# Brief for the United States — United States v. Harriss > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386408_0051%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Brief for the United States - **Published:** January 1, 1954 - **Citation:** 347 U.S. 612 ## Text INDEX Opinion below --------- SAP Ae Ey os hie PPD Oey inet Jurisdiction - - - - - . 7 = on n/t Questions presented - - ; renerkings wee nen Statute involved______-_- ee ain Aiea wee eer er ‘i Statement -_- :; Sep AR nr i ao in arene wwe we dbierowe ea Ree a B. The holding of the District ‘Court. a akg Pht hE Specification of errors to be urged-------------------------- Summary of argument_. os ssh thats rh va wi na Sioa cic dake at bap re a ckde eet woke ens bees awe 1. Sections 305 and 307 of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act are not unconstitutionally indefinite as applied to the counts of the information laid under those provisions A A. Sections 305 and 307 plainly apply to those who expend money either (a) to pay others to communicate to Congress or (b) in the course of directly inducing others to com- municate to Congress______-_-_---_------ 1. The language of the Act...... aenatd ns 2. Legidiative Wistory............-...--. a. The 1946 Act------ ee B. The Section 305 ate charge that the de- fendants paid others to make representa- tions on their behalf to Congress or at- tempted to induce others to communicate with Congress _ - C. There is no unconstitutional * vagueness in Beo- tions 305 and 307 as applied to direct com- munication with, or intentional stimula- tion of direct communication with, Con- gress _- SPIE: Rae i D. The “principal: purpose”’ requirement of Sec- tion 307 has substantial application only to defendant National Farm Committee and its application to that defendant is clear_ II. Section 308 of the Act is not unconstitutionally indef- inite as applied to the counts laid under that sec- tion - A. As applied to ‘those who are » hired either to ex- press views to Congress or to cause others to do so, Section 308 is sufficiently definite_ B. Defendants Moore and Linder were hired to express views to Congress and to cause others to do so___---- 273108—-53 1 (1) 25 42 49 54 58 58 61 lI Argument—Continued Page III. As applied here, Sections 305, 307, and 308 of the Act do not violate the First Amendment_-_-_-_______-_- 64 IV. The information should not have been dismissed on the basis of the alleged invalidity of the penal pro- vision of Section 310 (b) which is plainly separable- 75 V. The validity of the Lobbying Act as applied to other situations is not before the Court. -____-_-______- 80 ee oo, ae Cree caw as cemackwuavusee ce 88 OIE sag oo sins sees Sods Scenes se Fede ees RG he Knap ee enne 89 CITATIONS Cases: URE 0 ee, ee ie oc See ep nne 80 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. ss see ae neds eng ee oak a an eta 49, 53, 70 Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 Sas coe eee ee eee an as ee eer 71 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1_-.---------- 71,73 Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. 8S. 8._-_-_--_------ 53 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. 8. 249_..__..--.---.----.---- 83 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. 8. 250...........-.---.--- 69, 86 Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337__ 18, 50, 52, 53 Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534_ 37, 51, 56, 68 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 208 U. 8. 238... ........-.-.-. 85 Dennis v. United States, 341 U. 8. 494__-----_- 53, 64, 70, 83, 86 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1__-------------- 82 Dovemy +. Raenses, Tet GU. B: BOC 6 on on nnn coven sewnccues 85 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Com- MOR Be Ar eS Re owes beh ees saw neem awed oune~ 77 Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450____-_----- 81, 84 For v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273_._....------- LES pesmi 87 Gorin v. Untied States, 313 U.S. 19. .........-...-.6.-.-- 53 Jordan v. De George, 341 U. 8. 228. .......-.--.----- 18, 53, 86 Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 233 U. S. 325-- 84 ag 9. Uiaieee Gey PE © Oe Bison cee cece cwenecntyes 77 et 7 ee ts Fk vo oni oricens tees weveens 52 Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445_-_----------- 83 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288_---------- 70 Dea +, Br, FEU, BB Gs vw cence ewe coded ewcsn 53 Nash v. United States, 220 U. 8. $73...........--..---- 53 National Association of Manufacturers v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510, vacated on grounds of mootness, 344 U. 8S. SUB a ae ee oe eee 13, 24, 54, 77, 81, 83 National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric & ee Oe i ee Oe Gn oo os was cenee eee ede eo 70 New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63-- - - - 75 Naa 6. Beer, VE. OO eee cn cw se ncecersewecsesnns 80 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. 8. 186-- 71 Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U. S. 183_------- 52 BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY Ii Cases—Continued Page Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. “ aera ee cae praia fa seta mie” Se Parker v. Los Angeles County, 338 U.S. 327_.__.______- 82 People ex rel. Alpha Portland fieied Co. v. Knapp, 230 ee Fe fo an ee Pi ee aed eA ee 84 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270______- See ee 84 Price v. Johapten, 334.0. B. 966.......-.. <2... cece. 80 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549__________ 22, 81 Robinson v. United States, 324 U. S. 282...__.__________. 83, 86 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91_________- BR ieee ee 53 epeeles St. TRAE, GEO TB OBTE. oni ccc n ecco en 53 St. Louis, Iron Mountuin & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wynne, Pe WE sericea Roce tiene oe dere 84 Stroud v. Swope, 187 F. 2d 850, certiorari denied, 342 U.S FN barn aie a Eat pela el aeniet oe a Di tie bate Sree EE 80 ement ¥. Fanta, Gee UB: OOO... oo lke. 82 Thernhill v. Alabama, 310 me ME cat ake Soe ee YG Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. Se, EEE Sie toe en wnt 82 Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U. § S. 462. : 82 United Public Workers v. inp 330 U. 8.75. 22, 53, 70, 81, 82, 86 United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264____- SAE ee Le 52 United Stutes v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 ie i: ee Sk ner ieee REISE Gee 6 eS CE 49 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S, 304_____- 64 United States v. Hayman, 342 U. _ oo SRS ae tees ena 82 United States v. Petrillo, 382 U. $8. 1. ....-.-..-._-.-.- 18, a“ 45, 47, 49, 52, 82, 83, 86,87 United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513____- Sf eer Spe Ge 8 52, 53 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41___. 16, 24, 28, 50, 66, 82, 85 United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 1€% -......--___- 22, 64, 83 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 3896.________. : 18, 22, 50-51, 53, 56, 78, 83, 86 Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236.....___-_________. 72 Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown, 2 Gray (Mass. 1854) 84__ 85 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Teras (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86_____. 52 if ae eS a ee 77 Williams vy. United States, ag’ MeCN ace tects coe 53, 86 Winters v. New York, 333 U. 8. 507. ...--.........- Ree 87 Constitution and Statutes: Constitution, First Amendment 64 Fe@eral Corrupt Prac- SRE AOE, he MN sg ww nn on wn nk oak wks cwussavce 37 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 812, 839, 2.0. 8: ©. 361-370. .... Se pee sae ae aaa Vie ae 3, 66 PSUR cre amnsa axcware veces cleen eer heonweenene 89 Sa sc ase Beds neickee sae ee ee 58, 89 sities ree digo nn Gi a Ge a ge eee ao eck 90 RE tennwns was nne Gane noes oien meet Sere be Mueien 90 Sec. 305._....... 2, 18, 15, 17, 19, 22, 26, 28, 49, 54, 59, 60, 90 OR an wha die koae co uu pho ow eed Suter e use 92 — ELIE | a SERREL Reka IN gt NN OR TDR TPR HO Meee rer ayr SRLS TER CTRIORE Mp setae sone IV Constitution and Statutes—Continued Page RO SUE wckeso ss ea Sy ea co eee eee 2, 13, 15, 17, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 79, 84, 92 ee _ NAVES GRE RLS on pert 13, 15, 19, 22, 23, 26, 37, 59, 60, 79 UR IRS oon a cata e de neeees uae 2, 93 EE ly RE eter ey ete ay Ee eho Sg < Wd 94 acuta oan ns un ay ra wane acai Wey ora 94 IE io oo odin oe neee obese aeaeawsese 2, 75, 76, 94 See: 310 Go. - cnn 2, 13, 21, 59, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 95 | SRR ee Beare een once Meese lee 95 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812_____ 29, 66 i SO on donc nec exte codes saxsnwie cs ancet 21, 76, 95 26. Bo Se ey es OE ak a oe coca cw Snacavavecune 80 Miscellaneous: Comment (1947) 56 Yale L. J. 304, 313-316____-__.__--- 68 TO TOE, Tate, Be nice sciceceewnnceeneunese seus 37 iy OO SS os, cee beac se soe aeaueneeoccone 41, 42 ee CE CI Gidea oie adword ahekmwemern seb aene 40 Oe ee i, ison ok owes ccsecnesteesunes 40 80 Cong. Rec. 9430-9434, 9743-9753 _ _...--.-.------.-- 40 OS Oe ee, re IR ase cam ari dentesnnccciiweeus 41 OE ae. ee, a dn hie eee cud n sw acunsue 33 Be I este were ncaa di inn acann vane 34 OF AE See SUE ca a aas caus ses bone aenens xmawas see 35 99 Cong. Ree.: OO H. (dally ed., dam. B, 3000)... 225-26 secs cuus 65 2881 ff. (daily ed., April 7, 1953) -_.-------- retpteatate 65 6784 ff. (daily ed., June 15, 1953) ...-.----.-------- 65 Futor, An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act (1949), 10 Oe E.On con scuba ccucunensxeeenwontunaueneee 36, 57 MG EEE Cannas ceeesiow ak ce wend oeciubasas« 36 SH a oracles cansicm ne onawd ae wid Sohn ene 41 Committee Print of H. Rep. on Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 32-33_......---- 31 Hearings, House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, Sint Cots., Wd ee, Whe 3 De WOR ec wick owen dunce 67 Hearings before the Special Senate Committee To Investi- gate Lobbying Activities, 74th Cong., Ist and 2d sessions, and 75th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1014-1015_______- 38 H. Concurrent Res. 18, 79th Cong., Ist sess., 59 Stat. 839_ 30 Be Wes RU so os a wee ew wen sus eason 37, 40, 60 De. Wi Ss FE NR os so ewe een ee Geo icanuecun 40, 60 H. Rep. 2)81, 74th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 2-4... - - ----...--- 38 H. Rep. 1675, 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 26_.-...----------- 30 H. Rep. 3239, 81st Cong., 2d sess.: Poe ecdcc cud ncn aussena ten Resbuke Semen Geeeowee 43 MOR Ss cinieas cock d dee men cawar enw pn cnankd aes ees 43 ee Renn ae pine ee oe Rees 41 Lane, Some Lessons From Past Congressional Investigations of Lobbying, 14 Pub. Opin. Quar. 14................-- 66 BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY Miscellaneous—Continued Note, (1947) 47 Col. L. Rev. 98, 99-103________________- Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection Against Governmental Intrusions in Political Affairs, (1948) 47 Mich. L. Rev. 181, 204-206_______________- Outline of Instructions for Filing Reports by Clerk of the House, Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (1951) -_-_- Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (To Secure These Rights, 1947), pp. 52-53, 164 ey we ee ote cw ecawikewens S. Rep. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 26...-__--___---_-- S. Rep. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 27__.-._..__.__--- S. Res. 165 and 184, 74th Cong., Ist sess____________---- Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76 BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY Ynthe Supreme Court of the Wnited States OcToBER TERM, 1953 Unrrep States oF AMERICA, APPELLANT v. Rosert M. Harriss, RaLPH W. Moore, Tom LINDER, AND NATIONAL Farm COMMITTEE ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OPINION BELOW The opinion of the District Court dismissing the information (R. 39-40) is reported at 109 F. Supp. 641. JURISDICTION The order of the District Court was entered on January 30, 1953 (R. 40). Notice of appeal was filed by the United States on February 27, 1953 (R. 41), and probable jurisdiction was noted by this Court on May 4, 1953 (R. 43). The juris- diction of this Court to review on direct appeal a judgment dismissing an information based on (1) as “ 2 HORDES ARTUR UR Ae ORR CUNIAL ERS TIN i 2 the unconstitutionality of the statute on which the information is founded is conferred by 18 U.S. C. 3731. See also Rules 37 (a) (2) and 45 (a), F. R. Crim. P. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Section 305 (a) of the Federal Regulation of | Lobbying Act requires that certain records be kept and reports filed by persons receiving contribu- tions or expending money for the purposes des- ignated in Section 307, 2. e., to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of federal legislation. Section 308 (a) requires any person ) who engages himself for pay for the purpose of | attempting to influence the passage or defeat of legislation to register b ‘ore doing anything in furtherance of such object. Section 310 (a) makes violation of any of these disclosure require- | ments a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or im- | prisonment, and Section 310 (b) prohibits, for a | period of three years, any person convicted of | such a misdemeanor ‘‘from attempting to influ- | ence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any proposed legislation or from appearing | before a committee of the Congress in support of or opposition to proposed legislation.”’ The present information charges violations of Sections 305 and 308 by persons who expended or collected money, or engaged themselves for pay, for the purpose of communicating directly to Congress on federal legislation or of causing others so to communicate. BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY —— : 3 The questions presented are: 1. Whether the purposes specified in Section 307 are so vague and indefinite as to render Sec- tion 305 (a) invalid as applied to this information. 2. Whether Section 308 is unconstitutionally in- definite as applied to this information. 3. Whether Sections 305, 307, and 308 violate the First Amendment, as applied to this infor- mation. 4. Assuming that the penalty in Section 310 (b) is unconstitutional, whether the unconstitution- ality of that provision serves to invalidate See- tions 305 and 308, despite the inclusion in the Act of a separability clause. STATUTE INVOLVED The full text of the Federal Regulation of Lob- bying Act, 60 Stat. 812, 839, 2 U. 8. C. 261-270, is set forth in the Appendix, enfra, pp. 89-95. STATEMENT A. THE INFORMATION An information in ten counts charging viola- tions of Sections 305 and 308 of the Federal Reg- ulation of Lobbying Act was filed against the de- fendants in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on August 31, 1949 (R. 1-23). 1. Section 308 counts.—Counts I, VIII, and 1X against defendants Moore, McDonald,’ and Lin- 1The death of McDonald was suggested of record in the District Court on January 30, 1953, and the case was dis- missed as to him (R. 38). —_ SREP RIE EEG fig FOI BERNAL 9S AE. 8 TT CER NR INANE PCED RETR ARN Ta : F f PRY, Bee he ee Ti tan oe Fike as ia oe der, respectively, were laid under Section 308 of the Act (infra, pp. 93-94), and charged each defend- ant with having been a person who engaged him- self for pay for the purpose of attempting to in- fluence the passage of legislation relating to the price of farm commodities, without having regis- tered as required by that section of the statute. a. Moore was charged in count I (R. 1-6) with having engaged himself for pay and other con- siderations, on behalf of the defendant Harriss, for the purpose of attempting to influence, directly and indirectly, (a) the passage of legis- lation by Congress which would cause a rise in the price of agricultural commodities and com- modity futures and (b) the defeat of legislation by Congress which would cause a decline of such prices. It was charged that, in pursuance of this engagement, he did the following things (R. 4-6): (a) Procured the Association, Southern Commissioners of Agriculture, and the Farm Commissioners Council to attempt to influence legislation by Congress relating to (1) parity on farm prices, (2) repeal of the oleomargarine tax, and (3) the President’s program for legislation pro- viding for an increase in commodity trad- ing margins. (b) Procured one McCloskey to urge the passage of legislation by writing state- ments which were presented to committees of Congress and to members of Congress, urging the passage of the Case Bill and 4 Se ae ee a a OE TO” S RAREST PO CRIES IN LE IIL RE GEENA IM LMI EIT. I CARMI TH BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY - Oo other bills which would enhance the prices of farm commodities. (c) Paid the cost of a dinner at the Raleigh Hotel in Washington, D. C., in the name of the North Central States Association of Commissioners, Secretaries and Directors of Agriculture, at which dinner a large number of members of Con- gress were present, and at which speeches and statements were made concerning legislation by Congress. (d) Paid the cost of a dinner at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., in the name of Farm Commissioners Council, at which dinner a large number of mem- bers of Congress were present, and at which speeches and statements were made concerning legislation by Congress relating to farm commodities. (e) Procured one Clair, for pay, to write up material for the Association, Southern Commissioners of Agriculture, to be presented to the Congress of the United States and its committees relative to legis- lative matters affecting the price of farm commodities. (f) Procured one McCloskey to write letters to Grange officers in the Pacific northwest, urging them to write and wire their Congressmen to put peas in the pro- gram for foodstuffs to be sent to Europe under the European recovery program. (g) Procured one Wilken to appear before committees of Congress to urge 6 legislative action regarding farm com- modities which defendants desired; and, specifically, procured him to testify before the House Agriculture Committee to urge the defeat of legislation which would tend | to cause lower prices of agricultural com- modities, and, also, to testify before the House Ways and Means Committee con- cerning proposed legislation respecting the reciprocal trade agreements program to urge the defeat of any legislation which would tend to cause lower prices of farm commodities. b. Similarly, Linder, who was alleged to have been Commissioner of Agriculture for the State of Georgia (R. 1), was charged in count IX (R. 19-21) with having, outside of and apart from his official capacity, engaged himself for pay and for other consideration on behalf of defendants Moore and Harriss, for the purpose of attempt- ing to influence, directly and indirectly, (a) the passage of legislation by the Congress of the United States which would cause a rise in the price of agricultural commodities and commodity futures, and (b) the defeat of legislation which would cause a decline of such prices (R. 20). And it was charged that, in pursuance of this en- gagement, Linder did the following things (R. 20-21) : (a) Testified before Committees of Con- gress, sent letters and telegrams to members of Congress and officials of the executive BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY “ branch of the Government of the United States, issued press releases which were distributed by the Association, the South- ern Commissioners of Agriculture, and the Farm Commissioners Council, to members of the Congress of the United States, and made speeches at various functions of these two organizations, (b) Together with the defendant, James W. McDonald and others, organized the Farm Commissioners Council, for the pur- pose of utilizing it in influencing and at- tempting to influence legislation by the Congress relative to farm commodities. (c) Made a statement before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, using material prepared by one Clair,’ opposing proposed legislation which would reduce the prices of farm commodities. (d) Delivered a speech at a dinner al- leged to have been sponsored by the Asso- ciation, Southern Commissioners of Agri- culture, staged at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., at which about 200 members of Congress were present; and in that speech urged Congress to enact legis- lation ending the Office of Price Admin- istration controls of prices.’ C. Count LX, against the deceased defendant, McDonald, was substantially the same as that 7 2 See allegation (e) of Count I, with respect to defendant Moore (supra, p. 5). Cf. R. 5 with R. 21. 8 See allegation (d) of Count I, with respect to defendant Moore (supra, p. 5). Cf. R. 5 with R. 21. BA? STN PG TY IY TTBS 88 LILA EER BE CHET RBS OY mca 8 against Linder, except that the specific events and statements were different (R. 17-19). 2. Section 305 counts.—The remaining counts— II, III, IV, and V, against the defendant Moore; VI and VII, against the defendant Harriss; and X, against the defendant National Farin Commit- tee—were all laid under Section 305 of the Lobby- ing Act (infra, pp. 91-92). The counts against Moore and Harriss charged them with having made various expenditures for the purpose prin- cipally of influencing, directly or indirectly, legis- lation which would affeet the prices of agricultural commodities, and failing to file the reports re- quired by Section 305. Count X, against the Na- tional Farm Committee, charged that the Com- mittee, whose principal purpose was to influence, directly or indirectly, legislation relating to agri- eultural commodity prices, solicited and received specific sums of money for such purposes, and failed to file the required reports. The detailed allegations with respect to defen- dants Moore and Harriss show that many of the expenditures were in connection with the acts alleged to have been done by Moore, MacDonald, and Linder, in pursuance of their hire agree- ments, but other expenditures of similar purpose were also charged. More specifically, count IT charges that Moore, for the purpose of influencing and attempting to influence the passage of legis- lation affecting the prices of agricultural com- modities and commodity futures, ‘‘ paid money to, BLEED THR OUGH BLURRED COPY ee 9 financed and sponsored activities of’’ the Associa- tion, The Southern Commissioners of Agriculture, the Farm Commissioners Council, and the North Central States Association of Commissioners, each of which was an unincorporated association which had ‘tas its principal purpose the influencing, directly and indirectly, of legislation by the Con- gress of the United States affecting agriculture”’ (R. 7). Count IT also charges the procurement, for hire, of the services of the defendants Linder and Moore, who were state agricultural officers, as well as officers in one or more of these associations ; and, further, the payments of sums to Wilken and McCloskey as set out earlier in count I (R. 5-7).* Count V, also against Moore, charges the fol- lowing expenditures (R. 11-13): (a) On or about November 7, 1947, to one C. C. Hanson, at Washington, D. C., in the sum and amount of $46.21 for the services of said Hanson in mimeographing 25 copies of a document sent to R. M. Harriss, New York, at the request of the defendant James E. McDonald. (b) On or about November 20, 1947, to one C, C. Hanson, at Washington, D. C., in the sum and amount of $63.05 for the serv- ices of said Hanson in preparing and send- ing out a press release on behalf of the Association, Southern Commissioners and Directors of Agriculture, in which a hear- ing was requested before the Senate Com- 4 Nu pra, pp. 5-6. —_— SEELEY SERE MELON SHEL OIE RNIB ea rei Te eet 3 eh FF mittee on Agriculture on the proposed legislation which the President mentioned in his State message on January 17, 1947. (ec) On or about November 20, 1947, to one C. C. Hanson * * * in the sum of $33.92 for the services of said Hanson, in preparing and sending out a press release, 50 copies of which the said Hanson de- livered at the National Press Club. (d) On or about December 4, 1947, to the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., the sum and amount of $1,589.98 which amount was credited to the defendant Moore’s ae- count at said hotel against a charge therein entered for 293 dinners on November 24, 1947.° (e) On or about December 31, 1947, to the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., the sum and amount of $4,356.01 which amount was eredited to the defendant Moore’s account at said hotel against the balance of the charge for 293 dinners on November 24, 1947, and other items.’ (f) On or about December 15, 1947, and again on or about December 19, 1947, to one C. C. Hanson, the sums and amounts, respec- tively of $500 and $459.36, in payment of an expense account of the said Hanson. (g) On or about December 18, 1947, to one C. C. Hanson, * * * the sum and amount of $77.73 for the services of said Hanson in preparing a document to Presi- dent Wilson of the Association of Southern Commissioners and Directors of Agri- culture. 10 *>Compare items (c) and (d) in count I, supra, p. 5. BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY 11 (h) On or about December 18, 1947, to one C. C. Hanson, * * * the sum and amount of $52.76 for the services of said Hanson in preparing and sending out a Farm Commissioners press release stating that nearly 200 members of Congress had accepted invitations to the dinner sponsored by the Farm Commissioners Council. (i) On or about December 18, 1947, to one ©. C, Hanson, * * * the sum and amount of $205.61 for the services of said Hanson on press releases in one of which the defendant James E. McDonald stated that he found the President’s proposal unsound. (j) On or about December 18, 1947, to one C. C. Hanson, * * * the sum and amount of $94.00 for the services of said Hanson in respect to a news item in the Washington Post, 531 copies of which were sent to members of Congress. (k) On or about December 18, 1947, to ene C. C. Hanson, * * * the sum and amourit of $197.34 for the services of said Hanson in preparing 1600 copies of a state- ment made by the defendant Tom Linder before the Senate Committee on Agricul- ture. (1) On or about December 18, 1947, to one ©. C. Hanson, * * * the sum and amount of $100 to compensate one Dr. Clair, for work on a press release. (m) On or about June 1947, to one C. H. Wilken, Washington, D. C., the sum and amount of $1,000. 273108 —53--—-2 on | (n) During said quarter the defendant loaned to one C. H. Wilken, the sum and amount of $5,750 The other Section 305 counts against Moore and Harriss* do not materially differ, except that they relate to different reporting quarters under the Lobbying Act, and except that Harriss is charged with having funnelled some of his expenditures through Moore (see especialiy R. 16-17). The Section 305 count against the Farm Com- mittee (count X) is different in that it relies on the language of Section 305 predicating liability on the solicitation, collection, or receipt of funds, 12 rather than on the expenditure of funds as is the ease in the Moore and Harriss counts. Thus, count X charges that the National Farm Com- mittee, whose principal purpose was to influence the passage or defeat of legislation affecting the price of agricultural commodities and commodity futures, during ‘he third quarter of 1946 solicited, collected and received contributions for carrying out its purposes, and, specifically, solicited, col- lected, and received the sum of $1,000 from de- fendant Harriss, all without having at any time complied with the reporting requirements of See- tion 305 of the Act (R. 22-23). B. THE HOLDING OF THE DISTRICT COURT All of the defendants pleaded not guilty to all counts (R. 42), and moved to dismiss the infor- * J. e., counts IT, ITI, IV, VI, and VII. BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY 13 mation, contending, inter alia, that the lobbying statute was unconstitutionally vague and indefi- nite, and an unconstitutional infringement of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment (R. 23-38). The District Court granted their motion, adopt- ing for this case the opinion of a three-judge court of the same district in National Association of Manufacturers Vv. MeGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510, vacated on grounds of mootness, 344 U. S. 804. In that opinion, the District Court had heid that the language of Section 307 (infra, pp. 92-93), making the disclosure requirements applicable to any person whose “‘principal purpose’? was “to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation,’’ is so vague and indefinite as to be in violation of the Fifth Amendment; that the same defect vitiates See- tion 305 (infra, pp. 91-92), which ineorporates the critical language of Section 307; that the pro- hibition against lobbying in Section 310 (b) (infra, p. 95), imposed as a penalty for viola- tion of the Act, is repugnant to the constitu- tional guaranty of freedom of speech and of petition; and that this infirmity of the penal provision makes unconstitutional Sections 303 through 307 of the Act. The decision in the N. A. M. case had not passed upon the validity of Section 308 (infra, pp. 93-94). Astothat Section, the Distriet Court in St enn eameee | 14 the present case held that the invalidity of the 310 (b) penal provision, which also applies to violations of Section 308, invalidates Section 308, in spite of the separability clause in the statute (R. 39-40). Thus, all counts of the information, which was based on Sections 305 and 308, were held bad. SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE URGED the Distriet Court erred: 1. In dismissing each count of the informa- tion. 2. In holding that Section 305 (a) of the Fed- eral Regulation of Lobbying Act is uneconstitu- tionally vague and indefinite because, by ineor- porating Section 307 of the Act, it applies to any person who receives contributions or expends money for the purpose of influencing ‘‘directly or indirectly’? the passage or defeat of federal! legislation. 3. In holding that the penalty imposed by Sec- tion 310 (b) of the Aet, prohibiting convicted violators from lobbying for a three-year period, is unconstitutional as in contravention of the First Amendment. 4. In holding that the invalidity of Section 310 (b) in itself serves to invalidate Sections 305 and 308 of the Act, despite the inclusion in the Act of a separability clause. BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY —“T 1h SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Three counts of this information come under Section 308 of the Federal Regulation of Lobby- ing Act, which requires registration by any per- son ‘‘who shall engage himself for pay or for any consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation” by Congress; the remaining seven counts are laid under Section 305, which demands quarterly re- ports from persons ‘receiving any contributions or expending any money for the purposes desig- nated in subparagraph (a) or (b) of section 307," 4. ¢., (a) the “passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress * * *,"’ or (b) ‘‘to influence, directly or indireetly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress * * *.”" Somewhat different constitutional problems are raised by Section 308, on the one hand, and See- tions 305 and 307, on the other. In addition, the validity of each of these provisions cannot be appraised im vacuo, but as it applies in this case to the particular charges made against these de- fendants. No other case is here. I Sections 305 and 307 of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 are not uneonstitution- ally vague and indefinite, as applied to the seven counts of the information laid under those sec- tions. 16 | A. It is clear, from the language and legislative history of the sections, that they were designed to apply, at the least, to those who pay others to state views to Congress, whether formally in com- mittee sessions or informally in speeches, ietters, or telegrams, so long as the statements are di- rected at Congress or Congressmen. It is also clear that the sections were intended to apply to those who spend money in course of inducing others, for nonfinancial considerations, direetly to communicate with Congress—in short, to those who sponsor campaigns asking persons to write or contact their Congressmen with respect to the merits of particular legislation. These activities are the core of the traditional understanding of “‘lobbying”’ (see United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47), and were undoubtedly intended to be covered by a statute called the ‘* Federal Regu- lation of Lobbying Act.”’ Both the history of the 1946 Act itself, and that of the 1936 progenitors on which it was modeiled, show that, whatever else Congress may have had in mind,’ it certainly de- sired to reach those who seek or sponsor direct communication with Congress and Congressmen. B. Examination of the seven Seetion 305 counts of this information shows that the great bulk, if not all, of the charges against the defendants are either specifically of this nature, or provable by *For example, attempts to “saturate the thinking of the community” or organized efforts to influence mass public opinion on federal matters. Cf. United Ntates v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,47. BLURRED COPY —_ 17 facts of this nature. Each count involves charges of failing to report (1) payment to others to com- municate directly with Congressmen on pending or proposed legislation, or (2) expenditures or receipt of money in an attempt to induce others to communicate with Congress, usually by letter, on pending or proposed legislation. The gist of these counts is the defendants’ undisclosed efforts to have Congressmen contacted on behalf of their views, either directly by the defendants’ emis- saries or through a stimulated letter campaign. Defendants, with private financial interests at heart, were attempting to exert direct influence on Congressmen in the guise of official representa- tives of the farmers of Georgia and Texas and genuine proponents of the public weal. C. Applied to these facts, there is no constitu- tional vagueness in Sections 305 and 307. The covered activities are simple, specific, and definite. The statutory language, 7. ¢., “to influence, di- rectly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation,”’ clearly comprehends actions of this type, and, since they are so close to ‘‘lobbying”’ in its most commonly accepted sense, defendants re- ceived more than sufficient warning that they were subject to the Regulation of Lobbying Act. The added requirement that defendants be proved to have had a specific purpose to secure a direct con- tact with Congress also increases their protection. As applied to this case, Sections 305 and 307 are at least as definite as many other laws which this 18 Court has upheld. E. g., United Siates vy. Wurz- bach, 280 U.S. 396, 399; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. 8.1; Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223; Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337. D. The District Court also apparently thought the statute invalid because coverage was based, in part, on whether solicitations were made, or money received, by persons whose ‘principal purposes” were the purposes designated in Section 307. But the statute itself shows that this ‘“‘principal pur- ? requirement is not significant in the pres- pose’ ent case because coverage may clearly be predi- cated either on (i) expenditures for the designated purposes, (ii) the solicitation or receipt of specific contributions principally for the designated pur- poses, or (iil) any solicitation or receipt by a per- son or group organized principally for the desig- nated purposes. And all of the counts under Section 305, except count X (against the National Farm Committee), are based on e.rpenditures, to which the “‘principal purpose’’ qualification does not seem to apply. In any event, there will be no difficulty in determining the purpose of these ex- penditures, as they are alleged in the information, since they are plainly single-purposed, and not multi-purposed expenditures as to which the “‘ prin- cipal purpose”? requirement is important. Simi- larly, in the case of the National Farm Commit- tee (count X), it is alleged that the purpose of the unreported receipt of money was the specific pur- | bene srear ene norma: BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY _— — — _ 19 pose designated by the statute; this is alleged to be the sole purpose. II Section 308 of the Act is not unconstitutionally indefinite as applied to the two remaining counts laid under that section.” Like Sections 305 and 307, Section 308 governs at least those who are hired to express views to Congress or to cause others to do so, and Moore and Linder are charged with failing to register although they were hired for these specific purposes.’ III As applied in this information, Sections 305, 307, 308—requiring disclosure by those who pay others to express views to Congressmen on their behalf, or conduct letter-writing campaigns, or hire themseives to affect legislation by these methods—do not violate the First Amendment.” Whatever restraint this requirement may im- pose on communication is indirect, incomplete, peripheral, and private. There is no legal or governmental sanction on the expression of ideas; if sanction there be, it is fear that the reporter or registrant will be subject to private pressures. *The count against McDonald has abated because of his death (R. 40). ® The District Court did not hold Section 308 too vague, or that the Act violated the First Amendment, although defend- ants made those contentions. * See footnote 9, supra. 20 This may, indeed, be an actual restraint, but it is not an abridgment of First Amendment rights. Self-censorship or self-restraint in expression of ideas—stemming from but going beyond a legal requirement (¢. g., the slander and libel laws)—is a common result of timidity, caution, care, or the desire to avoid controversy or litigation, but this type of voluntary, tangential restraint has never been thought within the First Amendment, even where it flows from fear of a statutory penalty or other legal sanction. A fortiori, there is no abridgment here where the feared sanction is con- cededly not legal at all, but social or economic pressure consequent upon disclosure of true facts. At least where disclosure serves a legitimate pur- pose, it cannot invade First Amendment rights. On the other hand, the interest in favor of which this peripheral ‘‘restraint’’ is imposed is fundamental to the very processes of democratic society. For forty years, Congress has been con- cerned with the relationship between (a) fact- finding and opinion-finding, as bearing on the legislative process, and (b) the individuals, groups, and organizations which seek to influence Congressional action. Congress” own studies, and those of other responsible students, have indicated that there is at least reasonable basis for the be- lief that Congress’ functioning has been impaired by tack of knowledge of the character, sponsor- ship, and activities of those who seek to influence it. Disclesure, it is thought, will aid the reaching BLURRED COPY y+ | of wiser judgments on federal legislation by help- ing Congress and the electorate to evaluate the facts and arguments pressed on Congress and to appraise the true scope of the blocs of opinion said to support or oppose a particular bill or project. The aim ef the Lobbying Act, which has not been to silence or prohibit ideas but to under- ' stand their sponsorship, is consonant with, rather than contrary to, the First Amendment. IV The information should not have been dismissed on the basis of the alleged invalidity of the penal provision of Section 310 (b). Even if Section 310 (b) were invalid, the remainder of the Act is plainly separable. Section 310 (a) imposes a penalty of fine and/or imprisonment, which is clearly separable from the penal provision of Section 310 (b), both as a matter of obvious Con- gressional intention and because the Act has an explicit separability clause (60 Stat. 812, 814, infra, p. 95). There is no reason to hinge valid substantive provisions on the ‘‘additional’’ and minor penalty in Section 310 (b). Moreover, the penalty is valid as properly construed. Vv The validity of the Lobbying Act as applied to other situations is not before the Court and should not be determined. This Court does not reach out 22 to decide hypothetical constitutional controversies unsupported by a proper record. E. g., United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568 ff. Nor do the defendants have standing to raise the alleged rights of others. E. g., United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, 399. And where the statute applies to the case before the Court, borderline situations of greater difficulty are put aside until they arise. Since the Lobby- ing Act is severable as to both provisions and eir- cumstances, there is no occasion to breach these accepted principles of constitutional adjudication, which have been expressly held to apply under the Criminal Appeals Act. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. 8. 1, 5, 10-12; United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169, 172. ARGUMENT Three of the ten counts of the information (against Moore, Linder, and the deceased defend- ant, McDonald) are laid under Section 308 of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, and the other seven (against Moore, Harriss, and the Na- tional Farm Committee) come under Section 305. The former requires ‘‘any person who shall en- gage himself for pay or for any consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation’? by Congress to register with the Congress ‘‘before doing anything in furtherance of such object.’’ Section 305 de- BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY 23 mands a quarterly written report from ‘‘every person receiving any contributions or expending any money for the purposes designated in sub- paragraph (a) or (b) of section 307.’’" The District Court invalidated Section 305 on two grounds, first, that Section 307, which was incor- porated, is too vague and indefinite, and, second, that the penalty provision of Section 310 (b), pro- hibiting convicted violators from lobbying for a three-year period, is unconstitutional and insep- arable from the rest of the Act. Section 308 was invalidated solely on the latter basis. The con- stitutional problems posed in this Court by the two sections are, therefore, not fully coextensive— aside from the fact that the provisions differ in wording and reach. The constitutional issues befere the Court also come here embedded in the context of this par- ticular information. These charges concern de- fendants who collected or spent money, or engaged " Section 307 provides that the Lobbying Act shall apply, with stated exceptions, to any person “who by himself, or through any agent or employee or other persons in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which »erson is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the following purposes : (a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States. (b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.” PO te cota tesa cea — 24 themselves for pay, for the specific purpose of making representations, or causing others to make representations, to members of Congress—in com- mittee assembled or at dinners in Washington, through publications designed for direct Congres- sional perusal, or through letters to Congressmen. The pith of the information is that the defend- ants sought, for their undisclosed private gain, to influence Congress to maintain high prices for farm products by deliberately purchasing repre- sentations which would appear to Congress to be made on behalf of the general public or of the country’s farmers. Purporting to speak to Con- gress on behalf of the farmers of Georgia and Texas, the Commissioners of Agriculture of those States (Linder and McDonald) actually repre- sented, for pay, the defendants’ personal finan- cial interest; the same is charged of the repre- sentations made or procured on defendants’ behalf by various agricultural organizations and other persons. The vagueness which the District Court found in the statute relates, not to its application to these averments of paid direct representations to Con- gress on behalf of undisclosed interests, but to its possible impact on activities more remote from such direct (but camouflaged) communication. Cf. Na- tional Association of Manufacturers v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D. D. C.), vacated on the ground of mootness, 344 U. 8.804; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S, 41. But whether or not the Lobbying Act BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY _——_— Renn would be valid as applied to all organized efforts to influence mass public opinion on federal matters, it was error for the court below to dismiss this information in view of the clearly operable area for the statute in the circumstances presented here—the area of direct communication with Con- gress. The thrust of this brief is, therefore, di- rected to the validity of the Act as it relates to the specific situation alleged in this information. It is in the light of this situation that we discuss Sections 305 and 307, then Section 308, and finally Section 310 (b). I. SECTIONS 305 AND 307 OF THE FEDERAL REGULA- TION OF LOBBYING ACT ARE NOT UNCONSTITU- TIONALLY INDEFINITE AS APPLIED TO THE COUNTS OF THE INFORMATION LAID UNDER THOSE PROVI- SIONS A. SECTIONS 305 AND 307 PLAINLY APPLY TO THOSE WHO EXPEND MONEY FITHER (A) TO PAY OTHERS TO COMMUNICATE TO CON- GRESS OR (B) IN THE COURSE OF DIRECTLY INDUCING OTHERS TO COMMUNICATE TO CONGRESS Congress enacted the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act because it had found, over a long period of time, that its ability to determine the public will, with respect to particular legislative issues, was distorted by the fact that what ap- peared to be legitimate expressions of the views of individuals or groups, with various apparent interests, turned out on closer inspection to be views that those expressing them were hired, pressured, or seduced to take. Congress did not believe that it could effectively perform its legis- ~ . lative function without being able to determine, with as little distortion as possible, what were | the true components of the public will and what | was the source of the facts and information | brought to its attention. Two basie techniques were adopted to accom- | plish these purposes. One was to require those who were hired to communicate to Congress to | state by what authority and at whose financial in- stance they acted. That is the gist of Section 308 of the Act, which we discuss below (infra, pp. 58 ff.). But beeause the history of the problem showed that identification of the paid lobbyist solved only part of the difficulty, Congress also devised a mechanism for disclosure by the direct lobbyist’s financial supporters of their efforts to affect legislative operations. Sections 305 and 307 fulfill that function. In this Point, we show that those sections are clearly designed, at the very least, to require dis- closure by those who collect or spend money for the specific purpose of causing other people to communicate directly with members of Congress. That is the express charge levied against Moore, Harriss, and the Farm Committee, under Sece- tions 305 and 307. 26 1. The language of the Act Section 305 of the Act provides that: Every person receiving any contribu- tions or expending any money for the pur- BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY en So ity Mae a" SENG HE Ait NRE BU ME tes tl OGL 27 poses designated in subparagrapk (a) or (b) of section 307 shall file * * * a state- net * * *. Section 307 provides that: The provisions of this title shall apply to any person * * * who by himself, or through any agent or employee or other persons in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the following purposes: (a) The passage or defeat of any legis- lation by the Congress of the United States. (b) To infiuence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States. It is clear that on its face this language com- prehends, and must have been intended to com- prehend, those who pay others to state their views to Congress or Congressmen with respect to par- ticular legislative matters ; it also covers those who spend money in the course of inducing others to contact Congressmen with respect to legislative matters. Obviously, such conduct may aid in the accom- plishment of the passage or defeat of legislation by the Congress; or, if more remote from a spe- cific vote on legislation, such conduct may influ- 273108--53——_3 —_ ence its passage or defeat. The Congressional testimony, for example, of the defendant Linder, an agricultural official of the State of Georgia, that certain legislation would adversely affect agricultural income in Georgia, might well ‘‘in- fluence’ a legislator in the sense that it might cause him to shift his view or his vote for or against the legislation. The same is true of speeches or talks to Congressmen at dinners or in their offices, as well as of written communica- tions mailed or delivered to them. Nothing would seem to be clearer than that a statute called the ‘Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act’’ (infra, p. 89) would cover at least those activities which this Court, at its last term, called the ‘‘commonly ac- cepted sense’’ of ‘‘lobbying,”’ 7. e., representations made directly to the Congress, its members, or its committees. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 47. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Section 307 must have that scope as a minimum, and Sec- tion 305 must deal with those who expend or con- tribute money for such activities. Not all efforts will, however, be quite so imme- diate. An avalanche of letters directed at a Con- gressman in favor of or against a particular piece of legislation may cause him to draw some conclusion about community feeling with re- 28 spect to a legislative issue, and this conclusion will ‘ affect (¢. e., ‘‘influence’’) his vote, or his speech on the floor, or conferences with colleagues, and thereby the passage or defeat of legislation. In - Op PH Sy Hoe, aver i z r i BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY a _ 29 such a case, the effort of the opinion-influencers to mold Congressional opinion through the me- dium of requests to people to write letters is one step removed from direct contact, but it is at least an ‘‘indirect’’ attempt to influence legisla- tion, which Section 307 (b) also covers. The making of representations to Congress, which is the traditional core of lobbying, is both sought and intended by those who urge the sending of letters, and the letters constitute the representa- tions they desire. The purpose of such people is clearly to ‘‘influence”’ ‘‘the passage or defeat”’ of legislation through direct communication with the legislators. 2. Legislative history a. The 1946 Act.—Congressional explanation of the Lobbying Act at the time of its passage in 1946 was fairly sketchy. Nonetheless, that his- ~ tory shows that conduct like that charged against the defendants, conduct which is calculated to cause a direct and almost immediate impact on Congress, was within the purpose of the Act. The Lobbying Act was enacted as part of the much broader Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. That broader Act was reported to Congress by the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress which had been authorized by concurrent resolution to “‘make a full and complete study of the organization and operation of the Congress of the United States and * * * recommend improve- Me ments in such organization and operation with a view toward strengthening the Congress, simpli- fying its operations, improving its relationships with other branches of the United States Govern- ment, and enabling it better to meet its responsi- bilities under the Constitution.’’ H. Con. Res, 18, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., 59 Stat. 839. After hearings, the Joint Committee issued identical House and Senate Reports (H. Rep. 1675, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.) in which it was stated (at p. 26 of both reports) that: Your committee heard many complaints during its hearings of the attempts of or- ganized pressure groups to influence the de- cisions of Congress on legislation pending before the two Houses or their committees. We fully recognize the right of any citi- zen to petition the Government for the re- dress of grievances or freely to express opinions to individual Members or to com- mittees on legislation and on current po- litical issues. However, mass means of communication and the art of publie rela- tions have so increased the pressures upon Congress as to distort and confuse the nor- mal expressions of public opinion. A pure and representative expression of public sentiment is welcome and helpful in considering legislation, but professionally inspired efforts to put pressure upon Con- gress cannot be conducive to well consid- ered legislation. 30 BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY 31 This language shows that Congress intended to deal, at the least, with those efforts which were designed to result, directly and immediately, in people talking or writing to Congress. The right to express opinions to Congress and its committees is unquestioned by the Joint Committee, but it speaks of the problem raised by “mass means of communications and the art of public relations.”’ One who pays another to talk to Congress, or who specifically requests that others talk to Congress, is plainly within this explanation of the problem with which the Committee was to deal. Both the Senate report and the House report (issued only in preliminary form) on the Reor- ganization Act (8S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 27; Committee Print of H. Rep. on Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 32-33) declare that the Regu- lation of Lobbying title applies ‘‘chiefly to three distinct classes of so-called lobbyists”’: First. Those who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda from all over the country, in the form of letters and tele- grams, many of which have been based en- tirely upon misinformation as to facts. This class of persons and organizations will be required under the title, not to cease or curtail their activities in any respect, but merely to disclose the sources of their collee- tions and the methods in which they are disbursed. —? 32 Second. The second class of lobbyists are those who are employed to come to the Capitol under the false impression that they exert some powerful influence over Mem- bers of Congress. These individuals spend their time in Washington presumably exert- ing some mysterious influence with respect to the legislation in which their employers are interested, but carefully conceal from Members of Congress whom they happen to contact the purpose of their presence. The title in no wise prohibits or curtails their activities. It merely requires that they shall register and disclose the sources and purposes of their employment and_ the amount of their compensation. Third. There is a third class of entirely honest and respectable representatives of business, professional, and philanthropic organizations who come to Washington openly and frankiy to express their views | for or against legislation, many of whom serve a useful and perfectly legitimate pur- pose in expressing the views and interpre- tations of their employers with respect to legislation which concerns them. They will likewise be required to register and state their compensation and the sources of their employment. The generally unsatisfactory debate on this measure in the Senate and House shows the same understanding. Senator La Follette, who was Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Organ- ization of Congress, stated at the outset of the IE ESE LR" BL OPE recs wages PS gL E OREM LBL REL ADT Oe OS TEGO © St oP BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY 33 debate in the Senate on this phase of the reorgan- ization bill [92 Cong. Rec. 6367-6368 | : * * * * * Mr. President, in the last analysis the Congress is the center of political gravity under the Constitution, because it reflects and expresses the popular will in the mak- ing of national policy. In recent years in particular, and to a growing extent, the true attitude of public opinion has too often been distorted and obscured by pressures of special-interest groups. Every Senator and Representative has been on the receiving end of this type of public pressure. Organized campaigns of one kind and another are daily reflected in the telegrams, letters, and other com- munications which are received in the of- fice of every Senator and every Repre- sentative. Therefore, your committee has come to the conclusion that the time has arrived when the Congress must take action, not in any way, shape, or manner to contravene or to reduce the right of peti- tion which is guaranteed to the citizens of this Republie by the Constitution, but in order that there may be a public record of the activity of those pressure groups. We have recommended, therefore, and there is contained in this measure, a provision for the registration of persons using their influence upon the Congress. * f * * * a * * * the title applies chiefly to three distinet classes of so-called lobbyists: First. Those who do not visit the Capitol, but initiate propaganda from all over the | country in the form of letters and tele- grams, many of which have been based entirely upon misapprehensions or mis- information as to the faets. I am sure every Senator has had the same experience I have had on occasion of writing to persons who have responded to this type of suggestion, sending them a copy of the proposed legislation, and asking them for their comments. After they have read the measure, it is discovered that the telegram or letter was written perfectly innocently by the citizen or the organiza- tion without proper information as to the true legislative intent of the measure then pending. At this point, Senator White interrupted Senator La Follette to say [92 Cong. Ree. 6368]: Of course, it is everlastingly true that, unless Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives are able to know who is appealing to them, they never are able properly to evaluate what is said to them or what is written to them. It is ab- solutely essential, if we are to give the proper weight to whatever comes to our ears or our desks, that we shall know who are the people and what is the interest of the people who are making their representations to us. 34 LEED THR OUGH BLURRED COPY Raat. puiteideemmemmmaneien et Ce 35 And later still, Senator McClellan, after quoting the language of the Report stating that the Act applied to those lobbyists “who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda from all over the country in the form of letters and _ tele- grams PBR: ** *,” stated [92 Cong. Rec. 6552]: The provision may have a wholesome pur- pose. I do not know whether it can be restricted to that one purpose. One of the purposes is to try to reach those whe spend large sums of money for broadeasting, buy- ing radio time, or sending out literature which usually winds up with the request, “Be sure to write your Congressman or Sen- ator to oppose H. R. »” or to support a certain Senate bill. There is a great deal of such activity. I doubt if there is any Senator who cannot sense the propaganda and pressure type of mail, even before he opens the envelope. It is not difficult. I know the peopie of my State well enough so that when I receive a letter I can usually tell from the opening sentences whether the letter was inspired by the head of some organization, or by some of the propaganda which is continually being sent out over the channels of the air by commentators and others who spend a great deal of their time criticizing the Congress and trying to bring it into disrepute. * * * *** TI believe there should be some regulation of the professional propagan- dists who are always trying to agitate the people and stir them up to write their 36 Senators and Representatives on many sub- jects. These professional propagandists are motivated purely from a selfish or personal standpoint, or because they are paid for their activity. * * * [Emphasis added throughout. ] | There was, in short, ample indication to those who voted in support of the Lobbyine Act in 1946 that the words ‘‘to influence the passage or defeat of legislation’’ were meant, at the least, to apply to the situation where expenditures were made for programs explicitly designed to induce others to contact Congress, and, a fortiori, where people were paid or hired to state the views of others to members of Congress. There is no doubt that the Act was intended to reach at least that kind of lobbying activity. b. The 1936 proposals—The Lobbying Act passed in 1946 had as progenitors some proposed pieces of legislation introduced about ten years earlier in the 74th Congress. See Futor, An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act (1949), 10 Fed. Bar. J. 366, 375 ff. Like the 1946 law, the history of the earlier proposals shows that, although the bills may have had a broader scope, the drafters certainly intended to cover those who, as defendants here, either paid people to com- municate to Congress, or spent money in an ex- press attempt to induce others to talk or write to Congress. BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY a7" we —_ 37 The first draft of the 1936 legislation,* which was introduced in the House as H. R. 11223, was deliberately based on the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070, which required the disclosure of contributions and expenditures of ‘‘any committee, association, or organization which accepts con- tri®utions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the elec- tion of candidates or presidential or vice presi- dential electors * * *’’ [emphasis supplied]. (The constitutionality of this Act had been sus- tained in Burroughs and Cannon v. Un ited States, 290 U. 8. 534.) The proposed lobbying legislation stated as the controlling purposes, in language not materially different from that now used: (a) The enactment or defeat of any legis- lation or appropriation by the Congress of the United States or the repeal or nonre- peal of any existing laws of the United States, or adoption or defeat of any amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (b) To influence directly or indirectly the passage or defeat of any legislation or ap- propriation by the Congress of the United States. 1° S, 2512, passed by the Senate in May 1935 (79 Cong. Rec. 8304-8306), dealt with those who engaged themselves for pay or other consideration to attempt to influence legisla- tion, and was thus a parent of Section 308 of the 1946 Act. See infra, pp. 58 ff. i ee ee aE Oe ee aN Tee CAN PA aOR Wd ARIE EER ORM ACT a ey Maelo ERR KEY 3 4 i 38 This earlier bill, unlike the 1946 legislation, was not the product of a general attempt to overhaul the functioning of Congress. Rather, it resulted primarily from an investigation into activities fi- nanced by public utilities in opposition to the Pub- lic Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Con- sequently, it is fair and proper to read into this and cognate bills a basic purpose to cure the glar- ing aspects of the lobby campaign that provoked the proposals.” While this reveals considerable evidence of a broad purpose to regulate the ex- penditures of enormous amounts of money to sat- urate the publie with a particular point of view, it reveals also a narrower and specifie purpose to regulate those whose efforts were intended to get people to write or talk to Congress. Thus, in the House Committee Report, reporting H. R. 11223 and recommending its enactment, it is stated (H. Rep. No. 2081, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-4): * * * * * * Tn 1935-1936, there was a major investigation of alleged efforts by public utility holding companies to influence leg- islation regulating holding companies. The Black Commit- tee was designated by the Senate to investigate (S. Res. 165 and 184, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.), and it made an intensive study, including the making of representations to Congress. The study showed, for example, that out of a total of 31,580 telegrams sent to Washington from twenty different towns, all but 13 were filed and paid for by utility company agents, almost invariably without consent of the person whose name was used. Hearings before the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Lobbying Activities, 74th Cong., 1st and 2d Sessions, and 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 1014-1015. BLURRED COPY 39 The companies acting in concert sought to bring home to utilities investors and em- ployees, and to the public generally, the purport and consequences of this legisla- tion as the companies saw them. The means used were telegrams, articles, letters, circulars, advertisements, and every form of communication practicable. Coupled with this county-wide dissemination of pub- licity were appeals that whoever agrees with the position of the companies communicate his attitude to his Representative in Con- gress. Field agents everywhere urged such actions. In many instances facilities were afforded and expenses paid for sending such communications. * * * * * Ordinarily, the right of executives of cor- porations to keep their investors informed when in their judgment the value of their securities is imperiled, as well as the right of the investors to protest to their Repre- sentatives in Congress is without question. But this was no ordinary instance. The committee is of the opinion that to unloose upon Congress a highly charged avalanche or propaganda is unwholesome and inimical to the public interest. It seeks to impress upon the membership the sense of a popu- lar uprising, when in fact it is an artificial product. * * * * * * * * This Committee believes that every American citizen and interest that may be 40 affected by proposed legislation has the highest right and privilege to be heard— a right that should be neither denied nor abridged. But on the other hand, the mem- bership of Congress, to whom appeal is made and upon whom it is sought to exert pressure and the public likewise appealed to, and who is asked to exert that pres- sure, have a right to know by whom and in whose interest such appeals are made, by whom these movements are financed, and the manner in which money is expended. * * * Likewise, when legislators are ap- proached upon any question they are en- titled to know by whom, for whom, and under what exact circumstances. * * * [Emphasis added. ] H. R. 11223 was carried over into H. R. 11663, which was twice debated by the House, first in its original ‘‘narrow’’ form and later as broadened by the Senate and the Conference Committee.” On both occasions, there was an authoritative declaration that the bill applied to those who caused letters and similar communications to be sent to Congress. Representative Smith, the “H. R. 11663 was first passed by the House in March 1936. 80 Cong. Rec. 4541. Without significant debate, the Senate substituted its own bill by way of amendment. 80 Cong. Rec. 4969-4970. The Conference Committee proposed the so-called “broad” version of H. R. 11663. This was rejected by the House in June 1936. 80 Cong. Rec. 9430-9454, 9743-9753. BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY ee fee 41 sponsor, said during the first debate (80 Cong. Ree. 4525) : One class [affected by the bill] will be those people who sit at home and raise great funds to flood Congress with false propaganda; people who cause telegrams and letters to be sent to you and to me to try to make it appear to us that there is a great surge of public sentiment for or against a certain measure proposed here. Similarly, Mr. Smith stated on the second occasion (80 Cong. Ree. 9750-9751) : This bill * * * originated with the utility investigation. It was aimed at the utility lobby which was investigated by the Rules Committee, of which I was a member. * * * * * The bill was framed principally to curb the growing evil of organized attempts to influence legislation by the stimulation of false propaganda designed thru avalanches of inspired letters and telegrams to im- press upon Members of the Federal Con- gress that a great surge of public senti- ment exists for or against the passage of proposed legislation. These indications of Congressional purpose in 1936 are especially significant because the terms of the 1946 Act were substantially taken from the earlier bills. See Futor, op. cit. supra, pp. 374- 380; H. Rep. No. 3239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., fie » : » ey TRIAL PR BARE 42 pp. 17-20 (the Buchanan Committee’s Report and Recommendations on the Federal Lobbying Act). B. THE SECTION 305 COUNTS CHARGE THAT THE DEFENDANTS PAID OTHERS TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON THEIR BEHALF TO CONGRESS OR ATTEMPTED TO INDUCE OTHERS TO COMMUNI- CATE WITH CONGRESS We have set out in the Statement the allega- tions of the information in some detail (supra, pp. 4-12) because we think they show that the great bulk, if not all, of the charges against the defendants relate to two general classes of acts: (1) paying others to talk directly to Congress or Congressmen, and (2) attempting to induce others, by non-financial inducements, to com- municate with Congress, usually by letter. In each instance, the representation was made with respect to the merits or demerits of pending legislation affecting the prices of agricultural commodities, but without disclosure of the de- fendants’ private financial interest. Although the form of the statute requires the Section 305 counts to be framed in terms of specific expendi- tures, or receipts, in specific quarters of the year, it is nonetheless true that the basic nature of the defendants’ efforts to affect legislation, as ® Representative Smith’s statement, in 1936, of the three classes of persons to be covered by the then lobbying bill (80 Cong. Rec. 4525) is virtually identical with that given by both the Senate and the House reports on the 1946 Act. See supra, pp. 31-32. LE SIE LIED SG GEILE LEE EO NEG LIE LCG AGE POLL ICE OSE RAE GLE DEA LITE LATTE AH SO BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY 43 charged in this information, clearly falls into the pattern we have stated.” 1. Thus, counts II, III, IV, and V, the Section 305 counts against defendant Moore, charge ex- penditures for the principal purpose of aiding “in influencing, * * * the passage of legislation * * *” by (1) sponsoring activities of three farm associations, The Southern Commissioners of Ag- riculture, the Farm Commissioners Council, and the North Central States Association of Commis- sioners, Secretaries and Directors of Agriculture, each of which in turn “had as its principal pur- pose the influencing, directly and indirectly, of legislation by the Congress of the United States affecting agriculture’’; (2) by procuring the serv- ices of the defendants, James E. McDonald and Tom Linder, who had been identified as the Com- The Act does not in terms state the amounts necessary to be contributed or spent to result in coverage. But it must certainly be true that it was not intended to cover minimal amounts, since such contributions or expenditures obviously would not have significance in terms of the purposes of the Act. The Clerk of the House of Representatives, in prepar- ing his Outline of Instructions for Filing Reports, Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (1951), placed the minimum amount which would require compliance with the Act at $100 per year. This figure was used as a result of a Report by the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities (the Buchanan Committee), H. Rep. No. 3239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 15-16. The new forms for reporting and registra- tion, adopted by the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate in 1950, have simplified compliance with the Lobbying Act. See H. Rep. No. 3239, Sist Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5. 273108—53——4 44 missioners of Agriculture of Texas and Georgia, respectively ; and (3) by procuring the services of one Carl H. Wilken, who was apparently an agri- cultural expert and who testified for defendants before Congressional committees (R. 5-6). In addition to these allegations, common to the four Section 305 counts against defendant Moore, there are allegations respecting particular expen- ditures in particular quarters which Moore failed to report. These particular expenditures are the immediate basis for the charge of failing to re- port, as required by Section 305." In count ITI, these items related to payments, in the amount of $2,250, to defendant Linder, and, in the amount of $250, to one McCloskey, who appears from the information to have written letters to Grange officers at Moore’s instance, urging them to write : their Congressmen to put peas in the program for ‘ foodstuffs to be sent to Europe under the Euro- pean Recovery Program (R. 5), and also to have written statements, also at Moore’s instance, for presentation to Congress (R. 5) (although it does not appear on the face of the information that this payment was specifically related to these let- ters and statements). In count IIT, the specific expenditure was a payment to the Mayflower Hotel for a dinner, in * Through a typographical error, paragraph 11 of count II (R. 8) refers back to paragraph 9 instead of paragraph 10. BLURRED COPY — the amount of $1,100 (R. 9). From allegations elsewhere in the information (R. 5), it may rea- sonably be inferred that this was a dinner which was ostensibly sponsored by one of the defend- 45 ants’ farm associations, and at which Congress- men were spoken to about farm legislation.” In count IV, the specifie expenditures were de- posits of three separate sums of $3,000, $4,500, and $3,600 in brokerage accounts of the late de- fendant MeDonald, of one Harold B. MeDon- ald, of Texas, and of Ruth Aspinwall (not other- wise identified), presumably as part of the pro- gram of securing the good offices of McDonald, a Texas state official, and those of the person for whom Aspinwall acted, in having representations made to Congress. In count V, the specific expenditures were many, but they included (1) a printers bill for preparing and sending out a press release on be- half of the Association, Southern Commissioners and Directors of Agriculture in which a hearing was requested before the Senate Committee on Agriculture on the specific proposed legislation ; (2) a payment to one Hanson in respect to a news *® A comparison of paragraphs 11 (c), (d), and (e) on R. 5 with paragraph 2 (a) on R. 9 and paragraphs 2 (d) and (e) on R. 12 indicates that the hotel referred to in count III should be the Raleigh Hotel, not the Mayflower. This and other errors can be corrected on remand. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 11. item in the Washington Post, 531 copies of which were sent to members of Congress; (3) payments and a loan to Wilken, who is elsewhere identified as having testified before Congressional commit- tees at Moore’s instance (R. 5-6), in the total sum of $6,750; and (4) payments to the May- flower Hotel, in the sum of $5,945.99, for dinners at which Congressmen were spoken to on agricul- tural legislation (see R. 5). 2. Similarly, in counts VI and VII, the Section 305 counts against defendant Harriss, it is first generally alleged that Harriss expended money ‘‘principally to aid in influencing * * * legisla- tion * * *’’ affecting the prices of agricultural commodities and commodity futures; and that he did so by procuring the services of defendants Moore, McDonald, and Linder (whose activities are described elsewhere in the information). And in count VI it is charged that he made specific expenditures to various persons, including Lin- der, Hanson (see supra, pp. 45-46), one Lois Moore, one Matt Dahl, the National Farm Committee, and to Richard Tullis, identified as an officer of the National Farm Committee, in each case in amounts of $250 or larger. In count VII, pay- ments to defendant Moore, in the total amount of $50,000, and to defendant McDonald, in the amount of $6,000, are alleged. From other alle- | gations in the information, it can be assumed that these expenditures related to the procuring 46 PRAT RH ERNIE RTS TRS, EF TES EL ORAL AIR EP TROL Ny BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY ae a Sev 47 of direct representations to Congress on agricul- tural matters.” 3. Finally, in count X, the remaining Section 305 count, it is alleged that defendant National Farm Committee, whose principal purpose was to influence the passage of legislation which would cause a rise in the price of agricultural commodi- ties and commodity futures and the defeat of legislation which would cause a fall in such prices, had solicited, collected and received from the de- fendant Harriss the sum of $1,000 for carrying out its purposes. * * * * ~ Realistically read in the context of the whole information, it is clear that the substance of the 305 charges against defendants Moore and Harriss is that they paid individuals and groups to com- municate with Congress, in various ways, on their behalf, and that this was deliberately done with- out disclosure of the true nature of the pecuniary backing or the identity of the sponsors or their private financial interests.” It is plain, also, No bill of particulars was sought by the defendants. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 10-11. *° Paragraph 6 of count I, which is expressly incorporated into all the other counts, declares that the “defendants well knew and intended [that] the members of the Congress would not know that such activities, plans, schemes and de- signs of the defendants and such use and employment of these several organizations were in fact based upon and in pursuance of the defendants’ purpose to advance their per- sonal financial interests; and, as to the defendants Tom 48 that the means of communication took the form of releases directed at Congress, testimony before § Congress and its committees, the more subtle blandishment of after dinner speeches to Con- gressmen, or, finally, the encouragement of letters | to Congress. With respect to the National Farm Committee, the substance of the charge is that the Committee received money, for the purpose of taking positions on farm legislation which would ‘‘directly’’ influence the passage of favor- able farm legislation, from Harriss, the motiva- tion of whose interest in that type of legislation did not coincide with that of a public nonprofit agricultural group such as the Committee ap- peared to be. These charges are all provable, within the mean- ing of the statute, by showing facts which would go no farther than we have shown is appropri- ate in subsection A of this Point of the Argument (supra, pp. 25-42). The lobbying activities with which the information deals all involve direct representations to Congress or the express in- ducement of such representations.” Linder and James FE. McDonald, that the members of the Con- gress would be unaware that they were acting outside of and apart from their capacities as state officials instead of making unbiased efforts to further the interests of persons engaged in agricultural pursuits and of other members of the public” (R. 3). * There is no prohibition in the Criminal Appeals Act on this Court’s construing an indictment or information in con. nection with a determination of constitutional or statutory issues, so long as the Court does not go counter to a const ruc- ol ceh alee OTE — PR REIID, PCUIEES CE AEBS ORL IES SRE EPO PR EE BS I II BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY oo. Oe ek ieee oa 49 C. THERE 15 NO UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS IN SEC ‘TIONS 205 AND 307 AS APPLIED TO DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH, OR INTENTIONAL STIMULATION OF DIKECT C¢ IMM UNICATION WITH, CONGRESS As we have shown (supra, pp. 25-42), the lan- guage and legislative history of Sections 305 and 307 make it plain that they were intended, at the least, to apply and they do apply to persons who pay others to state views to Congress, whether formally in committee sessions, or informally in speeches, letters, etc., so long as the statements are directed at Congress or Congressmen. It is also clear that the sections apply to those who spend money to induce others directly to com- municate with Congress, such as the sponsors of campaigns asking members of the public to write or contact their Congressmen with respect to par- ticular legisiation. We have also shown (supra, pp. 42-48) that the activities charged in this in- formation fall within these bounds of direct communication. Thus applied, the Act presents no serious ques- tion of indefiniteness, in appraising which ‘‘the particular context is all important.” American tion of the indictment or information made by the District Court. See United States v. Congress of Industrial Organi- zations, 335 U. 8. 106, 110-112: United States vy. Petrillo, 382 U.S.1. If the Court should feel, however. that any part of the information is not sufliciently definite for the purposes of constitutional adjudication, United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1. 9-13, shows that the case can be remanded without determination of the issues relating to that portion of the information. | a 50 } Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. 8S. 382, 412.* The necessity that there be direct contact with Congress, whether paid for or expressly stimulated, imports a sufficient degree of specific- ity. Certainly, no one who paid money to have another present views to Congress or who spent money to stimulate persons to write to their Con- gressmen would be in any doubt that his conduct came within the terms of a statute which covers a ; purpose “to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Con- : gress of the United States.’’ Activities of that type—as United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47, now underlines—are the traditional heart of lobby- ing and legislature-influencing, and would plainly be governed by a “Regulation of Lobbying Act.”’ The coverage is indisputable in this instance, but, even if it were more doubtful, it would not be “unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line ”’ Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 340. For this aspect of the case, it is perhaps not necessary to go beyond the decision in United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, where the Court sustained, on direct appeal, an act which 22 As we point out in detail infra, pp. 81 ff, the presence of t difficult, borderline or peripheral cases does not invalidate a ; ! statutory provision where there is a hard core of circum- stances to which the statute unquestionably applies. EAPO STD LIT OPA ARE MERIT i Sind OC MOINES pte > ge PLN A bE TEL GS RL EY Reh AL IME ROS § BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY ————— 51 made it unlawful for any Congressman, or candi- date for Congress, or officer or employee of the United States “‘to directly or indirectly solicit, receive, or be in any manner concerned in solicit- ing or receiving any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political purpose whatever, from any such officer, employee, or person.”’ [Emphasis supplied.] The indictment charged a Congressman with having received money from federal officers and employees for the political purpose of promoting his nomination as Re- publican candidate for representative at certain Republican primaries. The Court thought that the “‘language is perfectly intelligible and clearly embraces the acts charged.’’ 280 U. S. at 398. It was argued that the statute was invalid, among other reasons, because there was no definite mean- ing to the crucial words ‘political purposes.”’ However, the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, said, at p. 399: * * * But we imagine that no one not in search of trouble would feel any. When- ever the law draws a line there will be eases very near each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be un- certain, but no one can come near it with- out knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373. Cf. Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (Federal Corrupt Practices Act). 52 As sought to be applied to the present defend- ants, the Regulation of Lobbying Act is also at least as definite as several other statutes upheld by this Court. In Boyce Motor Lines y. United States, 342 U.S. 337, the defendant was required to determine whether there was a truck route available which made it possible to avoid ‘‘eon- gested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaduets, and dangerous ecrossings’’; if so, it then beeame necessary to determine whether the alternative route was “‘practicable’’ and ‘‘feasible.”’ Other statutes have required those covered to decide whether sound trucks are “loud and raueous”’ (Kovaes vy. Cooper, 336 U. 8. 77, 79); whether competitive activities are ‘fair and open’? (Old Dearborn Co, v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183) ; whether sheep are interfering with the ‘‘usual and customary’’ use of a range (Omaechevarria vy. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348) ; whether activities are : “reasonably calculated’? or ‘‘tend’’ to fix prices (Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 : U.S. 86); whether a fire is ‘near’? the publie domain (United States v. Alford, 274 U. 8. 264) ; whether income tax deductions are for “a rea- sonable allowance for salaries or other compen- sation for personal services actually rendered”’ (United States v. Ragen, 314 U. 8. 513); whether one is coercing an employer to employ persons in excess of the number ‘needed’? (United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1); or whether a crime in- LIE SEE ST ENN I Mg OTE? RM MPN FIORE NENT AP HO IS SF BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY 03 volves ‘moral turpitude’? (Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223). See also United Public Workers Mitchell, 3830 U.S. 75, 103-104 (Hateh Act “active part in political management or in po- litical eampaigns’’). Men can constitutionally be required to make these determinations, each of which involves a general standard of consider- able latitude.” The Lobbying Act, as applied here, makes no greater demands on those who come within its compass, for a very specifie and easily foreseeable content has been given to the general terms of the statute. In addition, the requirement of a deliberate purpose to influence federal legislation relieves the Act of the basie ‘objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware’’, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102.% With the specifie subordinate ery applicable here and this element of sctenter, there can be no entrapment of the innocent or the unwary. ** For other cases, see Lmerican Communications Assn, Vv. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412-3: Dennis vo United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515: NSerews v. United States, 325 U.S. 91: Wial- liams v. Pages States, 341 UL S. 97; Gorin v. United States, 312 UL S. 19; Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373: Miller vy Sirah: 239 U. S. 426, 454; Bandini Co. v. Superior C art, 284 U.S. 8, 17-18; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 874, 392-3 ms en ap vican Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 3Aa2, 413: Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S, 494, 515: Boyce Motor Lines vy. United States, 342 U.S. 3387, 342: Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28; Unite d States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524; Unite ‘d States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399; Omaechevarva v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 348, 348. teehee a 54 " D. THE “PRINCIPAL PURPOSE” REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 307 HAS SUBSTANTIAL APPLICATION ONLY TO DEFENDANT NATIONAL FARM COMMITTEE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THAT DEFENDANT IS CLEAR Section 307 of the Lobbying Act states, in part, that : The provisions of this title shall apply to any person * * * who * * * directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the following purposes: * * * * * The District Court in the N. A. M. case held that the reference to ‘‘principal purpose’? was so vague as to be meaningless. See 103 F. Supp. 510,514. Presumably, the court’s reference in this ease to the N. A. M. holding (R. 39) means that the alleged indefiniteness of the ‘principal pur- pose”’ language was also thought to be present here. 1. Actually, however, the ‘‘principal purpose”’ aspect of Section 307 has little to do with this case. Section 307 refers to any person who ‘‘solicits, collects, or receives money”’ to aid, or ‘*the principal purpose of which person is to aid,”’ in the influencing of legislation. The reporting requirements of Section 305, however, apply not only to persons soliciting but also to those ‘‘ex- pending any money for the purposes designated in subparagraph (a) or (b) of section 307,”’ ¢. e., | the purposes of influencing legislation. Thus, the — EEO LOL E SING LD ED ME REE BNE GN NM Ss SIE NE SSRN IW MR LTO Sp, ERE EGF LEIS API ad = BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY —7_ 55 ‘‘principal purpose’’ language of Section 307 would appear to have no application to those making expenditures (as distinguished from those receiving contributions) for the purpose of in- fluencing legislation. In the instant case, all of the Section 305-307 counts, with the exception of eount X against the National Farm Committee, are predicated on the fact that ‘‘expenditures’’ were made for the purposes designated in Section 307, and not on the fact that some person had ‘solicited, collected, or received’’ funds for those purposes. All that it seems necessary to prove is that the expenditures were actually made for the purposes set forth in subparagraphs (a) or (b) of Section 307. 2. If the ‘‘principal purpose’’ language does apply to ‘‘expenditures’’ as well as ‘‘contribu- tions,’’ the statute poses no problem whatever as to defendants Harriss or Moore. The ‘‘principal purpose’’ requirement is worded alternatively. It suffices to bring a person under the Act if either (1) that person’s principal purpose is ‘‘to in- fluence’? federal legislation, or if (ii) that is the principal purpose of the contribution itself, or of the expenditure itself (if the latter is to be ineluded).” However great a problem it may be > The language of Section 307 is “The provisions of this title shall apply to any person * * * who * * * directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives * * * any * * * thing of value to be» .ed principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which person is to aid * * *.” [Emphasis added. ] om 56 ; to determine the principal purpose of a person, there is usually little difficulty in determining whether the principal purpose of a specific con- H tribution or expenditure is to accomplish one of the statutory purposes. In this case, specific ex- penditures are listed, and it is charged that their principal purpose was the affecting of designated legislation. This raises a precise issue capable of proof or disproof in ordinary course, just as if the inquiry was solely as to the ‘‘purpose’’ (un- qualified by the adjective ‘‘principal’’) of the ex- penditures. See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396 (discussed supra, pp. 50-51) ; Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U. S. 534. Consequently, with respect to all the Section 305 counts, except that against the National Farm Committee, the short answer to the court below is that the ‘‘principal purpose”? requirement is either inapplicable or it is met easily and without any doubt. 3. Count X, against the National Farm Com- mittee, does allege that that organization, which was one whose principal purpose was to influence legislation, received money to be used principally to aid in the passage and defeat of legislation relating to agricultural commodities; specifically, the charge is that it received a check for $1,000 from Harriss for the purpose of influencing and attempting to influence such legislation. Irre- spective of the “principal purpose’’ of the or- ganization, the count charges a violation of Sec- BLURRED COPY — ol tions 305 and 307 under the alternative require- ment of Section 307 that reports be made by per- sons receiving contributions principally to aid the accomplishment of the purposes specified in See- tion 307. And it is clear that the specifie con- tribution which is alleged in count X was a single- purpose contribution—that the one purpose was to influence the passage or defeat of legislation which would, respectively, enhance or depress farm prices. For the present case it is enough that the information charges that the contribution was ob- tained for the purpose of influencing legislation.” The statute is definite and explicit enough to inform a person receiving money for such a pur- pose that he is within its terms. The **principal purpose’’ language of Section 307 (pp. 54-55, supra) is designed to make clear that the fact that the contributions are multi-purposed will not neces- sarily preclude coverage under the Act. Cf. Futor, An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act (1949), 10 Fed. B. J. 366. Where contributions have several purposes, the qualifying word ‘*prin- cipal” may possibly raise problems, but no prob- lems of indefiniteness are presented where, as in this case, contributions are obtained solely for the purpose of influencing legislation, particularly * The additional allegation that the principal purpose of the Farm Committee was to influence the passage or defeat of legislation does not appear in the operative paragraphs of count X, 7. ¢., paragraphs 6 and 7, 58 when “‘influencing” is interpreted, as discussed above (supra, pp. 25-42), to mean acts of directly contacting or stimulating direct contact with Con- gress. The National Farm Committee cannot properly complain of any vagueness in the charge against it in this information.” II. SECTION 308 OF THE ACT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTION- ALLY INDEFINITE AS APPLIED TO THE COUNTS LAID UNDER THAT SECTION A. As applied to those who are hired either to express views to Congress or to cause others to do so, Section 308 is sufficiently definite——The Dis- 27In the court below, defendants also contended that the statutory definition of “legislation” in Section 302 (infra, pp. 89-90) is too vague because it includes—in addition to “bills, resolutions, amendments, nominations, and other mat- ters pending or proposed in either House of Congress”—“any other matter which may be the subject of action by either House.” Like so many of defendants’ arguments below, this contention has no place in this case, for the information makes it quite clear that it uses the term “legislation” in the ordinary sense of bills and legislative proposals already being, or just about to be, considered by Congress, its com- mittees, or its members. See, especially, paragraphs 1 through 8 of count I (R. 1-4), which are incorporated into the other nine counts. Whatever may be the difficulties in other circumstances with the phrase defendants attack, there are no real problems here, particularly since the charges concern direct or stimulated contact with Congressmen. We may point out in passing, however, that the critical phrase, “which may be the subject of action by either House,” can be read as referring to “other matters” which “are” being con- sidered by Congress, its organs, or its members, or which “are” being presented at that time to some member of Con- gress. The statute would not appear to cover matters merely being debated in the schools, SEP ESE LPO NOTES AERP ai LAIN LE Ft BEE a a TOC Te eee is Smee REL ST ay, BLURRED COPY 59 trict Court did not hold Section 308 unconstitu- tionally vague. It held Section 308 unconstitu- tional because the penal provision of Section 310 (b) was unconstitutional, and because Sections 308 and 310 (b) were thought to be inseparable. We discuss this separability problem in Point IV, infra, pp. 75-80. The defendants argued below, however, that Section 308 was unconstitutionally vague (a) be- cause it could not be determined what was meant by “influencing’’ legislation as defined in the stat- ute, and (b) because Section 308, although self- sufficient on its face, seems inconsistent with Section 307 which states the persons to whom the Act is applicable. We have already discussed the meaning of “influencing’’ legislation, and have shown that at the minimum it covers direct com- munication with Congress and the intentional stimulation of direct representations. Supra, pp. 2542. Like Sections 305 and 307, Section 308 is not too indefinite to govern this case. Section 308 does not refer to Section 307 and is not governed by it. Section 308 covers one ‘‘who shall engage himself for pay or for any considera- tion for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Con- gress of the United States.’”’ There is nothing mysterious about the concept of hiring oneself out to do a job, and the language ‘“‘engage him- self for pay or for any consideration” plainly em- braces that notion. 273108—53——_5 ; = The history of the legislation shows that the provisions for the registration of paid lobbyists grew out of a different bill from those which sought to require disclosures by groups and indi- viduals who collected moneys for lobbying pur- poses.* There is, therefore, nothing in the leg- islative history which requires Section 308 to take on additional requirements from Section 307. But even if the persons described by Section 308 would have also to meet the description of 307, the result would be the same. Section 307 is specifically applicable to those who receive money to be used principally to aid the passage or de- feat of legislation. See supra, pp. 54 ff. Presum- ably, the receipt of money for lobbying services by a professional lobbyist is the receipt of money principally to aid the passage or defeat of legislation. The defendants also argued below that Section 308 was unconstitutionally vague because it is “‘so all embracing in that it requires the person who has engaged himself for pay or for any consid- eration for the purpose of attempting to influ- ence the passage or defeat of legislation ‘before doing anything in furtherance of such object’ to register’? (R. 25). The argument runs that “‘do- * This provision, now Section 308 of the Act, grew out of S. 2512, 74th Cong., which dealt only with paid lobbyists (see fn. 12, supra, p. 37); Sections 305 and 307 of the Act grew out of the major provisions of H. R. 11223 and 11663. See supra, pp. 36-42. BLURRED COPY _——— 61 ing anything’’ includes so much that ‘‘men of common intelligence must guess at what is really meant shall constitute an offense * * *’’ (R. 25). It is plain, however, that the phrase ‘‘doing anything”’ refers to acts done consciously, in ex- change for pay or other consideration, in pursuit of the passage or defeat of legislation. The de- fendants’ complaints on this score seem to us to come down to the proposition that Congress can- not require them to distinguish between the posi- tions they take with respect to legislation because they are paid to do so and those positions rep- resenting a genuine unsolicited conviction. Not only is this position unsound on its face, but the information further aids defendants by specify- ing in each instance the acts done by them with- out registering. See R. 4-6, 20-21. B. Defendants Moore and Linder were hired to express views to Congress and to cause others to do so.—It is clear that counts I and IX charge defendants Moore and Linder with offenses under Section 308. Count I alleges that Moore “‘en- gaged himself for pay and for other considera- tion on behalf of Robert M. Harriss for the pur- pose of attempting to influence, directly and in- directly, (a) the passage of legislation by the Congress of the United States which would cause a rise in the prices of agricultural commodities and commodity futures and (b) the defeat of leg- islation by the Congress of the United States which would cause a decline of prices of agri- ay 62 cultural commodities and commodity futures’’ (R. 4). The count alleges in considerable detail the acts done to carry out this undertaking—the procurement, on various and sundry occasions, of witnesses, private individuals, and southern agri- cultural associations to take positions before Congress and Congressmen with respect to certain legislation. As to Linder, it is alleged that he engaged him- self “for pay and for other consideration on behalf of the defendants * * * Moore and * * * Harriss for the purpose of attempting to in- fluence, directly and indirectly, (a) the passage of legislation by the Congress of the United States which would cause a rise in the price of agri- cultural commodities and commodity futures, and (b) the defeat of legislation by the Congress * * * which would cause a decline [in such prices]’’ (R. 20). The information also alleges that Linder, ‘‘acting outside of and apart from his official capacity, in furtherance of the objects and purposes for which he had theretofore re- ceived money and other things of value * * * [helped to organize] the Farm Commissioners Council * * * made a statement before the Sen- ate Committee on Agriculture of the Congress of the United States, using material prepared by one Dr. Clair, opposing proposed legislation which would tend to reduce the prices of farm com- modities [and] on or about the fall of the year 1946, — sonememnney ET ae AR BOING WIL NOIR AMEE BE LIELP SPER, BLURRED COPY a 63 at a dinner alleged to have been sponsored by the Association, Southern Commissioners of Agricul- ture, staged at the Mayflower Hotel, in Washington, D. C., at which about 200 members of Congress were present, the defendant Tom Linder delivered a speech in which he urged Congress to enact leg- islation ending the Office of Price Administration controls of prices’’ (R. 21). As they are charged, both Moore and Linder were acting to bring pressures to bear directly on Congress, but in such a fashion that Congress had no idea where the sponsorship of their ideas lay. Moore almost consistently spoke through the medium of others. And though Linder talked for himself, he permitted it to be supposed, according to the information (see fn. 20, supra, p. 47), that he spoke only as the State Commissioner of Agriculture for Georgia; the charge is that he had a personal, financial stake outside of his job in such a way as to permit the inference that he was being paid to divide his loyalties between Georgia, on the one hand, and his own personal interests as well as those of Moore and Harriss, on the other. It was, partly, to avoid precisely this type of situation that the Lobbying Act was passed. Supra, especially p. 32. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that those who were act- ing as did Moore and Linder could not have deter- mined that the Act required their registration. 64 III. AS APPLIED HERE, SECTIONS 305, 307, AND 308 OF THE ACT DO NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMEND- MENT The District Court did not hold Sections 305, 307, or 308 of the Lobbying Act invalid under the First Amendment, but the defendants strenu- ously insisted on that contention below. See R. 24, 32, 33, 35. For that reason, we answer it here.” A. The First Amendment guarantees to the de- fendants, as to all others, the right to petition Congress; and the expression of views to Con- gress in groups or through agents is admittedly an exercise of the right to petition. But it is equally clear that the right to petition, like other First Amendment freedoms, may be qualified, in certain circumstances, if necessary to protect other interests in the community whose preserva- tion is of sufficient importance. The limitation on the freedom to teach and advocate the idea of forceful and violent overthrow of the Gov- ernment is only a recent and dramatic example of this point. Dennis vy. United States, 341 U.S. 494. The problem, then, in the present case is to de- termine the nature and extent of the restraint, if any, which has been imposed on the defendants’ 2” The Court has apparently held that it has power, under the Criminal Appeals Act, to consider constitutional con- tentions other than those passed on by the District Court. See United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169, 172; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 330. BLURRED COPY RGU, — 65 right to petition; and then to determine whether the interest in favor of which the restraint has been imposed can justify a limitation of this type. The restraint, if it be one, is certainly not a direct or a heavy one. The conduct of those at- tempting to influence the passage or defeat of legislation is not prohibited or made criminal. They are not forbidden to make their views known or to hold beliefs. It is simply provided that under certain circumstances there must be dis- closure of specified facts; and disclosure is re- quired, not on the basis that anything improper is being done, but merely as an impartial register of those whose concern with their affairs before Congress is great enough so that they spend, or solicit, money to pay or induce people to make certain kinds of presentations to Congress. There is no choice among differing political opinions and no singling out of selected activities or views for disclosure. All must be reported alike and no stigma is attached to those who register and report.” On the other hand, the interest in favor of which this restraint has been imposed is funda- mental to the legislative process. The intricate back-and-forth process between representative %° For the most recently published lists of those registering and reporting under the Act, see 99 Cong. Rec. 60 ff. (daily ed.; Jan. 3, 1953), 2881 ff. (daily ed.; April 7, 1953) ; 6784 ff. (daily ed.; June 15, 1953). There is a wide representation of occupations, professions, organizations, and individuals, both notable and unknown. — - a 66 and represented, which is the gist of the demo- cratic form of government, has brought forth two central problems with which Congress can : rightly concern itself. The first is to ascertain correctly the true will, desires, needs, and hopes of the people as a whole, and of the different groups in the Nation. The other aim is to se- cure the facts, all the facts, on which to build legislative action. Without both kinds of knowl- edge, legislation is hobbled and to that extent rep- resentative government fails in its exacting goals.” For at least forty years,” Congress has been much concerned with the relationship between these two prime ends of opinion-finding and fact- finding, on the one hand, and the individuals, groups, and organizations which seek to encour- age or retard Congressional action, on the other. There have been many, inside Congress and out, disturbed by the thought that proper attainment of the two fundamental aims has been partially frustrated by persons with special axes to grind. Congress, in legislation, has an obligation to the general welfare which ‘‘is not the mere sum * * * * The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 resulted, of course, from a deep concern with both aspects. It was not accidental that the Regulation of Lobbying Act was part of the Legislative Reorganization Act. * See Lane, Some Lessons From Past Congressional In- vestigations of Lobbying, 14 Pub. Opin. Quar. 14; Brief for the United States, United States v. Rumely, Oct. Term, 1952, No. 87, pp. 30ff. ROSIN 6G PETIT SA SALON THIN Gy ' ’ : BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY — 67 of Maine potatoes, Texas oil, Wyoming wool, Colorado silver, Mississippi cotton, and Georgia peanuts.’’ Hearings, Hous Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, 81st Cong., 2d sess., pt. 1, p. 100. As those interests, and their like, have borne down upon it, Congress has repeatedly undertaken to determine for itself how much it has been subject to pressures only partially repre- sentative of the total interest, and how much these pressures have distorted its functioning. The remedy has not been to silence or prohibit the ‘‘interest’’ or ‘‘pressure’’ groups, but to uti- lize a measure of factual disclosure in an attempt to remedy the distortion which Congress has found, without forbidding or limiting in any way the expression of ideas. In the present context, there would, of course, be indirect disclosure of the political ideas or actions of some persons whose views or activities may now be relatively private (e. g., defendants Harriss, Moore, and Linder), but only to the extent that they affirm- atively engage in attempting to affect federal legislation by communicating to Congress or in- ducing others to communicate. And such dis- closure of these activities and views enables Con- gress and the public, it is believed, better to ap- praise the source and true worth of the facts and arguments brought forth, and thus to reach wiser judgments on proposed federal legislation.” In addition to the Federal Government, over twenty states seek to regulate some aspects of lobbying through dis- 68 The legislative interest is so important and the means adopted for its preservation so moderate that it is difficult to believe that the possible de- terrence of some communication with Congress or Congressmen by certain individuals can be the abridgment of freedom which the First Amend- ment prohibits. This Court and informed opinion have always refused to see illegality in compara- ble minor ‘‘restraints’’ of this character, where a significant social end was being served by the leg- islation. Thus, in Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, the Court sustained the statute requiring disclosure by those who at- tempt to influence the outcome of presidential elections by soliciting contributions or making ex- penditures for that purpose, although it is clear that such a disclosure requirement would cause some to forego support of the candidate of their choice. The Court, in an opinion with major and special relevance to the present problem, both be- cause of the fact that the language of the earlier act was the basis of the present statute and also because of the similarity of the interest involved, stated its view as follows (290 U. S., at 545) : closure (see Note, (1947) 47 Col. L. Rev. 98, 99-103; Com- ment (1947) 56 Yale L. J. 304, 313-316). Almost all the states require disclosure of campaign contributions and some also regulate political advertisements and circulars (Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection Against Gov- ernmental Intrusions in Political Affairs, (1948) 47 Mich. L. Rev. 181, 204-206). BLURRED COPY 69 The importance of his [the President’s] election and the vital character of its rela- tionship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate leg- islation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influ- ence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protec- tion. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threat- ened by force or by corruption. Civil and criminal libel and slander law un- doubtedly deters some people from communicat- ing ideas which are actually permissible, but which they fear will provoke litigation. But that kind of restraint obviously does not invalidate such laws. Indeed, this Court has recently sus- tained an Illinois law imposing criminal sane- tions on those who publish material which ‘‘por- trays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion’’ or which exposes the citizens of any such group to ‘‘contempt, derision, or ob- loquy * * *’’; and this validation was in the face of serious contentions that the proscribed conduct was too vaguely described. Beauharnais v. IIli- nots, 343 U.S. 250. The Court did not regard the restraint flowing from the prohibition of the stat- 70 ute, or that voluntarily operating on its edges upon people who fear getting uncomfortably close to its reach, as sufficient to invalidate the attempt by Illinois to wrestle with the perennially intract- able problem of meliorating troubled racial and religious antagonisms. It is also true that a requirement that holders of second-class mailing privileges disclose their ownership of the publication probably discourages some who have certain views they would like to express in newspapers or periodicals. But this peripheral discouragement is permitted, in part, so that the public may not be ‘‘deceived through ignorance of the interests the publication repre- sents.’’ Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 312, quoting H. Rep. No. 955, p. 24. The existence of the Hatch Act probably deters some federal employees from activity permitted by that statute, and, yet, the national interest in a nonpolitical civil service has sufficed to permit the restraint. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75. Perhaps, the Smith Act and the sedi- tion statute (Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494), the non-Communist affidavit provision of the Labor-Management Relations Act (American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382), and the employer free speech unfair labor practice provisions of the National Labor Rela- tions Act (National Labor Relations Board v. Vir- ginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469), have all Nt PRP TAG LORE ORBEA PEELE LATTICE Gh iLL LO LL I GS OE Ar a ne OP eae BLEED THROUGH BLURRED COPY ; 71 had comparable effects on certain individuals. But, in each ease, broader interests in the safety and the economic order of the community have made these tangential restraints permissible. Even the prospect of being called as a witness in a proceeding before a court or other tribunal, or of being investigated by a public or private agency, may discourage some people from utter- ing, even privately, wholly permissible ideas.” In short, there is frequently self “‘ecensorship’’ or self-restraint in expression or communication growing out of, but going beyond, a requirement of law. But the First Amendment has never been thought, for that reason, to invalidate the law or other Government action because of these tangen- tial, voluntary consequences. Caution, timidity, a desire for privacy or to be free from controversy or litigation, may all cause people voluntarily to refrain from expressing their views in order to avoid all chance of incurring some legal sanction— which is not actually imposed on or related to the expression of those views—but it does not follow from this that any law has abridged their First * The National Labor Relations Act (Associated Press vy. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103), the Fair Labor Standards Act (Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186), and the Sherman Act ( Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1), as well as the income tax, may likewise have affected publication by existing or potential publishers. 72 Amendment freedoms.” The burden, non-existent for some, of first importance for others, is merely a consequence of the hard and enduring fact that most of the truly effective pressures and sanctions on conduct are private or internal, protection from which simply cannot be the business of the First Amendment. B. The case may be put more affirmatively in somewhat different aspect. The basic legislative problem here is to preserve the conditions under which the legislative process can function, inde- pendently and intelligently. The technique of dis- closure is thought by many to permit such inde- pendent and intelligent operation. The permis- sible purposes of this technique were summarized in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, involving the Foreign Agents Registration Act (22 U.S. C. 611, et seq.) (in which the Court found it unnec- essary to pass on the statute’s constitutionality be- cause it held Viereck’s activities not within its purview). Mr. Justice Black said (at p. 251): * * * Resting on the fundamental con- stitutional principle that our people, ade- quately informed, may be trusted to dis- tinguish between the true and the false, the bill is intended to label information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers 36 This is all the more true, of course, when the feared sanc- tion is not legal at all but social or economic, such as a hostile public reaction resulting from disclosure of opinions or activities. oe EEA SO ast, ATER Ste Ley ee: BLURRED COPY j : ; : 73 may not be deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinterested source. Such legislation implements rather than detracts from the prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. * * * [Emphasis added.] On this view, disclosure—because it implements the conditions precedent to free and intelligent judgment, particularly in a large, diverse, and segmented political economy—is not improper merely because it may restrain some whose pur- veyance of their ideas is more effective or con- genial when it is anonymous. The test of con- formity with the First Amendment cannot be limited to the disclosure requirement in vacuo; rather, the test must consider the effectiveness of the disclosure to forward the conditions which underlie the body of political freedoms protected by the Amendment. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, this Court, in sustaining an antitrust prosecu- tion against a press association, answered an ob- jection that the prosecution was prevented by the First Amendment, by saying (at p. 20): The First Amendment, far from provid- ing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful rea- sons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free FEMALE LE IESG LEED LE SB IPI AA IS HEY —— 74 press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental com- binations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed free- dom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to pub- lish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from pub- lishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combina- tion to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity. This was express recognition that it is the legit- imate business of Congress to maintain the con- ditions on which freedoms of expression depend. The present legislation has a comparable goal. A primary aim of the right to petition and the other First Amendment rights is to keep open the channels of communication between the rep- resented and the representative. When Congress finally drew the conclusion, out of its experience of many decades, that the integrity of the legisla- tive process was threatened by its inability to ap- praise the sources of the stream of demands flow- ing from the ‘‘public,”’ it sought to free the chan- nels b [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386408_0051%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.