# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Webb v. Illinois Central Railroad > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386408_0265%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1957 - **Citation:** 352 U.S. 512 ## Text LIBRARY | wee od MAR &. . }! SUPREME = COURT, U. Ua 7 | HAROLD 8, WILLEY, Clerk | ~ C. ie - SR - Supreme Court f te United Sates -Ocrosrn TERM, me 198 0. Ret a JOHN. W. WEBB, eee | Petitioner, . v8. ° d ILLINOIS CENTRAL RATLROAD COMPANY, ta . Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIROUIT. 7 Cari L. YarEcer, — sas Baker Building, } Minneapolis 2, Minnesota, : . * " Attorney for Petitidner. Rosert J, RaFFeERTY, sry ‘ yee Chicago, Illinois, _ Of Counsel. © Z . a’. = "INDEX. ‘ | 1 | $F PAGE PRONE: TIIOW Sis ticsnenici cnet inctenven Rierscvcistinnniegeccssonivaivnn aw arearatn ¥ a Jurisdiction Satie pines TLE a cata I aeons sidan isaeelbcubpinn oto ‘2: | Questions Presented siccasatkie cicteenie Snes pledeiiibmiaacasmiiesinne » iat Statutes. Involved saesesecensonsusssnssnvessessesuvaiesssnenscsessnnessnsnesneasons a Statement of the Case ...icoccccccesess ssdesennessnnsenanecee is OE swe Reasons For Granting Writ . Bee Rita ae EATER a Appendix A, Opinion of Circuit Court of Aguile tor the Seventh Cireuit Mpkidcgendibskeebinbahdens eoesasensantencasonsencncees meta Appendix B, Judgment Ba oe hs : ESPEN ENTS oe 18. Appendix C, Order Denying Rehearing . IK tiles ieee | Appendix D, Statute re Certiorari | OTAREN Wie ce ion 19° Appendix EK, Pertinent Pfovisions, Federal sa a | I I I nai Sicici cocina cnssctchicansciunchnapdocnedapiesabiens 19 ‘Appendix F, Statute, Trial Court Jurisdiction seinitaiesais OM Crrations. : a Bailey v. Central, Vermont’ R. Co., 319 U.S, 350 sereeeeere 8,8 Blair v: B. & O. BR. Co., 323 U..S.,600 wvnntinnnnnnenne — 6 : Brown v, Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 sindgivnids 8 Ellis v. Union P. B. Co., 329 U.S. 649 o.sscsssisssnysenegeessesee Sa Lavender vjKurn, gt” Ee Se a 6, .: if Myers v. Reading Be i Fe IT sess inciseerecnsssas 6,9 ‘Southern R: Go. v. Puckett; 244 U.S. 571 cesses 8 Spotts v. B. & O. Co. 102 F. (2d) 160 vescsssisssssnsseeseesne 9 | at ee is | _ ‘PAGE Stone v, N: Y. C. & St. L. R. Co., 344 U.S. 407 ..3............ 6 Tenpant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co,, 321 0. “Cerne -— ‘MPiller v.-Atlantic C. L. R. Co. 318 U. 8. 84 Scenes oe | Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 58 wloccsssssssesensenaee 6,8 OTHER REFERENCES. 7th‘Amendment, U. S. Constitution ...:cjcicseesssese way 6 ee ie eS Ea Oe piWecndites fs 19 ( 00:66 6 ........ MRT. ABRATS sense ToeesBi\Dy 19 pre G32 ae eles Seem Soman Te os | 4} V4 . J | IN THE SY PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - - OcroBer Term, 1955. - No... ‘JOHN W. WEBB, ; Petitioner, vs. . ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY. _ Respondent. vf PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH OmECUrT. | Petitioner’ respectfully petitions this Honorable Court to grant the Writ of Certiorari to review the decision and : judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the ‘Seventh Circuit in the above case. : | Dovdaeer AND OPINION OF THE COURTS Ra BELOW. ae The judgment of the ‘United States | District Court for? _the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, was entered February 23, 1955, and.is not reported but is printed in the record filed with the clerk of the’ Court of Appeals below. (R: 122) _ 7 The opinion of the United States Court of ‘peiials for the Seventh Circuit, reversing said. judgment, was filed December 29, 1955, and is not yet reported. but is set forth in the — hereto. (App. A.) eee eee STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURIS. DICTION OF THIS COURT I8 INVOKED. Date of Judgment to be re Maas: Descniier: 29, 1955, | (App. B), as amended by order denying rehearing Janu-— ary 30, 1956 (App. C). | Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S$ Code, Section 1254 (1) (App. D). — QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR aes Question I. er P order. to prevail under the Federal Employers’ Lia- bility Act, need a plaintiff negate all possible: inferences of negligence of persons other than the defendant and - prove his casegby a standard of “probabilities”? — : Question II. Does a Court ‘of Appeals invade the province of a jury and violate the scope of appellate review in a Federal Employers’ Liability . ‘Act case by setting aside an em-- ployee’s jury verdict, ‘and judgment and directing. entry of final judgment. for the railroad when the record shows. 1 that: The seein stepped on a large clinker buried near a switch stand in a soft, new roadbed constructed . _ by the railroad about three weeks before the accident; the railroad’s firemen cleaned their fireboxes at. this - location; the employee’s duties. reauired him to work. - on the ground at this point and the employee and the _ employer's witnesses testified that a clinker .as de-— scribed made for bad footing and an unsafe place to work? — as cual a e ee STATUTES INVOLVED. . . a 28 U..S. Code, See. 1254 (1), Appendix D. 45.U. 8. Code, See. 51, Appendix BE. 45 U.S S. Code, See: 56, Appendix F, STATEMENT OF THE case. ae ee The Material Facts. _ This action was brought by Petitioner, a brakeman in the employ of Respondent, under the Federal Kmployers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S. Code, Sees, 51-60, to recover damages . _ for injuries suffered as a result of the alleged negligence of his employer. (R. 3-5) + °. Around the middle of June, 1952, extensive repairs, had. been made by Respondent’ on its house track at Mount -; Olive, Illinois. (R. 68) This work included raising the rail and‘ ties about 5 inches above their previous level and the use of about 15 cubic yards: of new cinder and . chat ballast. (R.-72, 73) ‘During the repairs, the house: - 3 track was closed for use by the trainmen. (R. 67). . About three weeks after the ' repair work: (July 2 , 1952): _ when uncoupling a car on this house track, Petitioner ob- - served a leaking grain car. He turned around to go to | the caboose to get some waste to use as a plug ea - stepped on a large buried clinker. ‘He had looked at the ground before stepping and it was level, locked like good footing outside of. being a‘little loose. (R . 43) Wher he - stepped on’ the clinker his foot turned, he-was thrown off ' balance and his leg doubled under him’ and he sustained injyries. (R.. 14) After the accident he saw the clinker —4— with a hole right by its side. (R. 44) It was’ partially» kicked .out of the cinders. (R. 61) It was about the. size of his fist. (R. 14) | pan Petitioner, a man with 25° years railroad experience wt a former section hand, testified that it is not a cus- iry practice to use clinkers the size of a man’s fist railroad road bed. They don’t pack down and give _- nica footing. (R. 44) Lester Rector, defendant’s section - foreman, who had charge of the Mount Olive track rais- _ing: and new ballasting, said that such a large clinkes * would ‘not belong in a road: bed near a switch stand. (R. 77) John, Brosnahan, defendant’s track supervisor, testi- fied that one purpose of ballast is to provide safe.footing: for trainmen. He stated that the presence of a clinker as °, - described and Jocated would represent an unsafe place to — work. -(R. 87) The cinders were not sereened before being . used in the new roadbed. .(R. 77) ‘The site of the accident was the only place for Respondent’ 8 firemensto clean their | fire. boxes at Mount Olive. (R. 59) - , _ Webb’s ‘statement ken hy Respondent’s claini agent | was admitted in by agreement. It.states in part: - 4] soil one step and stepped on a. cinder buried jin the loose cinders about a. foot feom the end of the ties. When I stepped on this cinder it threw te off balance, . caused me to fall and. I injured my left Knee as I fell. This happened about’ 15 feet south of the house ‘track switch onthe east side of the house track. This track had: been worked on shortly. befcre - this hy the trackmen and the cinders were stirred up and loose and this large cinder about six inches in . circumference was -buried in the loose cinders around | it so that ‘it was not discernible from the rest of the ‘small loose cinders. It looked like the surface was © -level and good enough footing but this cinder beigg solid in the loose cinders caused my fo@$ to turn as I © ®» le alin eae “~ ~. . sepped on it, tained. my foot and caused me ‘to fall; | 80 that, I injured the ‘partilage in my. knee_as I felJ.*" “(R. Le | the applicable statute (45 US .C. 51) dente “Etery. common, carrier by railroad * * * shall be - fiable ‘in damages to any person suffering injury ~— - * while he is employed by such carrier * * *.for such injury * * ‘resulting * * * by reason of any defect or insufficiency due to its negligence in its * * * "track, roadbed ¢ $28 or other equipment.” — The- ‘plaintiff in his complaint charged that i aiid failed to use ordinary care to furnish him with a rea- sonably safe place to work.. The jury returned a verdict for petitioner | fn the sum © of $15,000.00. J udgment was entered on the verdict. Motions for new trial ‘and for judgment notwithstand- with directions to.enter judgment for respondent. rede B) Petition for rehéaring was denied (App. ©). nr te we papas Basis.for Federal Jurisdiction in District: Court. Jurisdiction in .the District Court, the court of first instance, was based: \ upon the provisions of 45 U. S. Code, Section 56. (App. | 4 ee : > : &. neP » ing the verdict were denied. (R. 128). On appeal, the ie ‘Court of 2Appeals for’ the Seventh Circuit “reversed the “judgment and remanded the case to the District ‘Court REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT. _ 1. The decision - of the Cour: of Appeals constituted an @ ~ <> invasion of the province of the jury contfary to the. Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. ~“. a | | In recent years this: Court has, on many occasions, ex- pressed itself clearly regarding the respective functions of the Court and jury, and the scope of appellate review in cases srising under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. ¢ ie | These Bistisinis include Tiller vy. Atlantic Coast Line’ R. Co., 318 S. 54 (1942) ; ‘Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. * @o.; 319 U.S (1942);.Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 US 29 (1943); Blair v.-Baltimore dé O. R. Co., - 323, U.S. 600 patos Lavender. v. Kurn, 327 US. 645 (1945); Ellis v. Union P. R. Co., ‘329 U.S. 649 (1947); "Myers v. Reading R. Co., 331 U.S. 477 (1947) ; Wilkerson v. a y, 336 U.S. 53 (1948) and Stone v. New York, C. St. L. R. Co., 344 U.S, 407 (1958). Ae The decision herein complained of ‘is in direct ootiant -with the foregoing cases on the authority of the jury to draw permissible inferences from t the ‘evidence and the right of an Appellate Court to-sitbstitute its interpreta-_ tion of the evidence for the verdict of the’ jury and the . judgment of the trial court. a . aie te ‘ The vo clusion of the Court of Appeals “Dy bottomed “on its ‘selbiaient that: ‘‘there is no evidence as to the agency whereby the hazard was placed in.or on me 4 road-. bed.’”(Opinion, App. p. 14) ; Following’ this ass tion, the: Court of Appeals notes “that strahgers may bee requent ‘the premises and that the ‘ne of another railroad is in close proximity to the scene ‘of the accident. ° 4 $ “The Court ‘then says that.a finding that the Aeteibaat . placed the clinker in. its roadbed as a ‘part of the ballast used in the repair operation .can rest on nothing but _ speculation. (Opinion, App. pj 15) \ mah The. Appellate Court infey 8 that a stranger or another — railroad could have gone on ‘to defendant’s right of way and buried a clinker therein ‘and dismisses the probative evidence of a major repair job (using 15 gubic- yards of unsereened cinders and chat) on the railroad done by jits own employees three weeks before the accident and an injury caused by. clinker buried in a roadbed”¥ which ‘was still soft from new ballast installation. \ \ ; The Court of Appeals by. weighing the than and _ searching the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence . has violated the clear mandate of this Court and deprived petitioner of. his right of trial by jury. Excerpts from several of the cases construing the F.E.L.A. cited on page 6 demonstrate ‘this to be true. \ In Ellis . Union P. R. Co., 329: US. 649, Gah) ‘this Court said at page 653: “Once there is a reasonable cis in the record for concluding there was negligence. which caused the in- jury, it is irrelevant that fair minded men might — reach a diffprent conclusion. For then it would bé an invasion of the jury’s function for an appellate court “to draw “bntrary inferences or to conclude that a different conclusion would be more reasonable.” — _-“ ite v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, (1945), holds, at page 653 : , | “It ifno answer to say that the jury’s wesiliet in- volved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fairminded men may draw different inferences, a measure of ' speculation and conjecture is required on the part aoe. “ of. those itinte duty it is to settle the. dispate by choosing what seems to them to be the most rea- | sonable inference.” : : i” Wilkerson v. McCarthy; 336 U.S. 53 (1948), thiis 7 Court stated at page 63: ss ot Bx = “In reaching its conclusion as to negligence, a. jury | is frequently called upon to consider many separate ‘strands of ~$- 649; Seaboard: Air Line Ry. Co. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Koske, supra; Patton v. Texas &é P. Ry. Co., supra, _ Applying these. governing. principles, we believe the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions for a directed verdict. The evidenee, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, supports the following fact statement. He- sustained. a serious injury when he stumbled over an’un- . ‘usually ‘large clinker which was embedded, partiaily at least, in defendant’s roadbed. At the point’ where the accident occurred defendant maintains its mainline track which runs in a north-south direction. Parallel to,- and east of, that track, defendant maintains a second track which is referred to in the record as the passing* track. _ The latter is connected to the mainline by switches and a cross-over track. Ingress to the passing track is gained over a switch, known as the “house track” switch. The ‘section of the passing track south of the switch is known | as the house track. East of these installations, and con- ‘ nected thereto by switches and a tross-over track, are. ~ eertain fagilities of the L. & N. Railroad consisting of its mainline and house tracks. Plaintiff was standing on the roadbed of defendant’s house track approximately twenty feet south of the switch when he. noticed the leaking condi- “tion of the wheat car. The accident occurred at that, spot when he turned toward the caboose and took one step. He was -regularly employed on the East Saint. Louis- Clinton local and worked frequently at this locale. He. | did not see the clinker before he fell¥ during cross-exami- nation of plaintiff, the trial judge characterized his testi- mony as to his knowledge whether, before the accident, the clinker was completely buried in the roadbed in the following language, ‘‘It is. self-evident that he does -not. know, if he did, not see it.”. The physical set-up of de- ae ‘ fendant’s house track had been altered in June, 1952, when the level of the house track: switch had been raised five inches. In this operation the ties..and.rails were raised and sufficient ballast in the“form of fine cinders and | ‘crushed stone was employed to raise the switch to the re- | “Syuired level and the grade of the connecting rails to a compensating elevation. There was‘ no direct testimony that this operation affected the roadbed at the point where . the accident occurred, i.e., twenty feet south of the switch, but; -for -affected.7Some fifteen cubic yards of ballast were required to accomplish the end result. Further weight is afforded to our assumption by plaintiff’s testimony that the footing at that place was level but a little ‘soft: Three different employees testified that .they periodically inspected the trackage at’ this location for defects in the facilities and hazards existing thereon or nearby. One of these wit- nesses testified that he had, occasionally, discovered large clinkers in the ballast in his territory and had caused them to be removed. Subsequent questioning: of. the witness elicited the testimony that the “territory” togwhich refer- ence is made included more than forty miles of deferdant’s right of way and mainline. There was no testimony ‘as » to conditions at the scene of the accident either hefore or after the occurrence except plaintiff’s testimony that. he stumbled over 2. unusually large ‘clinker which caused his injury. To make a submissible case it was, inenmbent on plain- tiff to adduce substantial evidence that defendant either negligently placed the clinker in the ballast or was. charge- ,° able with notice, either actual or constructive, of its pres- ence therein. Bevan. v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., ~. 132 Ohio St. 245, 6 N. E. 2d:982. We think.his proof_fails in this’ errs There is no evidence as to the agency —-. the hazard was placed in or on the roadbed. ‘whereby it Defendant’s lines are in close gow ‘to and are con- nected with those of the L. & N. Plaintiff testified that the facilities of ‘the two roads were connected to permit the interchange of freight cars between them. A photo- rposes of this opinion, we assuine that it. was. _ graphic exhibit which, according to. plaintiff's testimony, ) substantially represents the conditions at the scene -of the. - accident, reveals several buildings in the near vicinity; . . there is no evidence to show whether these-are the prop- erty of’ defendant or of the.L. & N. or of some other — ‘stranger to the occurrence. The right of way is not fenced, ~ and is, therefore, accessible to the public ; there, is no + ; evidence as to whether or not the premises are frequented by strangers. There-are no probabilities to deduced from this evidence.” That defendant placed the/clinker in its roadbed asa part of. tiie ballast used in’ the repair. operation is merely one of several possibilities present. - A finding that it did so can rest on sada i ‘but — | elation. Furth rmore, were we to hold that it was’ prop rT to pernut the jury so to speculate, plaintiff still would not ~ he entitled to recovery unless it was allowed also to.shecu- | late that it is negligence per se‘to allow stich an object to become mixed in with the fine ballast used in improving its roadbed. Defendant’s duty to plaintiff in this respect ¢ was to exercise tlie care of a reasonably prudent person, under the existing circumstances, to p ohibit the introduc- tion of’a hazard into the roadbed «wh re plaintiff was re- quired to work. Cf. Seaboard Air Line >» Ry. Co. v. Horton, 233: U..S. 492; Missours Pacific R. C9. v. Zolliecoffer, 191 S. W. 2d 587. 588 (Ark.). Not only’ is.there no evidence that defendant violated that duty, ‘but also,.there is a total want of evidence as to what constitutes reasonable prudence under the proved circumstances. The record is equally. lacking in evidence. to prove that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the danger- pus condition. The testimony as to actual notice is that - no one, plaintiff included, knew of the presence. of the clinker until the accident occurred. There is substantial. undisputed evidence: that this portion of defendant’s right of way was inspected frequently, with a purpose whick included the seeking out andVvremoval: of such hazards. — The evidence j is silent as to what standard of car® plaintiff id a —! a was entitled to expect and to rely upon. ee is ‘no evi- 4 , dence that defendant was remiss in any respect. There | is.no proof that its inspection of its premises did not. meet ° The required nandfan or that a\closer, ;nore thorough, inspection would have disclosed \the e Kistence of this * hazardous situation. — Aare e \ Plaintiff having failed in his rata of proof, it was error te submit the case to the-jury and permit it to reach a verdict by pure speculation. The situation is not unlike that disclosed in Kaminski v. Chicago, River & I. R. Co.; 200 F. 2d 1 (C. A.-7). Kaminski, |while working in. the course of his employment on the prem sesiof a customer . of the defendant. railroad, was seriously injured: when he fell into a hole beside an industry track. We found that there was no evidence as to when and\ ithradgh what agency . the hazardous condition was created dr as to\the railroad’s . notice, either actual or constructive, of. its istence,. and held that the tria] court erred in: overruling tke railroad’s motion for a directéd verdict.. A comparable olding is: found in numerous cases involving. factually simWar situa- tions. See e.g., O’Mara v. Pennsylvania’ R. Co., 95 F. ¢2d 762 (C. A.-6); Bevan v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 132 _ * Ohio St. 245, 6 N.-E. 2d 982; Spencer v. Atchison, T. & 8. _ \F. Ry. Co., 907 P. 2d 126 (C! al. App.); Waller v. Northern | Pacific Terminal Co., 166. P. 2d 488 (Ore.); “Matthews v. ° Southern fags 59 P. 2d 220 (Cal. App.}.. , - The cases 6n which plaintiff relies aré largely inap- _ posite. -In each there was evidence from which the jury might reasonably infer thatthe defendant either negli- _ ‘ genfly created the dangerous agency involyed, or was . ~ chargeable ‘with notice of the existence of: a condition which rendered unsafe the place where the injured em- . ployee was required to work. £g., Brown vy. Western Ry. rg of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294; Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244-0. S. 571, afffing, 16 Ga. App. 551, 85 S. E.. 809; Fleming v. Kellett, 167 F. 2d 265 (C. A.-10); Waddell v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., 142 F. 2d 309 (C. A+7); Pitcairn t, ehege ey F.2d 664 (C. A.-7); Virgintan.'Ry. Co. v. By Forty 84 F. 2d 133 (C, A.-4); Smith Vv. Schumaker, 85 tte lt a 9a 967, cert, denied 307 U. S. 646 (Cal. App.) ; Missouri Patific R. Co. v. Zolliecoffér, 191 S. W. 2d 587 (Ark.): Tash v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 76S. W. 2d 690 (Mo.); McClain v. Charleston & W. C.. Ry. Co., + S.:E. 2d 280 | (8. C.); Lock-v. Chicago, B. € Q. R. Co., 219 S. W. 919 _ (Mo.); Hollaway v. Missouri, K. d T. Ry.. Co., 208 S..W. 27 *(Mo:). ‘The only case cited which purports to justify an inference of negligence merely from the existence-of an obstruction and the happening of the accident is: Marcades v. New .Orleans. Terminal Co., 111. F. Supp. 650. The case was tried by the court without a jury and the evi- ‘dence is not reported. Insofar, however, as that decision imposes liability merely because of the existence of a hazard without any evidence as to defendant’s notice, it- _ rests upon a theory: of liability ‘without fault and cannot | -be reconciled with pronouncements by the Supreme Court that the Act does not make railroads insurers of employee - safety. Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 329 U. S. 649; Séa- , board Air Line Ry. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492. Since’ we are of the opinion that defendant’ s motions for a directed verdict should have been allowed, we find it: - unnecessary-to-consider other assignments of error. The | judgment is reversed and ‘the cause remanded to the Dis- trict Court with directions to enter judgment for defendant. A true Copy: Teste : 7. ° ee —) APPENDIX B. ‘Judgment. oe (December 29, 1955) Joun W. Wess,\ = = -—s«Y Appeal from the : | laintiff-Appellee,| © United States’ Dis- . a ak : . trict Court for the ILuyvors CENTRAL” RatLRoap Com- Northern _ District PANY, 4 _ of Tilinois, Eastern, . Defendant. Lepellant J) Division. This cause te dl on to be’ heard on the transcript of. the record from the United States District Court fé@r ‘the ) _ Northern District of «Illinois, Eastern Division, and was . | argued by counsel. . ) - Qn consideration whereof, it is ordered nd adios by | i “this court that the, judgment of the. said District Court in. ) ‘this. cause appealed from ‘be, and the same is hereby; . Reversep with costs, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby ReManpep. to the said District Court with. direc- tions ‘fo enter judgment for: the Defendant. A” APPENDIX ©. aigbiclanen 7 ce Order Denying. Rehearing. 4 (January 30, 1956) _ a ; _.. Joun W. Wess,” CELE a Apphal Pasig ae e- este rat anes Plaintif’ Appellee, United States Dis- No. 11462 ee 4 triet Court for the | ILLANOIS CENTRAL RamroaD Com-{ ° Northern Bistrict: PANY, of [linois, Eastern Defendant- Appellant.) Division. It is ordered by’ the Court that the petition ies a re-. ez hearing of this cause be and the’ same is hereby, Dentep. “ , Me see APPENDIX D. ) 7 Courts of Anoeeis: Certiorari. Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods : : (1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal cases, ‘before or after rendition of judgment of decree.. June 25, 1948, ¢. 646, 62 Stat. 928, 2 U. 5. Code, Sec. 1254 (1).. ie E. ~”~-eoOo oO “a * 3 ¢ The Federal’ Employers’ Lia Every common carrier by ‘railroa while engaging in commerce between any of the sevefal States or Terri- . tories, or between any of the States and Territories, or . between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign: nation or nations, shall be — lable -in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by ‘such eafrier in ‘suc’ commerep, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her per- . widow or husband%and ‘children of such. employee; and, if none, then of sueh employee’s parents; and, if none, then: of the next of -kin dependent upon such employee, fer such injury or death regulting in whole or in. part u — from the. negligence | of | any of the officers, agents or em ployees of such carrier, , oF Hy-reason of any defect or. iff _ Sufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, ap- .- pliances,. machinery, — track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment. a sonal representative, . for the benefit of the surviving . | ai 20 we : Any employes of a carrier, any part of whose duties as _ such employée shall be the furtherance of interstate or ‘foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely am] substantially affect such commerce as above set forth ii for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being }employed, by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chap- _ ter. Apr. 22, 1908, ce. 149; Sec. 1, 35 Stat. 65, Aug. 11, . 1939, c. 685, Sec. 1, 53 Stat. 1404. 45 U. S. Code, See. 51. - APPENDIX F. ~ . Actions; Limitations; Concurrent Jurisdiction of Courts. No action shall be maintained under this’chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued. | Under’ this chapter an action may be brought in @ dis- trict court of the United States, in the district of the - residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action “arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of. the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States. Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, See. 6, 35 Stat. 66; Apr. 5, 1910, ec. 143, See. 1, 36 Stat. 291; Mar. 3, 1911, e. 23t, Sec. 291, 36 ‘Stat: 1167: Aug. 11, 1939, c.. 685, Sec. 2, 53 Stat. 1404 5 June 25, 1948, c. 646, , See. 18, 62 Stat. 989. 45 U8 a. Sec. 56. es --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386408_0265%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.