# Brief for the Petitioner — Feres v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386406_0300%3A03 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Brief for the Petitioner - **Published:** January 1, 1950 - **Citation:** 340 U.S. 135 ## Text nee . , as Executrix under the Last Will | net ee tener ; Index. ts tes AARON gx ERA eALERTS 3 eg i ae Sy. ce eee? SERA nt AE Ee 4 Argument ...... ESR EPI NONE SAC OP ELD US IIT EY aT AGUERT ORI BS) Pornt I. The Federal Tort Claims Act gave - the District Court jurisdiction of ‘tany claim” against the United States. Since the peti-- tioner was not excluded by any of the excep- tions, the District Court below had jurisdic- tion of her claim for the negligent death of her husband caused by an act or omis- sion of an emplovee of the Government. Neither the act as written, its legislative history or avowed purpose permitted the dA'ourt below to read into the Act an excep-. tion that was not there 220000000... lL cclings tapared rs) Pownr II. Since a soldier ts on duty at all times, irrespective of his particular activity or non- activity, the decision in ‘the: Brooks case is CORTFOUNN GE TOTO oi ica isd pisiecesedesboidcis 14 Pornr IIL. The privileges granted hy federal statutes are not a substitute to the rights granted by the Federal Tort Claims Act... 19 Post IV. The authorities relied upon by the Court below are not controlling 000.000.020.000... 2 Conelusion .......... POWER CR ire aten Se ccanman sacs onh dureniasvadsowate 24+ ADORRIEE sac snmsisclsctevoamanmetcs: son Maceadencabaa ete pecatanaias peo tee taste 20 ii. TABLE OF CASES.” Pare : Bamman v. Erickson, 259 A. D. 1040, 21 N.Y. S, - i Fee ees eee al a CARs eee Re a “ \ ‘ The complaint alleged (R. 6) that the agents of the United States were negligent in assigning the deceaséd to unsafe quarters because of a defective heating plant which caused the fire, and were further guilty of negli- gence in the supervision of the fireguard. Other specifiea- tions of negligence are alleged including failure to provide a safe place rag the decedent ‘to be quartered. The complaint was filed August 19th, 1948, and no answer was filed by the Government. There was no trial and a motion madeson the complaint to dismiss the jy action on November Sth, 1948. The order dismissing the , complaint was entered February 10th, 1949, and on the oth of April, 1949, appeal was taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Secand Cireuit. The United States Court of Appeals on November 4th, 1949, rendered a-decision affirming the District, Court. Se 3 Federal Statute Involved. The Federal Tort Claims Act is Title IV of Public Law, 601—79th Congress, Chapter 753, Sksers Session, 60 Stat. S43, ef seq. (United States Code, Title 28, Section 921, ef seq. On 1 September 1948, while this action was pending, the new Judicial Code became effective. In it the provisjons of the Act were recodified as Sections 1346 (b), 2401 (b) and 2671-2680. Sinee the rights of litigants of impending actions are preserved as they were under the. prior law (Section 2 [b] of Act of 25 June 1948, | ». L. 773) 80th Congr., 2d Sess.), we will refer to the Sections in the Act as or iginally enacted. (See Appentlix). ee ; | " uestions Presented. ; In Brooks v. P. S., 337 U. S. 49, 93 L. Ed. 1200, this Court Held. that the Government is. liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act to a soldier on furlough “ for injuries then tortiously inflieted by other miktary personnel. The question presented: here is: . Is a soldier sleeping in barracks removed from combatant areas after hostililies have ceased under the protection of the Federal Tort Claims Act so that his widow and dependents may recover dam- ages for his death caused by the fegligence of the employees of the United States Government acting: Within the scope of their employment? \ In the Brooks ease, this Court answered in the aflirma- tive the question as fo whether members of the United States armed forees were under the coverage of the Aet. This Court, see expressly reserved the question -as to whether the Act appled to accidents. whieh were incident to the sldier’s military serviee, stating In way .of dicta (p. 52): ; — \ : 3 ; 4 ‘*But we are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with the Brooks’ army. careers, injuries not caused by their service except in the sense that all human events depend upon what ts has already transpired.” &. The question presented, therefore, is whether the Fed- eral Tort Claims Act made a distinction as to coverage depending upon the soldier's particular activity. at the time of the injury or death and whether if the soldier is disqualified while a soldier from suing under the Act is this disqualification grafted over to his widow and dependents. Summary of Argument. The Federal Tort Claims Act as written gives the District Court jurisdiction of petitioner's claim. The legislative history shows that the purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act was to relieve C ongyess from considering _ thousands of bills introduced each year for claims against the Government arising out of multitude of cireumstances, including those of the armed services and their dependents. The history of the enactment shows that Congress had consid«red members of the armed forces. The exception that the Court below has read into the Act was once excluded by “Congress. .The Act is a general waiver of immunity intended to do away with the old practice of waiving sovereign Lmmunity by special. Act of Congress. it follows the trend of the last 25 years of the Govern- ment waiving sowreign immunity as ‘their activities ex- pand. Since a soldier is on duty at all times as a member of the armed forces until discharged or separated trom the service, the Aét creates no distinction upon the rigit of the plaintiff to sue depending upon the particular activity of the soldier at the time of the Act complained — of, except those of the combatant nature. Since this Court 5 has decided that a soldier on furlough is entitled to sue under the Act, it necessarily follows that all other soldiers, so long as they have the status of the soldier, are likewise entitled to sue under the Act. Assuming for reasons of military discipline, a soldier should not sue while a member of the armed forces, this disability is net grafted to his widow and children, the petitioners here. The fact that the Gevernment has given to soldiers and their dependents certain privileges by other Federal stat- utes cannot be considered a substitute to or an exclusion of the right granted under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The decisions relied upen by the Court helow are those under-an unrelated Act passed more than 25 vears ago which Acts were limited waivers of immunity and not the broad general waiver of immunity as the Federal. Tort Claims Act. ARGUMENT. POINT I. The Federal Tort Claims A® gave the District Court jurisdiction of “any claim” against the United States. ° Since the petitioner was not excluded by any of the exceptions, the District Court below had jurisdiction of her claim for the negligent death of her husband eaused by an act or omission of an employee of the Government. Neither the act as written, ita legi-la- tive history or avowed purpose permitted the Court below to read into the act an exception that was not there. ml The Act, Section 410, vives the District Court exclusive Firvisdiction to hear, determine and render jadement with outa jury ‘fon any claim against the United . States, — They provide ,for District Court jurisdiction. over any claim founded on negligence brought against the United States. We are not persuaded that ‘any claim’ means ‘any claim but that of ser ricemen. | The . statufe does contain twelve exceptions, See, 421, None exclnde petitioners’ claims. One is for claims arising in a foreign country. A/second extludes claims arising out of combatant activities of the wilitary or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during Aime of war. These and -ther exceptions are too lengthy, specific, and close to the present. problem to take away petitioners’ judgments. Without re- sorting to an automatic maxiin of construction, such exceptions make it clear to/us that Congress knew what if was about when At used the term ‘any ‘efairh.’ Tt would be —beurd/to believe that Congress a Mee did not have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when this statute was passed. ‘Thaloverseas and: com- oF batant activities exceptions makes this plain.’’ (a) Ufider familiar canons ‘of instructions, the Act does not need interpretation and should be administered as written. , The proper viewpoint is well expressed, with citations of numerous authorities, in 50 Am. Jr., pages 204-207, as follows: eee ‘;A statute is not open to construction as. a smatter of course * * *, Where the language of a statute is plain ind unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning * * * the -Court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. In the ease of gsuch unambiguity, it is the estab- lished policy of the Courts to regard the statute as meaning wWhat\it says, and to avoid giving it any other construction than that which its words demand. The plain and obvious meaning of the language used is not only the safest guide to follow in construing it, but it has heen presumed conclusively that the clear and explicit. terms of (/ a statute expresses the legislative \intention, so that such plain and ol. vious. provisions must control, A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself, and any: attempt to make it cleaner is a vain labor and tends ouly to obse uritv.”” Mr. Justice Holmes, in United States v. Pulaski Ue 243.U. S. 97; ste ited (p. 106): foods \ wv; “There js 9 strong presumption , on thks the literal meaning isthe true one, especially as/against cacconstruction that is not interpretation, but. per- version; that takes from the proviso its ostensible purpose to inrpose a eghdition precedent. * * *7") Another familiar canon of statutory construction that . when the meaning of the statute is plain the sole funetion 8 of the Courts is to enforce its terms. - See Caminetti v. -U.8., 242 U. S. 470, 485:- Osaka Shosén Kaisha dine v. U. S.,-300 U. S. 9S, LOL. \ Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pettus, 140 U. S. 226, 233, 359-L. Ed. 497, 500, 11 S. Ct. 822, 825, the Court said: % “This construction is put beyond doubt: by see- tion oYS6 which, by specifying four eases—in which the three preceding sections ‘shall not be applicable’ necessarily implies that. those sections shall eon- trol all cases not so specified.”’ The specific exclusions, therefere, carry the implication that all claims not thus exeluded may be successfully . asserted.* (b) The legislative history yrecludes the construction put upon the Act by the Coun below. — oe ter This Court in the Brooks ease stated (p. 50): ‘*More than the language and framework of the act support this view. There were eighteen tort claims bills introduced in Congress between 192. and 1955.2 All but two* contained exceptions deny- ing recovery to members of the armed forecs. When the present Tort Claims Act was first isikedeced the, exception coneerning servicemen had heen “dropped! What remained from previous bills was an exclusion of all claims for which compensation was provided by the World War Veterans Act of (June 7) 1924-43 Stat. 607, e320, 38 U.S. C. A. See. 421, 11 F.C. A. title 388, See. 421, compensation for injury or death o¢eurring in the first World War. H. R. 181, 79th Cong. Ist Sess. When HR. 181 was incorporated into the Legislative Reorgant- * Volume 23, Arnerican Bar Association Journal (p. 962): “When these exceptions ‘are considered, we are left in the field of Megligence of governmental agents in (a) the operation of motor ve- hicles; and (b) the maintenance,, operation, and contro) of highways, bridges, publie lands, building, and structures of all kinds.” 9 e zation Act, the last vestige of the exclusion for members of the armed forces disappeared. See also Note, 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 87,:93, 94.. Congress specifically considered and deliberatély re- jected an exception having exactly the same effect as that which the Court below now writes into the Act. - This is to be seen undeniably in the following circumstances : The original’ predecessor of the Federal Tort Claims Act was a bill, H. R. 7236, introduced in the 76th Congress. ‘It, like.the present law, provided for general waiver of the Government’s immuyity to tort suits and in it there were listed substantially the same twelve exceptions and exclusions which appear in the present Act. But, in addi- tion to these, there was at that time another exception Proposed which would have excluded from the coverage of the Act: 9g ‘*Any ¢laim for which compe nacabians is provided — Boer i } by the * World War Veterans’ Act of 1924, as amended.’ The theery of this exception, just as the Government now urges in support of the lower “Court’s decision in the present ease, was that the World War Veterans’ Act: of 1924, as amended, confers certain governmental bene- fits, such as the right to compensations payments, upon all persons injured while in the armed services of the United States, and therefore such persons should not also have the benefit of a general statute permitting tort suits against th Government. The clear purpose and effect of the proposed. exception was thus ‘to exclude all members of the armed services from rights of action under the contemplated statute. Conversely, it seems fo have been considered dbbvious (see Congressional Record, Vol. 86, Pt. TL, 76th Congress, 3d Sess., 1940, pp. 12015- 12032, and see also footnote, p. 212, Jefferson vf United States, 74 F.Supp. P09). that under the proposed statute's general opening of the way to tort suits against the Goy- a ; - 10 ernment, members cf the armed services would be able to sue like all other persons unless some such exception was expressly written into the statute. Though deba’ed, the bill was, of course, not eiheted by the 76th Congress. In the 79th Congress, the same bill, retitled"H. R. 181, Was again introduced with all its exceptions including the additional, or thirteenth, exception quoted and discussed above. Congress again considered the bill, struck out of ut the exception-in question, and enacted the remainder as the present Federal Tort Claims Act. The Federal Tort Claims Act, as its history partially outlined above indicates, was no hasty or ill-considered piece of legislation. The Court below was in error. to assume that when Congress gave its attention to the subje@ of exceptions or exclusions from the Act and carefully etched out twelve such exceptions, it overlooked and failed to mention a thirteenth exception which it really intended, Certainly and above all, the Court below erred when it disregarded the fact that Congress did con- sider such thirteenth exception. And for the Court below to write the effect of that exception back into the statute after Congress deliberately and specifically struck it out, is unjustifiable. ° In the Report of the Joint Committee pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Congress, 2d Session, House Report ‘No, 1675, it is stated at page 25: 78 Delegation of Private Claims. ‘*Recommendation: That Congress delegate au- thority to. the Federal courts and to the Court of 4 _(4Yanns to hear and'settle claims against the Federal Government; and that Government agencies and - departments be empowered to handle |eeal and pri- vate matters now provided-for in private bills, such as private pension bills and legislation authorizing eonstrnuetion of bridges ever navigable streams. g 11 ***Congress is poorly equipped to serve as a judi- cial tribunal for the settlement of private claims : against the Government of the United States. This method of handling individual claims does not work well either for the Government or for the individual claimant, while the cost of legislating the settle- ment in many eases far exeeeds the total amounts involved. : ‘‘Long delays in consideration of claims against the Government, time consumed by the Claims Committees of the House and Senate, and crowded private calendars combine to make this an ineffi- cient method of procedure. — 7 ‘The United States courts are “well able and equipped to hear these claims and to deeide them with justice and equity both to the Government and to the gaimants. We,. therefore, recommend that all claims for damages against the Government be transferred by law to the United States Court of Claims and te the United States D¥striet Courts for proper adjudication. “We further reeommend that private pension hills and other bills aealing with purely loca] and private. matters, including the authority to con- struct bridges over navigable streams, be delegated to the proper agencies of government for final determination.’’ (Italies ours.) In the Senate Report No. 1400 to accompany S. 2177, at pages 18 and 19, it is stated: | ‘Part 2. Provisions Applicable to Both Houses. ‘**Seetion 121. Private bills banned. “This section bans private bills, resolutions and seeders aathotivas or directing the payment ~ of property damages for personal injuries or death or for pensions; the construction of bridges across navigable streams; or the correction of military or naval records, It is provided, however, that the provisions of this seetion shall not apply to private bills or resolutions conferring jurisdiction’ on the Federal courts to hear, determine, and ren- der judgment in connection with private claims otherwise cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims howe Act if the claim accrued between January 1, 1939, and December 31, 1944, the last day heing the day hefore the effective date (for the purpose of ae- erual of claims) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. This wiil permit consideration of bills or resolu- tions covering claims going back for a period of 6 years and would seem to be ample to prevent any inequities.’’ (Italies ours.) Page 29; ‘Tithe [V—Federal Tort Claims Act. “This title waives, with certain limitations, gov- ernmental immunity to suit in tort and permits suitz- on tort claims to be brought against the United States. 1t is complenrentary to the provi- sion in title [T bannivg private hills and. resolutions in Congress, leaving claimants to their’ remedy | under this title.”’ Therefore it seems evident to us tha to rid itself of the great number of priv; of military personnel and their famille session, Congress wanted te bills for relief presented at every Several’.cases arising under the Act have been inter- preted as its primary purpose or intention to relieve Congress of the burden of dealing by private acts tort claims and construction put upon the Aet by the Court below and the Government defeats that purpose... ° United States v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 171 Fed. 2d 893. * State Farm Mutual -Liability Insurance Co, v. United States, 172 Fed. 2d 737. The position now assumed by the Government in litiga- tion under the Act is at variance with the original pur- pose of the Act as so indicated by Congress. \ For the first time -in’ the history of this country has there been peacetime consctiption® and the present activi- ties of the Federal Government reach corners never dreamt of by the founding fathers. It should not seem unusual that co-related with this extension of Government activity that there shoulyl ye assumed Government liability and waiver of immunity ite suit. The Act is a genera ie of immunity intended to do away with the old Practice of waiving sovereign im- munity by special act of Congress.” It follows the trend of, the last twenty-five years of waiving Government immunity as Government activities multiply. The proper view of the! Act we submit is as stated i Griggs v. United State}, 178 FP. 2d, page 3: “With dileverks m4 the views of the learned judge, in the Jefferson case, we fail to find any- thing in the context of the Act or its legislative history justifying judicial limitation upon the claims of servicemen. As pointed out in the Brooks case, there were eighteen tort claims bills intro- duced in Congress between 1925 and 1935, all but two of which contained provisions expressly ex- empting claims of members of the armed forees. When, however, the Congress finally came te con- fer. jurisdiction 5 the District Courts over tort claims against the United States, it: conspicuously omitted to exclatfe claims growing out of a govern- ment-soldier relationship. We think the only logi- eal conclusion is that it deliberately refr: ained from Sanka so. If the result of its omission to exept such elaims leads to dire consequences and absurd results, it is for Congress and not this Court to provide ration: il limitations. ’’ — soya forces of 2,300,000, still goal for the year" (N. Y. Times, Sunday, Sept. 10th, 1950). 14 { POINT II. BB ine Since a soldier is on duty at all times, irrespective of his particular activity or non-activity, the dec cision in the Brooks case is controlling here. Since this Court in the Brooks case has held that a soldier on furlough is entitled to sue, they have recog- nized that the Aet creates no distinetion dependent upon the particular activity of the soldier at the time of the act complained of (except those in the exceptions)... The decision that a soldier on furlough is covered by the Act capried with it the necessary liuplic ation that all solliers must be likewise covered. dae as te While he has the status of a soldier, his particular ac- tivities or non-activities may vary from time to time. He way be performing the duties of a soldier of the widest variety, from training* to combatant serviee. A soldier may be on furlough, as the soldier in the Brooks case, or he may be in the hospital, uncenscious on the operating table, as the seldier in the Jefferson case (178 Fed. 2d 518, cert. granted March 13th, 1950, No. 381), and the soldier in the Ostrander ease (No. 33, October Term, 1950, application for certiorari to the Second Cireuit.Coenurt is pending undecided before this Court), or he may be a soldier sleeping in the barracks far removed from combatant areas, as the soldier in this case. ue soldier’s status is that of a member of the armed In Skeels v. LU. S.. 72 Fed. Supp. 372, combatant activities were corstrued to men actual conflict. If Congress intended to exclude activities arising out of ‘training activities, it. would have been easy to have said so for they did chai “Guinan activities as well as those arising out of ditties of a discretionary: nature. forces until separated by discharge or retirement, if he Gbeys its laws and regulations. Once inducted into the army, his status is that of a soldier and not of a civilian and henee a decision in the Brooks case should be decisive of the ; sue here. , ° Is it to be assumed that Congress intended to include soldiers covered by the Act while on furlough or some other siinilar status but not- when sleeping in a barracks or per- forming some other activity? The error of the Court be- low is in assuming that the Act created the distinction be- tween a soldier who was or active duty and one who was: not. There is nothing in the wording of the Act that cre-_ ates this distinction; on the contrary, the exceptions where the Act does not apply are specifically set forth in meticen- lous detail in Seetion 421 thereof. | jos e What the Court below overlooked is that a soldier is on duty at all times irrespective of his particular activity at the time, ; 3 | There is no doubt whatever that’ a soldier on furlough is on active duty. He receives army pay and allowances (see The Judge Advocate General School’s Text No. 3, ‘Military Affairs,’ p. VIII-25), is ‘subject to the Ar- ticles of War and céurts-martial (see Manual for Courts- Martial, U. S. Army, 1949, par. 10, pp. 10-11), and is en- titled to army hospitalization and medical care (see see- ond Fourth Cireuit decision in Brooks ease, 176 FL. Dd 482). If injured while on furlough and discharged from the army, he is entitled to benefits under the Veterans Act only because he was disabled in NE of duty while on active duty. Active duty status is one of the prerequi- sites of the Veterans Act of 1924, as amended, which provides for the payment of disability benefits (88 USCA 71 fal) tor | i a ‘Cay Any person who served in the active iill- tary or naval service and who is disable as a ~“- result ol disease or injury or aggravation of a pre- existing disease or injury incurred in line of duty in such serv ice,”’ If fatally injured while on furlough, his: legal repre- sentative is entitled-to the six months’ death gratuity (10 USCA 9023 and 456.a). ‘Phese benefits inure to the soldier on furlough, as was illustrated in the Rrooks case, solely because he was on active duty and was in- eee in line of duty.’’ The theory is set out in Moore rv. UL S., 48 Ct. Clms. 110, 113: : **As a general proposition, we believe a’ soldier is in line of duty until separated from the service by death or discharge, if during such time he is submitting to all of its laws and regulations, * * * The provisions for furlougus or leaves of absence are a part of the disciplinary regulations of the military service, and no more separate a man from the service than an order to report to a different command. ’ For the historical development of the rule see the bd Judge Advocate General’s School Text No. 3, ** Military Affairs’? (1943 ed.), pp. X-26 to N-54. In the Court below the Gavernment contended in its brief at page 16: ‘ “The Supreme Court has stated that while on leave, a serviceman ‘is at liberty to go where he will during the permitted *ahgence, to. employ his time as hé pleases, and ag surrender his leave if he chooses.” nited States Wiliamson, 23 Wall. 411, 415. The leave ‘is a pS extended for his sole accommodation’ to permit him te ‘enjoy a respite from military duty.” Mosterv. United States, 48 C. Cis. 170. * A. leave of absenve ‘or ‘a furlough ‘is a faver extended. A soldier cannot » “ > Py ‘ 7 “a ge have a furlough forced on him.” Hunt % Uaited. States, 88 C. Cls. 704, 710.’ ) bac 4 17 We, therefore, argue that if a. furlough is merely a. favor extended to the soldier it cannot be concluded then | that it is such a radical change in his status as to again make him.a civilian foi the purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Government argued that:much when in its brief before this Court in the Brodks ease it stated (p. 18): 3 | Ahan € ee 3 \ ‘*The soldier is subject to military discipline even while at play, and his desertion is a serious ¢rime, punishable at times by death." (p. 29): ‘*Even in the absence of such statutory exten- sion, it has been recognized that a serviceman is entitled to compensation benefits for injuries sus- tained while he was away from duty and on leave, inasmuch as the military relationship is continuous and is not broken because of a pass. ‘A pass grant- ing temporary leave for recreational purposes can- not change this status any more than a leopard can change its spots. It would be dehors the.prineiples of riilitary seience if it were otherwise.” Globe Jun- demnity Co, v. Forrest, A65 Va. 267, 272." The Court of Appeals” for the District of Columbia in Wham v. United States, 180 Fed. 2d 38, cited the ease at bar but refused to follow it, pointing out the same error as we haves In that ease a police officer of the District of Columbia was injured while on duty by a Treasury Department vehicle, Cfiven by a Treasury Department employee. An action Was brought under the Tort Claims Act. _ The. po- liceman was eligible for various special benefits under Federal stAtutes but the Court refused to. apply thy doctrine of the Cireuit Court below in the case at bar or the doctrine of the Dobson* and Bradey™ cases, hold- *See Point IV infra where these cases are discussed. 1S ing that the decision by this Court in the Brooks case controlled. 9 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals said that there was no reason to draw a distinction between a soldier on furlough and a soldier acting in the line of duty because on furlough soldiers enjoy the same benefits generally as those on active duty, therefore, there could he no distinction chetween>a policeman on duty or off duty. See alsor Santana ws. The U. S.. lis Fed. 2nd 820, What had disturbed some of the Courts helow is in- terference with military discipline and like matters if a soldier was permitted to sue his government. These ¢on- siderations are hot present here because the soldier is not suing. His widow is the plaintiff, the petitioner here. We may make a general analogy to a person in a jail who undergoes a change in his civilian status while in- carcerated as punishment for the- crime found guilty of. Very often penal statutes disable a convict from suing while under the disability of a sentence. The Courts are universal in hoiding that such disability does not carry over to the convict’s familx or assignee-and that the dis- ability is personal to the convict and is removed when . he is no longer under the consequences of his criminal sentence, See’: Green v. State of New York, 278 N. Y. 15. Bamman v. Erickson, 259°A. D. 1040, 21 N.Y. 5. 2d 40. es! : ‘ . a purpose. Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & Steamship Co.,. 386 U. S. 198.’’ Argument was made,in the Brooks ease that Congress was aware of the decision in the Dobson and Bradey eases and, therefore, when they drew the Federal Tort Act molded its language in Accordance. with that aware- ness. In footnote 4 in the Rrooks opinion, this Court easily disposed of that contention, stating: “Other bills after’ those mentioned in note 2 above, also omitted: this exception. See, e. g., HR 5373, 77th Cong. Ist Sess.; HR 1356, 78th Cong. Ist Sess. This has nothing to do with ‘congressiona) awareness’ of the Dobson decision (CCA 2d N. Y.), 27 Fed. 807, and Bradey decision (CCA 2d N. Y.), 151 F. 2d 742, both infra. The ' present Tort Claimg sAct contains exceptions which would have been Part 3 Suite on Tort Claims Against the United ec .eeat co eird achic iat. ep ea : \ Sec. 410. (a ) Subject to the provisions of this title, the United States District’ Court for the district wherein the plaintiff is resident or wherein the act or omission com- plained of oceurred, including the United States District - Courts for the territories and possessions of the United States, sitting without a jury, shall have exclusive juris-— diction to hear, ‘determine, and render judgment on any claiin against the United States, for money only, aceruing on and after January 1, 1945, on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with the law of. the place where the act or omission occurred. Subject to the provisions of this title, the United States shall be liable in respect of such claims.to the same, claimants, in the same manner, - and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, except that the United States shall not be ‘liable for interest prior to judgment, or for punitive dam- ages.. Costs shall be allowed in all courts to the success- ful claimant to the same extent as if the United States were a private litigant, except that. such costs shall not include attorneys’ fees. ‘ Part 4—Provisions Common to Part 2 and Part 3 One- Year Statute of Limitations.’ Sec. 420. Every claim against the United States cognizable under this title shall be forever harred, unless within one year after.such claim acerued or within one vear after the date of enactment of this Act, whichever is later, it is presented in writing to the Federal agency aut of whose netivities it arises, if sneh ciaim is for a sum not exceeding $1,000; or unless within one year after such ae ae claim accrued or within one year after the date of enact- ment of this Act, whichever is later, an action is begun pursuant to Part 3 of this title. In the event that a claim for.a sum not exceeding $1,000 is presented f> a Federal agency as aforesaid, the time to institute a suit pursuant ‘to Part 3 of this title shall be extended for a period of six months from the date of mailing of notice to the claim-' ant by such Federal agency as to*the final disposition of the claim or from the date of withdrawal of the claim from such Federal agency pursuant to Section 410 of this title, if would otherwise expire before the end of such period. : : Exceptions Sec. 421. The provisions. of this title shall not apply to— (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an em- ployee of the Government, exercising due care, in the ex- ecution of a°statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercises or pegform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. : (b) Any claim arising out of the Toss, miscarriage, .or negligent transmission 6f letters or postal matter. P (¢) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law -enforcement ‘officer. (d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by the Act of Mareh 9, 1920 (U.S. C., Title 46, Sees. 741-752, incinsive), or the Act of Mareh 3, 1925 (U.S. C., Title . ? 28 ~ - . 46, Sees. 781-790, inclusive), relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States. (e) Any élaim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering the pro- visions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended. (f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United States. (g) Any claim arising from injury to vessels, or to the eargo, crew, or passengers of vessels, while passing through the locks of the Panama Canal or while in Canal Zone waters. (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false im- prisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or inter- ference with contract: rights. a 3 en (i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal opera- tions of the Treasury or’ by the regulation of the mone- tary system. (j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or, naval forces, or the Coast Guard, dur- -ing time ower. * (k) Any claim arising in a foreign country. (1) Any claim arisirf from the activities of the Ten- nessee Valley Authority. , Exclusiveness of Remedy See. 423. ‘From and after the date of enactment of this Act, the authority of any Federal agency to sue and be sued in its ewn name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such Federal agency on claims which are cognizable under Part 3 of this title, and the remedies provided by this title in such cases shall be exclusive. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386406_0300%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.