not consented. 2. That the Governor of the State of Maryland and/or the President of the Maryland Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates are indispensable party defendants under Rule 19 (a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their joinder will divest this Court of juris- diction. 5 3. That this Court should abstain from exercising juris- diction because on the face of the Complaint there is al- leged to be a State statute susceptible of construction by the State courts which would avoid or modify the constitu- tional question raised. 4. That the Complaint does not raise a substantial con- stitutional question nor state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because “poor relief” is a State question and there is no constitutional right thereto. Wherefore, Defendants request that an Order be entered dismissing the Complaint in accordance herewith. (Signatures and Certificate of Service.) United States District Court for the District of Maryland MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS ARGUMENT 1 Eleventh Amendment The Plaintiffs do not merely contend that the Maryland Department of Public Welfare’s maximum grant regulation 57 (Maryland Manual of the Department of Public Welfare, Part II, Rule 200, Section VII 1) of $250 is violative of the State and Federal Enabling Acts [Article 88A, Sections 44A and 49, Annotated Code of Maryland (1964 Replacement Volume), and 42 U.S. C., Sections 601, et seq.) and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but they additionally contend that the Williams family (Plaintiffs herein) is entitled to an additional $46.15 more per month in AFDC benefits from the State (Paragraph IX A of the Complaint) and that the Gary family (Plaintiffs herein) is entitled to an additional $81.50 per month in AFDC benefits from the State (Paragraph IX B of the Com- plaint). That the Plaintiffs are really seeking a monetary judg- ment against the State becomes even clearer from the nature of the specific relief requested. They request a preliminary and permanent injunction: “(a) prohibiting, restraining and enjoining defend- ants . from enforcing, applying or implementing said maximum grant regulations”. Obviously, if the State may not apply its $250 maximum grant regulation, the next step becomes obvious: “(b) prohibiting payments of assistance which are less than the minimum subsistence and shelter needs as established by the Maryland Board of Public Wel- fare, and ordering and requiring defendants to make welfare payments to plaintiffs . . . in accordance with minimum subsistence and shelter needs as established by the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare”. In the case of the Williams family this would amount to an affirmative award of $46.15, and in the case of the Gary family this would amount to an affirmative award of $81.50. Not content to rest with (a) and (b), Plaintiffs further clarify the true nature of their monetary claim by requesting this Court to (e) order and require “defendants . . to furnish AFDC assistance to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated without regard to said maximum grant regu- lations”. The essence of the Plaintiffs’ claim, then, is that they are entitled to monetary relief against a State by virtue of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.* The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion provides: “The Judicial power to the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court construed the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit suits in fed- eral courts against a state for a monetary judgment by one of the state’s own citizens unless the state itself consents. This constitutional doctrine has been reaffirmed since Hans. Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1944). The present claim for monetary relief may not, by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, be maintained in this Court since it is one to which the judicial power of the United States shall not extend. II. Joinder of Indispensable Parties The Plaintiffs in this elass action are essentially asking that the State provide additional money in the budget of the Maryland State Department of Public Welfare for in- creased grants under AFDC. That will be the ultimate * More alarmingly, their assertion, when cut to the “bare bones”, is that they are entitled to “poor relief” as a matter of “right” by virtue of the same constitutional provision. 59 effect, if grants beyond the 8250 maximum are constitu- tionally required.“ Under Article III, Section 52 (3) of the Maryland Con- stitution, the Governor is charged with the ultimate re- sponsibility for the preparation of the budget of the State Department of Public Welfare. The Governor may reduce or exclude from his budget an appropriation requested by one of his executive departments. Moreover, the General Assembly may only reduce executive appropriations in- cluded in the budget as submitted. However, the General Assembly may appropriate additional moneys by way of a Supplementary Appropriation Bill, provided that a rev- enue source by way of a ‘ax is established to support the Supplementary Appropriation Bill. Maryland Constitu- tion, Article III, Section 52(8). Further, the State Department of Public Welfare does not have the authority, within its fiscal year 1968 or 1969 budget, to transfer funds from one program [i.e., Aid to the Blind (AB), Old Age Assistance (OAA), or Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD)] to AFDC, in the absence of a legislative amendment, without obtaining the approval of the Governor. Article 15A, Section 8 of the Maryland Code (1968 Replacement Volume), in perti- nent subsections, provides: “(a) What constitutes initial plan of disbursement.— The items and amounts making up the appropriation in any budget bill, supplementary appropriation bill or bond issue shall represent the initial plan of dis- bursement and apportionment of the appropriations of which they are part. Each appropriation shall be paid out only in accordance with the schedule therefor, unless such schedule be amended, within the limits of such appropriation, in the following manner * „ * * * = *The Department estimates that there are approximately 2,300 grants which would have to be increased if this class action pre- vails, requiring increased grants for AFDC of $957,600, neither ap- propriated in the present 1968 fiscal year budget nor appropriated in the 1969 fiscal year budget. “(e) Amended schedules submitted by departments, etc., and approved by Governor; amendments made or approved by Governor to be reported to General Assembly. — Any department, board, commission, of- ficer or institution may, at any time submit in writing to the Governor an amended schedule for the disburse- ment and apportionment of the appropriations made to it by him. If the Governor shall approve such amended schedule, he shall transmit the same, with the certificate of approval, to the Comptroller and thereafter, such appropriation shall be paid out in ac- cordance with said amended schedule, subject to the provisions of subsection (f). Any such amended sched- ule so submitted to the Governor may be withdrawn at any time before the Governor has acted thereon. Any, amended schedule approved by the Governor may be again amended at any time in like manner and with like effect. All amendments and schedules made or approved by the Governor shall be reported by him to the next session of the General Assembly.” In order to achieve the fiscal scheme contemplated by the Plaintiffs, namely, increasing the AFDC grants by $957,600, the Governor and/or the President of the Mary- land Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates are indispensable parties. Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in pertinent part, provides: “A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdic- tion over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.” Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro- vides: “If a person as described in subdivision (a) (1) (2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall de- 61 termine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus re- garded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.” Rule 19(a) is satisfied because, in the absence of the Governor and/or the President of the Maryland Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates being made a party, “complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties”. Rule 19(b) is satisfied because each is a State official charged with statutory responsibilities which would be affected by this action and the relief prayed by the Plaintiffs. These State officials are, there- fore, “indispensable” parties within the meaning of Rule 19 (a) and (b). Since the Plaintiffs’ action would be essentially asking for monetary relief against these State officials, an in- crease in the AFDC grants beyond the present $250 maxi- mum, their joinder could divest this Court of jurisdiction because of the Eleventh Amendment as construed in Hans v. Louisiana, supra, and Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, supra. These additional defendants are, therefore, “indispensa- able” parties whose joinder would divest this Court of jurisdiction and (1) any judgment rendered in the absence of these parties will be prejudicial to them; (2) in shaping relief, a monetary award to the Plaintiffs against the State will necessarily result; (3) in the absence of the additional defendants, relief will not be adequate because of the fis- cal scheme established by State law; and (4) the Mary- land courts have jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’ action. These factors being present, Rule 19(b) author- izes this Court to dismiss the Complaint under these cir- cumstances. III. Abstention The Complaint states: “This is a proceeding for injunction enjoining the defendants from continuing to enforce or otherwise apply its ‘maximum grant’ regulation. This is also a proceeding for a declaratory judgment that defend- ants’ ‘maximum grant’ regulation: (A) Contravenes the equal protection and due proc- ess clauses of the Fourteenth Amepdment to the Con- stitution of the United States; and (B) Is contrary to the purposes of the federal and state Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro- gram as expressed by the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. Sections 601 et seq.) and the statutes of the State of Maryland (Article 88A, Sections 44A and 49, Ann. Code of Md., 1957 ed.).” On the face of the Complaint the Plaintiffs allege the nar- rowly limited “special circumstance” which permits this Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction, namely, that the “maximum grant” regulation promulgated by the Mary- land State Board of Public Welfare [ils contrary . . . to the statutes of the State of Maryland”. In Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), the Supreme Court, in approving the District Court’s declension of ju- risdiction, held that abstention is properly exercised when a state statute is susceptible to a construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the constitutional ques- tion. This principle has been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Zwicker v. Koota, 36 L.W. 4041, 4043 (1967), although abstention was held to have been im- properly applied in that case because it was conceded there that a construction of the state statute would not render unnecessary a decision of the constitutional chal- 63 lenge. In the present case, however, the Plaintiffs them- selves assert that the “maximum grant” is inconsistent with a state statute. If this is true, as the Plaintiffs claim, such a construction would avoid the constitutional ques- tion. Regard for the interest and sovereignty of the state and reluctance needlessly to adjudicate constitutional is- sues are appropriate considerations by a federal District Court in the ultimate determination of whether to ex- ercise jurisdiction, where the Harrison “special circum- stance” is present. In this connection, it is interesting to note that recently in King v. Smith, 36 L.W. 4703 (1968), the Supreme Court struck down Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation which denied AFDC benefits on statu- tory rather than the asserted constitutional grounds. Moreover, there is every danger that a federal decision on the merits of the constitutional claim will disrupt an entire regulatory scheme, not only in Maryland where appropriations were made for both the fiscal year budgets 1968 and 1969 with the $250 “maximum grant” regulation for AFDC in mind but also by implication in one-third of all states participating in AFDC categorical assistance pro- grams under the Social Security Act. One-third of all states fix the maximum amount of grants to families with dependent children.* The Supreme Court has observed without disapproval that: “The level of benefits is within the State’s discre- tion, but the Federal Government’s contribution is a varying percentage of the total AFDC expenditures within each State [citations omitted]. The benefit levels vary greatly from state to state. For example, in May, 1967, the average payment to a family under AFDC was about $224 in New Jersey, $221 in New York, $39 in Mississippi, $20 in Puerto Rico, and $53 in Alabama [citations omitted].” King v. Smith, 36 L.W. 4703, 4706 (1968). See Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, 12 Prac. Law 13, 21 (1966). In Georgia the maximum grants in AFDC are $36 for the first child, $27 for each additional child up to and not to exceed $144 per family per month. Ga. Manual of Public Assistance, Part III, Section VII, at G-37 (1966). 64 The “special circumstances” doctrine of Harrison has not been tampered with in Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). In Damico the question presented was whether a three-judge court properly declined to exercise jurisdic- tion to hear a Section 1983 claim upon the doctrine of abstention because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust state administrative remedies. No such ground is asserted in the present case. Finally, the doctrine of abstention is properly raised by a Motion to Dismiss (compare Government & Civic Em- ployees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364; Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321, with Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368) although it may be the better practice to retain jurisdiction pending adjudication in the state court. See Note, “Federal Question Absten- tion: Justice Frankfurter’s Doctrine in an Activist Era”, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 604 (1967). IV. “Poor Relief” is a state question and there is no constitu- tional right to a level of benefits beyond that provided by the states. Public welfare takes the forms of general assistance and categorical assistance in the United States. General as- sistance is financed by local and state governments. Al- though programs of this sort provided the only public aid available prior to the Depression, the now furnish only a small portion of public welfare funds. Categorical assist- ance is today the predominant form of public welfare. Under this scheme, state programs which are supported by grants-in-aid from the federal government pursuant to the Social Security Act administer aid to specific cate- gories of needy individuals and families. The federal stat- ute recognizes four major categories: Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to the Blind (AB), Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). State participation is not required by the federal statute. States may choose not to apply for federal assistance or may join in some, but not all, of the programs. In order to receive federal funds, however, state plans must be sub- mitted for the approval of the Secretary of Health, Educa- tion and Welfare. Although the establishment of criteria for need and other factors of eligibility is left largely to the states, the plans must meet certain basic qualifications under the act and must conform to the rules and regula- tions promulgated by the Secretary. The state plans themselves are usually devised pursuant to general enabling legislation empowering a state agency to promulgate rules and regulations for administering the federal program. The Maryland AFDC program is legis- latively authorized and detailed in Article 88A, Sections 44A, et seq., Annotated Code of Maryland (1964 Replace- ment Volume). Maryland, together with every other state, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia and Guam, participates in the Federal Government’s AFDC program, which was established by the Social Security Act of 1935. King v. Smith, 36 L.W. 4703 (1968). The category singled out for welfare assistance by AFDC is the “dependent child”, who is defined in Section 406 of the Act, 49 Stat. 629 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 606(a), as an age-qualified “needy child . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with” any one of several listed relatives. The Maryland State Department of Public Welfare, with respect to AFDC grants, promulgated the following regula- tion: “The amount of the grant is the resulting amount of need when resources are deducted from require- ments as set forth in this Rule, subject to a maximum on each grant from each category: A. For local departments under any ‘Plan A’ of Shelter Schedule B $250. For local departments under any ‘Plan B’ of Shelter Schedule B $250, except that: Os a. If the requirements of a child over 18 are included to enable him to complete high school or training for employment (III-3, C), the grant may ex [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0173%3A01. Public record. Not legal advice.