# Appendix — Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386411_0073%3A08 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1964 - **Citation:** 377 U.S. 656 ## Text / TABLE OF CONTENTS: : So ea ee 1. The history of the Federal Consgtution with regard io representation in Congress_--.-~.------------------ ee SE .b. The Federalist Papers._.:-..----- cabinets c. Other post-convention ‘materials prior to the 4. patifying convehtion............-------+--- de The. ratifying conventions ...---------- shinies - e. Materials on the Constitution originating. after the start of the new government------------ 2. Lhe views of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison on © apportioning state legislatures ----~-- ealaqpenestipabibensesitbeoss } mt IG i oo itenonene ee eT See enero hibnhatiane €_ — 706-573>43--— 1 e a ° \ ” if 5 a ° ° ‘ . ° . 2 . > aS $ ars : ’ “. ° . . gi ° ‘ ' — : * ° Ps . . ' G . o, ? . + e . J aE . o . “© APPENDIX B 1. THe History or tHE FepeRAL, CONSTITUTION WITH REGARD TO ‘REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS. a. The Convention—The Confederation ‘of the United States, which was formed in 1777 by the thir- teen States, was explicitly a confederation of SOv- ereign States. . Articles of Confederation, Article IT. Each State, aithough, it could have two to seven dele- gates to the Congress, had a single vote. Id., Art. V.. s While the power to make treaties and wage war was . hy ; 5 Congress could not impose taxes, but could only ask the States to contribute -pariicular sums. I[d., Art. VI. ; eee Sie erat The lack of’ power of the Confederation to ‘meet the. ‘growing problems of the former colonies led to -a serious crisis. See The Federalist, Nos.-15~22 (Cooke ed, 1961); pp. 90-146. The convention in Phila. | delphia was ealled by the Congress by a resolution dated February 21, 1787, “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall When agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states’ render the federal . constitution adequate to the exigencies of . . Government & the preservation’ of the Union,” IIT Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand ed., 7 1911),' 14. On May 18, 1787, a few days after the first delegates arrived in Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin. describe d the meeting as “ag Convention of the prin- “Herejinaftef referred to as “Farrand.” | gts 7 ‘4 : ee : z ‘e “9 ‘cipal people in the several States, for the purpose ’ of revising the federal Constitution, and proposing | such amendments as shall be thoroughly necessary.’’: Letter to Richard Price, May 18, 1787, id. at 21. 4Phus, both the Congress. and ‘Franklin conceived of the purpose of the convention as merely to revise the ' Confederation, but to keep its essential form. “On the other hand, some of the delegates arriving in Philadelphia were proposing to form ‘an entirely different kind of government, a national government:-* _ in which.representation in the legislature would be on the basis of population. George: Mason, a, delegate © - from Virginia, wrote saa son on May 20, 1787 (IIL Farrand 23): . —°.. x The most sian ‘idea in the principal States seems to be a total. alternation of the’ present federal systeri, and substituting a great national council or parliament, consisting of two branches of the legislature, founded upon . the pringiples of equal proportionate represen- ~ tatiori, with full, législative powers upon all the subjects of the Union; and an executive: and to make the several State legislatures sub- _ ordinate to the national, by giving the latter _ the power of a negative upon all such laws as they shall judge contrary to the interest of the fedéral Union. ° AN few days later, on May: 21, Mason wrote altnost \. identirg words to Arthur Lee. -Ta- at 24. That same a - day, reorge Read, a- dNegate from Delaware, wrote ?The terms seth ‘and federal. government vas ised by othe framers themselves in conflicting ways apparently for par- tisan advantage. Therefore, the ‘meaning can be ascertained only from the particular context. We, however, use national government to mean a government operating directly“ on the people in which the States are plainly subordinate. , We use Federal government to mean a government, which regu- lated certain areas but with the other areas remaining under the authority of sovereign 5 team ; - “of & proposal for a new federal.system (id. at 25): eee iy Sipe ar. 3 to’ John Dickinson, another delegate from Delaware, -Some of its principal features are taken from the New York system of government. A house of delegates and senate for a ‘general legislature, as to the great business: of the _ Union. The first of them to be chosen by. the _ Legislature of each: State, in proportion to its - number of white inhabitants, and three-fifths of all others, fixing a number for sending each representative. The second, to wit, the senate, to ‘be ‘elected by the delegates so: returned, either from themselves or the people at large, ‘in four great districts, into which the United States are to be divided for the purpose of forming this senate from, which, when . so: formed, is to he divided into four classes for ‘the purpose of an°annual rotation of a fourth of the members.’ Read warned that the small States imust be careful ‘to protect theiy interests. Ibid. George Mason wrote his son on June 1 that (id. at 32): peretee ea a The idea T formerly mentionéd- to you, be- fore the Convention met, of a great national council, consisting of two branches of the legis-. lature, a judiciary and an executive: upon the principle of fair representation in the legisla- _ ture, with powers adapted to the great objects . of the Union, and consequently a control . . ——— In these instances, on the State legislatures. is ‘still the prevalent. one. Virginia has had . the honor of presenting the outlines of the nian. °°? ©, . oe a The convention held its first mecting o1# May 14, SY 1787, but was adjoined: because of lack of a quortm. [ Farrand 1. Soon after regular sessions started on May 25th, the convention started to, do its ‘work *The New York “Senate and Assembl¥: ‘were apportioned by/ - eligible voters. New York Constitution of! 1777. Articles 4. 12. saan eee through a Committee of the Whole. On May 31, in- -* debate on whether. the first branch of the legislature _ should be elected: diredtly by the people, George ‘Mason qi Farrand 48-49) : ; F ‘ wee argued dinate for an election of. the ; larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of ‘the democratic sa of the Govt. During ‘debate on June 6th on. whether the upper house of the new legislature should be elected by the. - - state legislatures instead of the people, Pierce Butler, &y of South Carolina stated that he opposed “deter- meer the mode of election until the ratio of Repre- ion is fixed—if that proceeds on a principle. favorable to wealth as well as number of Free In- ‘habitants, I am coritent to unite wh. Delaware: (Mr. . Read) in abolishing the. State Legislatures, and he- * coming one Nation instead of a confedn.-of Repub- ‘* lies"? [King].* 1 Farrand. 144. The next day, in ‘ " . * continuing the debate on the sarie proposals, Madison - ‘said that if the Senate was to be elected by the state legislatures (id. at-151) : *.* * we must either depart from the cities ." of: proportional representation; or admit into . the Senate avery large number of members. The first is inadmissible, being evidently un- just. The second:is inexpedient. 7 * "George Mason stated (id.at 161):°. = 2 + ia - ’* All references to the proceediffZs of the constitutional con ac vention are to the offigial Journal or to Madison’s notes unless ~.. otherwise indicated, Rufus King of Massachusetts and Robert Yates of New York also made no ane part of the proceedings _to which. we will occasionally refer. , © This quotation is from Mason’s notes of a speeci: which Farrand believes was given on June.7. I Farrand 160-161, | note 8. azo a. i? ° . The treaties, leagues, arid =confederacies: be- tween different’ sovereign, independent powers ‘ have been urged as proofs in support of. the propriety and justice of the-single and equal representation of each individua] State in the ‘American Unién; and thence corclusions have been drawn. that the people of these United °- States would refuse to adopt a government founded more on an equal representation of the people themselves, than on the distinct ~ 7 representation of .each separate, individual State. \ If the different States in. our Union always had been as now substantially and in - reality distinct, sovereign and independent, - this kind of: reasoning would have. great Tee SB “On June 8th; Gunning Bedford. of Delawate om: Ee pyaned at attempts (1 Farrand 167): * * * to strip the small. States of their ‘equal right of suffrage. In this case Delaware would have about 1/90 for its ‘share ‘in the General Councils, whilst Pa. & Va, would possess 14 of _the whole. * * * This shows the impossibility _.of adoptihg such a system as that on the. table, or any other founded on a change in the prin- ciple of representation. i The next day,. June 9th, the Cceditns. 6f* the Whole considered the resolution (I Farrand 181): Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suf- _ frage in the national legislature ought to be ap- - portioned tothe quotas of contribution, er to the number of inhabitants, as the-one or other rule- mai seem bést in ‘(different cases. -[ Yates]. A long dehate ensued. Wilham i iahete of New. . Jersev said that (id.at 17) + . A 1, OH Hye proposition for a proportional! rep-~ -. resentation [struck] at: the ‘existence of. the lesser States. He wd. premise however .to an. investigation of this que stion some‘remarks on os 6 - _ the. nature structure and powers of the Con- ° , vention. The Convention he said was formed in pursuance of ‘an Act of Congs. that this act ‘ was recited in several of the Cornmissions, par- ticularly that of Massts, which he required to | be read: That the amendment of the confed- eraty was the object of all the laws and com- missions,on the subject; that the articles of the. — tion were therefore the’ proper basis — . the proceedings of the Convention. .We sh to keep within its limits, or we should be charged by our constituents * with ‘usur- : pation.. ; Paterson then stated (id, at 178): vies eee A confederacy supposes EEN in the '/- members composing it & sovereignty supposes = equality. If we are to be considered. as a na- tion, all State distinctions must be abolished, the whole must he thrown into hotchpot, and | - when an equal division is made, then there may _be fairly an equality of representation. Paterson’s notes: for’ his. speech on June 9th state , (id. at 186) : ; ? Each State is %vereign, free, and. edlepend- ’ ent, ete. Sovereigrity includes Equality— If then the States in Union are as States still to continue. in U nion, they must. be considered as Equals— "i 13° sovereign and independent leates ean never constitute one Nation, and at the same © Time be. States—they may be Treaty make one confederated Body— James Wilson of Pennsylvania, a proponent of a — strong national government (I Farrand 179-180) : * * * entered Aaborately into the defence of a ° proportional] representation, stating for his first position that as all authority was derived from the people, ‘equal numbers of people ought te have an ecfital no. of representatives, and dif-~ . Ee ferent -numbers of people different matnbese of eee ae This principle had been im- rly violated iri the Confederation, owing e urgent circumstances of the time. * * * Mr. P. admitted persons, not property’ to be the measure of suffrage. Afe not the citizens of Pena. equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require. 150 of the former to balance 50 of the - latter? Representatives of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their aa aan constituents hold ZG each other. The next speaker, Hugh Ww liamson of North Carolina (id. at 180): ? ee PP caaege the cases by a comparison’ “of aes the different. States, to Countiesof different sizes within the same States; observing that ' proportional representation was admitted to be _ just in the latter case, and could not therefore . be fairly contested in "the former. aa Judge David ‘Brearly of New Jersey agreed with Pat- _ erson (id. at: 181-182) : If the states still remain SOV ereign, the form of — the present resolve is: founded on principles of injustice. He then stated the comparative _ weight of each state—the number of votes 90. ” Georgia would be 1, Virginia 16, and so of the -rest. ‘This vote must defeat itself, or end in despotism. If we must have a national govern- . ment, what is the remedy? Li-y thé map of the © _ confederation on the table, and extinguish the present boundary lines pyam respective state _ . Jurisdictions, and make a new division so that__' each state is equal—then:a government on the present system: will be just. - [Yates] In contrast, Edward Carrington wrote Thomas Jef- ferson on the same day that the basic issnes be fore the convention hier Farrand pees) Yi [A a WER eh BEES asin d SR6dR, wane Servs tran RAP Lite TR PRE A RIE IEG AS MSE pen . ° oa ® . ye ag ES. NY ee ik PRY we 2 ‘Mea Wea Tae ee, ee el oN 2 os ; é ™ e : O'8'F te spaniels to two se dhisee x—the first, as. e - eonsolidation of the whole Empire inte one re- Aublic, leaving in the states nothing more :thai: ‘subordinate courts for facilitating the adrhin- ‘ istration of the Laws—the second an investiture - - of“of [sic] a foederal sovereignty with full and. independant authority as to the Trade, Reve- nues, and forces of the Union, and the: rights of » aes and’ War,. together with a Negative upon * all the Acts of the State legislatures. the first idéa, I apprehend, would be impracticable, and therefore do not suppose it. can be adopted—. _ general: Laws through a Country embracing so vy Borey productions, .aid- manners, as. -.. ited States, would operate many oppres- Ming! A pe & a general tegislature’.would, bé found | . _ incompetent to the formation of local ones, as” ce Sa majority would, in every instance, be ignorarit et. Gee of, and unaffected hy thie objects ofelegisla . ~*~ — , ay * tion * *-* Something tike the second will . en * probably: be formed—indeed I am certain’ that nothing less than what will give the foederal -. sovereignty compleat. controul over the State Governments, will che thought worthy of dis- J * * # eyssion fe On June 11, ‘1787, a resolution was: introduc ed (1. Far rand 192-193) :. a . that the right of suffrage in ‘tai first braneh ‘of ‘ the riational Legislature ought not to be accord- —— - -ing to'the rule established in the articles of con- ) federation ; but according’ to some equitable ratio lee ; of representation, ** * in proportion to the >: »® oe. whole number of white ‘and other ‘free Citizens and ‘inhabitants of every age; sex and condition, - - ineluding those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons. not ' + comprehended in the foregoing’ description, ex- . | | oe Indians, not paying taxes in each State. es +S The resolution was ‘passed 9 to 2° by th Conimittee of the W hole with only New’ Jersey ‘and; Delaware op- __ posing. Roger Sherman of Connecticut then proposed. : rae, <>) ’ ® 5 : a.) % gt x . e ° . ~ 9 ; ¢ a for the first time the plan which was uitimately. | adopted for the Congress: ‘‘[¢Jhat in. the steend— braneh of the National Legigature each State have One vote.” Id. at 193.. Sherman explained a at 204) : pier erkiis that as the mr, ought to have the elee-. tion of one of the brar@hes of the legislature, . - the legislature of each@state qught, to have the . election of. the second branch, in order to pre- . serve the state sovereignty ; ‘and: that each state - - «ought in this branch to have.one vote. [Yates] The resolation was rejected 6 states. to 5. Id. at 193. James’ Wilson, then proposed a’ resolution, which was seconded by Alexander Hamilton:, ‘that the right of . ’ suffrage. in the second. branch of the national Legis- lature ought tobe: according to the rule established . in the first.” ‘Ibid. This resolution was passed 6 to 5: The debate ‘on June 11th centered in large part on iielitls: dhe legislature should be apportioned: aceord- to inhabitants.or, taxes.° John Rutledge of South’ Carolina (1 Farrand 196) :. eee proposed that the proportion of suffi ne in the Ast. branely shouid according to the quotas ‘of contribution. - The. justice of - this rule he said: could not be contested. Pierce Butler of § Pith Carolina —— Rntlede(%s proposal ‘(id. at 204) : . [MJjoney is strength; le every state’ oug it -to have its weight in the’ national. couneil in "6 New Hampshire stjll- apportions its Senate by taxes paid. | The support foxy this proposition at the convention reflects the belief that if." suthth by taxes as’ Well as by population wis equitable, “since ‘the foriner constituted. the contribution of, the States to the federal government. On the other hand, equal ° representation to all the States, regardless of inhabitants or” contribution, .was considered by the supporters of Joist es ment according to taxes to be unfair: @ NN fad a. « -# 10 ates | John Dickenson likewise (id. at 196) : | ~~ * * * eontended for the avtzal contributions of the States as the rule of their oe _ suffrage in the first branch. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts opposed th posal because he (td. at 201): . eee thought property not the rule of repre- _ ‘sentation.. Why then shd. the blacks, who were ~ sentation more than the cattle & horses, of the ‘North. Benda: Franklin said that he ee that . (id. at. = 197-198) : ee the muumiber” of Dcicthintiiatons ‘should bear some proportion to’ the number of the Represented; “and that. the decisions shd. be by the majority df members, not by the majori- ty of States. This is objected to from an ap- ‘prehension that the greater States would then swallow up the smallér * * *. _- But, Sir,” in, the present mode. of voting -by. States, it is ‘equalty in the power of the lesser States to swallow up the greatér ete pee June 14, the North? Carolina Sean, sii ‘to Goverpor Caswell, that the problem of the con- vention was to form a ‘‘Union of Sovereign States; preserving their~€ivil Liberties and connected. to-. gether by such Tyes as to Preserve permanent & effective Governments * * *. III Farrand 46. ' The New @ersey plan, was presented to the conven- tion. ‘by Paterson on June 15. Its first sentence . emphasized: ‘‘That a*union of the States merely > federal ought to be the sole ‘Object of the Exercise _ of the Powers vested in this Convention”’ IIT Far- sceiasiiiiain to the quantity it possesses. property in the South, be in the rule of repre- é “eg é 6 « . ° $ ; a 11 | 4 . : rand 611.. AS to Congress, the plan proy ided (td. at OQ G3) 5 = Resolved That every State in the Union as a State possesses an equal Right to, and Share _ of, Sovereignty, Freedom, and Independance—- Resolved, therefore, that the Representation “in the supreme Legislature ought .to be by States, otherwise some of the. States in the Union will possess a greater Share of Sever- eignty, Freedom, and Independence than oth- ers. * * a! 2 The next day, Cisienns rare the basie assnmp- : : tions of. the plan (I Farrand'250): : oe a confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger . powers, not assume them of ‘ourselves. * *-*— CO Our: object is net such a Governmt. ds may be | best in‘itself, but such a one as our Constit- uents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. -If’we argue. the matter on _ the supposition that no Confederacy at present exists, it can not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. * * * If we argue on the fact that a federal compact i actually exists, and consult the articles of it we bag find an equal Sovereignty to be the-basis of ape ‘He reads the 5th. art: of Confederation — ow piving each State a ‘vote—€& the 13th. declar- ing that no alteration shall be, madé witheut | unazlimous consent. . -This is ‘the nature of all _ ‘treaties. Dies atte “Burning to the question of representation, he said a (id. at 251) :. - If the sovereignty of the States is to ‘be main- tained, the: Représentatives must be drawn im- mediately from-the States, not from the people: - and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. : ° ey be o James Wilson replied strongly: (id. at 253-254) He would not repeat the makes he had foxin- erly made as the principles of Representation. he would only [say] that an inequality in it, has ever. been a poison contaminating: every ‘branch of Govt. In G. Britain where * this _ poisen has-had a full operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely to,the purity. of her tribunals of Justice * * *. The political liberty.of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the merey of its rulers. “Paterson then regponded (id. at 259): FR Jepresentation: must be drawn frora_ the states to maintain their independency, and not from.the people composing those states. — 'The doctrine advaneed by a: learned gentl- . -man from Pennsylvania [Wilson4, that all _power is derived from the people, and that in proportion to their numbers they ought to .° participate equally i in the benefits and rights of government, is right: in principle, but ‘unfor-. tunatety for him, wrong in the application to the question now in debate. -. When independent societies confederate for mutual defence, they do-so in their’ collective capacity; and: then each state for those pur- ‘poses must be considered as. one of the contract- Ing parties. Destroy this balance of equality, and you endanger the rights of the lesser socie- ties by the danger of usurpation in the greater. "| Let us. test the government intended to -he ‘made by the Virginia plan on these principles. whe. representatives in the national legislature. . are to be'in proportion to the number of inhabi- - tants in each state.. So far‘it is right upon the . principles of equality, when. state distinctions are done ‘away; but those to certain purposes | still exist * * *. In his notes, Rufus King shows how deiliis: Sevie- ing representation by population based their argu- a * . ; “* +s > : 8 13. , a- rae a ment on ar kind of government which was to be con- stituted. ‘ His notes’ state as to Robert Lansing of ‘New York, who favored giving equal reppesentation 7 to ‘all .the States (I Farrand 263-264) : ¥ . Lansing Natl. i eee. [- & One Br..to come from. ec come from. the the people m propn..- State . Legislatures part to yr. numbers . equally & to repre-— +4 Rees sent the States All acts-of ind. States To possess enumerated ‘subject to a national powers Negative’: * Will absorb the State ,Sovereignties & leave , them mere Corpora- tions, & Electors. of the natl. Senate— , -Remarks—The confedn. admits the sovereign- : ties of the States—it speaks of an Union—hut it never meant a consolidation—If this ‘had been in view NYk never wd. have sent ‘Dele- ga * &.# Similarly, King’s notes show . Wilson, who pro- . posed apportionment by population (id. a 269-265): Ww ilson—contrasts the two— . Nat. on Ped. Legis. of 2 Brs.. - A ‘Congress or one Br. ie ‘People are the_ ere Legislatures of basis of Rep— : State A -repn. according _T e ‘States are equal Numbers or Wea Ast Where the rine? of unequal Represtn. prevails there exists a poison wh. eventually will dexttoy it the Government— s . oS ‘14 : Ga June e 18, 1787, ‘Alexander Sacniiten ' attacked the New Jersey plen (1 Farrand 286) : Another destructive ingredient in the [N ew . Jersey] pian, is that equality of suffrage which. is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that Va. & the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they shd. long abide by it. It shecks too much. the ee of Justice, and every ‘human | feeling + v3, He also submitted to the Committee of the Whole a ~ sketch of a plan for the new government.’ The plan — ' set the’ number of Representatives. at the start for each State apparently on -the basis of population. After that, the plan provided (IIT.id, at 620): The Legislature shall provide for the future _ élections of Representatives, apportioning them . In each State, from time to time as nearly as may be to the number of persons described in the "46 of the VII article,“ so\as that the whole- - number of. Representatives. shall never be less than one hundred, nor more than hundred. There shall be a Census taken for this purpose within three years after the first meeting of the Legislature, iM within, every successive period of ten years... The composition of the initial Senate was likewise _ to be preseribed by the constitution but the number for each State had not been filled i in. .As to the appor- *This plan was never actually before. the convention. ITi Farrand 617. . “= s * Article VII, Section 4 of the plan provided for the appor- ‘tionment of direct taxes among the States by the number of inhahjtants, except Indians not taxed and three-fifths of all other persons. ITT Farrand 628. ™~ i? Cy ee ara Ya : “15 - tionment’ of senators, Hamilton's ee provided (id. at 621): The Legislature shall spaviiie fo the future” eléctions of Senators, for which purpose the . States respectively, which have more than one Senator, shall be divided into convenient. dis- tricts to which the Senators shall be appor- tioned. A State having but one Senator shall be itself a district. * * * The number of Senators shall never be less _ than forty, nor shall any State,4f the same shall not hereafter be. divided, ever have less than the number allotted to it in the second section of | this article; but the Legislature may increase. ‘the whole ‘umber of Senators, in the same pro- - portion to the whole number of Representatives _as forty is to one hundred; and such increase | - beyond the present number, shall de appor- tioned to. the respective Sfates in a ratio to the respective numbers of their representatives. If States shall be divided,’ or if a new a have two ‘bran¢ltes, and a proportional repre- . sentation in 6he of them, provided each State . to had an“equtial voice ‘in the other. .This was necessaty to secure the rights of the lesser. States; otherwise three or four of the large States would rule the others.as they please. - The next day, William Samuel’ Johnson of ‘Connecti-*« * cut noted that James Wilson. and the Virginians had said that they did not want to abdlish the States (1 Ee Farrand 355) : cess He wished’ it therefore: to ‘be well considered whether in case the States, as .was proposed, shd. retain:some portion of sovereignty at least, . this portion could be preserved, without allow- ing them to participate effectually in the Gen. . Govt., without giving them each a distinct and » equal vote for the purpose, of defending them- st | ? selves in the general Councils. 7 - _. The debate as to representation continued on June - ' 25, 1787. Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts said + that (I Barrand Ma40: 5): : ? “* *:* he inelined to a,compromist as te the rule , ‘of proportion. He thought there was some. e e- 18 : oe weight in the. dbbitieni of the emell States. a. should have 16 votes & Delre. with sev- _ = mal other States together: 16. those from Virga. . ~“ would be mote likely to unite than the others, - and would therefore have ‘an undue influence. ~ This remark was-applicable not, only to States, - - but to Counties or other districts.of the same - _ State. Accordingly the Constitution of Massts. had provided that: the representatives. of the larger districts should not be in an exact ratio ; - to their riumbers.’ And experience he thought had shewn the provision. to be expedient. - - George Read of Delaware complained that the large ‘. States had appropriated the western . lands which ‘should have been applied to the public debt (id. at 405) : be applied fairly & equally to the discharge of - the general debt, and the sifaller States who’ had been injured would listen then perhaps to those ideas of just representation which had been held out. eae James Wilson opposed election of the second nena by the state legislatures (id. at 406) : ~The Genl..Govt. is not an assemblage of States, _but -of .individuals for certain political pur- ; _ poses—it ds not meant for*the States, but for - the individuals composing them: the individuals therefore not the States, ought to” be repre-. sented in it: A proportion in this representa-_- : tion. carn be preserved in the 2d. as welljas in the 1st: Me koy and. the elecffon ean be made by — electors chosen by the_people for that gurpose, 7 The Massachusetts | Constitetion . of 1780 @Povided that. the Senate would be apportioned among the districts on the "basis _ of taxes paid. Part IT, Ch. T, See. 2; Art. I. One member of the House of Representatives was: appdrtioned to each town having 450 voters and an additional member for-evéry 225 addi- tional. voters, except that each existing town was Bien at least one. Part IT, Ch. I, See. 8, Art. IT. . Uy © Let justice be aes on this head ; let the. furia: o* he - He said (I Farrand 437-438) : Ny However, his “amendment to ‘this effect: _Was not seconded. ators 7% . Pierce Butler of South Cintine ciesuael eve the issue as to the election of second branch until the question of representation was decided. James Madi- ‘son seconded. the proposal, but it was rejected 7 to 4. .. I Farrand 407-408. The convention then voted 9 to 2 to have the second’ house elected by ‘the state legisla- tures, with Virginia and Pemisylvania: opposing.’ At - this point. in his notes Madison dropped | a footnote (id. at.408): ‘i Sane ig” It must be kept i in view 7 that the largest States. “particularly. Pennsylvania & Virginia always considered the choice of the 2d. Branch by the State Legislatures as opposed.to a proportional Representation to: which they were attached as a mar reese principle of just Government. | The smaller States who had opposite views, . were reenforced. by the members from the large’ _ ’ States most anxious to secure the importance of the State Governments. James Wilson of Pennsylvania likewise’ said at’ rele convention (id. at 413): Equality of’ representation | can not be ‘estab- .. lished, if the second braneh Be lected by the — s state legislatures. [ Yates] . In the debate on June. 27th as to whether repre-_ " sentation in the first house should be by population, ‘Luther Martin of Maryland supported continuation of the state governments as under the Confederation. : e “f[A]m equal vote in each State, was. essential to the federal idea, and was ‘founded’ in justice & freedom, not merely in policy: that tho’ the States may gixe up this right. of sovereignty, vet they had not, and ought not:-that the States like. individuals ‘were in a: State’ of: nature 7: 4 at a $ 7 ' ¥. " ‘ ios ‘ ican ee ee fay sa teipes gs e % . 20. err 3 : equally sovereign & free * **, {T]he States : " equal cannot treat or confederate. ‘$0 as “to give. up an equality of votes without giving up their liberty: that the propositions on the table were a system of ‘slavery for 10 States:: - et that as Va. Masts. & Pa. have 42/90 of the’ ° - votes they can do as they please without a ' miraculous Union of the other ‘ten: that they will have nothing to do,- but to gain over one ' of the ten to make them compleat masters of . the rest * * *: that no State in’ ratifying the Confederation. had objected tothe equality of - votes; that the complaints’ at present run not agst. this equality but the want. ef power; that * 16 members from Va. would be more likely te aet in concert than a@ like number formed of . Members. from different States; that instead - of a junction of the smafl States asa remedy, ‘ he thought a division of the large States would be more eligible. Yates’ account of this same speech states (id. at 440- Pog 441): AD dee -—*Phhis~ prineiple of. equality, ‘when applied ie individuals, is lost in some degree, when he he- a comes a member of a-society, to whieh it ‘is. transferred; and this society, by the name of state or kingdom is, with “respect “to others; again on a perfect footing of equality—a right to govern themselves as they please. “Nor can “any other state, of right, deprive them of this equality. If such a. state confederates, it is ‘Intended for the good of. the whole; and if ‘it agains confederate, those, rights must be well + guarded * * *. .We must treat as free states = with each other, upon the same terms of equal- ity that men originally formed themselv eS. into socicties. # 4 5 ‘es * ' ae _ If the foundation 6f the existing confederation is well laid, powers may be added—Yoy may safely add a | third story toa house where the - The next day, Luther Martiti contimied his > Speech an g ee foundation is’ good * * Price says, that laws made by one man .or a set of men, and not by common consent, is pyew give it is se when applied to states; if vou give t unequal representation. ' x I Farrand 444-445) :. . [T]he Genl. Govt. ought to be Seanad for * thing whether their (represéntatives) were Yates ‘' “¢* * * Representation on federal principles | the States, not for ‘individuals: that if the “States were to have votes: in proportion to em an © their numbers of people, it ‘would be the same | chosen ‘by the Legislatures or the people; the smaller States would be equally enslaved * * ™. reports as to this speech (id. at 453-455) : | ' In a Federal governnient, a-majority of states must ard ought to tax. In-the local govern- ment of states, counties. may be tinequal—still numbers, not property; ° govern. © What is. the government now forming over states or persons? As té-. the ‘latter, their rights cannot be the object of a‘‘general _govern- ment—These are.-already se@ured’ by their _ guardians, the state governments. The general. . government is them@fore intended only to done, you must go’ back to principles: purely - my federal. . ° yon: ae *. ne hk - *' * The admission of the firger states: inta the confederation, on the. principles of equality, is dangerons—But on the Virginia system, it. .— ‘is ruimous. and destructive. Still it is the true - interest of ail. the. states to confederate * 72 * ; * * 9 * * f ” ‘ & ; v 22. > eer I would rather cokfederate with | single lars state, than }ubmit to the Virginia pian. But -.° , we are alrégdy confederated, and no- power on “earth ean dissolve it but by the consent of all - the’ contracting powers—and four states; on es this floor, have already declared, their opposi- gas eae tion to annihilate it pias James Madison, in opposing the motion see Laiising at that “the représentation of the first branch be accord- ing to tie articles, of the confederation” [Yates] (1 "Farrand 455), said that (id. at 44{}-449) : . od [H]e. was much disposed to concur in. any ex- - - pedient not inconsistent’ with fundamental . principles, that could remove the difficulty con- cerning: the- rule or representation.__But. he could neither be convinced that the rule ¢on- ceeded by MY. Breerly [sie] & Mr. Patterson Tsie] themselves.” The expedient proposed “by them. was a new partition of ‘the 4erritory’ of | the U. States. The fallacy of: fie reasoning 4 ° drawn from .the. equality of Sovereign States = in the formation of compacts, lay in confound- ing mere Treaties, in’: which were specified cer- tain dutiés to which the. parties were to be bound, and‘certain rules by which their subjécts - were to be reciprovally governed: in their intér- »’ . eourse, with 4 ompact by which an authority / . was created paramount:to the parties¢& making . _ laws for-the government of them.. If France, England & Spain were to enter into a Treaty for |. ° the regulation of commerce &c. with the Prince _ ‘of Monacho & 4 or 5 other of the smallest sover- eigns of: Europe; they. would. not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulatioris ‘perfectly. reciprocal. Wad. the ‘esee be the same if a Council were to be formed «of deputies -from each with authority, ,, and. discretion, to : tended for was just, nor necessary for the’ | safety of . the small ‘States agst. ‘the large _ States. That it, was not just; had been con-' @ .) : ° a , 3 : & ag Wigs .° faise money, levy troops, determine ‘the value - of coin &c? ‘Would 30 or 40 million of people submit their fortunes into the hands, of a few thousands? If they did it would. only: prove that they expected more. ‘from the terror of their superior force, than they feared from ae Y = the selfishness of their feeble associates. ‘Why - '- are Counties of the same States represented -in propertion to their numbers? Is it because the represéntatives are chosen by the people themselves? ‘so’ will be the representatives in the Nation]. Legislature. Is it beeause, the larger have more at stake than the snialler ? The casé will be the same with the Jarger. & ee sma aller States. Is it because the laws are to. - | operate imniediately on their persons & prop- erties? The same is the ease in some degree cas the articles of confederation stand; the séfne will be the ease in a far greater degree under ° the plan proposed to be substituted..* * * By the plan proposed a compleat power .of taxa- tion, the highest prerogative of supremacy is. .~ proposed to be vested in the National Govt. pe Many other powers are added which assimilate. ‘it to thé Govt. of individual States. The nega- — _ tive on’ the State_laws proposed, will make .it’ an essential- branch of the State Legislatures - & of course will require that it should be exer- - cized by a body established on like principles with. the other branches of those Legisla- wee, eee = * * ee ee * * * Ina word; the two extremes before us | are a perfect separation & a perfect ineorpora- tion,, of the 13 States. -In the first ease they w ould be independent nations subject to no. law. but the law of nations. Tn the last, they would - be mere counties of one entire’ republic, subject to. one common law. In the first case ey smaller states would have everv thing to fear | from the larger. Tn the last. they would have’ .s = o \ \ eee - - nothing to fear. ‘The t true oe of the small - States therefore lies in promoting’ these prin- ciples & that form of Govt. which will most ap-_ proximate the _Btates to the condition of ‘ Counties. 7) ee reports. that Madison said (id. at 457): There is danger i in the idea of the*gentleman from Connecticut: Unjust representation will ever produce it. In the United Netherianis, | Holland governs the whole, although she. has . only one vote. The counties - in Virginia are exceedingly. disproportionate, and -yet -the ‘smaller hasan equal vote with the — and no inconvenience arises." Returning to the ‘analogy of England’s. rotten prt ps James Wilson said (I Farrand 449-450) : - The- -leading argument of those who contend " ‘ie equality of votes.among the States‘is thaf* the States as such being equal, and being repre- sented wot as: districts of individuals, but in their political & corporate capacities, are en- titled to .n equality of suffrage. According to this mode of reasoning the representation of the burroughs in Engld which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten part of the Con- stitution, is perfectly right & proper. They are like the States represented in their corporate ° * ‘capacity tike the States therefore-they are en- “titled to equal voices, old’ Sarum [a rotten bor-- ough} to as many as ‘London. And instead of - . the injury supposed hitherto to be dene to Lon- don, the true grand of complaint | lies with old ° The last sentence,, supporting representation on a*non- population basis,’ seems almost surely dn error of the reparter. It is inconsistent with the first two sentences of the same ac- count, as well as with numerous other statements. made by | Madison at the-cenvention. Furthermore, it is:not reflected in ° _-Madison’s own detailed and presumably | more accurate account - of his speech wh: gh is quoted in the text above. Mes Sarum; for London instead of two which is her i proper share, sends four He kage naire to Parliament. ~ Yates says that Wilson stated (id. at 457) : I should be glad to hear the bontleman from | Maryland explain himself upon the remark of Old Sarum, when compared ‘with’ the city of . - ‘Loridon. This’ he «has eared to be an unjust proportion; as‘in the one place one man sends | - two members, and in_the. other one million are represented by. four members... I would be glad to hear how he applies this to the larger and smaller states in America; and whether the borough; as a,borough, is represented, or the people of the borough. Luther Martin ‘answered that Britain’s sillien bor- . onghs.were not analogous sinve ( ibid.) ): Individuals, as composing a part of the whole of one consolidated government, are there rep- resented.. [Yates] ie Roger Sherman argued for concessions by the larger : State to protect the smal er. Id. at 450., He further stated (id. at 457): ; | ‘In society, the poer are eQual to the rich in voting, although one pays more. than’ the other. This arises from an equal distribution of lib- , erty amongst all ranks; and it is, on the same or ounds, secured ‘to the states in the oumtodsea- tion *.*°*, [Yates] Hugh Williamson of North Carolina supported. rep- a ei aera based on population on the ground (id. at 456} : If any argument’ Wiil admit of demonstration, it is that which. declares, that all men have ai equal right in society. Against this position, J have heard, as yet, no argument, and | could wish to het what eould be said against it * * *, [Yates] ge Roy per RTL RCN ae . eager " G oe = (RAS ECR ERS Oe IGOR. On Juné 29th, William Samuet Johnson of Connec- ticut .supported Roger Sherman’s proposal. that’ one . luuse be apportionéd on. population and the ether be . apportioned equally among the States. In doing so, he explicitly based this pro l on a compromise as to the nature of the. new government (I Farrand 461—" 462): The AAPL Sr must be endless whilst Gen tlemen differ in. the grounds of their argu- ments; Those on one side considering the States as districts of people composing one political Society; those on the other considering them as. so many political societies. -The fact.is that the States do exist as political Societies, and a Govt. is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the individuals compos- - Ing them: * * * On the whole he thought that --as in some. respects the States are to be eon- sidered in their political capacity, and in others. - as districts of individual citizens, the two ideas*” embraced‘on different sides, instead of being ~ opposed to—each other ought to be combined ; ‘that in one branch the people, ought to be rep- resented; in the other, the States.’ Rufus King’s account of this speech is ‘Ud: -at A16- ‘ at): ~ Those who contend for an equality of ae amgng the Statesy define a State to be a mere association of men & then say ‘these Associa- tions are equak—on the other-hand those who ¢ contend for a Representation in proportion to. -numbérs, Define a State to be a District of Country with a certain Number of Inhabitants, like’a parish or County, and then say, these districts. shd. have an influence in. propertion to their Number of Inhabitants both - reason justly from yr. premises— we must then com- promise—let. both parties be gratified—let one Hause or Branch be formed by one Rale & & “fsie} the other by another. 7 , apg oS Madina continued ‘to oppose the comipromise be- _-eause it over-emphasized the sovereignty of the States - 2 under the new Constitution and because equal repre-— . , sentation by States was unjust (I Farrand 463-464) « [T]he mixed nature of. the Govt. ought to be kept in view; but thought too much ‘stress was . Taid on the rank of the States as. political so- _ cieties. (There was a gradation, ‘he observed sie from the smallest \eorpordtion, with the most : limited powers, to the’ largest empire with the _ . most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations on the sovereignty of the States. as now. confederated * *°*. Under the proposed Govt. the posers of the States will be much farther redyeed. According to the views 6f every member, the Genl. Govt. will have powers far beyond those exercised by the -British _ Parliament ywhen-the States wére part of the ‘British Empire. It will in particular have the ' power, without the consent of the State Legis: latures, to: levy money directly on the people ° themselves; and therefore not to divest such | unequal portions of the people as composed the several States, of an equal voice,- would sub- ject the ‘systemcto the reproaches & evils which ’ have . resulted from the vicious representation in GB. - - He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce*a. principle weh. was confessedly unjust, which ed. never be admitted. & if admitted must infuse mortality info a’ Constitution which we wished to last forever. | Yates reports eoneerning this speech that Madison said (id. at 472): _.If the power is. not immediately derived from ‘the people, if proportion to ‘their numbers we os may make 4 paper confederacy, but that wit Pty all. | , _ seansancinrars LOLOL IAL GROEN ERT meets ci i RRR dE Ra ae 28 e Alexander Hamilton likewise supported apportion- i ment based solely en population (I Farrand. 465-466) : oO Mr. Hamilton observed that individuals form- ing political Societies modify their rights dit- _ ferently, with regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are deprived of the right alto- ' gether, not having the requisite qualification of property. * * * In like manner States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger exercising a larger, the smaller a amaller share of it. But as States are a collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of _- , the artificial beings resulting from the composi- tion. Nothing could be more preposterous or - absurd than. to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been sd. that if the smaller -States re-. _ hounce their equality, they renounce at the same. time their liberty. The truth is it is 4 contest -for-power, not for liberty. Will the men com- posing the small. States be less free than. thos¢ composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 40,000 souls. will lose power, if she has Yo only ‘of the votes allowed to Pa. having _ +400,000: but will the people of Del: be less free, if each’ citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pa. He admitted that common resi- dence. within the same State would produce a eertain degree of attachment; and that this _ ‘principle wae have a certain influence in pub- le affairs. thought however that this might by some. precautions_be in # great measure ex-—-----~ cluded: and. that no maternal. inconvenience 8 could result from it, as there could not be any . ground for combination among the States whose influence was most dreaded. * *-* No. consid- erable inconvenience had been found from the aS tw . we eee Se ee as AI KLOET ’ division of-the State of N. York into. different _ | distrietsAof different sizes.’* : Yates gives this account of Hamilton’s speech (id. at 473) : ie sacrifice individual rights to the preservation of the rightS-of an artificial being, called states? The question, after all is, is it our inter- est’ in medifying this .general.government to. | There can be no truer princ!ple: than this—~* that every. individual of the eoiuniunity at large has an equal right to the protection of govern- * ment.’ If therefore three states contain. a-ma- » jority of the inhabitants of America, ought they to ‘be governed -by a minority? * * * [The larger States] are to surrender their rights— Se for what? for the preservation of an artificial being. We propose a free government-—Can it .be so if ‘partial distinctions ave. main- tained? * * * In the state ef New Yprk, five. ~ counties from a majority of represfntatives, and. yet the government is in no dakger, be- - cause the laws have a general operation. The | small states exaggerate their danger; atid on . this ground coritend for an undue proportion . of power, » ° ‘Elbridge Gerry of: Massachusetts also agreed with — ‘Madison (I Farrand 467) : [Wle never were independent States, were not | such now, & never could be even on the prin- _ ciples of the Confederation... The States & the - -- advocates for them were intoxicated with the ~——~«tea- of their sovereignty. He was a member of Congress at thé~time~the federal articles were formed.. The injustice of allowing. each ' 1! Both houses of the New York legislature were then appor- Sioned on the basis of eligible voters. New York Constitution _ of 1777, Articles 4, 12., i, Po =. “7 : "se ane 30 . State an n, equal vote was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it wes agst. his Judgment, and under the pressure of »public danger, and. the obstinacy of the lesser States. ‘ Luther Martin replied to Gerry that (id. at 468) :. [T]he language of -the States being Sovereign & independent, was once familiar & ‘under- stood; though it Seemed ‘now so strange & ob- secure. He read those passages in the articles of ‘Confederation ' which deqgribe them in that language. The convention rejected the motion of Robert Lans-, ‘ing to have the first branch elected on same basis as’ the Congress’ of the Confederation, é.e., equal repre- sentation by States, by a vote of 6 to 4 with one State ‘divided. By the converse vote, the conve ation adopted the resolution reported by the Committee of the Whole “that the rule of suffrage in the Ist branch ought - not to be according to that establishete by the Articles : of Confederation.”’ — (I Farrand 468.) Oliver Ells- worth: of Connecticut then again proposed the com- promise first suggested by Sherman (id. at 468-469)q * * * that the rule of suffrage in the 2d. branch, be the.same with that established by the articles - _ of confederation’. He ‘was not’ sorry on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had > determined agairist this rule in the first branch’ -He hoped it would become,a ground of com- _ promise with regard to the 2d. branch. We- were partly national; partly federal. The pro- portional representation in the first branch was: ’ conformable to the national principle &: would.’ secure the large States agst. the small. An equality of voites: was conformable to the fed- eral principle and was necesary to secure the Small States agst. the large. He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take: place: He did not see that it could on any ~~ 3l es Ey : 2 3 ae other. * * * The ‘existing confederation was founded on’ the equality of the. States in the article .of ‘suffrage: was it. meant to pay no regard to this. antecedent plizhted faith. Abraham Baldwin of Georgia opposed Ellsworth’s ‘motion on the ground that tlie second house: should: represent property. (Id. at 469-470.) - George Read of Delaware agreed in part with Madison and Hamilton (id. at 471) : | eR es If [the government was to be] more national, / ‘@ would be for a representation ‘proportionate 0 population. [Yates] he James Wilson, on June 30th, strongly opposed Ells- worth’s iotion to allow each State an equal vote in the second branch. He rejected threats that eonven- tion would otherwise’ fail (1 Farrand 482-484) : “* " Tf the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper - principles, if a separation must take place,” it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday agst. the, just principle of representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people of America. Peking the opinions to be the same on this point, * * * ‘the question will be shall’ less than '4 of the U. States withdraw them- selves from the Union, or shall-more than 4 “renounce the inherent, indisputable, and wn- alienabie rights of ten, in favor of the artificial aX systems ‘of States. If issue must be joined; it was on this point he Would chuse to join it. The. gentleman from Corinecticut [Ellsworth ] in supposing that the prepondenancy secured ‘to - the majority in the Ist. branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in the 2d. branch for the security of the minority nar- rowed the, case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to eontreui in all Cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the 706-578—63——-8 3 - Q 32: * majority:. Seven States will ‘controul Six: seven States according’ to the estimates that had been “used, composed’ # Yoo, Mf the whole people, It. .* would be in the powér. of less than’ 14 to’ over- >. rule 34-whenever. a question should happen to divide ‘the States in that manner. Can we’ for- get for whom we are forming a Government? “Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called ° : States? Will our honest Constituents be satis-’ - fied with metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought the vé to be: Satisfied with being told that one thir principle to be the same in the 2d. as in th _ branch. .* * * Ef the motion should be seniall t to, we shall Jeave the U.S. fettered precisely as heretofore; ‘with the addition’! “ditification of. seeing the good purposes of. ve fair representa- tion of ‘the people in the Ist. branch, defeated in 2d. ‘Twenty four will still controul sixty Six. Ellsworth replied that (id. at 484-485) : . ou 4 "The capital objection of Mr. Wilson “that. the myjnority will ule the majority” is not true.., . *.The power is given to.the few to save them: from. being destroyed by. the many. If an. equality of votes had been given to them in both bzanches, the objection might-have had weight. “ No. instance [of a confederacy] has _ existed in which an-equality of voices has not * been exercised by the members .of it. We’ are - running ftom one extreme to another. We are razing the foundations of the building. When we need only repair the roof. No salutary - ‘measure. has been lost for want of a majority of the’,Statés, to favor it. If security be all fhat the. great States wish for the Ist. branch - ;, Secures them. * * * He appealed again to. the 2 Farrand has taken this phrase from the account of Yates. I Farrand 484, note 5. >. compose the greater number of - States. The rile of suffrage ought on. ae od ae +f ene z) : ‘obligations. of the ‘federal pact which was still in force, and which had been entered into with -go niuch solemnity, persuading himself . that’ 7 some regard would still be paid to the plighted ~_— fe ® faith under, which each State small .as well. ats great, held‘ an_ equal right of suffrage in the General Councils. ; ioe Supporting Wilson, Madison said that speakers had urged (id. at 486) : ye ender thee * * * continually that an equality ‘of votes in the 2d. branch was not only necessary to secure the - gmalk, but would. be perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the Ist. branch was an: effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this . apparent defence, the. Majority of States might still injure the majority of people. 1. they e —-.. -eould obstruct the wishes and interests of the. : majority. -2. they could extort measures, re-’ pugnant to the wishes & ‘interest of the ma- jority. 3. They could ‘impose measures: ad- verse thereto; asthe, 2d branch - wilt probly exercise soine great powers, in which the Ist will not participate. . : Ye | eee _, + » William - Richardson Davie of North: Carolina - — agreed with Elisworth, opposing the resolution ap- proved by the Committee of the Whole (I. Farrand 5 487-488) : i ) Bs oa FS The Report’ of the Committee allowing the Leg- islatures to choose the Senate, and establishing a proportiona! representation in it, seemed to be impracticable. There will according to this . rule be ninety: members in the outset, and the number will increase as new States gre added. | It was impossible that so numerous .a body could possess the activity and other ‘qualities _ required in it. * * *_ [I]f a proportional rep- resentation was attended with insuperable dif- _ ficulties, the making the Senate the Representa- _ tiveof the States, jooked like bringing us back to Cones. again, and shutting out all the adyear ’ c — OA > must make concessions on both sides.” Id. at 515. * The convention approved the creation of the ‘commit-. tee 9 States to2. | : ae -On July 2, Phineas Bond wrote Lord’ Carmarthen that the problem was (IIT id. at 52-53) : * * * to form such a federal constitution, as | will give energy and consequence to the union. Whether this is to be done, by improving the old governments gr by substituting new ones— _.. |S. whether by continuing a power in each State eee to regulate its internal policy, or to abolish all . 7 IROCB separate establishments, and to form one grand ‘ - . federal authority, is a matter of consideration - " hich creates much doubt and animadversion. | 8 Yates gives ‘the following account of the meeting ' -of the newly formed Committee on Representation in the Legislature on July 3d (I Farrand 522): - | - Many of the members, impressed. with the util- ity of a general government, connected with it > myeroe tage: Be je LEE I ass the indispensible necessity of a representation from the states according to their numbers anid wealth; while others, equally tenacious of.the . rights’ of the states, ‘would admit of no other representation but-such as was strictly federal, or in other words, equality, of suffrage. - The committee agreed to a motion. by Benjamin =.Franklin providing that one representative shall .be apportiorted |i in the first branch for each 40,000 people | with a minimum of one for each State; that all bills for raising or apportioning money must arise in, that house and may not be amended by the second branch; . ‘and that-eath State shail have an equal vote in the | -" seeond hopse. Id. at 523. . - On Jul}fdth, the convention debated the committee’s sient “Madison continued. te oppose any. compro- mise. deviating from ‘apportionment based on pore _ lation (1 Farrand $9¥-528) : » . He conceived that the Convention was sodnued 3 to the alternative of either departing from jus tice in order to conciliate tke smaller States,: and the minority of the people of the U.S. or of - : displeasing these by justly gratifying the larger States and the majority of the ‘people. He | could fot himself hesitate as to the option he ought to make. The Conventiomwith justice & the majority of the people on their side, had nothing to fear. With injustice and the minor- _ ity on their side they had every thing to fear. It was in vain to purchase.concord in the Con- vention on:terms. which would perpetuate dis- cord among their Constituents. ‘The Conven- tion ought’to pursue a plan which would -bear the test of examination, whielt would be es- poused & supported by the enlightened and impartial part of America, & which they could themselv es vindicate &€ urge. ‘ : : pi St Ae ONG NY. COOLS POOR 39 Yates’ report of this’speech states | : We are driven to an, unhap} y dilepima. Two thirds of the inhabitants .of the union are to’ © please the remaining one. third by sactificing _ their essential rights. —. Gh) Oe jake Pierce Butler of South Carolina’ agreed that (id. at 529) : ; * * * he could not let down his idea of the peo- _ ple. of America so far as to believe they, would .- from mere respect to. the Convention adopt a ~ plan evidently unjust. * * * He urged that the 2d. branch ought to represent the States ac- -eording to their property. Sa In contrast, Elbridge Gerry supported the eompro- mise .(id. at 532): We were however-in a peculiar situation. We were neither the: same Nation nor. different Nations. We ought not therefore to pursue the one or the other 6f these ideas too closely. If no compromise should take place what will be the eonsequence. A secession he foresaw would _ take place; for some, gentlemen seem decided ~ on it; two different plans will be proposed, and thgpresult no man could foresee. If we do not ° come to some agreement among surselves some foreign sword will probably do the work for us. George Mason likewise,said that (#d. at 533) : ; There must be some accomodation on this point, . or we shali make'little further progress in the work. - Accomodation, was the object of the House in the appointment of the. Committee ; and of the Committee in the Report they had made. And however liable the Report might be to objections, he thought it preferable to an. - appeal to the world by the different sides, as had been talked of by some Gentlemen. — . 40 ‘ » ‘The convention then turned jn particular to the first - clause of: the ‘resolution which stated that one repre- _ sentative shall be apportioned to every 40,000 people. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania objected to this provision both because it was based on populatior rather than wealth and beéause the Atlantic Coast * states could be out-voted in the future (I Farrand. - acath apc! SE EE 4 ‘he's He thought property ought to be taken into the estimate as well as the number of. inhabitants. , Life and liberty were generally said to be of more value, than property. An accurate view | ot the matter would nevertheless prove that "ae ke tad was the main object of Soeiety. * * * e thought the rule of representation ought to . . ‘be se fixed as to’ secure to the Atlantic States .a prevalence in the National Councils. The new- :, States will know less of the public interest than these, will have an interest in many ‘respects’ different, in particular will be little scrupulous “of involving the Community -in wars the bur- dens & operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States.. Provision ought there- fore te be made to prevent the maritime States’: | from -being hereafter outvotéd by them. ‘He thought this might be. easily done by irkevo- eably fixing the number of representatives | which the Atlantic’ States shezld respectively have. and the number which each new State will have. This wd. not be unjust, as the western » settlers wd. previously know the conditions on whieh they were to possess their lands.“ _ Agreeing, John Rutledge of South Carolina said that (id. at 534): tie 2 . The gentleman ‘last up had spoken some of his sentiments precisely. Property was cer- ' ‘The fear that the western States would ultimately control the legislature was expressed repeatedly during the convention but no limit was ultimately placed on the representation of new States in either, house. : ht - NAA he roe saintly the principal object of Society. it num- bers should be made the (rule of representa- _ tion, the Atlantic States will be Subjected to the Western. He moved that the first -proposition in the report be postponed in. order to take up _ the following viz. “that the suffrages of the sev- eral States be regulated and proportioned ac- cording to the sums to be paid towards the gen- eral. thera by the inhabitants of each State vely Rutledge’s motion was rejected with only ‘South Gar- ‘olina supporting it. On July.-6th. Gouverneur Morris (1 Farrand 540): . eae weirs moved to commit [back to the commit- ee] so much of the Report as relates to ‘1 member, for every: 40,000 inhabitants’: | His view wak that they might: absolutely fix ‘the number for each State in me first instance; ' leaving the Legislature at ne y-to provide for changes in the relative importance of the’ States, ; - _ and for the ease of new States. “This view was opposed by ‘Nathaniel Gorham of Mas- * sac husetts 1 who (ibid,) :. * * * apprehended ‘great ine onvenieney from ° fixing directly the number of Representatives to be allowed to each State. He thought the number of Inhabitants the, true guide; tho’ perhaps some departure might be- expedient from the full proportion. . 13 iaridips asey (id. at 5AL): @ * *-* favored .the Commitment and: thought that Representation ewght te be in the Com- bined ratio of numbers of Inhabitants and of > Wealth, and not of either singly... Agreeing. with Gorham “that the Ratio of Represen- tation proposed evuld not‘ be safely fixed, since ‘in a -eentury « a half our computed increase of assem e ec. 42 would carry the number of representatives to an’ enor- mous excess,’’ Rufus King said that wealth not popu- _ . lation should be the basis of Spportonmanat (I Far- - — ct rand 541): bake oe ye. number - inhabitants was not the proper index of ability & wealth; that prop- - . erty was the primary object of Society; and ' that in fixing a ratio this ought not tobe ex- cluded from the estimate. With regard to New . . States, he observed ‘that there was something . peculiar in the business which had not been noticed. The U.S. were now. admitted to be proprietors of the Country, N. West of. the - Ohio. _Congs, by one of. their ‘ordinances have impolitiely laid it outeinto ten States, and have "made it a fundamental article of compact with those who may become settlers, that as soon as the number in any one State shall equal that of the smallest of the 13 original States, it may claim admission into the Union: Delaware does . not centain it is computed mere than 35,000 _ soul, and for obvious reasons will not increase much for a considerable time. It is possible then ‘that. if this plan be, persisted in by Congs. 10 new votes may be added, without a greater addition of inhabitants than are represented by the single vote of Pena. “Pierce Butler of ‘South Carolina aleo supported = as the proper standard (id. at 541-542) : - He was persuaded that the more the subject was examined, the less it would appear that , ‘the number of inhabitants would be-a proper rule of proportion.. If there were no other objection the changeableness of the: standard would be sufficient. He concurred with those who thought some balance was necessary be- ‘* —. tweerr the. old & New States. He contended strenuously ‘that property was the only just measure of representation. This was the great — ‘object of Governt: the great cause‘of war, the great means of carrying iton. — ry ‘Reem ata naehtings’ « EE et bead, be the! fe iat = - SBT Rvs ORT he STR a OR CET ad arose ‘ : : . e & \ a f 6 bo On ‘thes other hand, Charles Pinekney. (id. at. 3 * * * saw no good reason for committing: The...» value of land: had been. found on. full investiga- _ tion to be an impracticable rule. The contribu- _ tions of revenue. including imports , & exports; must be too chanyeable in their amount ; too - - -\ @iffieult. to. be adjusted; and too injurious to ‘7 tier noncommercial States: -The number ‘of in- habitants appeared to. him the only — & prac-. * ticable rule. | William Richardson’ Davie of, North Carolina pro- posed a compromise between ‘population and state ee equality (tbtd.) : : ° He seemed to think tHat' wealth or “property ‘ought to be represented in the 2d. branch; and » numbers in the Ist. branch. The convention voted 7 States to 3, with one State. divided, to refer’ the first sentence of the resolution ‘of the ‘Committee on Representation in the— Legisla>— ture to a new five-man special: committee. The clause requiring appropriation and tax bills to originate ‘in the first branch was passed 5 to 3 with 3 States di- vided. _ I Farrand 538-539. Jaibes Wilson then (id:at D42)i- . * * * signified that his views incagreeing te the @° Commitmt. was that the Come might consider — ' the propriety of adopting a scaie similar to that : established by the Constitution of Masts. [see p. 18, note 9 above] which wd give an advan-. tage to. ye. small States“ without substantially - departing from a rule of proportion. “After debate began.on the. clause of the ‘committee’ s “yeport concerning the origination of tax and appro- _ priation bills, George Mason said (id. at 544): He was i friend to proportional representation in both branches; but supposed that some points must be yielded, for the sake of accommodation. :: * . P : . a Poe Se ee : ff : . When debate began on ‘July 7th, Elbridge Gerry said that the issue of representation was (I Farrand , 550) : ' ** * the critical question. He lead rather agree to it tlian have no accommodation. A Governt. short of a proper national plan if gen- erally acceptable, -would be preferable to a_ proper one which if it could be carried at all, would operate on discontented States. = ~The convention then approved the committee ‘resolu: ° tion giving each State an equal yote ‘in the second | house 6 States to~3 ¢Pennsylvania, South Carolina, . ‘and Virginia), with two States divided. After debate | -was renewed, William Paterson, who introduced the New Jersey plan, said that he (id. at 55) : * * * considered the mode & rule of representa- tion in the Ist. branch as [a concession] and that after the establishment of that point, the small States‘would never be able to defend them- — “selves without an etjuality of votes in the 2d. ‘ branch.’ There was no other ground of accom- “ . -odation. His resolution was fixt. He would niéet, the large States on that Ground and no - other. For ‘himself he should. vote agst. the Report,. becausé it-yielded too much [the origi-— nation of -appropriations and revenue bills in _the Ist house]. Gouvenani Morris was. also iqooned to ‘the hecet ‘ but for entirely different reasons (I Farrand 551-552) :~ - He was agst. the Report because it maintained the improper Constitution of. the .2d.. branch. - It made it another Congress, a mere whisp of ~~straw. It had been sd. (by: Mr.°Gerry) that the new Governt. would be partly national, partly federal; that it ought inthe first quality to protect individuals ; in the second, the States. ‘But in what quality was it-to protect the agegre- gate interest of the. whole. Among the many. zi Tor a ene eco se Ds ee a 45 provisions which had been urged,*he had seen: none for supporting the dignity and splendor of - the American Empire. _It had been one of our | greatest misfortunes tBht the great objéets of the nation had been sacrificed. constantly to Aoéal views; in like manner asthe general in- -terests of States had been sacrificed to. those of the Counties. * * * They were originally nothing more than colonial corporations.’ 4)n ° ‘the declaration of Independence, a, Governnt. was to be formed. The small States aware of the necessity of preventing. anarchy, and taking advantage of the moment, extorted from the large ones an equality of votes... Standing now on that ground, they. demand under the new system greater rights as men, than their - fellow Citizens of the large States. The proper answer to them is that the same necessity of which they ‘formerly took advantage does not 3 — exist, and that the large States are at’ berty ‘now to consider what is. right, rather than what may be expedient. = : James Madison agreed with Morris (id. at 554) : An Equality of votes in ye. Senate will enable a minoritiy to hold the Majority—they: will com- pel the majority to submit to ther particular Interest or they will withhold their Assent to © essential & | necessary measures *** * . . [King] a 5; The report of the special committee on July 9th | proposed that the number of representatives in the _ first branch be specified in the constitution, but that (id. dt 559): ~ the legislature could change this apportionment “upon the principles of * * * wealth and number of inhabi- tants.” I Farrand 558. Roger. Sherman inquired , * * * on what principles ‘or ealedlations the “Report was founded. It did not appear to:, e . ° Te ee SRS PE RD PS ee oC ~ . & 46 fin mate for the future according to the Combined ‘| rule of numbers and wealth, as too vague. For this reason N. Jersey was agst: it.. He could {08-878 —8%—4 ! ; ; ; ” & ‘ F : : * 6 ‘ : f ; , ‘ Oe SO DAYS Me See ae . 4 0 ‘Oo e “ mks . . . . A e ; ° -* j 4 > 2 o rat suai? ‘eee ~ The amendment was opposed by. Gouverneur Mortis -on the ground that it fettered (id. at 571): etd Legislatire too much.:* * * He dwelt much on the danger of throwing such a | preponderancy into the western Scale, suggest- ing that in. time the Western people wd. out- _ number the Atlantic States. He wished there- fore to put it in the power of the latter to keep _ @ majority’ of- votes in their own hands. It was objected he said that if the Legislre. are _ left at liberty, they” will never readjust the * Representation. ‘He admitted that this’ was seaaiilin but he did not think it probable unless the reasons agst. a revision of it were vert > urgent” & in this case, it ought not to be done. ‘Debate resumed on Randolph’s proposal on July | 11th. . George Mason both rejected fears of western control and argued for a clear standard of apportion- ment based on population (I Farrand 518-5 19) The greater the difficulty we find in fitinic a pr oper rule of Representation, the more unwill- ing onght.we to be, to throw the task from our- selves, on the Geni. Legislre. He did not object to the conjectural ratio which was to prevail in the outset; but considered a Revision from time to time according to some permanent & precise . standard as essential to ye. fair representation required in the Ist. branch. According to the © present population of America, the Northn. part — of it “st a right to preponderate, and he could not deny it. But he wished. it not to prepon- derate hereafter when the reason, no longer con- tinued.. From the nature of man we may be sure, that-those who have power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it. -On the Contrary we know they will always when they can rather increase it. If the S. States therefore should have 34° of the people of America within their limits, the Northern will An . PLY TNR et RR OS oy eer \ 51 hold fast the majority of Representatives. 14 “wwill govern the 34. The S.-States will com-. plain: but they may complain from generation to generation without redress. Unless some »rinciple therefore which will do, justice to. them Saveatiee shall be inserted “in the Constitution, disagreeable as the declaration was to him, he must declare he-tould neither vote for the sys- tem here nor support it, in his State.* Strong objections had_been drawn from the danger te the Atlantic interests from new Western States. Ought we to sacrifice what we know to be right _ im itself, lest it should prove favorable to States - which are not yet in existence. If the Western _ States are to be admitted into the Union as they arise, they must, he wd: repeat; be treated as equals, and subjected to no degrading discrim-: inations. * * * He urged that nunibers of in-' habitants: though not alays a precise standard of wealth was sufficiently so for every substan-. tial purpose. : a) Hugh Williamson of North Carolina proposed a sub- stitute to Randolph’s resolution (id. at 579) : mn: “that in order to ascertain the alternations that -may happen in the popilation & wealth of the several States, a.census shall be taken of the free white inhabitants and 4/5ths of those of - other descriptions on the Ist year after this Government shall have been adopted and every year thereafter; and that the Representa-. tion be regulated accordingly.” = After agreeing to the substitution, Randolph (7d. at ' 579-580): . nt Eg 2 ica ; . ~. “ * * * observed that the ratio fixt for the Ist. [legislature] was a ‘mere conjecture, that it placed the power in‘the hands -of that part of America, which could not always be entitled to it, that this power would not be voluntarily re- -nouneed; and that it was consequently the duty - of the Convention to secure its ‘renwaciation ’ ; > { ay A Q a0 in jaakion wget SO require; “eo some ¢on- stitutional provisions. If equality between great : & small States be inadmissible, because in that. Ef _ case unequal numbers of Constituents wd. be “* represented by equal numbers of votes; was vit not equally inadmissible that a larger & _ more populous distri¢t of America should here- | _ after:have less representation, than a smaller & . less populous district. If a fair representation of the people be not secured, the injustice of the Govt. will shake it to its. foundations. What: relates to suffrage is justly stated by the cele- brated Montesquieu, as a fundamental article in Republican Govts. John Rutledge then repeated his contention that wealth should be considered in apportionment (id. at 582) + Mr. Rutlidge [sic] contended for the shins sion ef wealth in the estimate by which States will not be able to contribute in propor- tien to their numbers, they shd. not therefore be represented in that proportion. The-Atlan- ~~ tic States will not concur in such a plan. He moved that ‘‘at the end of _ years after the Ist. meeting of the Legislature, and of every years thereafter, the Legislature shall pro- portion the Representation according to the priiciples of wealth & population” Roger Sherman opposed considering wealth (bid. ) Mr. Sherman thougiit the number of people — alone the best rule for measuring wealth aswell _as representation; and that if the Legislature were to bé governed by wealth, they would be | obliged to estimate it by numbers. Returning to his fear of the W est, Gouve syneur Mor | ris argued much like those who. now claim that rura] — ‘areas are entitled to no ae nenee because rural 7 } epre- | sentation should be regulated.’ The Western- ‘ people are better at running a government (1 Farrand The Busy haunts of men not the remote wilder- ness, was the proper School of political Talents. .- If the Western people get the power into their * hands they will’ ruin the. Atlaittic interests. The Back members are always most averse to _the best measures. He mehtioned the case of. Pena. formerly. The lower part of the State had ye. power-in the first instance. They kept Z in yr. own: hands. & the'country was ye. better or it.”* | - Madison opposed any proposals designed to limit west- ern representation (ig. at 584-589): Nhe case of Pena. had been mentioned where it -was admitted that those who were possessed of the power in the original settlement, never ad- ‘mitted the new settlmts. to a due share ‘of it. England ‘was a still more ‘striking example. The power there had long been in the hands of the boroughs, of the minority ; who had opposed ° -& defeated every reform which had peen at- ‘tempted. Virga. was in a lesser degree another example. With regard to the: Western States, he was clear & firm in opinion that no unfavor- able-distinctions were admissible. either in point of justice or policy. * * * He could not agree that any ‘substantial objection. lay agst. fixig ‘numbers €or the perpetual standard of Repre- sentation. It was said that* Representation & taxation were to ‘go ‘together; that taxation & wealth ought to go together, that population and wealth were not measures of each other. He ad-. _ %4While Morris praised Pennsylvania for’ preventing the © _newly settled area from attaining power through malapportion- ment, it if significant that the ;convention rejected his view that. a similar-result should be attained by placing in the Constitu- tion a limitation on the representation of new States. ot SAS mitted that: in different climates, under differ- _ ent :forms of Govt. and in different stages of civilization the inference was perfectly just’. He would adinit that in no situation numbers of inhabitants were an accurate measure of wealth. Tie contended however that in the U- States it was sufficiently so’ for the object | in contem- plation. | Sire ". (eorge Mason supported the requirement of periodi- cal reapportionment. He (id: at 586) : *y * * * Aoreed with Mr. Govr. Morris that we ought to: leave the interests of the people to the Representatives of the peoplé: but the, objec- ~ tion was that the Legislature would cease to be the Representatives of the people. It would - continue so no longer than the States now con- - taining a majority of the peaple should retain -that majority. As soon as the ‘Southern & Western population should predominate, which ‘must happen in a few years, the power wd be in the hands of the’ minority, and would never be yielded to; the majority, unless provided’ for by the Constitution. a. ra The convention’ adopted 6 States to 4 Williamson's, _ proposal of a census for free inhabitants. “bid. Sub= sequently, Williamson's entire resolution, however, . was rejected 9 to 0.as different States opposed it for. different reasons. Id. at 588. On ‘July 12, 1787, the convention debated a proposal — to. make taxation proportional! to representation and to base representatiqn” on inhabitants and wealth. William Samyel Johnson of Connecticut contended (I Farrand 593) : Pe as a that Wealth and population were the true, equitable ‘rule of representation; but he econ- ~ ~ eerved that these two princtples resolved them- ~ ' . selves into one; -population. bethg the best measure of .wealth. dD On the other aid, Rufus Rie replied that (id. ¢ 595) : * * * he had still two powerful objections agst. tying down the Legislature to the rule of num- _, berso 1. they were at this time an uncertain index of the relative wealth of the States.- 2. if they were a just ircex at this time it can not be supposed always to continue so. Charles Pinckney then proposed that slaves equa! to whites ‘in ascertaining representation (id. at 596) : This he urged was nothing mor e than justice. The blacks are the labourers, the peasants of the Southern States: they areas productive of . : pecuniary resources as‘ those of the Northern States. They add*equally to the. wealth, and - cénsidering money as the sinew of war, to the strength of the nation., ~ The convention adopted a comsbatibes basing both di- rect taxation and representation on whites and 3/5 of the slaves and requiring a census within six years and subsequently every ten vears. Jd. at 597. fe Edmund Randolph proposed on July 13th that the resolution passed on July 9th providing for the future apportionment of representatives on the basis of _ wealth and numbers be reconsidered. I Farrand 603. He. submitted a’ resolution deleting the reference to wealth: Turing the debate on this resolution James _ Wilson strongly supported Saar mars on the basis. of population (id. at 605-606) : ears 6 Coneeivirig that all men wherever placed have equal rights end*tdre equally entitled to confi- dence, he viewed without apprehension , the period when a few States shanld contain the superior number ‘of people. The majority of _people wherever found’ ought in ali questions -*to ‘govern the minority. If the interior Coun- od try should acquire this ep ag they will m only have the right, but will avail themselvés 56 Pinape of .it whether we will or.no. This jealousy mis- led: the ‘policy of G. Britain with regard to’ -. America. The fatal maxims espoused .by her were that the Colonies. were growing too fast, “and .that their growth must be stinted in time.. What -were the consequences? first: enmity on our part, then ‘actual separation. Like conse- quences will result on the part of the interior” settlements, if like jealousy & policy be pursued ours. Further. if numbers be nof,a proper rule, why is not some better ruJe pointed out. _— Nop one. has yet ventured.to attempt it. Congs. have never been able to discover a better. No State as far as he had heard, has suggested any other. In 1783, after elaborate diseussion of a -measure of wealth ail were satisfied then as they are now that the rule of numbers, does ‘not differ much from the combined rule of numbers . & wealth. Again he éould not agreé that prop- — _ erty was the sole or the primary object of | Governt. & Society. The cultivation & improve-. ment.of the human. mind was the most noble vbject. With respect to this abject, as well as » to other sinned rights, numbers. were surely the natural & precise measure of , Representa- tron. And with'respect to property, they could not vary much from the precise measure. In no point of view however could the establishmt. of numbers as the rule of representation in the ‘Ist. branch vary his opinion as tosthe inipro-— priety of’ letting a Vicleus = into the 2d. branch. 3 Randolph’s resolution waa? States to O with Dela- -~ ware divided. Jd. at 606. On July 14th, Elbridge Gerry ee ed, and Rufus ; -Kiig seconded, the follow) ng resolution (II Farrand 3): . ‘ #e that in order to secure the liberties of the States already confederated, the number of Represen- . tatives'in the Ist branch of the States which shall hereafter be established shall never exceed oe 4] COR MORI saa vcs ; | > in number,~the Representatives from such of the States as shall accede to this confederation. Gerry explained. that he appreherided dangers from the western states. » He was for admitting them (ibid.) : * * * on liberal terms, but not for putting our- selves into their hands. They: will if they ac- quire_power like ‘all men, abuse it. . They will oppress commerce, and drain our. wealth into the Western Countr?. To guard agst. these con- sequences, he thought it. necessary to limit the | .. Number of new States to be admitted into thé ee Union, in such a manner, that they should never be abie to outnumber the Atlantic.States. Roger Sherman opposed the resolution (ibid.) : We are providing for our posterity, for our children and jour grand Children, who would he as likely to be. citizens of new Western. States, as of the old States. -On this considera: | tion alone, we ought to make na.such discrimi- nation as was proposed by the motion. Gerry reyilied that’ (¢hid.) ¢ Y Rae _ There was a rage for ‘emigration front the - Eastern States to the Western-Country and he did not wish-those remaining behind to be at _ the mercy of the Emigrants. Besides foreign- ers are resorting to that Country, and/it is un- . , certain what turn things may. take there. The proposal was rejected 5 to 4° with one State: divided. ; ae. John Rutledge then proposed reconsideration of the resolution previously adopted giving equality of rep- resentation in the Senate-and requiring money bills to - originate in the first branch. ‘IT Farrand 3. Support- ing reconsideration, James Wilson stressed’ (id. at 4): _* * * when on the question concerning an equal- ity of votes, the House was divided, our Constit- uents had' they voted! as. their representatives did, would have sfood as 24 agst. the equality,. a- ‘ ey, 58 and 1% only i in tan f it. This fact would ere » long be known, and Ut will appear that this a What’ h point has been carried by 3 agst. “ en when they find that the essential principles of justice have been violated in the outset of the Government: As to the privilege of originating * money bills, it was not considered by any as of much moment, and by many as improper in it- self. He hoped both: clauses would be ree on: } . sidered. The equality of votes was a point of such eritical importance, that every opportunity _ ought to be allowed, for discussing and collect- ing the mind of the Convention | on it. Luther Martin restated the threats he. had eon earlier in ‘the convention (ibid.) : He had rather. there shout " two Confedera- cies, than. one founded on any other principle - than an equality of votes in the 2d branch: at least. Charles Pinckney S gaia moved (id. at 5) fh. * * * that instead ‘of an equality ‘of votes the States should be represented in the 2d branch . as follows: N.H. by 2. members, Mas 4. R.I. 1. .Cont. 3. - N.Y. 3. 'N.J.-2.5 Pa. 4. Del. 1. Md. 3. Virga. 5. N.C, 3. S.C. 3. Geo, 2, making - in the whole 36. James Madison supported the motion’ “as a reason- ° able compromise.”’ Ibid. eek Rufus King continued to demand apportionment based on population. in both houses.” He (II are — 6-7): : : * * * considered ‘the proposed Government as ~ substantially and formally, a General and Na- tional Government over the people. of Ameri¢a. . There never will be a case in which it will act as - a federal Government on the States and not on x ~\ *What hopés: will our constituents enter- ~ i Soe ee RUROT er PRlias tet A Pee 5Y the individual Citizens. | Andis it hot a clear principle that iri a free Govt. those who. are to ce-= be the objects of a Goyt. ought to influence the - operations of it? What reason can be assigned why the samé rule of representation sd. not pre- vail in\the 2d branch as in the Ast?’ He could | conceive none. On the contrary, every view of the ‘subject that jiresented itself, seemed to re- quire it. * * * [I]n N. York he had seen that % the ‘most powerful. argument used by the con- siderate Opponents*to the grant of the Impost to Congress, was pointed agst. the viecious con- stitution of Congs. with regard to representa- tion & suffrage. He was sure.that no Govt. could last that. was not founded on, just, prin- © ‘¢iples. He preferred the doing of, nothing, to an-allowance of an equal yote to al the States. It would be better Re thought: to submit to a little more confusion & convulsion, than. to sub- mit to such an evil. ° On ‘the other ‘hand, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts supported the compromise in the committee report rathér than Pinckney’s resqlution (td. at 7-8) :. The Convention had been much divided im opinion. In.order to aveid the consequences of it,aan aecomodation had been proposed, A Committee had been appdirtited; and. though some of the members of it wére averse to an equality of -votes, a Report has been nfide in favor of it. It-is agreed on all handsthat Con- gress are nearly at an end. ‘If ne Accommoda- _ tion takes place, the Union itself must soon’ be dissolved, * * * He thought the smail States. "had made a-considerable’ concession in the ar: ticle of money bills, and that they might nat-. urally expect some concessions or the other side.’ From this view of the matter he was compelled | to give his vote for the Report taken all to- gether. _. ‘ ae ae. | ‘ o . a 60: Wart ns mae ‘James Madison (II Farrand'8-9): iat i : + * expressed: his apprehensions that if the. proper foundation of Government was de- stroved, by substi ting an equality in place of a proportional Representation, no proper super- structure would be raised. * * * He reminded the small States] of the consequences of laying - the existing eorifederation on improper princi- ples. * * * It had been very properly observed by Mr. Patterson [sic] that Representation was an expedient by which: the meeting of the people themselves was. rendered unnecéssary ; and thato -. the representatives’ ought therefore. to bear a - proportion to the votes which their constitue nts if convened, would respectively have. Was not this remark as applicable to.one branch of the Representation as to the other? But it had been said that the Governt. would in its opera- tion be: partly federal, partly ‘national; that — altho’ in the latter respect the Representatives: of the people ought to be im.proportion to the people: yet in cee former’ it ought. to be aceord- - - “mg to the number of. States. If there was any solidity in this distinction he was ready. to abide‘ ‘by it, if there was none it ought to be abandoned. Ii all cases where the Genl. Gov- ernt. is to: act on the people, let: the people be represented and the votes be proportional. In: all cases where ‘the Governt. is to act on the States as such, in like manner as Congs. now _ act on tht, let the States be represented & the votes "equal. This was the true ground of compron\ise if’ there was any ground at all. . But he denied. that there was any ground. He ealled for a sittWe instance in which the Gen], _ Govt. was not to operate. on the people in- dividualiy. ‘The practicability of making laws, . . With eoercive sanctions,. for the States as politi- cal ‘bodies, had been exploded on all hands: * * * @ o bl ° He enumerated the objections agst. an /equality of votes in the 2d branch, notwithstanding/ the ‘ proportional representation in the first{l. the minority could negative the will of the majority of the- people. 2. they could extort measures by making then a condition of their Assent to other necessary. measures. 3. they could ob- trude measures on the majority: by virtue of the peculiar powers 4vhich would be vested in. the Senate... 4, the evil instead of being cured by — time, would increase with every new State that should be admitted, as they must all be ad- mitted on the principle of equality. 5. the - « perpetuity it would give. to the preponderance © ; of the Northn. agst. the Southn. Senl® was 2 serious consideration. - ° James Wilson agreed with Madison (id. at 10): A vice in the Representation, like an error in’ the: first concoction, must he followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death itself. ‘The jus- tice ‘of the general principle of proportional . va representation has not in argument at. least been yet: contradicted. Pinckney’s motion was rejecte .d 6 to 4.with Pennsyl- vania, Maryland, Virginia, and. South Carélina in the minority. 7d. at'11: [Piel _. On July 16, 1787, the convention passed, 5 States to 4 (Pennsy Ivania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Geor- - gia), with Massachusetts divided, a’report from a ¢om- -. mittee providing for equality: of representation ’ among the States in the Senate. II Farrand 15, Edmund -Randolph then proposed adjournment.to allow ‘‘some. conciliatory experiment” to be devised. Td. at 18." However, James Patterson stated that (ibid.): No conciliation could be admissible on the. part of the smaller States on any other ground than that of an equality of votes’ in the 2d. branch. \ ss ° ° A 2? : > ° = -\ o Madison reports a meeting of the larger States the ‘following: day, July 17th’ (IT Farrand 19-20) : .*°* * for the. purpese of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of the’ vete in favor of an equal Representation in the 2d. branch, and the apparent inflexibility’of the’ smaller States on that point—Several- -meéinbers from the. latter States also attended. * ** Tt appeared indeed that the opinions of the mem- bers who disliked the equality of- votes differed sod much as to the importance of that point, and as to the policy of risking a failure of fany general ‘act of. the Convention by inflexibly opposing it.° Several of them supposing that no good Governnt. could or would be bujlt on that foundation, and that as a division ‘6f the Convention into two opinions was unavoidable it would be better that the side comprising the principal States, and a majority of the people of America, should propose a scheme of Govt. to the States, than*that a scheme should be pro- posed ‘on the other side, would have concurred in a firfn opposition’ to the smaller States, and. . in a separate recommendation, if eventually ~ necessary. Others seemed inclined to yield to the smaller States, and to concur in such an Act however imperfect & exceptionable, as might.be agreed on by the -Conventien. as a body, tho’ decided by a bare majority of States and by al ‘minority of the people of the U. States. It is probable that the result of this ‘consultation ; satisfied the smaller States that-thev had noth- ing to appfehend froma Unidn of the larger, in any plan whatever agst.. the equality of. votes — in the 2d. branch. wie om This finally settled the issue of re representation i in Con- gress, an issue on whic h “the ‘convention, had nearly flound ered: “Alexander Martin. a n delegate ‘from, North Carolina, wrate Governor Caswell on July: 28h that’ “it is no small task to bring toa conclusion the Rreat — e : 2, ; ‘ io 63 ‘ Pe ; , a ; “of. a. United Government viewed - in differcht points hy: thirt teen Independent Sovereignties ; United Amer- _ ; _iea must have one general Interest to be a Nation, ‘at-the same time presérving the’ particular. Interest of the Individual States.’’. ELL - Farrand. 64-65," A. ‘few days later on August Ist, Piéree Butler of. South. Carolina wrote’ that the ‘purpose of the convention -*. was ‘to form a stronger Constitution on strict Foed- ~~ eral. Principles, for the Governmt.’of the whole’ See Id, at 67. a4 On, August 8th, ‘ale deb ate on the va ee © TR-. quirement for élection to the House of Representa- ©. tives, Gouverneur Morris favored no such requirement, -- but only a freehold. “Such a regulation is not neces- sary. People rarely chuse a nonresident—It is im: - _ proper ‘as in. the Ist. branch; the people at large, not “the fates are represented”’ (emphasis in’ original). IL Farrand 217. .That same day, the report of the ‘Conimittee on Detail amended without debate or’ objection the section concerning. the apportionment of the Ist branch so as to provide “that each State. shatl have one representative at least.” Td. at 222." The next day, in discussing a provision that Con- gress has the power to regulate Congressional elec-- tions, James Madison ‘implied’ clearly his ‘view that apportionment of state legislatures on some. basis other than population, was unfair and _ that: a provi-. sion was necessary in the new constitution to. prevent _the persons, who as a‘ result. of malapportienment, controlled state ‘government from running Congres-_ sional, elections to serve their own interests (id. at 24h): ‘. Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would _ produce a like inequality .in their representa- - tion’ in the Natl. Legislature, as it was ‘Presum- 706-578—G3-——5_ > + . ‘ a, ok 64 able that the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to erscomuseneate in the latter. ee oe On August 13th, Cindlaes sien snppacted the pro- -posa! that revenue bills ‘must originate in House of.: Representativés and. cannot be modified in Senate on * the ground that (IT Farrand 273-274): ng 1. The Senate did not represent the people, but the States in their political character.’ It*was ‘improper therefore that it shouid tax the _ people. * * * si fog of Lords does not rep- eC resent nor tax’ the ople, because net elected by the people. * * * the pursestrings should be in the hands .of the Representatives’ of the : people. . : -] ' Likewise on August 234, ree ‘Madison, in the debate on the Senate’s power as te treaties, said that “the Senate represented the States alone. * * *.”’ II Farrand 392.. During debate on August 30 on the power of the new government to admit new States, Luther Martin opposed a provision to allow the divi- sion of existing States only with the permission of those States. He suggest@l as the reason for his posi- tion that a minority of the States might control the newly 463): settled areas through malapportionment (id. at -, a] * * * Martin, urged the nreasonableness of ~ forcing & etiaranteeing the people of Virginia beyond the Mountains, the Western people, of N. Carolina. & of Georgia, & the people of Maine, to continue under the States now fov- . , erning them, without the-consent of those States ae to their separation. Even if they should be- come the majority, the majority of. Counties, ' as in — may still hold fost the dominion over them. / 7 g } 65 . ; pe ek ay, . Much of the opposition on September 8thi to the pro- posal that treaties must be ratified’ by two thirds of the Senate.arose from the 1 fact that a minority of the’ people will elect-a majority of the Senators. Hugh Williamson . of - North Carolina (I Farrand 548) « * 8 © c ) remarked that Treaties are to be made i in o . © the-branch of the Govt. where there may be a ; majority of the States without a-ma jority of the - people, Eight men may be a majority of g quorum, & should not have the power to glecide the conditions of peace. Elbridge Gerry similarly stressed (2bid,) : .* * * the danger.of putting the essential rights - of the Union. ih the hands of so small ‘a number as a majority of the Senate, representing per- © haps, not one fifth of the people. On. September 17, 1787, the Cony ention tr ansmitted the proposed constitutiom to the Congress of the Con-— federation. II Farrand 665. -The resolution stated ° that the Constitution should afterwards be submitted to a convention of delegates in each State for rati- fication. Ibid. After ratification hy°the conventions _ of nine States, the resolution stated that the Congress ‘ of the Confederation shall ‘set a day.and nlace for | the election of President under the new constitution by. the electors chosen in the various States. The ‘ letter accompanying both the proposed constitution and the resolution to. the Congress of the Confedera- tion stated that “[i]t is obviously impracticable in the federal government ofthese States, to seeure all rights of. independent ‘sovereignty to eavh, and yet . provide for the interest and safety of all—Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty ‘to preserve the rest.’’ Id. at 666. On the other hand, ‘the letter:stated that the basic object of the conven- - tion was “the consolidation of our Union.’’ Jd. at 667. are pos fo pee a, “ e o- ; oe The transmission of the yroposed Constitution to the . Congress of the existing Confederation, together with the language of the accompanying. letter, demonstrate that the “Constitution was-viewed as a substantial modification to the Confederaticn in order to give greater power to the federal government dt the ex- pense of the independence of the States while at the same time-net totally discarding the existing system by creating a national system in which state sov- ereignty was ended. ~ Fe b: The “Federalist Piiet-ta Number 22 of the Federalist Papers, Which was published on December. «14, 1787, Alexander Hamilton attacked at somie length equality: of representation by States in the Conti- nental Congress in his enymeration of the evils and weaknesses ‘of the Confederation (The ‘Federalist cs (Cooke ed., 1961), pp. 138- 139): The right of equal suffrage among the States ihe is another exceptionable part of the confedera- tion. Every idea of proportion, and every, rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode-Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or C onnectic ut, or New-York; and to Delaware,. y @ an equal voice in the'national deliberations with Pennsylvania or Virginia, or North-Carolina. Its operation contradicts that fundamental maxin of republican government, which. re- quires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal,-and that a majority of the votes of. the States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of. ‘Justice and commop sense. It may happen that . this majority of States is a small minority -of the -people’ of America; and two thirds of the This exclusive delegation or . rather this alienation of State ‘sovereignty. _ would only exist in three cases; where the Con- ; stitution in express terms granted an exclusive autbority to the Union: where it granted in’ one " See te eed ta te A ; ty ° 69 dintened-s an authority to the Union and in an- . other prohibited the States from exercising the - u- like authority; &nd where it grantéd an au- , thority to the Union, to.which a similar author- “ ity in the States would he absolutely and to- . ‘tally. contradictory aad repugnant. ° In Number 39, James Madison similarly. deseribed the : _ hew system (The Federalist, pp. 254-255, 257) : The house of representatives will derive its powers from the people of America, and the . -.. people will be represented in the same ._propor- 5 tion, and on the same principle, as they are in ea ‘Legislature of a particular State. So far the’ Government is national not federal. The’. Senate on the other hand will derive its powers. from -the Statés, as political and co-equal so- cieties ; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now . are in the existing Congress. So far the gil ernment is federal, not national. * * * * * . 7 * * The “proposed ° ‘Constitution | therefore is, if - ' strictness neither.a‘national nor a federal: con-" -. stitution; but a composition of both. In its foundation, it is federal,‘not national; in fhe sources. from which the ordinary powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national: in the operation of these pow- ets, it is natiohal, not federal: In the extent of them agaim it is federal, not national: And - finally, in the authoritative mode of introduc- ing ‘amendments, it is neither wholly federal, " nor wholly national. : ’ He repeated in Number 40 that the States cota ee . ‘to be independent sovereigns under the new constitu- /*. tion (id. at 262): ; “We have seen that in the new government as in the old, the general powers are limited, and that the States in all unenumerated cases, are J te . vits members. 70 & left 3 in the enjoyment of their sovereign and'in- : _ dependent jurisdiction. - See also id. at 261. Likewise, in Nutaher 45, Madison said that ‘‘the States will retain under the proposed Constitution. a very extensive ‘portion of -active sov- — erejgnty * * #7 (id. at 340) and that (id. at 311-312): The State Goverriments may be regarded as - /eonstituent and essential parts of the federal |; ‘Government; whilst the latter is nowise essen- | tial to the operation__or ‘organisation -of. the ‘former. Without the intervention of the State - Legislatures the President of the United States -.. cannot be elected at all. They muist in all erases have a-great share in his appointment, and will perhaps. in most cases of themselves determine “ait. The Senate will be elected absolutely ‘and —- exclusively. by the State Legislatures. Even the House..of Representatives, though drawn immediately from. the People, will be chosen very miich under the mfuence of that ‘class of. * men, whose influence over the ‘people obtains for themselves an election into the State Legis- Jatures. Thus each of the principal branches: of the federal Government will owe. its-exist- ence more or less to the favor of the State Gov- _ ernments, and must consequently feel a depend- ~ | ence, which is much more likely to beget a of -Representa-" tion, where the largest and most inconsiderable *Sfates have an equal vote in. 1 the a airs of the : Union|:* *:*.-" e Because of the many defects in the existing system, he proposed that the'Convention (ibid.) : . : * * © consider the subject de novo. . That ee will pay’no farther attention to the Confedera- tion, than to consider it as good materials, and ‘view themselves as, at liberty to form and rec- — ommend such a plan, as from their’ Rnowledge of the temper of the people, and the. resources éf the States, will be mest likely to render our. government firm and united. This appears to me, far more proper than to attempt-the repair of a system, not only radically defective in prin- ciple, but which, if it was possible to give it operation, would prove absurd i oppressive. ” initaace stated that (id. at 109-110) :' The first important alteration is, that of the ‘ . principle of Representation, and the distribu- tion of the different Powers of Government. In the federal, Couneils, each State ought.to have a be ae in proportion to its importance; and — no 1s justly entitled—to a greater. A 4 Reon esmttation is the sign of the reality. Upon - this principle, however abused, the parliament .. of Great) Britain is formed, and it has been. ‘uriiversally adopted by the States in the forma- - tion of. their Legislatures, ** * The abuse of . _ .this equality, has been censured as one of the ~~ most dangerous corruptions of the English Con-. stitution; and I hope we shall not ineautiously contract a‘ disease that .has been consuming them. Nothing, but necessity, eould have .in- duced Congress to ratify a Confederation upo other principles. It certainly was the opinion . if” f i Pee fis . . 75 of the first Confress, in 1774, to acquire ma- _ terials for forming an estimate of the compara- . tive importance of’ each State; for, in the commencement of that session, they gave'as a ‘reason, for allowing each colony a’ vote, that it was not in their | ae at that tine, to pre- - cure evidence for determining.their importance. This idea, of-a just Representation, seems to have been conformable to the opinions of the: best writers on the subject, that, in a confed- erated system, ‘the membets ought to contribute: -according to their abilities, aidshate a vote in proportion .to their importance. But if each must have a vote; it ean be défended ypon no other ground, than that“of each .contributing . an, equal share of the publie burdens:-either ~ would be a pexfect System. The present must: ever centinue Treconcilable’ to josiee.. * * * Fhe Senate, .1, propose .to have elected by the House of Delegates, upon proportionable prin- ciples, in the manner F have stated, which, though rotative, will give that body a sufficient: degree of stability and independetice. The dis- tricts, into which the Union are to be divided, will be se apportioned, as to give to each its due weight, and the Senate, caleulated in this, as itought to be in every Government, to repre- - sent the wealth of the Nation. This method of rePresentation was. based on Pinck-_ ney’s view as to the proper relationship. of the new" . ational government and the States (id. at 112); * I apprehend the true intention of. the States in uniting, is to have a firm national Govern- ment, capable of -effectually executing its acts, ~ and dispensing its benefits and protection. In it alone can be vested those powers and prerog- atives which more particularly distinguish a sovereign State. The members which compose the superintending Government are to be eon- sidered merely as eye a great whole, andZ = Le. 76 ooh ane sufferéd to. retain th jowers sdscasan ts the administration o e theie tate S The . idea which has rag 80 Jong and falsely enter- tained of each being.a ‘sovereign State, must be iven up;. for it is.absurd to’suppose there can... more than one sovereignty within a Gov-,: ernment. > The ‘States should retain nothing more ‘than that, mere local legislation, which, as - districts of a general. Government, they can exercise mote to 5 tha benkfit of their’ ee -inhabitants “* *. *: Inv ‘opictailiong, ‘Pinckney ‘comments on the propdeed _ constitution and states.as one of: his. two objectioits. to Ge - \. aitthe composition 6f the Senaté. Id.at 127. ‘ In a, letter explaining why he had not signed thé. - proposed constitution, “Elbridge”. Gerry wrote that (IIT Farrand 128-129) : ees ‘As the convention: was ‘called for the ‘pole and express purpose of revising the articles of ~ _ confederation, and reporting. to congress, “and the several legislatures, such alterations and P) _ e provisions as shall render the ere constitir- . tion adequate to the “of the. government, and the preservation of th Pina I did not | eqneeive that these powers extend to the for-_ mation ofthe plan. ‘proposed : but the conven- ’ tion beitig of a different opinion, I acquiésced in it, being fully convinced that to preserve the | union, an efficient government was indispeps- ably necessary; and that it would’ be difficult to make proper amexidiménts to the articles of con- - _, federation. . ‘> “The. constitution proposed ‘hes few if any: fed- eral features; but is_rather a system of national - government. Nevértheless, in,‘many respects, «©. J think it has great merit, and, by proper. . emendmerits, may be- adapted. to the: ‘‘exigen- eies of government, and preservation of lib-" ; sctsridige Tiger ee Db > 2 : * s + a* ‘s 2 7 : . * v ‘Letter tothe President of the Senate and Pe of . 7 ; a sd 7 ¥ ; ‘ “the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, Octo- se _ ber 18, 1787, III Farrand 128-129. ' - On’ October 24, 1787, Madison wrote: J efferson in detail ecncerning the new constitution f IIt Farrand 131-132) : “It was’ generally: agvesd that the objects of the Union ‘could not be secured by any system es foundedyon- the principle of ‘a confederation of * Sovereign States. * Hence was embracef the alternative of a Gov- ernment which instead of Operating, on the States, should éperate without their interven- tion on the individuals composing them; and. ; - hence the changé in the principle and propor- tior: of tepresentation. - Madison explained the: relationship of the. States, to theederal ‘government (id. at 138-134)! Rae: The second object, the diie partition of power between the General & local Governments, was '. perhaps of all, the most nice and difficult. A -, few contended for an entire abolition of the States; Some for indefinite power of. Legislation in the Congress, with a negative on the laws df ‘the States; some for. such a power without-.a negative; some for-a limited power of legisla- — tion, with such a negative; the majority finally. for a limited power without the sesstive, © °° .°: ' * * * Tn the American Constitution the gen- ~ eral authority will be derived entirely from the subordinate authorities. The—Sena will rep- ‘ resent the States in their political capacity ;° ‘the . other House will represent the people’ of -the States in their individual capacity. Ac to the apportionment of the Senate, Madison said (id. at 135): ; "lm . The remaining “object ‘iieaia. ‘more -embar- ’ rassment, and a greater alarm.for the’ issue of. ope - fan large and small States at the-convention (III Farrand ~ 151-1 ne fess ie “ __ the other branch by a Representation according . to numbers.“ , oe a : 3 Martin likewise emphasized the conflict between the _ -House of Representatives—Virginia, Pennsyl-' . 53): tn, * * * informing the Confederacy the State of ‘Virginia proposed, and obstinately contended (tho ‘unsupported by- any other) . sentation according te Numbers: and the second resolve now brought forward by an Honourable: Member. from that State was~formed in the same spirit that characteriz’d its representa- tives in their endeavours to increase its powers and influenee in the Federal Government. * * * At length the Committee of Detail brought forward their Résolutions which. gave to the for repre- . ‘ larger States the sameinequality in-the Senate _ that they now are proposed to have in the vania and Massachusetts would have oné half— . all.the Officers and even the President were to . be chosen by the Legislative: so that these three ° States might have usurped the whole - . Betts" es * * * Three parties now appeared in Con- vention; one were for abolishing all the State . Governments; anether for such a Government as would give ay influence to particular States-— and a -third party. were truly «Federal, and - acting for general Equallity—They were. for considering, reforming and amending the Fed- ‘eral Government, from time to time as expe- r’ence might point out its imperfectiorts, ’till it could be made competent to-every exigence of State, and afford at the same time ample security to Liberty and general Welfare. * * * - ** Since McHenry was not present. for this debate, his descrip- tion does not come from his own observations. III Farrand | 147, note 1. rs ‘ “This statement is incorrect. See pp. 8, 9, 19, 30, 37, 44, 61 above. 1 eee, Cee - 706-578 —63-—6 : = ‘> 80 sinaiplen of opposition were thus mien and sy ught forward by the 2d. S: re- ~aaahiin the manner of representation, it .was urged by a Member of Penns mar dee that noth- ing but necessity had induced the larger States to give. up in forming. the Confederacy, the Equality of Representation according to num- _bers—That all governments flowed from the People and that their happiness being the end of governments they ought to have an equal Representation. On the’contrary it.was urged - by’ the unhappy Advocates of the Jersey Sys-— : tem that. people were equally Free, and - ‘had an equal Voice if they. could meet in a _ general Assembly of the w ole. . But because . one Man was st¥onger it afforded no reason=— . why he might injure another, nor because ‘ong ce ‘, . leagued together, they should have the powe ‘’” to injure five; this would destroy all ateal |. ialealbe * The History “of all Nations and sense of Mankind shew, that in all former Con- ' federaejes every State had an equal voice. Moral History a pane out the necessity that each State should vote equaliy—In the Cantons. of Switzerland those of Bene & Lucerne have more Territory than all the others, yet each . State has an equal voice in the General Assem- bly. The Congress in forming the Confederacy adopted. this rule on tlie principle of Natural right —Virginia then objected. ‘He then explained his reasons for. opposing the ‘ constitution. Included esis them, he said that (td. at 155) : Aotat Government of States ought. to (oe Federal, and which the object of calling Con- vention, and not to establish a Natjonal Gov- ernment, It begins We the -People—And the wers are made to flow from them-in the first + Instance. That in Federal Governments an — equal voice in each State is essential, as being .” all in a State of Nature with respect to each 81 other. Whereas the only figure in this Consti- tution that has.any resemblance to a federal - one, ‘is the equality f&tane.* °° An entry in Ezra‘Stiles’ diary on December 21 has an account of the convention received from Abraham ' Baldwin, a delegate from Georgia. Stiles stated that the convention was (III Farrand: 168-169) : | _ * * * pretty unanimous: in the following Ideas, © _ Viz. 1. In a firm foederal Government. * * * . 4. That the Jurisdictions & Govt of each State shd be left intire & preserved as inviolate as sible consistent with the coercive Subordifa for | % preservg the Union with Firmness. 5. Thatthe’ . 3 present foederal Govt was inadequate _to' this: — -"End. 6. That a certain Portion or Deg. of | . Dominion’ as to Laws and: Revenue; as well as to Treaties with foreign Nations, War & Armies, was necessy to be ceded: by individual: States to the Authory ‘of the National Council. . 7. That the National Council shd consist of two - Branches viz, a Senate, & Representatives. * . That the last .shd be a local Representa appor- _. tioned to the Property & Number of Inhabi- tants, as far as, practicable. ‘That this shd be the.governg Idea. And yet that the Distinction _ of States shd be preserved in the House of Representa as well as.in the Senate. 8. That _ the Senate stand on the Election & Distinction of States as -at present in Comgress, and tho’ | _ like the Representa be in some measure pro- .. portioned to the No of Inhab. yet that besides . this the Vote-in Senate shd be by States, tho’ in the Hquse of Representa the Vote- shd be by Plurality of Members present indeéd but not by States-as States. Hereby two things are secured, one, that the People at large shall be efficaciously represented, the other that ‘tho States as separate States be as also efficaciously ' represented, 9. That these two Branches com- bined into one Republican Body be the supreme a ° i 83 Legislature & become. vested with the Sover- [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386411_0073%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.