# Appendix — Edwards v. Pacific Fruit Express Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1968
- **Citation:** 390 U.S. 538

## Text

a COURT, ua Z a. | FiLED
NOV 24 1957_

aon —— \ "JOHN F..DAVIS, CLERK}

e

-

te Supreme Court of the United States
ee _ OCTOBER TERM, 1967

_ No. 465

'. ELISHA EDWARDS,

3 PETITIONER
3s a Se
\PACIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COMPANY |

>

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT-OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

. ; : -

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED-AUGUST 7, 1967
CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 23, 1967

Oi ee ee ee ee en

ey T.-C i . . ee

-.

itil Sabemanaites wii

APPENDIX

Supreme “Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1967

se yt . ‘
« \

No. 465
‘ pe

Eee

os

‘ELISHA EDWARDS,
PETITIONER

_—-- PACIFIC FRUIT. EXPRESS COMPANY
~ en

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT -

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED AUGUST 7, 1967 .
* CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 23, 1967 . %

\

> a
rai
é
INDEX

os i te teat Te? Page
Commplladet Bek TRMANNE a oi n cs ae decie we cecbeccsuqnnece aa te
Answer to Complaint Pes ccs iahdinveatabecesen

Notice. of Motion and Motion for Summary J udgment in
Favor of Defendant... .ccrsscssccccecseteccccocces 8

Memorandum of ‘Points and Authorities in Support of Mo-
tion for. Summary Judgment ..............+.. gh vesees 9
Affidavit of W. G. Granmer........-. tescsccenceecssccgees 18

Memorandum oe Points and - Authorities in. Opposition to :

- Defendant’s ‘Motion for Summary Judgment sete eseeeees » 23
Declaration of Jack H. Werchick ............ eeeee gecepepe 35
‘ Declaration of Leland P. Jarnagin eawwe eer jesecgooes a ae
“Now—PFE Goes Piggyback” ..... eon inns kavemaetn aa
“Pacific Fruit Express Company” .............. Pe ee
Summary Judgment for Defendant ..... A A Me aedewas 51

Opinion of the United States enn of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Per Curiam ..............2.0000 Savcst gece 53

>
#
< Xo

a

District Court of thé United States for the
' Southern Division of tke Northern _
District of California

No. 44,413

Elisha Edwards, 5 )
E ei ‘ Plaintiff,

ee 5
Pacific Fruit Express Company, a
Utah Corporation, »

; ©
iy errant , prt

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

. < - FELA) |

‘Plaintiff “complains of defendant and rors cause of |

_ action alleges: .

3 I ;

That at all times herein referred to, the defendant —
PACIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COMPANY was and
still is a corporation incorporated under and existing
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah and was,

er

\ ‘and still is, a common earrier by Railroad within the

meaning of Title 45 USC 51 engaged ‘in interstate —
commeree between the several states.

as z IT i . : :
That, on dr about the 9th day of Noveniber, 1963,

the plaintiff herein was an employee of said PA-

CIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COMPANY engaged in

- Work in furtherance..of defendant's railroad opera-
_, tions in inhexttate commerce.

| i |
| That on or about ‘the 9th day of November, 1963,

_ plaintiff was operating a certain motor vehicle on

the premises of the defendant in the City of Rose-
- ville, County of Placer, California. That. plaintiff was
‘ Operating said moter vehicle at the direction of said
defendant in the course and scope of his employment.
That said motor vehicle was owned and maintained
_by said defendant and was furnished by said defend- _
ant for the use of the plaintiff in the coursé of
plaintiff’s employment with defendant. That said
motor vehicle was so poorly and negligently main-_—
tained by .said defendant that it was in an unsafe
and dangerous. condition at the, time and place men-
tioned above. That as a proximate result of said poor

and negligent tnaintenance, the. said vehicle failed ©

in its normal use and plaintiff was precipitated vio-
lently to the ground, covered with burning gasoline,
causing the injuries . and cme? hereinafter de-
i. scribed.

. IV . ;
That at all times herein mentioned, defendant failed
to provide plaintiff with a safe place to work and

—

- 3 >”

failed to wind plaintiff with safe appliances with

. which to work. That said failure to provide.a safe
place to work and safe appliances with which to work ~

proximately caused the i injuries described: héreinafter.
Vv.

That defendant’ was negligent in ray care, operation
and maintenance of its yards, facilities, tracks, ve-
hicles, equipment, appliances and properties at ‘its.
location .in said City of Roseville. That defendant
failed adequately to oversee, manage, eontrol ‘and .
supervise the job which plaintiff was assigned. and
engaged in doing. That defendant failed to furnish
sufficient, adequate and proper equipment for the per-
formance of the job to which.plaintiff was assigned.
These acts and omissions all proximately contributed
to the injuries which plaintiff was: caused to suffer.

VI

As a proximate result of. the acts and omissions
complained of hereinbefore, the plaintiff was hurt and
injured in his health, strength and activity, sustain- |
ing injury to his body and shock and injury to his
nervous system and person, all of which said i injuries
- have caused and ‘continued to cause plaintiff great
mental, physical and nervous pain and suffering.
‘Plaintiff also is informed and. believes that said in-
juries: will result in permanent disability and dis-
figurement as well as pain and suffering in the fu-
-ture, all to his damage in the sum of ONE MILLION
~ DOLLARS aed aittate

i alas. clad a Sana aan at ae Ce AISLE Shale ae pee RL aEY Al Nie Sass ann ih Ni at ow tse REI Bia NEG BL BRINN RESIN 0S

Sc Abt ag ie IAS eh he abot aatiesh A th Magi, rato
a
ad *

ae te

[Title of Court and Cause]

.

VII

a

That by reason of said injuries, sustained as afore- |

said, it was necessary for plaintiff to engage the serv-

_ ices of physicians, surgeons and hospitals; that plain-

tiff does not now know the reasonable value of said

. services to be obtained or to be reasonably — |

in . the future.
" WIITI
As a further proximate result of said negligence

of the defendant, plaintiff was prevented from attend-
ing to his usual occupation, and plaintiff is informed

and believes that he will thereby be prevented: from —

attending to said usual ——. for an indefinite

period . in the future. .

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment for spe-

cial damages according to proof and. for general
. damages in the sum of ONE MILLION DOLLARS

($1,000,000.00) and for the cost of this suit and such
other relief as the court shall deem proper. .

Jack H. Werchick
~~ for Pisintiff.

_ AN SWER TO COMPLAIN T
Comes now defendant Pacific Fruit Express Com-

pany, a corporation, and in answer to the complaint

herein, admits, denies, alleges, and avers as follows:

| i.
“Answering paragraph I of plaintiff's Complaint,

defendant Pacific Fruit Express Company admits

ee
that at all times herein referred to, the defendant
Pacific Fruit Express Company was and still is a |

~ corporation incorporated under and existing’ pursuant
to the laws of the State of Utah.

IL. ;

Answering paragraph II of plaintiff's complaint,

defendant admits that on or about the 9th day of.
November, 1963, the' plaintiff herein was an employee
of said Pacific Fruit Express Company. ne

Answering paragraph VII of plaintiff’s Complaint,
defendant admits the allegations therein contained.
IV. |

‘Tienes génerally ot specifically each and every .
_ allegation ‘contained in plaintiff’s Complaint not ex-

- _pressly admitted to be and, without limiting the fore-

going, this defendant denies that it was guilty of any *
negligence, either as alleged in plaintiff’s Complaint,
or otherwise, or at all, and further, without limiting
the foregoing, denies plaintiff was damaged in the

sum alleged in the Complaint, or in my other amount,
| or at all.

For A Second, Separate, and Distinct duende
and Affirmative Defense, This Defendant
_ Alleges That:
- The plaintiff Elisha Edwards did not exercise ordi-
nary ‘care, caution or prudence in the premises to
avoid "said accident and for his own saféty and the

i ii ik Mel Sil ite, :
. .

; ’ . ti . 6

‘accident and resultant injuries, if any, sustained by

said plaintiff, were proximately contributed to and
caused by the failure of .said plaintiff to exercise
ordinary care, caution or prudence in the premises _
to avoid said accident and for his own safety in the —

premises.

For A Third, Separate, and Distinct. Answer
and Affirmative Defense, This: ‘Defendant
Alleges “That:

The Complaint fails to state a pee, against ae-
fendant upon _—. relief can be granted.

“For A | cesta and Distinct Answet
and Affirmative Defense, This Defendant
Alleges That:

The Court lacks acme over the subject matter :
of the action.

- For A Fifth, iiasiiies and Distinet Answer
_and Affirmative Defense, This Defendant.
: oe Alleges That:

The right of action set forth in the Complaint did
not accrue within one year before the commencement

of this action.

For A Sixth; teens, and Distinct Rieti
and Affirmative Defense, This Defendant
Alleges That:

Defendant is an employer within the provisions of |
Sections 3201 et seq. of the Labor Code of the State
of California, and plaintiff’s sole and exclusive

7

remedy is under said provisions and before the In- |
dustrial Accident Commission of the State of Cali- -

fornia. Pursuant to said laws. defendant has paid the
sum of $6,436.10 in temporary disability benefits and
has furnished medical care and hospitalization.

- For A Seventh, Separate, and Distinct Answer
and ,Affirmative Defense, This Defendant .
Alleges That:

There is pending in the Superior Court 3 in and for
the City and County of San Francisco bearing: action _

~ No. 548977, filed November 6, 1964, another action for, .

, personal injuries based on the same events set forth —

in plaintiff's Complaint. . +"

Wherefore, defendant Pacific Fruit: Express ene
pany prays judgment. that plaintiff’ Elisha Edwards

take nothing by his Complaint, but ‘that defendant -

have. judgment for its costs of suit against said plain-
tiff and for such other relief as may be by the Court
deemed: proper.
Dated: January 7, oy
~ Corrigan and Roy
‘/s/ Donald Roy
Attorney for. Defendant
Pacific Fruit Express Company

‘

ni Rpesestiieccte oe wae

FL a OO nT I eT

[Title of Court ond tiie ;
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
* SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR

re OF DEFENDANT |

Please Take Notice. that on Monday, the 7th day. -

of February, 1966, at 10:00 A.M., or.as soon there- __.

after as counsel can be heard, my the courtroori of
the Court hearing the Law and Motion calendar, at

the United States District Court House, 450 Golden ;

Gate Avenue, San Francisco, the defendant Pacific

Fruit Express Company will move the vourt as if

follows:
For an order ey ‘the complaint dk for -

_.entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant
- and against, plairitiff as prayed in the answer on file: —

- This motion is based on this notice, the pleadings,

‘records, and files herein; on. the affidavit of W. G.
Cranmer, attached hereto as - -Exhibit B, the state-
- ment of reasons and memorandum of points ‘and °

authorities in support of this motion, and the ‘pro-
posed summary judgment filed herewith.
Dated: J Tt 19, 1966.
’ Corrigan and Roy
/s/ Donald Roy '
ee: Attorney for Defendant
Pacific Fruit Express Company

[Title of Court and Cause] 2,
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHOR. .
ITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR.

peat Se ~ SUMMARY JUDGMENT

i
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This’ motion for summary, judgment by defendant
Pacific Fruit Express Company hereafter called PFE, —
is taken on the ground that PFE is not a common
carrier by railroad under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 51 et seq. Accord- -

ing to the allegations of paragraph II of the Com- ©
_ plaint and the Affidavit ef W- G. Cranmer, pages, 4

and 5, at all times pertinent hereto plaintiff was em- .
- ployed by PFE as an iceman. Plaintiff's Complaint
sounds under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.

IT
PFE IS NOT A COMMON CARRIER
The courts have been unanimous in holding that —
refrigerator car companies are not common carriers
by railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act, and three of these cases have so held as to sisi ©
Fruit: Express Company. _ iy
A recent authority is Aguirre v. Cathe Pacific
Company, et al., 232. ACA 777 (March 1965). That
ease dealt with precisely the same problem and the
same defendant. Judge Sheehy of the Superior Court
for the County of Sacramento. granted a summary

a

judgment and the matter was appealed to the Dis-

trict Court of Appeal which affirmed. A hearing has _

not been granted in: the California Supreme Court.

The District Court of Appeal held that since PFE |

does not operate as a common carrier by rail its em- —
ployees do ‘not come under the Federal Employers’

‘s Liability Agt. The court further held that ownership

of PFE by Southern Pacific and Union Pacific does
not make PFE employes. the employees of the rail-
roads. Further, the mere fact; an. employee of a _re-
frigerator company works on or near railroad cars

does’ not convert his. employer to a railroad ora rail-
road to his employer. Aguirre is in point and+a copy - ~

of the District Court of Appeal opinion is ‘attached

vs hereto as Exhibit wa

‘In Gaulden v. Southern Pacific: Company, 78 B.
Supp. 651 (N-D. Calif. 1948), aff’d 174 F.2d 1022

i (9th Cir. 1949); Judge Goodman held adversely to-the
_ plaintiff who raised the same contentions as are made
by plaintiff in. the instant. case. Gaulden was em-

ployed as an iceman in the icing yard and plant

“owned and operated by PFE at Bakersfield, ,Cali-
fornia. He was injured while aiding in the moving

of an empty ear from a loading platform. The Court’s
— states:

. Pacifie Fruit Express Gunpeny neither
moves 8 nor eontrols-the movement. of ‘reefers’ to
aad from or beyond its icing docks and plants.

Such movements are handled by rail common’ .

-earriers, principally Southern Pacific Company
or Union Pacific Railroad Company. This was

¥e-.

t oe Ge

- true in the case of the cars being unloaded when
_ plaintiff was injured. Pacifie Fruit Express Com-’
pany possesses no rail motive power, except one
plant locomotive used for shop switching purposes.
The only railroad tracks owned by Pacific Fruit
- Express Company are shop tracks and unloading
tracks. The former are used: only in the opera-
tion of its car shops. The latter are used only
for deliveries of ice to: Pacific Fruit Express
Company for. use in its icing service. The only
movement of reefers by Pacific Fruit Express
* Company are at its own shops and plants, on-
and along these tracks. These movements are
incidental to the repair and rebuilding of reefers —
in the Pacific Fruit Express Company shops and
, the servicing of reefers at the Pacific Fruit Ex-

press Company ice plants.” (pp. 653-54) ~

In holding that PFE is not a common carrier by
railroad. hence not within the Federal Employers’ Li-
ability Act, the court said:

‘“‘Plaintiff contends that the Pacific Fruit Ex-
press Company is.a common carrier by railroad
and hence within the reach of the Fedéral Em-
. ployers’ Liability Act. The Court holds to the
contrary. The act itself subjects freight common
- earriers by railroad, while engaging in commerce
between any of the several states or territories,
to liability in damages to any person suffering
injury while employed by such carrier in such .-
-eommerce. 45 U.S.C.A. §51. There does not seem .
to bie any doubt at all that the business of renting
refrigerator cars to, railroads or shippers and
providing protective service in the transportation
of perishable commodities is not of itself that of

ms. Teo ee salts vt ewe wie “ ttl, meat ee ee ee _ . Seu ud Pe

| Ales: noe a ae

j | a common carrier by railroad. Ellis v. Interstate
» «+ Commerce Commissioner, 237 U.S, 434, 35 S.Ct.
646, 59 L.Ed: 1036; United States v. Fruit Grow-

ers, Express Co., 279 U.S. 363, 49 S.Ct. 374,. 73
_ L.Ed. 739; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S..

175, 41 S.Ct. 93, 65 L.Ed. 205; United States ex’

rel. Chicago Refrigerator Company v. Interstate
Commerce Com., 265 U.S. 292, 44 S.Ct. 558, 68
: L.Ed. 1024; Reynolds Vv. Addizon Miller Co., 143
/: . Wash. 271, 255 P. 110.

| oo “The Federal Employers’ Liability Act 7,
| amended: in 1939. At that time, despite earlier

: ' decisions, some of which have been cited, no ef-
; ; fort was made to include refrigerator companies
..° _. within its terms. Congressional inactivity in that
7 regard must be given its usual implication, i.e ac-
quiescence in the judicial rulings. Federal legis-
lation concerning the social security of employees
employed in Interstate Commerce specially in-
cluded employees of Refrigerator Companies —
within the meaning of the term carrier, thus indi- |
eating Congressional awareness of the actualities.
Thus the terms of the statute, plus thé judicial
interpretations of its meaning and the obvious
_knowledge of the Congress over a long period of
time as to such judicial pronouncements, make
it abundantly clear that Pacific Fruit Express
Company itself is not a common carrier by rail
and not.subject to the —— of the Act. me
' (pp. 65455) © Pedage

The Supreme Court. of Utah has also held that PFE —
is not a-common carrier by railroad. In Moleton v.
Union Pac. R. B., 219 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1950), cert.

ney
fe

7B on

4

~ dented, 340 U. sg. “932, a judgment of not suit dis
‘missihg plaintiff’s action under the Federal Employ- —

ers’ Liability Act was affirmed. Plaintiff was an ice

_man employed‘ to descend into bunkers on refriger-
ator cars to regulate heaters which generate carbon ‘

monoxide gas. He was injured while performing this

_ duty in the Union Pacific yards at Laramie, Wyo-

ming. As in Gaulden, supra, the court ‘held that the
supply of refrigerator ¢ars and’ protective services

| _ to railroads by PFE was not, enough to make it a

common carrier by railroad. °

_ An unbroken line of United States Sapocnts Court
decisions has conclusively settled that refrigerator car

companies or .companies supplying protective serv-

ices to railroads, whether railroad owned or not, are

- not commen carriers by railroad for any purpose,

whether under, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
or under the Interstate-‘Commerce Act. Thus, in Ellis
v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 237 U. S. 434 (1914), —
it was held that Armour Car Lines, which owned re-
frigerator cars and rented’ them to railroads, and
operated icing stations on lines. of various railroads,
was hot a common carrier. At pages +45-44, the court
said: |
“Tt has no control over motive power or over

-,. the movement of - the cars ‘that it furnishes as’

- above; and in short, notwithstanding some argu-.

" ment to the contrary, is not a common carrier /
subject to the act. It is true that the definition

of transportation is §1 of the act includes such °
instrumentalities as the Armour Caf Lines lets

MA S.A Me OE ey. 2 en oe
’

ae COAT AA OA Foo ;

14

-' to the railroads. But the definition is a prelim-
inary to a requirement that the carriers shall
. furnish them upon reasonable request, not that
_ the owners and builders shall be regarded as éar-
’ riers, contrary to the truth.: The control of the

Commission over private cars, &¢., is to be ef- .

a | 7 by its control -over the railroads that are

t to the act.”
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 (1920),

>

held that an employee. of a common earrier by express

who was injured in ‘the derailment of an express car

‘in which he was working, which was part of a rail-
‘road passenger train, was not entitled to recover

under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. It was
held that the express company was not a common

‘carrier by railroad. The remarks of the court on eae
‘187 are particularly significant:

“*Tn our opinion the words ‘common carrier by

) ~ yailroad,’ as uséd in the act, mean one who op-

_ erates a railroad as a means of carrying for the
public,—that is to say, a railroad company acting
as a common carrier. This view not only is in

- accord with the ordinary acceptation of the words,
__*» but is enforced by the mention of. cars, engines,
* - track, roadbed and other property pertaining to
' a going railroad (see Southern ‘Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 212-213); by the obvious
reference in the latter part of ##3 and 4 to
statutes requiring engines and cars to be equip-—

_ ped with automatic couplers, standard drawhars
and other. appliances intended to promote the
safety ‘of railroad employees (see San ‘Antonio

& Aransas-Pass Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U. S. 476,

— Dis Ota See es

15

484); by the use of similar words in closely re-
lated acts which apply only to carriers operating —
railroads, ¢. 196, 27 Stat. 531; ¢. 225,.35 Stat. 476;

_ ¢. 208, 36 Stat. 350, and by the fact’ that similar
words in the original Interstate Commerce Act
had been construed as including carriers operat-
ing ‘railroads but not express companies doing
business fas, here shown. 1 I.0.C. 349; ‘United
States v. Morsman, 42 Fed. Rep. 448; Southern —
Indiana Express Co. v. United States Express.
Co., 88 Fed. Rep. 659, 662; s.c. 92 Fed. Rep. 1022.
And see American Express Co. v. United States,
212 U. S. 522, 531, 534...

‘‘As Taylor was not an employee of the railroad
company and the express company was not with-
in the Employers’ Liability Act, it follows that
the act has no‘ bearing on the hability of either
company or on theyvalidity of the ‘messenger’s _
agreement.” — ‘ Seether PERL

Fruit Growers Express Company, which is owned .
_by'a number of railroads, is engaged in the same type’.
of business as PFE, the renting of-refrigerator cars

to railroads and ‘the Qetrming of protective serv-
ices ta perishable freight. United States v. The Fruit
‘Growers Express Co., 279 U. 8. 363. (1929), held
that Fruit Growers Express was not a common e¢ar-
rier by railroad under the Interstate Commerce Act.

_ The most recent holdind\in this field reaffirms that
result as to Fruit Growers’ Express Co. and reaffirms
_ the holding of this court in Gaulden v. Southern Pac.
Co., op cit. In Hetman v. Fruit Growers Express Co.,
346 F.2d 947, the Court of Appeals for the Third’

LM LEE IBID ICDS is wile e NOR
%e

16

Circuit considered the contention that the defendant
was a common carrier by railroad within the mean-

ing of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The
Court rejected the contention in the following, lan-
(1) Weare of the opinion that the District Court

correctly held that the defendant is not a ‘‘com-

mon carrier by railroad” within the “ne of

the Act,

_ We need go no further. than to cite Goulden
. v. Southern Pac: Co., 78 F.Supp. 651 (N.- D. Cal.

1948), aff’d per cur. 174 F.2d 1022 (9 Cir. 1949);

where it was held that the Pacific Fruit Express
- Company, which conducted ‘a business similar in

all critical aspects.to that of the defendgnt, here, |

and which was also wholly owned by railroads,
- was not a ‘‘common carrier by railroad” within

-- the meaning of the Act. It would serve no useful
~ purpose to here restate what was so well said
in Gaulden in its analysis and ‘application of the .

~ Act or to make repetitious reference to the cases
therein cited in support of the court’s holding.

Bes 1h SNe Sn

ICING OF RAILROAD CARS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE EMPLOYMENT BY
_ A COMMON CARRIER -

It is. clear. that plaintiff was employed by PFE |
which is not a common carrier by railroad. More- ©

over, it is settled that service on or around railroad

i. equipment, including icing of refrigerator cars, does
not constitute employment by a. common ¢arrier by

railroad. It is not the. equipment which plaintiff is

7 servicing or working about that is critical; for a rail-

road relationship to exist a railroad must have the

_ power to control and’ direct plaintiff’s : services.
Aguirre v. Southern Pacific Company, supra; Gaulden
uv. Southern Pacific Co., supra; Moleton v. U nion Pac.

Rk. R., supra; Wells Fargo and Co. v. Taylor, supra.
The plaintiff here was subject to the direction and

control of the PFE. Under these circumstances plain- ©

tiff was working exclusively for PFE, an independent

contractor, and not in any sense for the. railroads.

Dated: January 20, 1966.

Corrigan and Roy
/s/ Donald Roy ea
Attorney for Defendant
Pacific Fruit Express Co.

[The opinion of the California District Court of .

Appeal in Aguirre v. Southern Pacifie Co., 232 Cal.

» App. 2d 636, 43 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1964), is omitted,] _

—

Ss i bidet wat $2
7

State of California

ay and County of San Frarcisco—ss.

Affidavit of W. G. Cranmer
W: G. Cranmer, being first duly sworn, deposes

_ and says:

I am Ansistantt to the Vice President and General.
Manager of Pacific Fruit Express Company. Pacific
Fruit Express Company (hereinafter referred to as —
‘‘PFE”) was incorporated in Utah in 1906. Its stock-
holders at that time, and now, are Union Pacific Rail-
road: Company and Southern Pacific Company, each
of - which owns: 120,000 shares of its common stock.
PFE owns ‘and maintains a fleet of refrigerator cars
and refrigerated trailers specially designed to hold
perishable commodities, such as fruits and. vegetables,

~ and rents them to practically all railroads in the
‘ United States, Canada and Mexico. PFE also fur-. ~—
- nishes protective services against heat or cold to com-

modities carried: in said cars or trailers, by the use
of ice or mechanical refrigeration for cooling, or port-

~ able alcohol heaters, for mechanical means for heat-

ing. PFE, as of December 31, 1965, owned and leased

- 20,852 refrigerator cars and 2039 trailers. It has ap-
proximately 3,700 employees. PFE has formal written .

contracts to render protective services to a number of |
railroads, including Western Pacific Railroad. Com-
pany; Chicago and North Western Railway Company;
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad
Company; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rail-
road; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Com-
pany; Norfolk-& Western Railway Company, Chicago °

19

Great. Western Railway ;. Illinois Central- Railroad;
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company; Southern
‘Pacific Company, and Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany. By virtue of other contractual arrangements,
_ PFE supplies refrigerator cars to any railroad i in the

United States desiring to use them, and any railroad |
using a refrigerator car currently pays PFE a rental
varying from 4.5 to 5. 25 cents per mile for each mile
the railroad may move the PFE car.

PFE does not directly or indirectly serve the ship-_
Ping public as a common. carrier by railroad: It is a
supplier of services and vehicles to railroads, and _
does not hold itself out to render transportation serv-
_ lee as a common éarrier by railroad. PFE also has.
- contracts with approximately fifty railroads covering
the leasing of trailers. It. is currently negotiating
similar contracts with the other railroads in the
United States, Canada and Mexico.

. . None of the properties or facilities \pagihied by
PFE subsequent to its organization in 1906 were
turned over to it or acquired. from Southern Pacific
' Gompany or Union Pacific Railroad, but. were ‘ac-
quired or constructed by PFE with its own funds.
Prior to the organization of PFE in 1906, Southern
Pacifie Company and Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany did not furnish refrigeration services directly,
- but contracted for these services with private” con-
certis.

PFE does we issue bills of Naan nor does it
publish ‘tariffs as a common garrier by railroad. |

Me ‘Tariffs ataaning rates for the movements of perish-

AY eer ep!

Aedes as ci cata OA eect ow
!

e
rr y Bos * ™
AG ES i hit Set Maat
s .
*
‘

1 ats alls alae:

ike bahia ani Rosedale Mwe Saemabhtes — i

ee are published by railroads, and PFE is not a

| party to such tariffs. PFE does not report to the

California Public Utilities Commission, nor to any
other state utilities commission. PFE files financial

data with the Interstate Commerce Cominission, and 3

the Commission’s authority is limited to the receipt
of such data and the prescribing of the form of ac-
counts. The Interstate Commerce Commission does
not exercise any jurisdiction over PFE as a carrier.

PFE operates its business entirely with its own
personnel and none of its employees are joint em-
ployees with either Southern Pacific Company or
Union. Pacifie Railroad Company, or both. None of

the directors of PFE are directors of Southern Pa-

cific Company or Union Pacific Railroad Company.

PFE operations are supervised by Mr. L. D. Schley,

its Vice President and General Manager, whose office

is at 116 New Montgomery Street, San Francisco,.
California. Neither Southern Pacific nor Union Pa- -
_ eifie owns or has any interest in this building, and ~
_ >. their San Francisco offices are at different addresses.
PFE has its own car service, traffic, mechanical and

engineering, purchasing and stores, and accounting

- departments which are completely separate from and _
independent of Southern Pacific and Union Pacific.

The Vice President and General Manager of PFE
reports to the President of PFE and to its Board

of Directors. PFE has its own bank accounts in San

Francisco; New York City, and Montreal, Canada.
‘Its principal-bank account is in the. Crocker-Citizens
‘National Bank, and its average balance is in excess

21

of a million dollars. All PFE expenses are paid from
‘said bank accounts and its income from car rentals
and’ protective service activities is deposited in said
accounts. The Board of Directors of PFE holds reg-.
_ ular meetings. in New York City. PFE’s net income
for 1964 was approximately $5,000,000.00. As of the
end of November 1964 the net assets of PFE were
approximately $120,000,000.00. (1965 figures are not
yet available.) = he a

PFE’s main generat-shops and the ice plant where
Elisha Edwards worked are located at Roseville, Cali-
_ fornia, on property owned and leased by PFE. The -
_ Shops occupy an area about one and one-half square
miles and the ice Want oceupies an additional area
. about two hundred feet wide by one and one-eighth
. miles in length. The accident alleged to have occurred
_ to plaintiff herein occurred on the ice plant premises,
on a roadway running between icing docks,. All of’

_. PFE’s work and services at Roseville are supervised

and controlled by its own officers and employees; and
“none of such work and services are subject to the -
supervision and control of any officer or employee of
_ Southern Pacific Company or Union Pacific Railroad
Company. ; Pe:

PFE has no rail motive power, except two shop.
' switch engines used exclusively for shop switching
purposes entirely within its own facilities at Rose-
ville, California and Tucson, Arizona. The only rail-

_- Toad tracks owned by PFE are shop. tracks and load-

ing tracks. The former are used only in the operation.
_ of its car shops. The latter are used only for deliver-

° ; a:
_¢ : . » Se

ies of ice to PFE, which ice is made by PFE and |

used to furnish protective service. The only movement
of cars by: PFE is at its own shops. -These move-
ments are incidental to the repair of cars in PFE
shops and to the furnishing of protective services.

When PFE cars need repairs at Roseville, they are
switched to the PFE repair tracks by. a Southern

Pacific locomotive and PFE pays Southern Pacific

. for this service. A similar payment is made to Union -

Pacific in Union Pacific territory. |

Pacific Fruit ‘Express Company officers negotiate
and: execute agreetnents : ‘with labor organizations Tep-
resenting PFE employees. °

On November 9, 1963, Elisha Edwards’ was em-
ployed by PFE as an iceman. An iceman’s duties are.
comprised chiefly of moving ice from one location
to another, operating conveyors, and chains, install-_
ing and removing portable heaters, loading and. un-
loading ice in bodies of cars, reffieling mechanical |

‘ears, and’ other miscellaneous protective service work.

All of Mr. Edwards’ supervision was from PFE per-
sonnel. On the date of November 9, 1963, and: for
some time prior thereto, Mr. Edwards. was employed
only by PFE and not the Southern Pacific Company
or the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Iceman’s
duties are-done solely by PFE employees and there
are no employees of Southern Pacific Company or
Union Pacific Railroad Company engaged in per-—

' forming-such sérvices for PFE at Roseville.

The PFE has been subject to the Workmen’s Com-

_ pensation Laws of the State of California since their

ak en Se eee ee Diaries

- enactment. Pursuant to those laws, the plaintiff has -

been paid by PFE $6,436.10 in Temporary Compen-
sati®n and has-been furnished medical care and hos-
pitalization, ee ue . ;

Dated: this 20th day of January, 1966.

| gis /s/ W. G. Cranmer

o\

[Title of Court and Cause] iM sag
_ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS oe

AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION

TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION”
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

_ Defendant relies most heayily upon Wells Fargo v.
Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920). Plaintiff Taylor was an
employee of Wells Fargo Company and was assigned

_ to ride thé express car while the car was being towed .

by a railroad compahy. The Court narrowly con-

‘strued the F,E.L.A. such that-the statutory language *
“common carrier by railroad” was held to mean “one
’ who operates a railroad as a means of carrying for
the public,—that is to say, a railroad company acting.
aS a common earrier.” The unfriendliness of the
_ Court to the Act is revealed by the balance of the —

opinion. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking for the
Court, held that it would be “inequitable” were the
employee to recover for negligently inflicted injuries

. (there was no question of workmen’s compensation

here) against the railroad or the express company,

since Taylor had been required to sign a contract in |

2

i lbh SNe taint ast gh
.
2

SARRNNR eee cs .
4 whettatninch L dt

which he “assumed the risk” of his ‘employment and |.
agreed to hold/ both his employer and. thé railroad.
harmless from liability for their own negligence. The
Court felt that it would deprive the employee. of his
freedom,of contract to allow him to maintain a com-

‘mon law action for negligence and it held that he was

not under the protection of the as aaa: Sata of
risk clause of the Act.

The ¥ederal Employer Liability Act, 45 US. ©. 51,
was enacted in 1908, 35 Stat. 65, after a prior act had

- been declared unconstitutional (Act of 1906, 34 Stat.

232.). The subsequent act was H.R. 20310, 60th Con-
gress and was reported out of the House Judiciary:
Committee in H.R. Report*1386 (a copy of which is
appended). On page six of that report, the committee

discusses the purpose of section 5 of the Act. “Sec-

tion.5 renders void any ‘contract or rule whereby a

common cafrier. seeks to’ exempt itself from liability

created by this act.” Later in the discussion at the
bottom of page 6a hypothetical example of the pro-
vision that the section seeks to void is set out.
American Express Company is chosen as the sub-
ject. of the example and it is perfectly clear that
Congress ‘intended such companies to be covered

under the Act. In the Wells Fargo case the Court. .
- was dealing with exactly the same type of company
‘and yet the Court failed to consider the clear legisla-

tive intent expressed in H.R. Report 1386 (60th-Con-

- gress). Perhaps the Court did not have the text of

the.report before it when it made the decision, but in

view of the history of that period it is. more likely

Nt CR ty hb beth by hut lave asd oNg ih

‘ill in A

25

that the Court was disregarding the legislative pur-
pose. The Act was amended in 1910 to insure a more

liberal interpretation, of the death section and to

clarify Jurisdictional questions (See H.R. Report 513
[61st Congress] appended: hereto.). The Act was
again amended in 1939 (53 Stat. 1404) to overrule the

_ -restrictive effect of decisions which had-held that
‘ employees of admitted common - carriers could not

recover’ under the. Act unless they themselves were
engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the
death or injury. (The amendment overruled Shanks
vs. DL. & W. R.R., 239 U.S. 556) (See Senate Re-
port 661, 76th Congress: appended hereto). The 1939

. enactment was not an overall revision of the statute

as can be seen. from the limited objestives set out on
page 2 of Senate Report 661, * : be
Gaulden v. Southérn Pacific, 78 ¥F. Supp. 651, and
Aguirre v. Southern Pacific, 232 Qa] App 2d 636, .
relied upon by defendants follow Wells Fargo, supra,
and depend entirely upon it for their vitality.

Aguirre simply follows Gaulden and since the latter
is merely an intermediate appellate court decision of :
. the state courts in California, it does, not require
_ Separate discussion. The Wells Fargo case is plainly

and markedly out of the spirit of the modern com-
merce clause cases and the courts in both Gaulden
and Aguirre demonstrated a marked reluctance ‘to

_ follow it. Plaintiff’s major contention is that the

Supreme Court has, subd silento, overruled the whole -
line of cases upon which defendant relies, including
Wells Fargo v. Taylor, supra. af

%

”

4 In 1987 iin the case of Jones and Laughlin Steel
~\@. — Co. v. N.L.RB., 301 US. 1, 81 L: Ed. 893, the Su- .

oa 8 a " ‘preme Court. overruled the entire restrictive line of
. See commerce clause cases that typified the late Ninteenth
‘. ~ and early Twentieth century. That ruling was ex-

\ tended to include the working conditions of employees
hs \ engaged in interstate:commerce in United States v. -
**.. * Darby, 812 U.8. 100, 85 L.Ed. 609, the case in which
“the Wages and Hours Act was upheld. In the famous
case of Wickard v. MiWbarn, 817 US. 123, 87 L.Ed.

. 122, the Court extended the effect ‘of the commerce

clause ,to include any activity which directly or in-

directly affected interstate commerce. The 1965 cases

of Heart of. Atlanta Motel v. Katzenbach, 379 U.S.

241, and Katzenbach v. “McClung, 379 USS. 294, il-
lustrate. the extreme liberality* with which the com-

merce clause. is applied: at present. These. cases

- plainly indicate that the rule of liberal construction
. has become firmly established .for statutes based. upon’
e ‘~ -the Commerce Clause. It seems equally clear from. .
the legislative history discussed earlier, that F.E.L.A.
was intended to be applied liberally and in particular .
to expréss company employees (See H.R. Report
1386, 60th Congress, appended hereto). The phrase |
os j Ree “common carrier by railroad” was intended to include
| + -all activities closely connected with the actual . car-

: riage of goods by railroad in interstate commerce.
The terminal company cases, which will be discussed
— below. followed a liberal Pee of the Act

. from atte beginning. | | :

27

The plaintiff here contends: that this court is not
confined by the Wells Fargo case. The whole narrow’
restrictive policy on which Wells Fargo ‘was based
has been’ rejected in Jones and Laughlin Steel Co. v.
N.L.R.B., supra and the long line of cases following
that historic decision. The rejection of the old policy
has implicitly overruled the Wells Fargo case itself.
It is to be noted that none of the Supreme Court
authority cited by defendant is ‘more recent than 1929
_ and the Wells Fargo.case itself is a 1920 decision,

_ Moreover, it is-to be noted. that employees of the
express companies have been included -in other
_ Statutes dealing with common carriers by railroad en-
acted’ since F.E.L.A: | Weaver:
The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 (1926), The ~
Railroad Retirement Act,.45 U.S.C. 228(a) (1935),
the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. 1532, the .
Carriers Taxing Act, 45 U.S.@. 261- (1935—since re-
. pealed), and The Railroad Unemployment Insurance.
Act, 45 U.S.C. 351 (1998). The inclusion of re-
-frigerator car- companies under all these statiites was.
accomplished by including in the statutes a descrip-
tion, of the activities that constituted those of a com-
mon carrier by railroad, ‘“fcing” cars being specifi--- .*
cally included. Throughout these statutes is present
the clear Congressional intent to treat all activities |
closely related to common carriage by railroad as sub-~ -
ject to the various acts regulating common carriers
by railroad. PFE has been subject to all the named
acts because its activities fall within those listed. as

wee

OMG LER hg IBA palit Saya stivid a ht fpobaietaite ake

PE EARS BBR Om WL oe Pt oy oe SE ee Re ew aT

activities of a ‘common carrier by railroad as noted
in Gaulden, cited by defendants. |
Defendant ‘can find no support in Ellis v. Inter-

- state Commerce Commission, 237 US. . 434 (1914)
since that decision does not involve the question of
whether or not Armour was. a common carrier by
__ railroad. It was held that Armour was .involved in
interstate commerce but that the Coimmission could

: not presume to treat Armour as a common carrier |
without first establishing that it was such: The case .

involved a refusal by a witness to answer questions
propounded ‘by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. Justice Holmes states, obiter, that Armour was
not .a common earrier, but no one,’ including the

*.Commission, had said that it was: The nature of. .

Armour’s business does not appear in the case, nor is

it of any moment in the decision. The case simply —

held that some of the questions propounded had to

be answered and some did not, and that Armour was .

subject at least to some of the investigative power of
the I.C.C.

United States v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 279 :

U.S. 363 (1929), is not determinative of the status of

‘ PFE as a‘common earrier by railroad. That case was

a-criminal action in which the defendant -was prose-
cuted for making a false entry in a common ecarrier’s
report under the Interstate Commerce Act. It was

found that the express company was not a common |

carrier. It. is to be noted that the nature of Fruit

Growers Express .was considerably .different than
. PFE. The so-called protective services is all that

-

29

Fruit Growers provided. In fact, the case indicates —

that icing cars was their entire business. They did
_ hot own cars ‘or tracks as does PFE. The sole ques-
tion before the Court in ‘the Fruit Growers Express :
case was whether icing cars without more made the -
" company a common carrier hy railroad." PFE’s other

activities and extensive ownership of railroad equip-

ment plainly distinguish the Fruit Growers Express

Company opinion.
-- The Supreme Court has not spoken on the subject
of express companies and F.E.L.A. since the Wells

| Fargo decision. But it has rendered another: line of
decisions, the termina] company cases, which plaintiff
3 & the controlling law. |

urges upon the court as stat
Actually the facts of the instant case come closer to

: _ that'line of authority than the so-called “express com-

pany” cases relied upon. by the defendant. In Fort
Street Union Depot Company v. Hillen, 119 F.24 307
(1941) the court, dealing with a terminal company

» engaged chiefly in making up, trains for interstate

commerce and: providing services for the trains that
used the terminal, -held that a terminal company is

subject to the Federal Employer's Liability Act. Re-

lying on United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District

Terminal,. 249: U.S. 296, and Union Stockyard v.

United States, 308 U.S. 213, the Court said: It ig no

. longer open to dispute that a terminal company en-

gaged in furnishing facilities and services is a com-

‘mon: carrier where the character of the Service in its

relation to the public demonstrates its nature as a

common calling.” In the JU. nion Stockyard case,

baiinsiiind

el

F % e
HM i i sean shila i si shtaiabhsacatials
- ’ 9 i .
. .
J ;

.
aaa MB cei hihisiig yah“
-e

MLE DR APEC iia ities

30

' supra, the términal company was engaged in loading

and unloading cars and providing various other serv-
ices but did not.own any cars or tracks. The railroads
paid a fee to the terminal company for its services,

‘and the.tariffs of the railroads included these services

without a separate charge being made for them. No —
direct services were rendered to the public. The United
States Supreme Court held that the terminal com-

' pany was a common carrier within the meaning of

the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 1-27. The

. similarity of this arrangement with that existing be-

tween various railroads and the defendant, Pacific
Fruit Express, is clear; neither provides a direct
transportation service to the public.

PFE indicates that it does not load and anlondl
ears, but it does. work very closely with the railroads
in that connection. In Union Stockyard the company
did not own railroad cars or tracks, but it: provided.

services exclusively. PFE by its affidavit admits

ownership of some.twenty thousand refrigerator cars.
(Defendant’s Exhibit “B” 1:19-20.) In addition the

' Union Stockyard case clearly holds that it is not
_ necessary. that the service be provided-directly.to the

public to ‘make the company a common carrier by
railroad. Nor does the ownership of motive power

seem to be of particular significance, although PFE

does admit to owning and operating switch engines.
(Defendant’s Exhibit “B” 4:4-7) Another of the:
terminal eompany cases was United States v. Brook-
lyn Eastern District Terminal Co., supra, 249 US.
296. The Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal Co.

31

terminal facility. It was held subject to the Hours
“of Service Act as a common carrier by railroad en-
gaged in interstate commerce in that case. (Followed
in Busch v. Brooklyn. Eastern District Terminal,.218
N.Y.S. 516, 218 App. Div. 782. )- |

McCabe v. Boston Terminal: Company, 303 Mass.
450, 22 N.E. 24 33, was also a terntinal. company
case. The company owned no engines or cars, It.
owned tracks, the station and yard facilities, Tt di-
rected switching and making up of trains, controlled
traffic in the yards and did some loading and un-
loading. The plaintiff was injured unloading mail,
The company. was ‘held to be a common carrier by
railroad and the employee’ entitled to’ sue under -the
‘F.E.L.A. It appears from a comparison of defend-
ant’s affidavit (Exhibit “B”) with these terminal
company cases that PFE bears more resemblance to ~
a terminal company than it does to an express com-
‘pany. A discussion of defendant's cases will tend to
bear out this fact. ik pact 3 .
| Ag previously noted it is not hecessary’ to deal in
detail with Aguirre v. Southern Pacific, 232 Cal App
636, because it merely relies on. Gaulden v. Southern
_ Pacific, 78 Fed. Supp 651. It is Plaintiff’s contention
that Gaulden is in error though it is apparent the
court had no basis for deciding otherwise because no
authority was cited to the court which would have .

— — tee

Siete
‘

32

led. it to any other conclusion. The cases cited. in sup- |

port of plaintiff's position here were not brought to ©

- the attention of the court in either Gaulden - or

Aguirre. |
Judge Goodman in Gaulden mentioned that the
F.E.L.A. statute had been amended in 1939 without

adding employees of express companies or refrig-

erator companies to the list of covered employees.. It
was inferred from that fact - by the court that if
Congress wished ito cover these employees it would ~
have added -guch groups when the statute was
amended. As noted. previously, the 1939 amendment
was not a revision of F.E.L.A. and was confined to
limited objectives set out in Senate Report 661, 76th
Congress (appended hereto). A consideration of that
report shows that the inference is not justified. It is
“more reasonable to conclude that the inclusion. of .
companies such as Pacific Fruit Express under all
the other statutes cited previously: meant that Con-
gress intended to include all railroad employees in a
uniform statutory scheme. Considering the existence
of the terminal company eases, it would easily have
appeared to Congress that employees of ‘companies
such as PFE were already covered under FELA,
especially in view of the doubtful vitality of, the pre-
1937 commerce clause cases. fi |
‘Jt was previously meritioned that the basis of thie
Wells Fargo case was the holding that Wells Fargo
was not a common carrier by railroad because it was
not a railroad company. In Fleming v. Railway Ex-
press, Agency; 161 F.2d 659, Railway Express was
s : 2 nawnwiar hv railroad:: a8

i

“We are convinced that a common carrier is one
- who, for: hire, engages in. transporting com-
modities from one place to another, or in con-
. nection with another carrier, such as a railroad.
It does ‘not step outside its common carrier
status because it only renders part, though a |
necessary part, of a transportation service, or
because it renders its service as an agent of a
common ¢arrier.” |

Railway Express was held to be exempt from war-

time price control legislation because common car-
riers were exempted. It is to be noted that Railway -

. Express i is now engaged in exactly the same business By.
_ as Wells Fargo was in 1920. The Wells Fargo case is

not cited in Fleming, but the implication is crystal
clear that the Wells Fargo case is no longer the law, —
since the earlier decision had specifically held that
Wells Fargo was not a common carrier by railroad.
The language quoted above from Fleming, is clearly
inconsistent with Wells Fargo’s holding that “com-
mon carrier by .railroad” means “a railroad company
acting as a commen carrier.”

To summarize the argument: The terminal company
cases represent the more liberal line of cases applying
F.E.L.A. to entities where the character as a railroad
is subject to question. The Boston Eastern District

-. Terminal Co. case is the earliest, 1919. This case was -

picked up. and followed in the- Union Stockyard case
in 1939 after the great revolution in the attitude of
the Court toward the commerce clause and legislation :

. enacted pursuant. to it, ushered in by the Jones and
& Laughlin case in 107. Defendant has cited us no

}
Lee ee la ey

Supreme Court case following Wells Fargo since

: | 1937.. The business. of PFE appears from PFE’s own

affidavit to be more similar to that of the terminal
companies than that of the express companies. The .-
authority of the. Wells Fargo case is very doubtful ©
since its reasoning has been completely rejected by
later authority. The non-application of F.E.L.A. to

~ companies such as PFE is anomalous in any event

since all the other major seetions of title 45 are.
applied to PFE~and similar companies, specifically
on the theory that such companies are common car-
rier by railroad. Nothing about the amendment of
the act in 1939 refutes. that- contention. It is clear
from the affidavit that PFE is engaged in railroad
operations and its employees are subject to all the .

hazards that railroad employees are.

It is therefore respectfully requested that PFE be

. held'to be a common carrier by raijroad within “the

meaning of 45 U.S.C. 51 and that defendant’s motion
for summary judgment be denied.

_ Dated: March 10, 1966,

Respectfully submitted,.
Jack H. Werchick
Attorney for Plaintiff — >

[The following Congressionat Reports, found at
R. 50-65 and alluded to in the. Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, are omitted:

H. R. Rep. 1386, 60th Cong. Ist Sess./ (1908) .

H. R. Rep. 513, 61st Cong. 2d Sess. 910)

S. Rep. 661, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1989))

™,

" er oe 5 OP ae ae
@ ose

day of March, 1966.

+. 35.

[Pitle of Court and Gained) ay ee
DECLARATION OF J ACK H. WERCHICK

I, Jack H. Werchick, declare ‘under penalty of |
perjury :. Lee |
‘That I am an attorney licensed to practice in the

State of California and am attorney of record for the

plaintiff herein.

That I directed Leland P. Jarnagin to investigate
the nature of Pacific Fruit Express and that he ob-

_ tained at-my direction the materials submitted under
his affidavit. © ne

That I submit those materials as tending to prove -
that Pacific Fruit Express is more- extensively in-
volved in railroad operations than the affidavit of
W. G. Cramner, submitted by the defendants herein, —
would tend to indicate. That a Substantial question

of fact exists as to-the nature and extent of the rail--

road operations of Pacifie Fruit Express.

_I call particular attention to the numerous refer-
ences to railroad activity in the document entitled
“Pacific Fruit Express” and to the apparent idefftity
of Pacific Fruit Express, Southern Pacific and Union _
Pacific. indicated on the document entitled “NOW—
PFE goes Piggyback!” calling particular attention to
the photographs of Car 301213 and the text: below
that photograph. ~ ert | |
’ Executed at San Francisco, California, this 10th

- Jack H.. Werchick .

r P

.
. .
. .
| . Nv oo
Snapp leganihed os Leave

36

[Title of Court and Cause]

- DECLARATION OF LELAND P. JARNAGIN

L Leland P.” Jarnagin, declare’ under penalty of

_ perjury that if called as a witness I would testify, .

and the faet is that during the pe of May, 1965,
at the request of counsel for the plaintiff herein, I
went. to the office of Pacific Fruit Express at 116 New
Montgomery Street in the City of San Francisco,

‘\\ California. ‘I asked for material which | described the: |
activities of Pacific Fruit Express. I was‘handed the
material attached hereto entitled “Pacific Fruit Ex-

press Company” and, “N OW—PFE Goes Piggy-
back!” by personnel in the office of the company at
that address. That the attached papers are the

- original papers handed to. me by employees of

Pacific Fruit itt Company. ‘at that time and
place.

Executed ‘at San Fesueteon, California this 10th
day of March, 1966.

Leland P. Ji ee

Now
PFE GOES PIGGYBACK!

Pacific Fruit Express presents TEMPCO-VAN SERVICE—and the’
400 new refrigerated highway trailers/containers and 200 Piggy-
back rail flat. cars just purchased to inaugurate it.

TEMPCO-VANS, the most modern trailers designed especially
for combination highway and piggyback operation, are the latest
addition to PFE’s first family of perishable transportation.

hfe

WHAT WILL TEMPCO.VAN SERVICE DO FOR THE

PERISHABLE TRADE? { :
> Shippers and consignees want their shipments transported speed- :
| | ily and smoothly and delivered to the market in top condition:

ae % . ‘ > te eo
= 2 °

y - acceenemennenniemnnememn meres Ee ee ee EET Sore hm eee ee aguas et Sk AA NSN DA Meyers 9
aed . :

38

i TEMPCO-VAN service hoa this ie combining the convenience of
7 pick-up and delivery with the dependable railroad service of
Southern Pacific and Union Pacific — PFE’s owners.

“wey WE FEEL TEMPCO-VAN SERVICE IS FIRST IN
_ REFRIGERATED TRANSPORT car. :
A refrigerated trailer must do more than just transport and re-
frigerate — it must maintain perishable commodities in first-
class condition at all times, under all conditions. Here is where
the difference between PFE’s new TEMPCO-VANS and other re-
frigerated trailers really counts. The TEMPCO-VAN'S air circula-
~ tion and full perimeter coating Preserves freshness, quality and
‘natural taste. . “3.8

WILL ALL iad BOTH FRESH AND FROZEN, BE
PROTECTED IN A TEMPCO-VAN? -

Yes. — because the bintiplesatune range is mechanically controlled
"from 10°F. below Zero to » 80°F. above. “ ’

is HEATER SERVICE AVAILABLE WITH TEMPCO-VANS?

Yes. TEMPCO-VAN'S unique mechanism also provides perfectly

controlled heating and, by’ turning off the- system, TEMPCO-

WANS can be used as a non-refrigerated trailer for westbound
dry freight shipments. :

Bic siesgzit rama ye sane»

39
DOES TEMPCO.VAN PROVIDE AN ALL-PURPOSE TRAILER?
ioe Yes. It gives unsurpassed PFE protective service against heat

or cold. Sturdy construction and high-cube capacity provide a
smooth ride for any load: | |

LOOK AT THESE TEMPCO.-VAN VITAL STATISTICS:

" MEAT-RAIL
. VANS _ . VANS VANS
Number in service 180 = ~— 200 20
Overall Width: - 8° 0" (same) © (same)
" Height =" vende, ai .
” Length : 40’ 0” ” ”
Inside Width _ i CE cs a
”" Height © A a (i
” Length : 37' 9” ° 38’ 2° : 38’ 4”
Total Cube -- 2249 76 2264 *
Controlled Temperature . 10°F. to. _ (same) (same)
Range 80°F.

_ TEMPCO-VAN SERVICE IS IN PFE TRADITION

| With over fifty years of Pacific Fruit Express service, PFE has

‘come to mean “Perishables Finest Equipment.” New TEMPCO-
-VAN service is now one more reason why perishable shippers will
find even greater satisfaction as well as better performance by
specifying Pacific Fruit Express service — either rail cars or re- _
frigerated trailers, - 8 —_ ti |

4

ths | ne 7 |
OTHER PFE EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES AND SERVICES

© Total refrigerator car ownership . . ... . . .. 25,300
‘ @ Total mechanical cars owned . . .... . . * 2,730
® Total Ice-Tempco-cars owned . . i - «.+ 42,000

© Offices and Agencies in all principal Western producing areas;
as well as in all major receiving and consyming areas.

®@ Car shops, ice plants and icing facilities at strategic locations
across the country.

® Complete diversion and passing advice. service.

* Specialized personnel to serve the perishable peng and
receiving trade.

PFE — the nation's largest operator of ttgnried rall cars.

For the finest in perishable transportation service denen
America, call

: PACIFIC: FRUIT EXPRESS
SOUTHERN PACIFIC + UNION PACIFIC

All three have offices in principal cities ” supply your needs fast
—wherever you are.

41

PACIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COMPANY

The Pacific Fruit Express Company is one of the
oldest refrigerator car companies in the business,
having been organized in: 1907 when it. started. with
three employes. Contrasted with this.it now has some

4,000 employes. -However, transportation of perish-. |

able foodstuffs and other commodities which require
protection against heat and cold were handled by rail- —
roads even as far back as 100 years ago. We have in-

formation about a carload of butter which moved in: ©

a “primitive” réfrigerator car for several hundred -
ae from upper New York — ‘to Boston, Mas-
sachusetts i in July 1851. |

Gradually through the years’ refrigerator cars, us-
ing ‘water ice as a refrigerant, were improved by
better construction, including addition of insula-
tion and other devices and then about ten years ago
mechanical refrigerating units were developed for use -
and several thousand cars equipped with such units.
are already in service. -

The refrigerator cars shown i in the attached photo-
graphs are of the most modern type. Car PFE 10351
is a “standard” car—we refer to it as such because it .
is by far the most numerous and uses ice and salt
to produce refrigeration—is equipped with 4” of in-
sulation in sides and ends and 4144” in the roof and
floor. PFE 301213, is a 50-ft. mechanical car, has 7”
of insulation in the floor, .7”. in the walls and
10” in the roof, and is equipped with adjustable load
dividers. These compare with the car of 50 years ago
which used 1” or less of insulation. Of course, many

‘ RT ee eae ee

’ other improvements have been developed to give the

cars longer life,and much greater efficiency in ac-
complishing the purposes to which they are devoted. —
We mention that: the “PFE”, as it is familiarly |

called in railroad and shipping circles, was organized

in 1907; it was formally organized in that year, but
when plans were laid for the Company in 1906, 6600
refrigerator cars were acquired and they constituted
the Company’ s fleet at that time. We now have over
22,500 cars which is the largest -single ownership in’

_ the country and constitutes about 30% of the nation’s
‘fleet of .refrigerator cars.

So much experience has been obtained not only by ...
actual service conditions but by intensive research
which has been carried on through the years that it
is now possible safely to handle all kinds of perish-
able foodstuffs and other commodities from and’ to |
every part of the country. About 1,000,000 carloads .
of such commodities move in the United States in the

course of a year, and this Company originates and
otherwise handles around 285,000 carloads or ap-

proximately 28% of the nation’s total, the balance
being handled by a considerable’ number of other
private car owners, including the Santa Fe Re ~
frigerator Dispatch owned, of course, by the ‘Santa’
Fe Railway, the Merchants Dispatch owned by the
New York Central, Fruit Growers Express owned

E principally by the Pennsylvania Railroad but also by

a number of others, and the American Refrigerator
Transit owned by the Missouri Pacific and Wabash

Sanaa

> tte’ ou, dint Va Ae

43

_ Railroads. These are the largest of the carline com-
'. panies besides the PFE. The PFE is owned jointly

by the Southern Pacific Company and the Union:
Pacific Railroad Company with which it has con- —
tracts for furnishing of refrigerator car's. for perish-

able loading, and in addition has contracts.with the |

Western Pacific Railroad Company and certain
Mexican railways under which cars are provided for ;
perishable loading on those lines.

Of. course, the providing of cars is ‘naturally one of

* the essentials of our Company but in another ‘way it

is equally essential that various facilities and services
be provided to fill out the entire picture. For in-
stance, we have to maintain and operate car shops at
which cars are built and repaired: The PFE owns

_five of these located at strategic parts of the country

along the lines of the Southern Pacifie and Union
Pacific Railroads. Supplementing these shops are .
light repair and cleaning stations at a number of

- places throughout the Western part of the United

States. ‘
~The Company also operates eleven ice. manufactur-

ing plants located at various places along the lines of —

its Owning Railroads and here it manufactures ‘a
very considerable tonnage of ice each year; this to-
gether with ice purchased from commercial concerns
amounts to close to 1,300, 000 tons annually, and all

of this is issued to the ice compartments in the ice

bunker cars as they travel toward their destinations
with their precious ladings of fruit, vegetables and -

“44

_ other foodstuffs and miscellaneous perishable com-
* modities. evi

You will note on some ofthe attached pictures
what appear to be trap doors on’ the tops of cars
which are in elevated position. -These are cover open-
ings in the car roof through which ice in broken-up
form is placed. in what are called bunkers or ice

tanks. The tanks take up several. feet. in either end of

the car and something more than 10,000 pounds of -ice

‘are distributed to the two tanks in each car. when

they move, under refrigeration service. After the cars

are ic@ these “trap doors”, which are more correctly
«. referred to in the industry as:a combination of plug

and hatch cover, are lowered into the opening
through which the ice has been placed in the car and
thus you have actually a mobile ice .box. When ice -
is not required for the preservation of the lading the

- ‘hatch cover plug assembly can be elevated as shown

in the pictures and when moved in this way air
enters in one end and goes out the other accomplish-
ing ventilation service for certain commodities. Then.

* again during ‘cold weather: instead of requiring re-

frigeration. some shipments require heat, and a spe-
cial type of heater, thermostatically controlled, is —
used. for this purpose; it is lowered into the ice tank
compartment of the car securely affixed in “place and:
thus performs its function. :

In accomplishing the icing of cars as well as_ the

| placing of heatets in the bunkers the Company main-
tains -at all of its ice plants and also at many other

”

45 o

points where servicing is accomplished, platforms
‘which while varying to some extent in structure yet
_ are elevated in such way that the deck is level with
- the tops of the cars. Ice is raised to these dedks and
moved by conveyor -chains and from there issued by
icemen into the tanks of the cars. A more recent de-
velopment is mechanical icing machines which per-
_, form the work of ‘icing ears in a much faster time |
_ and more efficiently than by hand, poe

Ice alone can cool commodities placed in the cars
to average of 40° F., but with the addition of salt
mixed with the ice the temperatures may be lowered
depending upon the amount of-salt used; the maxi-.
mum being 30 per cent. With this rather large quan-
tity of salt placed in and mixed with the ice in the.
process of servicing the cars in transit, temperatures
as low as 10° F. could be obtained and it was with
this high percentage of salt with ice that until the
last few years the heavy volume of frozen foods
shipped throughout the country was moved.. However,
while this method of transporting frozen foods proved
satisfactory in producing the low temperatures in-
dicated, demand developed for the equipping of cars
for this kind of traffic with mechanical refrigerating
units to provide zero temperatures, The PFE now
has some 2700 of the heavily insulated cars with me-—
~ chanical refrigerating units driven by diesel engines .

housed in one end of the ear. These cars are equipped
with thermostats which may be set for controlling
temperatures during transit anywhere in the range
from below zero to 70°.

Pe ee et ee ee

46
~\

" In the years 1960 and 1961 PFE equipped 1,000 of
- its ice bunkers cars with units for cong{ant operation

of air-circulating fans while under‘ load to produce

controlled temperatures. These modified «cars, called °
. “‘Iee-Tempeo” cars, have one end bunker removed

and the remaining bunker has ‘been enlarged to hold
in excess of 7,000 lbs. of ice. The resulting increase

in cubical loading capacity of these cars is about 10%.
That means.many commodities can be loaded heavier —

in the car and the constantly. operating fans produce

= 5 better refrigeration under thermostatically controlled —

temperatures. A 5 HP diesel engine is installed under

the car, and an alternator or generator keeps the fans
in operation at all times. The thexmostat controls the

operation of the fans and dampers or louvers which

_ open and close as needed control the circulation of air

throughout the car. |
The thermostat éontrol range of the’ dep Ptigteen

ears is from 30 to 70 degrees with control settings

provided in five degree increments. A; *‘Heater Serv-
ice”.switch is provided in the thermostat control box,

which when thrown to the ‘‘ Heater Service” position, -
. will reverse action of thermostat, and provide heater —

service. When the commodity temperature falls be-
low the desired set point, the fans which then be-
come ‘‘heater fans” start and dampers open, by
thermostat action, and bring the commodity up to de-

‘sired set point. Actual heat is generated by an alvohol

heater installed in i ice bunker.

Mae at Seek abet Mime iets ne”.

“Tee-Tempco” ear.

ir:

PFE 20043 shown in attached photographs, is an

Additionally, in J une, 1961, PFE acquired several
million dollars worth of refrigerator trailers for use
in the piggyback rail field. - ety et yt es
.PFE’s piggyback fleet consists of 425 forty-foot -
refrigerator trailers ‘and 200 flat cars. ‘The trailers are
designated as ‘“Tempco-Vans” ‘and like PFE’s me-

_ chanical refrigerator cars they give thermostatically

PFE 513145.

controlled. refrigeration and heater service. They are
used for frozen foods as well as fresh fruits and veg- a
etables and add to the many other features of PFE
service the convenience of pickup and delivery.

Tempco-Vans ‘can be moved by tractor: to locations ra

most convenient for shippers for; loading and when
they have received .their cargoes, they are rushed to
rail centers where they are placed on. railway flat cars, |
two trailers to the car. At their rail destination, they
are again taken by tractor to the point of delivery.
Two piggyback trailers (Nos. 120004 and 120002)
are shown in attached photograph ‘loaded ‘on flat car’

Naturally in the operation and administration of

So large an enterprise a considerable number of spe-

cialists are required. . ;
The construction and maintenance of our very large

‘fleet of refrigérator cars requires an engineering staft

and specialists both at headquarters and at the shops.

ig Ss nt

nents aiGes - a o :
is n ™ x Sis waar eee .

=
* hy
« ¢ é ,
‘

Similarly our refrigeration functions involve many

scientific operations and we.are staffed to handle this

end of our ‘business in the most efficient manner. We
“have other engineers assigned to handling all phases
of the design, construction and maintenance of our
car shop, store and ice plantbuildings, structures and-

related facilities, also research and development activ-
ities. We have the necessary Accounting, Purchasing
and Executive Departments, and last but not least,

. the operations of the Company that are referred to
as Car Service operations. These. latter operations

consist in large part of ¢ar distyibution, the furnish-
ing of commodity protective services as ordered by
the shipper, and what is referred to in railroad term-

inology as diversion. and passing service. a |
As you might well imagine, ear ‘distribution is an —

operation that involves the provision of cars at proper
places at the proper times.and in condition that will

permit the safe transport of products to points of use.
. This must be accomplished within the limits of reas son-

able economic necessities, wlfich is to say that the
cars must receive full employment without delays. -

We have ear distribution personnel mainly at San
_ Francisco, Omaha and Chicago, but also in smaller
‘ numbers at many other points in the country, all of

whom are linked together by telephone and: telegraph.
They gather information about crop conditions and

future need of cars in various. loading territories so _
" that they can arrange with the various railroads to’

g

49

move available cars to such loading territories at ex-

actly the right times. It is an intricate operation and

one which requires constant attention and. exercise of
good" judgment to keep the operation in balance.

Shippers of various perishable commodities must,

of course, regulate their. operations to meet the mar-
ket demands of various consuming areas. They have
to aniticipate what future conditions will be and plant. -
and harvest their produce accordingly. Nearly every
carload of perishable commodities that moves is sub-
ject to the vagaries of market conditions and if after
valuable produce is.loaded into a.car and it is @arted

‘ on its way to the consuming center, say an eastern
“market, it is learned that another. area has better de-

mand and offers a better price, the shipper will call
us on the telephone and. request that we “divert” the
car from its originally billed destination to the new
destination. That is the basic meaning of ¢ word
‘‘diversion.” In handling some 285,000 carloads of

perishables a year we are called upon by’ ‘shippers

to accomplish in the neighborhood of 170,000 diver-.
sions a year. This involves a vast amount of clerical:
work and telegraphing and telephoning. We have siz-

able diversion forces at Chicago, which as you know is
' @ major railroad center, as well as at a great many
other. points. These same forces. through an intricate | =

system of telegraphic reportings are aware at all times:
where each and every loaded car may be and we keep’
shippers informed when their shipments “pass” cer-

=

eee 5
ee a |

. tain points, and this is what we mean when we speak
. of “passing service.” - '

(See next attached for photographs mentioned herein)

Office of VicePrei ident & Genéral Manager
- San Francisco, Cali rnia
March 1; 1963

. . ESR Ac ER De tt Ris ot 20,

«

cacti aed Nii ee ee eee
4 > . - * . ne)

eee ee ee |

ee _

RRA SF amy wa: * 30

= S Soatericien : :
oe mie SE ee

3 PFE Car No. 10354.
. Standard Refrigerator Car~
* Built in February 1957)
pote: oe: aetna see ree ecm a NRE REF
Ice-Tempco cer
} “ak * ‘ .

ee eT eS

; Fruwr |
a 301213. Ex reese
LS aol) Sn
PFE Car No: 301213
: 50-ft. Mechanical Car
ate Sass he 8.

' ExisHa Epwarps, | hs

‘51

‘United States District Court. —
‘Northern District. of California
Southern Division

- No. 44,413

ia’

os ‘ Plaintiff,

Pim Frurr Express. Company, i

a taten4 Corporation, . iS
_. Defendant. |

\
i

at.
| SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

This case coming on to be heard before the Honor- :
able Albert C. Wollenberg upon motion of defendant

. Pacific Fruit- Express Company ‘for summary judg-

ment, the plaintiff, Elisha Edwards, being: repre-
sented by Messrs. Werchick, Kiriakis & Sullivan, by
Arne Werchick, Esq.,.and defendant, Pacific Fruit -

Express Company, being represented by Messrs. -
Corrigan .& Roy, by Donald 0. Roy, Esq., and the

Court being fully advised, it is found that the de-
fendant Pacific Fruit Express Company was not at

‘the time of plaintiff's injury ‘a common carrier by:

railroad subject to the Federal. Employers’ Liability

’ Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 51 et seq. It is therefore found

_ ‘that the complaint fails to state a claim against de-

52

: fendant Pacifie Fruit thine Company, upon which ~

relief can be granted.

It Is Therefore Ordered And Mijodzed that -

fendant Pacific Fruit Express Company” is — Be oe
granted judgment «gainst plaintiff. , :

Dated: MAR-18 1966 : ee

a Albert C. Wollenberg

Judge of the United States

* __. District Court

“f

ce eas
' United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit |

_ No. 21,020 -

>

Evisu EDWARDS, , |
Saye Appellant,
vs. cer
_ Paciric Fruit Express Company, Alix

. Appellee. ; -

[May 10, 1967]

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the N orthern’ District of California ,

Before: CHAMBERS, ae and MERRILL,
z ‘ Cireuit Judges. | - , se
Per Curiam::- are ;
_ This is an appeal from a district court iliebintes-
tion that Pacific Fruit Express Company (P.F-E.) is
not a “common carrier’ by railroad.” ‘Appellant, an

injured P.F.E. employee, claims that P’ F.E. is such
a common carrier. At stake is appellant’s attempt to ~

'. proceed. under the Federal iain hs s pes Act,
— -45-U.8.0..51, et seq.

PBE. is a large. refrigerator car company. It
_- owns approximately 25,000 refrigerator cars and car-

ries’ about 28% of all refrigerated’ goods moving by
‘rail. P.F.E. deals directly with the shipper and,
among other activities,. maintains.a service by which’
it keeps the shipper posted as to the whereabouts of -.
its goeds in transit, thus allowing the shipper to —
order goods diverted from one destination’ to another.

In asking this court to decide that P.F.E. is a
- “eommon carrier by railroad,” appellant necessarily
* asks that we overrule the case of Gaulden v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 78 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Calif.), aff'd 174 —

. B, 2d 1022, which construed the term narrowly to °

exclude refrigerator car companies.* Were the slate .

clean, we might well be convinced by appellant’s
arguinent for a broader definition, but, as it is not,
_ we choose -to follow the unanimous line of. authority
and affirm. We note that since Gaulden, supra, was
decided in 1949, Congress has not acted to bring re-~
-frigerator car ,company employees under F.E.L.A.
. protection. “3 ee :

*Gaulden, supra, has been followed in H etman v. Fruit Growers °°

Express Co., 3 Cir., 346 F.2d 947; Moleton v. Union Pacific Co., *
118 Ut. ‘107, "219 P.2d 1080, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 9382; Aguirre v.
" Southern Pac. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 636, 43 Cal. L Rpt 73.

ie

4

a

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386412_0147%3A01. Public record. Not legal advice.
