# Brief for the United States — Anselmi v. Attorney General of the United States (No. 225)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States
- **Published:** January 1, 1953

## Text

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CE awit rah xan disci tteed Miser ener inn amen he ee
RS GHNNINE.. .. «22-2 re osccesececeeneveesecocese
Ss ie bs ae eames ebame waa wiimewdoe
tt ee On
The certification and route transfer proceedings_-_-______-
The mall pay proceedings...................--s2656.-.-

1. The Board’s first decision___.________-_---_-_-_-

2. The Board’s second decision. _-_-_____-------_-_- 12

The decision of the Court of Appeals____-___-_________- 14
I I in corwee pene caal eben anna igs 15

Cocooanwnn =

I. Subsidies in the form of mail pay cannot exceed the
PR Or Cr oc kv Soe c wer cere case wets 18
II. Section 406 (b) requires the Board, in determining
a@ carrier’s subsidy need, to offset all—not just
some—other revenue of the carrier___-_-__------
III. Western did not ‘‘need’’ the $447,000 additional
subsidy mail pay, and the award thereof was not
made on the basis of Western’s need_-_-_-----_-
I ea ae eee en he me cng IAS Ss LEE A Wy Pe Peete
Cases:
American Airlines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 323___.----_-_-
American Overseas Airlines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B. 695_-_-
Capital Airlines, Mail Rates, 10 C. A. B. 705___----------
Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 161-
Colonial Airlines, Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 71___-----_-----
Continental Air Lines and Mid-Continent Airlines, Order
No. E-5803, Docket No. 5173, October 23, 1951___-__-
Continental Air Lines, Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B. 825__-__-_-
Delta Air Lines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B. 645__----------_-
Inland Air Lines, Mail Rates, 1 C. A. A. 155_------------
North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C. A. B. 676____---
Northeast Airlines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B. 291__----------
Pan American-Grace Airways, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 550_-
Pioneer Air Lines, Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B. 175___---------
Trans-Texas Airways, Mail Rates, 12 C. A. B. 101_____-_-
Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 184 F. 2d
66, certiorari denied 340 U. S. 941__.___-__---------
United Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 198 F. 2d

8

88

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280856—53,

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ve

II
Cases—Continued
United Air Lines-Western Air Lines, Acquisition of Air
Carrier Property, 8 C. A. B. 298.___._____ 6-8, 24, 25, 26

Western Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 196 F. 2d
933, certiorari denied, 344 U. S. 875.__.._.___.._..___

nautics Board, 155 F. 2d 169___-______.____________. 5,6
Western Air Lines, Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 441__..._____ 9
Western Air Lines, Mail Rates, 10 C. A. B. 285......_____ 9

Statutes:
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 977, 49 U.S.C.

401 et seq.:

I ite crt cist eusinvemeicussbinucce 3,17

RE ET tae pa eee 3

I al 4

Section 406 (b)_...........-........ 2, 4, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23
Miscellaneous:

Civil Aeronautics Board, Administrative Separation of Sub-
sidy From Total Mail Payments to United States Air

Carriers, September 1953 revision._____._________.____ 28
48 Columbia Law Review 88........_._...........____ 24
61 Harvard Law Review 523._..................______ 24
60 Yale Law Journal 1196.__................... 31

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Ynthe Supreme Court of the Wnited States

OcroBER TERM, 1953

No. 224

Civit AERONAUTICS BOARD, PETITIONER
v.

ArtHuR E. SUMMERFIELD, PosTMASTER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, ON BEHALF OF THE PosTMASTER GEN-
ERAL, AND WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.

No. 225

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC., PETITIONER
v.

Civiz AERONAUTICS Boarp, ARTHUR E. SUMMER-
FIELD, PosTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
oN BEHALF OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE POSTMASTER GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit (R. 341-353) is

reported in 207 F. 2d 200. The opinions of the Civil
(1)

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2

Aeronautics Board (R. 54-125, 183-253, 258-281,
333-339) have not yet been published.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on May 4, 1953 (R. 354). The petitions for writs of
certiorari were filed on July 31, 1953, and were
granted on October 12, 1953. The jurisdiction of
this Court is conferred by 28 U.S. C. 1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In fixing subsidy mail pay for a past period, the
Civil Aeronautics Board refused to offset the portion
($447,000) of the total profit ($1,099,000) made by
a carrier on the 1947 sale of one of its routes and
related equipment which represented the value of
the transferred certificate of public convenience and
necessity. Section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics
Act directs the Board, in fixing mail pay subsidy,
to “take into consideration * * * the need of each
such air carrier for compensation * * * sufficient
* * * together with all other revenue of the aiz
carrier, to enable such air carrier * * * to main-
tain and continue the development * * *” of a
national air transportation system. The questions
presented are:!

’ We do not discuss the other questions raised by petitioner
Western in No. 225 that the Board awarded it insufficient
subsidy by erroneously offsetting certain other portions of
its revenue. These issues, which the Court of Appeals
decided against Western, are discussed in petitioner Board’s
brief, pp. 13-20. We support the position there taken that
those other items of revenue properly were used to reduce
the carrier’s mail pay need.

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1. Whether Section 406 (b) of the Act empowers
the Board to award a subsidy in the form of ‘‘need”’
mail pay which exceeds the carrier’s actual ‘‘need.”

2. Whether Section 406 (b) requires the Board, in
determining # carrier’s “need” for subsidy, to offset
| “all other revenue of the air carrier,’’ or whether the
Board may, in its discretion, offset only a part of
such other revenue.

3. Whether the carrier ‘“‘needed’”’ the additional
; $447,000 subsidy which it received as a result of the
) Board’s refusal to offset the profit on the sale of the
| certificate.
STATUTE INVOLVED

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973,
as amended, 49 U. 8. C. 401, et seg., provides in
pertinent part as follows:

Section 401 (h) The [Board], upon peti-
tion or complaint or upon its own initia-
tive, after notice and hearing, may alter,
amend, modify, or suspend any such certifi-
cate, in whole or in part, if the public con-
venience and neeessity so require, or may
revoke any such certificate, in whole or in
part, for intentional failure to comply with
any provision of this title or any order, rule,
or regulation issued hereunder or any term,
condition, or limitation of such certificate:
** * [49 U.S. C. 481 (h).]

* *x * * x
Section 401 (j) No certificate shall confer

any proprietary, property, or exclusive right
in the use of any air space, civil airway, land-

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ing area, or air-navigation facility. [49
U. S. C. 481 (j).]

* * * * *

Section 406 (a) The [Board] is em-
powered and directed, upon its own initiative
or upon petition of the Postmaster General
or an air carrier, (1) to fix and determine
from time to time, after notice and hearing,
the fair and reasonable rates of compensation
for the transportation of mail by air-
craft, * * * and the rates so fixed and de-
termined shall be paid by the Postmaster
General from appropriations for the trans-
portation of mail by aircraft. [49 U. S. C.
486 (a).]

Section 406 (b) In fixing and determining
fair and reasonable rates of compensation
under this section, the [Board], con-
sidering the conditions peculiar to transporta-
tion by aircraft and to the particular air
carrier or class of air carriers, may fix dif-
ferent rates for different air carriers or classes
of air carriers, and different classes of service.
In determining the rate in each case, the
[Board] shall take into consideration,
among other factors, the condition that such
air carriers may hold and operate under cer-
tificates authorizing the carriage of mail only
by providing necessary and adequate facili-
ties and service for the transportation of mail;
such standards respecting the character and
quality of service to be rendered by air car-
riers as may be prescribed by or pursuant to
law; and the need of each such air carrier
for compensation for the transportation of

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mail sufficient to insure the performance of
such service, and, together with all other
revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air
carrier under honest, economical, and effi-
cient management, to maintain and continue
the development of air transportation to the
extent and of the character and quality re-
quired for the commerce of the United States,
the Postal Service, and the national defense.
[49 U. S. C. 486 (b).]

STATEMENT

Petitioners challenge the correctness of the Court
of Appeals’ decision that the Civil Aeronautics Board
awarded excessive mail pay subsidy to petitioner
Western Air Lines (‘“‘Western’’). The court held
that, in determining Western’s subsidy need, the
Board had departed from the applicable statutory
standard in failing to offset part of the profit made
by Western on the sale of one of its routes to United
Air Lines (‘“‘United’’). A brief description of the
certification and route transfer proceedings is neces-
sary for an understanding of the case.

THE CERTIFICATION AND ROUTE TRANSFER
PROCEEDINGS

On November 11, 1944, the Board issued a certi-
ficate of public convenience and necessity to Western
for a new route (route 68) between Denver, Colorado,
and Los Angeles, California. Western Air Lines,
Denver-Los Angeles Service, 6 C. A. B. 199, affirmed
subnom. United Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
155 F. 2d 169 (C. A. D. C.). The Board selected

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Western over United, the principal other applicant,
because award of the route to United “would divert
so much traffic from Western as to seriously impair
that carrier’s ability to continue as a strong inde-
pendent air carrier in a position to compete for traffic
in the western section of the country,’ and would
make Western “dependent upon the Government for
substantial subsidies in the form of mail compensation
in order to provide the service contemplated in its
existing certificates.” 6 C. A. B. 210. The Board
concluded that maintenance of Western “as a strong
regional carrier in a position to compete effectively”
in its service area “outweighs any benefits which
might accrue from the establishment of [the] addi-
tional single-company service from Los Angeles to
the east via Denver” which United could provide.
Id. at 212.

Western did not inaugurate service over route 68
until April 1, 1946 (R. 59). Less than a year later
Western and United entered into an agreement,
subject to approval by the Board, for the sale of the
certificate and route, together with aircraft and
equipment used thereon, to United for $3,750,000.
The purchase price represented a substantial profit
to Western over the cost of the tangible property
to be transferred.?

On August 25, 1947, the Board approved the sale
as “consistent with the public interest.” United

? Route 68 was the only one on which Western made a
profit during 1946. During the nine months of that year
when the route was in operation, it earned approximately
$640,000. 8 C. A. B. 298, 301.

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Air Lines-Western Air Lines, Acquisition of Air
Carrier Property, 8 C. A. B. 298, 324. The Board
pointed out that Western’s president had testified
that in his view Western’s ‘dual role” as a regional
and a transcontinental carrier was ‘‘one of the pri-
mary causes” of the carrier’s financial difficulties; *
that Western should withdraw from the transconti-
nental field and ‘‘concentrate on a regional service’’; *
and that United’s routes made it the logical carrier
to take over route 68 (id. at 303). The Board noted
that the purchase price exceeded Western’s depre-
ciated original cost of the tangible property trans-
ferred by $2,000,000, of which $1,500,000 represented
the value of the route. Jd. at 312.5 It found, how-
ever, that sale of the route at a profit would not be |
“adverse to the public interest’ (id. at 324), since |
prohibition of certificate transfers ‘‘at a commercial |
profit” would eliminate the carriers’ “incentive’’ to
transfer routes to other carriers ‘‘who would be in a

3 Western had ‘major obligations” of several million dol-
lars coming due in February, 1947, which, if not extended
or met, “could have resulted in receivership or bankruptcy”.
Market conditions in January, 1947, precluded the carrying
out of a previously planned financing program for the
company. Western’s balance sheet as of February 28,
1947, showed current assets of approximately $3,800,000
and current liabilities in excess of $10,000,000, 8 C. A. B. 302.

4 He stated that effective development of Route 68 would
have required Western to undertake full transcontinental
operations at an estimated capital outlay of $85,000,000.
8C. A. B. at 302.

’The Board found that the $3,750,000 purchase price
was a fair one reached through arms-length bargaining.
8C. A. B. at 314-315.

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position to operate them with greater advantage to

the public interest,” and would “ ‘freeze’ the air

pattern of the Nation to its present design * * *”

(td. at 323). But, in order to prevent “inflation of

the investment rate base” and “potentially higher

charges to the public,” the Board required United

to make an immediate charge to surplus of the

$2,000,000 item of intangibles (id. at 318-319).
Chairman Landis, dissenting, disapproved the

transaction unless the purchase price were reduced by

the $1,500,000 representing the value of the route.

He stated that the parties should not be permitted to

“traffic in air certificates,” since Congress had stated

that there is “no private proprietary right in air

transportation that can be made the subject of barter

and sale—the subject of an additional claim against

the public” (id. at 344). He added that Western

“actually” would be “giving up very little” in re-

linquishing the $1,500,000, since under “any theory” |

that sum is ‘“‘profit to Western and as such is revenue

under section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act

which the Board must take into consideration in

fixing any need rate.” ‘The Board,” he concluded,

“thus must in the last analysis charge the subsidy

that Western will get and upon which it must depend

with that amount, so that in the end Western’s

acquisition of $1,500,000 becomes only a temporary

advance against future subsidy payments” (Jd. at

344-345).

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ee Sr een

THE MAIL PAY PROCEEDINGS

On April 26, 1944, Western petitioned the Board to
increase its mail pay (R. 15).° A temporary higher
rate was fixed by the Board in April 1947 (R. 44-48).
On December 31, 1948, the Board issued Tentative
Findings and Conclusions (R. 54) proposing total
subsidy mail pay of $4,252,000 for the period May 1,
1944, to December 31, 1948, together with an order
to show cause why the proposed mail pay award
should not be made final (R. 124-125).? In caleu-
lating this subsidy, the Board treated the entire
profit from the sale of route 68 as “other revenue of
the air carrier’ which, under Section 406 (b) of the
Act, would “serve to reduce Western’s ‘need’ for
mail compensation” (R. 68), and accordingly offset
the total profit in ascertaining the carrier’s need.

1. The Board’s First Decision.—After full admin-
istrative proceedings,? the Board issued its first
decision (R. 183-253). The Board again held that
Western’s entire net profit on the sale—which it
calculated at $1,099,000 (R. 196)*—constituted

6 Western was then on a so-called service or compensatory
rate, which the Board had fixed in November 1943. Western
Air Lines, Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 441.

7The Board also proposed a prospective mail pay rate to
become effective January 1, 1949 (R. 91-104). This rate
became final on May 6, 1949. Western Air Lines, Mai
Rates, 10 C. A. B. 285.

* Exceptions were filed to the tentative findings (R. 127),
hearings were held, briefs were filed, and the Board heard
oral argument (R. 185).

* Western’s book profit of $2,124,000 was reduced by a
number of offsets against such profit (R. 70, 82, 196-197,
212-220, 264).

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“other revenue” which should be offset in determin-
ing Western’s need for mail pay subsidy. The Board
stated that it was “clear that to the extent that
there was a profit [on the sale], Western’s need for
mail pay support was reduced accordingly” (R. 195).
Pointing out that the profit arose from the sale of
“air carrier property,” the Board refused to differ-
entiate between the tangible and the intangible
elements of the sale. It stated that these elements
“go together to make up one transaction”; that the
profit from the intangibles was no “less valid” a
source of other revenue than that from the tangibles,
since both were received “by virtue of benefits
accruing to Western from its certificate of public
convenience and necessity, which it received from
the Government”; that it would be “contrary to
the public interest’’ to use public funds to “subsi-
dize a need which had already been covered by profits
accruing from benefits under the certificate’; and
that offsetting the profit on the sale of the intangibles
“in no sense’ curtailed the carrier’s rights under its
certificate, which include the right to subsidy mail
pay “based upon need,” but merely offset against
these rights “all special benefits in the form of
profits realized by virtue of having been awarded
the certificate’ (R. 197-198).

The Board specifically rejected Western’s conten-
tion that inclusion of the total profit as “other
revenue’ would ‘adversely affect the incentive for
air carriers to accomplish necessary route adjust-

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ments through voluntary route transfers and merg-
ers or consolidations” (R. 198). The Board pointed
out that
The incentive of a carrier wishing to dispose
of a route or to merge is to correct a situation
which is inimical to its best interests, such as
the operation of an uneconomical route that
will mitigate against its over [ever] reaching
self-sufficiency. The incentive to divest itself
of such a route should be reinforced by the
realization that subsidy mail pay will not be
forthcoming to perpetuate an uneconomic route
pattern {ibid., emphasis added].
The Board further noted that the record did not
indicate that Western would not have sold the route
had it known that the profit would be treated as
“other revenue” for subsidy purposes (R. 198-199);
that Western had ‘‘no basis for believing otherwise”
(R. 199); and that the fact that the ‘outstanding
example” of an airline merger since the sale—the
purchase of American Overseas Airlines, Inc. by
Pan American Airways, Inc.—had been consum-
mated at book value indicated that the “profit
motive” is not such a ‘‘necessary consideration for
the accomplishment of route transfers or mergers as
Western would have us believe’’ (zbid.)?°.
The Board accordingly offset Western’s entire
profit of $1,099,000 in calculating that the carrier’s

The Board pointed out that in approving the sale of
route 68 it had not been ‘‘concerned with the issue of the
treatment of any profit realized by Western in relation to
its need for mail pay” (R. 196; see R. 262).

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break-even need was $2,087,000 (R. 229)." To this
the Board added $134,686 representing the carrier’s
estimated tax liability, and $1,358,840 representing
a 7% return for each of the years involved on the
carrier’s adjusted investment base ® (zbid.). Total
subsidy mail pay was thus fixed at $3,580,526, or
$671,474 less than the $4,252,000 temporary mail
pay that Western already had received (ibid.).

2. The Board’s Second Decision.—Exceptions to
the Board’s decision were filed by the Postmaster
General and by the carrier (R. 254-257), and the
Board heard oral argument (R. 258)." The Board’s
decision on the exceptions (R. 258-281) reversed its
prior holding, and refused to offset the $447,000
profit (R. 264) on the sale of the route in fixing
Western’s subsidy.

" The Board also offset other non-flight revenue, including
restaurant and concession income (R. 191-195). And, in
determining Western’s break-even point, the Board dis-
allowed certain expenses which did not meet the statutory
standard of “honest, economical, and efficient management.”
Thus, excessive maintenance costs were reduced (R. 207),
excess general and administrative expenses were scaled down
(R. 212), and depreciation on unneeded aircraft was dis-
allowed (R. 223).

% In determining Western’s investment ase, the Board
excluded certain items—such as excess aircraft—which did
not reflect “economical and efficient management”’ (R. 247).

8 The Air Transport Association of America, a trade asso-
ciation of air carriers, filed a brief amicus curiae supporting,
inter alia, Western’s contention that the profit from the sale
of the route was not “other revenue” (R. 258-259).

* In its second decision the Board for the first time referred
to its prior decision as a “tentative” one (R. 258). In its
first decision the Board had stated that the matter was then
before it “for our decision” (R. 185).

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The Board reaffirmed its prior holding that the
entire profit on the transaction—tangibles as well as
intangibles—constituted “other revenue”’ within Sec-
tion 406 (b) (R. 261).%° However, the Board distin-
guished between the two elements, and held that it
was “appropriate” to allow Western to ‘keep the net
profit from the sale of the intangibles” (R. 264).

The Board reasoned that the statutory requirement
that it ‘‘take into consideration” the ‘‘need’’ of the
carrier, together with all its other revenue, did not
require it to reduce the carrier’s mail pay “need”
with any part of such other revenue; that this was a
matter for its discretion; and that it might ‘take in”
such other revenue “in whole, in part, or not at all’’
(R. 262). The Board stated that it had approved
the sale of route 68 at a profit “because it would
provide the necessary incentive for Western to dispose
of the properties to another carrier which was in a
position to operate them with greater advantage” ;
that it was the Board’s “serious concern”’ in so doing
that unless Western were allowed a ‘‘commercial
profit,” the Board would be “thwarting the improve-
ment of the air pattern through voluntary action by
the carriers’ (R. 262-263); that if the Board were to

16 The Board stated that it could see “no distinction * * *
between the net revenues derived from the sale of tangibles
such as operating property and equipment, and the net
revenues received from the intangible elements of the sale
such as the earning power of the route. Both kinds of
revenue originated in the same transaction and augmented
the carrier’s net income. Both must be considered in
relation to the carrier’s ‘need’ ”’ (R. 261).

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“safeguard the incentive for voluntary route trans-
fers,”’ it could not refuse Western the right ‘‘to retain
at least some portion” of the profit (R. 264) ; and that,
although the tangible and intangible elements to-
gether “‘made up the single transaction,” they could
be separated to determine “whether, and to what
extent,” the other revenue should be offset against
Western’s ‘‘need”’ (zbid.).

The effect of the Board’s ruling on this issue was to
increase Western’s subsidy by $447,000 over the
amount allowed in the first decision."

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

On the Postmaster General’s petition to review, the
Court of Appeals unanimously held that the Board
had erred in failing to offset the $447,000 profit on the
sale of the route.” The court pointed out that the
Board had not found that “Western itself’? needed
the additional $447,000 subsidy, but only that the
additional amount was given “in order to encourage

The Board, after making further adjustments in the
carrier’s expenditures and tax allowance (R. 333-337),
awarded Western total subsidy mail pay of $3,917,361 (R.
337). Since Western previously had received temporary
mail pay of $4,252,000, the carrier was found to have
received an overpayment of $334,639 (ibid.).

The Postmaster General’s petition for reconsideration,
which challenged the refusal to offset the $447,000, was
denied by the Board without discussion of the issue (R.
333, 337).

” The carrier filed a separate petition to review, alleging
that the Board had awarded it insufficient subsidy. The
court rejected the carrier’s contentions (R. 345-348, 350-351)
See supra, p. 2,n. 1.

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other carriers (not Western) to follow a given course
of action” (R. 348-349). The court held that the
Act does not authorize the Board “to provide in-
centives to the industry generally’ for the develop-
ment of air transportation, but restricts subsidy
payments ‘to the need of each individual carrier to
maintain and continue a development program of its
own” (R. 349-350).

The court stated that it was erroneous to speak of
“offset[ting],” “‘deduct{ing],” or “recaptur[ing)’
profit by including it in revenue, since the need
contemplated by the Act was a “net figure’ which
appears ‘necessary over and above that which the
carrier has,” and not a gross figure from which offsets
or reductions were made (R. 351). The court added
that (R. 351-352):

* * * the passenger revenue, etc., is not
“offset” against or “deducted” from the need
of the carrier. None of the earned revenue is
recaptured. The bare, uncomplicated situa-
tion is that when the carrier has substantial
revenues from non-mail sources the margin of
its need for mail pay is less.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Our statutory arguments under Points I and II
are fully set forth in our brief in Nos. 222 and 223,
this Term, and are merely summarized here.

I. Mail pay is fixed by the Civil Aeronautics
Board either on a “‘service” rate, which constitutes
fair compensation for carrying the mail, or on a
“need” rate, which is an outright subsidy to enable

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the carrier to earn a stated return on its investment.
Section 406 (b) of the Act imposes a clear duty. on
the Board to limit subsidy to such amount as will
meet the carrier’s need as therein defined. In the
instant case, the carrier received subsidy designed to
give it an ample 7 percent return after taxes.

II. The Board declined to offset Western’s profit
on the sale of the route—admittedly ‘other revenue”
of the carrier—on the theory that the Act gives it
“discretion” to ‘take in ‘other revenue’ in whole, in
part, or not at all.” The Act, however, requires the
Board to offset all of the carrier’s other revenue, and
the Board has no discretion to offset only some of it.
Western’s profit from the sale of the route reduced
its need for subsidy from the public treasury just as
much as the prefits from the sale of equipment used
on that route, or from restaurant and slot machine
concessions. By failing to offset the profit on the
certificate, the Board gave Western $447,000 more
subsidy than it needed.

III. There is no issue here as to Western’s right
to ‘‘retain” any portion of the profits on the sale of
the route. Western retains every penny of that
profit. The only issue is how much additional money
Western is to receive as a subsidy from the public
treasury.

The extra subsidy was mot needed to induce
Western itself to sell the route. Indeed, the Board’s
decision makes it clear that Western was given the
additional subsidy in order to encourage other car-
riers to effect route transfers. The Act, however,

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makes the need of the individual air carrier the basis
for subsidy, and does not authorize the Board to
award subsidy to provide incentives to the industry
generally.

There is no basis for the Board’s only justification
for its refusal to offset, that other carriers would
refrain from making route adjustments if profits on
such transfers were not to be duplicated with subsidy.
The Board has adequate authority to encourage
route transfers through its other powers under the
Act. Retention of a route not economically adapted
to the carrier’s operations constitutes a failure of
“economical and efficient management” which should
result in reduction of subsidy. Needed changes in
the route pattern can also be effected by the Board
through its power under Section 401 (h) of the Act
to “alter, amend, modify, or suspend” any certificate,
in whole or in part. Moreover, mergers and consol-
idations can accomplish route alterations.

ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTION

In setting aside the Board’s order, the Court of
Appeals held that the Board had erred 'n awarding
Western an additional $447,000 subsidy “‘in order to
encourage other carriers (not Western) to follow a
given course of action” (R. 348-349). The Court
stated that the Act does not authorize the Board
“to provide incentives to the industry generally”’ for
the development of air transportation, but restricts
subsidy payments ‘“‘to the need of each individual

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carrier to maintain and continue a development pro-
gram of its own” (R. 349-350). While we believe
that the court was correct in this conclusion, we do
not rely solely on this basis to support the decision
below, but also rest on the broader ground that
under the Act the Board cannot award subsidy in
excess of a carrier’s need, and that in determining
such need the Board is required to offset all—and
not just a part—of the carrier’s other revenue.
Thus, even if the Board were correct in its contention
(Br. 26-27) that the incentive in this case was for
Western itself, and not for the industry generally—
which we dispute (see infra, pp. 23-26)—that fact
would not validate its refusal to offset the $447,000.

These same general statutory questions as to the
Board’s duty to offset all other revenue also are in-
volved in Nos. 222 and 223, which have been con-
solidated with the instant case for argument. We
have fully set forth our arguments on those issues
in our brief in that case, and will not repeat them
at length here. In sections I and II of this brief
we will merely summarize our position, and refer
the Court to the portions of our brief in Nos. 222
and 223 which discuss those issues in detail.

I.
SUBSIDIES IN THE FORM OF MAIL PAY CANNOT EXCEED
THE ‘“‘NEED’’ OF THE CARRIER

Section 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act re-
quires the Board, in fixing “fair and reasonable”
rates of compensation for the transportation of mail
by aircraft, to “take into consideration,” inter alia,

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19

* * * the need of each such air carrier for
compensation for the transportation of mail
sufficient to insure the performance of such
service, and, together with all other revenue
of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier
under honest, economical, and efficient man-
agement, to maintain and continue the de-
velopment of air transportation to the extent
and of the character and quality required for
the commerce of the United States, the
Postal Service, and the national defense.

In fixing mail pay, the Board has recognized the
distinction which the Act thus makes between com-
pensation sufficient (1) to insure the transportation
of mail, and (2) to enable the carrier ‘‘to maintain
and continue the development” of a national air
transportation system. Mail pay for economically
self-sufficient carriers is fixed on a so-called ‘service
rate.” This constitutes fair compensation for carry-
ing the mail, is based on mail miles flown, actual or
prospective, and supposedly contains no element of
subsidy. If, on the other hand, the carrier is not
operating profitably, then it is given what the Board
calls a “need rate.”’ This bears no relation to car-
riage of mail at all, but is an outright subsidy de-
signed to enable the carrier to meet its expenses, pay
its taxes, and earn a stated return on its recognized
investment base. (Brief, Nos. 222 and 223, pp.
17-18.) Western received ‘‘need’”’ mail pay in the
instant case designed to give it the 7 percent return
after taxes which the Board customarily allows for
past periods (R. 226).

i hiiainncaretecnstesiianteipinin

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Section 406 (b) imposes a clear duty on the Board
to limit subsidy to such amount as will meet the
carrier’s “need”’ as defined in that section. Although
“need” is not the only factor which the Act requires
the Board to consider, it plainly is a limiting one,
i. e., the Board cannot award subsidy in excess of
what the carrier actually needs. Congress could
hardly have intended, after providing the “carefully
worded ‘need’ formula which the Act sets for the
Board’s guidance in fixing the air mail ‘compensa-
tion’,”’ American Airlines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B.
323, 335, to permit the Board to disregard this
standard by determining and “considering” such
need, and then awarding a subsidy in excess thereof.
Plainly, the Act sets the carrier’s ‘‘need’’ as the
ceiling on subsidy mail payments. See Brief, Nos.
222 and 223, pp. 16-22.

Il.

SECTION 406 (B) REQUIRES THE BOARD, IN DETERMIN-
ING A CARRIER’S SUBSIDY NEED, TO OFFSET ALL—
NOT JUST SOME—OTHER REVENUE OF THE CARRIER
In fixing Western’s mail pay subsidy, the Board in

its initial decision first determined the carrier’s

break-even need by calculating the difference between
the carrier’s nonmail revenues and total allowable
expenses.'* These nonmail revenues included res-
taurant and concession income (R. 191-195) and the
entire profit on the sale of route 68 (R. 195-200), as
well as flight income. In holding that the restaurant
The Board disallowed certain expenses which did not

meet the statutory standard of “honest, economical, and
efficient management” (see supra, p. 12, n. 11).

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21

and concession income was “‘other revenue” for de-
termining mail pay need (R. 191), the Board relied
upon the “broad statutory language referring to all
other revenues,” and the “desirability of reducing
government support where the carrier has net income
available to it from other sources to support its certif-
icated operations * * *” (R. 193, italics in original).
And, in holding that the entire profit on the sale of
route 68 should be offset, the Board stated that it
“would be contrary to the public interest to use pub-
lic funds to subsidize a need which had already been
covered by profits accruing from benefits under the
certificate” (R. 198).

In its second decision, the Board again held that
the entire profit on the sale of route 68 was ‘other
revenue” within Section 406(b) (R. 261). However,
the Board for the first time distinguished between
the profit on the tangibles (equipment) and the
intangibles (certificate), holding that the former but
not the latter should be offset in calculating
break-even need. It did so on the novel theory that
Section 406(b) gives the Board “discretion” to “take
in ‘other revenue’ in whole, in part, or not at all”
(R. 262). We submit that this construction of the
Act is unwarranted, and that under the Act the Board
is required to include all other revenue, and has no
discretion to take it in “in whole, in part, or not at
all.”’

Section 406(b) defines the carrier’s need for subsidy
as an amount which, “together with all other revenue
of the air carrier,” is sufficient to enable the carrier

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to meet the statutory objectives. In other words,
the Board is directed to award subsidy in an amount
which, when added to all the carrier’s other, 7. e.,
non-mail pay, revenue, will provide it with funds to
enable it to “maintain and continue the development
of air transportation.” The “bare uncomplicated
situation is,” as the Court of Appeals stated, “that
when the carrier has substantial revenues from non-
mail sources the margin of its need for mail pay is
less” (R. 351-352). It was this “desirability of
reducing government support where the carrier has
net income available to it from other sources” that
presumably led Congress to require the Board to
offset all other revenue in determining subsidy need. |
The source of such other revenue is immaterial:
the significant fact is its amount. Western’s need
for subsidy was not increased because a portion of
its revenues in 1947 was derived from the sale of a
Government franchise. This revenue reduced the
carrier's need for subsidy from the public treasure
just as much as the revenue from the sale of the |
equipment used in operating under such franchise,”

22

'® In its second decision the Board, in offsetting the profit
on the tangibles, stated that it saw no reason “why the
carrier’s need should be duplicated” therewith (R. 264). The
Board consistently has offset profits on the sale of aircraft
and equipment to reduce a carrier’s subsidy need. Chicago
and Southern Air Lines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 161, 172
(1941); Colonial Airlines, Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 71, 77
(1942); Continental Air Lines, Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B. 825,
843 (1947) ; American Overseas Airlines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B.
695, 706 (1948). In Delta Air Lines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B.
645, 654 (1948), the Board offset net income derived from
an insurance settlement of the crash of one of the carrier’s
aircraft.

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a, —_ee en RO EE

or from the operations of airport restaurant and
slot machine concessions. When Congress used the
words ‘‘all other revenue’”’ in Section 406 (b), it
did not mean “all or some part of such other revenue.”’
(Brief in Nos. 222 and 223, pp. 30-45.)

The result of permitting the Board to ignore
portions of a carrier’s other revenue—for whatever
reason—is to give the carrier a subsidy in excess of its
needs. In the instant case the Board’s holding in
its first decision, not modified in its second decision
(R. 268), was that Western “needed” subsidy which,
together with all its other revenue, 7. e., the entire
profit on the sale of route 68, would give it a 7
percent return for the years 1944 through 1948,
and the Board awarded subsidy on that basis. By
subsequently refusing to offset the profit on the
intangibles, the Board in effect gave the carrier an
additional subsidy of $447,000. This results in a
return of 14.76 percent for 1947, the year in which
Western received the profit on the sale of route 68.
The Board, however, had already determined that
Western needed only a 7 percent return in that year.
By thus giving Western a subsidy $447,000 greater
than it needed, the Board departed from the statu-
tory requirement (see Point I, supra) that, subsidy
cannot exceed the need of the carrier.

III.

WESTERN DID NOT “NEED” THE $447,000 ADDI-
TIONAL SUBSIDY MAIL PAY, AND THE AWARD THERE-
OF WAS NOT MADE ON THE BASIS OF WESTERN’S
NEED

In refusing to offset the profit on the sale of the

certificate, the Board did not find that Western

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“needed” an additional subsidy of $447,000, or that
it ‘‘needed” a return of 14.76 percent in 1947 (see
supra, p. 23). On the contrary, the Board merely
stated that ‘“‘* * * if we are to safeguard the in-
centive for voluntary route transfers, we cannot now
refuse Western the right to retain at least some por-
tion of the net profit from the sale of Route No. 68”
(R. 264). But the Board’s policy of encouraging
voluntary route transfers does not establish the
‘need’ of the transferring carrier to receive extra
subsidy, and it is clear that Western did not need the
additional subsidy awarded in this case.

In the first place, the Board’s theory is predicated
on an erroneous assumption. ‘There is no question
here as to Western’s right to “‘retain’”’ any portion of
the proceeds of the sale of route 68.29 As the Court
of Appeals recognized, under a subsidy system
“{njone of the [carrier’s] earned revenue is recaptured”
(R. 351). Contrary to the Board’s suggestion (R.
263), Western “keeps” every penny of the $3,750,000
it received from the sale of route 68, including the
$1,099,000 profit. The sole question here is how

® The correctness of the Board’s permitting Western to
sell its certificate at a profit is questionable. Section 401(j)
of the Act, which provides that no certificate shall confer any
“proprietary” or “property” right on the holder, seemingly
precludes such trafficking in certificates. Notes, 48 Co-
lumbia Law Review 88(1948), 61 Harvard Law Review 523
(1948); see dissent of Chairman Landis in the route transfer
case, 8 C. A. B. at 333-334, 341-345.

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25

much additional money Western is to receive as a
subsidy from the public treasury. Or, putting it
differently, the question is whether the Government
js to duplicate through subsidy a portion of the profit
previously realized by the carrier on the sale of its
government franchise.

There is no showing that the extra subsidy was
necessary to induce Western to make the transfer
of route 68. Indeed, in its first decision the Board
flatly found that (R. 198-199)—

There is no indication in the record that
had Western been certain that the profit it
would realize on the sale would be considered
“other revenue” it would not have sold the
route. In fact, it had no basis for believing
otherwise when it negotiated the sale.

That finding has not been repudiated, and clearly is
correct. As the Board itself recognized in its de-
cision in the route transfer case (8 C. A. B. at 302-
303) and concedes before this Court (Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, No. 224, p. 11), it was Western’s
critical financial situation and its desire to dispose
of a route not adapted to its long-term development
as a regional carrier which prompted the sale.
Moreover, Western could hardly have anticipated
that the Board would exclude the profit from con-
sideration for mail pay purposes. The clear warn-
ing in Chairman Landis’ dissent in the transfer case
that the transfer profit would reduce need mail pay

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26

went unanswered in the majority opinion.” The
only Board decision that had dealt with the question
up to that time included profits on the sale of a route
in determining the carrier’s need. Inland Air Lines,
Mail Rates, 1 C. A. A. 155, 162-163 (1939). Thus
it cannot fairly be said that Western ‘‘needed”’ this
extra subsidy even in the special sense that, without
it, the carrier would not have sold the route.

Nor is exclusion of such profits justified as a means
of encouraging route transfers generally. For, as the
Court of Appeals correctly held, the Act does not
authorize the Board “to provide incentives to the
industry generally,’ but restricts subsidy payments
“to the need of each individual carrier to maintain
and continue a development program of its own”
(R. 349-350). And it is clear that the Board awarded
Western additional subsidy “in order to encourage
other carriers (not Western)”’ to effect route trans-
fers.

In its second decision, the Board (R. 265)—

emphasized that our decision not to include
the net profit from the sale of intangibles was
reached solely because we are thus seeking to
encourage improvement of the air route pat-

*1Chairman Landis pointed out in his dissenting opinion
that “under any theory” the $1,500,000 was “revenue under
section 4(6(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act which the Board
must take into consideration in fixing any need rate. The
Board thus must in the last analysis charge the subsidy that
Western will get and upon which it must depend with that
amount, so that in the end Western’s acquisition of $1,500,000
becomes only a temporary advance against future subsidy
payments.” 8C. A. B. 344-345.

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27

tern through voluntary route transfers by
other air carriers [emphasis added].

The Board also stated that it had permitted West-
ern a “commercial profit” in selling route 68 to pre-
vent “thwarting the improvement of the air pattern
through voluntary action by the carriers,” and that
the incentive of profit from a route sale should be
“preserved here’’ in order “to continue to encourage
voluntary action by the carriers” (R. 263). In other
words, the Board gave Western additional subsidy of
$447,000 in order to preserve the incentive for other
carriers to sell their routes at some future date.”
The Act, however, makes the ‘“‘need of each such air
carrier’ (emphasis added) the basis for awarding
subsidy. Plainly, Western cannot be said to have
needed the additional subsidy because other carriers
might otherwise be discouraged from effecting future
route transfers.

Furthermore, there is no basis for the Board’s
assumption that other carriers would refrain from
making route adjustments if profits on such transfers
were not to be duplicated with additional subsidy.
As the Board noted in its first opinion (R. 199), the
only major airline acquisition during the period 1947-
1951—the purchase of American Overseas Airlines
by Pan American Airways—was consummated on
the basis of approximate book value, and raised no
issue as to profit on intangibles. North Atlantic

® Indeed, the Board recognized in its second decision that
in approving the sale of route 68 it had not been “concerned
* * * with the ultimate treatment of the profit which was ‘
to be realized by Western * * *” (R. 262; see R. 196).

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28

Route Transfer Case, 11 C. A. B. 676, petitions to
review dismissed for want of jurisdiction, sub nom.
Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 184
F. 2d 66 (C. A. 2), certiorari denied, 340 U. S. 941.
This fact, the Board stated, indicated that “there
were sufficient incentives to negotiate this transaction
on the part of both parties which outweighed the
consideration of a profit,” and that ‘the profit motive
is [not] such a necessary consideration for the accom-
plishment of route transfers or mergers as Western
would have us believe” (R. 199).

The Board has adequate authority to encourage
route transfers through its other powers under the
Act without having to resort to subsidies from the
public treasury to accomplish this end. The Act
requires carriers claiming subsidy to meet the stand-
ard of “honest, economical and efficient manage-
ment.”” Retention of a route not economically
adapted to the carrier’s operations constitutes a
failure of ‘economical and efficient management”
just as much as operation of an excessive number of

* Whatever significance the granting of additional subsidy
once may have had as a means of encouraging route transfers,
it appears to be of diminishing importance today. For more
and more of the major domestic carriers have, as they
achieved economic self-sufficiency, shifted from a need to a
service basis. Civil Aeronautics Board, Administrative
Separation of Subsidy from Total Mail Payments to United
States Air Carriers, September 1953 Revision, p.3. Subsidy,
of course, can be used to encourage route transfers only as
long as the carrier is on a need rate.

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29

flights,“ payment of excessive salaries,” retention of
unnecessary aircraft,”* or unduly high maintenance
charges,” The Board hasreduced subsidy payments to
take account of the foregoing management inefficien-
cies. There is no reason why similar adjustments in
subsidy mail pay cannot and should not be made with
| respect to uneconomical routes‘that a carrier refuses
torelinquish. Since Western had taken the position
| in the route transfer case that it no longer could operate
Route 68 effectively unless it went into the trans-
| continental field and acquired substantial additional
equipment which it then was not in a position to
acquire, retention of the route under those circum-
stances would itself have constituted a failure of
“economical and efficient”? management.
We think the complete answer was given by the
Board itself in its first decision. In reply to West-
ern’s argument that inclusion of the profit as ‘‘other
revenue” would adversely affect carriers’ incentives
voluntarily to adjust route patterns, the Board
stated:

* Capital Airlines, Mail Rates, 10 C. A. B. 705, 708-712.

*5 Pioneer Air Lines, Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B. 175, 185; Trans-
Texas Airways, Mail Rates, 12 C. A. B. 101, 110.

** In the instant case, Western “moved quickly” to reduce
the size of its fleet of DC-4 aircraft following a “rapid drop
in traffic volume”’ in the fall and winter of 1946-1947 (R.
63-64).

” Northeast Airlines, Mail Rates, 9 C. A. B. 291, 296-304.
In the instant case the Board disallowed certain excessive
maintenance expenditures by Western (R. 212).

Sele

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The incentive of a carrier wishing to dispose
of a route or to merge is to correct a situation
which is inimical to its best interests, such as
the operation of an uneconomical route that
will mitigate against its over reaching self-
sufficiency. The incentive to divest itself of
such a [uneconomical] route should be rein-
forced by the realization that subsidy mail pay
will not be forthcoming to perpetuate an uneco-
nomic route pattern [R. 198, emphasis added].
Indeed, the Board’s settled policy to “reduce the
extent of their [carriers’] dependence upon compensa-
tion from the Government,” ** which the Board
reasserted in its first decision (R. 193), requires such
a result.

The Board also can effect desirable changes in the
route pattern through its power under Section 401
(h) (supra, p. 3) to “alter, amend, modify, or sus-
pend” any certificate, in whole or in part, “if the
public convenience and necessity so require.” Pur-
suant thereto the Board recently suspended the
authority of two trunkline carriers to serve particular
points authorized under their certificates in order to
allow local carriers to serve the same places. Western
Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 196 F. 2d 933
(C. A. 9), certiorari denied, 344 U. S. 875; United
Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 198 F. 2d 100

*% Pan American-Grace Airways, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B.
550, 589 (1942).

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31

(C. A. 7). Furthermore, appropriate mergers and
consolidations, which the Board has not hesitated to
suggest in the past,” afford another method of
accomplishing route alterations without any drain
on the public purse.

We submit that the Board had no basis, eviden-
tiary or otherwise, for a conclusion that Western
needed the additional subsidy of $447,000. In its
first opinion the Board clearly recognized that fact.
But in the second opinion the Board shifted from the
statutory test of need to the erroneous policy concept
that having allowed Western a ‘‘commercial profit’’
in the route transfer case, it should permit the
carrier to “retain’’ some of such profit. The Act,
however, requires that all other revenue be taken
into account in determining need, and confers no
discretion upon the Board to offset such other
revenue “in whole, in part, or not at all’ (R. 262).
In awarding Western an additional $447,000 subsidy
to encourage changes in the route pattern, the
Board exceeded its statutory authority.

* See the Board’s show cause order suggesting the com-
bination of Continental Air Lines and Mid-Continent Air-
lines. Order No. E-5803, Docket No. 5173, October 23,
1951. The proceeding was dismissed following the proposed
voluntary merger of Mid-Continent and Braniff Airways.
Order E-6107.

A recent comment suggests a possible merger program for
the airlines. 60 Yale L. J. 1196, 1213-1217 (1951).

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32

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Rosert L. STERN,
Acting Solicitor General.
. Srantey N. BaARNEs,
J Assistant Attorney General.
DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,
v Murray L. Scuwartz,
Special Assistants to the Attorney General.
Ross RIz.ey,
Solicitor.
FREDERICK E. BatRvs,
Associate Solicitor.
EuGENE J. BRAHM,
Assistant Solicitor,
Post Office Department.

Vv

DECEMBER 1953.

U &. OVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1983

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386408_0014%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
