# Appendix — United States v. Standard Oil Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1966
- **Citation:** 384 U.S. 224

## Text

—

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1965

No. 291

UNITED STATES, APPELLANT
vs.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

INDEX
Original Print

Record from the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Divi-
sion

Docket entries A
Information. ............................ rare ES 1
2
3

Defendant’s motion to dismiss information......
Stipulation SEC ee er POE Bees ated
Order granting motion to dismiss and dismiss-
ON MIG is a ss een ese esos nceres eee
Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the
| Be Rae eee eee nen neS

[ fol. A}

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No. 64-298-CrJ,
THE UNITED STATES
vs,

STANDARD OIL COMPANY

Fer U.S.:

Wm. J. Hamilton, Jr.

For Defendant:

Richard H. Miller of Mahoney,
Hadlow, Chambers & Adams,

Statistical Record

JS, 2 mailed 10-26-64 Clerk

JS. 3 mailed 8-26-65 Marshal
Violation Discharge gas into St, Docket fee
Johns River-Navigable waters

Title 83

See, 407
DocKET ENTRIES
Date
1964

Oct. 26 Information Filed.

Nov. 25 Notice of Arraignment on Dee, 4, 1964 at 9.30
A. M.

Dec. 38 Motion to Dismiss Information by Deft.

SLL EE AERO TYPE NA, RGIS SS IE ROE SEO IES

Pa

a

Arraigned and Plead Not Guilty
Continued to be set for Trial at a later date

WAM R-31

Notice of Hearing on Pending Motions on Feb. 16,
1965 at 10:20 A. M.

Notice of Trial on Mar. 8, 1965 at 9:30 A. M.

Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss BS

Continued for Term in open court BS

Stipulation between Parties.

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing
Information. R-32 BS

Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States filed by United States

[Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing
paper omitted in printing]

| 3
[fol. 1]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No. 64-298-Cr-J
(83 USC 407)

[File Endorsement Omitted]
[Title Omitted]
INFORMATION—Filed October 26, 1964
The United States Attorney charges:

COUNT ONE

That on or about November 21, 1963, at Jacksonville,
in the Middle District of Florida, Standard Oi] Company
did discharge and deposit and did cause, suffer and pro-
cure to be discharged and deposited from and out of its
oil discharge terminal at the Standard Oil docks, 3117
Talleyrand Avenue, refuse matter, that is, 100 octane
aviation gasoline, into the St. Johns River, navigable
waters of the United States; in violation of Title 33,
United States Code, Section 407. |

EDWARD F. BOARDMAN
United States Attorney

By /s/ William J. Hamilton, Jr.
Assistant United States Attorney

_

4

{fol. 2]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No. 64-298-Cr-J
(33 USC 407)

[File Endorseraent Omitted]
[Title Omitted]
MOTION TO DISMISS INFORMATION—filed December 3, 1964
The Defendant, STANDARD OIL COMPANY (IN-
CORPORATED IN KENTUCKY), moves that the in-
formation be dismissed on the ground that it does not

state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the
United States of America.

MAHONEY, HADLOW, CHAMBERS & ADAMS
By /s/ Ear! B. Hadlow
Attorneys for Defendant

Post Office Box 4099
Jacksonville, Florida

[Certificate of service (omitted in printing) ]

—

(fol. 3]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No. 64-298-Cr-J
[File Endorsement Omitted]
[Title Omitted]
STIPULATION—filed March 24, 1965

The United States of America and Standard Oil Com-
pany, the defendant in the above-styled case, acting by
and through their respective undersigned attorneys, do
hereby stipulate and agree to the following facts, for the
purposes and subject to the limitations hereinafter set
forth:

1. On or about November 21, 1963, at Jacksonville,
Florida, certain employees of Standard Oil Company did
repair and clean a main, 8-inch line connecting one of its
bulk storage tanks at its Tallyrand plant with dock fa-
cilities.

2. At the completion of the repairing, cleaning and
airing-out of the line, employees of Standard Oil did refill
the line with 100-octane aviation gasoline which was then
stored in the bulk storage tank, and, because the main
shut-off valve at the dockside end of the line had been
accidentally left open, approximately 300 gallons of the
described gasoline spilled out of the open valve, onto the
dock, and thus into the St. Johns River, which constitutes
navigable waters of the United States. The shut-off valve
was closed immediately and the amount of the spill was
not such to impede navigation, to damage property or
to cause any fire or explosion.

[fol. 4] 3. Standard Oil immediately reported the matter
to the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and to the
United States Coast Guard. Thereafter Standard Oil
Company was charged, by information, with a violation of

Pa.
Resets em Rese a <TR ARORA AIOE! SOE AE TEP RENNES RPMS i aS SILOS ENT RIE EOS ETRE EL aM RENE

. 7

Title 33, United States Code, § 407, which states in part
that:

“It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or de-
posit, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, dis-
charged or deposited . . . any refuse matter of any
kind or description whatever . . . into any navigable
water of the United States.”

4. The 100-octane aviation gasoline which was acci-
dentally discharged into the St. Johns River was undi-
luted, unspoiled and unadulterated, and spilled directly
from Standard Oil Company’s main storage tank and
main delivery line running therefrom onto the docks and
into the river. Such fuel was sound, valuable and usable
material, in no way damaged or impaired in value prior
to the unintentional spillage thereof from the open valve
and into the navigable water.

5. The spilled gasoline was not salvaged by Standard
Oil Company and was dissipated into the river hy the
current, and by fire hoses and boat wakes of the Jackson-
ville Fire Department and the United States Coast Guard.

6. It is agreed by and between the parties that this
factual stipulation is submitted in this form for the sole
and single purpose of assisting the Court in making a
proper ruling in respect to and in disposition of the de-
fendant’s Motion to Dismiss Information heretofore filed
in this cause. Both parties reserve the right to file
another or supplemental stipulation of facts and to pro-
duce live testimony and exhibits in the event this cause
proceeds to trial.

[fol.5] ISSUE

The issue before the Court, accordingly, is whether or
not the United States of America has stated in its In-
formation facts sufficient to constitute an offense against
said United States of America, by alleging, in this re-
gard, that Standard Oil Company did discharge “refuse
matter” into navigable waters of the United States, which
refuse matter consisted of “100-octane aviation gasoline.”

%

_ ——
7

Respectfully submitted by and on behalf of the parties
hereto, at Jacksonville, Florida, this 23rd day of March,
1965.

EDWARD F. BOARDMAN
United States Attorney

/s/ William J. Hamilton, Jr.
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorney for the United States of

America
407 Post Office Building -
Jacksonville, Florida

MAHONEY, HADLOW, CHAMBERS & ADAMS

/s/ Earl B. Hadlow
Attorney for Defendant, Standard
Oil Company
P. 0. Box 4099
Jacksonville, Florida

—

[ fol. 6]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No, 64-298-Cr.J
| File Endorsement Omitted |

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs,
STANDARD OL COMPANY

ORDER GRANTING MOTION To DISMISS AND DISMISSING
INFORMATION——March 26, 1965

On a prior date the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(filed December 8, 1964) was argued and submitted by
counsel for the respective parties. Both government and
defense counsel were agreeable to the Court's considering
admitted facts in the disposition of the Motion to Dismiss,
At the Court’s suggestion, counsel agreed to submit a
written stipulation of facts to be considered by the Court
solely in connection with the Motion to Dismiss. The
case Was taken off the trial calendar for March 8 vo per-
mit this to be accomplished,

Formal Stipulation, dated March 238, 1965, was filed
by counsel for the parties March 25, 1965, and is con-
sidered by the Court in disposing of the Motion to Dis-
miss, The crucial facts now made to appear, in addition
to those alleged in the information, are these; By the
accidental failure to close a shut-off valve controlling a
line connecting the Defendant's bulk storage facilities at
its Talleyrand plant, Jacksonville, with its dock facilities,
about 800 gallons of 100-octane aviation gasoline was
permitted to spill out of the open valve onto the Defend-
|fol. 7] ant’s dock and from thence into the St. Johns
River, which constitutes navigable waters of the United
States, The shut-off valve was closed and the amount of
spill was not such as to impede navigation, to damage

—_7

property, or to cause any fire or explosion, The gasoline
so accidentally discharged into the river was undiluted,
unspoiled and unadulterated. It was sound, valuable and
usable material, in no way damaged or impaired in value
prior to the unintentional spillage from the open valve
and into the navigable waters, The gasoline was not
salvaged and was dissipated into the river by the current
thereof and by fire hoses and boat wakes of the Jackson-
ville Fire Department and the United States Coast Guard.

The Information here is brought under Title 38, U.S.C,
Section 407, which states in part:

“It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit,
or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged
or deposited... . any refuse matter of any kind
or description whatever . . . into any navigable water
of the United States,”

The information charges the offense in the statutory
language, referring to the substance discharged into the
river as “refuse matter”. The critical question is wheth-
er or not this valuable and entirely usable matecial may
be construed to fall into the description of “refuse mat-
ter”, This is so since the admitted facts at the least show
that the matter was “suffered” to be discharged,

The answer to this question seems to me to be found
[fol. 8] in U.S. v. The Delvalle, 45 F.Supp, 746, decided
by District Cater Circuit) Judge Wayne Borah in the
Eastern District of Louisiana of this Circuit June 24,
1942, There, as here, valuable and usable matter (fuel
oil in The Delvalle) was accidentally discharged into
navigable waters through the failure of a member of the
ship’s crew to completely close the shut-off valve,

Judge Borah’s Conclusions of Law were short and are
quoted herewith:

“Conclusions of Law,

“1. The statute in suit is a penal statute and
must be strictly construed,

2. The word ‘refuse’ is used in the statute in its
adjective sense, Webster's New International Die-
tionary, 2nd Edition, Unabridged, defines the ad-

as
10

jective, ‘refuse’, as follows: ‘Refused; rejected;
thrown aside or left as worthless or of no value;
worthless; useless.’

3. The oil involved in this proceeding was not re-
fused, rejected, or thrown aside or left as worthless
or of no value. It was not worthless nor unless. The
accidental discharge of valuable, usable oil, under the
circumstances set forth, does not constitute a throw-
ing, discharging, or depositing of refuse matter, and
is not a violation of the statute. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 407,
411 and 412.

4. The libel should be dismissed.

Let a decree be entered accordingly.”

Other cases are cited, Second Circuit, which might re-
quire a different conclusion. They are: The Colombo, 42
F.2d 211, and U. S. v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, Inc.,
195 F.2d 369. The Second Circuit said in the latter case:

“The spilled oil was certainly ‘refuse matter’; it
had escaped from the tank whither it could not be
{fol. 9] reclaimed; and for all useful industrial purposes
it had ceased to exist. The word, ‘refuse’, does not
demand that the material must have been deliberately
thrown away; it is satisfied by anything which has
become waste, however useful it may earlier have
been.”

Since the question is open in this Circuit, I am con-
strained to follow Judge Borah’s decision which to me
seems sound and well reasoned, based as it is upon the
dictionary definition of the term “refuse” not otherwise
defined in the statute. This is especially so since we deal
here with a penal statute which should be narrowly and
strictly construed. 7

In consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of the Defend-
ant Standard Oil Company is granted and the Informa-
tion is dismissed.

il

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Jacksonville,
Florida, this 26th day of March, 1965.

/s/ Bryan Simpson
Chief Judge, U. S. District Court

Copies mailed to:

EARL B. HADLOW, ESQ., P. O. Box 4099, Jacksonville,
Florida, 32201, Attorney for Defendant.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, (AUSA Hamilton), 407
Post Office Building, Jacksonville, Florida.

12

[fol. 10]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

No 64-298-Cr-J
[File Endorsement Omitted]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
Vv.
STANDARD OIL COMPANY, DEFENDANT

NoTIcE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES—filed April 26, 1964

I. Notice is hereby given that the United States appeals
to the Supreme Court of the United States from the order
and judgment of March 26, 1965, dismissing the infor-
mation which charged the defendant, Standard Oi] Com-
pany, with a violation of 33 U.S.C, 407.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 18 U.S.C, 3781.

II. The Clerk will please prepare a transcript of the
record in this case for transmission to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and include therein
the following:

1. Transcript of docket entries

2. Information

3. Motion to dismiss the information

4. Stipulation of facts to be considered by the Court
in connection with the motion to dismiss

5. Order granting the motion to dismiss and dismiss-
ing the information

6. This notice of appeal

Ls 4 r EY M él

13

III. The following question is presented by this appeal:

Whether gasoline which was permitted to spill out invo
navigable waters of the United States constituted “refuse
{fol. 11] matter” within the purview of 33 U.S.C. 407
prohibiting the discharge of any refuse matter of any
kind or description into the navigable waters of the
United States,

EDWARD F, BOARDMAN
United States Attorney

/s/ William J. Hamilton, Jr.
Assistant United States Attorney

Dated this 26th day of April 1965.

[Clerk’s Certificates to foregoing paper and transcript
omitted in printing. |

(oe. 3a} *°”

14

(fol. 13]
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No, 291, October Term, 1965

UNITED STATES, APPELLANT
Vv.
STANDARD OIL COMPANY
APPEAL from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida.
ORDER NOTING PROBABLE JURISDICTION—October 11, 1965

The statement of jurisdiction in this case having been
submitted and considered by the Court, probable juris-
diction is noted and the case is placed on the summary
calendar.

UV. 8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1965 791032 289

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386411_0261%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
