# Opinion — Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opinion
- **Published:** January 1, 1967
- **Citation:** 386 U.S. 685

## Text

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ) STATES

No. 18.—Ocroszr ‘TERM, 1966.

5 On Writ of Certiorari ;
Utah Pie Company, Petitioner, to the United States

v. N
Continental 9 00. ot. al. ‘the Tenth Greuit. |

[April 24 1967.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit for treble damages and injunction under
15 U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26 was brought by petitioner, —
Utah Pie Company, against respondents, Continental
Baking Company, Carnation Company and Pet Milk
Company. The complaint charged a conspiracy under
88 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 88 1 and 2,
and violations by each respondent of §2(a) of the
Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
15 U. S. C. 8 13 (a).“ The jury found for respondents
on the conspiracy charge and for petitioner on the price

1 gection 15 provides that:
“Any person who shall be injured in his l or property a
f reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which
the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in-controversy, and shall recover threefold the dam- .
er ee —— a
. &ttorney’s fee.” ;
Section 26 provides Anne relief for private parties from n *
tion of the antitrust laws. 5
2 The portion of § 2 (a) relevant to the issue before the Court
provides that: .
“Tt shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commeree, in the : *
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
: m price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
. and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce . . . where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or

—

2 UTAH PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING.

‘discrimination charge. Judgment was entered for- peti-

tioner for damages and attorneys’ fees and respondents
appealed on several grounds. The Court of Appeals
reversed, addressing itself to the single issue of whether
the evidence against each of the respondents was suffi-
eient to support a finding of probable injury to competi-

tion within the meaning of § 2 (a) and holding that it

was not.. 349 F. 2d 122. We granted certiorari. 382
U. S. 914.“ We reverse. :

knowingly receives the benefit of such diseriminatipn, or with the |

customers ‘of either of them. .

* Respondent Continental by counterclaim charged petitionss with
violation of § 2 (a) in respect ‘to certain sales. On this issue the
jury found for Continental, and although petitioner fgiled to move
for a directed verdict on the counterclaim before its submission to
the jury, the trial judge granted petitioner’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment notwithstanding thé verdict on the counterclaim, and re-

manded the issue for a new trial. No question concerning the

counterclaim is before the Court.

The order allowing certiorari requested counsel to brief and dis-
cuss at oral argument, in addition to the questions presented by the

petition, the following questions:
1. Whether, if this Court affirms the judgment and ordér of the

Court of Appeals directing the District Court to enter judgment
for respondents, petitioner can then make a motion for new trial

under Rule 50 (c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within
10 days of the District Court’s entry of judgment for respondents?

“2. Whether, if under the order of the Court of Appeals, peti-
tioner cannot make a motion for new trial under Rule 50 (e) (2)

within 10 days of the Distriet Court's entry of. judgment against
him, the order of the Court of Appeals directing the District Court ;

to enter judgment for respondents is compatible with Rule 50 (b)
as interpreted by this Court in Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper
Co., 330 U. S. 312; Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 832 U. S. 571;
and Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, 337 U. S. 8017

„3. Whether Rule 50 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides the Court of Appeals with any authority to direct the entry
of judgment for respondents ?” os
In the light of our disposition of thie c we need not reach thee

ed
*

‘UTAH PIE v: CONTINENTAL BAKING. 3

The product involved is frozen dessert pies—apple,
cherry, boysenberry, peach; pumpkin, and mince. The
period covered by the suit comprised the years 1958, 1959,
and 1960 and the first eight months of 1961. Petitioner
is a Utah corporation which for 30 years has been baking
pies in its plant in Salt Lake City and selling them in
tah and surrounding States. It entered the frozen pie
business in late 1957. It was immediately successful with
its new line and built a new plant in Salt Lake City in
1958. The frozen pie market was a rapidly expanding
one: 57,060 dozen frozen pies were sold i in the Salt Lake
City market in 1958, 111,729 dozen in 1959, 184,569
dozen in 1960, and 266,908 dozen in 1961. 'Utah’s share
of this market in those years was 66.5%, 34.3%, 45.5%,
and 45.3% respectively, its sales volume steadily increas-
ing over the four years. Its financial poffttion’ also
improved. Petitioner is not, however, a larg@company.
At the time of the trial, petitioner operated with only 18
ployees, nine of whom were members of the Rigby

increased from $31, 651.98 on October 31, 1957, to
$68,802.13 on October 31, 1961. Total sales were
$238,000 in the, year ended October 31, 1957, $353,000

ily, which controlled the business. Its net wortk

in 1958, $430,000.in 1959, $504,000 in 1960 and $589,000 ae

in 1961. Its net income or loss for these same years was
@ loss of $6,461 in 1957, and net income in the remaining
years of $7,090, $11,897, $7,636, and $9,216.

Each of the respondents is a large company and each
of them is a major factor in the frozen pie market in one
or-more of the regions of the country. Each entered the
Salt Lake City frozen pie market before petitioner began
freezing dessert pies.- None of them had a plant in Utah.
By the end of the period involved in this suit Pet had
plants in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and California; Con-
tinental in Virginia, Iowa, and California; and Carnation
in California. The Salt Lake City market was supplied

4

here:

4 ‘UTAH PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING. *
by respondents chiefly ‘from their ‘California operations.

They sold primarily on a delivered price basis.

The Utah“ label was petitioner's proprietary l
Beginning in 1960, it also sold pies of like grade and

quality under the controlled label Frost N- e” °

to Associated Grocers and in 1961 it began selling to

American Food Stores under the “Mayfresh” label.” It
also, on a seasonal basis, sold pumpkin and mince frozen

pies to e be Safeway’s own “Bel-air” label.

The major
was price, location of petitioner’s plant gave it

natural advantages in the Salt Lake City marketing area

and it entered the market at a price below the then
going prices for respondents’ comparable pies. For most
of the period involved here its prices were the lowest in

*

petitive weapon in the Utah market °

the Salt Lake City market. .It was, however, challenged |

by each of the respondents at one time or another and
for varying periods. There was ample evidence to show

to be a deteriorating price structure over the period
covered by this suit, and eaeh of the respondents i in the
gourse of the ongoing price competition sold frozen: pies

in the Salt Lake market at prices lower than they sold: . ;
_ pies of like grade and quality in other markets consid-

erably closer to their plants. Utah Pie, which entered

that each of the respondents contributed to what proved

the market at a price of $4.15 per dozen at the beginning

of the relevant period, was selling “Utah” and Frost N
Flame” pies for $2.75 per dozen when the instant suit
_ was filed some 44 months later.“ Pet, which was offering

pies at $4. 92 per dozen in February of 1958, was offering

in February 1960 petitioner sold’ frozen pies to a.

3 spake > Washington, buyer under the “Sonny Boy” label.

The prices discussed herein refer to those charged for apple pies.

The apple flavor has been used as the standard throughout this case,

‘without objection from the parties, ee ee

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4

* UTAH PIE v. - CONTINENTAL BAKING.
““Pet-Ritz” and “Bel-air” pies at $3.56 and $3.46 per

dozen respectively, in March and April of 1961. Carna-
tion’s price in early 1958 was $4.82 per dozen but it was
selling at $3.46 per dozen at the conclusion of the period,
meanwhile having been down as low ag $3.30 per dozen.
The price range experienced by Continental during the

period covered by this suit.ran from a 1958 high of over

$5 per dozen to a 1961 low of $2.85 per dosen. | |
The Sekt Lake City sales volumes ahd markét, shares of the

parties to this suit as well as of other sellers during the period at

issue were as. follows:

We Volume
Company" p(n doz.)
Carmation ....:...... 222 „ 5,863
Continental .:....... „ 754
c ˙ 37, 969.5
—-.. ee 9,336.5
GE Aah Jacke) * Volume Percent

Company . (indoz.). of Market
_Camation .............4. r 8.8
Gn. 18,799.35 83
A v'ao cdades videdanuves 102,690 45.3
. mani 66,788 29.4
o 18,565.5 82
Ni. . .... 260 1000

e aniantes: entered into on January 1, 1960,

obligated the Safeway organization to purchase a. minimum of
- 1,000,000 cases (six pies per case) from Pet during the year. The
contract was orally renewed for one year and thereafter to the time

of the trial the production of “Bel-sir” pies by Pet for Safeway was |

continued without a formal contract. All of the volume of the
; E conta Gi wot Sa tay

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*

UTAH PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING. See

pies was slightly lower than Utah’s price for its “Utdh”
brand of pies at the time, and near the end of the period
the Bel-air price was comparable to the “Utah” price
but higher than Utah’s Frost N' Flaine” brand. Pets
Safeway business amounted to 22.8%, 12.3%, and 6.30
of the entire Salt Lake City market for the years 9959, oe
1960, arid 1961, respectively, and to 64%, 44%, and 22%
of Pet’s own Salt Lake City sales for those same years.
Second, it introduced a 20-ounce economy pie under
the Swiss Miss” label and began selling the new pie in 8
the Salt Lake market in August 1960 at prices ranging
from $3.25 to $3.30 for the remainder of the period. This
pie was at times sold at a lower price in the Salt Lake
City market than it was sold in other markets. *
Third, Pet became more bompetitive with respect to
the prices for its “Pet-Ritz” proprietary label. For 18
. of the relevant 44 months its offering price for Pet-Ritz
pie was $4 per dozen or lower, and $3.70 or lower for
six of these months, According to the Court-of Appeals,
in seven of the 44 months Pet’s prices in Salt Lake were
blower than prices charged in the California markets.
This was true although selling in Salt Lake involved a
30. to 35-cent freight cost.
The Court of Appeals first eoricluded that Pet's price
differential on sales to Safeway must be put aside in
considering injury to competition because in its view
of the evidence the differential had been completely
cost justified and because Utah would not in any. event
N have been able to enjoy the Safeway custom. Second,
: it concluded that the remaining discriminations on “Pet-
Ritz” and “Swiss Miss” pies were an insufficient predicate
on which the jury could have found a reasonably possible
injury either to Uteh: Pio ab & competitive force or to
— generally. ee

7

8 UTAH Tm CONTINENTAL. BAKING.
5 At We -disagree. with the Court of Appeals in several

~

respects. First, there was evidence from which the jury
could have found considerably more price discrimination Re

Salt Lake were lower than prices in the California 8
markets, there was evidence from which the jury could .

buy Pet with respect to “Pet-Ritz” and Swiss: Miss pies
: than was considered by the Court of Appeals. In addi-

tion to the seven months during which Pet's prices in

reasonably have found that in 10 additional months the
Salt Lake City prices for “Pet-Ritz” pies were discrim-

inatory as compared with sales in western markets other
than California. Likewise, with respect to “Swiss Miss”

. pies, there was evidence in the record from which the

= jury could have found that in five of the 13 months

during which the Swiss Miss” pies were sold prior to

te filing of. this suit, prices in Salt Lake City were
e ee f
dome other western market.

Second, with respect to Pet's Safeway Dae the

burden of proving cost justification was on Pet and,
in our view, reasonable men could have found that Pet’s

lower priced, “Bel-air’ sales to Safeway were not cost

b justified i in their entirety. Pet introduced cost data for

with a violation of this section ....” 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C.

1961 indicating a cost saving on the Safeway business
greater than the price advantage extended to that cus-

tomer. These statistics were not particularized for. the
Salt Lake market, but assuming that they were adequate

to justify the 1961 sales, they related to only 24% of

8
ee 8 000 Gt übe Wbt n bude Ase dee tho be

3 “Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint’ under this

section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or

facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case

thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged
$13 (b). See F. T. C. v. Morton Salt Cos 334 U. 8. 37, 44-45;

United States v. Borden:Co., 370 U. —

@

UTAH PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING. 0
the Safeway sales over ‘the relevant period. The evi-

dence concerning the remaining 76% was at best inbom-

plete: and inferential. It was insufficient to take the
defense of cost justification from the jury, which reason-
ably could have found a greater incidence of unjustified —
price discrimination than that allowed by the Court of
- Appeals’ view of the evidence?
With respect to whether Utah would have ee 8
Safeway's business absent the Pet contract with Safeway,
: it seems clear that whatever the fact is in this regard,
it is not determinative of the impact of that contract
on competitors other than Utah and on competition gen-
erally. There were other companies seeking the Safeway
business, including Continental and Carnation, whose
pies may have -been excluded from the Safeway shelves
by what the jury could have found to be discriminatory a
sales to‘Safeway." What is more, Pet’s evidencb that

10 The only evidence cited by the Court of Appeals to justify the
remaining 76% of Pet's sales to Safeway was Safeway’s established
practice of requiring its sellers to cost-justify sales that otherwise
would be illegally discriminatory. This practice was incorporated
in the Pet-Safeway contract. We are unprepared to hold that a
contractual obligation to oost- justify price differentials is legally
dispositive proof that such differentials are in fact so justified. Pet

admitted that its cost-justifieation figures were drawn from past

performance, so even crediuing the data accompanying the 1960
contract regarding cost differences, Pet’s additional evidence would
bring under the justification umbrella only the 1959 sales. Thus, at
the least, the jury was free to cofisider the 1960 Safeway sales as
inadequately cost justified. Those sales accounted for 12.3% f
the entire Salt Lake City market in that year. In the context off
~ this case, the sales to Safeway are particularly relevant since there

in this case depressing overall market prices.
r
if from respondents’ conduct “there is reasonably likely to be a sub-
stantial injury to competition among sellers of frozen pies in the
Utah area.” . Record, at 1355. (Emphasis supplied.)

-

10 UTAH PIE v. ‘CONTINENTAL BAKING.

8 unwillingness to install quality a
prevented Utah from enjoying Safeway's private label
business is not the only evidence in the record relevant
to that question. There was other evidence to the con-
ttrary. The jury would not, have been compelled to find

\ that Utah Pie could not have gained more of the Safeway —
business. 2
_ Third, the Court of ‘Appeals * 5 entirely ignored ‘
other evidence which provides material support for the
jury’s conclusion that Pet’s behavior satisfied the statu-
tory test regarding competitive injury. This evidence
bore on the issue of Pets predatory intent to injure Utah
Pie.“ As an initial matter, the: jury could” have con- 2

12 The dangers of. predatory price di 3 were-recognized. 8

a in Moore v,. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. 8. 115, where such
. pricing was held violative of 5g 2 (a). Subsequently, the Court
noted that ‘the decisions of the federal courts in primary-line-
competition cases consistently emphasize the unreasonably low
prices and the predatory intent of thé defendants.” F. 7. C. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Ing., 363 U. S. 586, 548. See also Balian Ice Cream
Co. v. Anden Pen Co., 231 F. 2d 356, Maryland Baking Co.
v. F. T. C, 243 F. 2d 716; Atlas B 1 5
Block & Gravel Co, 260 F. 2d 960; An} Busch, Inc. v. F. T. ....
280 F. 24 836. In the latter cate ine court vent so far ato suggest °
“TE the projection [to astertsin'the future effect of prise
gon sianet Gent oe sokieion & nein
2 reasonably be forecast: that an adverse effect on competition may | .
occur. In that event, the discriminations in their incipiency are suck
that they may have the prescribed effect to establish a violation of
82 (a). If, one engages in the latter type of pricing activity, a 5
_Yeasonable probability may be inferred that its wilful ¢onduct may
E injure, destroy. or-plevent: competition.” 29
F. 2d, at 848. N
...
_ “knowledge of actual intent is an aid in the interpretation of facts
and prediction of consequences.” Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U. 8. 344, 372, and we do not think it unreasonable for
courts to follow that lead. Although the evidence in this regard

* * *

UTAH. PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING. 1

eluded that Pet’s - discriminatory pricing was aimed at

Utah Pie; Pet's own management, as early as 1959,
identified Utah Pie as an “unfavorable factor,” one which.
“dlulg holes in our operation” and posed a constant
check on Pet’s performance in the Salt Lake City.
market. Moreover, Pet candidly admitted that during
the period when it was establishing its relationship with

Safeway, it sent into Utah Pie's plant an industrial spy:
to seek information that would be of use to Pet in con-

vincing Safeway that Utah Pie was not worthy of its

custom. Pet denied that it ever in fact used what it
had learned against Utah Pie in competing with Safe-

way’s business. The parties, however, are not the ulti-
mate judges of credibility. But even giving Pet’s view
of the incident a measure of weight does not mean the

jury was foreclosed 1 from considering the predatory intent.

underlying Pet’s mode of competition. Finally, Pet does
not deny that the evidence showed it suffered substantial
losses on its frozen pie sales during the greater part of
the time invotved in this suit, and. there was evidence

1 — which the jury could have concluded that the

losses Pet sustained in Salt Lake City were greater than

those incurred elsewhere. It would not have been an
irrational step if the jury concluded that there was a
relationship between price and the losses. 7

—

nen, ö *

n Ben n bib d l

intent from surrounding economic circumstances, which would in-
clude persistent unprofitable sales below cost and drastic prioe outs

themselves discriminatory. See Rowe, Price Discrimination. Under

the -Robinson-Patman Act 141-150 (1962), commenting on the

Court’s statement in F: T. C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, that

“a price reduction ‘below cost tends to establish [predatory] intent“
363 U. S., at 552. See also Ben Hur C Co. v. Wells, 242 F. 2d

, 481, 486, and. Raban Ice Cream Co. v. A i Farms Co., supra, at

bn

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5
7

4
“

12 ‘UTAH PIE ». ‘CONTINENTAL BAKING.

It seems clear to us that the jury heard adequate——
_evidenee front which it could have concluded that Pet

had. engaged in predatory tactics in-waging competitive
warfare in the Salt Lans City market. Coupled with the
inciderice. of j

II.

‘Pétitioner’s case against Continental is is snot complicated. i
Continental was a substantial factor in the market in

1957. But its sales of frozen 22-ounce dessert pies, sold

under the “Morton” brand, amounted to only 1.3% of
the market in 1958, 2.9% in 1959, and 18%. in 1960. Its
problems were primarily that of oost and in turn that of
price, the. controlling factor i in the market. In late
it worked out a o- packing arrangement in California

by which fruit would be processed directly from the trees
into the finished pie without large intermediate pack-
ing, storing, and shipping expenses. Having improved
its position, it attempted to increase its share of the

attributable to Pet,
7 the evidence as a whole established, rather than negated,
the, reasonable possibility. that Pet’s behavior n

‘a ane of competition proseribed by th ne Act..

Salt Lake City market by utilizing a local broker and |
offering short-term price concessions in varying amounts.
Its efforts for seven months were not spectacularly suc- |
cessful. Then in June 1961, it took the steps which are

the heart of petitioner’s complaint against it. Effective.

frozen apple pies in the Utah area at $2.85 per dozen.
It was then selling the same pies at substantially higher

prices in other markets. The Salt Lake City price was
less than its direct cost plus an allocation for overhead.
Utah’s going price at the time for its 24-ounce “Frost N-
Flame” apple pie sold to Associated Grocers was $3.10
per dozen, and for its U ” brand $3.40 per dozen.
At its new prices, Continental sold pies to American

for the last two weeks of June it offered its 22-ounce .

=

1
— nll se
S

for another two-week period. Utah filed suit on Sep-

tember 8, 1961. Continental's total sales of frozen pies

‘increased from 3,350 dozen in 1960 to 18,800 dozen in
1961. Its market share increased from 1.8% in 1960 to
8.3% in 1961. The Court of Appeals concluded that.
Continental’s conduct had had only minimal effect, that
it had not injured or weakened Utah Pie as a competitor,

that it had not substantially lessened competition and
chat there was no reasonable possibility that it would 5

do so in the future.

: We again differ with the Court of Appeals: Its opinion
that Utah was not damaged as a competitive force appar-
ently ‘rested. on the fact that Utah’s sales volume con-

tinued to climb in 1961 and on. the court's own factual

conclusion that Utah was not deprived of any pie busi-

ness which it otherwise might have had. But this retro-

spective assessment fails to note that Continental's

discriminatory below-cost price caused Utah Pie to re-
' duce its price to $2.75. . The jury was entitled to consider
the potential impact of Continental’s price reduction ab-

sent any responsive price cut by Utah Pis. -Price was

& major factor in the Salt Lake City market. Safeway,
which had been buying Utah brand pies, immediately

reacted and purchased a five-week supply of frozen pies

from Continental, thereby temporarily foreclosing the
| proprietary brands of Utah and other firms from the Salt
Lake City Safeway market. The jury. could ‘rationally .

have concluded that had Utah not lowered its price,

\
\

vran PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING: 13

Giogers i in Pocatello, Idaho; ahd to American Food Stores ag
in Ogden, Utah. Safeway, one of the major buyers in sie
Salt Lake City, Also purchased 6,250 dozen, its require-
ments for about five weeks. Another purchaser ordered
1,000 dosen. Utah’s response was immediate. It reduced
its price on all of its apple pies to $2.75 per dozen. Con-
tinental refused Safeway s request to match Utah’s price,
but renewed its offer at the same prices effective July 31

9
+ .

se ‘UTAH PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING.

ee Continental, which repeated its offer once, would have
oontinued it, that Safeway would have continued to buy
from Continental and that other buyers, large as well
— . as small, would have followed suit. It could also reason-
; ably conclude that a competitor who is forced to reduce
dais prioe to a new all-time low in a market of declining -
7 " Prices ‘will in time feel-the financial pinch and will be
a less effective competitive force.
Even if the impact on Utah Pie as a competitor was
negligible, there remain the consequences ‘to others in
the market who had to compete’ not only with Conti-
-nental’s 22-ounce pie at $2.85 but with Utah’s even lower
price of $2.75 per dozen for both its proprietary and
controlled labels. Petitioner and respondents were not
the only sellers in the Salt Lake City market, although
they did account for 91.8% of the sales in 1961. The
evidence was that there were nine other sellers in 1960
-who sold 23,473 dozen pies, 12.7% of the total market.
In 1961 there were eight other sellers who sold less than
the year before—18,565 dozen or 8.2% of the total—
although the total market had expanded from 184,569
dozen to 226,908 dozen. We think there was sufficient
| C |
32 (a) by Continental. . f
III.
. d ce ‘Company enigréd ‘the: se dessért
pie business in 1955 through the acquisition of Mrs.
Lee's Pies” which was then engaged in manufacturing
and selling frozen pies in Utah and elsewhere under tje
Simple Simon label. Carnation also quickly found
a the market extremely sensitive to price. Carnation de-
cided, however, not to enter an economy product in the
market, and during ‘the period covered by this suit it
offered only its y “Simple Simon” brand. Its pri-
mary method competition in its markets was
to offer a va of discounts and other reductions, and

| "UTAH PIE », CONTINENTAL BAKING. Wi

- thé technique was not unsuccessful, ‘In 1958, for ex-
ample, Carnation enjoyed 10.3% of the Salt Lake City
market, and although its volume of pies sold in that :
market increased nearly 100% in the next year, its per-
centage of the miarket temporarily slipped to 8.670.
However, 1960 was a turnaround year for

the Salt Lake City market; it more than .doub ie
volume of ‘sales over the preceding year and thereby
gained 12.1% of the market. And while
— — 0 1961
Carnation’s position remained important.

Wa need et dwell Jong upon — Carhe- *

tion, which in some respects is similar to that against
Continental and in others more nearly resembles the
case against Pet. After Carnation’s temporary setback
in 1959 it instituted a new pricing policy to regain busi-
ness in the Salt Lake City market. The new policy

ne involved a slash in price of 60¢ per dozen pies, which

brought Carnation's price to a level admittedly well
below its costs, and well below. the other prices prevail-
ing in the market. The impact of the move was felt
immediately, and the two other major sellers in the
market reduced their prices. Carnation’s banner. year,
_ 1960, in.the end involved eight months during which the
prices in Salt Lake City were lower than prices charged
in other markets. . The trend continued during the eight
months in 1961 that preceded the filing of the complaint
in this case. In each of those months the Salt Lake City
prices charged by Carnation were well below prices
charged in other markets, and in all but August of 1961
the Salt Lake City delivered price was 20¢ to 50¢ lower
than the prices charged in distant San Francisco. The
Court of Appeals held that only the early 1960 prices
could be found to heve been below cost. That holding,
however, simply overlooks evidence from which the jury —
could have concluded that throughout 1961 Carnation -

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„ 8 ‘ ; ö ö ‘ an ' 4 :

-: ran v. ‘CONTINENTAL BAKING.”

3 |» maintained a below-cott price structure and that Ons.
tt on's diseriminatory pricing, no less than that by Pet
and Continental, had an important effect on the Salt
Lake City market. We cannot say that the. evidence.

+‘ phecluded: the jury: from: finding it reasonably possible
©: that Carnstion’s nde would i We N

e * . IV.
t 2 (a) 4 not forbid price competition ‘which
. will probably i injure or lessen competition by eliminating
2 competitors, discouraging entry into the market or
, enhancing the market shares of the dominant sellers.
But Congress has established some ground rules for the
„game. Sellers may not sell like goods to different pur-
| '. chasers at different prices if the result may be to injure
competition in either the sellers or the buyers market
‘unless such discriminations are justified as permitted by
the Act. This case concerns the sellers market. In this.
Context, the Court of Appeals placed heavy emphasis on
the fact that Utah Pie constantly increased its sales vol -r
ume and continued to make a profit. But we disagree 85
* with its apparent view that there is no reasonably possible
injury to competition as long as the volume of sales in a
particular market is expanding and at least some of the
competitors in the market continue to operate at a. profit.

at

;

Nor do we think that the Act only comes into play to
? regulate the conduct of price discriminators when their
discriminatory: prices consisténtly undercut other com-
petitors. It is true that many.of the primary line
cases that have reached the courts have involved blatant
predatory price discriminatioris employed with the hope
3 of immediate destruction of a particular competitor. On
the question of injury to competition such cases present
- _ courts with no difficulty, for such pricing is clearly within
the heart of, the proscription of the. Act. Courts and
commentators alike have noted that the existence of
oes intent might bear on a the’ likelihood of i injury

7
= 92 9 3

* <9 e a 3 BY * . 8 a é 2 5
UTAH PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING. 17

eae to competition. In this case there was some evidence .
Nid of predatory intent with respect to each of these respond- *
ents.“ There was also other evidence upon which the

jury could rationally find the requisite injury to compe-

- tition. The frozen pie market in Salt Lake City. was
highly competitive. At times Utah Pie was a leader in
moving the general level of prices down, and at other
times each of the respondents also sbore responsibilit)
for the downward pressure on the price structure. We
believe that the Act reaches price discrimination that
_ erodes competition as much as it does price discrimination -
that is intended to have immediate destructive impact.
In this case, the evidence shows a drastically. declining i
price structure which: the j jury could rationally attribute
to continued or sporadic price discrimination. The j jury
was entitled to conclude that the effect of such dis-
crimination,” by each of these See may de sub-
‘ _ stantially to lessen competition .. . or to i ‘injure, destroy;
or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or. N receives the benefit of such discrimina-

un .” The aun test is one that necessarily . .

das tats 12 dtinwa:
ccc
only fierce competitive instincts. ‘Actual intent to injure another
““s,competitor does not, however, fall into that category, and neither,
‘when viewed in the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, do persist-
ent sales below cost and radical price cuts themselves discriminatory.
Nor does the fact that a local competitor has a major share of the
market,make him fair game for discriminatory price cutting free of
RobinsonsPatman Act proscriptions. “The Clayton Act proscrip-
- tion as to discrimination in price is not nullified merely because of a
_ showing that the existing competition in a partietlar market had
a major share of the sales of the product involved.” Maryland |
Baking Co., 52 F. T.-C, 1679, aff'd, 243 F. 2d 716. In that case
the local cempetitor’s share of the market when price discrimina- -
tion began was 91.3%, yet the Federal Trade Commission. was not
impressed dy ‘the argument that the effect of the discrimination
P ˙ arate
market. .

. — 2
9 1 s
— ‘ U 2 P
. ° A ° 5 0
* 0 cal . 0 ©
. . *

*
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18 UTAH PIE ». . CONTINENTAL BAKING.

‘looks forward on the basis of proven conduct in the
past. Proper application of that standard here requires
reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals?“
Since the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had
failed to make a prima facie case against each of the re-

spondents, it expressly declined to pass on other grounds |
for reversal presented by ‘the respondents. 349 F. 2d
1222, 126. Without intimating any views on the other
eo. grounds presented -to the Court of Appeals, we reverse:
its judgment and remand the case to that court for

e 8 It i 0 ordered.

‘THE Curer Justice took no part i in the decision of this
case.

e disecinidention
cases in the courts and before the Federal Trade Commission, in
which no primary line injury to competition was found, establish
e standard which compels affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ hold-
ing., But, the. cases upon which the respondents rely are readily
distinguishable: In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. F. T. C., 289 F. 2d
835, 839, there was no general decline in price structure attributable
to the defendant’s price discrimination, nor was there any evidetice
that the price discrimipations were “a single lethal weapon aimed
11 Id., at 842. In Borden Co. v.
F. T. C., 339 F. 2d 953, the court reversed the Commigsion’s deci- *
sion on price discrimination. in one market for want of sufficient 1
interstate connection, and the Commission's charge regarding te
5 other market failed to show any lasting impact upon prices caused ae
by the single, isolated incident of. price discrimination proved.
Absence of proof that the alleged injury was due to challenged price
‘discriminations. was determinative in International Milling Co.,
. CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, 1963-1965, M 16,494,
16,648. In Uarco, Inc, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder,
- 1963-1965, { 16,807, there was no evidence from which predatory
* intent could be inferred and no evidence of a long-term market
price decline. ‘Similar failure of proof and absence of sales below
cost were evident in Quaker Oats Co., CCH Trade. Reg. Rep. Trans-
fer Binder, 1963-1965, J 17,134. Dean Milk Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
17767, is not to the contrary: There in the one market where
„td found no primary line injury there was no evidenoe
ofa C

.
\

5.

8 ; ; , N * en 2 c 8 , : . : =
SUPREME OOURE OF THE UNITED STATES |

No. 18.-Oorosan Tei, 105

i * oe 3 on Writ of Cartiorari
Utah Pie Company, Petitioner,|"" che United States

is 9! a D. - 5
Continental Baking Co. et. al. the Tenth Get *

5 i [April 24, 1967.

Mp. JUSTICE Srrwanr, with whom Mn. Suenos
' _ HARLAN joins, dissenting. 2 8
I would affirm the judgment, agi ceing substantially ;
with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals as expressed
in the thorough and conscientious opinion of Judge —
Phillips. .
There is only one issue in this case in its present pos-
ture: Whether the respondents engaged in: price discrim-
ination where the effect. of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, 1
or. prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimina-
tion. Phrased more simply, did the respondents’
- actions have the anticompetitive effect required by the
a statute as an element of a cause of action? f
The Court’s own description of the Salt Lake City
frozen: pie market from 1958 through 1961, shows that
the answer to that question must be ho.“ In 1958 Utah
Pie had a quasi-monopolistic 66.5% of the market. In
1961—after the alleged predations of the respondents—
Utah Pie still had a commanding 45.3%, Pet had 29.4%;
and the remainder of the market was divided almost

1 Section 2 (a) ofthe Clayton Act as amended by the han-
Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a).
2 See ante, p. ae 7.

- UTAH PIE v. CONTINENTAL BAKING.

poe between Contifental, Carnation, and other, . |

local bakers. {Unless we disregard the lessons 80 labo-
riously learned in scores of Sherman and Clayton Act
cases, the 1961 situation has to be considered more com-
petitive: than that of 1958. Thus, if we assume that the

price discrimination proven against the respondents had
any effect on competition, that effect must have been

beneficent.

175 That the Coprt has fallen into de error of reading

‘the Robinson-Patman Act as protecting competitors,
instead of competition, can be seen from its unsuccessful

attempt to distinguish cases rélied upon by the respond-
ents. Those cases are said to be inapposite because they
imnvolyed no general decline in price structure,” and no
“lasting impact: upon prices.” But lower prices are the

hallmark of intensified competition.
The Court of Appeals squarely identified the fallacy
seg the Court today embraces:

. a contention that Utah Pie was entitled to

: ae? the extraordins.y market share percentage of
66.5, attained in 1958, falls of its own dead weight.
To approve such a contention would be to hold that

Utah Pie was entitled to maintain a position which -

~~ approached, if it did not in fact amount to a monop-
oly, and could not exist in the face of proper and
healthy competition.” 349 F. 2d 122, 155.

; 1 cannot hold that Utah Pie’s monopolistic position
was protected by the federal antitrust laws from effective
price competition, and I therefore. respectfully dissent.

*See ante, p. —, n. 15. :

2

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386412_0013%3A29. Public record. Not legal advice.
