# Brief for Appellees and Respondents — Shelton v. Tucker

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for Appellees and Respondents
- **Published:** January 1, 1960
- **Citation:** 364 U.S. 479

## Text

ILE COPY ae os a
| a re __OCT 31 1960 °

; , R. BROWNING. Clerk
ee ~ SUPREME COURT OF - THE UNITED S] —
, . October Ter ii, 1960
~ Nov -l4—No. 88
i - Saree 2 Ce |
Bb. T. Suevrox, et all, - : - ' Appellants
. a ‘ ‘. No. 14
Lvexeer Tockers Jk, Presipent, evc., et al, .. Appellees -
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
. POR THE EASTERN DISTRACT: OF AKKANSAS Muah,
\iax Carr, - al., — ; Petitioners
v. ° | NN No. 88
Ro AL Youna, et al, \ : ‘Respondents oD
ON WRIT OF CERTIONARL TO THE SUPREME COURT. | Nyt
a , OF ARKANSAS |

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES AND RESPONDENTS |

LOUIS L. RAMSAY, JR. *
FE. HARLEY COX

- Simmons National Building,
Pine Bluff, Arkansas
_ HERSCHEL H. FRIDAY, JR,

. ROBERT V. LIGHT

_Boyle Building

at . * — Little Rock, Arkansas
ae Attorneys for Appellees: in No, 14

co HERSCHEL H. FRIDAY, JR.
oe ROBERT V. LIGHT |
‘Attorneysfor Respond nts in No. 83

“PARAGON PRINTING CO . LITTLE ROCK

e

s
p ; PAGE
Questions Presented — a eee 1
Statement a : Aaa 1
Summary of Argument | - ; | eer 27 ‘a
Argument: —_— . * eee
. : se * ° ,
I. The Motives ‘of the Gavernor and‘of the Le gislature
_ in Connection with the Adoption of Act 10 Haxe No
Bearing on Considerations of Constitutionality
of .the Act. . a aes
II. Act 10 is a Constitutional Exercise of Power of
the State Legislature to Provide for the ,
Administration. of the Public Schools. 7
Conclusion 0 ; ; 20

ESOC ED > tere. & «

Qo

- Bates v. Little -Rock, 361

‘Lérner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468

a

INDEX—(Continued) |

Table of -Cases
Adler v. Board: of Education, 342 U.S. 485 ©
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S.° 207°

U.S: 516

>

. Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 -U.S. 399

-
>)

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 -

Carr v. Yoyng, - . Ark.

Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 US. 535

Garner v. Les Angeles Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716

Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56

Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312

riorosko v. Mt. Pleasant Twp. School Dist., 336 Pa. 369

N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
Palko #. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
Shelton »v. McKinley, 124 F. Supp. 351

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education,
162. F. Supp. 372

Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551

‘Sweegy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234

. .: - . :
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75

Wieman v.-Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183

' Miscellaneous

42 AAUP Bulletin 96(1953)

42 AAUP Bulletin 49(1956)

‘SUPREME COURT OF THE ‘UNITED STATES

October Terin, 1960

No. 14--No. 83

B. T. Suevton,-et al., pepeets soe Appellants
3, 1 Now oe

Evene rr Tucker, Jr, Presment, ete.,-f al., Appe lees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTLARN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS)

Max Carr, ef al, . ‘9. .. Petitioners
Va. pa _ No. 83
R.A. Yousa, et als ; hale Respondents

_ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ARKANSAS .

BRIEF FOR APPEL L EE AND RESPONDENTS

:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The-questions: presented by Appellants in'No, 14 and
by Petitioners in No. 83 are substantially? identical. - _ In
eaclr the issue is drawn on ‘whether Act 10 is ciel,
tional on its facé by virtue of conflict witlr the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitutian of the United States. In
No. 14 the rights secured by that Amendment suggested
to. be violated by the Act are academic freedom and free-
.dom of association. In No. 83 both of these rights are
mentioned and there’ is also suggested a deprivation of

rights of apeec ‘hy. press and religion. 7

/

2
STATEMENT

The statements of appellants and petitioners are ade-
quate to acquaint the Court with the factual background
of the cases. However, we do not concede, nor does thie
competent evidence in tlie Record support, petitioners’
statements that the purpose of calling the Second Extra-
ordinary Session of the General Assembly of Arkansas
in 1958 was that ‘fof enacting anti-desegregation legis-
lation.’ * (Petiticners? Brief .6).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The motives of the Governor, Attorney General and —
members of the legislature in connection with the adop- .
tion of Act 10 are immaterial to any question before this
Court. Deyle v. Continental Ins. Co. » 94. U.S. 535; Baren-

Liatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109.

The relevance of the information required by Act 10 |
to the determination of teacher fitness, suit«bility or
trustworthiness is the point upor which issue is joined in
this ease. . Both ‘Congress*and the legislatures of the
States hav? a- -broad power to impose. conditions upon
public employment. United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75; Garner vy. Board of Public Works, 341 US.
716. Relevance to fitness and suitability for the. posi-
tion held or sought -marks the limits prescribed by this
Court ef the public employer’ 8 inquiry into the other-
wise private affairs of its employees. Gerende v. Board_
of Supervi isors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56; Garner v. Board
of Public Works, supra.

‘The snail dutiei and responsibititic es. of a teacher
make relevant a broader area of- inquiry by the public
employer than is the case with less sensitive avoc ations.

Pp

:

Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485. Act 10, un-

_like the mandates in Garner arid Adler, is not a eisquali-

fying enactment and requires information relevant to
promotion and re: issignment decisions as well» decisions
on the fitness of an imdividual to teach at all.

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, and Sweee y v.
New Hampshire, 304 US. 234, do not restrict the power
of the State exercised by the adoption of Act 10, and

". there is no ‘dispute in this case about the concept of con-

stitutional. protection for acedemic freedom as it was

treated in those decisions. It is also clear that Slochower
v. Board of Education, 350 U S.001, prescribes’ no inhibi-.

tions against relevant inquiry by the public employer,
' 2)
° ‘O

There is .no constitutional requirement. that

In the Garner case “inquiry” inte advocacy v of over.
ihrow of the government by unlawful means and member-
ship in the Communist Party was regarded to be relevant
to the question. of fitness or: suitability to hold any posi-
tion of municipal employment -in the Cite of Los Angeles
There is na attempted” distinctio® hetween its applieabi-*
‘ty to the street cleaners and to the Mayor. In Adler vy.

1U
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, a more jromogencous
group of public employees was affected. There a state
law: providing for the disqualification ‘and removal of
public school teachers who advocate the overthrow of the
government by unlawful méans or’ who belong to organi-
vations which have like purposes was held valid. The .
Court specifically rejected the suggestion that the de-
cision in the Garner case should not be followed, and an-
nounced adherence to’ that case. In language squarely
applicable to the cases at bar, the Court describes those
aspects: of thé teaching profession which, make relevant
inquiry of its members that perhaps, would not be so when
dire¢ted to public employees charged with a less critical
- responsibility :
“A teacher works in a sensitiye area in a
school room, There he pes the attitude of
young minds towards the society in) which they
live. In-this, the state has a vital concern. It
must preserve the integrity of the schools. — That
the school authorities have the right and the duty
to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as
to their fitness to maintain the integrity. of the
schools as a part of ordered - society, cannot be
doupted. —One’s associates, past and present, as
well us one’s conduct, may. properly be considered
ii determining fitness and loyalty. From time
immemorial, one’s reputation has been determined
in.part by the company he keeps. In the employ-
nient of officials and teachers of the school sys-
~. tem, ue state may very properly inquire into the
-company they keep, and we know of no rule, ¢con-
stitutional or otherwise, that prevents the’ state.
when determining the fitness and loyalty of such
“persons, from considering the organizations and
persons with. whoni they-asseeiate.”” - .

The foregoing. language of this Court goes straight
to the heart of the question of the relevance of the in-
formation required by Act 10 to the suitability or fit

ll

ess of teachers for their positions. The public board
charged with administering the sehgols is entitled, in fact
is duty bound, to maintain for the school system both in--
tegrity and publié: respect. This it must do through an

exervise of judgment which approaches soundness at a

pace in direct ratio to the extent that it is enlightened by
the facts voncerning the individuals under. consideration.

It should be remembered that unlike the ordinance |
in Garner and thé statute in Adle ‘r, Act 10 is not-a dis-
qualifying, enactment. It does not provide for the re-
moval of anyone from any position. The information
required by it is available equally to judge the fitness of
“ mployees for different assignments and promotions as

‘it is to judge their fitness: to teach at all. The interests,

civie activities and perhaps specialized knowledge which
membership in various organizations would’ tend to re-
veal are of no ‘less interest to school authorities in de-
termining which teacher is best prepared for advancement ;
(ya principal’s position than is. similar information to a

private employer making a decision with regard to pro-

méting one of his subordinates.- Revelation of member-

ship by the physical education instructor in historitai:

societies could lead to better use of. his talents and ‘in-
lerests, and membership by the teacher of practical medi-
cine for future homemakers in the Church of Christ
Scientist might properly lead the governing board to
wake a teaching. assignment for which it: felt. tlie teatcner
Was letter fitted. ;

om ‘Adle vr’ this Court decided Wieman vy. U ‘pde-
graft, 344 U.S. 188, invalidating an Oklahoma statute re-
juiring a loyalty oath of all state-officers and employees

to the affeet that they had not been members of any or-—

fanization on the **Attorney General's List”’ within the
five preceding years. The basis of conflict of this stat-

12

ute with the Fourteenth Amendment was that it created
a conclusive presumption of. disloyalty based on member-
ship ‘alone without regard to the knowledge of the per-
‘son at the time of membership of the nature ‘and purpose
of the organization. This statute, like Garner and Adler
but unlike Act 10, was-a disquilifying enactment effect:
‘ing the removal of public employees who would not, or
could not, take the oath it ‘prescribed. ,

Wieman is cited by appellants and. petitioners along
with Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 US. 234, in support
of the general proposition that academic freedonr is with-
in the protection of the Constitution. © We certainly have
no quarrel - this concept.

The attack on Act 10 can draw no suppor froin
- Slochower v. Board of. Education, 350 U.S. 551, which
held to violate due process a provision in the Charter of
the City of New York requiring discharge of any city em-
ployee who involked the privilege against self-incrimi-.
nation’ to avoid answering questions relating to his of- .
ficial cunduct. The privilege was invoked by a munici-
' pal college professor before a United States Senate Sub-
committee and was employed. to avoid giving information —
already possessed by municipal authorities. Again the
distinction can be drawn that this statute, unlike Act 10,
disqualified and required removal of the class of persons
which it reached. However the fundamental considera-
‘tion that distinguishes Slochower from the cases at bar-
is that there was no refusal there to furnish information
‘to the * public employer. The distinction is carefully
defined by Mr. Justice Clark speaking for the majority
as follows: :

“Tt is one thing for the city authorities them-

selves to inquire into Slochower’s fitness, but
quite another for his discharge to he based en-

tirely on events octurring before a federal com-
mittee whose inquiry - was announced as nat di-
rected at ‘the property, affairs, or government of
the city, or . . . official conduct of city employees’,’’
That Slochower prescribes no inhibtions against rel-
evant inquiry by the public employer is: reaffirmed in
Beilan v. Board. of Education, 357-U.S. 399. _ There this
Curt sustained dismissal ‘of a pupblic school teacher
under a Pennsylvania statute permitting such a discharge
for “‘incompetency”’. The finding of incompetency was
. predicated on the. teacher’s refusal to answer a question
of his superintendent as to his membership in the Com-
luunist Party, Listing, apparently with approval, the
various disqualifying grounds contained in the Pennsyl-
vania teacher tenure law and similar statutes of other
states, the Court Says:

ee , aa
_ “We find ho requirement in the Federal Con- .

stitution that\a teacher’s classroom conduct be the
. \ . . . ae .

sole basis for determining his fitness. Fitness

for teaching depends on a broad range of factors.’’

A classic example of activity distant from the school

‘house which was properly’ considered to justify discharge
of a publie school teacher appears in H orosko v. Mt. Pleas-
aut Twp. School Dist., 335 Pa. 369,,6 A. 24 866, and is

discussed in the Betian opinion. . In the Horosko case the |

discharge was classified under the statutory ground of
“ineompetency’? and’ was based on the teacher's after-
hours activity in her husband's beet, garden, serving as
‘ bartender and waitress, and engaging in allied activi-
ties, THe information required by Act 16 could’ well
reveal similar activities by teachers inconsistent with the
‘best interests of the school system, It does not seem
- 00 remote to Suggest that it may be well known: that
Local Chapter 262 of the United Aesthetic Society is, in

2

- sate . Id z

fact, a place engaged principally in dispensing alceholic
beverages in violation, of local laws, is frequented by pros-
titutes and is tlie site of regular brawls snd’ disorders.
Revelation of anembership in this organization might, well
lead the public employer to reassess all relevant informa-
tion as to the suitability and fitness of a teacher,

,. Appellants and: petitioners seem to. overlook — the
‘fundamental duty of frankness and candor with regard
to his fitness for the position held or sought owed by any
“~mployee, publie or private to his employer. That duty,
as it rests on a publi¢ school ‘teacher is deseribed in Beilaw
in this language:

“By engaging in teaching in the public schools.
petitioner did not give up his right to freedom’ of
» belief, speech or. association. He did, however,
undertake obligations of frankness, candor and
cooperation in answering inquiries made of him by
his employing Board examining mto his fitness to-
serve it’as a public school teacher.”
‘The failure to discharge this obligation resulted in. the
dismissal 6f a municipally employed subway conductor,
a. position considerably less demanding of responsibility-
than:that of a teacher, and the public employer’s action
was approved by this Court in Lerner v. Casey, 3857 US.
468. Lerner refused to answer 2 question put by his
employer as to his membership in the Communist Party,
and relied on the privilege against self-incrimination in
his refusal. The Court points out that the discharge
was grounded on a finding of doubtful trust and relia-
bility based on Lerner’s lack of frankness, and not on his
“,vocation of the Fifth Amendment's protection.

Recognition of the, obligations of candor resting on
members of the teaching profession has not been limited
to the courts, Congress, legislatures and public employers

1d

lone. These obligations are generally recognized - by
the professional organizations of the teachers themselves
ws indicated by the following stutemeft in 42 American
Association of University Professors Bulletin 96:

:

“AS in all acts of' dissociation, the professor
aceepts conventions which become morally binding.
Above all, he owes his colleagues in the university
complete candor and perfect integrity, precluding
any kind of clandestine or conspiratorial activi.
ties. He owes equal candor to the publie, If he
is called upon to answer for his convictions it js
his duty as a eitizen to speak ont. Tt is‘even more -
definitely his duty as-a professor. Refusal ‘to do
80, on whatever legal grounds, éannot fail to. re-
fleet upon a profession that claims for itself the
fullest freedom to speak and the maximum p' o-
tection of that freedum vavailable in) our ‘society,
In this respect, invocation of the Fifth Amendment
places upon a professor a heavy burden of proof
of his fitness to hold a teaching position and lays
upon his university an obligation to reexamine his
qualifications for membership in its society,

' 2.» When thé powers of legislative inquiry
ure abused, tlie remedy does not lie in noncoopera-
tion or defiance; jt 48, to be ‘songht through the
normal channels of informed public opinion.’’

This statement of position of the A.A.U.P. was adopted
n 1953 and is quoted in the dissenting opinion in Sloc-
lower, & later statement appearing at 42 AATUP.
Bull. 49 (1956) reaffirms the position that lack of candor
's relevant to fitness as a teacher in this language:

.“*The fact that a faculty member has .refused
: to disclose information to his own institution is
relevant to the question of fitness to teach, but
not decisive, ° . os Nevertheless, nicmbers of the
teaching profession should recognize that sincerity
canyot be judged objectively and that a callege

/

/

tts . 16
or university is entitled to know the” facts with”
whieh it mast deal. This is especially true when a
faculty member's activities, whether or not they
‘are blameworthy, have resulted in publicity Irurt-
ful to his institution, © Accordingly, i ‘YY proper
inquiry by his institution, it is the duty of a faculty
member to disclose facts concerning himself that
are of legitimate concert to the institution, namely,
those that relate to his fitness.as a-teacher .. .”’

~The disclosure required by Act 10 is attacked as in-

pinging upom the rights. seenred — by the Cue process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendinent. Against the back-
cround of the almost universally recognized duty of the

public school teacher of candor and frankness to his in- |

_stitution’s governing board can this requirement: of dis-

closure be classifiéd as inconsistent ‘with the fundamen-
ta’ principals ‘of liberty: and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions’? as the scope
o¥ due process was defined in Hebert vy. Louisiana, 2
U.S. 312, 316, or as ‘a practice ‘repuguant to the con-—
seience of mankind’? as* that language was employed in
Palko vy. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 219, 3232 We subniit that

it cannot.

National” Agso. for Advancement af Colored People:
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, does not limit the power of a
state to aequire information relevant to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose. © The holding there was merely to
the effect that the: membership lists which the Alabama

Circuit Court ordered to be produced were not relevant

.o the issue then before that Court regarding whether

the N.A.A.C.P.’s activities in Alabama had been such as

to bring it within the scope of that State’s: foreign Cor:
poration registration. statute. Bates v. Little Rock, 361
US. 516, turned on the same distinction. Tt was ‘there,
held: that there was ‘no relevant correlation between the
power of the municipalities to impose occupation license

i

taxes and the compulsory disclosure and publication of
membership lists of the local branches of the National -
Association for the Advnacement ‘of Colored People.’ Jy
order for these two cuses to govern the disposition of the
oues at bar it would be necessary for the Court to hold
that the information required by~Act 10 is wholly ir-
relevant to the proper administration of the publie school
system and the determination of fitness and suitability
‘of teachers. Such a holding would be contrary not only
to logie but also to the teachings of ‘this Court in Adler
and Beilan. Indeed, the relevance of the. required in-
‘formation is 86 clear that the Supreme Court of Arkan-
‘as commented that “It cannot be doubted that the in-
formation .would often be of real Value to the employing
school board.’? (Carr v. ¥ oung, i.
N.W.'2d 701) and the three-judge District Court held that
“We think that the information required by Act 10 is
relevant:’> (Shelton vy. McKinley, 174 F. Supp. 351.)

The real objection to Act 10-that underlies the ar-
guments of both appellants and. petitioner's is’ the conten-
tion that its purpose i8 to expose membership in unpop-
ular organizations. It has already been pointed out as.
4 general proposition that the courts are without power |
'o search for mofives which prompted legislation, and
Burenbiatt vy. United States, 360 U.S. 109, comes directly
{6 grips with the specific matter of.‘‘exposure” as a legis-
lative purpose. There the Court. held that it was im-
material that the objective of the Congress and of its
Committee in conducting an investigation might ‘have
been "purely one - of exposure, It was again pointed out
that so long as the legislative branch acts in pursuance
of its constitutional power, the judiciary lacks authorit@)
‘0 intevene on the basis of the dnotives which spurred ©
the exercise of that power.

a”)

Is

Petitioners argue that the possibility that the in.
lormation contained ‘in the affidavits will) not be. kept
confidential makes Act 10 unconstitutional. This is .
shuply an arguinent that the statute could te put to an
unconstitutional use, There are few statutes. which
cannot be administered in an improper aeanner. The
remedy: for that is to attack the objectionable acininistra-
tion if and when it oceurs. +The SApretie Court of Ar-
kansas, in construing the statute held that ‘*the permis-
sible purposé of the statute is to enlighten the schol
board alone’? and ‘that the affidavits need not be opened —
to ‘publie inspection’. Carr vy. Young, supra. Since
* the statute does not provide for public inspection of the
affidavits, and since, as said by’ the Supreme Court :of
Arkansas,. ‘*. . . the proof does not show any inclination
on the part.of aily school }oard to use Act 10 ina discrim-
‘inatory manner’, there is no proper occasion to specn-
date at this il Resi regard to possébilities of future
~ abuses of the statute. | |

The suggestion by appellants that Act 115 of the
Acts of Arkansas of 1959, adopted in February, 1959, and
held unconstitutional by the court’ below in No, 14° in -
June, 1959, should in some way affect the constitutional-
ity of Act 10 which was enacted at an. entirely different
session of the General Assembly in September, 1958, does
uot merit extensive rebuttal. It is unnecessary -to con-
sider the question of whether these two wholly unrélated
Acts while concurrently 1 f ve would achieve an an
Constitutional end. This question became moot when
the District Court adjudged Act 115 to be invalid and
unenforceable and no appeal was taken from that judg-
ment. If Act 10 incurred a constitutional taint upon the
advent of Act 115, it was removed by the e1 radication of
Act 115. ’

- We have not arguéd here the wisdom or thegneces-
sity of Act 10 because those questions are clearly p.

19

* *.
.

yond

the competence of the courts to review, Lerner vy. ( ‘asey,
supra; United Public Workers y, - Mitchell, supra, In
_ the proper exercise of the judicial ‘function, the courts
must always abstain from Passing on such questions as -
did the Court in Atkins vy, Kansas, 19] U.S. 207, when,

‘peaking through the earlier Mr. Justice Harlan, ic saig:

e

‘

‘Sa, also, if it be said tha statute like the

one before us is misehievous in its tendencies, the
auswer is that the Tesponsibility therefor -rests
upon legislators, not upon the courts. No evils
arising ° from such legislation could be more far-
reaching than those that might come toeour System .

of

government if the Judiciary, abandoning the

sphere assigned io it by ‘the fundamental law,
should enter the domain of legislation, and, upon
grounds merely of justice or reason or wisdom, -
annul statutes that -had received the sanction of -

the people's representatives,’’ .

ie MACRUBEON -
7 Wheretore, for the reaspns hereinabove stated, the
judgments of the District Court in No. 14 and of- the Sp
preme Court of Arkansas in| No. 83 shor ud be affirmed. |

HicopectYally submitted, .
se |
LOUIS L. RAMSAY, JR.
E. HARLEY COX

Simmons National Building
Pine Bluff, Arkansas )

HERSCHEL H. FRIDAY, JR.

ROBERT V. LIGHT

Boyle Building .
- Little Rock, Arkansas

Attorneys for Appellees in No, 14

HERSCHEL H. FRIDAY, JT.

- ROBERT V. LIGIT
‘Attorneys for Respond: uts in No, 83

October Ps? 1960 |

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