# Brief for the Petitioner — Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the Petitioner
- **Published:** January 1, 1949
- **Citation:** 336 U.S. 601

## Text

LIBRARY —
SUPREME COURT.US ©

INTHE

Supreme Court ‘of> the. United States

Ocroser Term 1948

“* : No. 387

- 6
” ° -r .

TRANSCONTINENTAL & WESTERN’ AIR; INC,

Petitioner,
a

CIVIL AERONAU TICS BOARD,

Ow. Wait or Certrionaki tro THE Unrrep States Court
or ApreaLs FoR FHE District or CoLUMBIA

"BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

« ‘ OP, .
. Geravp B. Broprry,
Attorney for Petitioner.

' (CHarLes Piekert,
Josern S. leeman,

of Counsel

Respondent. ae

INDEX.
i. P
? PAGE
Opinions Below ....0....6000...06. SOROS reer
eee CET RS PEER T CLS Ay SNe ei
Statement of the Case . : eucawes us sesecceacss re = Sivsecsn ' @
Specification of Errors pele ieee ie hese eradhcr nasa Ses
; Summary ‘of Argument seas eee? pe oe Pree oe i
Point I. .The Act clearly delegates to the Board the power w hich | |
has been held non-existent ..-@p-.--+ +--+. +5 +0-- ba aaens ales ‘11

Point II. The Court of hemeska” relied on, an inapplicable

presumption against *trospective oe settee eee
Pont III. The cola Appeals —— on a false analogy to.

public utility ‘Tate statutes ........5. eee eee eidesewsenas

-Point 1V. The Act ‘inne dhateves restrictions may have

ee

existed under earlier mail pay statutes .....6....... eee
A. Mail pay prior to the Railway Mail Pay Act of tof.

The Railway. Mail Pay Act of OE oi hoc cde an cexs
C. The Air Mail Acts of 1934 and 1935. Peer T Fa a

ant

D. The changes made by the Civil Accousestics | OCTET

E. The‘ ‘Legislative History” of Section, 406 (a) ( RD éevasa »

Point. V. The decision below thwarts the basic policies of. the
Act and defeats the. airlines’ constitutional right to just com-

"pensation ee €60600600808662080'8 © Me pe enter ee made eelsseescees

‘CONCLUSION . ta Hees Reece Lene des mimes feo ee eee ee see eeeeee

Arrenpix A—The Board has often fixed rates Basi ged
as of a date prior to the institution of a rate proceeding .

A. The new route cases .......0.... aaa Spies g pre career

B. The “nune pro tune” petition device ......... \icahaae
C. Retrospective “reopening” of “final” rate orders ........

.

J ay .
ae
a . ¢ ) a
tsi \ i we
v as °
ii
‘ PAGE
D. The “system” cases ....... Melaens Hea pas ree
erie, Mor i eae ee
E. ‘Significance of the: Board's action ... Nar “SEEpEN Da 96

‘Supplement to Appendix A—Civil ediaiiseillca Board's Memo-
‘anda of “May 22 and June PE CEe Sep rrer ry ass. 798

Appr NDLX BARelev ant statutory provisions Be ee ee 81-123 |

: TABLE OF CASES CITED*: ,*

“Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., ae ‘U. S..607, 88

L: Ed. 488; 64 S. Ct. 1215 «..2.....;... Soins heehee eee aes 62
Air Mail Compensation, 206.1. C.C. "pp ve... 21,'53,. 55, 58.
* Air Mail Compensation, 216 1. C. C.. 366... . gees. . 6 5 387, 65, 69
Air .Mail Compensation, 222 I. C. €. 602 .0...... BY, 56, 57, 58, G6.
Air Mail Compensation, 232 1. C. C. 608 ........ ph paneweat 58, 66
Air Mail.Rates for American Airlines, Inc., 2251. C..C. 12 . cy aa
‘Air Mait Rates for Braniff Airways, Inc., 226 . oS tees: 57
Air Mail Rates for Route No; 2, 231 1. C. C.. gor conkaats Aes ° 56, 5?
~ Air Mail Rates fof Route No., 62291. C. C. 88% 2.0.0... 000. 58
Air Mail Rates for Route No. 8, 227, 1.-C. Cc. pry inhi Pe
Air Mail Rates for ‘Route No. 13, 231 1.C. C. 673 2.00... . ei
Air Mail Rates for Route No: 26, 22% Rg@® ©. B78. Me cee en 57
’ Air Mail Rates for Route No. 29, 229 1. Ct oe Deke ere ny
Air Mail’Rates for Route No. 31, 214 Can Ca Me cays dee kane 5b
Air Mail Rate for Route No. 33, 216 F.C, C, 381. ....56,66,69 >
Alaska. Airlines. :Inc., Mail Rates, Order No. E- 1665, June 4, '
th Cae Ee Sra rete Eaters Cr ee a Aura mt Mair ap rere a aan 43
Alaska Airlines; Inc., Mail Rates, Order No, E; 1885, ‘Aug. 13,
BOGS. sce ness PEPE eee COT eS cr Seah heck tes e an ae den 86
> All American Aviation, | Inc., i Mai Rate for. Route No: ih 3
tee ee a tee eA alae he ee cn ee ae | ee
All American Aviation, ra “Nail Rate for Route No. 4, "pate
as ee ew Lees VA CaKaei aera Leeee pecan enn 22,41 ©

| Allman v. United States, 131 ws 5. 31; 33 L. Eu. 51, 9S a. Ae 632. 33.2.

lent

Alvord vy. United States, 95 -U. S. 356, : 24:L. Ed. 414 2.......6. $6
American Airlines, . Inc.—Mail Rate Proceeding, 3 C, -A. -B: pre
ee Wine tks nase see oes 27, 38, 39, 51, 58-59, 61,-76, 79, 83

American ‘Airlines; Inc.*Mail Rate Proceeding, 3-C..A. B. 770. ts
American Airlines, Inc. et al., Mail Rates, 4 C.A. B. 90 temas 1, 1

*“Full citations for .decisions ‘ot the Supreme Court of mh \United ‘States
appear in this table; in the body of the brief - references ak given only.

_ to the United States ——- ope ay

ee | sae : aN ‘¥

are . af

“8:
. : : F | z ij :
$52. PAGE 7
- American Airlinés, ake Mail Rates, 6-C. A. B. 564» re nt
- American . Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, ‘Order Nv. 1351, April 7%~
4 ae ore asco B ae SERA eT RE ae 21
a ~ American Export ‘Kvloces, Ihc.—Certificate of Public Con- rd
.. .- ‘venience and Nesessity, 2.C.°A. B. 16.0 06.......... cece 37. Of

Amtrican President Lines, Ltd., et al. Petitions 7'C. A: B. 799. . 39 \e
- American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States, 259 U. S.-

> YB, 46. Li- Ed: 883,42 .S. Ct. 420: 2... ec ecec ieee nse eas : nae
Ses . American Stevedores, Inc. Vv. Porello, 330. oe 446, i, Et * 2
133,67 S. Ct. 847°...... eae ees Age wr ee 1) ei
«Anderson National Bank v. Luckett 321 U. S. 233, 88 L. Ee. ee
Pe MN RR er ee was Be.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v. U. +» 225 U, - G40, 56
| L. Ed. 1236, 32 S$. Ct. 702 rae vue PS POE Pee Tee 1
{a Bankers’ Mutual. Casualty Co. v. Minnéapolis; St. Paul & S:
"am "SM, Ry. Co., 117 Fed. STEN OD ois cick cce ss 2 30
Bs _ The Bayonne, 159 U. S. 687, 40 L. Ed. 306, 16S. Ct. 185 ...0.. 88
3 ’ Beaver’ Valley Water To. v. Driscoll, 28. F. Supp. ages . 35
Board = Public Utility Commissioners v. New York Telephone —.
; - Go, iF U.S. 23, 70 L., Ed. 308, .46°S. Ct. 363 ... 0.055. Ym | at tad
A _Boatinien’ s Banke. Atchison, Topeka &. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2-F...- *
GO) SEU AR as fe sacs, 88

‘ Boston-Maine’ Airways, Inc. Base Rate Mileage, 229 I. Cc. C. 343 57 -
Boutell y. Walling, 327 U. S. 463, 90 L.. Ed. 786, 66 S. Ct. 631.. 97
’ Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 88 L. Ed: 892, 64 . Ct.

Ws Saker dk hob cab REV Aa KE RORRE SAAS AD eS AOE ee |
_ Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 5%, 64 L. Fd. 135; 40 S: Ct, 62 82
5B Braniff Airways, Inc., Mail’ Rates for Routes Nos. 9, 15 and 50, :
* ee Oe re isa oe ae . 22
a ‘Braniff Airways, Inc., Mail Rates, Order No. E- 966, ‘Nov. eres
i es Ma es is ae ee rs a 86
'; . Braniff Airways, Inc., * Mail. Rates, Order No.. E: 2129, Oct.. 28,
Bre Serene Pirenaor eer er oe ae
Brewst®r y. Gage, 880 U 5. 337 74 Aas 45%, 50 S.Ct. 115. oe :
Burrill v. Locomobilh , 258 U. S. 34, 66-L. Ed. “450, 42S
j . m3 256 ....... ce eS ig pee n ted yeas C444 14 SRDS Ob Oa 82
ee * Capital Airlines, tic: v. c ivil Aeronautics Board (Court ‘of oe es
4 * peals, D. C., Docket ee CSE pee ee eae ae
Caribbean- Atlantic. Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 6C. A. B. 407.... 85°":

Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc, Mail Rate, 7 C. A. B, O43, 23, 41.
—— Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. United States, 104
VS. OR, 96-Le BM BOB Foo os ccs yeni pce ceks. coed, 48

e } ae
. Kb : "|. RAGE
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. U.S. 198 U.S. 385, 8
SD idc. TOG ROUGE, BG... Ch. GOR sia cca cancecécrasss ; : ol 47
Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. ¥ United States, 104. U.
SG A Ba Se UE Kin eda ncceanececnaiar as etapwedy “1a, 48"
Chicago & Southérn Air Lines, Inc. oo Mail Rares Xor Routes+
eR OT ag ES RP Ey paren Oey eo - 59.
Chicago “& Southern Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rates, Order No. * ;
Rit ORO soc cvcrcddkescincv ihe deeasuekusi ae
Chicago & Southern sAir Lines, ‘Inc., Mail Rates, Order. No.
nee Be 7) 0. n son ShocaukeanaReteen scenes 85 —
*-CIncage & Southern Airlines,’ inc., Order No. om 182: 5, duly 28 3
RO Aaah bas ehh Pane es oc Ons gannteadss el conuees s 29, 45
Chicago.& Southern Air Foe, ‘Inc. Rate Reviews, 223 I. C. C.
BE Sotuanacde WSs ba RCRA be ON eK ak eae ete tees pee Sea}
Chicago & Sou — Air Lines, Ine. -v. Waternian Steamship *
* ‘Corp., 333 U.$..103, 68 S. Ct. 431° ea etblewewanenes keene dt.
Chorpenning v. U nited States, 94 we . 397,°24. L. Ed. 126... 13 -
Colonial Airlines, Inc., Mail Rate, 7 ¢. A.B. 415 a ee
Colonial Airlines, Inc., 7 C. A. B. ORG Spina ken eee ac ow ous nets 95 D s
- Colonial ‘Airlines, Inc., Bermuda Servi ices Mail Rate, Order No. --. \
E-1153, Jan. 26, 1948 ....... SO ST PTE aE EOE LP RE 86
’ Colonial Airlines, Inc:, Mail Rates, Order No. E-12 63, March
By TOURS ce usuwensetavakdvegevacsy: leectit chcel ink os 95
Colonial -Airlities, Inc., Mail Rates, Order "No. E- 1340, —_ |
‘Mg (ROO. Viaviss esse caseeucneseiase awipsdueds Tee wcaacst 95

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 C S.- 591,, °
- 92°L, Ed..653, 68 S. Ct: 702 ....... Pegs SORE Pree Papegee
Conboy v. First Nat. Bank of Jersey City, 203 U. s. M41, 51

Li, ee RO Oe My Wace cerercvcds tuieteguseds eenes 88
Continental Air Lines, Ine. —Mail Rates for Routes. Nos. 3 and :

le ay LG RCS Wee | Bose 20.
Continental Air Lines, Inc. —Mail Ses for Roitte No 45,

CCA. A. 188 2.65.5 RTT TTL TORT OPT PELE CT ETT TO LTPPRPT. 86 :
Cox v. Hart, 260 U. S. 427, 67 L.4Ed. 332, 43 S. Cte 154........ 26

* Credit Co. Ltd. v. Askansas Central, Ry. Ce. 128 LU. S. 258, 32,
L. Ed. 448,.9'S RE DOE deeb ccelvesvdtsgcsranvovaiveess ~ 88

‘Delaware, Leckawanne & Western. Rd. Co. v. Rellstab, 276. \
U: S. 1, 739 LE. 408, 46-3. Ct. 908 5 cc cscsccccscedacces P 1
Delaware, Lachawanna & W estern Rd. Ca v.-United States, 219 .
OS, S: S08, 6 1, dk 680,90 S.Cn. B06 ow dvcateciccecets ‘ 47
. Delta Air Corp., Mail Rates, for Routes Nos. 24 and D4,
SP a wo xdGuhddncbad Kaceoeteeetoceieeas webiec “Ste Be

">

: al ?
ae

. gS j v :

i PAGE

Delta Air Linda, Inc., Mail Rates, Order No. Bayo Oct. 28,

SE act duowenéka dente sbaebaendnckonbaneshéuseekébnks 43
+ Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 LS. 104,.83 L. _ Ed.
f=: 7 MOR OO 8, 98 2... 5005605..5 Apr tee eee, Be 35
3 Eagle Cotto Dil Co. v. Souther Ry. Co., 51 F. (2d) 443...../ 76
z= Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rate Proceeding, 3°C. A. B. 733 _ 38,
a 2 = Gans, "> 78, 93
& Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rates, 6 C. A. B. 551.......00... » 12
~p Eastern Rd. Co: v. U. S., 129 U.S. 391, 32 L: Ed. 730,9S°Ct.
OBR SAREE IIS ace one RR a OU RUIN 6 SOA ty ey pe a »i4,47- -
Edwards v.earzey, 96 U. S_595, 24 L. Ed. 793° ...... pee $2.
Empire Air Lines, Inc. ., Mail Rates, Order No. E-896, Oct. 20,
eR ae. ARE prey oe Be pain ae STE TD 85
_ Essair Inc., Temporary Mail Rate, 6 C. A. B. 687 Ae sae ie Pe 42
. Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, .
88 L. Ed. 333, 64.8. Ct. 281.22... 9.22.6 ERE RE SENOS 7%
- | Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline €o., 313 U. S.*
= € . ee Oe ac ee: Pe: Oe Bs Ge, SO i kates ehcccecsnkanncs 34, 81
Federal: Trade Comm. v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. : 49, 85
Ras es Ms, sy OD nok nd sin > Sad veendaawed Scaueueas 49
diese. gma Bank’ y.. Missourt, 265 Us . 640, 68 L. Ed. 486,
o( Dele SE dad nn shatutel acess bhi eddebnxlccedaxisante a.
- Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U. S. 111, ~
‘9 91 L, Ed. 1378,,67. S. Ct. R489 2.2 20:. ~denvessadewadees 4 97
Florida Airways, Inc., Order No. E-765, Aug. 19, 1947 ....: oe
Florida Airways, Inc. “s Mail - Rates, Order No. E-897, — 20,
SOG .cnwne FEE AP PEE PP Lee ae SPT Or ErY ee rere TTT rrr 8&5
Freund v. United States, 260 U. S. 60, 67 L. Ed. 131, 43'S . o.* ~
$ Mh, Palkiens, ieee Nip eS spore Bis ahs sve eseceo age sns cee 46°

ll oie
Cline v. Us 193 U.S. 451, 48°L. Ed. 45, 21S. Ct. 510.... 88
Gemsco, Inc. v. W alling, 324 v. S.. 244, 89 L. Ed. 921, 65 S.

3 Ces a lek oes ba eae ae SNS bo Ok hood KOO rae ade ee kee 74
Grand Trunk W estern: Ry..Co.°v. U.-S.,.25¢ U: S. 114 64 LS -
Me, BOG, 20 By Oe. BO 8a onic ccadonc yp oV bes cctste “2.33, 79, 97 --
Great Northern Ry. Co.-v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. 287 . -
U. S. 858, 77 L. Ed. 360, 53 S. Ct. re ras aceet el caved 76
Great Northern Ry.Co. y. Sutherland, ‘ ar3 U.'S. 182, 71 L. Ed.
Pe ae ee MP vidcdns kv eudinoced ceeWasuaetess 2
Great Northern: Ry, Co. v..U. S., 315 t. S262, 86 ~ Ed. DS aa
OE RAPE AD asivcaedpbadsdasccyobseseesasucaenass an ee
Gryger v. Burke, a. U. S. 728; 68 S. Ct. 1256 2000s. Seaeaans par
Halstead v. U.-S., 55 Ct. CL OS seus caoueavecseenee sens roe

bs a tne

Vi

: PAGE
Hanford Airlines, Inc. Rate Review, eA Oe ees
Helvering v. Reynolds, 315 U.S. 428, 85 L. Ed. 1438, 61 S.Ct.
PRE rere rae ye ase Kec (Ween esgendennawaw nese s ia ee
erin ater Co, v: Corporation Comm. of North Carolina,
" 269-L. $278, 70 L. Ed, 273, Bay AE ae) ene Ser ew pe to
Hicsbayashi +. U. ss $20 yy 81, 87. L. Ed. 1774, aa Ree
BGGO sce scadecapaavage ities FE Se ee a PP ng NE NAD Oe co ae
: Hooton ¥, United States, 38 ¢. Cl. 639 Ae Se ee wee ees : Pe PC ene.
Hunt v. United a. 5% U.S. 9125, 66° L. ‘Ed: 163, 42.S. -
is Eee as Od yh reer POET Briere Pers 46

Hurley, v. Kincaid, ' 235 Us 95, 76:1... Edd. 643. “52 SL Ct. 273 . 82
" Ilinois Central Rd Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U. S. 187, 84 L.. Ed.

670760 S. Ct: 419 .....: (Gadhbss ws eaes Rada w ee ks eee Re 27
Ink: Air Lines, Ine.—-Mail Rates for Routes Nos. 28 and 35,
Pe SOON eae cece s ica coke uee ba vee ae oF

inf ter- tala Airways, Limited, Rate Reviews, 225 1.C.C.115.. 56-°

a. |

Lapras Pensacola & Mobite Rd. Go. -v. U. S., ‘Tas U: S

626, 30 L, Ed. 273, 7 S.Ct. - beleeseess ipectesience Rea
~ Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet: {U, S.] 524. Rig eRe ars: 13
Lewis. v. Fidelity & Deposit Cy. of ‘Shanland 292 U. S. 559,

28 L. Ed. 1000,. 54 §. @t. 568 2... cece esac eee cteces 26
Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 68S. Ct. 1294......... “41-
Luckenbach Steamship Go. v. U. S280. U.S. 494, 20 &. nee hs

356, 50S. Ct. VAS eeepc eee chee eee eee eens cm Wee taee gd
Macon, Dublin '& S Savannah Rd. Co. v. U.'S., 78 C. Cl. 25),
We CER SOE ae eae 51-A2
Mail Divisor Cases; The, 251. U. S. 326, 64 L. Ed. 290,.40.S. °

i Sa ee tl oh ee

Manhattan General E ‘quipment Co. v. Commissioner. of Internal
- Revenue, a97 &. S. 129, o¢ L.. Ed. 526, 66 S°CO OT...
Mat ter of Maul Compe nsation of Pennsylvania Central Airlines

Corp.; Docket No. 484 2.23... 24/0 Pee CLE eee CREE Se 24
agree bea Co., In Re, 218 U. S. 312, 54 L. FA 1051, |

) ee oA | APs Se a are ee: ak ik de Oe Ea eS . nd) AS ee
Pr Fest oral ‘Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 1 C. A. A. ‘txaw 38

Mid-Continent .Airlines, Inc. —~Meail Rates for Rontes pei 26

and 48,°3 C. A. B. pr eae ig See Are Lo LEP PES wm tae

| Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc. > Mail Rare’ for ere No. 48, 2
C. A. B. 32 .. ; 86. 93

—_—

J ri js ow :
, et . - . ty .
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. “Co. v. U. a 256 U. S. 610, 68

L, Ed. 1J18, 415. Ct. 617.23 ee ete enesesdedaeecsessys 14
Monareh f\ir Lines, Inc.. Mai! Rates, Order: No. E-8Us, Oct.
ot A RO, ed or FR eels Warn ey Need Kine G Arne MIE oe 85
Mulford v. Smith, 307 UAS. 38, 821. E d. 1092, 59S. Cr. 64 26
National Airlines, ay Mail Rates, Order No. E-1271, orcs
5 ates Pinas parce aE ee ed ae ae 12
National Airways; fac, Rate hey: iew, 226 1; C. c re ae Da ; an
National Parks Airways-—Base Rate Mileage, 220 1..C..C. 149... 0 57
_, Neild. District of Columbia, 71° App. D. C. 306, 110 F. ¢ 2d)
246 Be ee oes we pay epee eta SA dete o. on an Lone, eae Sm oe reese 25, 26
Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258°. 165, 66 1. Kd. S38
wy eG See” eter purr astute ehar pn eatin (arnt erne ie ete are ey O4
‘New York, New Haven & Hartford Rd. Co: v. United States, ta
251-U. S. 123,64 L. Ed. 182, 40 S, Ct.-67 ...... GPE Sen 46,47
Northeast’ Airlines, Inc., Mail Rate—Route No. 27;:4C. A. B: |
Be. Ware ere we eer PPPS ee perro ree Died elects 95
Northeast -Airlines, Inc., .Mail Rates, Order No: E 1230, ‘Feb.
So WE SRM yatta yaneuel aa ae en en Gee ee 43, 96
Northwest Airlines, Inc, Mat Rate Proceeding for Route No.
we Se, eae | GE Drea eg. Lhe ABP Ns Beer on py Re a ee
Northwest Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, Order No. E-721, July
SO TONE GS kana yan teen Gea ih oak Pe te Pe oo
Bees in’ Nitrogen Products Go. v. U. Ss 288 U. S. 294,
YL. Ed. 796, 53°S Ct. Peat eds Sunes rica PACES
- :
Oklahoma Natural. Gis Company v. Oklahoma, 258 Sop 24, *:
«° 661. Ed. oh, 42 RS Se eae pte > cE Ty aay ' 34
‘Oklahoma Natural Gis ce v. | Russell 261.U. ‘Ss. 290, 67 -L. Ed.
Coe Se Oe Ba es Gh es cae haces eb oi eee eee 34,80.
Old Nick Williams Co. v. U. 5. 215 U. % Sug 42S. Ct. $91, :..°. 25
Social Security Board ¥. 3 Nicrotko, 327 U.S. 358, 90 L. Ed. 71%,

/ 668, Ct. 637 Sew ey eee oe eee ee ee ee eo ee been ee ee ee esas 97
Cohn -v. Watterson, 17! Wall. {U. $.J-596, 21-L, Ed. 737.0... 82.
Southwest -Airways, Cu, , Mail Rates, Order No. E-899, Oct. 20,

DEC iak aC S eee Ce UD See ane Rode bee oe ek eee 85
Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. Barker, 231 Fed. 391 ........ 34-
Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 267 N. Y. App. Div. 72,

45 N.Y. S. (2d) 337, afd. 292 N.Y. 611, 55 N. E. (2d) 376 33.
Stock v: Mann, 255 N.Y. 100, 174 N.E. 76 Pa “S. eckiethneeee oe
Trailmobile Co. v: Whirls, 331 US. 46, 91 L. Ed. 939,67 S:

ee ae ar an na Gag a eke hee eke Nee A a REE 72
Transcontinental & W estern Air, Ine. oli e Ratés, 4 C. A. B. ~

Ce ata P Ed Ack ARAMA pA TER LASER ROLE WKS 22, 92, 93 -
Transcontinental, & Western Air, tec, Mail Rates, 6 C. A. B ,

Ee | a Peer HS AR Spey ee eae ee ee eee ee ee ee ee 3, 12, 85
Transcontinental & Western Air, Tnc., Trapsdblaiitie Mail R: ite,

7C. A.B. fs Se ee eee Cee See eee ee ‘prey re =
2 7

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

Opinions Below

. +, The opinion of the-Court of Appeals is reported in

169 F? (2d) 893. It appears at pp..111-115 of the Transcript
of Record. The majority opinion of the Civil Aeronautics

- Board, which-has not yet been officially. printed, appéars at

pp. 60-91, and the dissenting sured — at pp- 92- 108,
of the Transcript of Record.’ .

' For brevity, the following abbrev iations will be used hereafter.
Numbers in parentheses refer to the pages of the Transcript of
Record. The “Act” means the Civil Aeronautics Act .of 1938, as

_

_ Jurisdiction,

The jurisdiction of -this Court is invoked undef 28
U. S. . $ié 24 (see Pub. L. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., e. 646)
and * 1W06(f) of ‘the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (32 Stat.
1024; 49 U.S. €. 646(f)). a order of the Court of Ap-
peals was entered on August 2, 1948. Petition for-a writ
vedhinetouaiers was filed on October 30, 1948, and granted on:
December 6 , 1948 (93 L. ed. adv. op. 12 3). ;

Statement of the ole

Petitionér is ate air carrier engaged in transporting’
- persons, property and mail by aircraft in the United States
and elsewhere under certificates of public convenience and
necessity issued under the Act by respondent, Civil Aero-
nautics Board. : ;

Section, 406 (a)(1), ‘the Act empowers ited directs the
Board, upon its own initiative or upon petition of the
Postmaster General or an air carrier, ‘to fix and determine
- from time to time, after notice and hearing, the fair and
reasonable rates of compensation for the transportation of
mail by aireraft-... by each holder of a certificate author-
izing the transportation ef mail by aircraft, and to make.
such rates effective f rom such date as it shall determine to

99.

be proper eis soe? ae

amended Act of June 23, 1938, c. 601, 32 ‘Stat. O73, as amended,
9 UL S.C. $$401-691. See Appendix .B, infra. The Civil Aero-
nautics "Board and its predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Authority,

‘will be called “the Board,” (The functions of the Authority were.
transferred to the Board by pry wg Plan No. IV, effective
June 530) P40. 54 Stat, 1255, 5 Fed. Reg. 2421). Petitioner will

sometimés be called “TWA .
Unless otherwise stated, all italics are ours.

The basic question is whether the Board has any pow er
to determine that a new rate for carrying the mail should
_ be made effective from a date prior to the filing date of
the airline’s petition. Whether TWA should obtain such
relief, on the merits, is not the question here. The merits
have not been ‘examined—the Board has been held power- .
less. to examine them. _ The question of power arose in the:
following manner. . 5. | oe \ =
1. ‘The Petition for a. New Rate -

. -By petition filed March 14, 1947 (8-13), TWA’ applied
—~ to the Board, pursuant t’ §406 of the Act, for an order
fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of com-
pensation, effective J anuary 1, 1946, for transporting mail
by aircraft over certain routes (designated as routes Nos.
2, 38, 44 and 58) operated by it wholly within the United
States. That petition stated, in substance, the following.

- By order dated October 26, 1945, the Board reduced —
TWA‘'s rate for carrying mail over its domestic routes to ©
45¢ per ton mile, retrospectively effective as of January
1, 1945 (10)?. TWA suffered losses in every month after
the issuance of that order except June-1946 (9-10): These
losses were partly due to a common postwar experience:
costs kept rising while: mail revenue declined (&).° They
were largely caused, however, by conditions peculiar to.

TWA first received new ‘4-engine Constellation air-
-eraft in September 1945 (8). Because of certain contro-
versies, these airplanes were not’placed in service until

* Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Mail Rates, 6 C. A. :
595. ; ks

: . *

_ 10. The Court of Appeal erred: in affirming the order —

of the Board.

\

necessary.

Summary of Argument

Whenever the Board fixes a future mail rate, it makes’
-a propheey. In the-field 6f-air transportation, mail pay i
prophecies are peeuliariy speculative. When events show:

that a prophecy was wrong, the Board is required to ‘cor-
rect it. So the Act provides, Indeed, since the airlines are
required to carry the mails, revision is constitutionally

Mail rates must always he- suffic sient to ae the air-

lines to carry out the Act’s objectives, as expressed prin-
“ecipally in $2 and 6406(b). Hence §406(a) (1) both. empow-
ers and directs the Board ‘*to fix and determine from time.

to time, after notice ne hearing, ‘the fair and ‘reasonable
rates of compensation. for the transportation, of mail by air-
craft... and to, make such rates effective from such ‘date as

» 33. : \

it shall determine to be proper. Ve

x w . 4 .
The basic issue inthis "ase-Is simple. » Changing a mail
rate for the future does not remedy its past ulfairness.

* Concededly the Board» has: full power to adjust the rate

back to the filing date: of the proceeding broug shit to revise
the-rate. The question here is“whether its power to fix a

prope r effective date is arbitrarily limited by: the start of

that proceeding, or whether it has pawer, after hearing the |

facts and weighing the merits, to det termine that arate ad-
justment shou’. properly. be made effective as of a day
—"= tbat filing date.

It is hog. Afocossary to speculate as to the Congressional ~_

‘intent. The Board was. given power to make its Fates

“effective from such- date as it shall determine to -be
ame ree roe + aee ,
-proper.’": "Those are not words of limitation Wut of com-

“lets delegation of discretion. For Inany years: Congress

.
«
.

he

itself exercised the power:to adjust mail pay retrospec-,
tively. By §406(a)(1) Congress delegated to the Board.

full power to correct false prophecies by adjusting mail
rates retrospectively, not a limited power to adjust them
back only to the filing date ofa rate proceeding and 1fo
further. -

Read asa whole, the.Act compels the same -conclusion.
Its purposes require that the language be given its plain
meaning. When Congress gave the Board power to change
**publie utility’
- tinguished from mail compensation, it expressly limited the
Board to making changes effective only for the future or
‘from -the date of filing’’ of the proceeding, ‘rather than
from any date ‘*it shall determine to be proper.”’ Thé dis-
tinction reflects long-standing ‘practical. differences between

_. publie utility and mail rates. It underscores the breadth

g

ae

Ay

”

Be

of the power conferred by §406(a) (1).

For ten years the Board has been making rates effective
as of dates: ~prior to the start of a rate proceeding. Its only
statutory authority for . this action was derived from

- $406 (a) )(1). After a decade it set out to discover ‘whether

the section was not intended to have a somew h@t\narroywer
meaning’? (68). Suddenly -it feund that language which
it had earlier termed’ **plain’” had somehow become “‘am-
It and the Court of Appeals created, and then
“resolv ed, that ambiguity by a series of false analogies and
unsdund policy arguments.

99

bigtous.

Thus, yh was’ claimed that-a narrower construction is
_ justified by am analogy to usual publie utility rate de-
termination statutes S-although® the Act itself refuses to
draw the analogy: It was contended that to interpret

“406(a) (1) the’ way it reads would guarantee’

4
4

rates—passenger and cargo rates—as dis- .

a profit to

10.

every airline regardless of the character of its service, to-
tally ignoring the standards prescribed in §406(b). It
was argued by the Court that our contention would em-
power » “the Board to. lower rates retrospectively. | To that
we agree, and we are ‘puzzled by the Court’s concern. If
the airlines are to be protected against- unreasonably low
mail rates, the Government should be protected against.
unreasonable profits accruing from excessively high mail
rates. Numerous other arguments of like nature were
advanced. eee ;
While all these arguments are unsound, as we shall .
show in detail, their basic fallacy is that they erect variable
polic y considerations into a rigid limitation on the Board’s
power, Questions of poliey are for Congress to resolve.
Congress resolved them in no uncertain terms. Its only
statement as to what it Was:trying to accomplish, contained
in the Couferenee Report on the Act as it was finally passed,
confirms the fact that $406(a)(1) was intended to give the
soard the broad, flexible power to fix rates as of any date
caters to be proper after hearing the evidence: pro
“and con.. | ;
The dais question involved here is whether TW. A shall
have the opportunity. to present evidence on the ‘‘proper”?’
effective date of an adjusted rate. A decision granting
TWA a hearing. will merely enable the five- man Board to
weigh the facts. If thafacts. do not justify the Board in
increasing thy rate retrospectively, the Board will not be
bound to take that action. By refusing ait hearing on the
point, the decision bclow frustrates the basie policy of the
Act to afford full relief to an airline whose economic sound-
Jess has been impaired. by events unforeseen when the

Board's previous rate prediction w was made.
od .

;

sa on

_}t = Sor:

POINT 1

The Act ibaa: delegates to the Board the power
whith has been held non-existent.

"Under the Act, ie aly sald is not a matter of
choice. Every air carrier authorized to carry mail must
‘*transport mail whenever required | by the Postmaster Gen-
eral.” §401(m), 49 U.S. C. $481(m); cf. §401(k), 49 U.S.C.
§481(k). From this statutory duty flows a’ constitutional
right to just compensation,’ as the Act recognizes. ‘Such
air earrier shall be entitled to reeelve reasonable compen-
ed.’? Tbid.

owered and directed

sation therefor as hereinafter provi

Consequently the Board is ‘‘en
. to fix and determine from timg to time, after notice -
and hearing, the fair and reasonable rates of compensation
for the transportation of miail by aireraft, the facilities
used and useful therefor, and the services connected there-
with . . . and to make such rates effective from such date .
as it shall determine to be ‘proper.’ $406(a) of the
Act, 49 UL S.C. g486(a). The ‘trates so fixed and deter-
mimed shalk be paid by the Postmaster General from a
propriations for the transportation of mail by aircraft.’
Ibid.

‘The rates: which the Board i is to.‘‘fix and determitie frome
time to time’’ are not, therefore, rates in the abstract.

99

They are ‘‘rates of compensation’’—more precisely, ‘‘fatr’
and reasonable rates of compensation. ”’
Determining a reasonable rate of compensation for ear-

rving the mail ix Ho — matter ev én whe n, the services

% United States v. New York Central. Rd re 279 U. S: 73, 78,

*9. ne

“

have already been performed and the actual™results of
operation are known. It-is far more difficult, however, to .
forecast what fair compensation for, carrying the mails
will be in’ the future. Every such forecast involves a
propheey.. ‘That is true in the relatively stable ‘field of
‘rail transportation, although the forecaster has over a
century of past experience on which to draw. It is espe-
cially true in-the much newer and less stable field of air
transportation. Se He | iar? .

“In air sig shasig we can see but dimly the shape
of things to come.” American. Airlines, Inc.—Mail Rate
Proceeding, 3 C. A. B. 323, 339. ‘The determination of a
fair rate necessarily“includes consideration of the suscepti-
bility of the industry to large and unpredictable fluctuations
of net operating income.’’ Delta Air Cérp.—Mail Rates for
.Route Nos, 24 and 54, 3-C. A. B. 261, 285. Recently the,
Board remarked again: on “the -paibore weakness in.
“prophecy as to revenues and expenses.”?’ Pan Americay
. Airways, Inc., Order No. E-771; p. 6, Aug. 25, 1947. When
it set TWA’s mail rates in 1945, it emphasized that fact
time and again.’ 2

‘

* Transcontinciital & Western. Air, Inc., Mail“Rates, 6 C. A. B.
595. Thus, it’ remarked that “accurate forecasts of future operations
are complicated not only by uncertainty as to-the direction. in which
these curves will move in the future but also becatise of uncertainty
as to the relative timing and rate of movement of each individual
curve” (pp: H9YT-D98). “. 2. it is not possible under existing
circumstanices.to arrive at a fully reliable determination of the prob-
able future mail costs” (p. 600). Likewise it referred to “the
dynamic conditions now developing” (p. 601). * °

This decision appeared simultaneously with others setting the
same 45¢ mail rate for three other domestic airlines. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., Mail Rates, 6 C: A. B. 551; American Airlines, Inc.,
Mail Rates, 6 C. A. B. 567;°United Air Lines, ‘Inc., Mat Rates,
6 C. A. B. 581. -It is revealing to ‘compare the Board's predictions

» ue ve

Peal

3 = } BB

» Any determination of. air mail rates for the future. is’
therefore: peculiarly ‘‘a forecast subject to all the frailties
of propheey.”’ United Air Lines, Inc, v. Civil Ae ronauties

Board, 81 App. D.C. 89, 955; 1 Lao F. (2d) 169, 175. When
the forecast proves false, revision of the prophecy in light
of the actual facts is desirable and, wher the rate becomes
unreasonably low, constitutionally. mandatory.

‘Congress could, of course, undertake thé revision itself.
In fact, several times it has ‘adjusted mail rates retro-
spectively by special legislation. Sometimes private laws
have been passed to remedy specific past -injustices.® At.
other times general statutes have made retroactive changes
in mail rates—both upw ards and downwards."

of these sidelines? annual profits (on press it hased on 4: i¢ rate.) with
the actual profits or losses reported for 1946 and. 194% ( Civil Aero-.
nautics Board, Recurrent Reports of Financial Pata): :

Net Operat- |
ing Profit Actual Net Operating Profit or Loss

Predicted by _
vs Board 1946 _ 1947
TWA -| ”. $3,459,000 $-9,675,898. -$- 4,747,098
American 5,997,000 - 318,31 - 4,159,124
United , 7,162,000 976,402 - — - 5,203,699
* Eastern 3,754,000 _ 8,221,376 2,859,703

5 Congress has Suthorized, by. private bill, mail carriers to sue
in the Court of Claims to recover compensation to which, for some
reason, they. had no contractual right. Kendall y? United States,
" 2 Pet. (U. S: ‘| 524; Roberts v. United States, 92 U.S. 41; Wightman

. United States, 23 C. Cl. 144. Of course the consent te suit could
o withdrawn by a later statute, leaving the mail carrier ‘remediless.
Chorpenning v. United States, 94 U. S.-397, } oe .

® Thus, the Act of July 72, 1876, ¢,.179 at Stat. 79, 82) directed
the Postmaster General “to pial art compensation to he’ paid
from and after the. first day of July, 1876, for transportation of .
mails on railroad rdgtes by reducing the poniedinesitne to all railroad
companies for the transportation of mails ten per centum per annunt
from the rates fixed and allowed” by a prior act. . By its very terms

14.
‘For example, when Congress established the. parcel post
system in 1912, it- failed to provide for a general increase
in mail rates. For ) years railroads were unable to obtain :

this statute Was retroactive. Tr was held ineumlcaide ¢ to certain
railroads, on the ground that under their contracts no right tad been
Tese ‘rved: to change the pay if mail service were ae Chicago
» Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Untted States, 104. U.S. 680; Chicago,
M: Tmaukee & St. Paul Ry, Co. v. United States rie U.S. 687; see
St. Paul & Duluth Rd, Co. v. United States, 112 U: S. 733, 7385.
As to other railroads, however, the statute was held applicable: and -
given effect. Jaéksonville, Pensacola: & Mobile Rd. Co. v. United
States, 118 U.S. 626; Eastern Rd. Co. v. United States, 129 U.S.
391,° 395-3596; Wisconsin Central. Rd. Co. v. United States, 164
UL S. 190; cf. Chicago, Mili vaukee & St. ‘Paul Ry. Co. v. United .
States, 198.U. S. 885, 3389. ; ;
Similarly, the Act of August 24, 1912 ¢. 389, $4 637 Stat. 539,
554; 39 U. S.C. $474) provided for readjustment of mail - pay in
certain cases vice mail was diverted’ from: a railroad; “readjust--
ment made hereunder shall not take effect before. July first. nineteen
hundréd and twelve,.and shall) be. for diversions occurring .after
January first, nineteen hundred and twelve.” This statute was ap-
plied in Missourt, Kansas & .Texas Ry. Co. ©. United States, 256
U. S. 610, Plaintiff was carrying’ mail ‘under’ a 1910 contract,
Early in 1912 it discontinued a ‘fast train which had been operating
when the 1910 contract was made. “After the statute was passed,
the Postmaster, General ‘ordered the mail diverted from plaintiff's
line to two other raileoads. In 1913 the Postmaster General di-
minished plaintiff’s mail ee and increased the two other lines’
“compensation; as of July 1, 1912. This Court sustained his .order.
Mr. Justice Holmes said (p. 614): ;
“The statute itself contemplates a readjustment in respect
of past services, since it was not approved until August 24,
1912, and allows a readjustment from .the first of the pre-
vious July. As the change in pay is made in respect of a
change that has ‘occurred in the service by which the current.
pay was fixed, the railroad suffers no injustice, and, as we
have said, by the terms of its iste came it took the risk
of such a statute being passed.”

-

7 The parcel post system was inaugurated effective January I,-
— 1918... Act of August 24, 1912, ¢. 389; 37 Sta*. 557. At that time
‘mail rates were based’ on the weight of. the mails carried, rather

7.)

‘adequate relief, although seme legislation was passed to
improve their situation.® - Finally in 19167 Congress au-
_ thorized increases in their pay for, carrying parcel post, |
‘retroactive to stated dates in 191; 3 and 1914.2 At the same _
‘ime—July 28, 1916—the Railway Mail Pay Act ‘‘author-
ized and directed”’ the Postmaster General “to réadjust
the compensation to be paid to railroad companies from
‘and after the thirtieth day of June, nineteen hundred and
sixteen, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable’’ for
mail of all kinds at the rates hereinafter providéd.’*!" .
Likewise, the revision of the Air Mail Act of 1934 in
August 1935 provided that compensation under existing
contracts, for carry ing air mail ‘‘shall be paid at the rate
fixed py order. of the Commission under this act’? from—

a ctr ee ete enn enemecnee ———— ween cone ne eee — nn ee

than the space ‘occupied. sine sek “weil ie a pro-
portionate to the space occupied, than- regular. mail. Hence the
new system acted to reduce the carriers’, compensation. ‘The original
act authorized an increase in the compensation of “star.rotttes and
*screen*wagon contractors” on proof of inadéquacy. See 37 Stat.
558; Halstead ’v.: United States, 55 C. Cl. 31%; Hooton v. United
States, 58 C. Cl. 639: -No such ’inerease was authorized for rail-
roads; “there was.a widespread belief that the railroads were over-
paid.” St. Lows Southwestern-Ry. Co. v; United States, ° 262.0. a.

TO, 75.

‘While the Act of March 4, 1913, ¢. 143 (37 Stat. 797) per-
mitted the Postmaster General to make a limited increase in the
railroads’ compensation after July 1, 1913, it was purely discretion-
-ary. If he failed to exercise his discretion, the railroads; were left
witliout r-medy. United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 24 .S. 451; St: Louis Southi vestern Ry, Co. v. United States
262 U. >. 20, 73.

* Act of July 28, 1916, c. 261, $$5 ok 4 (39. Stat. 425). quoted
infra, pp. Bi0-B1l. See St Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. United
States, 262 U.S. 70, 73, footnote 2. : \;

1 Act of July 28, 1916, ¢. 261, 85, subdivision 1 (3% Stat. 425),
quoted infra, p. B11. . ,

fe oe
“on and after March 1, 1935.°°" Decisions under this
statute are reviewed infra, pp. 03-09, is
Adjusting inequitabie mail rates by special legislation -
s, however, a-cumbersome and slow. precess at best. Re-|
Vision by an’ adininistrative agency can be: more flexible
and less dilatory. Hence Congress created the Board to.
take over the burden. for it in. the field of air transporta-
tion. es
The Act conferred on the Board sufficiently Nil power
to enable it to cope with all situations that might arise, thus
: reducing appeals for legislative relief to a Minimum.” By
the unique language of §406(a)(1) of the Act—itself
unique statute—Congress delegated to the Board plenary
power to correct its false prophecies by adjusting mail
rates retrospectively, ‘without regard to: any ‘arbitrary
filing date. | }
By §406(a) (1) the Board is ‘Ceinpwered aa directed”?
to ‘‘make such rates effective from such date as it shall
* On its face, this language is
pertectly clear. Indeed, in 1943 the Board remarked on
“the plain language of the statute relative to the Board’ 3.

> determine to be proper.’

discretionary power make rates effective from such date
as.it deems proper.’’. American Airlines, Inc. et al., Mail
Rates, + C. A. B. 90, 93. Curiously enough, in 1947 it
thought that ‘ambiguity ix clearly present?’ (68).
More comprehensive words than are found in 406(a) (1)
would be hard to ‘imagine. Ax the Board pointed out in

| ee
1b Act of “August 14, 1935, c. 530, §8; 1 Stat. 617, quoted mifra,

pp. BlO-BIL. oes 7 es cers
Ok, United States v. Newe York Centrat Rd) Co., 279 U.
13, 79: . “Obviously: Congress intended the Commission to: dt

the whole bustness, not to leave a straggling residuum to look out for
ityatt, with possible danger to the validity of the Act.”

,
Oo

NS

re Ww

ove of its first mail rate cases, it is given broad diseretion
to select any date deemed proper. ‘The language of see-
tion 406 (a) gives to the Authority {Board| the right to’
exercise a sound discretion in determining the prope r date
on which a rate shall be made effective. Pan American
Airways Co. (of Nevada)—Mail Rates, he, A. A. 389, 409.

s°

No limitation on that discretion is imposed, although’ of
- course the. Board must regard the statutory abiectiyes.

The Board stated this forcefully. i in Ame rican Airlines, Ine.

—Mail Rate Proceeding, 3 C. A. B. 323, 331:

“We conclude that section 406 (a) of the Act:

vests in the Board complete discretion to determine
the date upon which its orders theteunder shall be-

come effective. ‘In exercising this discretion, we are.

limited only by the procedural requirements of no-
tice and hearing and by the necessity of promoting
the broad objectives of the Act.’’"%

Thus the unwieldy process of petitioning Congress for
special legislation to cor rect past Jnequities has been obvi-_
ated. Of course the Board is not compelled to make re-
trospectiv e changes regardless of circumstances—any more
than was Congress. It must, however, after hearing and

Ww eighing all the facts-of: the particular case, select a proper: ;

effective date. It can be the day on ‘which its order. is
issued, or even a future day. Likewise it cajn’ be a past

day which may or may lot-antedate the institution of the.

rate proceeding. Complete pliability- is the essence of the
statutory scheme in this respect.

8 The Board reiterated this conclusion im olmerican Airlines, (ne.

vt al. Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B. 90, 92. ‘The statutory objectives are

set forth inf Sections 2 and t06¢b) of the Act; see pp. 37-39, B1-B2,
Bi2z-BL3 mnfra.

18
: ~ ‘ .

The sweeping scope of £406(a)(1) is illuminated by its
contrast with other parts of the Act dealing with changes
, in public utility rates for carrying passengers and cargo.

All air carriers must file with the Board “tariffs show-
ing all rates; fares and charges” for passenger’ and cargo
transportation, under §403(a4 of the Act, 49 y. S. Cc.
S483(a). The carrier. may ¢hange threse rites, but only pros-
pectively. ‘*No change shall be made in any rate, fare, or
charge... specified in any effective tariff . .. except
after thirty days’ notice of the proposed change . Such
notice shall plainly state . . . the time such cate shall
_ take effect. The Board may in the public interest... . al-

low such change upon notice _ than that herein specified

. .’* §403(¢c) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §483 (ce). So too the

Board may review the filed rates and fix different’ ones,

but only in futuro, for §1002(d) of the Act, 49 U.S. C.
-§642(d), provides: | _ §

‘‘Whenever, after notice and hearing ... .- the

Board shall be of the opinion, that any individual or,

joint rate, fare, or charge demanded, charged, col-

lected or received by any air carrier ... is or will

‘be unjust or unreasonable ...°. the Board shall de-

_termine and prescribe the lawful rate, fare, or charge

. thereafter to be demanded, charged, collected

or received or the lawful classification, rule, regula-

tion or practice thereafter to’ be made effee-

Ee lites

Similarly, (404(a) of the Act, 49 U.S. ¢. ‘484(a), re--

quires air carriers to ‘establish just, reasonable, dnd
‘cadeaaekos ‘

'§ Manifestly. the Board's power under this’ section - is purely
prospective, Cf. Public Unhities Cominission of Ohio vy. United Fuel
Gas Co., 317: U. S, 456, 464." ;

19.

equitable divisions’’ of joint’ passenger an: cargo rates
‘tas between air carriers."’ The Board may ‘‘upon com-
plaint or upon its Owar’ mitiative’’ investigate ‘the divi-
sions of joint rates’? and ‘‘prescribe the just, reasonable,
and equitable divisions thereof to be received by the, sev-
eral air carriers.”’ (1002(h), 49 UL S.C. §642(h). That
section goes on to say: ¢

‘*The Board may. require the adjustment of divisions
sy between such air carriers from the date of filing the
complaint or-entry of order ef investigation, or such
other date subsequent thereto, as the Board finds to
be just, reasonable and sac tiie

-

‘Thus when Congress. wanted to prevent the Board from—
taking any retrospec tive action, it said so. W hen it wanted
to prevent the Board from taking retrospective action back -
of the date of a proceeding, it said so. It said! nothing of
the sort in §406(a)(1).! Instead it gave the Board fall au-
-thority to make mail pay rates “effective from such date”’
-—past, present or future—‘‘as it shall determine to be
proper.’’ This marked contrast betweeti §406(a)(1) and
the other provisions of the Aét v was completely ignored be-

low. . mae

| The opinion below reads into the flexible langnage of
§406(a) (1) a rigid limitation on the Board’s power.’® .The: .
Board ‘is to determine ‘‘fair and reasonable rates of com-
pensation,’’ and it may make the rate ‘‘effective from such
date as it shall determine to he proper”? —but not if that
date i is earlier than the filing date of the rate proceeding.
A rate may become unfair and unreasonable on one day.

_— —

15

. we should not write in limitations which Congress did
not see fit to make.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 284.

\ e 20

«
-

If -the rate proceeding does not start until a month later,

however, the Board is held powerless to remedy the- past

injustice, for it may not make the fair rate effective as of

the day wien the. old one becanie confiseatory. Full relief

may be granted only if, by some lucky coincidence, a rate

proceeding happens to be pending on that day for Some
* totally different reason.’

For, example, on March 1 two sites may be sank

* affected by the: sudden grounding of airplanes which, they .
both use.” If a rate proceeding involving airline X ‘hap-
pens to be pending at the time, the Board is free to adjust
.X’s mail rate to allow for the increased. costs due.to the
grounding. If-no rate proceeding involving airline Y. is
pending 6n March 1, liowever, the Board is unable to adjust
Y’s mail rate back to March 1, although Y’s need for
increased mail pay may be exactly the same as X’s. It
‘must stop short’ at‘the later date when the rate proceeding
involving: Y got under way."

16 Rate ace before the Board ° generally . take from one
to four years. See Civil Aeranautics Board, Report of Formal Eco-
nomic Proceedings, March 31, 1948, p. 41, showing one mail -rate
“proceeding which had been pending for over four years, four pro-
ceedings pending: for over three years, fivé proceedings pending for
over two years, and fifteen proceedings pending for over one year,

'In Braniff - Airwiys, ‘Inc., Order No, E-2129, Oct. 28, 1948
the Board pointed’ out that “costs attributable to the grounding of
aircraft types are neither normal nor recurrent in nature,” aiid “are
neither predictable nor capable of actual measurement on a prospec-
tive basis” (P. 18).

18 Such a situation has actually geveloped. On, November 1, 194%,
all DC-6 airplanes were-grounded. American Aviation Daily, Nov.
12, 1947, p. 210. Both United Air Lines, Ine. and American Air- |
lines, Inc. were using DC-6 aircraft and receiving the same mail rate.
U ‘nited had a rate proceeding pending; ‘Ameriean’ had none. The:
DC-6" ‘airplanes were gradually restored to service between | March

.

The Act contains no such arbitrary limitation on the
Board’s power. It has simply been imported into the

Mn

statute by main force. This-amendment of the statute by.

judicial fiat is the more unwarranted because it makes it
impossible for an airline to obtain full redress when a rate
prophecy is mocked by events.

Even when-a sudden catastrophe occurs, and rates are

-bound: to be affected, it is not physically possible for an
airline. to act instantly. .The Act requires a petition to
-be:more than a routine ‘piece of paper. The airline must
make a conscientious estimate of a fair rate. ‘*Any peti-
tion for the fixing of fair and reasonable rates of compensa-
‘tion under this Section shall inelude a statement of the rate
the petitioner believes to be fair and reason»ble.”’ §406(e),
§49 U.S.C. 6486(c). If an airline i is to. comply ‘sincerely
with §406(e),.it cannot possibly file a petition. the-moment
a disaster occurs. Especially is that true when the calamity
is of uncertain duration, stich as a strike or the grounding
of airplanes, so-that one can only speculate whether its
effect will pass quickly or persist indefinitely.

The rule adopted below operates just-as arbitrarily when Nef

the unfairness of a rate develops imperceptibly, as it usu-.
ally does. ‘It is impracticable to determine when. a rate,,
reasonable at the time of establishment, ‘will become unrea-
sonable.’’ Air-Mail re aentatoie 206.1. C. C. 675, 725.

nm a ee eee — a

11 and June 1, 1948. On April 7 7, 1948, the ‘Poecd piopoeed to in-*

- crease United’s rate temporarily bagk to January 1, 1948. At the |

‘same time it instituted a proceeding proposing to increase American's
mail rate—but only as of April 7,,1948, since no proceeding was
pending before then! See Orders Nos. E-1351 and’ E-1355, -Apr.
7, 1948, The proceedings are still pending, and United may expect
‘to receive compensation reflecting losses arising cut of the grounding,
but. American may not.

r

Y

It is equally impracticable to detect exactly when a‘ fair
rate becomes unfair.. Even after unfairness is suspected,

the airline may quite reasonably attr ibute its lossés to other
causes, No ins

rument exists which ‘records the precise
moment when a f ir rate passes into confiscation. ° With all
the advantage of knowledge after the event, the Board’s
attempt (years later)\ to fix the day when the rate became

unfair will be only an ‘juformed guess.

Yet the airline is now told that it must rush to fhe Board |

‘with a petition whenever it\y ‘emotely suspects that a rate
-may--have become unfair, or ‘isk losing part of its just.
‘eompensation. It delays at its peril, for the Board ‘will be
powerless to grant relief if hindsight shows that the rate
was unfair before. the petition was filed. Thus a premium
is put on hasty, ill-considered petitions s, and a penalty is
‘imposed on the airline which files a petition only after

events have actually indicated that its fears were well-

fourided. It is a curious theory indeed which: re; wards ‘the |

rash and penalizes the prudent airline. \

Actually the Board has repeatedly exercised ‘the pow er
to obviate such untoward consequences which is now disa-
vowed. Until the decision below, it never denied that it
had power to make mail rates retrospéctively effective,
from any date. The most that it stated wasthat ‘‘as a

matter of sound general policy there should be no adjust- >
ments in mail rates during periods when a rate case is not

pending.’”’ ‘Braniff Airways, Inc., Mail Rates for Routes
" Nos. 9,15 and 50,3 C. A. B. 633, 63 6."9 It would be idle to

ae

’% For other similar “policy” statements, see Transcontinental’ &
Western Acr, Inc., Mail Rates, 4 C. A. B, 139,.142-143; All American
‘Aviation, Inc... Mail Rate for Route No. 49, 4 C. A. B. 354, 356-357;

Pacific Alaska dirways, Inc., Mail Rates, 6 C. A. B. 61, 70; Carib- ;

.

-talk of a ‘‘general”’ rane if tlie Board lack cod power to

vary oe
-Moreover, time and again the Board has both aacealiail

and exercised the power to make. rates effective as of a

time earlier than tht start of a rate proceeding. As the

‘cases are ‘rather lengthy and somewhat technical, they are

reviewed i in detail in “Appendix A hereto. When these. cases
are read with the decision below, it-would seem that the -
Board mast regard 6406(a) (1) as providing that:

ee Board is empowered and directed * * * to make

"such rates effective from such date as it shall deter-.
mine to be ] proper, but only if that date does not an-
tedate the date when the Board institutes a proceed-
ing on its own initiative or when the carrier or the.
Postmaster General files a petition, unless (a) the.
rate is belng established for a new route, or-(b) the -

-rate changes a rate previously established by con-
tract only, r (c) the rate changes a previous rate
which the Board labelled a‘‘temporary’ or ‘tentative’
rate, or (d), the Board perniits the petition tosxbe
filed or amended nunc pro tunc some date earlier
than its. actual filing, or (e). the Board decides to
‘reopen’ an earlier proceeding and’ issue an
‘amended’ or ‘revised’ order, or (f) the carrier be-
gins a new route and the Board desires (although
it is not réquired) to adjust comperrsation retro-
spectively to an earlier date on a ‘system’. basis,
but in that event it may make the adjusted rate —
retrospective to such-earlier date-only if it is lower
than the’ previous rate.’’

—- EE eee rt Mee ee

‘bean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc., Mail Rate, 7-C. A. B. 943, 946. ‘Ta o ty -

ewo cases did the Board specifically leave open the question whether
power existed. * Continental Air Lines, Inc—Mail nates for Routes

Wos. 29 and 43,3 C. A. B. 395,401; Mid-Continent Airlines, lic.—

Mail Rates for Routes Nos, 20 and 48, 3 C. A. B. 464, 466.

Se ag om ee es Sg Sane = 4

os = IPhis complicated hodge spodie of. Ure -efied: dnd me: ming-
1 ~3- ‘distinctions is now offered as What Congress is sup-
posed fv have intende d by. the origyn UKAmotion in’the present case argued -only_

*, the propriety of the TACT increase (43-21). TAWA’s answer
—ovited .faritiliar® authorities showing that t] ic Boaril could not abdicate

its, pt wey hy denying a heating on the merits” (22-24)... Then,. two

Spednths after the original motion, Publi 4¢ Counsel amended the motion
ca Bs to cost tend that no*such .pawery existed (38). The claim’ of

Tacky oi poms ‘Wi as a sheer ‘afte rthought, ai CF he Na °

atter of sound. general policy’ that. no adjustments .-

>

5 eee

POINT IT. 2 00.

The Court of Appeals relied on an inapplicable pre-
sumption against a retrospective ee

The Court of Appeals admitted that the Act uses lan-

guage which could aptly confer power to make ret rospective-

changes in, rates.”! To] pare it down, it resorted to a’ series:
of false analogies. ae

“In the first place,” ‘said the Court, ‘we are met with
the almost conclusive presumption. against power ‘to’ take’
retroactive action unless Congress | plainly ‘specifies , such:

power”? (112). If there were any such ‘presumption, ’? the
er language of (406(a)(1.) would be more than. ample to rebut

it. ‘But, as the Court’ s citation of Nedd v. District ‘of €o-
lumbia, 71 App. D,_C..306, 110 F. (2d) 246," shows, it com- .
pletely misapplied the familiar principle that ‘‘unless the

contrary plainly appears a statute ‘applies prospectively

only.”? 110 F. (2d), at p. 254. Since the Act has been in
effect all along, it ‘‘applies prospectively only”’ no matter

-- how it is construed. - : av :

‘Ordinarily, statutes establish. rules for the future,”’
Brewstér v. Gage, 280 U- S. 327, 337,:an@gsince ‘‘the court
will presume that the lawmaking power is acting for the

: “future only and not for the past,’’ W hite v. United States,
191 U.S. 545, 552, “ ‘laws are not to-be considered as apply-

ing to cases which arose before their passage ee as
intention be clearly declared, Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U.

529, 534. That is all as presumption against: retroactivity
— : ey

—e

* te eee s , ' ae , .
““1°The language of the disputed clause 1s not -necessarily re-

troactive. It-is as apt in reference to the future as it is to the past”

Li) eee ane aes, 3 | -

The presumption ‘has’ no. application to Judicial or
administrative action taken purguant to a statute after its
passage., To be sure, in certain respects the meaning of a
statute may not become known until after, it has been judi-
cially construed. In that sense, every case of :first impres-
sion interpreting a statute necessarily has some retrospec-
tive effect, since it determines what the statute meant as
well as what it means. Manifestly, however, the presump-
tion against a retroactive interpretation. ia no relation.
. whatever to the unavoidable fact that.often the meaning of
a law is not known until it is judicially + dec lared later.
Securities & Kxchange,Comm, v. Chenery Corp., 33210. S.
194, 203:204. Rather the presumption is intended to insure
that the legal effect of acts will be determined: ordinarily
by the statutes then in existence (whenevér judicially Cou-
strued) instead of by later legislation.

Hence. a statute - ‘is not interpreted | retroactively when,
as here, it operi ates. only on situations coming into existence
after its passage. “Muljord v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 51;
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 153. Indeed, a ait

‘is not rendered retroactive merely because the ‘facts or.
requisites: upon whieh its subsequent action depends, or
some of them, \re drawn from a time antecedent to the en-
actment.’’ Reynolds v. United States, 292 U. S. 443, 449.22
In fact, the Neild ease so held: 110 F. (2d); at p. 250.
_ This is not {he case of ‘a new law reaching backwards.’
Woeds v. Stone. $33 U. S. 472, 477. The Act has been in
- effect since 1938. This pane concertis the fairness of

22 See also, Cax v. Hart, ee Lis 23, 435; Great Northern Ry.

Co. Vv: Sutherland, 273 U. S. eo uae we Fidelity o Deposit
Co. of Kfaryland, 292 U. S. oe 5t1: United Sta ites Ve Jacobs, 306

LoS. 365, 367; ef. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. T28, 732.

a rate during 1946 and 1947. . Throughout the entire period
involved in this case, the Act was in force. There can be

10 ‘tclaim of -retroactivity’’ where-a statute Involves a

F ‘recomputation by the state | Board | of, taxes [mail pay |

under a statute whic h was e xistent’ through the whole pe riod
in question.’’ JHinors‘€ ‘entral Rd. Co. v. Minnesota, 309
U.S. 157, 164. ‘*Readjustment under these conditions can-
not be said to be retroactive law making.’ W oods Vv. Stone,
333 U.S. 472, 478. The ‘almost conclusive presumption’
on which tlie Court of Appeals relied is non-existent.

«
P «

POINT HII,

The Court of Appeals relied on, a. false analogy to
public utility rate statutes.

¢

The Court of Appeals also rested heavily on a supposed

* analogy to public utility rate statutes. ‘The whole is cast

in the form of the usual public utility -rate-determination

measure. “Such-measures are frequently mage effective as of:
the date of the inauguration of the proceedings, but never,

so far as we know, for periods prior thereto’ (114). There.

fore the unique language of 406(a)(1), which is found in

no publié utility rate statute, was cut down to mean some-
‘thing less than it says.
‘Even if the Court’s assumption- —that §406 of the Act

is the ‘‘usual public utility rate-determination measure’’—

were correct, its conclusion would not follow. ‘‘A restric-

\ wr r
“8 See also, Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, 297 U S. 129, 1357 Helvering v. Reynolds,

sey, 428, 433\ Cf. Usiited States Vo New York Central Rd. Ce..

279 UL S. 33, 79: Nmerican Airtines, Inc —Mail Rate Proceeding,
3C.°A. 8 323, 328. \ : ‘ ;

%

.

tive interpretation ‘should not be given a statute merely

beeatse Congress has chosen to depart from = custom.’’

Uuited States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 6932 And there -

were excellent reasous why Congress did not choose to
apply public utilityirate principles to airmail pay.

1. Undoubtedly in many respects the Act embodies
publie utility procedures.. The Act -is hybrid in origin.
Its provisions as to certificates of public conyenience and

necessity, passenger and cargo rate regulation, disclosure —

of ownership, interlocking relatignships; and so forth, are
directly derived from sections of the Interstate Commerce.
Act, particularly those dealing with motor: carriers. But,
as will appear shortly, the Act’s mail pay provision, $406,
has an entirely aia and different purposes.
The only similarity between the ‘‘usual public utility rate-
determination measure’? and $406 is. that both employ the
‘word ‘‘rates’’,”° and that the agencies used to fix the
‘frates”’ are called Boards. ee |

Of course, the fact that’ mail pay is determined by a’
Board of five men rather than (as in earlier days) by one
man, the Postmaster General, is of no significance. It is
equally irrelevant that ¢406-uses the word “rates.”
. Basically ‘the airline is ‘entitled to receive reasonable
compensation’’ for ‘carrying the mails, as §401(m) of the
-Act provides. The’ ‘‘fair and reasonable rates of compen-.

Z

z
(

sation’? which the Board fixés -under (406 are,only the’) @”
. ° ie . f t

a
——————nne

*4 See also. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S.1, 31, footnote 40,

. * The Court of Appeals seemed to attach considerable significance _

te the word. “This is the method ordinarily employed by authori-
tics in regulating the charges of public utilities. The word ordi-
narily used is ‘rates’ ” (113).

S

means whereby the end result of ‘‘reasonable compensa-,

tion’? is computed.*® As an-airline is not obliged to trans-
port a stated quantity of mail during any given period, it

‘total’compensation for that period cannet be fixed in ad-
| ] ] Y

vance, Necessarily the ¢ ompensation is expressed in terms
of a ‘‘rate”’ per unit. Multiplying the yumber of units car-
ried-by the rate gives the total ‘‘reasonable compensation.’”
When the facts are known, however, the process works just
as easily in reverse. Thus, when the Board adjusts mail
pay retrospectively to the date of institution of a proceed-
ing it first hits upon a total figure which it believes will
provide reasonable compensation, then divides it by the
rumber of units and (reasoning backwards) arrives at an
applicable rate.?7 |

-It is simply bad logie,. moreover, to ‘conclude that. the
Act takes over in a body all the rules peculiar to public
utility rate determination because both public utility
charges and mail pay are expressed in terms of. “rates”?
As a matter of fact, fh was settled long ago that Carrying

see Hee

+ Cf, United States v. Griffin, 303 U. . 226, 237: “While the
compensation fixed in a tajlway mail pag bao is ordinarily meas-_

ured by a rate, the ultimate question decided by the Commission: is

. the proper compensation to be paid by the Government to the —
railroad for services and the use of its property—the quantuin me ruit
for carrying the mail.” ; J

“t-For instance, in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Order No.
E-1825 (July 28, 1948), the Board fixed a per unit rate from and

after, January 1, 1948, but at the same time awarded the Jump sum
- of °$3,139,000 as additional mail pay for the two-year period freriiy

January 1, 1946 to December 31, 1947. As an afterthought it added
in a. footnote: “This amount of mail pay is eq te 20.69 cents
per airplarte mile flown in scheduled service” (Orders. 2), Thus
was the “rate” determined. For other examples,/ see infra notes
415 and 47. .

ea se re

the mail is not a public utility funetion. ‘The company
in carrying the mails was not hauling frtight, nor was it
acting as a common carrier, with cor responding rights and |

liabilities, but in this respect it was serving as anagency
of government.”’ Alchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

United States, 225 U.S. 640, 649.2% Yet for a century both
legislation and judicial opinions have referred to mail pay
‘as being ‘‘fixed’’ by ‘‘rates.’’

Even before railroads were used to carry mails, mail ,
pay Was expressed in terms of ‘trates’? or ‘rates of com-
pensation, ’**° In 1845 a statute was passed to insure an

‘‘equal and just rate of secmaod for the railroads

*“ See also, . United = v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet-
fanrt, cleticn Gesellsghaft, 212 Fed. 40, 45 (@ C. A. 2); Bankers’
Ag utual Caeeony Co. Vv. Uigeee St, Paul & SOS. M. Ry. Co, WF
Fed. 434,.439 (C2 C. A. 8); United Fruit Co. v. Unite d States, 33
- (2d) 664, 666 (C.C. A. 5); United States v. Atlantic Coast Line

R. Co., 206 Fed. 190, 194; ; Railway Mail Pay, 269 1. C. C.-357,-36%

** Railroads were. first désik gnated as “post routes” by the ee

of July 7,°1538, c. 171, $25 Stat. 268, 283. ;

8 Section 2 of the Act of February 20, 1792, c..7, 1 Stat. 282,
fixed maximum mail pay in terms of the ‘postage rates which were
stipulated in $$ and 10. Tt authorized the .“Postmastér General.
to entér into contracts, for a term of not exceeding eight years, for

extending the fine of. posts, and to authorize the person or persons,

so contracting, to receive, during the continuance of such contract,
‘according to the rates by this act established, all the postage which
shall arise on letters, new or and packets, conveyed by Clout management, “to maintain and continue the déevelop-,
- ‘ment of-arr- transportation lo the extentsand of ‘the chagac-
ter and quality’ required for the commerce of the United
‘Stafes, the Postal Service, and the national defense.’ _
a -‘*Seetion 406(b), more than any other passage of the
_ Givi Aeronautics Act, discloses the basic difference between
* the dual developmental: and regulatory objective of this Act
. “aaid the | regulator v “objective: of the ordinary statute de-
~ signed for the: control of public utility rates.’’ * American
~ Hirlines, Tne. Maik Rate Proceeding, 3-°C. A.B, 323, 335.
. The Board’s “mail. pay: task differs ‘fundamentally from
that’ ‘which faces the public. regulatory body in-the’ fixing
of rates for the transportation’ of passengers and property *.
or in “the fixing of rates for publie utility. services.”’ Pau
_ American “Airavays Co. (of “Delaware y—Mail ; Rates, | 1
r C. A A. A. 220,9952- 953. sg too, Eastern Aur Lines, Int.
‘Mail Rate Proceeding, 8 C. A. B. 733, 75d. °° |
74 | Actually: mail compe nsation is, wader the Xet, “Govern.
, mey subsidy i in the form of mail pay.’’ Annual Report off
the Civd Atveumeliog Board (1947), p. ® - “The u use of. the:
mail payments is.a statutory device for the ackomplishment
of national objectives’ that transcend the interests. of ‘the
postal sertvica ..; .-The ‘compensation’ which the carrier.
re ccives thus cee compensation* not only for carrying
-the majkbut for the building Fp of a system of air trans--
i. portation which will serve. the nation’s commerce and se-
curicy as. well.’ Ame rican Airlines, Inc., Mail Rate Pro-:
c®eding, 3 ©. A. B. 523, os ete
~ #49 U. SC. §486(b), quested, in full it enjya pp. RIe- Bis

.

“~ oe

ry 7

firs

-:

o D. j . ©

“Thus section. $6 (b)’ of the Act departs. from the cus-

enla ‘ate standards.’", Amerigan Preside nt Lines, Ets,

et.al, Petition, 7 C. A. B. 799, SAB, note ¥ 9. T hat was pada

clear in the Board's. very first tail pay case, Mid-Con-
tinent ‘Afrlines, Inc., Mail Rates, (@ A. AL 45 (at pp. o4-:

Pe above factors whict the [Board] is directed to

* take into consideration in fixing and determining fair

and ‘reasonable rates under the act, difer:trom the

_tests which, under the influence of judicialdecision

duritfg the past 40 years, have been set up,for the

a guidance of public regulatory bodies in fixing rates

oe 23 Buble utilities and common carriers . . . See-

tions.2 and 406, as well as other sections of the Civil

Aeronautics Act, disclose the clear intent of C ongress

that the problems. ot civil aviation require ‘special
‘treatment.’’

ih

Precisély: because “the problems of civil aviation require:
special treatment, ” §406(a)(1) of the Act uses special |
s language ‘% appearing in no other statute.
| Hence it is doubly* fallacious to try to define the Board’s
| mess to change. mail rates retrospectivdly by analogy to
_ |pablie utility rate cases. That fallacy ‘Was riddled by the

Beard when it rejected ‘an argument that, because a ease -
had held: that public utility rates gould be reduced ‘only:

prospectively, it could not reduce magpay retrospectively.
American Aindines, Inc.—Mail Rate Proceeding, 3 C. A. B.
323." “There the Board said (pp. 330-331):

a

involve ure sear between a private shipper and
a.common carrier _If it,did, then the earrier’s argu-

_

? The same argument had been rejected in Av Mail Com pensa-
tion, 222 I. C. C. 602, 603-604.

‘i . oF

rae 6 inlike that case, the instant proceeding does not”

-

-

‘

ee eek

ment that. the. Board may “retroactively” increase

‘rates apparently has no force in view of the principle

that a private shipper, once having paid a published

rate, need not concern himself with subsequgntly hav:

ing oe io more.. On the contrary, the Postmaster
‘pi SR

General, wnlike the private: shipper, ts the medium

o

‘through which ‘continuous financial support neces-—

sary for the carriers to fulfill the purposes of the Act

is extended: Our obligation is to. see to it that the
“rates he | pays cre at all times'sufficient to enable the
carrices to accomplish and maintain those purposes.
Likewise, our obligation is also to see that the rates
do not at any.time excéed those which are proper
., under the statute. We, must discharge both obliga-
© tions.” : | ae Bes

- 4> The P0urt. was led to espouse its false analogy to
- public utility rate cases s by the assumption that its only real
alternative was to regard mail service as rendered under a
‘“cost- plus’? contract in which ‘‘the net to the contractor is
the same nd matter what the quality of the performance
may be, and he bears none of the risks of the oper ration”?

(114). ae egannot f find in this statute any language which

indicates that Congress intended to guarantee’ to every
‘earrier a profit”’ (114). joe. Sen an

. Noone claims that Congress intended to ‘‘guarantée to
every. carrier a profit ’—much. less a profit regardless of
“the ‘quality of the performance. *" It. had to,. awd did,

* gue rantee that ‘*reasonable - compensation’” ‘for carrying |

mail w ‘ould be received. The Board can, Must and always
does review costs.” Iti as ever alert to allow only reasonable

. ® & :
42 Section 106: b) expressly refers to the carricr’s need for com-
pensation to enable it to fulfill the — objectives * ‘under honest,
economical, and e fficte, nt manage ment.

e

4

eee : - Seer are

> .

an waste ite the Keht Sf ope rating expe rience. The buyaboo
conjured up-by the Cc air is simply imaginary. oon

- Moreover, the dite which the Court posed is non-
existent. Even in the fiel eld of Government contraects—and
of course carrying airmail is no longer a matter of contract
—the alteynatives are got between a “public utility’ * sys-
tem ‘‘where a price per unit is fixed’?/(11 3): and a }‘cost-
plus’’ system in which ‘‘the net to the contractor’? is. fixed
(114). As procurement experience during the war ae s,
many devices are available ‘whereby a unit price is stipu-
lated in adv ance'but later adjusted retrospectively so that
it: does not result in undue advantage to either party.“ .

The broad, flexible provisions of. 6406 likewise ‘enable

the Board both to stipulate mail. rates on a per unit badis -
in advanc€ of performance, and to rectify past er rors in its
forecasts on the basis of actual] experience. lr practice the
Board does just that. For instance, it often fixes avowedly
‘*temporary’’ rates for the future, which it later revises re-
trospectively after the results of: operation are known. At
one time, to be sure, it ‘declined to promulgate mail rates
on a ‘tentative basis, subject to change according to future
operating results’? because that ‘‘would, in effect, result:
3 in the establishment of a ‘cost-plus’ system of rate mak-
=. ing.”? All American Aviation, Inc., Mail Rate fér Route

+ #No. 49, 4c. A.B. 354, 357. ,But it has long sinee recognized
the fallacy of that argument, and row regularly fixes “tem
aoe, ee

43 See, C.9., : aitikens. Atlantic Airlines, Inc., Mail Rate, rC. A. B.

943, 951-953 ;|Pioneer: Air Lines, Inc., Mail: Rates, 8 C. A. B. 1%

_ 185-186; Bragiff Airways, Ine., Order No. E-2129, Oct. 28, 1948,
pp. 15-16.

44 See Lic her 4 ‘nited States, 334 U. S. 742, 7 762-763, 768-773

= e >

relevant factors in the light of actual experience. Then, 1
ae *. ; oe ;

,

. ay tid | Liptiake

* porary’ rates both for new routes® and established routes

a

on which ‘*permane nt’? rates were previously in effect.**
After operating results” are known, it revises the former’
rates—retrospectively as well as* prospectively—on_ the —

basis of audited aetual costs and other factors deemed

pevtinent. Clearly in these situations the Board usés both ;
thé so-called: ‘‘ post-audit”’ method to es mail rates
for past periods and the “price per unit’’ or,“ prophecy”
method to fix rdtes for the future.,

Moreover, admittedly: the Board is required- to re
rates back at least to the date when a proceeding

. @
new :

begun, Whenever it does that, necessarily it audits.a
Sat actual revenues, and wejghs them and all other

a

See, c.g., E ssair, duc., Temporary Mail Rate, 6-C, A. B. 687,
690-6913 ! Presitoaliaatadl & Western Air, the., Transatlantic Mail.
Rate, 7 C. A. B. 421, 423; Pan American Airways, Inc., Transpacific
Mail Rate, 7 C.: A. B. 615, 618. Sometimes, indeed, the Board, does '
not-even profess to fix'a “temporary” rate where ‘new or experi-
mental services are ‘involved, but waits for several years to obrain
actual operating results, occasionally making “temporary” payments .
on account. Usually in such instances it awards lump sum pay-
ments for past periods, which of course: can be expressed’ mathe-

matically.in terms of “rates.” See, e:g., Pan-American Airways, Inc, .
y: q- ;

—Transatlantic Rates, 8 CC.‘ A. B. 367 (June. 9, 1947), awarding |
$1,484,000 for the year 1945; Pioneer Air, Lines—Mail Rates,’ 8
C_A.-B. 175 (July 2, 1947), awarding $505,420 for mail service on
anew. feeder line from August 1, 1945, to August 31, 1946; Pan
American Airways, Inc—Latin-American: and — Leopoldville
Mail Rates, Orders. Nos. E-738 and E-739 (July 24, 1947), award-

ing approximately $4,500, 000 for services from fan .F,.1944, to
£ ap} y y:

August’31, 1945, In each of these.cases the Bagard went through the -

ritual of dividing: the lump ° sum payment by the mileage actually

flown to obtain a‘“‘rate.

416 See, e jes Pennsylvania- Central Airlines Corp., TCA B. 988,
990: Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc., Order No. E-510, p..7

.( May 6, 1947);: National Airlines; Inc., Order No. E-1271, pp.

5°6 ( March 5, 1948). . ‘

¢

¢
Oy
: \

its past forecast has proved too low, it is corrected-for the
* past—often for as much as two or three y ears—and anew

oe

compensation”? which the C ourt thought were mutually eXx-
_ elusive. ae |
Several times the Board itself bad pointed out why the

“eost: plus”’ spectre affords ng reason to adhere doggedly

e «|toa false propheey: when events have: proved. it wrong.

“Although at is not the Board’s intention in rate proceed-
ings involying the fixing of mail rates for past periods

zs $6 determine mail rates merely on a cost-plus basis, it must’
be recognized .that the process of fixing rates for a ‘past

Tatesis set for the future? Here again there coexist, in
actual practice the two metliods of arriving at ‘reasonable’

“-.. , period’’. on a retrospective basis. ‘‘does assure the air.”
- _ carrier substantial protect tion against unforeseea de > con-

tingencies for which a prospective fair-sand reasonable rafe

might well have made inadequate allowance.’ Pain Ameri--

can Airways,.Inc., Transatlantic Mail Rates, 8 C. A. B.

267, 291, note 22,8 @ertainly C on#ress yas amply: justified.

oR not... : ,
‘ & Pe : eens oe

“ea. 7 See cases cited notes 27, 45 supra; Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
a Order No. E-1230 (Feb. 26,1948) awarding $2,107,578 in increased

‘ compensation for the period from May 1, 1945 to April 30), ‘1947 and
“setting anew rate for the future.

Sf BQ

41 (June 4,°1948). “It has been the practice to provide a some-
what lower rate of return for a past period than for a future period
mM view of the fact that for a past period the-probability of error in
estimates of operating results is removed and other operating risks
have been realized in stibstantial part.” Braniff’ Airways, Inc.
Order No, E;2129, p..36 (Oct. 28,°T948). See also, Chicago &
‘so Southern A@lines, bic., Order No. E-1885,*p. 29 Cpuly 28, 1948) ;
Delta Air satitg ine. , Order No. E- ruts \e 21 (OG. 2s, 148).

-

. ‘ ° .
* 5 re ?
a ‘ sa 7 o
d x ; .

ee

in xecepting that view, whether the Board now likes it or_

* See also, Pan American’ Airways, Inc., Latin-American and.
Miami-Leopoldville Services Mail. Rates, Order No. E-738, p. 47°
( July 24, 1947); Alaska Airlines, Inc., Order No. E-1665, pp. 40- -

~~
44

PA ee
. ° ° e

*

1. In short, the Court relied on a wholly non-existent.
dilemma to -find an analogy in the practice under publié .

utility rate statutes.. That meneey ignores the practical
ditferbnegs between public utility ‘rate statutes and $406

of the Act—differences which explain why the Act care-.

fully distinguishes between the Board's purely prospective

power to change passenger. and cargo rates and its power --

to change mail pay’ r

spectively.» It ignores} ae ‘fact that mail pay has never.

‘been governed by trad tional publie utility rate principles,

-and that $406 deliberatkly departs from those. principles. .

And it-ignores the admonitt
lines, Inc. v. Waterman. Steamship Corp., 333 U. 8. 108,
where, after noting that all forms of transportation had
“common: features,’” this Court j warned against exactly the
kind of reasoning by false analogy that was. indulged in
below (353 U. S.,-at pp: 107-108): - .

%

‘‘But these resemblances must ndt. blind us to the .

—ftuct-thatrlegally as well as literally, air commerce,.
1 whether at home or- abroad, soared into-a différent_
realm than any that had gone before... . . However
useful paraltels with older forms of Pasisit may. be
in adjudicating private rights, we see no reason why
the efforts of the Congress to foster and regulate
“development of a revolutionary commerce that op-

erates in three dimensions should be judicially cir--

cumscribed with analogies taken” over from two-
dimensional transit.”

s both retrospectively’ and pro- .

thicago & Southern Air-

Tim

jot |

POINT IV.

The Act removed whatever vesistetbens may have ex-

‘isted under earlier maif pay statutes. ;

The Court ‘thought that “406 (a) (1) “appears to have

been designed -to establish in the Board? thle same powers |

which had theretofore existed at the Interstate C commerce:

Commission in Yespect. to railw ay mail’ and it “had never

been claimed that the. Interstate Commerce Commissior

had. unfette red retroactive power’” (11: 3). ‘It found justi-

9

tive purpose

If ¢406(a) (1) w ere merely designed to codify the powers

of ‘the Commission over railway: mail rates, the ques-

tion naturally arises why the Act did not simply copy the’

words of the Railway Mail Pay. Act. Actually the novel”

language of §406(a)(1) removed any, lintifations on the

"power to adjust mail pay rates which existed under earlier,

restrictive statutes. ae it conferred lems authority

_ fication for w hitthing down the Act in the ‘*limited Jegisla-_

| which. it. thought was “apparent from the. ;
history! (113). ae

inh this respect is in Dy xpression of Con-

gress on the point, whieh appears in “the Conference Re-

port on the final bill:

‘*This section empowers the Authibedey {Board} ‘
fix mail rates and sets-forth, the congressional policy
to guide the Authority [Board] ini fixing such rates
and enables the Authority [Boarg] to adjust rates
so that the policy of Congress may be properly car-
ried out in the case of each carrier or class of carriers
according to the needs of the ‘particular case . ;
These provisions appear in the conference agreement
as section 406(a), (b) and (c).’?”

” he R. Rep. No. 2035, 75th Covg. 3d Scss., June 7, P9358, pyr
11-72. The same report was mide to and adopted by the Senate
on ps 13, 1958. -83. Cong. Ree. 8961- 8963. The: bill was .ap-
proved by the President on June 23, 1938, j ,

.

*

a 46

6

a

Yet the decision below holds that even whe n the pe >

of the particular case’
‘rates’

require that the Board. rey ters
retrospectiv ely so that the dirline May; ‘properly’

carry: out ‘‘the policy of ( “Ougress, * the Board i is powerless
to. achieve that result. ‘aes

.

° 3 Os 3 s

A. Mail Pay Prior to the Railway Mail Pay Act of 1916.

Prior’ to the Railway Mail Pay Act, mail was normally
transported pursuant’ to contract's made with private car-
~ylers by the Postmaster General under statutory authority.” ‘

Details of the contracts were largely left to the Postmaste rT
General, but ordinarily the maximum rates which he could
pay were prescribed - by statute, though: of course he was
free té contract at lower rates. if he could obtain them.*

It was settled doctrine that, except for certain land-:

: grant roads,” ‘‘railroads were not requi red -by law to carry
the mails." They were perfectly free, as a matter of law,
2,
: %© In rare instances a mail carrier was Called on to render serv-

ices entirely beyond those covered by its contract, or after expira-——_—
—tion-of-a contract-—In_such situations the carrier was entitled to.

recover reasonable compensation. Alvord v. United States, 95 U.S.
356, 359; United States v. Utah, Nevada, & California, Storage Co.,
199 U.S. 414, 423-424; Hunt v. United States, 257 U.S. 125, 128.
Reasonable compensation iftcluded “a. fair es: Freund v.*United ©
‘States, 260 U. S, 60,

"' The Mail . Divisor Cases} 251 U. Ss. 326, 330. °

52 Usually land- -grant railroads were obliged chy the statutes
wiser whack we erunts were made to transport mail ° ‘at bent peibe.

a

.. statutes were star sini that “fair ahd ‘anita rates of
- ‘compensation, not to exceed the amounts paid by private parties fer
the same kind of service” should be paid. fer carrying mail, et al
stores, ete. See Union Pac nia Rd. Co. 2 Unite d State s, 104 U.
662, 665. ~ 3
ws ge we} ork, New Haven & "Hartford Re. Co.v.U nited States,
21 U. S. 123, 125,

to reject the Government's terms and refuse to carry:

‘the mail. Carriage of the mails was regarded as a purely |
voluntary matter of contract.” Therefore if a’railroad kept |
carrying mail, it was not entitled to ‘sadequate compensa-
tion to be judicially determined?” but only what the Gov-
ernment allowed. -* a °°

- ‘As a practical matter, therefore, mail rates were. largely
fixed by the Postmaster General within the limits set by
statute. ‘Either Congress by statute, or the Postmaster.Gen- ’
eral ‘by regulations read into the contracts, took care.
fo reserve the power to change the rates. Of course the
railroads were not compelled to keep transporting mail if -
they did-not liké the new rates, but if they continuedto carry .
mail they could not recever more fhan the changed rates no
matter how much they protested.° — - |

-

: 4 Eastern Rd. Co. y. United States, 129..U: S. 391, 395-396 ;

Chicago,-Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry, Co. v. United States, 198 US.
384, 3 3899 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v, U inited States,
225 U. S. 640, 6504 United States v-New- York Central Rd... Co.,

8895, 185 Chled States v. Griffin, 303 U: S. 226, 229, feot-

note 2, “It may be that any: railroad by failing to carry the mails

would incur the hostility of those living along its lines and as a--
consequence suffer Serious financial losses; but the fear of such re-

sults certainly does not’ ameunt“to compulsion by the United States
and cannot constitute the basis of a justiciable claim, against them

~ for taking property.” New York, New Haven & anions Rd. Co.

he S.-640;-650- a

v. United States, 251 U. S. 123, 127: igi
53 Atchison, Tope ka & + Santa Fe-Ry-Go- V. United ‘States, 225

8 See, C.9., Eastern Rd. Co, ». Ualted States, 129 U- S. 391,

395- oa Chicago Mikwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. United. States, °
198 U. S. 385, 389; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry: Co. ¥. United

States, 225, U.S. 640, 650; Pagocagesd Lackawanna & Western. Re.

Co, v. United — 249 U. S. 385, 388; New York, New Haven &

Hartford Rd. Co. hag retcea 251 U.S. 123, 127; St. Louis:
Southwestern Ry. Co; v. United States, 262 U. S. 40, %3- 75.- The

rule was otherwise ‘as tw apron contracts in which,-1t was concluded,

¢ ay a.

48
e ; : ; OF. ¢
Thus the’ re- 1916 system of railroad mail pay was in-
elastics. The only modicum of flexibility in the strueture

_resulted, when, Congress finally ‘passed statutes permit-

ting or directing an increase or “decr@yse. in compensa-

“tion or prive ate bills ‘to ‘take care of partic ular situations.

In some instatices, as already seen {supra, pp. 13-15) both
increases and decreases in mail pay were ultimately made
by retroactive statutes. Years often went by, however,
before remedial legislation was enacted.’ ** Since changes
affecting the railroads, the principal mail carriers, were
relatively inffr ‘equent, the inflexibitity of the rate structure
was not as serious as it would have been in the field of air
transportation, which is subject to rapid, unpredictable
fluctuations in earnings and expenses. ‘Nonetheless the sys-
tem produced results which were regarded as. inequitable
and a certain amount of elasticity was imported into it by
the passage of fhe sented Mail Pay Act in 1916. -

the right to change the rates was not 1 46s ved. Chicago & Nok

western Ry. Co. v. United States, 104 U, S. 680; Chicago, Milzaukee
> St. Paul Ry. Co. v. United States, 104 . S. 687; see St. Raul &
Duluth Rd. Co. v. United States, 112 U.S. 733, 735, ip

“7 -For instance, railway mail pay was ‘jie fixed on a mile-

age basis. In 1864 railway, postal cars were introduced for distribu-

o

ts up for a, weight hasis. See The Mail Divisor, Cases, 241 U. S. 326.°

furnishing postal cars

tion of mail en route, -but no additional ‘compensation, was provided.

Railroads protested without avail. Qnly in 1872 did Congress pass*

a ‘statute permitting the Postmaster General to callow. any railroad
now. allowed by law, as he may think fit, mot exceeding, however,
50 per centum of the said sates.” Agt-of June 8,.1872, ¢. 335, §265;
17 Stat, 283, 316. Seé Railway-Mail Pay, 56 1. C. C. 1, 4,

‘bhe ext year the mileage basis of coniputing mail Pay was given

The effect on the railroads of this weight basis of fixing compensa-
tion when the parcel post system was inaugurated, and ‘the years) |

it took before the railroads obtained rehef, have already been noted,
ns pp.. 14-15, : :

such additignal compensation. beyond that”

*)

649.

B. The Railway Mail Pay Act of 1916.
‘‘ Translation of an implication, drawn from the ‘Heeial
aspects of one statute to a totally diffé rent statute i is treach- |
exodf busings.’ > Federai Trade Comm. ¥. Bunte Brothers,
Inc., 312 U, 8.349, 353. - This warning is especially pertinent
when comparing the Civil Aeronautics Act with the Rail-

way Mail Pay Act of 4916" and the Air Mail Acts of 1934 .

- and 1935." Appendix B contains a detailed comparison of.

the thre statutes, ar
**The Railway Mail Pay Act siciaanil the system _
>
tracts.’’ United States v. Griffin, 303°C: S226, 229. Rail-
+ ° roads were compelled: to carry ‘mail. Necessarily they were
‘entitled to receive fair and . reasonable compensation. xslt
= 39 U.S.C. 6541. Oe eG ,
This compensation was fixed purely: on a quantum meruit
basis. United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S 26, 237. [Under
ce $e the Civil Aeronduties Act, airlines are not paid f for trans- |
a porting mail on any such restrictive basis. ] Mail ratés welt
ee to be fixed by the Commission, after hearing. ‘‘At\the con-
tlusion of the hearing the Commission shalfestablisi by
a order a fair, reasonable rate or compensation to be-received, .
at such-stated times as may be named in’ the order, for the
| transportation of mail matter .. .”’ a9 U. S. C. 9551, [No fe
~ such, language appears in the Cevil Aeronautics Act.] ©
“J “Once fixed, the rates were: to .remain,jn effect -uhtil
: changed. The Commission was ‘‘to fix ee Met aston from
“sr time to time the fair = sacrteer eed rates and compensa.

58 Act of July 28; 1916, ¢. 2615-39 Stat. A426 ft; 39 U, S: C. ‘

$$524-579. .
® Act of June 12; 1934, c. 466; 48 Stat. 933 ; sabia by Act of
—— 14, 1935, e. 530 ; 49 Stat. 614. “@

@ : 8

Oe

theretofore prevailing of- service under voluntary con. |

a ‘ , i . s - : of o

.
4 . e . as . . = -

tion for the transportation of such.mail matter by ratlway.

‘common carriers ......and to publish.the same, ‘and orders .”
SO made and published shall continue in force until changed
by the Commisston’ after “due notice and’ heaving.” ° 39

U..S. C. $542, [The difference betw retween this language: and
§406(a) (q)of the, Civil Aer ‘onauties Act is obvious.] No
provision fér jiidiciat review existed:. The statute’ per mit-—

ted only * ‘administrative review by ‘reexamination’ of an
order.” °U nited States v. Griffin, 303 U. Se 296, 231. [The _

Civil Aeronduties. Act contains anh express ‘provision for’
"judicial review. 51006; 49.U. S. & 9649.)

After it fixed a rate, the Commission. had nothing fur ther
to do, with-it until somebody petitioned it for reexamination.
It could not #reexamine’’ the rate on its own initiative:
Reexamination could be applied for only by the Postmaster

General or the raifroad affected. 39 8. S.-C. $053." [The ;

Board js not only “empowered”? but ‘directed’? to proceed

‘at all times “upon its own Anitiative’’ as well‘as — ig

pétition , of the Postmaster. General or‘an air carrier.
§406(a),, 49 U. 8. 1 $486 (a). J

‘ Moreover, a rate order could never be reexamined ‘until

it had remained in effect six month®@. ‘“‘Bither the Post--

" master General or any such, carrier may at any time after

the lapse of six mouths from the.entry of: the order assailed *
appl y fora reexamination and thereupon Substantially simi-
dar proceedings | ‘shall be had with respect to the rate or
rates covered‘by said application’. . .*’ 39 U, S. C. $553.

[No such limitation appears in the Civil Aeronautics es

Act. | And, of course, the Commission was not authorized
to make its rate orders “effective from such date a as it shall
determine to be proper.’ st |

Once the Commission fixed a rate, ‘it. had to remain in
effect: at. least s six months ; no > one—the Cominission, the tail-

-

Share eg

pee’

: or > -
$a
tt ‘ 7
~
: : oan «-
- aes, .
> se ed B

road ¢ or r the: Postmaster Genet al—could change it. In view
“of itshighly restrictive language, it is hardly surprising that

«at was: claimed that no. power whatever existed under, the

Railway Mail Pay Act to increfse mail pay retrospectively.

Yet this Court: held that power to increase tlle rate. re-
trospectively:to the date of the petition for reexamination’

. e ‘ : , ¥ oh re . . . . -— .
existed by ‘‘reasonable -. impjication,. ’* although it was

“quite. ‘aware that minutiae of expression may, be. found
that show Congress to have been thinking of the futufe. tam
Upited States: yy, New York® Central Rad. Co., 279 U.S. 73,

79,0 yr Ae as

&
No i issue existed 1 in the New York Cc ‘Entral case whether
mail pay could be increased as of a-date earlier than the.

applic: ation, for reexamination, and the Court: ™ passing

- perform these services,and -aécept pay without protest t

:

assumed that it could not." © The* problem actually arose’
in: the ‘‘short- line’?. caséyof Macon, Dublin & Savannah

Rd>Co.veU nited States, 78 C. Ci. 251.-

was “This -crncleicte was reached despite the fact that the ap-
plicable statute contained no express authority, such as is Contained
in section 406(a) “of the Civil Aeronautics’.Act, to determine the

date on which rate ordérs shisuld become effective.” American Air-
_ lines, ‘TInc:—Mail a Proceeding, 3°C. A. B. 323, 326-327 ‘

- See 279 U.S. fae p. 78: bo “We asstunv that while hg railroads
ley get no .
ground for -subsequént complaint. - American Smelting & Refining

Co. v. United States, 259 U, & 75, 78.” In the case: cited, plaintiff

claimed: that it was,not bound to deliver copper under a contract
because the coppet could have been requisitioned, and therefore the
contract was “made under duress. This argument was rejected, the,*

od Court pointing out” that if plaintiff “had desired to stand upon its

legal fights it should have saved the question of the-prices It did
not do-s0; but on the contrary . ‘so,far.as appears. was: willing ‘to

contract and was content. tn the main with what was offered” (259
U..S., at’p. 78). Manifestly a mail carrier can-no longer save “the

question of the price’” and is no longer, free ‘to decide whether it
will be “willing to contract.” Indeed, “the “price” is no longer a

-matter of “contract” at al]. ees | of ae

>... i oy

- Under orders of the Commission, **separatelyoperatal™!
_.short-line railroads were entitled to-higher mail pay rates — *s
than other roags. In May 1931 plaintiff and other short-
line railroads filed petitions for reexamination on “the
ground. that sincg Jul 3, 1930 they had been separately “d
Ceperated, uber a ugdor adopted ‘that day. ~ The
Commission made findings in ‘their faver but refused to
’ award ‘additional compensation for serv ices rendered
prior to the filing of their applications with us.’? - Railway -
Mail. Pay, 185 [. C. ©. 715, 720. * PlaintitfAhen sued in the os
Court of Claims forthe additional pay from July 3, 1930,
to May 1931. A demurrer to its. complaint was overruled.
**Congress reposed ‘in the Commission the primary duty 7.

of determining just compensation, : not whether by some a
act on the’ part of the carrier it was estopped as a matter :
of law from receiving just compensation. in its éntirety.’ *
78 C. CL, at p. 206. Final judgment was aa given for
plamtiff, 79 C.-Cl. 298... i

While the case primarily. i involved the question whethir
plaintiff was entitled to one previously determined rate
rather than another, it: shows that.even ‘under the Railway
Mail Pay Act—despite its severely restrictive language—
it was sometimes possible for a_railroad to obtain an -in-
‘¢rease in mail‘pay retrospectively to a time antedating its’

cy . , fo rat : 3
Be ee ee ee ee | Pe ee ee ee ee eee

petition for reexamination. No court décision has been
found holding to the contrary.

’

© The Court conduiet that the period of underpayment without 4

_ protést was not “so protracted as to establish, affirmatively, with all te
the other: circumstances, including the fact that plaingiff was not free
to decline performance, the defense of acquiescence.” © #8 C, C., at a
p. 258. 4
63 The “short-line” cases ( although not the Macon case by ndica’ ;

° were referred ‘to inthe hearings on the predecessor bill- ‘of the Civil
‘ ¢ . Fs

ko e 4 : ? . 4 .

_

ma, ie
ru > Oe

> °

Stat, Uo3-004, The contracts could be, t@minated, .how-

: te og
NCLUT nf ie option upon sixty days’ no-
3°

tracts, which were let ~ COM

ject toa specified ceiling. $3(4), 48 Stat. 954. Contracts

were to be “Subject. to any reduc Kol in the’ rate of payment

therefor.’ ' Gc), 4 8 Stat. 939.
Although rates were ‘determined by contract,. the In-
terstate. Commerce Coueiininn was also directed to fix

ae syrder rH rates of compensation for the transportation of

alr adl by airplane and. the serv ice connected therewith
but not im excess of the rates proyided for in this
Act... . and to-publish the same, which shall continue in

force until changed by the said Commission after due

notice ‘inl hearing.’ §6(a), 48 Stat. 935. ‘The limited.

procedure under the Railway Mail Pay Act, for reexamina-
I

tient ‘only uftey” six nfonths, was t taken over ‘bodily by a see-
tion making applicable the whale. pre eedure ‘for the ad-

justment of rates for.carriage of mail by railroads.’’ 6(d),.

8 Stat. 985. In addition, a special requireme nt w as im-
posed. thit rates be review ed annually **in order to be as-

° F é aK : ; ° 5 "5 ;
3 Pacific Air Transpori v. United States, 98 8 C-C1 649, reviewed
at Jength the facts relating to the cancellation.

°

09

retrospectively to a day antedating the start of. the rate
review sateen tile ee | oe

_ D. The Changes Made by the Civil Aeronauties Act

The Civil Aéronautics Act of 1938 completely revolution =:
ized the Status of the airlines and the nature of mail pay.

Congress ccucluded that air c&rriers subserved national |

interests of far greater importance e than cheap postal ser-.

_ vice, and that air mail pay should be the means of develop-

ing the infant aviation industry to effectuate those inter ests.
Hence - Congress enunciated a ‘‘new national poliey’’
to foster ‘*the continued development of an air transporta-

‘tion system adequate to the paramount national needs, not
only of the postal service but also of our commerce and our
national defense.

oe

( ‘hicago & Southern Air Lines, Ine.—
Mail Rates for Routes Nos. 8 and 53,3
o ect a
S

a
y

ie
zs - {3

63

‘present authority of the Commission to fix appropri-
ely the effective date of ifs rate decisions is... specitically *
preserved.
(74-76) and the Court below (113) as the Keystone of an
argument tliat Congress intended the Act to be construed,

some

This sentence. was relied on by: the Board

to permit fate increases retrospectively only to the filimg
date of the proceeding. The contention is grourfdless.

_. The Board’s argument prosesds about as follows. (a)
Under the Air Mail Acts of 1934 and 1939, there was a dis-
sagreement whether rate changes could be made. efféctive
back to the institution of a prageeditig. (b) The bill under —

consideration ‘in 1937 contained provisions ‘;practically

identical *? with those i in the Air Mail Acts. (c} Fhérefore
‘that disagree ment was bound to bé perpetuated if that bill
was passed. (d) No dther disag reement as to the Commis-
sion’s power existed; the implication is that it was settled.
that a rate change could: not -be made effective as of a day
aitedating the proceeding. (e) Recognizing that this’ one
ee of disagreement would persist, and’ solely to resolve
t, Mr. Gorrell. suggested the ‘‘make effective’ language ’
aa (f) it was added to the bill for the same limited pur:
poser (x) Consequently, despite its palpably broader lan-
guage, itymfst be given a meaning limited by the narrow

: disagree ‘ment which alone it "was designed to resolve. . (h)-

W hen C ongress passed the Act in 1938, over a year later,
‘it had all this past fistory in mind—although no one re-
ferred to it. (i) Therefore the clear words of the Act must

be interpreted to mean something less than they say.

This argument is unsound from start to finish.

Subcom mittee -Heartwngs, p. 525. See also Hearinis hetor

House Committee on H. FR: S234 and H. R. 4652, 75 C mg., Ist Sess,
p. 108. :

64

Admittedly there was disagreqnent within the ¢ ‘ommi:
sion on the question of retrospective: rate-making. Com.
Inissione or Mahatlie dissented from every decision changing
rites retrospectively, The disagree ment was not. limited
to .the narrow question whether thé Commission could |
chiinge rates retrospectively to the date the proceeding was
begun, but no earlier. Nor would a disagreeme ‘nt on. that
narrow question have been per petuated if the 1937 bill were
passed. For it simply is- net true that the 1937 ‘bill con-_
tained provisions | practically identical with those contained
__—-inrthe Air Mail Acts. ©‘. ee hed ea “Rg

for one. thing, the rate-making provisions of the 1937 _
bit were entirely different from those _of the Air Mail

«

Acts.” All the ‘minutiae of expression . . . that. show

a e

_§t Section” 308(d). of “amended ee rhage Dae etaeatet

Hearings, p. 28):

“eo “6 d)) The Commission is pete. ee pee directed, mponi
its own initiative, or upon petition of the Postmaster General .
“or an air cartier, (1) to fix and determine from time to time,

- after notice and hearing, the fair and reasonable rates of
compensation for the transportation of mail by aircraft, and
the facilities devoted to and servicés connected therewith, by

- each holder of a certificate authorizing the transportation of

. ‘ mail by aircraft; (2) to.preseribe the method or methods, by

. aircfait-mile, pound-mile, weight, space, or any combination

is compelled, the constitutional rights of the srailroads were,
considered of impertance. Here we_have a very different
situation. The air mail is carried ‘by contractors. - ‘Fhe air ©

, line jis under no degal compulsion to become a contractor. ¢It .

may’, on 60 days’. notice, terminate its contract, and end Jits
* undertaking to carry mail.” :

.e
.

on,

. -§
as

(entral Rd, Co.—whether or not the ‘‘make effective’’
Yuuite was added. Plainly, therefore, the ore point of dis-

. 5 A a &. rs s * 7 ad » : . » " A
agreement on which the Board’s argument is foeu ee

. would ‘nol have bee ‘n perpetuated’ had the. 1937 ‘Dill
passed without the ‘‘make effective?’ ¢lause: a iy =o ;

But the errors an the basic premise of the Board’s argu-
ment go even deeper. It is ‘not correct to say that the only

een

‘point of disagreement was whether r retrospective changes ;

could be made back to the start of ‘the rate proceeding.

Nor is it correct to neal that it was Settled, under the Air’
Mail Acts, that a | rate could not be ‘changed retrospectively
effective.as of any earlier day. ‘No case under the Air Mail,
‘Acts ever held or: said that. 6 On the contrary, in certain
_instances where such retrospective, changes were deemed

appropriate, the Commission actudlly made them—and°

those changes ‘also. elicited dissents by Commissioner Ma-
haffie. For instance, he dissented when a contract rate wa

inereased—on the supposed authority of: the 1935 fea:
ment —retrospectively back to -Mareh 1, 1935, which was
months earlier than the start of the rate proceeding. x In

shart, he subscribed to the broad principle that the Comhis- Ea

Sion had no power whatever te make any retrospective rate

- change. “And, as the hearings on the 1937 bill sh6w, it was

that entire broad principle which was under consideration.

°

—— eo

‘6.Cf. note 71, supra. YS

*7 See «dir Mail Rate for Route No, 33, 216.1. C. C. 381, stepra
note 69, rate 4 Commissioner Mahaftie dissented in de Mail

Compensation, 322 1, C.-C. 602, where the Commission amended a
135 order by“a proceeding begun ‘in, 1937, so as to insert a proviso
which had the effect of- reducing - rates from .1935, ané Air’ Mal

Conipensation, 232 I. C. C. 608; where it) amended the over again\

att struck out the proviso. The ‘Se t Gecisjons are digested more fally
in note . qe, supra:

\

~The background’ of the hearings -is illuminating. ‘Fhe
major issue at. the time was- whether air transportation
should -be regulated by the Post Office, the Interstate Com-
merce Commissign” or a, new agency devoted. solely tO ‘avia-’
tion.. While it ‘was: “generally agre éed that the divided re-
sponsibility ‘which existed. was undesirable, arial that” one,’
body ‘should control the industyy there was no ‘agreement

on which ‘body. The proponent $f the 1937 bill—Senator

‘McCarran—favored a “new, indygndent agency. ~The
President and many other persons favored the Interstate

ae ommerce Commission.” In deference to. the President's
‘wishes, the 1937 bill would have reposed coitrol. in the

Commission. 90 : Sees :
The Post Office Diiaceaens’ felt that soto?” over air
mail should rest largely with it.?' Therefore it and. its

champion, Senator McKellar, vigorously or the 1937 _

** Senator McCarran's very first bill, -introduced’ in: 1934, pro-
posed a separate commission. It would have had power under S1l0(a)

_ “to fix and determine’ from time to time the fair and reasonable —
rates and compensation’ ’ and ‘under. $10(b), “from time to time re-

vise the sdme in such manner as at all times to return a fair and
just compensation to the carrier operating said ‘route or routes and
as may le necessary ‘to maintain and tmsure -necessary and adequate
transportation of passengers, mail, and property, ard all services
incident thereto.”"’ 78 Cong. Rec. 7617, The bill was objéted to
on the grounds that a new commission should net be created, and
the industry; was -sti]}, too young to havesits passenger and freight
rates regulated ji in addition to its mail rates. 78 Cong: Rec. 7623.+ It
was defeated by a 46 to 26 vote in the Senate. 78 Cong. Ree. 7628,

_ ** The advisory Federal Aviation Commission created by the
1954. Act recommended creation of an Air Commerce Commission,
but the . President“ disagreed. See Sen. Doc, 15, 74th Cong., Ist
Sess., p. 39; and the President’s message of transmittal, p. iv.

% FMeommittee Hearings, P. 46. ° : ' Pe
om Ihid., pp. 107 ff:

° ou, 6 .
-. ¢ . .

68

bill? They proceeded to attack the Commission’s adminis-
_ tration of the existing statutes on a broad-front. The
attack was designed to show that the Commission. should
not be entrusted with control. over air mail. Charges and
-eounter-charges of all.sorts were made.” | 44 _e
During the course of the liearings, the views of: Commis-
sioner Mahaffie—who had held ont against, all retrospective
rate changes—were aired by the Solicitor’ of the Post Office

in respon® fo 4uestions. - Senator McKellar brought out

that the Commission had established ‘‘retroactive’’ rate 3.

- . . - -* . 2 .
‘On what possible pean fl he inquired, ‘‘or what possible

%2 Senator McKéllar Was ‘chairman of the Senate Committee on
Post Offices and Post:Roads. Some months before the hearings he
had castigated tlie Cofnission, accusing it of “willful defiance Of the

Congress.” “The Interstate Commerce Commission fixes. the rates*

on air mail. With respect to three companies sia not only fixed
the rates but they antedated them.” 81 Cong. Rec, 629.

8 For example, the Commission was charged with being too
diberal in ‘increasing air mail pay, ‘and too reluctant to reduce it

(Subcomputtee Hearings, pp: 116, 122, 160-161). A-list was sub- -

mitted’ showing that rates had been raed most routes, and de-
creased or left unchanged on relatively few (pp. 129-135).- So also,
=the Commission was chafged with not making a proper investigation
and audit before increasing rates and not disclosing the evidence on
Which it based its findings ( pp. 163, 172-174 ¥, OF failing to disclose

Wr > os

“upon what basis any of the rates have been fixed” (pp. 168, 171 ) ef.

employing .a man “unduly friendy to the air-mait companies” (p.

167), and of differentiating unduly between the rates given to come

peting airlines (pp. 169-170). 2

On the other hand, ‘the Post Officé was charged with permitting
an unlawful consolidation of two,airlines (pp. 112-115) and thredat-
ening to withdraw mail schedules: if the Commission increased rates
(pp, 116-118). At ,ofte %stage the Solicitor for the Post Office
plaintively remarked “We-are both defendants” and Senator Truman

replied, “We are not prosecuting anybody, Judge; we are trying ~

-to get the facts” (p. 118).

-* Subcommittee Hearings! p. 179. +

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69

claim of law were retroactive rates established?" The’

answer elicited the reply that ‘*Commissiéner Mahaftie in
one case wrote a dissenting opinion holding that the C om-
mission did not have the right to, _ £0 back ‘and fix rates
retroactively, but the majority held that they. did haye
that right, en rates were fixed retroactively, and

“are retroactive.

Testimony was elicited that the® ‘Commission went back
to ‘different dates. The first date the payments. were ad-

justed was to March 1, 1935, I believe. “In the last cases’
they were fixed back to the filing of the application.”

‘«Senator’ McKellar. In the fi rst one, did they 9 go
back. further than the application?
Mr. Crowley. Yes, in the first. case they went
-back, I think, to the first day of March 1935. Of course,
I do not want to ae: the Commission, you

understand. a
‘Senator McKellar. Oh, no. ad
. “**Mr. Crowley. But I think it went. back to the
Ist day of- Mareh 1935.
95 1 bid. °

.

% Thid. For Commissioner boner gy dissenting opinions, see

dir Mail Rate for Route No. 33, 216 1..€. C. 381, 402, digested.

supra note 09, and Air Mail ‘Compensation, 216 1. C. C. 166, 192,

‘mentioned supra note 70, : “

7 Subcommittee Hearings, p. 179. The, Post Office had already

Submitted a schedule showing that in a proceeding . instituted | on

July 22, 1935, the Commission “increased the bid rate of 19-1/2 to 25
cents per airplane mile retroactivély-to March 1, 1935." Jbid:, pr 130.
The proceeding referred to was Air Mail Rate:for Route No. 33.
216 T. C. C. 38]; discussed supra note 6%, where Commissioner Ma-
haffie had dissented on the ground -that ‘the act did not permit the
Commission to. fix rates ‘“retroactively.” This proceeding was re

ferred to later by Senator Mckellar as an example of how the >

Commission allowed “rétroactive rates.” Subcommittee Hearings,
See ae ae -

- .
YY ¥

CJ @ A |
Sewtee . .
* “Senator McKellar. Had the act been passed ,
at that time? ~ - its i
‘*Mr. Crowley. No. — oe | .
‘Senator MeKellar. They went batk, even, be-
fore the passage of the act? .
he. =i Mr. Crowley, » Yes, sir.
ee ne **Senator MeKellar. Did you seat st against the
creation of retroactive op tegid

. tte ae “Mr. Crowley. Yes, sir.”’ ;

-
'

Henentodbes therefore, Senator MeKellar tried to show
that the. C ommission ‘had ‘no. “rieht to make. their acts re-

9990

troactive in fixing rates. And the: proponent of the bill,
Senator McC ‘arran, countered this broad attack. on an
PN cs _equally broad front. He engleavored. to show that this
| court, had sustainfed ‘‘retroactive rate decisions." ‘In
- other words, that: establishes the principle of the propriety
of a retroactive decision.’ ‘Testimony was elicited to’
show that Congress itself had empowered the-Commission
_* to fix rates ‘‘retroactive from August 1935 to March 1,
1930: “iez Myr, Gorrell discussed “at length “the power of
the Interstate Commerée C ‘ommission to make a retroactive |
award." He contended vigorously, that. it existed, and.
even argued that the Post ‘Office itself had. aciually acqul-
esced in a decision in which the rate was increased back to

~ the date when the petition was file d. a,

%

"23 Second Annual Report of the Civil ‘Acronautics Authority
(1940), p. 6. “The Authority believes that it has a duty under the
Statute not only to fevise ‘air- “mail rates where such action is war- | -
ranted by evidence submitted in formal proceedings instituted by the
carrier, but also to act upon its own initiative and itself institute
‘mail-rate proceedings where the facts indicate need for reyision,”

. First Annual Re port of the Civil . menennaties Authority (1939), p.
2. *

oO

84 .

was the device employed to enable the airlines to fulfill
that purpose.

An airline cannot properly attain the legislative goal
when its financial strength has been impatired becatse

events have bNied the Board’s rate predictions. The Board

«cord the full relief needed to make good
the impairment. «I

fnust.be able to
that relief involves the retrospective
adjustment of past rat predictions, the Act confers on the
Board full power to effectuate the purposes of Congress.
We submit that the result reached below flies in the face_
of the.clear words of the statute.

‘Conclusion , °

- Phe order of the Court of Appeals should be reversed
_, and the proceeding remanded to_ the Board for a -hearing.
on the merits. | i Western
Alir, Inc:, Mail oth 6 C:. A. B, 595, . but the. magic word
“tentative” or “temporary” did-not Aocachy in 1 the order. .

125 ll American Aviation, Inc., Mail Rate for Route “No. 49,

3 C. Av B. 79 4 route operated 4 months before proceeding begun ) ;

United Air Lines Transport Corp., Mail Rate tur Route No. 57,
. C. A. B, 381 (route operated 9 days before proceeding begun) .
Pacific’ Alaska Airways, Inc., ét al., Alaska Mail Rates, 6 C. A. B.
61 (route operated 54 days before proceeding begun), Caribhean-

Itlantic Airlines, Inc, Mail Rates, 6 C. A. B. 407 (route operated .

27 months before prewceding hegun); Pioncer Air Lines, Inc., Mai!

Rates. 8 C. A, B. 145 (Toute operated a days before proceeding
begun ). vs

aR

*”
7

“operate.

a tts

~ Tire Board tried to justify this result on the ground of

necessity. *‘Obviously when a new operation is commenced |

the question of mail compensation for that operation from:
‘its commenceme nt must be decided”? (81-82). Obviously
some proce dure should exist for affording the airline full.

compensatior.” Equally obvious, however, ts the fact that
such a. procedure does exist in new route cases, without
conjuring up some special power to set rates. prior to the

time when a pe tition is filed. All the airline need do, to ob-

tain “compensation for that operation from its’ commence-

99

meuit,’’ is to file a petition when it starts opel rations. Li-
deed, it can petition for a rate even before it has begun to
126 Thus the attempt to distinguish the new route
eases on the ground: of i adie necessity. is utteriy
unsound, |
The Board noted that new route cases involve ‘no ques-
tion of, the retroactive revision “of n final rate, since no rate
at all WAS in effect for the new routes’ ' (82, footnote 32).

Quite reconutly it recognized that this argument was too

broad and held that it made no difference that a rate —

“in effect for the new cial all aed 7 But apart from .

——-_—

128 See, ea Mid- “Continent . firtine s, Ine.— Mail’ Rate’ for Route

No. 48;.2 ce a“ B. 392; North vest Airlines, Inc osha Rate Pro-
cecding for Route No. 45,°2 A. B, -827.; ‘Trans-Texas Airways,
Oriker No. E2900 (Oct. 20, 104 ‘ Colonial Airlines, Inc., Bermuda

/ Services Mail Rates; Order No. E SH53 (Jan. 26, 148); Piedmont

Aviation, inc., Order No. F-1277 (Max, 1948). -In fact, a so-
called “permanent” rate can be—and ‘has “peen—fixed even before
operations have begun. e.g., Continental “he Lines, Inc.—Mail
Kates fer Route No, 43,1 ra A. A. 182, 189; Pam. Pmreaican A yqways
Co. tof Delaware )—Mail Rates, '1 C. A® A. 220, 258-“sMore_re-

. ”

cently, only a”‘temporary” rate has been established when- operations ,

have. st Re started.” See, c.g., Braniff Airways, Inc,, Order No.

}- - EO « NOV 10,. E947 ).- ’
Alaska Airlines, Inc.; Order No. E-1885 fdas: 13, 1948}
L carrier Was opérating star rof%es ‘prior to 1943, and receiving mail

hog

is 87

the f fact that the statute does not even talk about’**final’’

rates (supra, pp. 79-77), the Act draws no distinction

between the Boerd’s power to make a rate retrospectively’

effective when it involves ‘‘revision of a final rate’? and

_ ifs power to make a rate retrospectively effective When no~

such revision is involved. In one case, the airline is ‘made
whole by retrospectively incre: ising its i? of compensa-
tion from an inadequate amount to a fair one; in; the other,
the inerease is from another inade ‘quate amount—zero—to
the same fair rate.

Moreover, the Board has actually undertaken revision

of what it is pleased to call ‘final’? rate orders.

B. :The “Nunc Pro Tunc” Petition Device ©

_. In May 1942 the Armed Forces took over many of the
airlinés’ planes, and severe restrictions on service: were
imposed. To alleviate the resulting hardship, the Board

99

issued two ‘‘veneral njemoranda to all juirlines, which
are set-forth ii full in\the supplement to. "this Appendix.

‘In the first, the Board, calling attention to its ‘‘policy of

not making rates effective prior to.the imstitution of a =

proce edidig?” (p. L00, infra), suggested that it might insti-
tute a new rate proceeding on June 1, 1942 , for the benefit

of carriers having no proceeding then sondite The seeond ©

memorandum of June 3, 1942, stated:- °

pay under contracts with the Postmaster. General. On September
4, 1945, it filed a petition te have the Board fix a higher rate.. Later’

it amended the petition to ask that. rates be fixed as of January 1,
1943. By analogy to the “new route” cases, the Board held that it
had power to grant Such retrospective relief. “The fact. that in this
case the carrier received some compensation, while in the new route

cases there was ‘ho-compensation, is not determinative. of, the real _

issue, The important point is that in neither case was there 4 pre-
viously fixed rate for the required service in accordance with the
standards of Section 406" (p. 5).

8S

‘The, Board will not imtiate new rate proceed.

ings as of June 1, 1942, as was stated in the Board's

» previous memorandum. Consequently; it will be

necessary for any carrier which does not’ now have a

crate proceeding pending but which wishes its rates

; to be subject to review by the Board for the period

beginning June 1, 1942, to tile a petition under See-

> “tion 406 of the Act requesting such review. The

Board will accept any such petition filed within the

neat two weeks as, being dated June 1, 1942, if ‘the
carrier concerned: so desires.’? ° |

Perhaps the Board thought that in this fashion it could

s

_pay lip service to its ‘“pohey’? while avoiding prejudice
to.any carrier which: had withheld & petition.in the hope
that the Board’ would start a proceeding itself. But if the
Board lacked power to make a rate retrospectively effective
gis of a date carlier than the filing of a petition, of course
it could not acquire it by allowing a petition to be ‘filed,
nune pro tune that earlier date. ‘*An order may not be
made nune pro tune which will-supply a jurisdictional de-
‘feet.’ Stock v. Mann, 255 N. ¥. 100, 103,-174 N,: BE. 76,
77. That is true no matter how eqititable the airline’s claim
for relief might be!’ Thus the Board actuall# invited
airlines to- file. petitions asking for .retrospective relief
which it now says it Was powerless to grant.

e 2 : 4 P ; : .

es Credit Co. Ltd. v..clrkansas Central Ry. Co. P28 U.S. 25s, .
261; The Bayonne, 159 U.S. 68%, 692-693; Gagnon v. U.S. 195
U.S, 451; Conhoy v. First Nat, Bank of Jersey City, 203 U.S. 141,
145; Old Nick Willams Co. v. Onited States, 215 U.S. 54h, 544;
Poatmen’s Bank v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 2 F. 62d) .
979° 993 0C. C. A. 8); Osborn v. United States, 50 F, (2d) 312.-
w5 0C. C. As 4): United States v. Rayburn, 91 F. (2d) 162, 164
iC. C. AL S)3 dn re Richinond Hill Electrical Supply Co., Inv. 4

Bo 62d) 94s, 889; Jn re Vasques, 50 F. (2d) 2%

——-.

. ‘ ‘
In United Air Lines Transport Corp—Maid Rate Pro-
eceding,.& C. A. B. 289, a petition was filed on December

26, 1941)! asking revision of. the. rate from that date. On~ |
. December 15, 1941, one of the airline’s schedules had been

discontinued by the Post Office, Department. This caused
a reduction in its total mail compensation. In January
1942 the airline asked that its petition be amended so as
* to request an adjustment of the rate as of December 15,

1941. As the Board did not ‘want the airline’s total mail

compensation reduced, it allowed the amendment ‘to avoid
such an uninte ‘nded resuli,’’ and then adjusted the’ rate on
the route upwards as of December 15-(p. 292). To be
sure, the airline's total. mail compensation was. not **sub-
stantially’? affected but the fact remains thatthe Board
actually increased the rate-as of a date hefore the petition
was actually filed, thins exercising power which it now
claims did not exist. — faa .

| c. Retrospective ‘“‘Reopening” of ‘‘Final” Rate Orders

+ In one of its earliest rate cases, the Board retrospec-—

,

tively inereased a rate, long after it had become ‘*finad,’
without paying even lip service to its **general policy.”’

— In ‘June 1989 certain transatlantic mail rates were es-
tablished, effective May (20, 1939. Pan American Airways
Co. (of Delaware)—Mail Rates, 1 C. A. A, 220. The order

set excess rates .for load’ over 1,600 pounds, ‘prov ided °
such trip: shall hayé been completed at least as far as

Foynes, Ireland or Lisbon; Portugal’? (p, 258). It’ pro-
vided that the airline ‘shall not be entitled t6 any payment
ofor any trip which shall not continue at least as far as
FoyneS Ireland, or L isbon, Portugal’ ; (pp. 257, 258).
On February 23, 1940, the Board “reope ned** the: proceed-
ing on its own motion ‘*to determine whether the‘ rate of

* Y

ba 8

. : 90 : A ” :
ar ; . . _ f, . ; . .

compensation being paid . . . for ‘the transportation be-
tween the United States and .°. . the Azores’? was fair
? .

-*tand in case such rate shotild not be found to be fair and:
reasonable, to fix and determine the fair and reasonable
‘rate’’ therefor. Pan A ease Airways Co, (of Delaware) .

-Transatlantic Mail ‘Rates, 1 CoA. A. 650. . It found that
the existing rate Was. wah “The fact that the volume
of mail between the Uniféd States and the Azores is nom-
“inal in no way alters the fact that petitioner ix entitled to
a fair and reasonable rate of compensation for the service

rendered’ in transporting such mails’? (p. 652). There-
apon it ‘tamended’’ its original order ‘to authorize excess
rates on mail carried only to the Azores, retrospectively to
May 20, 1959-8 months earlier than the reopening of the
proceeding (p. 654).

Conve rsely,: in Pan American Atrways,* Ine., Latin-
American Rate Case,

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386406_0127%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
