# Reply for petitioner — Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386410_0022%3A16 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Reply for petitioner - **Published:** January 1, 1961 - **Citation:** 367 U.S. 396 ## Text & ; . a e P A ; eh . on) , a = | s i? Page bee | 46) 49 66 14 yo . II Statutes and Regulations: Atomie Energy Act of 1954, S Stat. O19, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2011: | Page Section 103 _- 20, 24 Seetion 104_- 20, 21, 22, 24; 25 -Seciion 104(b)___. uae 19, 21 Section 104(d).....\-.--:,..--4.--- 21,31 Section 105 _ _ - ; ; 24 Section 161__- 19 Section 182_ 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 33, 34, 35, 36 Section 182(a)_.. -. 2”, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 Section IS2{b)___ “4, 24 io Section 182(¢) = 24 ogi Section 1S2(d)_. : rae 24 Section 184... -) | 24 Section 185__ > - : 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32. 37 | Section I86__ ge oe Section sy... ; 20, 24, 35 Atomic Ene rev Regulations 0c F.R.): eae Seetion 20_ _- ' Se 42 section 50.34. al oe a “eetion 50.35 . Pein SS "dy 14, 18, 16, 17, 19, 25, 26, 29, 32,39 . Section 50.40.22 15, 16:17 Section 50.57 (Cum. Supp. 1961)__ _- “19 | Proposed Section 100.11 (b), 26 F.R. 1235 47 Miscellaneous: | 1 Aceident Facts, 1960 ed., National Safety ° Council, Chicago, fll., p. 26 eee 44° AEC Press Release D-72, Mareh 30, 1961 2 - - 44 + Argonne National Laboratory Summary Status of Fast Breeder Reacter Program, dated December 1, 1960. .—__. Aaeae 45, 100 Cong. Ree. 12014, 3 Leg. Hist. 3759. 35,3435 “> Miscellaneous Continued » : Estep, Radiation Lujuries anil Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litiga- tion, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 259 | 25 Ked. Reg. 1225. _ - 26 Fed. Reg. 1224___- Hearings before Joint Committee on Atceinic Energy on Governmental Inde sunity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, S4th _Cong,, 2d Sess., pp. 62- 63 Hearings Be fore the’ Joint’ Committee on Atomie Energy on ‘8. 3323 and H.R. S862, “S3rd Cong., 2d Sess., pp.° 119-120; 2 Leg. Hist. 1753 —— on Development, Growth and State of the Atomie Energy Industry, hefore the Joint Committee on Atomie Energy, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 10300) - pares Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, A Study of AEC Procedures and Organization in the Licensing of Reactor Peeilities, 85th 3Y 36, 37 ’ Cong., Ist Sess. (Joint Commuttee Print . 1957): Pp. 6, 96, 107-108 _ Pp. 136-155 Joint Cominittee on Atomic Energy, Imprev- ing the AEC Regulatory: Process, “Sth Cong., Ist) Mess. (Joint Comittee Print - 1961): “i . Vol. 1: 3] Pp. 447-448 Vol 2) pid Se _IVv Miscellaneous—Continued ce — Bureau of Standards Handbooks: andbook 59 (1954, Supp. 1958)______- Handbook 69 (1959). = _. pope - New York Times, , April 7 7, 1961, p. 12. ee PRDC's Eighth Quarterly Technical Report, , Prgeeannt TM, Boe ee oe. S. 3323, 1 Leg. Hist. 181, ag ue oN. S. 3690, 1 Leg. Hist. 645; 718__. 22-8. aot Sn the Supreme Court of the Bnited States ‘ Oc TOBER TERM, 1960 © 7 No. 454 COMMISSION, PETITIONERS | ve | INTERNATIONAL UNION OF Exrecrricar, RApio AND MacHINE Workers, AFL-C1O, Ev AL. é APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT: OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ’ ‘ & REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS rye eS 2 ° ieee . i r Mie central issne in this case is whether the pro- cedure followed by the Atomie Energy Commission with the PRDC: Reactor’ accords with. the .Atomic Energy Act of 1954. -'Phe Commission. held’ a hearing on the PRDC application for a license to construct and operate the Fermi -reactor and found (R. 708): reasonable assurance in the record, for the purposes:of this provisional. construction per- mit, that a utilization faéilitv of the general type. proposed in the PRDC’ Applieation , and amendme nts thereto ean be constrneted and (14) | 2 ‘Univep Srares-or .AMERICA AND ATOMIC: ENERGY OX WRIT OF GERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT: OF - to protect the public health and safety: in connection © 2 operated ‘at the location without undue risk to the health and safety of the publie. The Commission thereupon issued a provisional con- struction permit. It also announeed that it would not issue a license to operate unless. it was demon- strated at a further hearing that the reactor as finally designed would be operated without danger. to the health and ; saféty of the public (R. 712, 718- 719). : , In our opinion this oR conforms exactly to the Commission’s’ regulations and its consistent prac- tice in other cases’ involving large ‘developmental re- actors. Consequently, our main brief is chiefly con- cerned with the interpretation of the Atomie Knergy Act. . ian Respondents have introduced a diffuse variety of additional questions, Although the only order under review is the order dated May 26, 1959, continuing the construction permit, as amended, they attack the -original provisional construction ‘permit issued Au- . gust 4, 1956. It is now necessary, therefore, to give the Court a brief account of that aspect of the pro- éeeding. See pp. 3-7, infra. ; Respondents also argue that the Commission’s find- ings in this case do not conform to its own regula- — ‘tions... The argument ~ .based partly aipon conten- tions concerning the meaning of the regulations and partly upon respondents’ interpretation of the Com- mission's findings, which waries from = time to time throughout its briefs Since the meaning of the fiid- ings must be established before’ one can determine whether the findings éariforn to-the regulations and 3 the sti atute, We shay abso “dis wins this ISSUC before. turning back to the central qitestion in the case. See “pp. 7-19, dufra. | Finally, since respondent’8 appended to their brief (a list of so-called “accidents” at atomic’ reactors, we shall discuss: the extraordinarily high safety record. "of this field of activity. See pp. 41-45, infea. I THE PROPRIETY OF THE ISSUANCE. OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION PERMIT IN 1956 IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ONLY ISSUE REFORE THE COURT, NAMELY, THE VALIDITY OF THE 1959 AMENDED CONSTRUCTION PERMIT The PRDC application was filed on January 6, 1956. Under the Act and regulations at that time, the Commission was. authorized to issue provisional constretion permits without a hearing provided that it gave ‘any protestants an opportunity to be heard -Uupom request filed within 30 days after issuance. The Commission referred the application to the Ad- visory Cunmitteé on Reactor Safeguards. - The Com- mittee reported (R. 587-593) that there was imsuf- ficient- information available at that time to give assurance that the PRDC reactor could be operated at the site without’ publie hazard and that it was doubt- ful whether.even an accelerated program of research "and development would give the assurance before the scheduled completion of the reactor in the summer of 1959. The Commission conducted further investiga- tions and on August 4, 1956, granted a provisional construction permit CR. 516-523). Commissioner Murray -dissented. eer om, . . 4 . ‘There was sharp criticism of this, procedure from the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and. in Congress, both because: the Commission had ‘Sassued a construction permit without a hearme and also beeause it had acted in-the face-of a discour: aging ACRS. report.” The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was subsequently amended to require a hearing before the issuance of eoustruction permits, to provide A statue tory basis for tlie, Advisory Committee's activities, and to require that itt report be made public. The handling of the PRDC Applieation at this stage and especially the alleged’ suppression “ef the ACRS re- port * became ‘an item in the political contest over the - A full explanation of the considerations that led the Coni- mission to issue the original permit, including its analysis of the ACRS repor:, is contained ina #56 letter from the Com- mission to the Joint Committee on Atomic “Energy, set. forth at pages 136-155 of A Study of AF C Procedures and Organi- zation in the Livensing of Reactor Facilities. Sith Cong., Ist oe: Sess. (Joint Committee Print 1957). “ae Respondegts state (Br. 17, n. 15) that the PRDC project has not, since the 1957 legislatian, been seferred to the Advi- sory Committee. While no formal reference is required until ‘application is made for an operating,license (Section, 182(b)}, the Advisory Committee has beei regularly reviewing the PRDC project to date, and its stibeommittee has had periodic meetings with thé AEC -staff and PRDC personnel. /mprar- ing the AF¢ Regilatory Process, Sith Cong., Ist Sess. ( Joint Committee Print 1961), Vol. 2, pp. 177-179. A> formal ‘repost will be rendered by the ‘Advisory. Committee prior to the hearing upon an application for an operating license. * The Commission’s uniform policy, until the 1957 legislation, was to consider such communications from the ACRS as in- ternal documents protected by executi¥e privilege. See /m- proving the AEC Regulatory Process, supra, Vol. 1, pp. a4i-* 448, 6 was “very probable that the necessary information will be obtained?’ (R. 674). Dr. Harvey, Brooks, an ACRS member, testified paw there was reasonable as- surance that such information would be available in time to meet the PRDC time schedule and that would furnish “the -necessary assurance “that the PRDC reactor ¢an be operated at a site such as that proposed without undue ‘hazard to the health ‘and safety of the public.””. Other ACRS members testi- - fied. to stibstantially the same effect: (R. 674-75).- 3. The Congressional criticism of the handling of the PRDC case which is cited by respondents does not. refer to the issues involyed in the present CAS but to. the proc ‘edure followed in the issuance. of the original provisional construction permit. ‘Thus, the material under the heading * Pertinent amendments to the Act after issuance of originalvonstruction per- mit’? (Resp. Br. 15-17) is rélevant, at most, only to the issuance of the original permit, and has nothing : to do with the issues before, the Court. Similarly, the colloquy between Senator ‘Anderson and Commis- ‘sioners Wilson ‘and Olson (Resp. Br. 55-56), in which the Commission’s handling of the Fermi project was criticized, related to the eriginal issuance of the per- mit in 1956, not to the permit here under review. THis is ‘also true of the cited Congressional criticism “a the Commission’s failure to make public the ACRS | report (Resp. Br. 61-62), and the statements by Sen- ator Anderson .and Representative. Holifield ¢riti¢is- ing the Commission for not having held a hearing be- fore issuing the permit (Resp. Br. 5, n. 53 61-63). > a” . e = - —_ oe. 4 * In short, .all of the Congressional criticism that re- spondents stress so heavily related to an issue not involved in this case—the issuance of the original | permit in 1956. The only issue before the Court is the.validity of the amended constriction permit issued *in 1959, and that depends woon what was done in issuing it, not upon what happened in the earlier proceedings. involving the superseded permit. Cf. Inland Empire Council vy. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 706- ° fF 6 710; Federal Broadcasting System _v. Federal Com- munications Commission, 225 F. 2d°560, 563, 564- ) 565 (CLA. D.C.), certiorari denied, 350 US. 923. cr 65 (CLA. D.C.), cert | 1, 350 U.S. 923 ¥ If THE COMMISSION'S .FINDINGS SA'FISFIED THE . REGULATIONS so = o . 3 Respondents’ argument that the Commission's find- ings satisfy. neither the regulations nor the statute rests upon shifting grounds. Af~ time& they seem to acknowledge thar the findings relate to both. the construction and operation of ‘the reactor but eon- tend that the findings are denigrated by the Com- : Mission’s statement that the findings were, made for the purposes of issuing a construction permit (see. Hrigf for Respondents, pp. T1-12; 14-15, 52, 70-71, —— 75, 78-79). At other times they -seem to argue that the findings relate only to the construction and not to the operation of the reactor, and, for thiis reason, full to satisfy the regulations (see Brief for Re- facts hearing upor@operating s safety. In this: case, the Commission explicitly stated in the cense Will not be issued “unless eee the Commis- pubhe will not be endangered by operation. of the facility in accordance with the specified procedures” » 718) ; and that, upon completion of construction in accordance with -the permit, an ope rating license sion of additional proceedings, if they be necess ary operation” (R. 719): See also Finding” 37, which states (R. 712, emphasis in original) : , Proceedings for a license to operate the pro- posed PRDC plant shall be held at a time later to be determined, after the completion of con- struction. In that proceeding the safety and financial considerations’ of -the PRDC project ~~ will-be in issue, and we shall ‘ again consider whether the PRDC plant” can be operated with _ _ reasonable assurance for the protection of the peeing health and safety of the public, Vv sion’s staff or intervenors such as respondents) to, amended: construction permit that an, operating li- | -sloni Siw found that the final design provides reason- | 2 able assurance that the health and safety of the will issue only “upon .a further finding, after conclu-’ or appropriate, of reasonable assurance of safety of - er “plied with, but alee that operation | of the reactor as” 82 In short, the Commission has m: ide it explicit that it ‘will. not rant. an operating license for the PRDC reactor unless it finds that he reactor can be operated safely.. As the Commission emphasized. in “its opin- _ion (R. 646-647, emphasis adde@) : “There can be no doubt that public safety is the first, last, and a per- manent consideration in any decision on the issuance , of a construction permit or a iicense to ‘operate a‘nu- clear facility’ Section 185 plainly authorizes -the Commission to refuse an operating license unless it finds that the reactor ean be safely operated, even if construction has been done in full accord with the . design presented at the construction permit stage; -and Regulation 50.35 provides for a definitive safety determination prior to the grant of an operating li- a ee a construction permit is’ issued on a provisional basis. ; ~ The Commission’s provisional construction permit procedure,. based tipon a' finding of operating safety of the. general type of reactor propoged when con- struction is authorized, subject to a further definitive safety evaluation of the proposed final reactor design before operation is permitted, provides much ‘vreater protection to the public health and safety than respondents’ suggestion that all definitive safety findings should be made when the construction ‘per- mit ‘is issued since the Commission must issue an operating license as long as* construction is carried | out in accordance with the permit. For under the -Commission’s _ two-step, . procedure the Commission makes its final definitive safety determination on the’ fF basis of the latest scientifie knowledge and experience 33 . . available, including that developed during the construction period.” Respondents, however, would require the Commission to base its determination of ultimate operating safetyggpon information available when construction Is arR thorized, which may be several years before operation begins. We submit that the strong Congressional concern for safety re- peatedly m ianifested in the Act is clearly furthered by the Ceieialaaleai! s settled practice. - 3. Neither of the two items of legislative history that respondents cite (Br. 39-44) supports their © _argument that Section 182 applies to construction permits. | a. The first item—a colloquy between Senator Hum- phrey and Senator Hickenlooper during which the latter stated that a. license and construction permit are. equivalent—did not relate to safety matters at. all, but to whether the various procedures (such as notice, appellate review and licensing. preferences) applicable to the issuance of operating licenses would also be applicable to the issuance of construction per- mits. See our-main brief, pp. 57-61. The proposed - ameridment of Senator Humphrey, which he. subse- queiitly withdrew upon being informed that amend- ments alréady made to the bill covered the. problem, was that ‘‘no construction permits shall be issued by’ the Commission until after the completion of the procedures established by y section 182 for the consid- eration of applications for licenses under this act’’ — (100 Cong. Ree. 12014, 3 Leg. Hist: 3759, emphasis added). = The.*‘procedures”’ of Section 182 to which this pro- _ posed amendment related were:the giving of notice of: license applications and the grant.to various public bodies of preferred consideration: in licensing, not any “precedures’’ with respect to the kind of safety findings the Commission must make in issuing .con- struction permits. This is shown not only by the legis- lative history cited in our main brief, but by the fol- lowing italicized statement that was omitted from re-. spondents’ quotation (Br. 42) from the Senate debate (100 Cong. Ree, 12014, 3 Leg. Hist. °7 — a Mr. Humpurey. * * * In other words, as I understand, under the bill a construction permit cannot be interpreted in any other way than being equal to or a part of the licensing procedure. Is that correct? Mr. HickeNLoorer. The Senator is correct. The staff has worked on this matter. ‘An. amendment was offered on, I believe, July 16, to section .189, having to do with hearings or judicial review, anf that section was tied up _ with other sagtions of the bill. A, license and '-a construction permit are equivalent. They are the, same thing, ‘and one cannot operate until the other is granted. | The same is true with reference to hearings. Thérefore, we believe, and we assure the Sen- ator, .that the amendment ‘is not essential to the problem which he is attenipting to reach. Mr. Humpnurey. Let me ask the chairman of the committee if subsection b of section 182, which applies to license applications, also ap- plies to construction permits? Subsection b reads: | Sey FS : 30 nt b. The Commission shall not issue any license for a utilization or production facility for the ~. generation of commercial power under section 103, until if has given notice in writing to such regulatory agency as may have jurisdiction over the mate: and services of the preposed activity, and Qntil it has published notice of such appli- cation once each week for 4 consecutiv : weeks in the Federal Register, and until 4 weeh ‘s after ‘the last notice. ert Mr. HicKENLQOPER. The sovliae fa The answer to the Senator’s question is “Yes” Mr. Humpurey. Jn other. words, the’ revised sections on judicial review and on hearings and the revised section 182 on license applica- tion all apply directly to construction permits? Mr. HickENLooper. Yes. Mr. Humpnrey. With that statement, Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment. The ‘only purpose of the amendment was to clarify that section. I am graieful to the chairman for having done it before the amendment was considered. The notice requirement referred to in the foregoing italicized statement (now in Section 182(c)) was _ one of the procedural revisions designed to give greater rights for public bodies which Senator Hum- phrey and other opponents of the draft bill, were able to obtain on the floor of the Senate. It—like the rest of the statements during the debate upon which Respondents rely—had no reference to safety find- ings, and it affords no support. for respondent’s con- clusion that ‘Congress, by making the procedural pro- visions of Section 182 and Section 189 applicable to ° . g 36 construction pe rmits, also made applicable the ope pate ne safety” findings referredto-in-Seetion 182, ° b. The second item cited (Br. 39-40) is a tolloquy from hearings in 1954 involving the testimony of an industry witness, Mr. McQuillen. It appears that Mr. slcQuillen was coneerned, (1) with the administrative . burden on an applicant where his proposed activities - would, under the bill, require allegedly up to nine different licenses and (2) with what he viewed as. the failure of the bill to provide that licensees ‘‘would have the assurance that when they had the facility finished in accordance with each of their require- ‘ments they would be able to run, it.”? Chairman Cole’s comment, cit@d by’ respondents, that “un? . doubtedly”’ the bill as drawn ‘‘would be so operated”’ does not seem, as respondents contend, to have. been directed to the second poiit, but rather to the first.’ 7 Respondents reach their-conclusion by omitting to quote that portion of the colloquy which, because it immediately precedes Chairman Cole’s interjection, was apparently. the statement — to which he was directing his attention. This was a statement by Representative Hinshaw: Representative Hinsuaw. That seems to me to be: rea- ° sonable, that you should put all the conditions into 1-license that can be put into 1 license. That would be fair enough. Chairman Cote. Would you mind my interruption? Why, cannot that: be done under the terms of the bill as it is now? Mr. McQuitten. I think it undoubtedly would be so operated. Chairman. Cote, Of course it would. [Hearings Before The Joint .Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and H.R. —_ 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 119, 2 Leg. ‘Hist. 1758.] \ The problem particularly referred to ‘e Representative Hin- shaw was subsequently cleared up by a committee amendment which added Section™461(h) to the bill, authorizing the Com- 4 PRATT ORAL CR 8nd FG SE ERE TD EOL ST Oe Tay OEE lt 6 Ps ° to the estan pola i the eaathuden respondents craw — ‘would fot follow, The next statement of the witnéss, in response to Representative Cele’s statement, was: “But the terms "of. the construction-permit seetion would need a little amendment, I think,. to- make ‘construction and license at the -— of that upon con- . strnetion as ‘required fit together’ * (Hearings, fr. 7, supra).. In other words, the industry. witness himself recognized that. Section 185 as drafted would not automatically insure an operating license merely be- cause construction was carried out in accordance with the terms of the permit. 4, Respondents challenge (Br. 58-64) our dailies (Main Br. 62-66) that Congress has acquiesced in the Commission’s two-step provisional construction permit procedure, on the ground that the Commission alleg- edly never informed Congress that it grants such per- mits upon finding reasonable assurance of safe opera- tion of the general type of reactor proposed, and defers a definitive safety finding of the final design until the reactor has been construed-and is to. be licensed to operate. The argument takes: various forms. Thus, they contend (Br.°59) that the Com- mission never informed Congress that its regulations construction would not endanger public ‘health and Mission to: aida in a sittgle application one or more of the activities for which a license is réquired by this Act” and to “edmbine in a single license one or more of such acffyities”. Compare S. 3323, 1 Leg. Hist. 181, 234, with S. a? Teg. Hist. 645, 718. * | er ‘ ~ on construction permits require only "a finding that Be ~ 38 safety. The Commission hasénever taken that view, It did not take that view in the present case. Here, as in all other provisional construction permit cases, the Commission aeted on the basis of findings of rea- sonable assurance that a reactor 6f the proposed type’ _-could be safely constructed and operated at the: ‘pro- posed site (R. 676-77, 706, 708). noting--the ‘ government’s statement in its brief ‘that there had been only one fatal reactor accident in this country, on January 3, 1961, they state (Br. 15). that ‘‘many. reactor accidents’ have occurred, some causing serious injuries to. reactor personnel and un- determined. injuries to the surrounding population.”’ In support of this-statement, they cite a four-page “List of Reported Atomic Reactor Accidents’ con- tained in the appendix to their brief, pp. 105-108).: We: - have set forth in Appendix C, infra, pp. 66-91, a de- tailed description .and explanation of each of the al- leged “‘accidents’’ in the United States, and of those elsewhere for which information is‘ ‘available, pre- pared by the Commission’ s Division of Licensing and Regulation. : . This material shows that, cantrary ‘to respondents’ statement, reactors have indeed been eperated in the ‘United States with a ‘‘remarkable- safety . record”’ (R. 879). Of the 22. “accidents”, in this country: cited by respondents, only one (to which we pre- viously referred) involved any fatalities, and that one enna, "ar the death of three operators inside the reactor building. Three resulted. in overexposure of a Pisa 42 operating employees to radiation, with no ‘reported. injuries. Several others caused a temporary increase in radiation levels in the facilities which, however, did not result in overexposure of any persons.” -The remaining 13 “accidents” involved only various dif- ficulties in operation, ranging from corrosion of a component, requiring, replacement, to damage to the reactor. - ¥hile these may have necessitated cleanup and maintenance work, they did not, present hazard to operating personnel or to the public. None of the’ incidents involved any person not employed in the + reactor itself. We recognize, of course, that an atomic reactor ac- . . . c 52 “Ir Is Fou nD THat: * * * ‘“‘D. There is sufficient information: to prov ide rea- sonable assurance that a reactor of the general type _ proposed can be constructed and eperated at the pro- posed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the publie; and that additional information required to complete the application will be supplied. ‘‘The Commission belieyes that the applicant has identified the subjects which should be further inves-_ tigated and that the plans described for earrying out these investigations: will produce the information wlfich will be needed prior to consideration of final design and operating -procedures and, conversion of this construction permit to’a license.”’ ~The Commission’s accompany ing Memorandum of Opinion stated: . “The reactor will be a pressurised water, re actor generally similar to the pressurized water reactor (PWR) now nearing completion at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. .Considerable information and. expe- rience -have been acquired from the design and opera- tion of pressurized’ water reactors by the Commission and the Department of Defense. Additional infor- mation and experience will be gained from continued operation of these reactors; and frem the design and , operation of other pressurized water reactors, prior to completion of the Yankee. reactor. The aceumv- . lated ‘experience and information now. available .as to such reactors, together with the information eon- tained in the application, warrant the conclusion that there is at the present time reasonable assurance that a facility of the type proposed by Yankee can be con-| structed and operated at the proposed location with- out undue risk to the health and’safety of the public. Accordingly, we have decided to authorize issuance of a construction permit to’ Yankee on a_ provisional basis pursuant to Section 50.35 of our regulations. a ae eo. —. a . 53 f 4 “The construction permit must be provisional at this stage of the proceeding pr incipally because Yan- kee has*not completed the design of the reactor and certain features of the proposed facility present un- resolved questions which might affect its safe opera- tion? ‘These features have been identified and dis- cussed in the testimony furnished at the hearing by . Dr. Clifford K. Beck, Chief of the Hazards Evalua- -. tion Branch and in the report of the Advisory Com- mittee on Reactor Safeguards.* - We agree with Dr. Beck and the Advisory Committee that the experi- mental program outlined in the application will prob- ably produce the. information needed to resolve these questions prior to consideration of finak design and. operating procedures and conversion of the construc- tion permit to a license.’’ 6. Saxton Nuclear Reswiiisaiin Corporation, Con- struction Permit No. oe issued February 11, 1960: . es ih "* D. The aaitials may proceed to design and construct the facility described in the application and amendments. thereto without further authoriza- tion: However, this does not constitute tinal approval of any technical specification of the facility as distin- guished from the general design concept proposed. “Before the license is issued to operate the facility, the Commission must finally approve all teehnical speci- fications. If the applicant desires final approval of ‘any particular technical specification prior to the is- suance of the license to operate, he may request that the Commission. grant specifie approval of any tech-— *“As identified in the testimony of Dr. Beck and in the re- port of the Advisory Committee on Reactor -Safeguards, these quest yr include : “i. The addition of neutron absorbers ; “2. Intentional design inte the reactor of nucleate boil- ing; and ; “3, Large plutonium build-up. * | (« ‘ommission’s foot note.) 7 54 soe nical specification by appropriate amendment te this peimit. on ° 2. "This permit is proy yisional -to, the. extent.that a license authorizing operation of the facility will not be issued by the Commissign unless Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corporation has submitted to the Com- mission (by amendment to the application) the com- plete, Final Hazards Summary Report (portions of which may be submitted and evaluated from time to. time) and the Commission has found that the firtal design provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of.the public will iret be endangered by operation of the fagility in accordance with the spec- ‘ified procedures.” , é The Hearing Examiner’s Intermediate Decision, issued January 21, 1960: * “Coneéptual design «nd design criteria for the ma- jor components of. thé facility: have. been developed in considerable detail in Saxton’s application and in testimony: at the hearings. Although detailed ‘engi- neering design of*the Saxton reactor is not complete, the information provided, as:partly summarized here- after, supports the conclusion that there is reasonable | assurance that the Saxton reactor can be satisfactorily designed and safely. operated. After all e1 ngineering details of the plant have been settled, Saxton will sub- mit additional information to the Commission as an amendment to its application for construction permit, in the form of a‘final hazards summary report, which | information will be considered at the hearing on the operating license. * : * * *- * . *The decisions of hearing examiners, cited in Appendices. A- and B, became-final decisions of the Commission in the absence of exceptions by the sims or review by the Commission.on its own motion. ; ‘ ’ 55 “4. Sufficient information has been presented to pro- vide reasonable assurance that a nuclear reactor of ' the general type described in the application and Pre- liminary Hazards Summary Report can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without endan- gering the health and safety of the public. * * * | es: oe “6. There. is reasonable assurance that. technical information omitted from, and required to complete, the afSplication will be supplied.’”. - 7. Carolinas-Virginia Nuclear, Power Associates, Inc., Construction Permit No. CPPR-=7, issued May 4, 1960: | oe This permit itisiens the sainitioned to con- struct the facility in accordance with the application and amendments thereto heretofore filed in this’ " pro- ceeding without further authorization. “D. If the applicant desires Commission approval of any particular technical specification: (such as the use.of Zirealoy for pressure tubes), prior to consider- ation of a license to operate, it may request that the Cémmission grant specifie approval of any, tethnical specification by appropriate amendment to. this permit. “KE. This permit is ptovisional to the extent that a license authorizing operation of the facility will not he issued by the Commission until evidence has. been adduced by Carolinas Virginia Nuclear Power Associ- ates, Ine. concerning: the tests performed of all .de- . signs and components of this proposed utilization facility, including, among others, specially designed ~ use of heavy water, the U-pressure tubes, and their. use of Zirealoy, and a basis Has thereby been estab- ’ lished as-to all components when operated as a unit, that. there is adequate protection to the health and safety. of the poe as.required by the Atomic Energy a) _ 56 Act, as amended, and by the rules and regulations of the Commission.”’ > The Hearing Examiner’ s Intermediate Decision, issued: April 12, 1960: ‘‘The final design of the reactor has not been com-_. pleted; but criteria for its major components have _ been developed in considerable detail in the evidence produced in this proceeding. Present analyses and calculations from these preliminary design param- eters indicate that no _ particularly unfavorable safety. characteristics will arise from the nuclear, thermal, or hydraulic features of the reactor. The ‘research and development program now being con- ducted by CVNPA, supplemented by the experience of ‘similar reactors operating earlier than the reactor, affords reasonable assurance that the presently un- resolved safety questions concerning its unproved fea- tures can be answered. and thus assure that the reactor can be satisfactorly designed and safely oper- - ated. The final design criteria will evolve from the full-seale critical experiments which will begin in the spring of 1960. After all of the engineering details of the nuclear plant have been settled, CVNPA will submit additional information to the Commission as an amendment to its License Application in the form of a final hazards simmary report. ' “As will be provided hereinafter, in view of the untested character, of certain components, and new design. problems involved in this nuclear reactor, - conditions will.be attached to this construction permit ° requiring proof by tests of the adequacy and safety of the pressure U-tubes,“specially designed for the use’ of heavy water and the zircaloy clad fuel elements, before this construction permit may be converted to an operating license. This evidence will be addi- _ tional to that presented as the basis for opinions that ‘the completed project has been constructed in accord- “ 57 anee with the specifications of this. construction per- “mit and will provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endan- gered by its operation. + * * . * *. **3. There is sufficient information to provide rea- ‘sonable assurance that the utilization facility of the general type proposed in the application, as Amended, by CVNPA can be constructed at the location speci- fied therein without endangering and _ will: provide adequate protection to the health and wore of the publie. , “4. There ds reasonable assurance that the techni- eal information omitted from and required to com- plete the application, inéluding particularly that related to the special designed use of heavy water, the U-pressure tubes, ‘and the use of zirealoy clad- ding of the fuel elements, will be supplied.”’ . 8. Northern States Power Company, Construction Permit’ No. CPPR-8, issued May 12, 1960: “C. This permit authorizes the applicant to con- struct the facility in accordance. with the application and amendments thereto heretofore filed in this pro- ceeding without further authorization. “D. If the applicant desires Commission. approval. of any particular technical specification (such as the design details of the various components and special design features, including the nuclear superheater, the. aluminum alloy fuel elements, and -circulation control system), prior to consideration of -a license to operate, it may request that the Commission grant specifie approval of any ‘technical specification by appropriate amendment to this permit. “EF. This permit is provisional to. the extent that a license authorizing operation of the facility will not be issued by.the Commission until the proposed re- search and development program has bee ‘n completed 7 58 , s > | Z 8 -and evidence has been adduced ‘by’ Northern ‘States Power Company and it has been found by’ the Cor mission, that the Northern States Power Company’s proposed nuclear utilization facility, incliding ameng other components which must be proven acceptable hy tests described in the Intermediate Decision dated April 21, 1960, the novel features respecting the fuel _ elements in the boiler region of the core, the ineor- poration of a superheater with unproven types of fuel elements as an integral part ef the basic reactor. core, and the proposal that a variable rate of primar -.. coolant recirculation be utilized for Controlling the’ power level of the core, has been constructed and can we operated with adequate protection to and without — eadangering the health and safety of the publie in ac-_ cordance with the requirements.of the Atomi¢ Energy Act, as amended, and by the Rules and Regulations of the. Comniissien.” : | The Hearmg Examiner’ s Fnserinndiite Deci ision, issued April 21, 1960: “As stated, the proposed facility is a boiling water reactor having several n&& features and unique char- acteristics . with which there has been no previous ex- perience in any other reactor of a size comparable to that proposed by NSP. These are the use of alumi- num alloy as a cladding for fuel.in the boiler core, the use of ‘cermet fuel of the type proposed to be used and the superheater core, and the variable rate of primary coolant recirculation proposed to be used for control- ling the power level of the core. * * . ad ® * *. ‘For the purposes of an operating license, both NSP and the Staff are agreed that further analysis .and research and development explorations must be -eonducted before a judgment can be made: that the superheater, the altiminum cladding, and the recireu- 59 lation rate of the primary coolant can be safely 1 incor- porated into this particular reactor. ‘* * * am “3. There is sufficient information available to pro- vide reasonable assurance that the utilization facility of the general type proposed in the application, as ate | by NSP can be constructed and operated at the location specified therein without endangeri ing and will provide adequate protection to, the health and safety of the public. : “ane | “4. Thére is reasonable assurance” that, in accor- ‘dance with (1) research and development programs outlined in the evidence, (2) the tests proposed to be undertaken of the components, and (3) the availabil- ity of proven features to be incorporated in the reac- tor should necessity therefore require, the technical information omitted: from the application will be sup- pled, including particularly that related to fuel ele- we ments to be utilized in the boiler region of the core, the nuclear. superheater and its fuel elements proposed to be incorporated as an integral part of the basic reactor core, and the controls of the 1 variable rate of primary coolant recireulation.”’ ; 9. Consumers Power Company, Construction Per- mit No, CPPR-9, issued May 31; 1960: -“C. This permit authorizes the applicant to con- strict the facility in accordance with the application ‘and amendments thereto heretofore filed in this pro- ceeding without further authorization. 5“T). If the applicant desires Commission: approval + of any particular technical specification, prior to con- sideration ofa license to operate, it may request that “the Commission gragt specific approval of any tech- nical specification by appropriate en to this permit. &, . : maximum. specifi: power densities proposed can be . ° : , . “Ki. This permit is: provisional to the extent that a, license authorizing operation of the facility will not be issued by the Commission unless Consumers Power Company has -submitted ‘to the Commission (hy amendment to the applicationy the complete Final - Hazards Summary Report (portions of which may be submitted and evaluated from time to time) and the Commission has found that the final: design provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of: the public will not be endangered’ by operation of the facility in accordance with the specified. procedures. The Hearing Examiner’s aa Decision, q issued May 6; 1960: ; ‘*The determination of the existence of .y-asonable assurance that the utilization facility can be con- structed and operated at the proposed site without undue risk to the health and safety of the public is limited by the present récord to the conventional type of boiling water reactor with a. power density of 30 kilowatts per liter.. Many details of the design of Consumers’: project remain to be conipleted. The Staff of the Commission has expressed ‘the view that while | it is believed that experiments will develop satisfac- | ‘tory designs, it. remains to be demonstrated that the fF safely achieved, .and that clarification must be pro- . vided on.the need for in-core instrumentation which may appear to be necessary as: performance parame- ‘ters are better understood. The adequacy of the con- trol rod drive mechanisms may warrant re-examina- tion at a later stage inthe design calculations. Pe ene. * * . * . “3. There is sufficient information available-to pro- vide reasonable assurance that the utilization facility of the general type proposed in the application by © Consumers can be constructed and operated at the 61 location specified without endangering and will pro- ' ‘vide adequate protection to the health and safety. of . ro the public. 6 “4. There is reasonable assurance that, in aceord- ance With the research and- development programs ‘outlined in the evidence and the availability of alter- nate proven features to be incorporated in the reactor should necessity therefore require, the technical infor-- mation omitted from the application will be supplied.” 10. Pacific Gas & Electric ('0., Construction Permit No. CPPR-10, issued November 9, 1960: | ; “C, This permit authorizes the. permittee to con- | struct the facility in ‘accordance with its application, as amended, and as described i hearing record in this proceeding, without furf uthorization. “DT. If the permittee desires Commission approval of any particular technical specification or modifica- tion, pyior to consideration of a license to operate, it may request that the Commission grant specific ap- proval thereof, by appropriate. cmenement to this permit.”’ . The Hearing Examiner’s dititiaialinte Decision, is- sued October 17, 1960: “Tssue (1) The applicant has submitted sufficient © information to provide reasonable assurance that a utilization facility of the general type proposed in the ° application can be constructed and operated at the - proposed location without undue risk to the héalth and safety of.the public; “‘Tssue (2) There is reasonable assurance that the technical information omitted from and required to complete the application will be supplied. sd ‘The ftirther finding with respect to “the nuclear : power reactor facility which is proposéd” and the res- ervation on certain safety questions, were discnssed i in our main brief, p. 44, fn. 12. eee 592283 e1——5- ® “APPENDIX B- Excerpts From ConstTRUCTION PERMITS ISSUED FOR - Power REACTORS AND ACCOMPANYING CoM MISSION Decisions. RELATED TO o SEctIoN 50.40 or THE Reau- LATIONS ‘ r% os 1. Consolidated Edison Company of Mew York, Inc., Construction Permit No. CPPR-1: “C. Consolidated is financially qualified to assume responsibility for the payment of Commission charges for the special nuclear material to be turnished by ‘ the Commission, to uadertake and carry out the pro- posed use of the material for a reasonable period of — time, and to- construct and operate the reactor in ~aceordance with the regulations contained in Title 10, Chapter 1, C.F.R. ae | Consolidated and the Babeock & Ww ileox Com- pany, the contractor selected -by Consolidated to de- sign and construct said reactor, are technically quali- fied to design and construct the reactor.’ 2. Commonwealth Edison Company, Construction ‘Permit No. CPPR-2: oe .“C, Commonwealth is finakgially qualified to as- sume responsibility for the payment of Commicsion charges for the special nuclear material to be fur- nished by the Commission, to.undertake and carry out the, proposed use of the. material for a reason- able peried of time, an@ to construct and operate the reaetor.in accordanee with the regulations contained in Title 10, Chapter 1, C.F.R. ‘Ae t, as amended, and the’ Rules and Re —— of - ne c ‘ommission. | . The issuanee-of. the proposed construction per- mit to NSP, substantially in the form attaehed to the | Notice of Hearing issued herein, as modified by thé ‘Order hereinafter made, will not he inimieal te the common deferise and security or to the, health and safety of the pubhie.’ ou % Consumer Power Company, Construction Pernnit No. CPPR-9. The es Examiner's Inte wrinédiate. Decision sti a Ss . Consumcrs, General Electric iggy ir and Rote Corporation, collectively, are tec ‘hnically qualified to design, construct, and operate the il posed utilization facility. “6. Consumers is financially qualified and able to engage in the aetivities proposed in its application in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, as amended,’ and the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. “7. The issuance of the construction permit in sub-_ stantially the form attached hereto will not be inimical to the common defense and security, nor to the health. and safety of the public.” ‘10. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Construction Permit No. CPPR-10. ; The Hearing Examiner’s Intermediate Decision states: . * “Tssue (3) The applicant, collectively with ave al Electric Company and Bechtel Corporation as here- in proposed, is technically queued to design and con- struct the proposed facility; ‘Issue. (4) The applicant is financially qualified to engyge in the proposed activities; and “Tssue ¢5)° Construction of the reactor will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.’” >» APPENDIX € AnaLysis oF ResrponpENTS’ List oF ALLEGED RrEAcToR > ACCIDENTS, PREPARED BY AEC Division oF Lic ENSING |. A ND Recu LATION * as be P %* Re RE ACTORS IN TuiE UNITED STATES A. Accidents Causing Death or Obse rved Injury to . Operating Personnel - , 1. Reactor: SL-1, National Reactér Testing Sta- tion, Arco, Idaho, boiling water reactor, used for power production, prototypé for low-power plant at a remote site. Date: January 3, 1961. Nature of Incident: Reactor ‘exeursion occurred during shutdown for maintenance. Control rods were disconnected from drives and nuclear instrumentation was not in use. Some of the control rods ere ejected from the core. ° Radiation level: Over 1000 ‘ities in the reactor building. ‘ Injurtes:* 3 fatalities, the operating ‘personne! in the reactor building. Evaluation: Evaluation. of this aecident is still in progress. It appears that ‘maintenance procedures were partially at fault and that the reactivity condi- tion of the reactor was not adequately known or un- derstood at the time of the incident. Although the | reactor was not housed in ’a containment. building, offsite contamination was low, despite the very exten- sive contamination inside the reactor building. No -significant radioactive..material was released ‘beyond | the reactor area. -*. “Injuries” in this’ analysis refers to clinically observed or reported injuries. | ; (66) ee . 67 LB. Accidents Causing Radiation Overes posure to Op. — Personnel Without. Observed Injury . Reactor: General Electric Test Reactor (GETR 3 ; r aoe California, pressurized water reactor, - used for materials testing. Date: March 10, 1960. : ; Nature of Incident: A technician preparing a GETR fuel element for transfer from the storage pool to the Materials Lahetapory inhaled tracer amounts-of radioiodine, | Radiation level: 48 rads to the hy roid. (Other employees received doses to the thyroid of from: 1.8 to 7 rem). Injuries: iii : . Evaluation: This was not a reactor accident. Its connection with the GETR consists only in that the fuel element from which the iodine was released had previously been used in the reactor. There were no perceptible injurious consequences. Such conse- quences can be caused only by radiation exposure to the thyroid many times greater than these. - 3. Reactor: Materials Testing Reactor (MTR), Na- tional Reactor Testing Station, Arco, Idaho, water- - cooled and -moderated reactor with highly enriched plate fuel, used for materials irradiation and testing purposes. | Date: July 23, 1956. : ey . Nature of. Incident: Eight men were working on the. top of the reactor near the reactor tank opening (which was uncovered), the reactor being shut down | for refueling and maintenance. The water level in the reactor tank was lowered during the shutdown — period to facilitate insertion and removal of experi-. ments in the reactor. The men were exposed when a “ radioactive reactor component was placed in a posi- 68 1 tion where it Was notGdequately shielded hecause ot the lowered water level. : Radiation Level: External doses at top of reactor were as follows: 21 r, 6.2 r, 3.9 r, G1 or, 10.6 r, 2.9 r, 2.6 r, and 2.5 r. Injuries: The men sere placed tile T - routine med- ical observation, but no illness or other radiation- induced effects, were observed. on Evaluation> This incident was caused by inadequate radiation monitoring and questionable Juaimtenance procedures. , No radioactive material was_ released from the reactor, and the reactor was not affected by. the incident. No effect on persons other than those whose action was responsible for the unsafe-radiation condition were affected or. could have been affected. Full-time radiation monitoring service has since been ° provided at the reactor tank opening to prevent any such future exposures. | 4. Reactor: Chigago Pile, Argotinie National Labo-. ratory, Illinois. Date: June 1952. Nature of Incident: Manual withdrawal of a con- trol rod from a reactor caused an accidental super- criticality. When the: eontrol rod . -was released, the reactor was shut down. : : ‘ Radiation Levels: Personnel exposures. for the four persons standing ‘on or near the reactor were 190 remy - 160 rem, 70 rem, and 12 rem. Injuries: The four persons exposed were hospital! : ized for observation and no injuries or symptoms of radiation illness were noted. ; Evaluation: This reactor is an experimental facility at a National Laboratory, and has a considerable de- sf ; 69 cree of flexibility. The above accident was‘caused by the operators’ fathrre to drain the -reactor of water. before the control red was withdrawn. Criticality in the drained reactor would have been impossible.’ Tn- clided in the protective measures taken after the accident was the absolute prevention of access to the room when the reactor was not drained of water. C. Other Accidents and Operating Difficulties 5. Reactor: Dresden Nuclear Power Station: (Com- monwealth Edison Co.), Dresden, Tllinvis, boiling. wa- ter reactor, used for powex production as central sta- tion, : ; : Date: November 15, 1960. * Nature of Incident: One ef. the 80 control .rods failed to. follow its drive mechanism upon a rod with- drawal, rod was then driven into core and locked in place. Subsequent’ examination, after shutdown of reactor, revealed that index tube in drive had frac- tured, and disclosed surface cracks in some drive: components made of 17-PH steel. . : Radiation level: None. ‘Injuries: None. . Evaluation: ‘The situation resulted from stress _ corrosion of the steel used in the shaft of the drive mechanism. No accident occurred and no hazard ex- isted.” All otber. drive mechanisms perfermed ‘satis- factorily and appropriate precautions were taken with the*failed drive. The,drive. mechanisms have been -- modified, by use of different materials, different heat . treatment and fabrication controls, to reduce suscep- . Z : ’ ae 1 70 tibility to stress ¢errosion and eliminate further op- erational difficulties. ; 6. Reactor: Westinghouse Test Reactor (WTR), Waltz Mill, Pennsylvania, pressurized water reactor, used for high-flux materials irradiation, Date: April 3, 1960, Nature of Incident: Fuel element had a small (about one-half square incli) area in which bond between - fuel and clad was defective. A hot spot developed, the fuel swelled and led to coolant flow restriction and subsequent fuel element failure. | Radiation level: 46 r per hr. in the reactor head tank. No one was exposed to this, however, — Injuries: None. No exposures: to employees or others.above permissible limits. Evaluation: Although this incident was: a serious nuisance and produced large quantities of low-level waste, no hazard was involved. The reactor system was, designed in anticipation of possible fuel element failure (the normal practice in high-power reactor design) and no significant activity escaped the facility. - Remedial actions inchide more ‘careful inspection of the fuel elements before their insertion into the reac- tor and. the installation of addittonal waste holdup tankage and a larger waste’ evaporator to facilitate cleanup after any future incidents of this type. 7. Reactor: Homogeneous ‘Reactor Experiment No. 2 (HRE-2), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, “Tennessee ; aqueous homogeneous reactor used for experimental and developmental purposes. Date: February 1960: Nature of Incident: Corrosion of the barrier be- tween the core and*blanket regions caused an addi- | tional hole. in this barrier. A similar hole which oceurred about .two years previously had not been repaired, and since that time, the reactor had been oe ere 71. operating: with fuel solution in both: the core and the blanket regions: Thus no substantial change in the condition of the reactor was preduced by this new leak. | . Radiation Level: Now. Injuries: None.. Evaluation: This was not an ace ident. ‘One of the principal purposes of the facility is the testing of compatibility of materials, and leaks such as this are vot considered ineidents or even unexpected events, hut rather constitute experimental results. No radio- active material was released when this second hole was produced, ; 8. Reactor: Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRF), Santa Susana, California, sodium-cooled, graphite- moderated reactor used: for experimental _ and devel- opmental purposes. | Date: July 24, 1959. Nature of I neident: Decomposition products of or- ganie impurities in the coolant caused . overheating and melting of fuel. The core was. extensively dam- aged but no .significant amount of radioactive ma- terial was released. . Radiation Level: None. Injuries: None. Evaluation: One of the primary purposes of this facility is the investigation of the compatibility of ma- terials for- use in such a facility, and an incident such as this is not totally unanticipated. There are ap- propriate safety procedures and no hazard resulted. 9. Reactor: Situation referred to under “ANP” ac- tually occurred in Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment No.. 3 (HTRE-3) at National Reactor Testing Sta- tion, Arco, Idaho, gas-cooled, solid-moderated reactor, used for experimental purposes for aircraft propul-: ston ene > the blanket region in.addition to the core.’ No -fuel © ‘leased from the reactor. ; is . bunker. ‘of a nuclear propulsion plant, releases of radioactive to others existed as a consequence.of this release. Pig | - Date: November 18, 1958. Nature of Incident: Radioactive material was re- Radiatign Level: O8-per cent 6f, the site Was con- taminated.. No persons were exposed™ahd no evacu- ntion of personnel was necessary, sinée._ facility _ operations are carried out remotely froma shtelded Injuries: None. . valuation: This reactor is an experimental facility designed and located so that in experimental testing hd material to the atmosphere may be permitted to occur , safely. Thus, no hazard to operating personnel or. 10. Reactér: Homogeneous Reactor Experiment No. ‘2 (HR#-2), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, aqueous homogeneous reactor, used for experimental and developmental purposes. —- Date: April 4;1958. es Nature@pf Incident: Corrosion of the barrier be- tween core and blanket regions ef the reaetor pro- duced a hole in this barrier. Liquid fuel thus filled é or radioactive material escaped from the reactor, and operation was continued with fuel in both regions. Radiation Levei: None. , » * Injuries: None. | is ‘Evaladtion: This was not an accident. One of the principal putposes of this fa¢ilitY’ is the testing of inaterials compatibility and jeaks such as this are not unexpected, and constitute useful experimental re- sulfs. (See Itera 7.) | 11.. Reactor: Godiva, Los Alamos Scientific Lahovi- “tory, New Mexico; bare, fast. critical assembly, used ror hasie fast reactor studies. * 7 Date: February 12, 1957. a . , Nature. of Incident: A yemotely operated fission- able material assembly produced.a neutron exeursion greater than’ intended, resulting in damage to -the “_usse mbly. *'Total energy of the excursion was 1.2 x 10" fissions or about one kilowatt heur, Radiatiow Level: None, at the point of neatest ap- proach to the facility (about one-quarter of a mile from the assembly). ; Injuries: None. Evaluation: This facility is an experiment. re for the purpose of intentionally prodiicing neutron bursts and is constructed and operated in a manner . much different than a normal reactar plant. It is unshielded, Because of the experimental nature of ~ the f facility, all persons are éxcluded from its vieinit and it is. remotely controlled from a safe Males, one-quarter mile away. Although the particular neu- ron burst cited here was larger than was intended, and was severe enough to violently disassemble the | system. and shut down the assembly, no hazard to any re rsons existed. . . ‘12. Reactor: Kinetic Experiment on Ww ater Boilers (KEWB). Santa Susana, California; aqueous homo- geneous reactor (water boiler), used for burst experi+_ ments in aqueous homogeneous reactors. . | . Date: January 4, 1957. . Nature of I neident: A small quantity of volatile ra- -dioactive material was released into the reactor room by leakage from around a valve stem when the valve Was operated. This resulted from failure of a vaewum pump which normally maintained a negativ’ pressure on the gas sampling line in which the valve was lo- ‘ated. ~The building was evacuated until activity levels returned to normal background ‘(less than one dey) . 74 Radiation Level: Above normally-accepted levels for continuous indefinite breathing. Building was vacated in about 10 seconds, and no dose of any sig- nificance was received by personnel., (No. detectable external dose, internal dose Tess than 50 mr, no activ- ity detectable by urinalysis.) Injurics: Nore. Evaluation: The equipment that failed Was a part of the auxiliary plumbyig system and not an integral part of the reactor system., Required cleanup effort was comparable to that which might be required rou- tinely in a radioisotope laboratory.’ As already noted, monitoring « procedures adequately detected the con- tamination and evacuation was completed without difficulty, so that there was no hazard to personnel] or, others, 13. Reactor: Howmogeucous Reactor Experiment No. (HRE-2), ‘Oak Ridge National “Laboratory, Oak . Ridge, Tennessee; aqeous homogeneous reactor, used % for development and experimental Parposes. Date: November 1956. © 7 Nature of Incident: Microscopic cracking ¢: aused by stress corrosion was discovered in the helium leak de- tector systém and in some of the flanges to which the system’s tubing is connected. The condition’ was dis-- covered during preliminary non-nuc ‘le ar checkout tests of the plant. Radiation Level: None. Injuries: None. — | | Evaluation: This was nut a reactor incident. No nuclear materials were involved in, the plant, which had not yet been fueled for operation. Corrosion was caused by chloride ion contamination of the stainless steel leak-detection tubing, as a result of inadequate. cleaning and inspection of this auxiliary system tub- ing. (Extreme eare had-‘been taken to ‘exclude all . s 75 chlorides from the components of the reactor system: itself, but less care was apparently exercised with re- spect to the auxiliary tubing.) This defect was dis- covered during noui-nuclear checkout of the system ‘‘pnlumbing.’’ The purpose of such checkout is to dis- close any such system defects before nuclear fuel is ‘jnstalled in thé plant. The discovery: of the stress corrosion condition caused a delay of many monfhis in the startif of the HRE-2, but no safety problems were involved. 14. Reactor: Seawolf Submarine (S2G), interme- diate, sodium-cooled reactor, used for naval propul- sion, experimental. fe” fe Date: September 6, 1956. pes : Nature of Incident: Several leaks were detected in superheater and steam generator tubes over a period of time. These tubes are of double-walled construe- tion with a barrier of- non-radivactive NaK in the annulus between the walls, and proved very difficult to maintain 100% leaktight. Radiation Level: None. Injuriés: None. oe Evaluation: Materials problems such as this are not uncommon in experimental and development systems. Leaks had developed in the land-based prototype for the reactor (S1G), and their occurrence in the actual ship reactor was not totally unexpected. In order to stop the leaks, ‘it was necessary to’ block off the af- fected tubes, resulting in a decrease in the maximum power and speed attainable by the ship. Since the leaks were internal and steam contamination was pro- tected against by means of the intermediate NaK_bar- rier, no que ion of radiation or radioactive material was ipvoived. The ineident was a signifieanf.opera- tional nuisance and development probicm, but no safety problem Was presented. 76 15. Reactor: Experimental Breeder Vidasee No, 1 (KBR-1), National Reactor Testin:; Station, ‘Arco Idaho, fast breeder, sodium cooled reactor, used for experimental fast reactor studies. Date: November 29, 1955. , | Nature of Incident: While the reactor was under- going a series of scheduled experiments, rapid power surges were intentionally introduced and fuel temper- “atures. were intentionally forced above their nortial limits. Automatie protective instrumentation and shutdown devices were disconnected in ofder to per- mit the power surge tests. without auteomatie shut- ‘down. During the last test of the series, the reactor overheated rapidly and extensive fuel melting ov- curred before the operator eguid initiate manual shut- down. — Radiation Level: None. Injuries: None. . Evaliation: The EBR-1 is. an experime ntal re- actov located in a remote site in .erder that Gt can he opel rated under ‘extreme conditions and in’ an ab- normal manner without producing -a safety hazard. When the meltdown occurred, the tests being per- forméd, involved the introduction of deliberate and severe abnormali‘ies, with normal automatic protec- tive equipment disconnected, and the possibility of damage to the ‘reactor under such conditions was clearly realized. The damage which did occur’ wes thus more an experimental result than a reactor in- ¢ident, and resulted in no adverse consequences from the safety standpoint. 16. Reactor: One of the Sentood Protiation Reac- tors, Hanford, Washington, graphite moderated. water covled reactor, used for plutonium production. Date: November 1, 1955. ay * Rip o Naturé of Inctdent: A ruptured fuel slug was forei- Ply loosed and then flushed from its tube by a high , pressure water ‘stream. A flash of flame occurred as the slug came out of the tube-at the rear of the re-' actor. The back of the reactor required decontamina- tion. Seme of the surrounding area on the site was slightly contaminated. Radiahoun Level: Unknewn (ow in occupied locations). : : een he! Injuries: None, : Evaluation: The. inecide nt necessitated a dete mi- nation. effort, but thére Was no actual or potential ef- | fect on operation of the reactor, and no potential propagation of the fuel slug failure. to other tubes of the reactor. Fuel slug failures are provided for in the design of the reactor and plant equipment. Monitor- ing instrumentation is in continuous use for the detection of plugging or reduction of coolant flow in the reactor tubes, and equipment is available for removal of failed fiiel slugs from the tubes without > = : hazard to plant personnel or others. The plant is so located that the release of fission produc ts associated - with. fuel failures such as this do not constitute an sare contamination problem or ‘hazard. . . Reactor: Raleigh Research Reactor (North pre State College), Raleigh, N.C., aqueous ho- mogeneous ‘(water boiler) reactor, used for Univer- sity researeh and training.” « 2 Pate: May 1955. @ ; . Nature of Fnewdent: The stainless steel vore of the renetor developed a leak, allowing fuel solution to ieak into the surrounding chamber and into the cool- ing. water, . Radiation eo None. Injuries: None. 592233- 61-6 ; : es by : © : ; Evaluation: ‘This failure is typical of the materials - problems that have been associated with this and-other solution-type" reactors. Reactors «wf this type are designed so that a core tank leak will not permit fuel solution containing radioactive material to escape. from the reactor system, _thus protecting ‘against hazard if Jeaks such as this do oceur, 18. Reacter: Mate? rials Testing Reactor (MTR), National Reactor Testing Station; Are, Idaho; water moderated and cooled reactor with highly enriched plate fuél, used for materials. irradiation and testing purposes. | Date: June 1954. Nature of Incident: Bulging of some fuel plates was discovered. This caused contact between plates and overheating in a few localized spots, Some fission products were released te the coolant. ; ‘Radiation Levels: Up to 3 rvhr on contact at some ‘points in the cooling system. . Tn juries: None. = — Ry ee j Evaluation: The inereased ‘radiation levels of the . cooling system caused some short-term operating prob- lems, because the allowable working time for mainte- nance of the cooling system was redueéd. During normal oper: ation, the system is well shielded and no _ problem was produced by the incident. Onee the source of activity had been removed, maintenance tire - limitations were able te be relaxed. Fuel elements - were modified to prevent a recurrence of this incident. _No. hazard to operating personnel or others existed as a result of this incident. . 19. Reactor: Godiva, Los Alamos Seientifie Labora tory, New Mexico, bare, fast, critical assembly, nee for hasie fast reactor studies: : Date: February 3, 1954. : Nature of TIneident: The reactor was made exces- 79 sively supereritieal during a study of the properties of supercritical bursts. This: study imvolved above- normal burst magnitudes. An error in preparation for the experiment caused this particular burst to be vreater than expected, by abou! a factor of three. Phe total eriergy generated in the bufst was approximately one-half ef one kilowatt-hour (6 x 10% fissiows ). ° ‘Radiation Levels: None, at the point of nearest ap- proach to the fae ility. Injuries: None.- | . —Evatvation: “Ag indicated. in item 11,. this experi- mental facility is operated remotely to assure safety of personnel under normal conditions and also under the abnormal conditions of an aceident. The only. adverse effect of the experiment was damage to the assembly, to the extent of #600, and time lost in re- pair of the ASSE “nbly before the next burst. 20. Reactor: Clementine, Los Adamos Scientifie Lab- oratory, New Mexico, plutonium-fuckea, fast, rier cury-cooled reactor, used for basic fast reactor studies. _ Date: Prior to dismantling of reactor in December 1957. . Nature of Incidtnt: One of the fuel elements firiled, rtleasing: plutonium into the mereury coolant: Since the résearch and development studies lipon the reactor. had Been completed, it was shut down and late Y dismantled. | Radiation Levels: None known. This f@lure is not of a type whieh would be expected to release a signifi- cant amount of radivactive niaterial. : Inj jurtes: None. , Evaluation: This was not a reac tor aceigent. The facility was of a very early fast reactor design and was constructed for developmental purposes. Materi- als failures of this type cited here.are not unexpected or unprepared for in-such facilities, Since the re- 80 actor’s planned objectives had been fulfilled at the time of the failure, it was decided not to clean up the . coolant and resume peraien, but to dismantle the reactor. ; “91. Reactor: One of fhe reactors at cLos Alitnnios: Ser -entifie Laboratory, New Mexico. Date: December 1949. ; ‘Nature of Incident: Supereriticality oce urred in the ene tor, caused by manual testing of control ‘rod in a a ; * : Radiation Levd: One employee was exposed to 2.5r (not abeve permissible level in effeet at that time). Injurtes: None. | Evaluation: The meident oecurréd in an. experi- mental facility at a remote site. It was caused by inannal eontrel red testing. Such testing is charac- teristi¢ only of the early stave éf reactor development at the time of the incident { L449) and is not practiced today. 29 Reactor: X- 10 Reactor, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Onk Ridge, Tennessee, graphite -moder- ated, air cooled reactor used for research and isotope production. . | Date: 1947-1948, Nature of Incident: Fuel elements of the type in use during this period éxperierncea failures at a low rate. Qn two occastons, one in 1947 and one in 1948, such failure went undetected antil the fuel element jacket had swelled enough to restrict cooling air flow in one echannel2 This eaused overheating and failure of other elements in the channel. In each instance, the channe! was damaged in removal of the elements and_ its’ further use was abandoned. There are 1248. channels in the reactor of which 821 are fueled. Radsation Levels: None. fujuriess None, a ? 81 — Evaluation: From the standpoint of hazard, this was hot a reactor accident. The reactor operates at a low power level and contains many. thousands of fuel ele-_ ments, so that the quantity of. fission produets ‘con- tained in each element is very small. Furthermore, the restriction of air flow caused in an ineident sueh as this serves to block the normal’ path of release of any — radioaetive material which might escape from a failed: fuel element. While the incident affected operating efficiency, there Was no danger t any employee or member of the public. HI. REACTORS IN ®OREIGN COUNTRIES* ‘A. Accidents Causing Death or Observed Injury to Ope rating Personnel 93. Reactor: Critica assembly at the Boris-Kidrich | Institute, Yugoslavia; natural uranium, heavy water moderated, . critical assembly, used for Peasearch piirposes. . Date: October 18, 1958. Nature of Ineiden’. Accidental criticality caused by uneontrolled pumping of heavy water into theoun- ~ shieided tank of the critical assembly. Radia: om Leve?: The average exposure to personne! located at distances varying frojn 10 ft. to 25 ft. from the reactor is reported to haveSeen 49 rems of thermal neutrons, 223 rems of epithermal neutrons, 116 rems of fast neutrons, and 295 rems.of gamma -radiation. Injuries: One person died a@s a result of over- exposure. Five persons received severe overdoses of radiation but have been reported Yecovering after receiving medical treatment. Fv aluation: The facility was a zero-power critical assembly, used for research. It was unshielded and oe *The analysis of foreign - incidents listed lL respondents is based solely upon published reports and statements. 2 82 the procedure for starting up was to pump the moder- ator, heavy water, into the reactor tank. This°is a major operation and should have been properly: scked- uled and properly controlled. The severe accident reported came about because (1) there was a, failure to control and schedule the pumping, which should not have been undertaken with persons near the unshielded assembly; (2) the monitoring, seram and other safety systems had been turned off. ° . B. Accidents C ausing Radiation Overesrposure to Op- erating Personnel Without Observed Injury : 24. Reactor: NRU, Chalk River, Canada, natrral urantum reactor heavy water moderated-and cooled, used for plutonium production, research and mate- rials testing. Date: May 23, 1958. Nature of Incident: The incident which triggered the chain of events leading to mere serious difficulties was in itseif minor. The reactor went threugh an au- tumatie shutdown initiated by an excessive rise-of- power. This rise-of-power may have been caused by a phenomenon known as water logging of failed fuel elements. It was decided to remove three damaged fuel elements.. During this phase of operations, one of the three damaged’ fuel elements jammed after .being- raised part way into the carrier flask and was with- out cooling for 10 minutes. The resulting. overheat- ing Amd oxidation caused a3 ft. long piece to fall out of the earrier flask when it, was being moved ov er to-. wards the storaze area, and to burn/in the open air of the reactor room. before being extinguished with wet sand. ee S: : Radiation Level: Reported radiation in the reactor room after the first incident was 100-1000 mr/hr. However, after the second incident, the radiation fields were probably m excess of 1000 r/hr. 83 Injuries: Eighteen employees: were exposed to radi- ation as a result of this incident. Of these exposed, during the ineidert, none reéeived exposure higher than’5.3 roentgens. During the eamup and removal of debris, the highest*e ‘xpostre received was about 6 roentgens. . None of these 18 individuals showed any evidence of: injury. Evaluation: ‘The initial incide nt was a minor one, ‘Contamination of ‘the reactor room and expostre .of personnel resulted from the attempt to move the high- ly radioactive damaged fuel element without assuring that the.transfer operations could be performed prop- - erly. : 4 ; © 25. Reactor; Wandscale Windseale, Engi and, natural uranium, graphite — air cooled. re- actor, used for phuitonitum pixposes. Date: Octoher 10, 1957. Nature of Incident: During a spec ‘ial annealing op- eratton (Wigner release) of the graphite pile, there was a failure of fuel cladding, which led to exposure of the uraniunt fuel, oxidation and thén to fire in the. combustible mass of graphite and uranium metal. Radioactivity was released out the stack (through a filter), dispersed to the atmosphere and ‘caused con- tamination in the vicinity. Radiation Level: Not given. Injuries: Fourteen workers had exposures over the “normal 3.0 r for a 13-week period, the highest expo- -sure being 4.66 r. “No. injuries reported from such exposures or from nearby contamination. Evaluation: This-incident took place during a spe- ‘cial plant operation’ undertaken to release energy stored in graphite by effects of irradiation. This phenomenon of a graphite pile, and:the necessity, for ‘such’ operation, was discovered earlier (see item 41). « It was reported that this incident occurred bee: wise tne operator failed to take sufficient time to perform ‘the Wigner release and there were inadequacies in the operator’s training and the written procedures. This reactor is cooled by blowing air through the pile econ- sisting of fuel elements and graphite slabs and ex- ‘ hausting the air out of the.stack. Hence, this reactor type does not exhibit the gas-tight plant containment _ usually -associated with power reactor installations. ‘As a result, the radioactive material: was released to. the atmosphere. ‘he incident necessitated extensive repair and deeontamination. However, there were no — excessive exposures to radiation and no injury ¢on- * sequences detected or reported. C. Other Accidents and Operating Difficulties 26. Reactor: G-2, Marcoule, France, natural’ ura- nium reactor, graphite moderated, CO: cooled, used for plutonium production. Date: July 6,1960. . Nature of Incident: There was a ‘mechanical rupture of a joint between the loading mechanism and a fuel canal, As a result, a small quantity.of CO: gas under operating pressure of 220 psi escaped into the reactor hall. Radiation Level: Not reported. It was stated by a spokesman for Le Commissariat 4 1’Energie Atomique that the escaping gases were only slightly radioactive. Injuries: None reported. | Evaluation: Mechanical failure of a component led . -to escape of small amount of radioactivity int tic reactor hall, which was immédiately detected by the monitoring instruméntation. The reactor was shut down, pressure reduced to stop the leak. and appro- priate maintenance work undertaken. No hazard to health and safety of operating personnel was pre- sented. | 84 85 27. Reactor: Research Reactor, Berlin, Germany, aqueous homogeneous reactor, light water moderated and couled, used for research purposes. _ Date: Mare 1960. — Nature of Incident: A welded metal ‘piece came loose inside the catalyst chamber and impeded the flow of gas, ; : Radialion Level: None. There Was no escape of ra- ‘dioactivity outside the reactor. Injuries: None reported. Evaluation: Water decomposes under radiation to hydrogen and oxygen, and this reactor was equipped with a loop through which these non-radioactive gases were drawn, introduced into a catalyst chamber and - -returned to the reactor vessel as water. The failure of a component of. that chamber did not present any safety problem. : 28. Ievactor: J Japanese Research Reactor #1, Tokai Mura, aqueous liémogeneous reactor, light water mod- erated and cooled, used for research pares Date: December 8, 1959. Nature of I ncident: Officials at the reactor plant ‘stated that a minor incident occurred which resulted in radioactive contamination of the reactor section, and that the radioactivity was completely contained in the reactur section. Insufficient- information is available to us to give further details or permit of any evaluation. | 29. Reactor: AGN-211, Basel, Switzerland, solid -homogeneous reactor, polyethylene’ moderated, — water cooled, used for research purposes. Date: November 10, 1959. Nature “of Incident: ‘Failure of the polyethylene - vs matrix around the fuel. Radiation Level: Radioactivity level of the reactor Water inereased to a maximum of 3 x 10° microcuries i) - per em’ after 114 hrs. of operation at 100 watts. No increase in radiation in areas accéssible to indivicuals. _ Injuries: No, overexposure or injuries reported. _ Evaluation: In this small research reactor, the fuel’ is dispersed as grains ina polyethylene matrix im-: _mersed. the reactor water. Due to a failure of the bonding between some of the fuel grains and the: matrix, small quantities of gas escaped into the re- actor water. The leak stopped upon reduction .of power to 950 watts. This difficulty had no adverse consequences for the health and safety of personnel. | 30. Reactor: EL-2, Saclay, France, natural uranium, heavy water moderated, CO: cooled reactor, used for research and isotope: production. Date: Fehruary 16, 1959. | Nature of Incident: Overheating of fuel element r9 resulted’ in rupture of cladding and the escape of ‘adioactivity into the CO: stream. Radiation Level: It is reported that there’ was no trace of radioactive contamination outside the reactor into the reactor room proper. Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported. Byaluation: A breach in the ititegrity Of the cladding in a fuel element caused escape of fission products _into the coolant, a minor operating difficulty. The moniforing system is equipped to detéct such escape. In each of such reported incidents at Saclay, the diffi- culty-was immediately detected. Thereafter, the reac- tor was shut down and appropriate maintenance work done to locate and replace any defective fuel element, and clean up the coolant gas where necessary. In some eases. the repair work was apparently time- — consuming. and expensive: However, there was no threat to the health and safety of the Fs ian personnel at fhy time. ; * ?.. Reactor: EL-2, Saclay, France, nawrrar’ uranium, heavy water moderated, CO: eooled reactor, used for research and isotope production. Date: December 27, 1958. _' Nature of Incident: Failure of the c itil of a fuel element resulting in escape of radioactivity into the ‘CO: stream. Radiation Level: Certain components in the closed’ - CO: system indicated 4 times the maximum permissible — devel. $ Injuries: No overexposure or injuries oe _ Evaluation: Same as in item 30. 32. Reactor: Calder’ Hail, Calder Hall, ‘Suskind natural uranjum reactor, graphite moderated, CO: cooled, used for power production. Date: June 28, 1958. Nature of Incident: ‘There was a mec ‘hanical failure of .a steam turbine. : Radiation Level: None. — Injuries: None. | Bo Evaluation: The failure of the steam turbine led‘to a shutdown of the reactor, since the latter was pro-. ducing steam for the turbine. The incident, how- ever, was a mechanical failure in the turbine which had nothing to do with the nuclear installations of ‘tthe plant. ; 33.. Reactor: F1:-8, Saclay, France » slightly enric hed urgnium reactor, heavy water cooled and, moderated, - used for iniaeel and materials festing. | Date: April 13, 1958. Nature of Incident: Aluminum channel in which.a fuel-element was situated broke-and fefl as result of _. vibration and lack of support. This intérrupted the — forced circulation eooling of the fuel element, and led © to overheating and rupture of the fuel element. i 88 ‘Radiation Level: Nw contamination of the reactor room, established by analysis of the air as well as check of the personnel. Any radioactivity which es- ‘aped from the fuel slug was confined to the primary coolant and the closed helium. gas systems.’ Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported. Kraluation: The release of radioactivity into the: coolant by this mechanical. failure of a component was promptly detected. The situation is similar to ‘that evaluated in item 30. 34. Reactor: SAPHIR, Wiire nlingen, Switzer Wand. pool type reactor, 20% enric ‘hed uranium, light Water eooled and moderated, used for research Purposes. Nature of Incident~ No incident of any kind is re- ported at the referenee given in respondents’ brief. . Reactor: EL-2, Saclay, Fronee, natural: ura- nium, heavy water moderated, CO: cooled reactor, use? for research and isotope production. - Date: November 26, 1957. Nature of Incident: Overheating of an aliminum clad uranium slug because of insufficient. cooling water flow, hele in’ él: idding released radioactivity into cocl- ing water. Radiation, Level: No inerease ofthe radiation level: . in the reactor hall reported.© Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported. = aluatidn: Same as item 30, Reactor: G-1, Mareoule, France, nataral uran- a graphite iqderated, air-cooled reactor, used for _ power produetion demonstration and plutoniun pro, duction. ; Date: October 26, 1956. ; ucts Nature of Incident: The failure of the canning ex- posed an uranium slug with subsequent oxidation and dispersion of. fission products inte the reacter’s cool- ing air. P ay Radiation Level: Wt was reported that the maxi- mum coneentration of radioactive material in the air. was 5 x 10°* microctries‘em’ for a few minutes at the base of the stack. It is nefed, however that the- ieasurements of the activity in the air by th stations ontside theesite always remained well under the max- imggm permissible lint. | Injuries: It was reported that personnel were not exposed to radiation above permissible limits and-no INjUTIOUS CoNseqiences were noted. Evalaation: The faihire of fuel eanninge released a small qnantity of radioactive fission products into the coolant. This was promptly detected by monitoring | Wistrumentation. The reactor was shut down and ap- prapriate action taken. The report stated that a mi- ner aceident of this order is not rungenene either for the personnel or for the reactor, 37. Reactor: -J EE P, Kieller, Norway, natural ‘uranium, heavy water modersted and cooled reactor, ‘used for research piirposss. Date: February, 1954. _ Nature of: Incident: The incident occurred in a ‘channel of the reactor used for irradiation purpe-es. The aluminum canning im an irradiation channel failed, expesing an uranium slug, with subsequent oxidation. . * Radiation Level: Not given, but. required evacua- ion of reactor hall. .The-report stated that radio- active dust spread into the «reactor hail when the ’ irradiation channel was opened, personnel were evacu- ated and had to don protective ciothing and masks hefore reentering the building. Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported. - Fvaluation: «This incident did not involve the reaetor fuel elements or any defect in the operation of the reactor itself. The. failure occurred in a can C ‘ as 90 placed in the reactor to be irradiated for experimenta! purposes. It was apparently due to careless ex- perimental’ procedures, and necessitated approprrate mamMtenance and decontamination. 38. Reactor: Windscale #1, Windscale, England, natural uranium, graphite moderated, air cooled reac- tor, used for plutonium production. | Nature of Incident: No incident is-reported im the reference given in respondents’ brief. 39; Reactor: Russian heavy water research: reactor ‘-(HWRR), slightly ‘enriched uranium reactor, heavy water moderated and cooled, used for research purposes. Date: 1958. Nature of Incident: Failure. of the cladding of an uranium rod, releasing radivactivity into the rez actly vessel. Radiation Level: The presen nee of fissivs products. in the reactor’s helium blanket was re ported. Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported. Evaluation: As reported, the initial incident was a failure of fuel cladding, a minor difficulty which was decected and which led to appropriate routine ‘deas- ures to replace the fuel element. The subsequent falling of the element and damage to the reactor tank, necessitated a difficult repair job. However, such re- pairs-ean be done safely and no injury or overex- posure is reported. : 40. Reactor: NRX, Chalk River, Canada, natural uranium, heavy water moderated, light water cooled reactor, used for research purposes. Date: December 13, 1952. Nature of Tneident: During an experiment, a power surge. oceurred because’ of mechanical failure of the safety shutdown system, resulting in melting of part of the fuel reds. A : ni 91 Radiation Lével: Not given. Plant personnel were required to evacuate the site. | Injuric sr No overe Xposure or other tv pe of Injuries reported. At times during the repair work it! Decrmne necessary to allow individuals to take a thirteen-week dosage (3.9 roenfeen) iv a matter of a day or two and subsequently bar thet. froii the radioactive area for. ape riod of 15 weeks. . Etaluction: This accident tools place during R pe- riod of experimental work with the reactor and was probably associated with special, experimental eondi- tions. It was a serious accident in terms of the exten- sive repair and decontamination work required in the reactor building and the reactor vessel. No adverse health and safety consequences were noted to operat- = hi “rsonnel and there was no danger to the public. . Re actor: Windseale #1, Windseale, Eneland, ni bate urantum, graphite moderated, air cooled reac- tor, used for plutonium production. Date: Se ‘pte mber 1952. Nature of Incident: Unexper éd release of energy accummilated in the graphite blocks, manifested as an Jncrease in the temperature of the graphite pile. Radiation Level: Not reported. ier Injuries.. No overexposure or injuries reported. Evaluation: This was an unexpected minor oceur- rence which’ did not result in any officially reported _ercotherwi- + known consequences to. the health’ and safety of the personnel or the publie. It alerted ‘the plant management to the “Wigner effect,’ the aceu- mulation ef energy in -granhite subject. to irradiation, and Jed to the develop.cent of procedures or periodic deliberate releases of Wi Igner energy. See item 25, US GOVERNMEN? PRINTING OFFICE. 1961 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386410_0022%3A16. Public record. Not legal advice.