# Brief for Respondents — Shelton v. Tucker > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386409_0304%3A4 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Brief for Respondents - **Published:** January 1, 1960 - **Citation:** 364 U.S. 479 ## Text fLE COPY. fF FILED NOV 1 1960 : ——F AMES KO BROWNING, Clerk __ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ——.. October ‘Perm, +960 —— ——— we Nerd No: 83 B. T. Sueitox, epee, « Appellants °° a v. er No. 14 j Everett Tucker, Ju, Prestpent, eve., ef al, A ppellees F ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ‘EASTERN: DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS Max Carr, ef al., : Petitioners v. . - No.. 83 R. A. Yowna, et al., . 5 Respondents. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT, , so "OF ARKANSAS ; BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS Bruce BeNNEtr Attorney General State of Arkansas Torr THomas Assistant Attorney General State of Arkansas Attorneys for Respondents. - ‘ - Lerner v. Casey, 357 USS. 468 tocoscecceet encentcneee stots snetnon un 3 NAACP. + Alabama, 357 US. 449 kesioig” STATUTES: Ark. Stats. (1947) $80-12297: 2 3 2 Ark. Stats. (1947) 80-1230 ; ae a Ark, Stats. (1947) $g0:1231 ". 7 2 Ast: Stats. (1947) $80-1232 | | ? 2 | eget = : Ark, Stats. (1947) §80-1304(b) 4 as ; ; 5 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ( Me ‘tobe eT erni, 1969: ee a 4 ; ‘No . 14—No, 83 ae | J B. T. Suevrox, ef al., Appellants: eos wae : . ® $e. 3 , e v. ; ‘ No. 14 E Evene ere Tucker: Jr, Prestvent, Evc., ef al., Appellees x ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT “Tt is-clear that such persons have the right under ovr law to assemble, speak, think and be- lieve as they will, Communications Assn. y. Douwds, 339 U.S. 888. Ti is equally clear that they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms. "wmited Public Work- ers v. Mitchell, 230 U.S. 75. Thev hhay work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authoritfes of New York. If they do not choose to Work on such~ terms, they » are at liberty to‘retain their beliefs and associa- iions and go elsewhere, .. . The petitioners cannot dewand that they be em- loved by ‘the school authorities with no investigation of their backgrounds. or present and past associations, If they feel that it would he to their detriment or foreign to their beliefs to comply with the provisions of Act 10° they are not forced to do so and are free to seek employ- nent elsewhere. — It is true that if they do not comply they can uot be employ ed, but this fact does not de my them any constit utior ral right, for no teacher in the State.of Arkansis as a vested right in his job” In Arkansas teachers: are hired on a “Year-to-year (basis and the only specific sec urity that a teacher has be ‘vond the end of a year iv the statutory provision. that if’ a teacher, is ‘not notified within 10 days aftet the end ef a school vear that his contract has hot been renewed, it is automatically re- newed for the following vear, Ark. Stats. varied §s0- 1304(b). ‘ Act 10 was not designed to -abrogate the constitn- tional rights of any member of the te: aching -profession, but is designed as an aid to the school boards and gov- erning bodies of the colleges and universities in determ- ining an. applicant's qualifications: and fitness for em- ployment in the respective institutions, i é The petitioners further argue. that Act 10, ‘even if valid, is subject to being: used in dn unconstitutional main ner. This arguinent.is premised on the ground that, ‘*: statute which compels disclosure. of assoctations may be unconstitutional without further direct governmertal -ac- tien of a punitive lature, if the governmentally. forced disclosure: sets in Motion private action whieh has the ef- fect of depriving one of his constitutional rights’’, To. ‘support. their argument they rely on National Associa. tion for the. Adv ancement of Colored Pe ‘ople vy. Alabama, oF C S. $49; and Bate 2 Pe; ity Of ¢ Little Rock. O61 US. 4) Mi. These cases are readily distinguishable from the case at hand. In the Alabama case it Was held that the Association could: not le compelled by a State court to disclose its membershiq: lists in connection with an action broughf by the State on account of its alleged noncom- pliance with the Alabama ‘statutes dealing with foreign _ corporations, — This Court said: **).. The issues in the litigation commenced by: Alabama, . . were whether. the character of petitioner and its activities in Alabama’ had teen such as to make petitioner subjest to the registra- tion statute, and whether the extent of petitioner's activi- | lies without qualifying suggested its perimanent ouster from the State: Without intimating the slighest- view upon, the merits of these issues, we are unable to perceive that the disclosure: of the names of petitioner's rank- camped : file my smbers has a subst: antial hearing on either of then.” The Bates case tarned on the: same peaeaee ome ‘that “there was ‘no rele ‘ant correlation between the power of the municipalities to Impose aceupation ‘license taxes and the eonpulsory “disclosure and publication, of niember- ship lists of the local branches of the National Associa- tion for the Advancement of Colored People’. This Court has recognized Inany times the « rele- vanev’* and ‘justification’ of obtaining from employees lists af past and present organizations of ‘which they have, heen, or are, members. Ht Is quite clear that-the em- nlovers in this case have abundant justification fot dis- *- covery of: the ‘past: and present associations of employ: CCS, ao 6 «SHELTON v, TUCKER. 3 It is urged here, as it was unsuccessfully urged through- out the:préceedings in both the Federal and State courts, that Act 10 deprives teachers i in Afkansas of their rights . to personal, associational, and academic: liberty, pro- tected by the Due Process Clause of the’.Fourteenth * Amendment from invasion by state action. In consider- ing this contention, we deal with two basic postulates. First. There can. be-no doubt of the right of a state to investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools, as this Court before now has had occasion to recognize. “A teacher works in a sensi- tive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards -the society in which they. live. In this, the state has a vital concern.” Adler v. Board of - Education, 342 U.S. 485, 493. There is “no requirement ‘in the Federal- Constitution that a téacher’s ciassroom conduct be the sole basis for determining his fitness. Fitness for teaching depends on a broad range of factors.” Beiian v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399, 406.: _ This controversy is thus not of a pattern wit such cases as N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516: In those cases the ' Court heid that: there was no substantially relevant cor- relation between the governmental interest asserted and the state's effort to compel disclosure of the membership | lists involved. Here, by contrast, there canbe no ques- ‘tion of the relevance of a state’s inquiry into, the fitness atid competence of its teachers." ‘ The actual holdings in Adler and Beidan. peaeneroe the validity of teachers’ discharges, are not relevant to the present case. * The declared purpose of Act 10 is, “to provide assistance in the administration and” finaneing of the pubhe schools . . * The declared justification for the: emerge ney clause is “to assist in the solu- e ’. Open Our Schools. SHELTON v. TUCKER. q Second It is not disputed that ta-compei a teachin disclose his every associational tie ‘is to impair a teacher's right of free assuciation, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364; Bates v. Little Rock, supra, at 522-523. Such interference with personal freedom is conspicuously accented when the teacher serves at the absolute’ will of those to whom the disclosure must be made—those who any year can terminate the teacher's ° employment without bringing charges, without notice, without a hearing, without affording an opportunity to explain. , The. statute does not provide that the information it requires be kept confidential. Each school board is left free’to deal with the information -as it wishes.*. The record contains evidence to indicate that fear of publie disclosure i is neither theoretical nor grourvlless, * Bven if tion” of problem= raised by “the deéeisions ot the United\ States Supre me Court in the school segregation cases.” See note TM But neither the bfeadth and generality of the declared purpose ndr the possible irrelevance ofthe emergency provision detract from the existence of an actual relevant ‘state interest in the mquiry. ® The record contains an opinion of the State Attorney Ge ndral that “it is an administrative determination, to be made by the tespec- tive Boards, as to the disclosure of information contained in the\affi- davits.” The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held only that “the affidavits need not he opened to pubhe inspection . 2. 106 Ark. Law Rep. 139, 144, 331 8. W. 2d 701, 704. (Emphasis added.) 7 In the state court proceedings a witness who was a member of the Capital Citizens Council testified that “his group intended to gain access to some of the Act 10 affidavits with a-view to clminating fram the school system -persons who supporter) organizations unpopular with the group. Among such organizations he named the American Civil Liberties Unien,- the Urban League, the American Association of University Professors, and the Women’s Emergeney Committee to a 4 8 _ SHELTON v. TUCKER. ° there were no disclosure to the general public, the pressure- upon @ teacher to avoid any ties which might displease -— . those who control his professional destiny. would be con- stant and heavy. Publie exposure, bringing with it the possibility of public pressures upon school boards to dis- charge teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would simply operate to’ widen and aggra- ' vate the-impairment of constitutional liberty. = The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. , “By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry and free- dom of-association, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling. But, in view - of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective exer- ‘eise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in the. case of teachers brings the safeguards ‘of those amendments vividly into operation. Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers .. © has an — unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought espécially to eultivate and prac- tice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by potential teachers.” Wieman v. U pdegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (concurring opinion).- “Scholarship cannot . flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. -Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and te evaluate... .” _ Sweezy v. New Hamp- shire, 354 U.S. 234, 250. i II. . The question to be decided here is not whether the: State of Arkansas can ask certain ofits teachers about all their organizational relationships. It is not whether the State can ask ‘all of its teachers about certain of their &%, SHELTON v. TUCKER. a D. associational ties. - It is not whether teachers can be asked. now many organizations they belong to, or how much time they spend in ‘organizational activity. The ques- ‘tion is whether the State can ask ev ery one of its teachers to disclose every single organization with which. he has been associated over a five-year period. The scope of the inquiry required by Act 10 is completely unlimited. The statute requires a teacher to reveal.the church to which he belongs: or to which he has given financial ‘support. It requires him to disclose his political party, and every’ -political organization to which he may have contributed over’a five-year period. It requires hini to. list, without number, every conceivabie kind of associational tie— sucial, professional, political, avecational, or religious. Many such relationships could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's occupational competence or fitness. In a series of decisions this Court has held that. even. ‘though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub- stantial, that purpose cannot. be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal libertiés when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Thecbreadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic perpen, —— “In other areas, involving dillereas constitutiona' issues, more administrative leeway has been thought allowable in the interest of inereased cfGciency in accomplishing a cleariy gag ae central purpose. See Purity Extract Co. v.. Lynch, 226 WV. S. 192: Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 US. 264; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270.U.S8 230, 241 (dissenting opinion) ; Queenside Hills Co. v. r. Sazl, 328 U. S. SO, 83. But ef. Dean. Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. 8. 349. # See Freund, Competing Freedoms in neon Cecatiateei Law, 13 U. of Chietago Conference Series 26, 32-32: Richardson, Free- Yiom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6. 23-24; Comment, Legislative Inquiry into Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity From Committee Interrogation, 65 Yale L. J. 1159, 1173-1175. 10 °° SHELTON +. TUCKER. Ih ais ‘ ll Vv. Griffin, 303 U3. 444, the Gourt invalidated - an ordinance prohibiting all distribution of lite ‘rature at any tine or place in Griffin, Georgia, without a license: pointing out that so broad an interference was ainnes- essary to accomplish legit#miite municipal auns. In Schneider v. “State, 308°C. -S #147, the Court dealt _with ordinances of four. differeit municipalities which either banned or imposed prior restraints upon the dis- _tribution of handbills: In holding the ordinances invalid, yi Court noted that: where legislative abridgment of “fundamental personal rights yl liberties” is asserted, “the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public conyenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities: but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of right’ so vital to the majntenance of democratic insti- “tutions.” 308 U.S., at 161. In Cantwell v.¢ ‘onnecticut, 310 U. S296, the Court said that “conduct - remains sabject t ri > ieanibation for the protection of society,” but pointed out that in each case “the power to regulate must - be so exercised as not, in attaining a Papereseee ch ‘—e unduly-to infringe the protected freedom.” 310 U. 304. . Illustrations of the same constittitional rete a are to be found in many other decisions of the C ourt, among them, Martin ‘vy. Struthers, 319 U, S..141 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558;.and Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290. As recently as last Term we held invalid an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills. because the breadth of its application went far beyond what was necessary to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60. In that case the Court noted that it had been ‘ ‘urged that this ordinance is aimed at providing a way to’ identify those responsible for ‘fraud, falge upsdieviabiey tag and libel. Yet the ordinance is . 1p no manner sq limited . .:. . Therefore-we do not pass 2 “* SHELTON 9. TUCKER 11 on the validity of an ordinance hinited to prevent these -. or any other supposed evils. This ordinance simply bars all handbills under all cireumstan*¢s anywhere that do “not have the names sud addresses printed on them in the place the ordinance requires.” 362 U.S.: at 64. > The untimited and indiscrimitmate sweep of the statute now before us brings it within the ban of our prior cases, The statute's comprehensive. interference with associa- tional freedom goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise‘of the State's legitimate inquiry imto the. fitness and competency of its teachers. The judgments in beth cases must be reversed. : . . It is so ordered. ws . s Palaapat5* RETR Ee AF SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES “Nos. 14 anp 83.--Ocroper Tern, 1°60. (On Appeal From the ‘B. T.: Shelton, et al., Appellants, United States Dis- 4. oo he - trict Court for, the Everett Tucker, ‘Jr..-ete.. et al.| Eastern .District of : Arkansas. ~ Max Carr, et. al., Petitioners.) On Writ of. Certiorari , . 83 on v. to the Supreme C ourt’ R. A. Young, et al. of Arkansas. [ December 12, 1960. | , Mr. Justice Fran kFurter, dissenting. 5 & As one who has strong views against crude intrusions by the state into the atinosphere of creative freedom in which ~~ alone the spirit and mind of a teacher can fruitfully fune- ti@n, I may find displeasure with the Arkansas legislation now under review. But in maintaining the distinction - ‘ between private views and constitutional restrictions, I am constrained to find that it does not exceed the permis- sible range of state action limited by the Fourteenth Amendment. By way of emphasis ! therefore add a few » - words to the dissent of Mr. Justice Haran, in which r concur. , It is meade: at the outset, to o establish what | is not in- volved‘in this litigation: ' (1) As the Court recognizes, this i is not a case where, asin N. A. A.C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S 449, and Rates v. Little Rock, 361 U. 5.516, a State, asserting the power to compel disclosure of organizational affiliations, can show -.no rational relation between disclosure and a govern- mental interest justifying it. Those cases are. relevant. here only because of their recognition iat an interest in 2 "SHELTON >. TUCKER. ia , ‘ * privacy, in non-disclosure. may w.der appropriate eireun- stances claim cotistitutional protection. The question here is‘ whether that interest is overborne by a counter- vailing publie interest. To this concrete. limited QUes- - tion—whether the State's interest in knowing the nature of the organizational activities of teachers employed by it or by institutions which it supports, as a‘ basis for . appraisitig the fitness of those teachers for the positions which they hold, outweighs the interest recognized | in NA. A.C. P. and Bates—those earlier decisions then: selves give no answer. . he | | *(2)*The Court's holding that the Arkansas statute js unconstitutional does not, apparently, rest upon. the threat that the information »-" ich it requires of teachers will be revealed to the. public. In view of the opinior of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, decision here could not, I believe, turn on a-elaim that the teachers’ affi- davits will not remain confidential. That court. has expressly said that “inasmuch as the validity of the act depends ufon its being construed as a bona fide legislative effort to provide school boards with needed information, it Lecessarily follows that the affidavits need not be opened to public inspection, for the permissible purpose of the statute is to enlighten the school board alone.” 106 Ark. Law. Rep. 139, 144-145, 331 S..W. 2d 701, 704. If the validity of the statute depended on this matter. the pronouncement of the State's highest judicial organ would have to be*read as establishing—the earlier view of the State Attorney General notwithstanding—that the statute. . does not authorize the making public of the affidavits. ' Even were the Arkansas court’s language far more ambig- uous than it is, it would be our duty so to understand its». ‘opinion, in accordance with the principle that “so,far as 4. statutes fairly may be construed in such a way as to avoid doubtful ‘constitutional questions “they should be so construed.” Far v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273. 277. a SHELTON -v. TUCKER. 3 (3) This is not a case in which Lovell v. Griffin, 306 ~ULS. 444; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 206: Saia v. New York, 384 U.S. 558; and Kunz v. New York, 340° U.S. 290, call for condemnation of the “breadth” of the statute. Those decisions struck down lice SINE laws “which vested in administrative officials.a power of éensor- ship over communications not cenfined within standards designed to curb the dangers of arbitrary or discriminatory official action. The “breadth” with whieh the cases were concerned was the breadth of unrestricted disegetion left *" to a censor, which permitted him to make his own sub- jective opinions the practicafly unreviewable measure of - permissible spee ch.’ -Nor is = a case of the nature of Thornhill vy. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, and Herndon. v. Lowry, 301 ©. 3. 242° aS penal mone which the Court found impermissibly “broad” in quit® another sense. Prohibiting, indiscriminately, activity within and without the sphere'of the Fourteenth Amendment's pro- . tection of free expression. those statutes had the double viee of deterring the exercise of constitutional freedoms by Inaking the uncertain line of the Amendment’s appli- cation determinative of criminality and of prescribing indefinite standards of guilt, thereby allowing the poten- tial vagaries.and prejudices of j juries, effectively insulated — Q ome ' See also Hague v. C. EF. 0.. 307 US. 496: Schneider v Stthe. 30s U. 8. 147 (the Irvington ordinance) : Largent v. Texas, 318 UL S 418: Jones v. Opelika. 319 U.S. 103. vacating 316 U.S. 584 (the Opelika ordinance); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268: Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 UsS. 495: Gelling v. Texas. 343 U.S M0: Superior Films, Inc., vy; Department of Education, 346 US 5ST: Staub v. Baxley, 355 v s. ei ef. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 50h: Tucker vo Teras, 326 U.S. 517. The common-law count in the Cantwell case involved cons recast similar to those which were determinative. of the deers} ons cited in text and note, at note 2, - infra. a. ‘ - 2 See also Stromber; Tg California, 283 US 350. Winters vo Neu York, 333 U.S. 507. 4 SHELTON ». TUCKER: _ against control by reviewing éourts, the power to intrude upon the protected sphere. The statute challenged in the present cases involves neither administrative disere- . tion to censor nor vague, overreaching tests of criminak vesponsibility. Where state assertions of authority are attacked as impermissibly rescrietive upon thought, expression, or association, the existence vel non of other possible les: restrictive means’ of achieving the object which the State seeks is, of course, a constitutionally_relevant con- sideration. This is not because: some novel. particular _rule of law obtains in cases of this kind. Whenever a the reasonableness and fairness of a ‘measure are- at issue—as they are ir every casé in which this Court must apply the standards. of reason and fairness. with the appro- priate scope to be given thiose concepts, in enforcing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation upon state action—the availability or unavail-_ ability of alternative: methods of proceeding is germane. Thus, a State may,not prohibit the distribution of litera- . ture on its cities’ streets as a. means of preventing littering, when the same end might be achieved with only slightly - greater inconvenience by applying the sanctions of the penal law not tothe pamphleteer who distributes the paper but to the recipient who crumples it and throws it away. Hague v. C.-1. Q., 307 U. S. 496; Schneider ‘y. State, 308 U.S. 147; Jamison v-Teras. 318.U.S. 413. Nor tuay a State protect its population from the dangers and incitements of salacious books by restricting the reading matter of adults to that which would be harmless to the susceptible mind of @ child. , Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380. And see. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353: Talley v. California, 362 U. S.°60.° But the consideration : Language. characterizing state statutes as overly broad has some- times been found in opinions where it was unnecessary to the resuit, and merely meant to.express the idea that whatever stute interest Was oad + PEGS TREN 2 2 SHELTON ». TUCKER. 7° 5 of feasible alternative modes of regulation in these cases did not imply that the Court might substitute its Own choice among alternatives for that of a state legislature, or that the States were to be restricted to the “narrowest” workable means of accomplishing an end. See Prince vy. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-170. (Consideration of alternatives may focus the precise exercise of sate legislative authority which i is tested in this Court by the standard of reasonableness, but it does not alter -or dis- place that standard. The issue remains whether, in light of the particular kind of restriction upon individual liberty which a regulation entails..it is reasonable for a legislature to choose that form of regulation rather than others less restrictive. To that determination. the range of judg- -ment easily open to a legislature in considering the rela- tive degrees ot efficiency of alternative méais in achieving the end it seeks is pertinent. In the present case the Court strikes down an Arkansas . Statute retharing that teachers disclose to school. officials all of their organizational relationships, on the ground that “many such relationships could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's oecupational competence or fitness.” Granted that a given teacher's membership in the First Street Congregation is, standing alone, of little relevance to what may rightly be expected of a teacher, is that membership equally irrelevant when it is discovered. -that the teacher is in fact a-member of the First Street Congregation and the. Second Street Congregation and the Third Street C ongregation and the 4-H Club and the ; $- H Club end half a dozen other groups? Presumably, a \ . there asserted as underlying a pti Was Instfficient to justify the reguletion’s appheation to particular. circumstances fairly within the. Fourteenth Amendment's protection. Compare Thomas \ Collins, 323 U.S. 516, with Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S 380 Com- pare Mer tan v. Struthers, 319 US. 141, with Breard vo Alexandra 341.U. $8. 622° 2 J : 4 6 SHELTOR v. TUCKER: teacher may have so many divers associations. so InANY s ’ . divers commitments, that they consume his time and energy and interes: at the expense of his work or even of his professional dedication.—Vnlike wholly individual Interests. Ofganizational connections—heéause. they in- volve obligations undertaken with-relation to other per- sens——tnay become ineseapably dematiding and distraect- ing. Surely, a sehool board:is entitled to inquire Whether any af its teachers hes placed himself, or is placing him- self. in a condition where his work may siiffer. Of course. the State might ask: “To how many organizations do vou ‘belong?” or “Huw nsuch time do you expend at organisza- tional activity?” Gut the answer to such questions could reasonably be re rded by & State legislature as insufh- clent, both because the veracity of the answer is more diffi- cult to test, in cases where doubts as to veracity may arise. thanan the case of the answers required by the Arkansas “statuteand because an estimate of time presently spent ~ an organize ational activity reveals nothing as to the quality and nature of that activity, upon the basis of which necessarily, judgment or prophesy ofthe extent of future involvement must be based. A teacher's answers to the questions which Arkansas asks, moreover, may serve the purpose uf naking known to school authorities persons _ who come into contact with the te acher in all of the phases “of his activity in the communkysand who ean be ques- tioned, if need be, concerning the teacher's conduct in “matters which: this Court ean certainly not, now say are lacking in any pertinence to professional: fitness. . It is difficult: to understand how these particular-ends could be achieved bysasking “certain of [the State 's] teachers about all their organizational relationships.” or “all of its teachers about certain ot their associational ties,” or all of its, teachers haw many associations currently involve them, or duting how many hours; and difficult. therefore. ae Nips al oa SHEL TON ». TUCKER. mY o to. appreciate why the, Court deems~ttireasonable and forbids what Arkansas-toes ‘ask. If I dissent from the Court's disposition in thiese cases, itis not that T put a lew value on academic freedom. see Wireman v. Updegraff, 344 Us. 183, 194 (concurring opinion); Swee2zy vo New Hamapsiure, 354 U.S. 234. 245 {eoneurring opinion). It ais because that very freedom. in its most creative reaches. is dependent. ip no small part apen the careful and dise ‘riminating selection of teach- ers. . This process of selection is an intricate affair. a matter of fine ivden. mt. and ‘if it is to be informed. it must be based-upon a comprehensive range of informa- tion, Tam unable to say. on the face of this statute. that Arkansas could not reasonably find that the information which the statute requires —and whieh may not be other- wise acquired than be asking the question which it asks— is germane to that selection. Nor. on this record, can | attribute to the State a purpose to employ the enactment as a device for the accomplishment of what is eonstitu- tionally forbidden. Of course, if the information gath-. ered by the required affidavats is used to further a scheme of te rminating the employment of teachers solely because ‘ot ther membership in unpopular organizations, ‘hat use, will rin afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. ft will be tune enough, if.such use is made, to liold the application of the statute unconstitutional, See Yiek Wo. v. Hop- Ains, LIS U.S. 356. Because i do net find that the dis- closure of teachers” associations to their sehoo! boards is. without more, such a restriepon upen their hberty. or upon that of the community, as to overbalance the State's iiterest in asking the question, | would affirm the - judginents helow.’ e l-am authorized to,say that Mk: Jusrice CLARK, Mr. Justice Hak.ax and Mr. Je ©» WHITTAKER agree with . this opinion. soe Pe Oh atin © et ‘SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITE D STATES ot . « _ . ¢ Nos. 14 anv &83.—OcToBER 1 ERM. 1Q60. _* = i. 1On Appeal - From the .B. T. Shelton, et al., peice) nited States Dis- - 14 v. > triet Court for the Everett Tucker, Jr., ete.. et ak Kastern District of Arkansas. oom Max Carr, et al. Pe stitioners, On Writ of Certiorari 83 , * te the Supreme Court “R. A. Young, et al. ) of Arkansas. . { December 12, 1960. | Mr. Justice Hartan, whom Mr. Justice FranK- FURTER, Mr. Justice CLarkK and Mr. Justick WHITTAKER join. dissenting. | Of course this decision has a natural tendency to enlist -. = eo ® “support, involving as it does an unusual statute that touches constitutional rights whose protection in the eon- text of the racial situation in various parts of the country demands the unremitting vigilance of the courts. Yet that very circumstance also serves iv remind of the restraints that attend constitutional adjudication. It must be. emphasized that neither of thece cases actually presents an issue of racial discrimination. . The statute on its face applies to all Arkansas teachers irrespective of race, anid there is no showing that it has been diserimina- torily administered. The issue is whether. consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may require teachers in jts public schools or colleges to disclose, as a condition precedent to their initial or’continued employment, all organizations “to which they have. belonged. paid dues, or contributed within the past five years. Since I believe that such a requirement cannot he said t6 transgress the. constitu- 2 SHELTON 9. TUCKER. | ‘tional limits of a State’s Yonceded authority to determine the qualifications of those serving it as teachers, I-am hound to consider that Arkansas had:the right to pass the statute in question, and therefore conceive it my duty to: . dissents The legal framework in which the issue must be judged ‘is clear. The rights of free Speech and association wmbedied in.the “liberty” assured against state action by: the Fourteenth Amendment (see DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652. 672. : dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.) is not absolute. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708; Whitney y. California, 274 VU. 38..357, 373 (concurring opinion of Brandeis. J.\. Where official action is claimed to invade these rights, the | controlling i inquiry is whether such action is justifiable on the basis of a guperior gove rnmental igtepest to which such indiv idual- rights maust yield. When the action com- plained of pertaina, to the realm of investigation, pur ivquiry has a double ‘aspect: first, whether the inv estiga- “tion relates toa legitimate governmental purpose ; se second, whether, judged in the hght of that purpose, the ques- tioned action has substantial . relevance thereto. See Barenblatt vo U a States, 360 U.S. 109; Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. - ; In the two cases pe ube I think both: factors are satis- fied. It is surely indisputable that.a State has the. right to choose its teachers on the basis of Benesb: And I think it equally clear, as the Canrt’ appears Wo recognize. that information about a ‘teacher's assoc iations may be usefui to school authorities. in. determining the Ynoral. profes- sional, and social qualifications of the teacher: yas well as in determining the type of service for which he well be best suited in the educational system. See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485; Beilan v. Board of Higher Edu- cation, 357 UL. 300: see also Slochower v. Board af Kdu-. cation, 350 U: S. 551. Furthermore, I take the Court. to } \\ = the gn Had Gatun oe si eee SHELTON ¢. TUCKER * 3 acknowledge thatzagrecably to our prev ious decisions, the State may enquire into associations to the extent ac hat the resulting information may be in aid of that legitimate _ purpose. These cases therefore do not present a situation such as.weé had in V. A. A.C. Py. agi 357 U.S. 449, and Bates v. hittle Rock, 361 U.S. 516. whibre’ the required. disclosure bears no poss reley ance to a legitimate state interest. Despite - these considerations this statute is stricken down because, in the Court's view, it is too broad, because it asks more than may be neecéssary to effectuate the State's legitimaté interest.- Such a statute, it is said. ea- hot justify the inhibition on freedom —— which so blanket an inquiry may entail. Cf. V. A. 4.0. P. Alabama, supra; Bates v. Little Rock, supra. : I am unable to subseribe to this view hecause | believe it Impossible to determine a priori the place where the line should be drawn between what would be permissible in- quiry and ov er-broad inquiry in a situation like'this, © ere ‘taihly. the Court does hot point that place out. There can be little doubt that much of the associational imforia- * tion called for by ‘the statute will be of little or no use whatever to the school authorities, but I do not under-- stand how those ‘authorities can be expected to fix. in advance the terms of their. enquiry, so that it will yield: only relevant information. T do not mean te cay that alternatives such as an enquiry limited to the names of. organizations of whose character’ the State is presently aware, or to a class of organizations defined by their purposes, would not be more consonant with a decent respect for the privacy of the teacher, nor that sueh alternatives would be utterly unwerkable. I do see, however, that these alternatives suffe Tofrom defi- “ciencies so Obvious where.a State is bent upon discove Te ing everything which would -be relevant to its proper purposes, that I cannot say that it must. as a matter ° ; \ * » 7% 40 . SHELTON 1 . TUCKER. of ceeilidiinien compulsion, adopt some sucn means , instead of- those which have. been chosen here. Finally, I need hardly say ‘that if it turns out that his - stafute is abused,ejther by an uhwarranted pubhicizing of the required associational disclosures or otherwise, we would have a different kind of case than those presently before us. See Lassiter v..Northampton> Elections Board, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54. All that is now here is: “the validity of the statute.on its face, and I am unable to daxee that “in this posture ‘of things the enactment can be said “te be unconstitutional. ens I would affirm in both cases. eS fe 128 /— Section 2 hereof prior to the employment or election of such persoti and prior to the making of such contracts, shail be nui and void and no funds shall be paid undey said con. ° tract to such superifitendent, principal, teacher, instructor, professor, or other instructional personnel; any funds so paid under said contract to such superintendent, principal, teacher, instructor, professor, or other iistructional per. ‘sonnel, maybe recovered from the person receiving the {fol. 176] same and/or from the board of trustves‘or other governing authority by suit filed in the circuit court of the county in which such contract wds made, and any judgment entered by such court’ in such cause ‘of action shall be a personal judgment agiinst the defendant therein and upon. .- the’ official ,bonds made by such defendants, if ‘any such bonds be in existence, SECTION 5. Every person. who shall wilfully file a false affidavitNander the provisions of this act shall be guilty of pérjury,sshall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred doltars ($500.00) nor more than one thousand dollars: ($1,000.00), and in addition shall forfeit his license to teach in any of the schools, institutions of higher learning, or other educational institutions supported whoily ‘or in part by public funds in this Staters All pen- _alties cellected under the terms of this act shall be for-— * warded to the State Treasurer to be placed by him in the: common public school f und. i. SECTION 6.. If’ any paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or word. of this act shall he held to be uncoustitu- tional for any reason, such holding: of unconstitutionality shall not affect any other: portion of this act; nothing con- tained herein, however, shall be construed so as to affect the validity of any contract entered into prior to the-, - @ ective date of this act. ; SECTION 7. It is hereby determined that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the school segrega- tion cases require solution of a great variety of local public - school problems of: considerable complexity immediately. and which involve the health, safety and general welfare of E. the people of the State of Arkansas, and that the purposeof §— Yt \ 7 va j ‘ FZ E 129 this ‘act ix 10 assist in the solution of these problems and to provide for the nrore ficient administration of public - education. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to |. exist, and this-aet being hecessary for the preservation of | the publi¢ peace, heatth arid Safety, shall take effeet and | be in force a, the date of its approval, | APPROVED: SEPTEMBER 12, 1958 ; ° tr, ae ; : . | [fol 177] - oie : ; [yj a 4. Bxpiee ae ial | STATE OF ARKANSAS. “»: OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL : | COPY 3 ae | , Honorable George N. Anderson . County Line School Dist. No, 1... Branch, Arkansais . _ Dear Mr, ‘Anderson: This. will acknowledge your letter of May cerning the affidavits as required by Act ] the 1959 4 rkansas General Assembly, 18, 1959, con- , O and Act 30 of. ‘Tam of the opinion that the word (swe ! ar) may be stricken “Outand the werd (affirmy Inav be gs ubstituted in its place. . ~ Your very truly, a Bruce Bexnerr » Attorney General é | Ail /8/ Buu J. Davis a By: Bill J. Davis : | Assistant Attorney Genera] BID :jmh “ae , ° (fol. 178} Reporter’s and Clerk’s Cer tificates to foregoing transcript omitted in printing) ' . 136 { fol. 180] ae . ‘hares [y THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. 5-1978 7 Max Carr et all, Appellants, Vv. 4 ¥ ’ R. A: Youna et al., Appellees, fae - Appeal: frem Pulaski Chancery Court, First Division; Murray 0. Reed, Chancellor. Affirmed. ¢ Opivion—February 8, 1960 Gerorce Rose Smiru, Associate Justice George Rose Smith, J. This. case involves the validity of the teacher-affidavit law, Act 10-of. the 1958 special ses- sion. The apneai ‘is from a declaratory decree upholding the statute. 5 Ser Two suits were consolidated in the trial court. In one the appellant Carr, an associfte professor of music at the University of Arkansas, acting for himself and others . ‘similarly situated, sought a- decree declaring the act un constitutional and enjoining its enforeemené by sthe defen- dants, the president and trustees of the University. The other ca#e is & similar class suit brought by the appellant - Gephardt, a vocational printing instructor at Little Rock Central High School, asking for liko~Felief against the Little Rock Special School Distriet’and its superintendent and directors,. Both plaintiffs assert that Act 10 infringes . upn, their freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, 'free- dom of association, freedom of thought, and allied rights, all protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and by parallel provisions in the Arkansas constitution, .. Act 10 ®rovides that no person shali he emploved as a - teacher in any of the state's public schools or as a super _ & 131 intendent or ‘principal in any, elementary or secondary . [fol. 181] sehool without having first filed with the employ- ing authority an affidavit giving the naines and addresses of all organizations and associations to Which the applicant has belonged Within the ‘preceding five years or to which he has paid regular dues or nade regular contributions within that time. Other provisions of the ‘act nullify: any contract made in Violation of ‘the statute, Permit the. re- " covery of funds paid under such’a void contract, and fix © civil and criminal penalties for the willful filing of a. false affidavit. ° . ia ear The appellants’ attack upon the act may: be considered* in two aspects: Iirst, is Act 10 unconstitutional on its face?. Secondly, if the act. is outwardly valid, does the: “record show that the-statute was intended to be applied, and will in fact he applied, in such a Way as to deprive the appellants and those they represent of their constitutional. > rights? - . - We do not find Act To to be invalid ‘on its face. By §1 of the act the legislature declared its belief that the publie _. School s¥stem would be benefited as a result of the school ', authorities having the required information about appli- cants for tife positions covered by the statute. I’ cannot be doubted that the information would often be of real value to the employing school hoard. We are not convinced ‘Bat either the federal or the ‘state constitution compels a school board to engage its teachers Without first inquiring about the matters that the act requires to be disclosed, A similar question Was presented long ago, in UecAuliffe Vv. Vew Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 NLE. O17, where a police- man complained of a «ty regulation that prohibited him from soliciting money or’ aid for. political. purposes, In the familiar words of Justice Holmes: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk polities, but he has - HO constitutional right to be a policeman. . . + the city-may pose any reasonable condition upon holding offices Within its contro},” ¥, (fol. 182] The appellants are not entitled to demand that. the University and the Little Rock school board -e iploy them without making any inquiry about organizations to Which they have belonged within-a period reasonably ¢ ose 132 N\ to the date of the seplination. Sueh inredtilgetions are ', the usual practice among private amployers, and, as the court pointed out in Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716; public eraployers are’ not de- nied the privilege of making similaf inquiries. From that . opinion: “We think that a municipal employer is not dis- abled because it is an agency: of: the State from inquiring of its employees as to matters tliat may gee relevant . to their fitness and suitability for the publik service. Past conduct may well relate to present fitwéss; past Jeyalty may have a reasonable relationship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in determining fitness for both high and low positions in private industry _ aml aré not less relevant in: public cunploy ment. The afi- davit requirement is valid.” The prima facte validity of Act 10 is pretty well settled by the holding in Adler v. Board of Education of New , York, 342 U.S. 485, where the court sustained a state statute forbidding the: employment in the public school system of persons belonging to organizations found to be subversive. ' This language in the opinion is peculiarly pertinent to the case.at bar: sca . . y A teacher works in a sensi B ve area in a schoolroom. There hé shapes the attitude f young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. [t must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as ‘to. their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a a part of ordered ‘society, cannot be doubted. One’s ‘associates, past and present, as well as’ one’s conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From timé [ fol. 183 | immemorial], one’s reputation has been’ deter- mined in part by the cgmpany he keeps. In the employ- ment of officials and teachers of the school system, the state may very. properly inquire: into the company they keep, and we know of no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that prevents the state, when determining the fitness and loyalty .of such persons, from considering the organiza- tions and persons with whom they associate.” ee 133 “In the Adler case the statute Was directed only at sub- ‘ version, but the eourt’s language dealt repeatedly with fitness as well as with loyalty. We haye no doubt that a school board might ask an applicant whether he belonged, specifically, to the Communist ‘Party, to any organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the government, to a nudist cdlony, to a drag-racing club, to an association of | atheists, or to other organizations that might be-listed al- most without number, membership in which x. ght shed light: upon the applicant’s fitness to guide voung minds in the ‘schoolroom. We -are not persuaded that the ‘constitution compels the board to ask scores or hundreds of permissible questions. one by one, instead. of making the blanket in- quiry required by Act 10. We conclude, as did the three“judge district court. in Shelton vy, MeWinley, D.C. Ark., 174 F. Supp. 351, that the act is not unconstitutional on its face. We do not, of course, pass upon the wisdom of the law, for as the court said in, the Shelton ase - “We think that the information’ required by Act 10 ss relevant. The fact that some ed- ueators and members of the public may feel that this re- quirement is unwise, or unnecessary or even insulting does not mean that the statute js unconstitutional. Those are considerations of the, legislative, not the Judicial branch vf the govérnment.” ; There remains the contention that Act 10, even if os- tensibly valid, is subject to being used in an “unconstitu- (fol. 184] tional manner. Upon this point the appellants offered three witnesses, Two of them, the Attorney Gen- eral, whose office assisted in the drafting of the hill; and .the state senator who introduced ‘the measure in the legis- lature, testified that the act-was. intended .28 @ Weapon against subversion. “Such expressions of individual opinion are not competent to show the legislative intention, Wise- man v. Madison Cadillac: Co.,.191 Ark, 1021, 88 S.W, 24 1007, but even if the testimony were considered it would not create any doubt about the validity of the act. The appellants’ third witness, Guthridge, testified that le was a director of, and ‘attorney for, the Capital Citizens Council, which he describes as an organization advocating ‘tates rights and racial integrity and opposing by all law. - . ful means the desegregation decisions of the United States , ae 134 * Supreme Court. Guthridge Was- interrogated by the ap. —“pethartsconsrt about Hews paperaecotnts-of thle state nents he had made concerning Act 10, In those stati ‘nents, * which Guthridge reaffirmed on the witness stand, he said . that hit organization and similar ones in the state meant to attempt to gain access to some of the Act 10 affidavits With a view to seeking to eliminate from the school system teachers who belonged or contributed td the NAACP, the Urban League, and other organizations opposed ‘by the Citizens Councils. : re We do not think this testimony sufficient to show that the act will be. applied- by the state and its agencies in such a way as ‘to violate the appellants’ constitutional rights. In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the settled printiple that a statute, even though ‘fair on its face, may hecome invalid if it is administered by the state “with an evil eve and an unequal hand.” Vick. We v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. Here, however, the proof docs not’ show any inclination “on the part of any school buard*to use Act 10 ina dis- . criminatory manner. The most that can be said is that at. (fol. 185] least some wembers of the Citizens Councils are so ill-advised-as to advocate that course. “Tli-advised” is the proper term, since such an effort, if shecessful, would. defeat its own purpose by rendering the act invalid. It is very far from certain that efforts to misuse Aet 10. - if any are made, will succeed. Inasmuch as the validity of the act depends upon its being construed as a bona fide legislative effort to provide school boards with needed in- ' formation, it: necessarily follows that. the affidavits need not be opened to. public. inspection, for the permissible — _ purpose of the statute is-to enlighten the schoot board alone. The only testimony on this point indicates that the affidavits are not being publicized: :the president of the University testified that its affidavits are being treated as. confidential and are being kept unger lock and key. Moreover, even if secrevy should not be observed in every instance’ it still cannot be surely predicted that any teacher will be eliminated from the school system. Unlike the statute upheld in the Adler case, supfa, which mandatorily forbade the employment of persons belonging to subver- 135 a school board to take any dction, no matte tions an affidavit may reveal. Thus in order for us to in- validate Act 10 at this stage of its eXistence we should have to assume, wholly without proof, that ‘conscientious and responsible schoo! board members yil] inevitably vield to a nebrlous public insistence. that the act he applied dix criminatorily and jn disregard of recognized constitutional: guaranties. We are aware of no principle that requires ls to attribute improper motives to means of enabling us to-declare an act- invalid. Affirmed.” r what associa- (fol. 186] . IN THE Supreme CouRT or ARKANSAS’ Max Carr, et al., Appellants; ie vs. : R. A. Young, et al., Appellees, : Appeal from Pulaski Chanicery 4 ourt, First Division. oe | ’ —_—_—_—_————, , J UDGMENT—F ebruary 8, 1960 This cause came on to be heard upon the tra ‘ nscript of ° the record of the chancery court of Pulaski County, First Jivision, and was argued by solicitors: on consideration Whereof it is the opinion of the Court that there is no error in the Proceedings and decree of said chancery coui‘ in this cause, “It is therefore ordered and decreed by the Court that the decree. of said chancery court in this cause.be and the , Same is hereby in all things affirined with costs, It is further ordered and decreed that said. appellees re- Cover of said appellants all their costs in this Court, j this cause expended, and have execution thereof, February 8, 1960, n sive organizations, Act_10 docs net—affirmatively require > public officers ge ; [ fol. 187 } | File endorsement t omitted) leTrHEe SupREME Court oF ARKANSAS _ Pulaski Chy., Ist Div. No, 5.1978 Max Cakk et .al., Appeilants, v. R. A. Youne et al., Appellees. Petition ror ReHearinc—Filed February 16, 1960 — Petitioners move that the Court grant a rehearing in ‘captioned cause for the following reason: The opirion is bottomed upon the erronedus premise that so long as no direct discriminatory action by pubiic officials is based upon the compelled disclosure of associa- tions required by Act 10, that First and Fourteenth, Amend: ment rights of petitioners are not violated. The resultant interplay of governinental and private action set in motion by Act 10, in successfully dissuading teachers from ex- ercising their constitutional rights, or making them targets of abuse if they do, through the publicity made possible by the Act, is ignoréd by the Court. r + Edwin E. Dunaway, Solicitor for Appellants. _Brier.is Support or Petition The admirable admonition contained i in ihe Court's opinion against the use of Act 10 for the purpose for. whieh it was enacted does not alter the fact that the Aét makes no requirement that the information in the affidavits be (fol. 188] treated as confidential. There is, consequently. provided by Act 10, with no necessity to justify it, the means by which teachers are subjected to the immediate possibility of publication of their past and present associa: tions. tT he United- States cisions Court recognized i in VA. {CP . dlabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, at p. 1172, - 137. e Stel publication “must be regarded as entailing thy likeli. hood of a substantia] restraint upon thie exercise by peti. honer’s members of their righ@% Freedony of &ssoclation,” That court then answered this Court's argument. that Whatever repressitie effect resulted from compelled dis. __tlosuretollows from private, not State action. “The crucial factor is the inte; ilay of governmental and private action, for it is only aftes the initial eXETCise Of state power repre- sented by the Production order that private action takes hold,” said the court at p. 1972. ; . In Watkins y. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 27 S.Ct. 1173, at p. 1184, the United States Supreme Court also recognized the constitutional eyi] of unnecessary: forced, revelations sabout possibly unpopular associations aid the resultant deterrent effect upon one’s exercising constitutional rights. CERTIFICATE cs The undersigned counse] for petitioners certifies that he ‘believes there is merit in the Petition-and it-is hot filed for « the purpose of delay. Copies have been served upon Op- posing. counsel] by mailing same on February 16, 1960. . Edwin &. Dunaway af 7 ca ee eT | fol. 189] oe Woes Ix THE SUPREME COURT or ARKANSags No..5-1978 anes Max Carr, et al, Appellants, cs R. A. Youna, et al, Appellees, : - ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR Renearing— February 29, 1960 oe denied. | tee tS : February 29, 1960.: eee in printing). (fol..190] Clerk’s Certificate — to. foregoing _ transcript . : yt 138 ' [fol. 191] | _ Supreme. Court OF THE Unirep States | No. 917, October Term, 1959 ° : — 7 oak * Max Carr, et al., Petitioners, * Ta, ; (-, J A. Youne, ota . Orver ALLowine Certiorari—June. 20, 1960 The petition herein for a writ of certiorari: ‘to the Su. preme Court of thé State of Arkansas is.granted. The case. is set for argument immediately following No. 541 ~- a Oe. ° . ° = Each case is allotted one hour and thirty minutes for-ofal argument. . site — And it is further ordered that the duly certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings below which accompanied the petition shall be treated as though filed in- response to such writ. ? --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386409_0304%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.