# Petitioners Brief — Ross v. Bernhard > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0099%3A04 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petitioners Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1969 - **Citation:** 396 U.S. 531 ## Text ‘, Iroewaserw : ° _ : ; tide-sun v0 { re) eee eee oe; t ot aa te > . qxensemcersmereesemmte —— — ae ; ist ’ MAY 8 i969 IN THE | Supreme Court of the oe Bitte OK . OCTOBER TERM ow 9 é- —_ yf os ' '. HOWARD ROSS and BERNARD ROSS, as- ‘Trustees for a3: -LENA ROSENBAUM, - Cpe ne nn em Petitioners, . sa 8 te ROBERT A. BERNHARD, et Pe , , Respondents, and PAUL L. DAVIES, ef ak. ei | _ Defendants. ON W RIT ‘OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT ® ” BRIEF FOR a * n) ». Wiutuiam E. Havpex Attorney for Petitioners anes 295 Madison Avenue . New York, N. Y. 10017 Of Counsel . — | ure , _ ABRAHAM L. PoMERANTZ Ricuarp M. Meyer Pomerantz Levy Havpex & Buock * 295 Madison Avenue New York, N. Y. 10017 RosentHaL & GurKIN 19 West 44th Street New York, N. Y. 10036 — st Se a AEE ie 320 (ase Pauss inc., 421 Hupsox st., NU¥.—ORegon 5-4540 - TABLE OF CONTENTS, — PAGE Opinions Below ........ gui eaad voeane oe ey eee 1 er ere ere Pe rer Pere TT TT Pee ee 1 | Constitutional Provisions and Statutes ............ ees ae _ Question Presented ..... Penta: erree ee ee Statement of the Case ...... eo aes pore 3 “ARGUMENT: , | I. Plaintiffs are constitutionally entitled to ‘a jury trial in a derivative stockholders action ‘if a right to jury trial would exist were. the underlying cause of action ne directly by the corpor MN hides vitewecesuas Ye eee oe II. The tinderlying causes of action in the present | case assert substantial legal claims. giving rise toa — to Jury ¢ Oriel . 65. eT e Pere ET eee 5 CONCLUSION .......... ee ene cv eccconvessetces ver 21 _AvtHoritiEs Cite - Cases © Beacon Theatres, Ine. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 ee as iow cs PEE ER RUE POR ee ....4, 6,8; 9310 Dairy: Queen, Ine. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) . . 6, 7, 8, 14, passim DePinto v. Prov ident Security. Life Insurance Co., *** 323 F.2d 826 (9 Cir. 1963), cert. den. 376 U.S. 950, i oe reh. den. 383 U.S. 973 bkees Layne teen wet 16, 17 Fanchon & Marco, Ine. v. Paramount Pistaits. Inc., , 9 402 F. 2d 731 (2 Cir: 1953) ........5..... 0,18 13 ce | ; | _ (PAGE Pleitmann v.W ddd Sireet Lighting Co., 240 U.S. ERE Se Ri EOE ck She Ceariicaeae Cerne ie | 12, 13 Galloway v. United outa 319 ‘U. S. 372 (1943; ‘dis- ‘senting opinion) ..... EN CARR aes eee ees hes 18 | Halladay v. V erschoor, 381 F. 2d 100 (8. Cir. 1967) . ore, Kelly v. Dolan, 233 F. 635 (3 Cir. 1916) . ae é Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., 330 US. 518 rate Cs eee eee ins Haak van ek es -- 5,9 “Meyer v. Fleming, 327 US. 161 (1946) Stoo eee So Moore vy. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 XL. 8.593 WI etrractacrery 2. ee 4 . Holmes, Law In Nilesiids and Science in Law,.i2 Harv. Bs, BOW, GES (ROIS) 5 2 5 hive vvcvesenss rere te , 9 Moore’s Fed. Pr. 113- 115 (1968) me Pee a rer mae Restatement of Agency 24, Sees, 399 et seq. Peele oe ae Towgue, In Defense of Juries ‘As Exclusive Judges of the Facts, 35 Ore. L, Rev. 143 (1956) ...... ives _ WwW aterman, ‘Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’ “eats ae Commentaries, 27 il. L. Rev. 629 (1933) ae IN THE/ Supreme Court ‘uf the uit States October Term 1968’ me it i\ a&-; ; -Howarp. Sons AND Berwanp Ross, as Trusty ES FUR = f 7 \ ey coe, Lena’ Rosexsaun,- eet a at it eee j ze Vita Ke 2 | - . i 7 emt: \ Aco meteenenmape, oe Statement of the: Case el This j is an 1 action beagle by stockholders of The Lehman - - Corporation in its right and on its behalf. It is brought under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 USe & SO. Tet seq. The amended complaint alleg es that the © ore poration, under the control of its broker, Lehman brothers, hi is paid illegal and unnecessary brokerage commissions to. ‘Lehman Brothers (A. *22-26). The’ plaintiffs ‘made. timely demantl for a Jury trial (A. 20). Pre-trial discovery was completed, plaintiffs filed.a note of issue and the action was placed’ upon the ‘trial calendar (A, 31). Defendants then _ moved to trike plaintiffs’ demand for jury triad and to ‘transfér ‘the,case to the non- jury calendar (A. 28): The District Court denied defendants’ motion, but certified the’ question to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit _(A,..41-52}, which aedepted the certification (A. 57). The’ ‘Second Cireuit, ina two-to- one - opinion, reversed the [is- ‘trict Court. 403 F.2d 909. Ae” se ‘Be _ ARGUMENT . ’ . . s i. ° ° ‘ 7 e - Plaintiffs are olnatielttinallby entitled to a jury trial ‘in a derivative stockholders action if a right to jury | ‘trial would exist were the underlying cause of action brought directly by the corporation. The right to jury rial j In civil actions, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendme nt, has been jealously safeguarded by this ‘Court. : 7 . ‘Maintenance of ihe jury as a fact finding eS ix-Of such ‘cata eaiaie oc ceupies so firm -a + Se - place in our history and jurisprudence that any seem-— ing cur tailment of the right'to a jury trial should be .Serutinized with the utmost ecare.’’’ Beae on Thea- tres, lnc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.-500; 501. (1959). - In so holding, the Court ré-affirmed the importance | of the ‘institution of the civil jury as a demoer ‘atic cheek upon ened power of the judiciary. See Parsons v, Bedford, 28 U: (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1850) ; Waterman, Thomas Jefferson ane z Blackstone's Comme ntarves, 27, Ill. La. Rev. 629, 648 (1953); Hogan, Joseph Story on Juries, 37 Ore. Li. Rev, 254,255 (1958) ; 3 Lihott’s Debates, 324, 594 (1836). Gxt ras Mr. Justice Holmes. explained low the jury systems oui irantee of popular participation in the judicial process operates: : ‘Indeed one reason why I believe in our practice of leaving questions of negligence to them [the jury]. ix witut is precisely one of their gravest defects from the point of view of their theoretical function: that they will introduce into their verdict a certain amount -a very large amount, so far as [have observed—of the community.”’ (Holmes, Law In Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. H3, 459-60 nner’ interpolation added.) , Inour “People” s Capitalism” embr acing 27 million stock- holders of public corporations the applicability of the con- ception of popular control to the derivative action is es- pecially compelling. i The Seventh Amendment preserves: the right of trial by jury ‘In Suits ‘at common law’’; not, to suits in equity. | The Court of Appeals below held. that a stockholder’s . . popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration: of the law in aecord with the wishes and feelings of . ar derivative action is ‘ta creature of equity’? to which the right of a jury trial does not apply: 408 I. 2d at.911. That tHe derivative stockholder’s action is an invention oftequity may be conceded. Howeyer, the proposition states ouly a half truth. A derivative action is constituted of two parts. The first parf, concerns the shareholder's right tv maintain the action on behalf of the corporation. This is a procedural mechanism of equity. The second part bs the underlying claim of the corporation asserted in the action. This claim may be either legal or equitable depending = its nature. Koster y. Launbermens Mutual Cas. Co., 330.08 918, 322-23 (1947) ; Meyer \ v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 168 ~ (1946). | | | Prior to the union of law‘dnd equity, an equity: court, onee having taken jurisdiction, would proceed to final ad- judication of all issues, legal and equitable, in the suit. “There was no practical alternative. Trying one half of the ease (the right of the stockholders to hail the corporation into Court) in equity, while sending the other half (the corporation’s claims against. defendants) to another judge sitting on the law side, had little appeal against considera~ tions: of litigative efficivney. The adoption of the F ederal tele of Civil Procedure in 1938 worked an-historical change by merging law and equity © -intoa single unified system. The artificial’ restraints of the old system were climinated. It now heeame possible fora litigation to be tried before i au single, judge sitting at once as a law court trying the +] legal] Issues with a jury if de- manded, and an equity court trying ‘the. equity issues, The Court of Appeals below reached. its result by utilizing 2 ~ & : : . . ° -- pre-merger concepts: It noted that a derivative ‘aetion. under the. pre-unified sy “stein, would have had to be in- ‘stituted i in equity and an equity court would have decided the entire Gase without reference to a jury, Theretore, it held, no right to trial by jyry is ever presen{ in a stock- holder’s derivative..action, even though the underlying ‘corporate claim be iegal. t ‘This Court, however, rejected: just such a test in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U S. 500. (1959)... There plaintiff sought an injunction and defendant counterelaimed for treble damages. under the antitrust laws. The lower court held that the suit under the pre-merger system would: have been c¢ ognizable i in equity and therefore denied a jury ‘on the counterclaim. This court reversed, holding that, if legal claims were present, a jury was required; the blending ef legal and equitable claims; which formerly would have resulted in exclusively equity jurisdiction, does not now destroy the right to a jury trial of the legal i issues a Pear Since in the federal courts equity has always acted only when legal remedies were inadequate, the - expansion of adequate legal remedies:provided by the’ Declaratory Judgment Acti and the Federal Rules necessarily affects’ the scope of equity. Thus,’ the justification for equity’s deciding legal issues once it obtains jurisdiction, and refusing to dismiss a ease, merely because subseque thy a lowe tl remedy becomes avidlable, must be re-evaluated in thé heht of the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal-Rules which allow legal and equitable causes to a brought and resolved in one civil action.’’ (899 U. . at 509: foot- note references eliminated, ‘ In Dairy Queen, Ine. WwW sak peo U S. 469 (1962), this Court) emphatically saat ‘its holding in Beacon Theatres. In Dairy. Queen, the car alleged that the 7 o . defendant was infringing the plaintiff’s trademark*and had br eached a licensing agreement between the parties; it as an injunction and’ an accounting. These were all. raditionally, ‘‘equitable”’ ¢ lainis—just as the stoekholder’ s io ative action is traditionally ‘“equitable”’ . Nonetheless, this Court held that, since money recovery was ‘also sought, the right’ to jury trial is not destroyed. The C ourt stated: 7s \5s5 eee holding: in Beacon T heatres was that where hoth legal and equitable issues are presented in, a single case, ‘only ‘under the most impor ative cireum- stances, circumstances whiich-in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now an- ticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through-prior determination of equitable claimis.’ That holding, 6f course, applies whether the ‘trial judge chooses to characterize the legal issues pre- sented as ‘incidental’ to equitable issues or not. Con- - sequently, in a case such as this where there cannot ‘even: bea contention of such ‘imperative circum- stances,’ Beacon Theatres requires . that any legal ‘issues for which a trial by jury is timely and prop-- . .° erly demanded be submitted to a jury. There hei ing | no question of the timeliness or-corr ectness of the de- mand involved here, the sole question which we must decide is whether the action now pending before the District Court contains legal issues.’’ (369 U.S. at 472-73; footnote references eliminated.) — »° The Dairy Queen respondents attempted to qualify: the rule, by quantitative considerations. They contended that ~ the equitable iSsues outweighed the legal i issue, Which was it mere incident to the equitable ‘one. * Without disputing -the premise, this Court refused. to weaken the right to a jury tr ial by the disintegrating erosion of particul: ur exceptions. “ ih . ‘ “* f FO" aL! ahent. It. fornid “thal this cen in “ti ies an) behi lf Eat Re hea Zuhy apie 8 eee {Lhe corporation. a “elaim which i A: “fenetanient lly togal ~ apo ee "pl that equitable: Be yl, supp. 519), a7, The, { ‘ourt os Sate SA a a i \ppeals: ge’ ision makes no » findings 40. the! contiyity, . op eae arr The’ ( ‘ompfaint. See ks av money: HeCOV ery broker age Com. ,° ires eS & = . /, q Fe 2 Mog Reo ‘nrissions illegally’ “paid hy The Corporation. most. of ‘it of. Es ee i a ashigneyt ‘Brothyrs, vacich! dominated. the. orporation. In- ree , : Ais ANE Cory ‘Ation. paid ., brokerage | commissions |, of. f “ ee s Pee eri ang + Pr Of ‘this sty sHe2, 90.3 wats. paid to Lelia’ Dot ters to oe ac dS ppihilayhy, i, 1905, ilie c O} por ats paid br okerage commis: é ‘ we 5 i ‘ | sap ' Seer +YOUs 7 at S): BS,622,, of whieli : 44,080 awe ni to. Ive han eet 3 Bo gecey” “difothsis: ‘Similar. payne nits for L6G - we ro sft I, ieee “dan 3 NT “af : ws 1, G40, respectively ie. CS. as) ee The. det eudanis 3 inclade, sn ioe OR te ~gildigion to, the divcetors of. the Ro ae ation, the partners se; j . ‘ oe ees wa of Rehman Brotters a A Bt) a ee a a aie \ cary The: ainsi may be bvokh ajo follows ‘ 4 “3. wd i AY \ ‘ ° ‘ ele ed aaa Pat, Cope ts (hy wl ‘ails ‘to utilize the third tharket. In order to gen- ‘fe ORS Lee ate continissions for tlre mselvesy Lelimnanel Br others s caused oe % .. » “ +. es - . ‘ oa ee a5 the Corpor: ation: to. excel transactions in listed Sec urities. =," Y ay eek “" . ih Cees: . “on “Aue Xv ww! York “Stock “PMCHiitige. Tlrese- transactions . | tes ~ os a a r ; 2S, RE ee VE ‘ould. have Been exetnted inst? mad on the third market vat ne ee ‘\ Ve, tavoruble prices, “but: sich yecutions: would nol have: ot + resdl ten Gonnissions to. Lehrian- Brothers (A. 23). et sae i ae) of Nea beeen é ; ; . ek Mie ee Neh Cc ee OA RN FT oe ge! ie : , : a : 1. im ~. “a? - a. +: * ms Lay ; - - , ; ’ ae o) “ : ‘ ; ad : oe ine ‘4 ez t*: Wy 3 No injunctive or other extraordinary relief-is sought (A: 27). — ‘ That causes of action seeking money recovery such as breach of contract, conversion, gross negligence an Vidia- tion of statutory provisions are legal rather than equitable’ in nature. is beyond question. Professor Moore. states: * Actions which at common law ...are jury actions... are: _ suits for damages for nevligenee .. . for Violation of : stattHes .. otrover ‘to recover damages for conversion of personal property... and special assumpsit +- fo ia damages on ‘. simple contract.” (5 Moore's - Fed. Pr TS -115 -(1968), footnotes omitted). hh Dh Pi. fo, supra, the Conrt held-as follows: “One ground for the judgement, applicable to -all of the appellants, is gross: negligence, Another ae applicable to all appellants except Landoe, is breach of fiduciary duty. ‘*An action brought by the corporation to reéover damages against former officers or directors, ow ‘the ground of negligence would be cognizable in a‘suit at common law. Nelly v. Dolan, a-Cir., 255 FF. 685. Thus all appellants were denied a jury trial on an issue cognizable bya suit at conmmon law. Landoe was neée- essarily aggrieved by this denial sinee, as to him, this was the only basis of the judgment. * Me * * are . ‘Having im mind the necessity of scrutinizing, with utmost care, any seening curtailment of the right to a jury trial, we hold that where a claim of breach*of- fiduciar y duty is predicated upon underly ng conduct, such as negligence, which is actionable in a direet sult at common law, the issue of whether the Ve hay” been such a breach is, subject te appropr inte iustruc- tions, a jury question. We therefore conclude that, in the context of this case, the question concerning breach of fiduciary duty, as well as negligence, should have been submitted te the jury.’’..(323 F. 2d at . 836-37; footiuote references eliminated) In the De Pinto case, the claim involved the dive ‘vsiou of. corporate assets in the purchase of allegedly worthless stock. Groyinds for the judgment were gross negligence and breach of fiduciary.duty. In the instant case the amended compjaint asserts that assets of the Corporation have been diverted. The diversion is in the form. of brokerage com- - -uissions, Which are paid-to Lehman Brothers and other bro%Sers. As in DePinto, the diversion is caused by gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The present case seéks not only: to charge the, directpr~ of the Corp oration, but. also asks for recovery from the C orporationi’ s principal broker. In Siler v. Conver. B72 U.S. 221 (1963), this Court held that‘a case éwticiien the amount of fees which-a client was obligated to pay his lawyer, whom he charged with overreaching, raised legal _issnes creating a right ef jury trial. Clearly a controversy with a broker concerning the propriety of commissions paid to hini is also a leg: il cause: of. action. Schultz v. Manutac- turers & Traders Trust Co.. 128 F. 2d S889 (2 Cir. 1942), cert. den. 317 U.S. 674; Restatement of Agenéy. 2d, Sees. 399 et seq. — oss oo" 18: The. meré fact. that the defendapits are fiduciaries does not mean th: it the causes of action against them ,must be~ ‘equitable. Thus, as the Court ‘of Appeals, for the Third Cirenit heid in Kelly v, Dolan, 233 F. 635, 637. (3 Cir. 1916) ; ‘. . .. That the negligence of a director is an in- Jury to ie corporation, and that the right to recover. ‘for such’ negligence is a leg: il as contrasted wifli an: equitable righi, and: that the corporation is vested with the right-t6-recover for such injury. is .extal- lished by authority. In some cases this right is as- serted im equity; in-some at daw, according to cir- cumstances; but in whatever form it is litigated the right to recover for negligence is a legal right.”"| See tse, Talladay \. Verschoor, 381. ¥. 2d 100, 109 (8 Cir. 1967). . | | Nor does the possibility that the transactions: may be humerous require a ‘denial: of the Jury right. There is no reason to believe that the jury would not be equal to its role, The issues are cousider: ably sunpler than those involved ‘in antitrust litigation, patent suits and ‘a large \ variety of ‘rtilyeomptex tatters where juries are called upoii to'ex- - amine yumerous transactions. constituting the wrongs eom- plained of, There i is ho justification for ereding the right to al Jury trial here. The mainstreanr of ‘aad: politic: l and jurisprnden- ‘ial thought hi is not shared the doubts of Alexander Ilam- ilton as. to the competence of, juries, relied upon by respondents (Br. in Opp. to Pet. for Cert. ‘p. 7). Thus, in “Hamilton's view, that constitutional protection of jury trial -in civil cases was undesirable, did not prevail. On the contrary, in - TEsponse to errr ad demands from the various State ( ‘onstitutional .* Conventions, the first Congress adopted the Bill-of Rights containing the Sixth and Seyenth Amenédments, intended to save trial in iaatls erimifal and common law cases from legislative or judicial abridge- ment.” Galloway v. weet” States, 3I9 US. 372, se 398 (1943; - .* dissenting opinion). "19 | as oa e. Sioux City & Pacific BLR. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873), ‘the Court said: ; : “*. . . Twelve men of the average of the commu- nity, comprising men of education and men of tittle educat@n, mén of lear ning and men whose learning consists only in wliat they have themselves seen-and heard, the merchant, the mechanie, the farmer, the laborer ; ; these sit together, consult, apply their sep- arate expericnce of the offsixn of life to the facts / proven, and draw a; unanimodus conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great effort of-the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men 1 ne one man;.that they can draw wiser and safer conclu-- sions from admitted facts thus occurring, than can a single judge.”’ . ’ See also Travelers Insurance Co, vy. Selden, 78 Fed. 285, 287, (4 Cir, 1897) , Crane, Judge and Jury.15 A.B. A.J). 201, 202 (1929) ; Caldwell, Trial hy Judge and Jury. 33° Am. 1h. Rey. 321,-329-38 . (1899) : Tongue, Jn Defense of Juries As Exelusive Judges of the Facts, 35 Ore. L. Rev. 143, 161-66 (1956). ‘What is sought byway, of relief here i is a judgment for a sum of money. As this Court held in Dairy Queen, supra, thix is the iApidiaiive factor: No extraordinary relief for which courts of law are adequate is required, notwith- standing the fact that. the prayer uses the word account. ‘The respondents’ conténtion that, this money a claim is ‘purely equitable’ is hased. primarily upon the fact that their complaint is cast in terms of an reine’ rather than.in terms of an action for. ‘debt’ or ‘damages.’ But the constitutional right to trial wy jiry caimot he “made to depend upon the . know more of the common affairs of life than does . bo 20. choice of Words used in the pleadings. The necessary ‘prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an. equitable accounting, like atl other equitable reme- dies, is, as we, pointed ott; in Beacon Theatres, the | absence of an adequate remedy aut law. Consequent- Jy, in order to maintain such a suit on a cause of action cognizable at law, as this one is, the plaintiff _ must be able to show that the ‘accounts between Sa parties’ gre of such a ‘complicated nature’ that ‘only * a court a equity can satisfactorily unravel thenn In view of the powers given-to District Courts by Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) to appoint-masters _to assist the jury in those exceptional cases ‘where _the legal issues are too eoniplicated forthe jury ade- quately to handle alone, the- burden of such a. shéw- ing is considerably increased and it will indeed be a vare case in which it can be met. But be that.as it may, this is certainly not such a®*case., .\ jury,/under proper instructions from the court, could readily de- termine the recovery, if any, to be-had here, whether | the theory finally settled upon is that of breach of contract, that of trademark infringement, or any combination of the two. The ‘legal remedy cannot be- characterized -as inadequate merely because the measure of damages may necessitate a look into pe- - tioner’s. business records.’’? (Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477- 79; footnote references © eliminated) . : Fics also, Swofford vy. B gi, Tne., 336 F.2d 406. 410- 11 (5 Cir. 1964), cert. den. 379 U.S..962. " 21 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court * of Appeals for the Second Circuit should be reversed. Respectfully submitted, Wituiam E. Haupex Attorney for Petitioners 295 Madison Avenue ‘New ¥ork, N. Y. 10017 Of Counsel _ ABRAHAM L. PoMERANTz Ricuarp M. Meyer ~ Pomerantz Levy Haupex & ne K 295 Madison Avenue ~ New York, N. Y. 10017 -Rosextuat & GurKIN - 19 West 44th Street “New York, N. Y. 10036 > IN THE JOHN F. DAB, ERK Pen Cnuri of the United fates . OCTOBER. TERM, mp )7¢ os pity © . | vn No. wath “AP. | - Ha, ARD ROSS and B [2 RN ARD ROSS: ax Trustees for ; a LENA ROSENBAUM, ~ ROBERT A Petitioners against— / BERNHARD; et ai.. ON, WRIT OF Cr! ' Respondents. ‘ TION AKI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF- APPEALS’ ron THE SECOND CIRCUIT a « : , —, | . = . Be - : a . B RIEF FOR RESPONDENTS .Manrvrs Scuwarrz ; Roger I . ; » Watpman ~ SuLLIvAY & CRroMWELI , {fhorucys hor Respondents Clark. ft al.. 48 Wall Street New #¥ork, N.Y MayNine. Siupsox Tracner & Barrett. Attorneys for Re sponde nts Be ruhard. ct al.. 120 Broadway Wissas "10005. P 8 | New York. N.Y. 10005 E. Rocer Frise iH, ‘ | Warsu & Friscu. Aftorue ux tor Re wad ni 7 The Lehinan Corporation, “4 250 Park Avenue June 6, 1969 New YorkN. Y. 10017 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386413_0099%3A04. Public record. Not legal advice.