# Transcript of Record — Burns v. Wilson

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Transcript of Record
- **Published:** January 1, 1953
- **Citation:** 346 U.S. 137

## Text

SUPREME COURT.U.S.° -

“TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD.»

v
¢

Supreme Court of the United States }
OCTOBER TERM, 1952

"9

No. 422, 7 ¢ eer

‘SoM Ww. BURNS § AND HERM AN B/DENGIS, JR.
, - PETITIONERS,

¢ *, “ under color of authority of the United States, in the-custody
of Headquarters, Japan Logistical Command, APO 503.

Said Command is under the authority offand responsible to,
Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense; Thomas K. Fin-
letter, Seeretary of the Air Force; and General Hoyt. S.
Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air. Foree, all of
i are within the jurisdiction of this Court.

The cause or pretext of such detention is by. virtue
sah ?| of ‘A trial by genera] court-martial for dae and
rape in.violation of Artiele of War 92 on May 27-30, 1949, at
Headquarters, 19th Bombardment Wing (Medium), APO
304, resulting in. petitioner’s conviction and sentence of
death. The court. martial proceedings were approved by

H
.

‘ , 7 : ,

2 % o

:
the reviewing authority, and the record forw -arded. to W ashi-
ington for appellate review in the office’ of the Sudge Advo-

cate General, United States Air Force. On March 14,1950,

a Board of Revi iew, and on 18 August; 1950, the Judicial:

Council, 4 Court Martial Reports (AF) 907, found the con-
viction and seftence legally sufficient and recommended con-
firmation. The Judge: ‘Advocate General concurred in these

conclusions, “and-on August 3, 1951, the conviction and

seaifence were confirmed and ordered executed by the Presi-
dent pursuant to Article of War38. Petitioner made ap-
plication. to the Judge Advocate General for a new, trial,
pursuant to Section 12, Act.of May 5, 1950 (formerly Artiéle
of War 53), and on January 28, 1952, his petition for a new

‘trial was denied. Petitioner has now exhausted all avail-

wble remedies provided by fhe military, and his’ only re-
course is to seek redress in this Court by way of shis-peti-
tion. — .. .
4, All of said actions resulting tn the contifining re-
straint and imprisonment of your petitioner are illegal and
in violation of the Artictes of War and the Fifth Amend-

‘ment. to the Constitution of the United States in that the

original conviction and sentence by court martial was be-
yond the jurisdiction of the U nited States Air Force and
Was secured in a manner violative of péetitioner’s tights asa
citizen of the United States, as a member of the United

States Air Force and as a person subject to laws and regula-

tions of an insular possession of the United States.

5. On December 11, 1948? Ruth. Farnworth, a white
civilian worker on Guam, was found missing under cireum-
stances les ding to the belief tnat a crime had been com-
mitted. On about December 13, she was found in a wooded
area near the place where she worked. She was’ unconscious
and ina critical condition.. As a result of medical examina-

{fol. 3] tion, it was concluded that she had. been raped and -

Beaten, She was taken to a hospital and on December 14.

- died without regov ering consciousness,

. On January. 7, 1949, military authorities turned peti-
Sonse over to civil authorities on the island of Guam, who
placed him under arrest and held him-in detention. These
officials were officers: and men of the United States Navy
and subject to the orders of the President of .the United
States and his appointees. For the next several weeks,

3
3 e

petitioner was held incommunicado in a death cell at Agana
p jail without process, subjected to continuous questioning,
heaten, denicd-steep and edible food. “(Affidavit of FE. 4.
Grimmett filed herewith as Exhibit A) “He was not allowed
to consult counsel during the entire period he was held in
custody by the authorities-of Guam, and in fact petitioner
was not furnished counsel nor allowed to obtain the advice
of counsel until one day before his trial by general court
martial which began, as heretofore alleged, on May 27, 1949.
(Exhibit A) On or about January 360, 1949, petitioner was
returned by the authorities of Guam to the custody of
Headquarters, 19th Bombardment Wing (Medium), U nited
States Air Force. On February 20, 1949, be, was officially
charged with rape and murder and after investigatfon by
military authorities, trial by general court martial was or-
dered, and petitioner was tr ied and conv icted as heretofore
ier
Petitioner ‘was apveaied, detained, interrogated ane
intimidated ’ in violation of the Penal Code of Guam in force
in January 1949, namely Sections 686, TSO and 825 thereof,
and.the Bill of Rights of Guam (set forth in Appendix
hereto) and the Constitution of..the United States. As a
result of these unlawful tactics, Herman Dennis and Calvin
{fol 4] Dennis, who were arrested: af the same time and
subjected to the same treatment, signed coerced confessions
and implicated petitioner in the crime for which he was
finally charged and convicted: The fruits of these unlawful
activities were ysed by the U nited States Air Force neainst
petitioner in his trial by ge ‘neral-eourt martial i in violation
of the Con: titution of the U nited States and the. Articles-of |
War. Further, upon petitioner’s being taken tn custody by
the United States Air Force, continued pressure dnd intimj-
dation were used to gethim to*confess: implication In the
ay ime. (Exhibit A’ Affidyi its of Edward Daly, filed herewith
as Exhibits C, Dand B) Failing in this, ihe military author-
ities used threats and promises in an attempt to get Calvin
Dennis (Affidavit ef Calvin Dennis, fileasherewith as Ex-.
hibits G and H) and: Herman P. Dennis, Jr. (f#xhibit A
and Affidavit. of Herman -P. Dennis, Jr. filed herewith as -
Exhibit B) to testifv against petitioner at his court-martial
trinl, Both the police authorities of Guam and the military
authorities of the Uyited States Air Forée contrived a con-

.

4

. . ” "¢ : . . . . .
viction through the pretense of 4 trial and the presentation

of testimony known to be perjured in violation of the Arti-_

cles of War and the Fifth Amendment to the (' onstitution of
the United States.

8, Although petitioner was tried by general court martial
for a‘eapital offense, counsel furnished him had only one
day to prepare his defefise, thereby deprivin® petitioner of
his right to effective counsel. (Exhibit A) Important_evi-
dence tending to show his innocence. was Suppressed. (Ex-
hibits C, Dand FE) The testimony of Calvin Dennis against

him at this trial resulted from threats and promises of ~

special consideration if Calvin Dennis agreed to testify

against your petitioner. (Exhibits A,C,D,@GandH) This

testimony, Calvin Dennis, how by his voluntary sWorn

[fol. 5] affidavit hereto attached, admits was pe rehired and
that any and all statements he made intending to establish
the guilt of petitioner were false, all-of which is in viola-

tion of petitioner's rights.of due-process as secured by fhe; -

(C‘onstitution arid laws of the United States and the Ar ticles |

of = ar.
The entire trial was conducted in an atmosphere af

terror, hysteria and vengeance (Exhibits A, C,D, and affi- -

davit of Mary L. Hill; filed herewith as F shibit F) thereby
preventing petitioner from being afforded due process gs
euaranteed by the Corfstitution of the United States and
rendering his trial, conviction and sentence wholly uncon-

_ stitutional and void. - : ee ss

10. Except for testimony of Calvin .Dennis, which the

- jitter now admits Was perjured, no te;fimony in the record
in any way directly connects this petitioner with the ¢rime —

‘for whieh he was charged‘ and convicted. Petitioner then

and now, professes that he is completely innacent of the

crime for whieh he stands convicted and condemned to

death.

11. The enmulative effect.of all of the above-stated con-—

diti as was to make petitiotier’s trial a mgsk for the denial
of petitioner's constitutional rights. Petitioner contends
tliat he ts entitled as an American citizen and an airnian in

the United States Air Force to a fair and impartial trial in’ -
accordance with the guarantees of the C oustitution of the -

United States and the Articles of War, and in that he was

~ oe

denied these fundamental rights, he is entitled to release
from custody of respondents, a

Wherefore, your petitioner prays:

1. That a writ of habeas corpus issue out of this Court
directed to Robert A: Lovet tt, Secretary of Defense; Thowias
K: Finletter, Secretary -of he Air. Force; General. Hoyt
Ss. V andenberg, ( ‘hief of Staff, United States Air Force; or
-[fol. 6] some person and persons acting in their place and
stead, requiring ihe to order He: idquarters, Japan Lowisti-

cal Command to produce the hody of your petitioner before |

this Court at sonle time gonvenient to he designated, to
abide hy what shall be awarded by the Court in’ premises,
to discharge petitioner from ; said imprise apmeat, and for

am: general and equitable relief.

2. That in the alternative, a rule to show cause why such

writ should not issue directed to said respondents he
granted herein. 3 : we

3. That a hearing be had before this Court fo i inquire into
and determine the legality of said’ detention. and that pend-
ing said liearing, shid respondents, and each of them, bé sre.

quired to stay execution of the sentence of death agi inst the |

petitioner pending final determination of thispetition.

4. That upon final hearng, petitioner may be discharged
from said custody.

5. For‘other and further relief as to the Court may seem -
meet and proper, _ yh

Fr ‘iat D. Reeves, 1901 lith Street, N. W.; W ashing-
n, D. C.; Thurgood Marshall, Robert L. Carter,
Pa West 40th Street, New York 18, New York, At-
torneys for Petitioner. ©

[ fol. al In’ THE Unirep States District Cov RT =

&° “+

[Title omitted]

a : ~ fs a , J
Mortos to DiscHarce THE RULE to SHow Causk anp Dis-
MISS THE PETITION For Writ or Hapeas Corpis

Gomes now the respondents, roRert A, Lovett; Seeretar v
of Detense 37 Thoms IX. Finletter, Secretary of the “Air

ih i | i | D7

i?

* gi

;
6

Forse: an General Hoyt S. V: pn No x, Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force, and by their attorneys move to —
discharge the rule to show cause aud dismiss the: petition
filed herein. because the. petition fails to state,a claim upon
which relief can be granted as hereinafter more specifically
indicated. Piet fe ;

1.4? he petition raises no questions Peviewable by this
court inasmuch as it fails to allege that the court: martial
was improperly constitgted, tHat the court-martial” was
without, jurisdiction over the offenses and the petitioner or
that the sentence adjudged by the court. anartial Was mau:
thorized by law.' |

oy habeas corpus ‘the civil courts” may exercise no
supervisory or eorrecting power over the proceedings of a
court: martial. «The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdigtion.*

‘In this case, the court-martial was lawfully consti- °
tuted, had. jurisdiction of the petitioner and the offenses
charged, and acted withjn its lawful powers ‘in adjudging oa
“the sentence, The correction of anv errors it-may haye
‘committed: is for ‘the military authorities which are: alone
authorized to review its decision. :

Py fol. 8] °4.-The court-martial proceedings have been exten-
“sively reviewed in accordance with the Articles of War and
the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1949. The petitioner was.
tried on Maw 27, 28,. and 30, 1949, at. Headquarters, 19th

Jombardment Wing, Medium, APO 334,: by a general court-
martial lawfully appointed by the’ Commanding General,
Twentieth Air Force. The petitioner was charged with rape,
and murder of one Ruth Farnsworth, in violation of the

' Hiatt v. Brown, 339° U S108, 94 Led. ene eee |
rehearing- denied, 339 U.S. 980, 4 L. ed. 1356, 70 S. Ct. 672
(1950), |

* Hiatt v. Brown, supra, 339 0 ‘S.at 11; United’States v.
Grimley, 187 U.S. 147, 100, 34 I. ed. = 6387, 11 S..Ct. 54
(1890). :

.. * Matt v. Brown, supra; Re Yamashita, ; oat GU.S.-1, 8,

9, 90 LL. ed. 499, 505, D006 », O68 SG. Ct. B40 (1946); Swaim Vv.

: t hited Ptates ‘be, 160 U s. om Ye, 562, 4] L. ed, B23, ITs A nt &. 9 448
(1897).

‘ ws
62nd Article of War (10: USC 1564), found guilty of both’
offenses and seritencedl to.death. The record of trial, a’
copy of which has been. filed with the petition for writ of
habeas corpus “in this action, was reviewed by the Staif
Judge Advocate, Twentieth Air Force, in accordance with
the: provisions of Article of War 47: (10 USC 1518), and,
after said review the sentencé was approved by the réeceiv-
ing authority, the, Conimanding General, Twentieth: Air.
Force. A copy of the review of the Staff Judge Advocate.
and the approving action of the reviewing authority are at-
tached hereto as Exhibits ‘‘A’’ and “BY respectively and
these Exhibits. as well as Exhibits “(C’’; “Dy EB’,
“E*) and ‘*G"" hereinafter referred to are by reference
made a part hereof as fully as though rewritten herein.
The, record of trial was then forwarded to the Office of
The-Fadge Advocate General, United States Air Force, for
review hy a Board of Review pursuant to the provisions of »
Article 9f War 50. (10 USC 1521). After comprehensive
Sctisidvdation of the record of trial by the Board-of Re-
View, whieh.review ineluded submission of brief and argu.
ment by the ‘attorney for petitioner before the Board, the
Board of. Reyiew on March 14, 1950, held the record-of trial
legally ‘sufficient to support the findines of guilty and the
sentence tnd to warrant the confirmation, thereof. ~ (A
copy of the opinion of the Board of Review is attached
hereto, marked Exhibit i Sead | The record of trial Was teen
rev fewed by the Judicial Council, Office of The Jude Ad-
vocate General, United States Air F orce, pursuant ta the
provisions of Article of War 48 (10 USC 1519) and 507710
USC 1521) which review included submission of brief and’
oral argument by the attorney for petitioners The Judicial
[fol. 9] Council, on August 18, 1950, held the record. of trial
legally sufficient to-support. the findings of guilty and the
sentence, and. to. warrant confirmation thereof, pit subi-
mitted its opinion, (a copy of which is appended as Exhibit.
“D™) to The Judge Advocate General, United States Air
Force. On November 14, 1950, pursuant to the provisions > ‘
of Article of War 50 (10 USC 1521) the reeord of trial, the
opinions of the Board of Review and of the -Fudicial Coun
ei, and the reécomme dations of The Judge Advocite Gen.
eral, United States Air Foree, (a copy of the latter is at-

.

= ° ‘ Pa mes ° : ? .- "
‘tached hereto gs Exhibit ‘‘F’’) were @ransmittg@l to the .
Secretary, of the Air Foree for the action of the”’President.-
On August- J 1951, the death sentence was cqnfirmed by the’

. President pursuant ‘to the provisions of Article of War 48
(10 USC 1519) and. ordered ‘to be carried into execution.
‘A vopy.of the Action hy the President is appended herefias

Exhibit “F’’:. By petition of August 31, 1951, to The Judge

. Advocate General, United States Air Foree, the petitioner
requested any and all relief afforded by Article of War 53
(10 USC 1525}°(Now Section 12, Act of 5+ ‘May 1950). In
support of such petition were raised allegations similar to
those presented in the petition for habeas corpus. The
Judge Advocate General appointed a ‘board of officers to
hear argument by counsel for petitioner, consider all evi-
dence, and make recommendations. After -re-examination
by The Judge Advocate General, United States Air Foree,

of the entire record of trial and the independent investiga-
tions conducted ‘at his request in the ligkt of the grounds |

set forth in the petition, The Judge Advocate General,
United States Air Force, denied‘the application :for relief
on January 28,-1952.° A copy of his action and: the Memo-
randum of C pinion relative to the denial of such relief is
appended hereto as Exhibit ‘*G’’..

Charles M. Irelan, United States Attorney, Wash-

ington, D. C.; B. M. Landé&man, Assistant 4/nited

States Attorney, Washington, D. €., Attorneys
for Re ‘spondents. ;

- Of, Counsel, Walter Kiechel, te ea Colonel,
USAR,.

USAF, Office of The Judge Advocate General,
Washington, D. C. ;

~
,

ee

(fol. 10] In tue-Untrep Staves District Court

No. — a
« Herman P. Dennis, Jr., Petitioner,
ay naga g
ee |

Rosen “A. Lovet, Seeretary of. Defense; THomas K. Fiy-
- LETTER, Secretary of the’ Air Force; Genegat Hoy S.
VANDENBERG, Chief of Statf,. United States ‘Air Force

-Pertrion FOR W RIT OF Hase AS Corprs

To: the United St tates District Court ‘for the District of
Columbia | ;

Comes now petitioner, Heyman P. Dennis, Ie: by-his at-
torneys, Frank D. Reeves, Thurgood Marshall and Robert
L. ¢ ‘arter, and respectfully shows that:

1. He is a Negro, a citizen of the U nited States and a
member of the United States Atr Force, AF 18 101 483. At
the time 6f his court-martial conviction, which is assailed
herein, he was stationed on the island of Guam, an insular
possession of the United States, as a private in the 12th
Air-Ammunitién Squadron, APO 264.

2. Tle is unjustly and unlawfully detained and imprisoned
by color of authority of the U nited States, in the: custody
of Headquarters of the Japan Logistical Command, APO
503. Said Command is under the authority of, and respon-
sible to, Robegt a. ‘Lovett, Secretary of Defe nse; Thomas
‘K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force; and General Hoyt
S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States. Air Force, all
of whem are within the jurisdiction of the Uuited States
-Distrivt Court for the Qystrict of € ‘olumbia, ‘

[fol. 114 3. The cause or pretext of such detention is by
virtue of a trial by general court-martial ori May 9-16, 1949,
at Headquarters, 20th Air Force APO 234, where the peti-
tioner was charged with murder and rape in, violation of
Article of War 92. This trial resulted in.the petitioner’s ’
conviction and sentence of death. The court-martial pro-
ceedings were approved by the reviewing authority, and the

ee 2

0 . “ , 4 iA

“record forwarded to Wi ashington for appellate review in the

office of thé Judge Advocate. Generak: United States: Air
Faree. On November 29, 1949, a Board of Review, and on
July 15, 1950, the Judicial Council, 4. Court-Martial Reports |
(AF )872, found the conviction and sentence legally sufficient
and recommended confirmation. The Judge Advocaté Gen-
eral concurred an these cone usignss and on August ! 3, 1951,
the conviction and sentence was confirmed: and Sieve
‘executed hy the President, pursuant to Article of War 38.
_Petitioner made application t6 the Judee Advocate. General
“for a-new tri ial, pyrsuant. to Section 12, Act of May 5, 1950
(formerly Article of War55), andon January 28, 1952, this
petition was denied. Petitioner has e shausted all available

_ remedies in the guilitary establishment, and .his only re-

course is now to seek redress i in ‘this € ourt by way of this -
—_— me A a
All of said actions iavaliies ir the continuing restraint
ee iiprisonment of your petitioner are illegal and in viola-
tion of the Constitution of the United States and the Fifth
Amendment thereof, in that the original alleged conviction
and sentence by court-martial’ was beyond the ‘jurisdiction
and lawful authority of the United States Air ‘Force and
seeured in a manner violative of petitioner’s rights as -a_
citizen of tlie United States, as a‘member of the United
States Air Foree and asa person subject to Ho tid regula-
tions of an insular possession of the United’ States and. are *
without authority andesvoid.. ,
5. On December ) 1948). Ruth: Fransworth, a white
civilian-worker on Guam, was found missing under cire um-

“stances leading to the. belief that @A cringe had hetn’ com-

tfol. 12] mitted. On December 13, she was found int
wooded area near the plree where she. worked, She was
uncanscious and ina eritie

iow: ri oe -Asa result of medi-
cal examination, it was con®fided that she had been raped

~ and beaten. She was taken to a hospiti il ane on December

14 she. died without” recover me CONSCIOUSNESS,
6. On January 7, 1949, petitioner was arrested without

“being informed of the chaeged against him (R. 218, 226)

and detained by police authorities on the island’ of Gian, a
United States posséssion under American sovereignty,
These police authorities were officers and men of the Unite id

11
States Navy and subject to the orders of the President of
the United States and his appointees, Petitioner was held
until January 17, 1949, before being arraigned by any

authority (R. 297), He--was held incommunicado without

process, (R. 193-4, 203-4, 214, 221, 244, Affidavit of. Haward

.Daly field, herewith as Exhibit C,>and Affidavit of BE. BE.

~ Grimmett filed herewith as Exhibit A) subjected a con.

rT . =>
of WE ee

‘tinuous questioning, (R. 197, 228, 240-2, Exhibit A, C and _

Affidavit of petitionér filed herewith as Exhibit B), beaten,
(Exhibits B, C, and: Affidavit of Mary. L-fiill filed herewith
as Exhibit F) denied sleep and food csi A) and placed
in'solitary confinement (R, 193-4, 203-4, 214, 22144, Exhi-

bits A and C). He was not allowed to ‘consult, counsel dey”

spite his requests durigg the entire time he wis héld in
custody by the authoritips of Guam (R. 232, Exhibits Ay ye
On or about January 29, 1949) petitioner was returned by
the authorities of Guam to the enstody :of. Headquarters,

20th Air Foree, APO 234 (R. 331). On February 1, 1949,
charges against the petitioner were fiked by the Air Foree.’
‘After an investigation by military authoritiés the ease was

referred’ for trial on March 21, 1949.) Amended charges
were filed on April 14, 1949. Defense attorneys were not
appointed-until April 8, 1949, and petitioner did not have

the opportunity to receive advice of counsel until shortly

before his trial convened. on May 9, 1949 (Exhibit C).

[fol 13] -7, During the period of his detention by the naval

eatin 's on Guam, petitioner withort being adequi itely
advised of his rights, (R. 218, 219-23) 227§7), 242-3 , 254,
279, Exhibits A, «> F) as required under’ Article of: WwW ar 24.

‘andthe Fifth Amendment te the Constitution of the United.

States, made four confessions to the poiice. authorities on
or about January 11, 12 and 13th. These confessions were
the result of physical duress, protracted interrogation, the

‘use of a le detector, threats that if he did. not confess, he
would receive the death sentence, promises of lenieney anil

°
special consideration if he did confess and the use of var 1OMS
ges rifuges (R. 188-198, 230 ff, 256-8, 239 ff, Exhibits A,
BF). I ee was also told what to say in his ei.

pasa (E. 191-2, 210, 245, Exhibit. B and Affidavit of peti

tioner filed herein “as Malibit G) anid: subse iyeytly both
hefoire and at his tri: ilall of his confessions were repudiated

v

. For other and further relief‘as tothe ogee may seem °

. meet and proper.’

z
vo

Frank D. Reeves, i901 11th Street, NW. . Was hi.
~ ington, D.C. Thurgood Marshall, Robert L. Carter,
>. 90 West 40th Street, New Y - 18, New Y ork, At-
a torneys for Pgtitianer.

>

[fol.17] - Ix tar Unirep States Distnict Court
= eee . - ¢ : >
i cee oe oinitted | aie
Mortox To ) Dascrrance THE Row ro Suow Cause anp Dismiss
THe Petition.ror Writ, oF ‘Haweas: ‘Corpus-—F ebruary 8,
1952, as ‘ se, 3

2

oa ¢ omes now the resjibiidents, Robert A. Lovett, Secretary

of Defense; Thofnas K, Finletter, Sec retary. of the Air

Force; and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Stadf,

Uyited States Air Foree, and by: their a¥torneya move to
discharge the rule to show cause aid dismiss the pefition

filed-herein becatise the petition fails to state a elaim upon

which relief can tie kot at as hereinafter more specifically .
incfeated : |

i

“

1. The petition raises no questions viewable by. this.
court inasmuch as it fails ‘to allege that the court- inartial
was Improperly constituted, that Yhe court-martial, was

' withont jurisdiction over the offenses and the petitioner ov:

that. the sentence oe by the court: martial Was ull-
authorized by a > @
2.. By habeas corpus “the: ‘givil courts: may exereise no
supervisoryeor correcting power over the proceedings of a
ffol. 18} court: martial: ‘The. single -inguiry, - ‘the, test, 4s

- jurisdiétion.* Pee

: Hiatt. Brown, 389 U.S. 108, 94 Leed. 691, 70S, Ct. 495,
rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 950, 94 L. gt. 1356, 70 S. Ct. 672 °
(19380) ae, 7 a -
Hiatt v. Brown, supra, 39 COS. at 117; United States v.

Grinlev,. 137 U. So IT, 130, 34 -L. ed. 636, 637; 11S. Ct.
D4 (1880), | as aia

ya“

A

fa)

1h ; i i ‘

In this case, the court: inartiaTw as lawfully constituted,
or jurisdiction ofthe petitioner and the offenses charged,
and acted within its lawful powers in adjudging the sen-

_tence. The correction of any eryors it may have committed

is for the military authorities which are alone % authorized

to he iew its decision. °
The qgurt- hiartial proceedings have been extensively

reviewed if accordance with the Articles of War and the

“*Manual for Courts-Martial, 1949. The petitioner was tried

on May 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, ‘and 16, 1949, at Headquarters,°
Twentieth Air Force, APO 234, hy a general court-martial
lawfdlly appointed by the ¢ ‘ommanding General, Twentieth
“Air Force. The petitioner was charged with rape ' and mtr-
der of One Ruth Farnsworth, in violation of the 92 Jud Article
of War (10 USC 1564), found guilty of both offensés and
sentenced to, death. Tlie record of trial, a copy. of which

has been aod with the petition for writ of habeas corpus © °

in this action, was rev iewed. by the Statf Judge Advocate,
Twe ntieth Air Foree in ‘aceordance with the provisions of .
Artiele of War 47 (10.USC 1518), and after said review the -

septerice was approv ed by the reviewing authority, the Com-

maWine General, Twentieth Air Force. A copy of the re-

view of the Staff Judge Advotate afd the approving action

of the reviewing authority are attached hereto as Exhibits —
eA” and *ti5"* respectively and these Exhibits as well as
Exhibits ‘‘C”*, ‘¢

It is for this C ourt, on a petition for a wld of habeas
corpus, only to inquire into and determine whether |
or not fhe court martial before which a petitioner is
tried. was lawfully,constituted; had jurisdiction of the
person and offense, and imposed a sentence-authorized |
[fol. 22] by law.* Beyond that the civil.courts should
not and cannot go. “The-Corgress has censtituted the
system by which military law shall be administered,
and it is not given to the civil courts, beyond the juris- -
diction of a military court, to inquire into the regu-
larity ‘of its. proceedings for the correction of errors
committed therein. . Tiatt ¥ » Brown, 339 U.S, 103, de-
efded Mareh 13, 1950. The proceedings of the court

nartial in this case.was considered and approved by
the reviewing authority, which was’ accomplished by.
a full analysis of the proceedings by the Staff Judge

Advocate of the Headquarters of° the 20th Air. Foree.

Thereafter a subsequent Liagdao was had by the Board

"of Review, and thereafter 1 further review avas had
‘by the Judicial Council, . Biba a review was

bad by the Judge Advoeate General, United States Air
Force, who,-because of the extreme eravity of both the
sentence adjudged and the allegations made, in his ca-
_ pacity as supervisor.of the administration of jnilitary
justice generally, caused the Office of Special. Tnves-
tigations, Office of the Inspectog, General, -to make a
-eomplete investigation of such matters. As the ‘ap-

‘ proval of the President of the U nited States was neces-

sory to carry such sentence intospffect, that-action was
also-had. Thereafter, upon thé application of peti-
tioner for relief provided by Section. 12, Act of May
12,.1950 (formerly Article of War 53), ‘tie Judew Advo-
cate General, United States Air .Foree, cansed a board
of officers to be. appointed to provide for a hearing,
which was afforded to counsel for petitioner, Alot
this extensive Machinery for review was leteuided to

* afford adequate opportunity for the correction of anw

errors prejudicial to the petitioner committed in the -
trial of his ease. The record here shows that extensive

e e

NAY

, consider ‘ation was given to each of the matters apsertex
in support of the relief sought in these proceedings
_and the various military authorities who were charge 7

with the responsibility of review determined such mat-

«ters to be. factually vroundless. “In these ‘eireum-
stances, this Court is without idrindiction to inquife
into the matters and things asserted by the petitioner
to be’ grounds for the relief sought, and, therefore, the

petition does not state facts upon which the relief -

sought can be granted. . ’ i

For the reasons stated, as sought. by the respondents in
‘response to a rule to show cause issned herein, the rule to
show. cause is discharged and the petition for’a writ of
habeas corpus is dismissed, ‘
a ee, Judge.

[fol. 23} - Is Usirep SraTes Dystrict Court
[Title omitted] |

” OrverR

id

_ This cause coming on ‘for consideration on a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, and the Court having considered the -

petition and memorandum of points.gind authorities. in sup-
port thereof, the -rate. Hrecting. the respondents. to show
cause why a writ shouid not issue, the respondents’ motion
to discharge. the rule to slow cause and dismiss the peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus and memorandum of an:
thorities in support thereof, and the oral argument had
by counsel before the Court-on the respondents” motion to

discharge the rule to show cause and dismiss the petition

for writ of habeas corpus, and it appearing to the Court
that the petition does not state faéts upon whieh the relief
_songht ean be granted, it is this — day of April, 1952,

Ordered, that the respondents’ motion be. granted, the.

rile to show eanse be discharged, and the petition for writ
of habeas corpus be, and hevebyni dis _ dismissed,

pnnaiggtt: ee. ae Ye | ee,

(fol. 24} Minute - Entry of Areume nt and Submission,
Jnne 18, 1952. omitted in printing. Aes

1)

‘)
Fw

| Mnited States Court of Appeals ~.e

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

? ‘

No. 11419

-Rosert W. Buys, APPELLANT
v.

Rosert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, et al., APPELLEES

eee |

No. 11420
‘Herman P. Dennis, JE., APPELLANT
o Sam -y, ; |
Rosexr A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, et al., APPELLEES

oun from. the United States District ign :
hee the sare Columbia |

Decided July ol, 1952 oC ‘

Mr. Robert L. Carter, pro haa vice, by special leave of
Court, and Mr. Frank D. Reeves.for appellants. ,

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kiechel, Jr., Office of the
Judge Advocate Géneral,. United States. Ads Force, and
Nr. Joseph M. How ard, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, with whom Mr. Charles M. Irelan, United States At- -
torney, and Mr. B. M.Landesman, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on the brief, for appellees.

a

& 7 ¢ ‘

2
Before Pretrywax, Procror and Bazeton, Circuit
Judges. «°°
. Prerryman, Circuit: Judge: These are appeals from
denials by’ the District Court of petitions for writs: of
habeas gorpus. Appellants were members of American

armed forces .on the Island of Guam.’ They were -con- .

vieted by courts-martial of murder and rape and were

sentenced to death. The convictions and sentences having .

been approved by the reviewing authorities, including the

President, they: filed pé@titions for habeas corpus. The -

records of the trials. by the. courts. martial were filed by
| petitioners at the Same time with the court. “Attached to
the petitions*were several affidavits and extracts from the
‘enal code of Guam. The court® issued rules to show
eause, and the respondent off vials filed motions to dismiss
the petitions and to discharge the rules, attaching to those
motions copies of the’ findings and opinions gf the several.

reviewing authorities. The court held that the petitions -

did not recite facts upon which the relief sought could
be granted and therefore discharged the rules and dis-
missed the. petitions: In this court the cases were con-
- golidated for hearing and decision.., Appellants are pres-
ently confined in the custody of Headquarters - of the
Japan Logistical Command. |

A civilian girl Government es at a store on the

Island of Guam was brutally raped ‘and murdered. In .

the eourse .of the ensuing investigation lie detector tests
were given, upon their consent, to many members of the
Amerivan armed forces in the vicinity. What tranapined
at these testssis not reported in the papers before us, but ,
‘immediately thereafter certain physieal evidence was a
covered and three soldiers, these appellants,and one Cal-
vin Dennis, were taken into custody and delivered to the
_eivil authorities of Guam, who were American naval offi-

eers and men. Thev- were detained in this eustody from —

Jennfiry 7, 1949, to January 30, 1949, when they were

a

3

delivered to the. military authorities: They were tried
separately, the trials of appellants being May 9-16 and
May 26-30. Several alleged gonfessions of Herman Den-
nis were presented at his trial. Calvin Dennis was the
principal witness for the prosecution at the trial of Burns.
Other testimony and phy sical evide ce of various sorts

were presented. The convictions were reviewed by the

Board of Review in the Office of the Fudge Advocate. Gen-
eral, United States Air Force, and by the Jndicial Coun-
ceil, both of which rendered long, written opinions. The
records and extensive correspondence relating to the cases
were reviewed by the Judge Advocate General, United
States Air Forse, and he wrote memoranda of his. con-
clusions to the Secretary of the Air’ Foree. Thereafter
the President confirmed’ the sentences. The executions
‘were stayed pending these proceedings.
The controversy presents a problem of jurisdiction. The
question is whether the, allegations of the petitions, viewed
in the light of the aecompatiying data and of: the returns

to the rules,’ are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of |

‘the court and to require a hearing.on the merits.
Our first inquiry concerns the authority, of courts to
review courts-magtial. The Constitution, in» Article TI,

Section. 8, Clause 14, confers upon the Congress power.

“To make ‘rules for the government and regulation of
‘the land and naval forees’’? Congress has done sso.
Those rules relating to trials for offenses wére the Arti-

cles of War*® now sunerseded bv the TWmniform Code of
] Bie |

: Walker v. Johnston, 312. U.S. 275, 284, 85 L.Ed. 850,-61
S.Ct. 574 (1941); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 90 L-Ed.

499, 66 S.Ct. 340 (1946): Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 96

L.Ed. . , 72 S.Ct. 191. (1951) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 80 U.S. App.

D.C. 9, 148 ‘F.2d 857 (1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890, 89

L.Ed. 2008, 65 S.Ct. 1580 (1945). See Reviser’s Note to 28
U.S.C.A. .§ 2243; United ‘States v:.Havman, 342 U.S. 205,
222-223, 96 L.Ed. , 72 S.Ct: 263 (1952).

741 STAT. .787 (1920), 10 US.C.A. § 1471 ef seq.

av

. OA.

4 .

Military Justice.’ They provides for trial procedure and
_ review procedure.* This power of the Congress and the
judicial power, pot established by the Constitution, are
separate powérs.’ Based. upon the constitutional power.
of the Congress over the armed forces, the courts have
held uniformly, from the earliest time down to a decision
as jate as 1950, that the power of courts is limited to a-
consideration of the ‘‘jurisdiction’’ of courts-martial, and
they have no power of review.’ In the Yamashita case’
the Supreme Court said: ;

- £64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 551 e8 seq.

*41 Stat. 797 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1522; 64 STAT. 128
(1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 653. ;

> Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65, 15 L.Ed. 838
(1858) Carter v. Woodring, 67 App. D.C. 393, 92 F.2d 544
(1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 752, 82 L.Ed. 582,58 S.Ct.
283 (1937); United States v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754- (E.D.
N.Y. 1926), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 705, 65 L.Ed. 1180,
41 S.Ct. 535 (1921); Fz parte ht aece 63 si = 582 —
Wis. 1945).

¢Whelchel y. McDonald, 340 USS. 122, 95: L.Ed, 141, 71 |
S.Ct. 146 (1950); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 94 L.Ed. -
691, 70 S.Ct. 495 (1950) ;°Dynes v. Hoover,.20 How. (61
U.S.) 65, 15 L.Ed. 838 (1858); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S,
109, 39 L.Ed. 914, 15 S.Ct. 773 (1895); Mullan v. United
States, 212 U.S. 516, 53 L.Ed. 632, 29 S.Ct. 330 (1909):
United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 34 L.Ed, 636, 11
S.Ct. 54 (1890); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 US. 49, 69,
46 L.Fd. 1049, 1057-1058, 22 S.Ct. 786 (1902); Ex parte
Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23, 25 L.Ed. 538, 539 (1879); Carter v.
McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 392-401, 46 L.Ed. 236, 250-253,
22 S.Ct. 181 (1902); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, —
41 L.Ed. 823, 17 S.Ct. 448 (1897); Note, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.)
413. See also Ex parte=Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2, 18
L.Ed. 281 (1866).

_ *In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8, 90 Tay 499, 66 S.Ct.
340. (1946). : | |

/

a>
4)

“‘Yf the military ‘tribunals have lawful authority to
hear; decide-and condemn, their action is not subject
to judicial review’ merely because they have made a

wrong decision on disputed facts. Correction of their
errors of decision is not for the courts but for. the -
military authorities which are alone authorized to re-_
view their decisions.”’ |

And i in Hiatt v. Brown* the Court said:

“Tt is well settled that ‘by habeas corpus the civil |
eourts exercise no supervisory or ee power,
over the proceedings of a court-martia] . The .
- single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.’ In re°Grim-
- ley, 137 U. S. 147, 150 (1890). In. this case. the court-
- martial had jurisdiction of the persom.accused and
_ Appellants say that recent decisions of the. “Supreme
Coat have expanded the concept of “jurisdiction”? for
purposes of determining the right to habeas corpus. That |
is correct. In Whelchel-v. MeDonald® the Court clearly
intimated, if it did not expressly say, that a deniai to an
accused of an opportunity to tender an issue of insanity |
would go to the question. of the jurisdiction of a court-
martial. Habeas corpus has been held to lie.in criminal
eases in the courts where there’ has been a denial of
counsel,*® a coerced ee of guilty,” 3 deliberate ethan

a

* 339 U.S. 103, 111, 94 L.Ed. 691, 70 S.Ct. 495 (1950).
° 340 U.S. 122, 95 L.Ed. 141, 71 S.Ct.. 146 (1950).

© Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct.
1019 (1938).

Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 85 L.Ed. 830, 61 S.Ct.
574 (1941): Von Moitke v. Gillies, 332 U.S..768, 92 L.Ed.
209, 68 S.Ct. 316 (1948). :

ty
6

sion of favorable evidence,” mob hy slered’* double jeop-
ardy."" We recently reviewed the problem in Smith v.
United States.”

The Supreme Court seemed, gn Hiatt v. Brown, supra,
‘to revert to earli¢r concepts of jurisdiction in considering
the power of courts ov er courts-martial. It’ cited In re
“Grimley. At the same time it used -the expression “acted -

within its lawful powers.” That expression seems: to

Imply a scope. of. review broader than a ‘technical “juris.
diction”. _

In its brief the Government contented itself ‘it sup-
port of ‘its ultimate conelusion, without attempting to es-
tablish premises, but in oral argument its’ counsel took
the position that persons in the armed forees are not
protected by the due. process .clanse\’ For that posttion
he relied: upon Johnson. y. Etsentrager.* It is true that
in ‘the opinion in that case the Supreme Court said,
American citizens conscripted into the military service
are thereby stripped of their Fifth Amendment rights

.’ Phere are also several expressions. in Ex parte :
' Quirin'* which. seem to imply that. the excepfion of “cases

2 Pyle v, Kansas, 317 U.S, 213, 87 L:Ed. 214, 63 S.Ct. 177.
(1942), agi

-433'Moore v- Dempsey, 2 261 U.S. 86, 67 L.Ed. 543, 43 S.Ct.
265 (1923). 3

“4 By parte Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 33 L. Ed. 118, 9 s. Ct. 672
¢ 889).

_ 4 88 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192 (1950), cert. denibd,
341 U.S. 927, 95 L.Ed. 1358, 71 S.Ct. 792 (1951). See also
Note, The Freedom: Writ-—-The Expanding Use of Federal
Habeas ener 61 HARV. i. REV. 657 (1948).

339 U.S. 763, 94 L.Ed, 1255, 70 S.Ct, 936 (1950).
17 Jd, 3839 U.S. at 788. 2) Cs
*317.U.S. 1, 87 L.Ed. 8, 63 S.Ct. 1 (1942).

?

7

arising in the land or naval forces’’ applies to the whole.
of both the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments. There is
also the sweeping statement, “We conclude that the Fifth
and ‘Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority.
was conferred by the Constitution to try ‘offenses against
the law of war.by military commission...” In the
‘opinion ef Chief Justice. Chase in Ex parte Milligan ® is -
the statement, “We think, therefore, that the power of
° Congress in the government of*the land and naval forces
and of the militia, is not at. all affected. by the fifth or
any other amendment.” Again there is a sweeping state-
ment hy the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that °
“The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are, of course, inap-
plicable to a court- martial. | Ex’ parte Quirin et al.,

supra. 921°
But we think those expressions must be read if con.
‘text. The Eisentrager case concerned enemy aliens. Tn-
the éxpression quoted, the Court cited Wade v, Hunter,”
which, concerned double ‘jeopardy, itself a Fifth Amend-
- ment. protection, in court-martial procéedings. In that
case (Wade ¥. Hunter) the Court recited the rule of the
Perez case,” applicable to federal ‘courts upon the dis-
continuing of criminal trials once begun,,and then said:

“We see no reason why ‘the same broad test should z

‘not he applied in deciding whether court-martial ac-,
ticn ryns- counter to the Fifth. Amendment’s provi;
_ sion, against double sqoEmray: Measured by the Perez

"Id., 317 U.S. at tie 3 ¥
20"4 Wall, (71 U.S.) 2, 198, 18 T.Fa. 281, 301 (1866).

"Innes v. Crystal, 131 F.2d 576, 577,-n. 2 (2d Cir. 1943),
cert, denied as moot, 319 U:S. sth 87° L Ea. 1708, .63 S.Ct.
1164 (1943).

20 B36 US . 684, 93 LL. Rd. 974, 69 S.Ct. 834 (1949),

23 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 579. @.L.Ed.
165 (1824). |

i?
_ruale to which we adhet, petitioner’ S second © ‘court-

martial trial was, not the kind of double jeopardy =
' within the intent Op the Fifth. Amendment.”?*”

In the Quirin case, supra, the Court was discussing the
right of trial by jury and indictment by grand jury. ‘The

indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment contains a.

specific exception of ‘cases arising in, the land or naval

forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time .

of war or public danger”. And, as to trial by jury, the
Court held, -in an éxtended disenssion, that the Sixth

4,

Amendment protection of this right does not extend to.

‘eases not subject to such trials at the common law: It
_ seems to us that the language and thought in Quirin was
directed to whether the rights there Involved’ (indictment
and trial by jury) were discretionary under the power
conferred upon the Congress by Article T or were within

‘the requirements of .the Fifth and’ Sixth Amendments.

We do not read the case as holding that all the rights

covered by the Amendments, including the right of due.
process of law, were abrogated by the clause empowering .

Congress to make rules for the armed forces.

In Ex parte Milligan, supra; the Court’ was dealing
-with-a civilian, and the: quoted observation of the Chief
Justice was directly related to the’ meaning of the: ex-

‘preged exception in the Fifth Amendment. The lan- .

gute quoted from Innes v. Crystal®® was used in a foot-
note to a ease which dealt «with errors not going to the
jufisdiection of the court-martial. We do not-read it as
intended .to be -a blanket denial of all Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. When the Supreme Court declared
the case moot and the petition was.presented to the Third
Cireuit,: that. court unequivocally d&lared petitioner’s
! right. te due ices ee | é

a |

24 Supra note 22, 336 U, = at 699.

7* Supra‘ note 21.

* United’ States v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944).

4

9
Upon elementary reasoning, upon. the language and. .
‘ructure of the Constitution, and upon authority, we
hink men_ accused before courts-martial are entitled to
os process of law. It is an elementary precept in-our
concept of law and government that a human being has
' an inherent right to due process of law.” The power of
the Congress to make rules for the armed: forces is one~
of a long list (eighteen, to be exact) of powers conferred
in Section 8 of Arficle I upon the Congress. We find: no
intimation in-the Constitution itself that Clause 14 of
Section’ 8 of Article I. and roceedings pursuant thereto
are exempt from the requi ements and prohibitions of: the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ‘We think those Amend:

ments apply to each and all of the. powers ofthe Congress,

to the 14th Clause of Section 8 as well-as fo the other

seventeen clauses, and to.all acts of executive officials _

under Article IL and to judicial proceedings. under the

_ ‘power conferred by Article TTI, except when an exception .
is stated in the Consticution itself. Moreover, the text of |

the Fifth Amendment supports thiseview. Tt reads:

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, -
or. otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or-in the militia, when
in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled:in-any crimifial, case to be a witness against.
himself, nor be ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private. prop- ,
erty’ be taker for public. use’ without an compensa-
tion.”” : —

It seems to us to be clear upon the face of the text that
the specific exception of cases arising in the land or naval
forces from the first clause, relating to indictment hefore
prosecution, conclusively shows that the exception does not
apply to the other clauses. As we have already pointed —

?

a

‘oe

eS eee ae

3 10 -

out, the Supreme Court has definitely: indicated hak the
double jeopardy clause. applies to courts-martial.

There is-a wealth of: authofity. té- suppert the. view
, that due‘process applies to ecourts-martial. The Supreme
Court So indieated in Hiatt v. BYown when it said:

“We. think the court was in error in extending its
review, for_-the purpose of determining compliance. .
with the. due process clause, to such matters as the
propositions of law set forth in the staff judge advo-
eate’s report. ».”?" (Emphasis supplied.)

We cite a few te eases in the footnote,” all clearly
- ba&ed upon the view that due process of law is a right of
persons accused Before courts-martial. a
‘ Of course, due process of law is not a fixed formula of
unchanging and unchangeable elements. Due process: of
law in the armed forces has always been in some re--
spéects different from due process: under civil authority.
“To those in the military or naval service of the United
States the military law is due process.’’* But the éssen-
tials of ‘a fair proceeding are requisites under all. condi-

af Supre, 339 U. S. at 110.

* Shapiro v. United States, 69 F.Supp. 205 (CECI. 1947) ;
->Sehita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 .(8th Cir. 1943).:cert. denied, |
322 U.S. 761, 88 .IyEd. 1589, 64 S.Ct. 1273 (1944); United
States:v. Hiatt, supra note 26; United States v. Swenson, 165
F.2d 756: (24 Cir. 1948); Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 512
(10th Cir. 1948); Henry v. Hodges, 171 F.2d 401. (2d Cir.
1948); cert: denied, 336 U.S. 968, 93. L.Ed. 1119, 69_S.Ct.
937 (1949); Becker v. Webster, 171 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1949), -
cert, denied, 336 U.S. 968, 95 L.Ed. 1120, 69 S.Ct. 988
{1949); Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 949),
cert genied, 338 U.S: 874, 94 L.Ed. 536, 70 S.Ct..135 (1949),

** Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304, 55 L.Ed. 225,
228, 31 S.C.. 230° (1911). See also French v. Weeks, 259
‘U.S. 326, 335, 66 L.Ed. 965, 42 S.Ct. 505 (1922); United
States v. Hiatt, supra note 26, at 666. aa

-

e alee a 11

tions. The cases cited in note 28, supra, so show. Those
essentials are fairly well identified and established in tlie
. Cases. | ' '
ee We ‘proceed, then’ akon the premise that the sail:
tions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to courts-
‘martial, exeept for the specific exception in» the Fifth
and the historie meanings at eommon law of the terms
used in both Amendments. But this premise does mot
solve our present problem, The mere presence ‘of Con-
stitutional questions, the assertion of. constitutional rights,
doés not always give rise to a right of habeas corgnus.
Phis writ is an extraordinary remedy. As a‘usual rule.
it eannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or as a
means for securing review of questions determined by te
‘authorities duly empowered by Constitution and’ statute
to ‘determine them. This matter was exhaustively exam-
ined in respect to: federal court proceedings by. the Su-
preme Court in Swial v. Large’. and it was there laid
down as the governing rule that only in exceptional cir-
cumstances wil# habeas corpus be granted where appel-
‘late procedure.is‘ available for. correction of the error. |
A detailed study of prior cases is included in the dissent
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The Court “put to one side”
in that case the problem of habeas corpus in proceedings
begun in state courts and referred that question to sev-
“eral eases, of which the latest was Ex parte Hawk."
There it was held (1) that a person must exhaust. his
state remedies and (2) that.a federal court will not ordi-
~. narily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus questions
adjudicated ‘by. state courts, but will do so where resort
to those courts fails to afford a full and fair adjudication
of the federal contentions raised.”

yoo

2% 339 US. 174, 91 L.Ed. 1982, 67 S.Ct. 1588 (1947).
- 391 U.S. 114. 116-117, 88 L.Fa. 572. 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944).

‘? See Frank v. Mangum, 287 U.S. 309, 59 L.Ed. 969, 35
S.Ct. 532 (1915); Moore vy. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 67 LF.

f

aa e

‘The problem befvre 1 us involves neither a federal court
nor a state court. It involves a trial and appellate proc-
ess, including process for new trial,’ established by the
federal Congress: undér a specific grant of power by the
Constitution. It. seems. to ug that_in such a proceeding,
under. the general’ dorirines: we have’ described, habeas
corpus: will not lie to review questions raised and deter-
mined, or raisable avd determinable, in the established

Hee nilitary process, unless there has been such gross viola-

tion of constitutional rights as to deny the substance of
a fair’ trial ‘and, because of -some exceptional circum-
.stance, the petit#oner has not been able to obtain ade-
quate; protection ef that right in the military processes.

The rule as we have phrased it includes three. proposi- ,

tions. (1) An accused before a court-martial is entitled
to a fair trial within due process of law concepts. (2)
The ‘responsibijity for insuring such fairness,and for de-
‘termining debatable points is upon the military authori-
ties, and their determinations nre not reviews able by the
courts, except (3) that, in the exeeptional case when a
‘denial of a constitutional right is so flagrant as to affect
the “i»risdiction’’ (7.e., the basic. power) of the. tribunal
to render judgment, the courts will review upon petition
for habeas corpus. To support issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus the cirewmstances shown by the: papers
before the court must so seriously affect the fundamental
fairness. of the trial and the validity of the appellate and
later determinations as fo deprive the military authorities
of jurisdiction, Le., of power to act.

548, 43 S.
79 LE

Ws (1923): Moonev v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,

US. App. D.C. 9, 23.95, 148 F.2d-857; 871-873 (1945), cert.
denied, 325 17.S. 890, o L.Ed. 2003, 65 S.Ct. 1580 (1945);
~Sanderiin v. Smvth, 38 F.2d 729 (Ath Cir. 1943) ; Morton
_v. Henderson, 123 F. is 48 (5th Cir. 1941):

°° 64 STAT. 147 (1950), 50 U.S.A, § 740,

A791, 55 S.Ct. M0 (1935); Jennings v. Tinois, 342,
‘TS, 104, 96 L Fa. , 72 S.Ct. 1283 (1951): Dorsey v. Gill, 80

“4

*.

t

13

We have discussed the applicability of ‘the Constitu-
tion, but we note that the Articles of War, as enacted by

- the Congress and effective at the time of thesé trials, re-

quired the appointment of defense counsel,** provided for
other ccunsel of accused’s selection, if ‘‘reasonably avail-

‘able’’,’ prohibited compulsory self-incrimination,”* and .

provided that the accused should have copies of the record
of trial.” —

This brings us to consideration of the | records inf the .

cases before us. _ -°
We note, as a preliminary, that no allegation is made

in these petitions as to the appointments of the courts- -
martial or of their jurisdiction over the accused or the

alleged offenses: Jad

By way -of further preliminary we not that the two
‘courts-martial.in these cages were composed of different
Officers. The record in one case recites that these officers
were detailed frorn areas far from Guam, and the orders
@n the other case. indicate the same thing. The convic-
tions were reviewed by different Boards of Review. They

were then reviewed by the Judicial Council. Motions for

new trials were made purguant to Section 740 of Title 50
of the United States Code, which provides -that ‘‘The

Judge Advocate. General . . . is authorizéd . . . upon |

good cause shown, in-his discretion to grant a new trial’’.

The Judge Advocate General, after’a special investiga-

tion ordered by him, denied the motions. Thus it appears

that all the steps provided by Congress have been taken,

and no irregularity in those respects is alleged.

41 StAP. 789. (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1482 (1927).
41 STaT: 790 (1920), 10 I.S.C.A.-.§ 4488 (1927).
“41 StaT. 792 (1920). 10 U.S.C.A. § 1494 41927).

741 STAT. 809 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. §.1583 €1927).

** Supra note 33.

°
|

.

14

- We look first -at the, Dennis netition and: the papers
relating to it. In sae it contains the following alle-
gations:

1. Dennis was -held aes arraignment by the civil
authorities of Guam from January-7 to January 17, 1949.
During this period he was held incommunicado in soli-
tary confinement, subjected to continuons questioning,
beaten, .and denied sleep and food. Four confessions
were obtained from him as a result of duress, protracted
interrogation, use of a lie detector, threats, promises, and
‘trickery, and certain hairs were taken from his person,
and these were introduced in evidence against him. He
-was not advised of his right against self-incrimination,
in violation of the Fifth Amghdment and of the 24th
Article of War,®® or warned that his statements would be
used against him. | }

2. He was denied opportunity to consult with counsel
during -the entire ‘period of his detention by the Guam
authorities, from January 7th to-on or about January
29th when he was returned to Air Force authorities. He
was denied eounsel of his choice; counsel -was not ap-
pointed for him until April 8th; and he did not have
opportimity to receive advice .6f counsel. until ‘shortly
before’’ his trial hegan on May 9, 1949. Defense counsel
was not given, or did not take, adequate time to prepare
and present his ease. “s

3. Important evidence tending to prove his innocence
was suppressed: efforts were made by the investigating
and prosecuting authorities to procure perjured testimony
against him; irrelevant, immaterial, prejudicial awd in-
flammatory evidence was received against him: and evi-
dence was taken from him, “planted’’, and presented at
‘the trial. In the light of defense -testimony placing him
elsewhere at ‘the time of the crime, of his repudiation of

—

a)

” Supra note 36.

seeeniiiiemestinadibhasienenisiassnammmnme ainean:aaieateeniia cacti eee eeniae — ssaneteattieencndnenntnelinhesdh th ieeieees

15

court- noha which convicted hime was-biased, _preju
and vindictive toward him. ;
4. The atmosphere surrounding the trial was one of
hysteria and terror. | :
We consider these allegations i in the light of the papers:
before the District Court and under the principles we
have enunciated.

. First we consider the point eencerning the confessions. °
ing

There were four of them, two holographic ‘and two dic-
tated. AppeHant urges a number of grounds for the
exclusion of these confessions. He urges that detention
without arraignment renders inadmissible the subsequent
confessions, under the ‘McNabb: rule.” But ‘military pro-

cedure does not provide for arraignment until the court-

martial is convened, and moreover the McNabb rule is
not a-statement of constitutional requirement but, is a
rule of evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court in its
supervisory capacity over the federal courts.

Appellant says that the confessions were the ny of

_ eoercion, lack of sleep,_cantinnous questioning, ete. The

alleged cireamstances whid§ comprisetl the coercion were,
of course, alleged facts. Testimony concerning them was
taken at the trial. Herman Dennis himself testified. He
did not deseribe continuous questiening for any appre-
ciable length of time,,did not mention lack of sleep or
food, and ‘specifieally denied that he had been béaten.,
His testimony was to the effect. that an officer insisted
that his connection with the crime was known and that
unless he confessed he would hang. The offieers involved
testified and related a different story of the eyents. They
denied pressure, threats or promises. The admissibility
and the worth of the confessions were argued vigorously

* McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 87 L.Ed. 819,
63 S.Ct BOR (1948). | .

a La
aw,
oe

16

by defense counsel at the conclusion of the evidence. Thus
the admissibility of the confessions was determined by
the resolution of a disputed issue of fact, thoroughly ex-
plored at the trial and ¢xamined upon both of the sue-
cessive reviews by the military authdrities.. The accused’s
right was to haye the disputed issue of coercion examined
‘and determined by the. properly constituted authority.
That was done. He does not claim that it was not done.
The. issue to be presented to the court,.as clearly demon-
strated .by the material before it, would not be a flagrant
disregard of the aeccused’s rights, but would be an alleged
erroneous finding upon an issue of fact. Upon the face
of the papers presented by the petitioner the issue was,
in the light most favorable to him, clearly debatable, and
there was .substantial evidence in support of the con-
clusion. ,Under such circumstances courts certainly have
no. power to review the finding and decision.

Next we consider the point concerning counsel. The
Articles of War coman‘¢wo provisions respecting coun-
sel. One (10 U. S. Cl $1482, supra note 34) provides
that defense counsel shall be appointed by the puthority
which appoints the court and the trial judge “advocate.
The other (10 U. S. C. $1488, supra note 35) provides
that an aceused may have counsel of his own selection,
in place ®f’or in addition to appointed counsel, On
January 25, 1949, Dennis was advised by the authorities
that four officers tvere available to him p., defense coun-
sel. Dennis requested one of these officers, a Lieutenant
Colonel Daly, as individual defense counsel. On’ April
18th Commanding General advised-Dennis that Colonel
Daly was under charges,and under psychiatric examina.
tion and was therefore not available. Dennis then wrote
the Genvral, on the same dav, “In view of the contents
- of vour letter of 18 April 1949, I do not desire the .serv.
ices-of Lt Colonel Rdward FeDaly and T will accept. the
regularly appointed defense esunsel as counsel in my

.

. .
SO eI er ee

es ae

case.’’ Lientenant Colonel Adrian .W. Tolen had been

_ appointed defense counsel, and Captain Bernard. A. Katz

and First Lieufenant John J. Ensley assistant. defense

counsel, by an order of the Commanding General .on
March 21st. (Special Order No. 65, Headquarters Twen-
tieth Air Force, APO 234.) ,

_ ‘Appointment of counsel by the convening authority |
_ satisfies constitutional requirements.“ The Manual: for

Courts-Martial provides that the appointing’ authority
_ shall determine whether special counsel requested by an
accused is “available’’, When the trial .began Dennis him-

self again requested Colonel Daly to assist’ regularly |

appointed counsel. The matter was explored, but the
ruling of the appointing authority, affirmed, by telegram

-. from Washington, was deemed controiling. The charges,

which had been served on April 14th, were then read and
_ the accused was arraigned. A motion ‘for the severance
of. the trial of Herman Dennis from that of Calvin Dennis
- was made and granted. Herman Tennis then pleaded not
_ guilty. Colonel Tédlen indicated that he had been active
in the case as defensé counsel throughout the investiga-
_ tion and that Captain“Katz had been so for some thirty
days. :
"The factual material given the court by the -petitioner
disproves his claim as to Jack of counsel. Tt shows ‘that
the accused was not deprived of counsel; he had three, in
fact. They were officially appointed more than a month
before the trial. It also seems clear that the require-
ment that requested counsel be found ‘available’? by su-
perior authority is,a reasonable one in view of the exi-
gencies of military affairs. Upon the appeals to the

Board of Review and the Judicial Counsel, appellant | 3

was represented by the same counsel who so ably pre-

« Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1945): Ro-
mero v. Squier, 133. F.2d 528 (9th Cir. Benya h cert. denied,
318 U.S. 785, 87 L.Ed. 1152, 63 S.Ct. 982 (19148).

. oe
sented this appeal. Certainly these events did. not de-
prive the court-martial of jurisdiction.

In support of his allegations concerning the suppression
of evidence, Dennis cites three exhibits attached to his ©
complaint. One is an affidavit of a Chaplain, Captain -
E. E. Grimmett, one an affidavit.of Lieutenant Colonel
Edward Daly, and one an affidavit of a Miss Mary L. Hill.
We can find in the affidavit of Chaplain Grimmett no
reference to suppressed evidence. In the affidavit of
Colonel Daly it is asserted that. during the investigation
and while affiant. was engaged in ‘preparation of ‘the
‘defense, ‘‘affiant Jearned that a set of Filipitio~dog-tags.
had been loeatéd in the immediate | vicinity ’ of the “place %

where the bodv was found and that,.on the following ~~
morning a Navy offcer’s uniform saturated with blood
was discovered”; that these items were’ in possession
of the Guam Police Department; that in preparation of
the defense affiant gathered statements and affidavits

: concerning those items; that affiant’s brief and material
on this matter were taken from his desk while he was &
being ‘hospitalized ; and that none of this evidence was
presented at the trial. | °

Colonel Daly was a witness at the trial, testifying

twice, called once as a witness for the prosecution and

' onee as a witness for the defense. He also appeared

as a witness called by the prosecution in the Burns case.

Upon these oecasions he made no‘mention of the dog-tags

or the Navy uniform. His present affidavit does not

show that the proseentors knew of such items or that

Colonel Daly ever called them to the attention of. counsel
ta for the prosecution or for the defense.

fiss Hill in-her affidavit says that she assisted Colonel

Daly.-in the preparation .of the defense ‘‘and thaf he

. Was-in possession. of material evidence in their behalf

which was not presented to the court’? and that while he

was confined-many of the papers, files and other evidence

“
4

19 ?.

were stolen from his office and quarters Affiant does not
say what the evidence was.

This matter of the dog-tags and the ‘Neoy: uniform was
presented to the Judge Advocate General upon the peti-

tion for a new trial. He held, after an investigation

made at his direction, that the charge that this evidence
was withheld from the court, as alleged-in an affidavit

‘of Colonel Daly, was baseless. Thus the official charged

by Congress, under its constitutional power, to make this

_ determination has made it. Congress provided no review

of that determination. Petitioner’s showing on the papers

hefore us, which we have deservbed, does not indicate any
cireumstances which could be regarded as a premise for

Nee ctioistion that the Jndge Advocate General was arbi-

rer outside the boundaries of reasonable conclusion.

—_—..

- That being. so, the matter is not reviewable upon habeas
corpus. Without attempting to state exhaustively the .
reasons for this conelusion on our part, we refer to the
disenssions of the, Second Cireuit Court of Appeals.in
Schechtman vy. Foster* and ‘Ofthe First Cireuit Court
of Appeals ° in Coqgins v. O’Brien (heth Judge Wood-
bury’s and Chief Judge Magruder’s opinions), of the
right to habeas corpus.in- a, federal court, when a new
trial has been denied in a state court. The full text of
those discussions #s helpful.“ The sum of them is that,”
where a petition for a new trial upon allegations of per-

‘jured testimony known to the prosecutor was denied by
_ the state corrective process, a federal district court has a

large measure of discretion to determine whether the
ease, upon the papers before it and without hearing, is
one of the exceptional cases.which requires federal author-
ity to inquire into state administration of justice. In the
matter before us there is Sate, to depict the exceptional .

. 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924,

94 L.Ed. 1346, 70 S.Ct. 613 (1950).
188 F.2d 130 (1st-Cir. 1951}.

‘+See also United States v. J@hnson, 327 U.S. 106, 99 L.Ed.
562, 66 S.Ct. 464 (1946). : ,

OTT NE RT EE = ee ree a nee

a” 20

; es a ; : . : ‘
ease which would require. the courts to inquire into the
treatment of this particular matter’ by the duly consti-
.tuted military authorities. There is nothing in this record
to indicate that the Judge Advocate General | based _
denial of fhe motion for new trial upon a denial of ac
colstitutional right.”

This court has received ‘a letter from one. “Wiens L.
Moylan, a witne:s at the trial, who says that he did see
these petitioners near the scene of the erime shortly
before the murder, as he testified, but’ that there were
two other men also there and that, while he tried to bring
this out, he’ was nof permitted. to do so. This letter is
-not part of the record and “is unsworn. Moreover the
record shows that Moylan was extensively eross-exem-
ined by the defense and was examined Also by the, court
but made no reference whatever to seeing other persons

and made no attempt to do so... ‘

' The matter of “planting” evidence concerned hairs
found on a smock and in a truck. This was ‘the sybject
of testimony and argument, at; the trial. . Defense counsel
in summation explicitly queried whether the smock had not |
been planted in the truck-by aa investigator. The matter

was considered upon the reviews. It is covered: by what

we have already said. \

No fact shown in the record jason the general alle-
gation of hysteria and terror, and every relevant fact is
to the contrary. The members of the eourts-martial were, -_
-as we have said, officers in the Air Foree and were de-
tailed from distant points. The members of the court
frequently and intensively questioned witnesses for the
prosecution. \

od

“Cf, Phyle y. Duffy, 334 U.S. 481, 444, 92 L.Ed. 1494, 68
S:Ct. 1181 (1948); Young v.. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238, 93°
L.Ed. 1333, 69 S.Ct. 1073 (1949) :-Woods v. Nierstheimer, |

328 U.S. 211, 216, 99 L.Ed. 1177, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946) ; Wool-
oe v. Best; 299 U.S: 1, 2, 81 L.Ed. 3, 57.S.Ct. .2 (1986) ;
Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806, 807, 92 L.Ed.
1739, 68 S.Ct. 1185 (1948). :

21

It is clear that the other allegations of the petition do
not go to the jurisdiction of the court-martial, even under
the expanded concept of “ Hanon” which we have
used in this case.

The Burns petition contains the following allegations :

1. Burns was held without arraignment by the Guam
authorities from “January 7 to January 17, 1949. During
this period he was held ‘incommunicado, subjected to con-.
tinuous questioning, beaten, and denied sleep and edible
food. Burns did not confess, but he allegés that the-eon-
fessions-of Herman Dennis and Calvin Dennis, the-alleged
‘third participant in the offense charged, signed coer reed
confessions implicating him. °. , are

2. He was denied opportunity to consult with ‘counsel
during his detention by the Guam authorities. He was
not allowed to obtain the advice of counsel until one day
before his court-martial began on May 27, 1949. :

E Tmportant evidence t tending to prove his innocence
was suppressed. ‘Testiniony given against him at the
trial by Caivin Dennis was the result of, coeycion, threats
and promises and is now shown to have been perjured
by the affidavit -of Calvin Mennis attached to the petition.

4. The trial was conducted in an‘atmosphere of terror,
hysteria and vengeance.

Several of. the foregoing allegations are the same as or
similar to ‘those of the Dennis petition. What. we have
already said will suffice for those points. The situations
with respect to counsel and ae confessions differ’ some-_
what. from’ the cireumstances in- the Dennis » Case, Sule
therefore discuss those “cay

efense counsel for Burns were appointed, by the
“proper authorities by formal order on March 21st. They
were the same as those appointed in the Dennis case,
Lieutenant ‘Colonel Tolen, Captain Katz, and Lieutenant
Ensley. Burns was. brought to trial. May 27th: The mem-
bers of the court’ were net the same officers. who sat in
the’ Dennis case. The record shows the following:

, we,

¢ 99
“prosEcUTION: The accused is present together
with the regularly appointed .defense counsel and
assistant defense counsel. By whom does the accused
desire to be defended?

“DEFENSE : The accused: desires to introduce as in-
“dividual counsel Captain Martin S Drueker, Head-
quarters, Marianas Bonins Command, and desires the
regularly appointed defense counsel, Lieutenant Col-
- onel Adrian W. Tolen, and assistant defense counsel,
First Lieutenant John J Ensley, to act as associate
counsel. Let the record show that Captain Drucker is
a member of The Judge Advocate General’s Corps,
Department of the Army, and is a qualified lawver.
Let the record also show that Captain Bernard A Katz
- who was appointed ws assistant. defense counsel in
. this ease. has been excused by the accused and his
name has been deleted from the court by an order
which will be appended to the record.

“prosecution: ITs. the ‘aceused satisfied then with
counsel indicated by eae at this time?
‘“accusep: Yes, sir.’ 7

Appellant refers to. the affidavit of Chaplain Gumi
as support for the allegation. respecting the one-day’
preparation of counsel. The affidavit. says “That the
Captain who. finally represented” Sergeant Burns. [had]
only one dav to prepare his case”. The reference must
be to Captain. Drucker, who'was “individual counsel”,
i.e., counsel selected fv the aecused, and not the ap-—
pointed connsel. That the-accused may not have engaged
or selected individual eounsel unfil one ‘day before trial
. (there is no direct statement in this record to that effect)
is not ground for complaint. Appointed counsel had been
designated long prior to trial. No request for a con-
_ tinuance. was made, nor was anv hint oifered that Cap tain
_ Drueker was unprepared. ;

- The only assertions relating té other counsel songht by
Rarns concern an effort hy Chaplain Grimmett te engage -
a°-civilian. lawyer in Guam who -required .a/ $15,000. fee,
of whieh $10,000 was to be a cash retainer in advance,

ws

¢

The accused having no such funds, the ee undér-

took a- contribution campaign among the military per-
sonnel throughout the islands. The military authorities
advised him that collections of such sums would have to

be under supervision of -the. authorities. He alleges that.

he was informed by unnamed persons that they had been

; intimidated by ‘their commanding. officers. into not con-

tributing. Nothing further. seems to have come of it.

Obviously . such circumstances ‘do not constitute a denial —

of: assistance by co; angel. .

We turn next to the matter of the alleged deliberate »

use of coerced and perjured testimony of Calvin Dennis.

_ No confessions ‘alleged to have, been made by Burns were

offered at his trial, and he did “ot take the stand. Calvin
, Dennis testified for the prosecution and gave eye-witness
testimony to the guilt of Furns. Calvin Dennis now
alleges that his former testimony was coerced and was
false. It was vigorously maintained hy defense counsel
at the trial that Calvin Dennis’s testiniony .was perjured:
The decision of the court represents a finding upon. a
disputed question of fact. Both military reviewing
authorities considered the point. Calvin Dennis’s sub-
sequent repudiation of this testimony was presented to

. the Judge Advocate General on the application for new.

trial. What we said in respect to the, suppressed evi-
dence allegatien in.the’ Herman Dennis case applies to
the present point.

As is.our frequent’ practice in cayntal eases, we have
examined the whole of both of these long records. This allegation raises mat- —

ters not contained in the court-martial record.** We are
not told either in the affidavit er in the petition how these
items of evidence tie in with appellants’ defense but we

would be diffienlt to show until the uniform had. bee

ean assume with respect to'the uniform that a ery

examined for hairs, the blood stains analyzed, ete. With
- respect to the dog-tags, an independent search of the
Herman Dennis court-martial record discloses that one
prosecution witness testified that he had observed two

fustomers inside the store talking with the victim shortly .

before the crime. One of the two he identified as resemb-
ling appellant.Herman Dennis. ** On cross-examination,
this witness admitted testifying during the course of pre-

¢

26 Transcript of H. Dennis Record, p. 5:
** Id. at 29. Transcript of Burns Record, p. 40.

7° Daly does not allege that the prosecution, as @istin-
guishéd. from the Guam ‘police, was aware of the existence of

shis evidence. I think it unrealistic to suppose that they.

were not. In my view, Daly’s shortcoming, if ony,-in not
testifying as to these matters at trial can hardly be at-
tributed to the defendant-appellants.

** Record of H. Dennis sion by Gosieral Court-Martial, pp.
103-5.

liminary investigz itions that ihe’ customers “appeared to be
Filipino ‘soldiers.” **

~

Attempts to Suborne Perjury and Intimidate Witnesses

Appellants alleged that the prosecution “sought: to pro-
cure wiinesses to perjure themselves * * * and intimidated
and threatened ‘those who sought to help your petitioner
** e728" In support of this allegation, Chaplain Grim-

indtt's affidavit charges that the Trial Judge Advocate.

‘‘went to eath of the defense witnesses. and intimidated
them with threats of ‘perjury unless they clianged their
statements,” and. that this could pe substantiated by
specifically named people—ineluding defense counsel—
“and any of the defense witnesses.” * The affidavit does
not state whether or not defense counsel knew: of this
before trial. There was no inquiry of any of the wit-
nesses, except Calvin Dennis whom [ shali discuss’ in a
moment, concerning intimidation or any matter touching
on attempts,to suborne perjury. This allegation, like
many others, therefore raises*matters outside the court-
martial record.

** Id, at 105; see also Record of Burns Trial by General.

Court-Martial, p. 140. In this connection, it should be noted
that the-Clerk of the court has received an unsworn fetter,
dated April 16, 1952, from one of the Government’s witnesses
to the effect that although he observed appellants near the

scene of the murder, he also observed two other persons. ..

This letter reads in part: “However, as my employees ‘and
l left, a few minutes -before Miss Ruth Farnsworth. was
killed, there were two men Who went. into the shop. Their
car was parked to the right of my Jeep and to the left was
a military truck. The description of these two men was
given—yet at the trial, this evidence was not brought up.
When I tried to bring it up severa! times it seemed I was
talking to the prosecutor and his subordinates ; therefore,
these men did not: receive a fair trial.” ;

” Transcript of H. Dennis Recérd, pp. -5-6.

* Transcript of H. Dennis Record, p. 15; Transcript of
Burns Record, p. 26. . |

32

The allegatian of attempts to suborne -perjury is given
specific context by witness Mary L. Hilk Her supporting ~
affidavit affifms that in the presence of two other named
_ persons one of the prosecution’s chief investigators “tried
to prevail upon [her] to make a false statement before
the court” coneerning the voluntariness of appellant
Herman Denis’ confessions. The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Air Force acknowledged in a memorandum to
_-the Secretary of the Air Force that there was’ ‘‘sub-
stantial evidence” that Mrs. Hill had been prevailed upon
by the prosecution’s investigators to make a falge affidavit
but he dismissed the. matter as immaterial since Ma Hill
resisted these pressures and: testified truthfully at the
court-martial? Lt. Colonel .Daly, the deposed defense
counsel, also swere that Sergeant Wright, who was in-
terrogated in the pre-trial investigations, told him that
he had been threatened by an investigator for the prose-
cution avith a perjury prosecution “if jhe testified at the
trial to what he himself, in his own mind, was thoroughly
eonvineed had happeneé * * *,” and that he had comrauni-
eated these threats to the Staff Judge Advocate of the _
Twentieth Air Force.’ Sergednt Wright was not called © -
to testifv at the trial. ; ’

Coerced Confe.sion of Calvin Dennis

One other point remains with respect to Robert W.
Burns. Three persons were charged with the perpetra-
tion of these crimes——Burns, and Herman Dennis, appel-
lants here, and Calvin Dennis. They were tried sepa- |
rately. At the Burns trial, Calvin Dennis, the: ‘only a. 4

$1 Transcript of H. Dennis Record, .p. 33; Transcript of
-Burus Record, p. 44. See note 22, supra.

3? Transcript of H. Dennis Record, Pp. 126.

*% Transcript of H. Dennis Record, P °25; Transcript af
Burns Record, p. 36. :

33

leged eye-witness he the crimes, ‘‘confessed;” implicating
Burns. Burns alleges that except for this confession, “no
testimony in the record in ariy way directly connects this

petitioner with the crime”;* that such implication was —

- false; and that such testimony at the trial constituted |

perjury which had been suborned by the prosecution upon
a promise of.reward therefor in the form of a lesser
punishinent for himself. This allegation is supported by

+ ay . “ . * . . : *
an affidavit from“Calvin Dennis in which he confesses his

perjury and the fact that it was induced by the: proseeu-
tion by physical coercion, by threats that the investigators
were “going to pin murder and rape and kidnapping on
me,” * and by offers of “part of the $4,000 dollars/{sic] |
reward if I sign a statement:”* Calvin Dennis further

“affirms that the Trial Judge Advoeate “promise [sie] me
_-if I wonld. testify against Burns he would see that my

sentence would be disapprove - [sie] in Washington at the |

-reviewing board.”’ *’ . ;

It is true that Calvin Siete was questioned at the
court-martial and testified to ‘the voluntary nature of his
confession. Ordinarily, as the, majority points out, tHis -
issue would be deemed settled, for habeas corpus will not
lie to review the fact finder’s acceptanee of one version
of events rather than another. But this case gces be-

yond the limits of that well-accepted doctrine. . ‘Calvin |

oe

Dennis’ affidavit is clearly new evidence of q vital nature

which calls for a reappraisal of the voluntariness of his
¢
confession.*®

—

¢** Transcript of Burns Record, p. 18.

** Transcript of Burns Record, p. 47.

36 Thid. . 3

"Ibid. See also Daly’s affidavit. Id. at 36-7.

** Cf. United States ex rel..MeCann v. Adams, 320 U.S.
29) (1943) ; Mooney v.: Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).

a on *

Conclusions

[ do not assume that due process. is the same in a
military setting as it is in a civil setting. For

“Many of the procedural! safeguards which have al-

ways been observed for the benefit of defendants in ~

the civil courts are not granted by the military law.
In this rospect the military law provides its own
distinctive procedure to which the members of the
armed forces must submit. But the due process
(clause guarantees: to them that this military pro- -
cedure will. be applied to them.in a fundamentally
fair way. '* * * it is open for a eivil court in a
habeas corpus proceeding to consider whether the
circunstances of a court-martial proceeding and the
manner in. which it was eonducted ran afoul of the
basic standard of fairness which is involved in the.
constitutional concept of due’ process of iaw % * %7%—

—

“United States ex re/. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 666
(3d Cir. 1944). The court illustrated what it meant by a
denial of fundamental fairness: defendant induced to testify
against self by use of threats or promises in presence of
court and jury, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) z.
use of fraud, collusion, trickery and subornation of perjury
on part of state prosecution, Mooney vy. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935); domination of trial by mob violence in court-
room, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).

Cf. Wheichel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950) (oppor-

tunity to present defense of insanity); see Hiatt v. Brown, ° .

. 889: U.S. 108 (1950) abuse of discretion in appointing law
‘member of court-martial) ; Wade v. Hunter, 336 US. - 684,
688-90, (1919) % double jeopardy); Powers v. Hunter, 178
F.2d. 141, 145 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 389 U.S.-986

(1950) (court can review severity of court-martial sentence -.

to see if it violates prohibition against cruel and. unusual! pun-
‘ ishment) ; Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 761 (1944) (denial of counsel of choice,
denial of: right to call witnesses, testimony against petitioner
given out.of his presence at trial, witnesses testified against
defendant without being sworn, petitioner and his witnesses
intimidated, ete.).

,

35

Appellants’ allegations, supported by affidavits, -raise.
serious doubt’ whether ‘‘the whole course of events’’”
from apprehension to conyiction did not amount to a seri-
ous denial of fundamental fairness. If proved, they .
-would paint a portrait,of inquisitorial zeal rather than |
of a fair'triat in the Anglo-American sense.
The allegations concerning detention without ‘counsel
are supported by the record and are not in dispute.
Those tonching interference with counsel, suppressed evi-
dence, attempts to suborne perjury and intimidate wit--
nesses, and the repudiated confession of Calvin ,Dennis
rely og matters outside the record, which therefore were
not considered by the ‘convicting tribunal. Appellees ‘do
not think this important, however, since, allegations simi-
lar to those. made herein have been the subject of special
independent investigation by high military authorities.
.These reveiw and investigatory procedures are wisely de-
signed to minimize possible injustices at the court-martial
level and the apparently thorough study which these cases
have received cannot be disregarded. . But ‘‘perfection
in the machinery for correction * * * does not seem to
[me] sufficient to, allow a Judge of the United States to —
escape the duty of examining the facts on orageiieon
if true as alleged they make the trial absolutely veid.” *_
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently pointed out’ of
the availability of military review and investigating pro-

cedures which appellants, used in these cases does not pre-

clude erage review by way of petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The: basis for the Judge Advocate General’s
denial of a new trial in these eases is not clear with re-
spect to all of appellants’ allegations. To the extent that

t,

a

——

* Smith v. Uinted States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d
192 (1959),+cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951).

“ Moore Vv. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-2 (1923)
« Gusik'v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 182-8 (1950).

itt
36
- he found them insufficient, if trie, to grant the relief —
. sought, he abused. his discretion.“ | =
* In: view of the serious nature of the allegations and-~
supporting affidavits, I would remand to the District
Court for a hearing on the allegatians of. the petition. |
a ‘
: 7
a- 2
& #

- - e oe °
- .© Even though, the denial of a new trial was based to some
extent.on disbelief of the allegations, 1 think the exceptional
circumstances of these cases require a hearing in the District
Court. Cf. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118. (1944) ; Cog-
gins v. O’Brien, 188 F.2d 136, 183 (1st Cir. 1951); but ef.
Schechtman vy. Foster, 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.- 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950). |

x
t
>

Tfol. 61]. [File endorsement —: \
Unirep Srates ‘ourr OF APPEALS FOR THE a T OF \
CoLUMPIA eh ca Aprnit Term, 1952 et ees 3

No. i419 (i.

Ronen W. Burs, Appellant,”

af,

*Rosert A Lovett, ‘Secret tary of Defense, et al., Appellees

No. 14, 420. April Term, 1952 ..

hike P. Dennis, Jn, Appelant;

Rosert. A, Lovert, Secretary of Defense, et al., Appellees

Appeals: from the United States. District Court for the
District of c ‘olumbia .

Before: Prettyman, Proctor and Bazelon, Circuit Judges
Jup6Ment—Filed July 21, Ade2

These appeals came on to be heard on the ivasserinte of
the records from the Unifed States District Court for the
Distriet of Columbia, and were.argued by counsel, rT:
*. On eonsideration whereof, It is ordered and adjudged .
by this Court that the judgments of the said District Court
appealed from 1 in these cases be, and the same are hereby,
affirmeck ° ‘*
. It is further ordered by the Court “that execution of the
death sentences in these cases be, and the same is here by,
stayed to and including September 30, 1952, to enable coun-
_- sel for appellants to file petition for writ of certiorari, if

they are so minded, and to apply to a Justice of the Su-

preme Ceurt for a ‘further stay pending disposition of such .
“a petition. . :

| Per Cirenit Judge Prettyman.
Dated: July 31,.1952. " ‘ | ont

Separate dissenting opinion by {* ircuit Judge Bazelon.

.

-

~ G07 ¢ .
3.

e

{fol.6la} ~ ~—- | File endorsement omitted]
; . . . . - e
| Titie omitted |
7 Usirep Stares Court or Aprrals
ORDER AMEX NDING, JU DOME s1—Filed sree dual 20, 1952.
Before: Pr een Piscter and Razelon, Cireuit Judges ”
It is Ofdered by the Court that the judgment of this Court , .

entered herein July 31, 1952 be, and it is hereby, amended
by striking the date ‘‘August 30°’ in the third line of the
last paragraph and insertitig in lieu thereof the date ‘‘Sep-
terfiber 30°’, so that the last paragraph of said judgment,
us amended, will read as follows: +

“Tt is further ordered by the Court that execution |
of the death sentences in these cases be, .and the same
is hereby, stayed to and including September 36, 1952,
to enable cauisel for appellants to file petition for w rit.
of certiorari, if they are so minded, and to apply to a *
Justice of the Supreme Court for a further stay pend-
ing dis sposition of such a petition.’

Per Curiam. ,
Dated: Aug. 25,1952. 9 2

[fols. 62-63] Designation or Recorp—Omitted in Printing

[fo]. 64] CTerk's -Certifieate’ to | foregoing transcript
omitted in printing. . see

fol. Ho) Surnewe Courr or THe Uxiren STATES, Ocroner
: Term, 1952
. ) .° No. 422
Revers W. Bouxs and Hera P. Dexis, Je., Petitioners,

. , " Vs:

5 _—— Eee N ° 4 f
open AL Loves by Seeretary of Defense, et al. ge
Orore ALLowIne Crertionant—Filed December 15, 1952 : : Nik
The petition herem for a writ of certiorart to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Distric t of Columbia C iveuit
ix granted, 7 |
And it is further orde sad that “the duly ebitified copy of
- trans eript of the proceedings below whieh accompanied
» petition shall be treated as though filed in response to
sue dh writ. | 2

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386407_0258%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
