# Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari — Coray v. Southern Pacific Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1949
- **Citation:** 335 U.S. 520

## Text

a7

_ INDEX
- SUBJECT INDEX

‘ dey” Page
SUMMARY ati nate | 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE... aes: a
ARGUMENT... ae ne
MRS. LUCUS WAS NOT ' DAMAGED BY THE DEATH ¢ OF -

FRANK LUCUS | Se ae

Cee gs ra Ree Ne AR,
o bs . 7 er e °

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

1

American Railroad Co. v. Didrickson, 57 L. Ed. 456, 227 ao 28 |

Bobango v. Erie R.. Co., 57°F. (2d) 667, (1982—C.C.A. Oia eas (12
Bohme v. Chicago M. & St. Ry. Co., 200 N.W. 804, oe ay
Court of Minnesota. Nov. 21, 1934) . Bek ee
Brady v. Southern R. R. Company, 320 U.S. 476, 88 L. Ed. 239 ce ae
Brady v. Terminal R.-Association of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10:
58 S. Ct. 426, 82 L. Ed. A ee wicccs 10

Deere v. Southern Pacific Company, 123 F F. (24) 4 438, Caiticonst

Denied, 314 U.S. 820, 86 fA RL CME «Sree

Johanna Frese, Admx., v. Chicago Burlington a ee

Railroad Company, 168 L. Ed. 131,'263 U.S. 1 ato ae
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 60 L. Ed. 732, 240 U.S. 444. basrendnis 20°
Helvering v- Gowran, 82 L. Ed. 224, 302 U.S. 238...%.0000 2... 30,

Anna Lang, Adm«x. v. New York Central Railroad Comp: ny,. .
° . 65 L. ‘Ed. ok ke ESOS Oe aCe ie cteeg: ae

Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. ialase 243 U. S. 617, 37 papeetee
i LUC UY

10
- McCalmont v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., 283 F. 739, (C.C.A. 6)... 23
' Michigan Central R. Company v. Vreeland, 57 L. Ed. 417, 227 U.S..59 29
. Morse v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 74 F. (24) 677, (C.C.A. 2). 22

Orton v. Pennsylvania. Railway Co., 7 F. (2d) 36, (C.C.A. 6) 1925 11
Peters v: Wabash Ry. Co., 42 S. w. an 588, (Supreine ¢ Court

of Missouri, 1931)... i 15-
Powell v. Waters, 190 S. E. 615.” 2 19 °
Reetz v. Chicago and E. R. Co., 46 F. (2d) 50, (CCA. 6). me hs

Reynolds v. New York 0. & 'W. Ry,Co., 42 F. (2nd) 164, (CCA. 2) 13

>’

SOUTHERN Paciric Company, a Corporation,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1947

¢

- CASE NO. 793

Howarp F. Coray, Ancillary Administrator of The Kstate
of William Frank Lucus,. Deceased, eee
Peti as
e i> r ;

7 3 TE. o

i]

Respondent. —

‘ . = ° . ® -
_ Brier ror ResponpDENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION |

FoR Writ or CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME CouURT

‘OF THE Untrep STaTEs ©

SUMMARY.

William Frank Lucus, an employee of Southern Paci-- —
fie Company, ‘died as the result of runniny: a small track
car into the rear end of a standing train. He was operating |
the car east and looking west on a straight, level track.
He waited by the side of the main line for the eastbound. *
freight train to pass him and then put the track car on —
the main line’ and followed the train east. A nut on a

valve in the air line became disconnected which applied

all the brakes in the train: The train was traveling 25 to
30 miles per hour and it traveled about 1350 to 1800 feet

after the brakes were_applied before it stopped.

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a

Lueus had no duties to perform which prevented him
from giving his entire attention to the operation of the
track car. The track car had a maximum speed of 25 to
30 miles per hour and would stop in 100 feet if the brakes
_ had been applied, which was not done at any time before
the collision. There is no doubt that Lucus had plenty of |
time to’ stop the track car if he had observed the train
stopping. He had plenty of time to stop the track car if |
he had looked ahead after the train. had stopped. He
knew he was following the freight train so closely that if
it should stop or slow down there would be’ a collision,
unless he also stopped: or slowed down. He did not expect
the train to stop so he risked his life on the assumption it
would not stop or slow down.

The Trial Court directed the verdict for defendant
after both sides had rested. The Supreme Court of Utah
affirmed. The decision below correctly applied the Fed-:
eral Law to the facts.

STATEMENT. OF THE CASE

- May 24, 1944, was a clear, calm, sunny day. (R. 50.) |
‘ At about 3:30 p. m: Lucus and Lynch put the motor car
- on the north siding and moved it to the east end of that
siding and waited there while the freight train pulled out —
of the south siding onto the main line and proceeded east.
(R. 48.) Lynch was going to replace Lucus as signal main-
_tainer at Lemay. The track was straight and level from.
Lemay to the place wherd the collision occured. (See the®
ee R. 131, 135.) After the freight train had
passed Lugus and Lynch, they pushed the track car 40- or
50 feet and put it on the main track, (R. 49.) Then Lucus ©
got on the nofth side, which was the operator’s side, and
Lynch pushed it’20 feet to start it. (R. 49.) They: followed
the train east.. Lynch sat on the south side of the track .
ear.. The car was constructed for one man operation (R.

. 49), and Lucus was the operator. When Lynch hopped on

the motor car afterstarting it, the rear end of the train

_, was then 300 to 400 yards east of. the motor car. (R. 50.)
' Lynch did not look east, but was watching the westbound —

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semaphore signal east of Lemay to familiarize himself
_with the territory which he was going to-take over. (R..
OI.) Lynch-did not see what Lucus was. doing after. they
-left Lemay (R: 54) and had no conversation with Lucus, |
(R. 52.) Lyneh was not sériously injured in the collision
‘and gave his deposition’ at the trial. He testified the motor
car was not traveling at an exce$sive speed. (R: 50) The
motor car has_a-one cylinder motor powered for maximuni
. speed of 25 to 30 m.p.h., and is equipped with’brakes which
would stop it within 100 feet at a maximum speed, and

- ‘the brakes immediately before the accident were in good

condition. (R..71.) A rule of the defendant company pro-
vided that when following moving trains, track caps must
remain not less than 400 feet to the rear of the same, (R.
72.) Lueus had no duties to. perform on the trip other than
' to operate the motor car. He was going -to deliver some .
pay checks to employees at stations east of Lemay. (R. 53) *

. The place of ‘the ‘collision was 3600 feet east of the
east switch points at Lemay in Box Elder County, Utah.
The deceased’ was a signal maintainer at Lemay. The
tracks at Lemay run east and west:and there are passing
tracks north and south of the main line. (R. 18, 22.)

The freight train inyolved was known as first 582,
consisting of 82 cars. At Lemay .t had taken the south
siding, and it pulled back on to the main line and pro-
ceeded east at about 3:30 p- m. (R. 21, 22, 50.) As it |
passed the east switch, Luews and Lynch, who. was with _
him on the motor car at the. time. of the accident, were
waiting with their car to place it on the main line and
follow it east as soon as the train had“passed. (R. 48.)

{ After the train had proceeded a very short distance,
the triplé union nut on ‘the triple union valve on the 60th
car from the head end of the train became disconnected,
and the brakes. were immediately applied in emergency.
' The disconnection” automatically ‘sets all brakes in the
train. (RB. 27, 40, 74.) The train was going about 25 miles
per hour, when the brakes were applied. The train rolled
to a smooth, ‘sudden, but easy stop. There weren’t any.
jerks. (R.. 28, 39.) It was, estimated by Brakeman Agricola,

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4 petcegs Ee

who was on the caboose, that the train ms between 30
and 40 car lengths after the brakes went into emergeney,

which was 1350 to 1800. feet. The engine Was working
steam while - stop was being made, and it wis made
with no jar whatsoever. (R. 43, 44.) The freight cars in -
the train were approximately 45 feet in length. (R..71.)
The purpose of the: air brakes is to stop the train, and the
same kind of stop which oecurred on this occasion would -
oceur if the engineer had oceasioh to set the, brakes in
emergency. (R. 32.) After the-train had come to a stop,
Jorgensen, who was the conductor on the caboose, ob-
Served that the air gauge on the eaboose showed the air 7
pressure had left’ the line..(R. 23.) After a few seconds,
Conductor Jorgensen observed the motor ear ‘about 500
feet- from the rear of the train and’ traveling about 35
m.p-h. (R. 24.) Both men on the motor-car were looking back
toward Lemay (west). (R: 23, 24, 31-)-.There’was no—
decrease in the speed of the motor ear between the time
Jorgensen first saw it and when it hit the eaboose. (R. 31.)
Anderson and Jorgensen on the caboose tried té stop the
men on the track car, but could not get them to turn their
heads. The collision oeeurred and Lucus was killed in.
stantly. (R. 23.) Brakeman Law on. the cabodse also ob- *
served that both Lucus and Lynch were traveling east and _
looking west at the time of the accident. (R. 36.) Emer.
geney stops. of trains frequently oceur. Engineers stop
the train by full application of the air (emergency or |
“big hole’’ application) very often if any emergency
arises. — ay tes .

ARGUMENT

_ Petitioner does not contend that Lueus was’ not hegli-
-. gent or that such negligence was not a proximate cause of
his death. No reasonable mind could find that Lueus was ‘
exercising any care for his own protection. His conduct
is important in the case not hecause his negligence is a
defense if the failure of the air line was the proximate
cause of his death, but because his faiture to look under
the cireumstanees was so highly extraordinary that it was
not to be anticipated by the Respondent. Because of the

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conduet of Lueus, the failure of the air line on the train =
is not the proximate cause of his death. + . ®

. Brakeman Agricola testified the train took from 1350
to 1800 feet to stop. Its speed was about. 25 miles per |
hour. Assuming a constant rate of deceleration of the .
train during the time it was, stopping, it would average
12% miles an hour which is 18.33 feet per second. At
. this rate it would take the train at least 73 seconds to
_ Stop. Some’ geconds elapsed before Jorgensen noticed the
_ track ear $00 feet away, approaching at 30 miles per hour, |
or 44 feet per second. The track car would take 11 see!

onds to travel the 500 feet and it seems fair to assume - -

15. seconds elapsed before Jorgenseir noticed the track ear.
This adds up to 99 seeonds from the time the brakes
went into_emergency until the collision, assuming - the
‘300 feet stopping distance instead of 1800 feet. That is
. not a long time under some circumstances, but it is a long
time to ride backwards immediately behind. a moving
freight train at 30 miles-an hour without looking ahead
‘or slowing or stopping the track car. oe

It does not in any way: justify the conduct of Lucus
to say it was only a matter of seconds between the time
the brakes were applied on the train until the collision oc-
curred. If the time was short the duty was that much :
niore imperative. If it had heen a fact known to Luetis -
.that there was no train on the track between. Lemay and
Newfoundland, the next station to the east, his failure sto
look might be understandable:- If instead of running into
the train he had run into a rock which had just rolled onto
the track or some other object he had no reason to antici-
pate would be on‘the track, when he thought he had a
clear track ahead, his conduct might be within the field
where the railroad should anticipate he might act as he
(lid. But Lueps knew he was following the train within
400 or 400 yards at 30 miles per hour. If he wanted for
some reason to look back at Lemay, this was not a job
_ Which was so exaeting upon either his time or attention

that it precluded him from turning his head occasionally
te see if there was a clear track ahead. If he wanted. to

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be free of the shligitien: to leak ahead often enough to
insure he would not run into the train if it stopped or
‘slowed down, he could easily have slowed or stopped his

motor cai. No train was following him. He had a choice: —

of. slowing his car or’ stopping, or. looking ahead to know |
how. much clear distance he had. It was highly. extra-

. ofdinary that he could resist the impulse to’ look where
. he was going. |

He knew the train was 300 to 400 yards ahead of him .

-when he left Lemay. He was in exclusive control of the

- track ear. If he had looked east while the train was travel- 3
_ ing the distance it took to stop after the brakes.went into

emergency, he could have observed the gap between his
ear and the end of the train was closing. The. Petitioner
makes no contention that Lucus was not negligent in
running into the rear end of a train stepped on a level
straight track on a clear sunny 9 >

‘*Events too remote to require reasonable prevision

need not be anticipated. * * *”’

The test of a danger, ‘‘reasonably to be anticipated”’
as stated in the Brady case is a rule announced by. all of.
the cases which analyze the doctrine of proximate cause.

Petitioner at page 21 of his brief states :

‘“** * * Unless the distance separating the track car
and the rear of the train was sufficient for Lucus..
to stop the track car, a collision was made inevitable
by the stop, and even if the distance was sufficient
the danger was ever present that he would not dis- -
_ cover the stalled. train in time.’’

_ » There is no evidence that the distance separating the. ~
. track car and the rear of the train was not sufficient for
Lucus to stop the track ear if he had looked. The evidence
is uncontradicted that the track car could be stopped in 100°
feet going at maximum speed. The brakés were in good
_ condition. The train moved at least 1360 feet after the ©
brakes were: applied. The evidence is uncontradicfed that
after the train had stopped Lucus still had more than five
times the distance nécessary to stop the track ¢ar if he
had not insisted on riding backwards. The evidence is
without dispute that Lucus could have stopped if he had
looked where he was going and that he did not turn his
head. The inquiry. here narrows to the question under the
rule of ‘‘reasonably to be anticipated’’: Was the defend-
ant required to anticipate that Lucus would not keep any
fookout ahead? We respectfully submit that no case Felied
on by: Petitioner answers this question in his favor.

, os = :
At page 19, of Petitioner’s brief it is stated: 3

‘The Utah court’s resurrection of ‘the absolute

defense of contributory negligence -by calling such
- conduct ‘the ‘legal cause’ is contrary to every Fed-—
eral authority petitioner has been able to discover. °
The phrases ‘legal cause’ and ‘proximate cause’ are

foreign to the Federal Acts in question ;: neither

phrase is used in any section of the acts, They are

2

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used’ and employed by the Utah court to obscure

"3 “veason and justify a result not otherwise obtain- .

able’? 3

But Petitioner’s brief quetes from opinions of this .

' Court which usethe phrase ‘‘proximate cause of ,injury’’
"in cases under*the Safety rig ie Act. The criticized
phrase is found at the -bottom *

page 15 of Petitioner’s .

brief in the quotation from Louisville & Nashville R. Co..

v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 37 S. Ct. 456, 61 L. Ed. 931: .

_ + {*This effect can be given to the acts and their wise
| - and humane purposes. can be acéomplished only by
“* holding, as we do, that carriers are liable to em-
'- " “" ployees in. damages whenever the failure\ to obey

these Saféty Appliance Laws is the proximate cause

_ of the injury to them when engaged in the discharge

‘of duty.’’ (Italics ours.) ~~ | ;

.. And Petitioner’s brief at pages 16 and 17 quot s froin
- Brady v. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Lowis, 303 U. S.
_ Ss Ct, 426, 82 L. Ed. 614, in part: - fi f

“t** * © The Statute has been liberally construed so
as to give a right of recovery for every injary the
proximate cause of which was'a failure“to comply °
_ with a requirement of thé act. * * * One can recover
‘

‘‘Applying to the present case the test announced
. and applied in the cases cited makes it clear that
~——
died at 7:00 that evening. The court held the defective air

_ bump.was-not the cause, but a mere condition, and held that
the lower court erred in overruling the general demurrer
to the. petition. The following syllabus is by the court:

“1. In an action against a rafiroad. company for:
injury to one of its employees based on the defend-
-ant’s violation of a federal statute, in order to
render the company liable there must necessarily
be, as in other cases, a causal connection between -
such violation and the injury. (a) ‘The most gen-
erally accepted theory of causation is that of natural
and probableconsequences (Mayor, etc. pf Macon v.
Dykes, 103 Ga. 847, 848, 31 S. E: 443); and i in order
to hold the defendant liable the petition must show
either that the act-complained of was the sole occa-
sion of the injury, or that it put in operation other
causal forces, such as were the direat, natural, and
— consequences of the original act, wf that

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the intervening agency could have reasonably been
anticipated or foreseen by the original wrongdoer,’
Rome Railway, ete. Co. v. Jones, 33 Ga. App. 617,
618, 127.S. E. 786.

‘“(b) An employee of a railroad company cannot
recover under the Safety. Appliance Act, 45 U. S.
C. Av See. 1 et seq., if the failure to comply with

its requirements is not the. proximate cause of the ©

‘ accident which results in his injury, but -merely~
_ ereates an incidental condition or situation, in which
- the accident, otherwise eased, results mn such in-

ee
“The following ieadisitas: from Reet: v. Chicage & E.

R. Co., 46 F. (2d) 50 (C.C.A. 6) reflect the facts involved.
and the holding of the coyrt: ; :

“Railroad held not liable for freight eohdnctor’s
death for failure ‘to provide footpath ont: guard .
7 railings along bridge abutment. )

“Deceased fell from bridge while endeavoring ‘to
locate place in. train where breaking of couplers
and drawbars had broken air line and brought train |
_. to stop. However, record did not show railway
+ negligent in’method of constructing bridge or in
main{aining it, and there was no evidence that
guard rgilings or footpaths: were used in open
_country Tior that their absence was proximate cause °
of injury. : ;

‘*Railway soirdiien-4 train with defective onnaies
and drawbars held not liable under statute for.
freight conductor’s death, which was not proximate

ne result thereof (Safety Appliance nat, (S USCA “3

Sees. 1-16. ee

This Court in Great Northern Ry. Co, v. Wiles, 60 L.
Ed. 732, 240 U. S, 444, held there could be no recovery for

the death of asbrakeman. on the\caboose of a-train which °

broke in two because the drawbar pulled out and stopped
the: train instantly. Another train following ran into the

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caboose hecadhe the weuld prevent the collision. In each ¢ase there was

neither negligence in bringing about the collision ~
hor cause forthe collision, except,the failure of the -
man hurt to take that step which it was his duty to |
take to protect himself and dthers. If Wiles had ~

gone back with his flag, as his duty required, that
collision probably ‘might havé been avoided. If Me-
Calmont had set out his-flag as his duty required,
it is even more probable that there would have been
no collision. Our affirmance of the judgment, below
could safely be rested on the. Wiles Case alone.’’

Plaintiff relies upon Spokane and Inland Empire Rait-
road. Company v. Edgar E. Campbell, 60 L..Ed. 1125, 241
U.S. 497. Theré Campbell moved the electric train west-

bound ftom Coer d’Alene when he discovered an eastbound -

_train approaching on the same track. The airbrakes on

Campbell’s train failed to work properly and a collision.
resuited. Of course, it could be reasonably foreseen that-

' if the air brakes were deféctive that might cause a collision
with anything on the track including an approaching train.
The Campbell case would suport a claim that if the brakes
on the track car failed to operate (if Lucus applied them,
we he did not) and a collision resulted for ‘this reason

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926

there would be causa conncetion between the faulty brakes
and the collision, The case gives no support. to the con-
_ tentiém that there. is any causal connection under the en.
tirely different faets in ‘the case at bar. ;

“The Respondent. would not be liable if ‘the stop had
been cansed by the engineer applying the air because it
is not re ‘asonably tobe anticipated that the operator of |
the track ear would fail to see the train stopped on the
track. It is for the same reason that the disconnection
of the air line is not the pr&ximate cause of the Year end
collision.

Mrs. Lucus W AS Nor DAMAGED BY FHE De \TH
OF W ILLIAM FRANK Luet Ss.

"‘Upos the trial of this case it was undisputed that the
deceased and his wife weré not living together at the time
of the death and had not lived together for approximately —
two yearseprior thereto. (R. 57-59) During this period, he
had turnished’ her no.support whatever. (R. 58-59, 109) —
She had been employed ever since they were married on —
December 26, 1936. (R. 55) There were no children, and
~ as-shown by defendant’s Exhibit: 4,-on March 18, 1943,
when Frank Lucus applied for employment, he stated in
his application ‘‘Am supporting no one.’’ (R. 142-B)
There was also introduced in the trial court as defendant’s |
_> Exhibit 1, a transcript of divoro~ proceedings in the Su-
perior Court of California in and for the County of Los
’ Angeles in tht case entitled .Wm. Frank Lueus vs. Edith °
_N. Lueus. That record shows that on August 27, 1942, the

deceased - filed ‘an action . against his wife for divorce, A

alleging a ay

S “That since the date of said marriage, ne defend-
ant has treated plaintiff in a cruel ‘and inhuman
mariner, and has wrongfully inflicted upon him

grievous suffering, pain and anguish; that all of
said acts and conduct of said defendant were with-
out exeuse, cause or provocation, and caused plain-
__ tiff to suffer shanie, embarrassment and humiliation,

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impaired his health and happiness.’’ (R. 105)

Mrs.-Lucus, thereafter on September 15, 1942, filed a

cross complaint .for separate maintenance, in which she
.stated under,oath: «+>. ©.

”

o

‘*That plaintiff deserted and cniadoasl defendant
‘more than a year prior to the commencement of his
action and lived separate and apart from the de-
- fendant against-the will and wishes ‘of the defend-
_ ant; that during all of said time.said plaintiff did

not contribute anything to the support of defendant
and did not supply her with the necessities of life;
that during the entire married life of the parties the

defendant has been’ forced to work and earn her .
livelihood and neéessities of life; that, plaintiff has °

always earned more than enough money to support
defendant but has failed, neglected and refused. so
to-do;-all of- which has. been do to no fault of. the

defendant.

‘**That plaintiff squanders his money on liquor, in
bars and on friends and acquaintances with whom

he associates with at public pares) places, con-

stantly drinking to excess.

°

‘‘That defendant has pleaded and SO, plaintiff

_ to give up his disreputable friends, to cease patron-

izing public bars and to return home and live with

defendant; that plaintiff has. persistently refused.
- todo so; that due to his excessive drinking, plaintiff
‘has Yecome, in the past, involved*in several griev-

ous difficulties, from which defendant was .able to
extricate him only after great and costly effort;
that due to plaintiff ’s conduct, defendant worries

about him and is in constant dread+hat he will again.

become involved in difficulties;,that/ her worry has
heen so great that it has affected her health and.she
cannot sleep or rest properly, has lost her appetite

and is almost physically éxhausted; that she is in’
need of medical attention and cannot afford to — -

| and causedhim to bioneae ili in mind and body, and

-

aha etre to return any judgment

pay for .it; ‘that she fears that’ she may have. to _
quit her job because of her health; that unless she
‘receives financial aid from plaintiff she will suffer
to a great. extent. *? (R. 109) ‘

It further appears from the record that among other
proceedings resulting from this divorce litigation Frank
Lucus was ordered. on January 6, 1943, to pay his wife .
$10.00 per week for her support commencing February 1,
1943. (R. 127) Shortly after this order was entered, frank
Lucus, left Los Angeles without paying anything to. his
wife on account of the order or otherwise, and on March -
18, of that year started to work for the Southern Pacific -
Company in the State of Utah. (R. 59, 142-B) The
testimony in the record shows that there was nothing left
‘of the marriage relation between Frank Lucus and Edith
'Luteus except the bare technicality that the divorce had not _
been granted: He left the State’ of California obviously
for the purpose of defeating her intention of making him
pay her support money. He was 39 when he died and she
was. 49. (R. 54-55) Her only hope of future support was
legal duress of a spouse who was determined not to pay.
She had alleged under oath that his society and association .
was destroying her health. To permit g jury: under these

+: the wife would
result in a verdict based on pure.speculation and conjec-
ture. If a jury had found that based on the bare possibility |
that in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary
at some time in the future there might have been a recon-

'- eiliation of. these parties, such a finding would not be

supported by any testimony, but: would be based on pure.
guess work, and contrary to all the. evidence.

The rule. of damages in cases under the act has been

clearly announced, by the Supreme Court. In American |

- Railroad Co. v. Didrickson, 57 L. Ed. 456, 227 U. S. 145,

tie court said:

“The datnages recoverable are limited to stich loss

as results to them because they have been deprived

of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits by

~f.

. 29
the wrongful death of the injured employee. The
damage is limited strictly to the financial loss thus
sustained.’’ — .

Michigan Central "R. Co: Lp. Vreeland, 57 L.. Ed. -417,
227 U.S. 59, involved ‘a Wdow’s action for the death of
her husband. The court held:

“The financial benefit which might reasonably be
expected from her husband in a pecuniary way is
the measure of damages in ap action brought against
an interstate railroad “arrier under the employers
liability act of April 2 ‘orthe benefit of the
widew of an employee i ngaged in inter-
state commerce.”’ ;

Mere status of husband and wife followed by: the death
of the husband dees not show pecuniary loss. In addition
__ to the status there must be a reasonable expectation of
- future support and maintenance. This essential was totally
absent in this ease. om

. The reeprd made im the trial court would seem to re-
quire the conclusion that Lucus died not at all because the
train. came to a stop, but only because Lucus,. knowing
the train was ahead of him, persisted in riding backwards
with no thought or care for his own safety, until he pro-
’ pelled the. little track car at unchecked speed into the

‘caboose. Likewise, the conclusion seems to be required: by
- the record as a matter of law that Lueus’ death resulted
in no ‘pecuniary loss to Mrs. Lucus. By her sworn state-
ment in the California divorce case, Lucus contributed
7 nothing to her support while they lived together. By her

testimony upon the trial below, Lucus ‘made no contribu-
tion to her while he lived in Utah and worked for Respond. .
ent. So clear was it in the mind of Mrs. Lueus, that she
had no fair hope of recovering financial help from:Lueus,. .
she did not even make a good faith effort to discover his
whereabouts or communicate with him Poe the fourteen’
months he worked for Respondent. .

The result i in the trial court and in the Supreme Court .
of Utah was clearly correct and resulted i in justice between

~ 30

‘ the'parties. Petitioner has been unable to point to any fact

- which would justify a finding of any causal connection be-
tween the stopping of the train and the death of Lucus.
Neither has he been able to point out any basis for a find-
ing that Mrs. Lucus suffered any pecuniary loss by Lucus
death. No claim was ever- made by the administrator that
anyone other than Mrs. Lueus was dependent upon fucus.

?

Petitioner complains bere of the language employed
by the Supreme Court of Utah.. We submit that not only
did the Supreme Court of Utah correctly decidé the case,

but that the reasons assigned for its decision are sound.
But,“the case having been properly decided; the ‘reasons
for the decision are immaterial upon review and cannot

’” be the basis for reversal.

This Court las stated the cule applicable here in Hel-
vering v. Gowran, 82 L. Ed. 224, 302 U.S. 238:

‘(In the. review of judicial proéeedings the ‘rule is
settled that if the decision below is correct, it must
be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a
wrong ground or gave.a wrong reason. Frey. & Son |
_y. Cudahy. Packing Co. 256 U. S. 208, 65 L. Ed. 892,
41 S. Ct. 451; United States v. American R. Exp.
Co. 265 U. S. 425, 68 L. Ed. 1087, 44 S. Ct. 560;.
-- United States ‘v. Holt: State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 56,
- 70'L. Ed. 465, 469, 46 S. Ct. 197; Langnes v..Green, .
282 U.S. 531, 75 L. Ed. 520, 51 S. Ct. 243; Stelos Co. :
v. Hosiery Motor-Mend Corp. 295 U. S. 237, 239,79 .
_ L. Ed..1414, 1416, 55 S. Ct. 746; ef. United States v. |
Williams, 278 U. S. 255, 73 L. Ed. 314, 49 S. Ct.
97.°* ° eo? |

-Conciusion

The decision of the Supreme Court of Utah seesiitle |
holds, in harmony with the decisions of this Court, that
the death of Lucus was not proximately caused by the
safety appliance failure. The decision is correct also be-

ee ie a5" —
' é .

31
b
cause the testimony shows without dispute that the widow

of Lucus did not suffer any pecuniary loss as the result
of his death.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that the
| ponies for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

® .

| so : Pau H. Ray |
A. H. NEBEKER - | S. J. Quinney ?
Of Counsel” : Counsel for Respondent
921 Kearns Building, |

Salt Lake City, Utah

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386406_0082%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
