# Appellees Brief — Toomer v. Witsell

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellees Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1948
- **Citation:** 334 U.S. 385

## Text

OCTOBER TERM, 1947

- - * *

3 ae :
5 10 us
8 au}

- EARLE J. TOOMER, J OSEPH A. CESARONI, J os rn
DenACLA. ET AL, eee N

2 M. ‘WITSELL, EDWARD E. BURROUGHS, E. i.
SWEAT, ET AL., . APPELLEES

*

b Court bn Srarks
ECF

= |

op JOHN M. DANIEL,
Attorney General of South

* Carolina.,
5 N 45 21 CALLISON, |
Assistant. * General.

J. MONROE FULMER, ,
Assistant Attorney · General.

JAMES F. D 5 |
DAVID W. ROB SON,
Columbia, 8. C,
Ot Counsel.

‘sa BG TOOMER v. WITSELL. a AD ere
aah in the late summer and fall and ng north-
ward in the spring. Since there is no federal regulation
of the fishery, the four States Inoat it intimately concerned
have gone their te ways in devising: conservation
and other regulatory measures. While action by the
States has followed somewhat parallel lines, efforts to
5 + secure uniformity throughout the e der e
* late been fruitless. Because of the integral nature of
dteue ſishery, many commercial shrimpers, including the
. appellants, would like to start trawling off the Carolinas
te in the summer and then follow the shrimp down the coast
to Florida’ Each State has been‘ desirous of securing for
ae its fesidents. the opportunity to shrimp in chis way, but
some have apparently been more concerned with channel-
* ing to their own. residents the b
Vaters ſtestrietions on non-resident fishing in the mar- .
c= os . ginal sea, and even prohibitions against it, have dv i in- ;
* e Vited retaliation to the point that the fishery is effectively -
ae v partitioned at the state lines; bilateral bargaining on an
5 official level has come to be the only method whereby
any one of the States can obtain for its citizens the right
to shrimp i in waters adjacent to the other States.

er . adi of the States (Florida, . Carolina)
peas a — belong to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, one of
the principal aims of which is d secure fhe enactment of uniſorm
| 4. fisheries laws. The Commission was established pursuant to an
-‘, <> interstateompact which has been ratified by at least thirteen eastern
75 States. It⸗ duties, however, are largely consultive and advisory, and
0 date its efforts have produced little in the way of concrete results :
insofar as the South Atlantic shrimp fishery is concerned. See 56
N Stat. 2% (1942); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 374.43 (Supp. 1946); Ga. Code
47 Ann. § 45-1001 et seg. (Supp. 1947); S. C Code Ann. (1944 Supp.)
§ 1776-1; ‘Annual Rep. of the 8. C. State Board of Fisheries (1943) ; 5
ye a id. (1944) ; id. (1945) ; id. (1946). :
at 4 ; See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 374.14 (3) (Supp. 1946), as . by VX
N \ re 1947 Gen. Laws of Fla., Act 163; Ga. Code Ann, § 45-216, 45-217 :
(1037); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 113-238, as amended 1947 Sessien
Laws of N. C., e. 256; S. C. Acts of 1947, Act 281, 8 1, 2, 5. See

j . rs oe . .
a . 8 ‘ : b 8 i i — i kL -
‘2 g . 5 1 7 — 5 .

ST ROOMER o WITHER. kT
South Carolina forbids trawling for shrimp in the
State 's inland waters,’ which are tle habitat of the young
. ° Shrimp for the first few. months of their life. It also.
Provides for a closed season in the three-mile maritime belt

during the spaWning season; 1 4 July 17.
— he validity of these regulations is nat questioned. =:
| The statutes appellants challenge relate to shrimping : 5
during the open season in the three-mile belt: Section
3300 of the South Carolina Code provides that the waters : 85
in that ares shall be a éommon for the people of the

state for the taking of fish.“ Section 3374 i pposes a

tax of % a pound on green, or raw, shrimp taker in those
waters. ~ Section 3379, as ‘amended in 1947, )

the Code; conditions the issuance of non-resident licenses _

also.statements by the S. C. State Planning Board that “In revising 5
these [shrimp] laws . non- resident licenses [should be] place

on @ par or reciprocal basis with those of other statés in the South
Atlantic. group” and “Under existing regulations our fishermen are

‘discriminated against.” 8. C. State Planning Board Bull. No. 14.
J ey es ey ee ech a8
gate ee ee ·˙ nic ii eo et

28. C. Code Ann. § 3408... 3
*““Fhe waters and bottoms of the bays, rivers, creeks and marshes
within the State or within three miles of any point along-low water
mark on the coast thereof, not heretofore’ conveyed grantNrom
the Legislature ar lawful compact with. the. State, shall continue and
remain as a common for the people of the State for. the taking of Ey
in Tf... N
”“The following fistieries’ tax is hereby imposed upon all fh
or fisheries products taken or canned, stiucked or shipped for market, =
to- wit ... on each pound of green shrimp, one-eighth. of one
om... „ ety ah. yaaa, ae
u Prior to 1947 there was impose on resident and non - resident:
shrimpers alike a. boat tax of $1.50 per ton; a personal license tax
of. $5; and a tax of $5 for each shrimp trawl net. S. C. Code Ann.
88 3375, 3376, 3379. These taxes, with the possible exception. of

8

— —

. „ :

.

3 gate
licensed to trawl for shrimp in the State's

—

a .

3 ToOfER v. rden.

— — xf proof
thet tio appmeans

ve paid South Carolina income taxes
ere nts”.
And. § 3414 requires that all boats,

. tax graduhted by wamage,

r 0 8 1 7

‘of South Caroline shalt take out 4 b for eack owned by
ae Wen, and said Hoense chell be Twenty-five (09580 dollars per year,

and all owners of shrimp boats who are ne the State

22 1

the past three years, shall take 8 beat oes
‘him and said license shall be thousand five hundred ($2,500.00)

3 8. C. Acts; 1947, Act 281, § 1.

The appellants cannot ify for: $150. licenses: and hence are
subject to the $2;500 provision. As introduced in the legislature *
and paséed by the South Carolina Housé of Representatives; the bill
to amend § 3379 did not contain the $150 provision. That provision
was inserted by amendment in the Senate at the instance of a senator
from Beaufort County, which is the coastal county adjoining Georgia. ©

See House Bill 555; Senate Bill 576; iene
1947, pp. 53-5; Charleston News and. Courier, Nr 1947, p. 1,
eceols. 2-8.

Other parte. e ds sams 1067 Ss uud ad E thie cnx
limit to 100 the number ef non-resident boats whieh may be licensed
and ‘forbid altogether the issuance of licenses, even on payment, of
the $2,500 fee, to residents of States which do not grant licenses to

ee ee

lower fee. Id. §§ 2, 1 8
u The Board of before i issuing any ‘non-resident Beis g

, N shall require proof that the owner
of the non-resident boat has paid all income taxes due to the State

. AW
S Id. 33. 1

‘ :
8 * 5 *

. — WITSELL. ’ 5 |

3 «ls Cnn pers end wade ͤů ¶ů tn tte
* atch “before shipping or t to another state
or the waters. thereof.“ Vi of the ‘fishing laws

eataile suspension — wellges 2. =

Stiles i t for a year, or a
- eombination of a ope aged imprisonment -

come into court with clean

. Ks to. the corporate appellant, r 3
lees that there has been no showing that enforcement of

the statutes would work an irreparable i injury. The rec- —

ord shows only that the corporation is an association of
fish dealers and that it operates no fishing boats, Indeed,
neither the record nor the appellants’ brief sheds any light
on how the statutes affect the corporation, let alone how
their enforcement will cause it irreparable injury. Under
such circumstances, the corporation has no standing to

ask a federal court to take thé extraordinary step of ret

' straining, enforcement of the state statutes: The re-
mainder of this opinion will therefore be addressed to the
individual appellants’ ease. 5,

As to them, it is agreed that the appellees were re attempt- 7
ing to enforce the statutes. It is also clear that compli- .

ance with any but the income tax statute would have

= _92 AM boats licensed by Yhis Blate ts tine! fer shrimp ia ths waters: :

ol the State of South Carolina shall land or dock at some point in
South Carolina, and shall unload their catch of shrimp, and pack

and properly stamp/ the same‘ before shipping or transporting it to 7

another State or the waters thereof. . "The stamping refers to.

ux stamps. ö °

* C. Acts of 1947, Act 281, wey 8 C. Code Ann. $5407, 3414.

——

. ‘TOMER v WITSELL.

tion could be obtained. Except as to the income tax stat:
ute, we conclude that appellants sufficiently showed the
imminence of irreparable injury for which there was no

it is ‘unconstitutional for South Carolin®
Georgia residents to pay South Carolina income taxes on
profits made from operations in South Carolina. waters.
Another South Carolina statute, however, permits any 8
taxpayer who believes a tax to be illegal for any caube
to pay the tax under protest and then sue in a state court

i i adequate remedy 4 at wane

may institute suit. to. recover the amounts ‘paid within
‘of the payment under protest. See Argent umber Co. v.

. payment oi large! sums of money for which South

Carolina provides. no means of recovery, that defiance —
would have carried with it the risk of heavy fines and long
‘imprisonment, and that withdrawal from further fishing
until a test case had been taken through the South C
una courts and perhaps to this Court would have resul

in a substantial loss of business for which-no compe

plain, adequate and complete remedy’ at law. 5
Appellants’: position on the income ‘tax statu 5s is that

require

to recover the amounts so paid.” In the absence of any
showing by appellants that: they could not take advan- 2

tage of this procedure to raise their constitutional. objec-

tions to, the tax, we cannot ‘say. that they do not Save oe ä

Ay ane

* Abe stress Américan Federation- Jie v. Watson, 32⁷

VD. S. 582 (1946). we think the doctrine of that case applicable to -
one of the arguments made against § 3374, supra note 10. See the
third division-of this opinion, infra p. —. As to all the other stat

utes except that relatingvto state income ‘taxes, however, we agree

wich the District Court thatsthere is neither need for interp tation
of the- statutes nor any other special cireumstance - thie
federal court to stay action pending proceedings in the State urts.

1 See note 12 supra.
178. C. Code Ann. § 2469. ‘This section: provides that a

178 8.C. 1,5, ee.

we
|

x e : Pi . „ 5
5 Prong - 2 5 E Seah 7 fs 3

TOO ER v. WITSELL, oe

yee of the ‘individual appellants had previously tne 5

convicted of shriniping out of senson and in inland wa-

ters. The Distriet Court held that this previous miscon- .
duet, not having any relation to the. oonstitutionality Ws

the chalfenged statutes, did not call for pplication of
"the clean hands maxim. We agree. a

Second. The appellants press a contention: which, .

it correct, would dispose of the case. They urge that

South, Carolina has. no jurisdiction © over coastal: waters -

‘beyond the lof-water mark. In the court below United -
States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947), was relied upon

for this proposition. Here appellants seem to concede,

‘and, correctly so, that such i is neithér the ‘holding nor the

implication of that case; for in deciding that the United

States, where it asserted its claim, had paramount rights:

in the three- mile belt, the Court pointedly quoted’ and

supplied emphasis tora statement in Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U. S. 69, 75 (1941), that It is also clear that Florida

has an interest in the proper maintenance of the sponge

- fishery and that the [State] statute 80 far as applied: to

conduct within the territorial waters of a in the
absence of conflicting federal legislation, is it hi
| ‘police power of the State. *

Since the present case evinces no confiiSiMketween- South
Carolina s regulatory scheme and any assertion of federal

State has sufficient interests in the shrimp fishery within

tree miles of its coast so that it may exercise its police
N. power to protect and ee that fishery, ae :

v 332 U. S. 19, 38 (1947).

. 1 A lants also contend . until 1924 South Caitline, bad itself ö
N its boundaries by the low-water mark and had .asserted’ no

power over the maritime belt. But, as the Distriet Court held,

wer, the District Court ly concluded that the

in the a

the statute cited, by appellants need not be given the effect which a

- they would attribute to it, and even if it were 80 construed, it did 1

not impos a constitutional limit on the power of future en. ;

*
4 ar *
&
„ & N :
5 > 7 6

Woo

the federal government has made

*
\ *

* TOOMER/v. WITSELL:

Tt does not follow. frond the existence of power to regu- a

late, however, that such power need not be exercised wi
the confines of generally applicable Constitutional li
tations.

problem.

no merit in this position. 7

Since South Carolina has power to regulate fishing in

eee eee eee ee

— ‘that belt cannot be considered
3 sense of the word. Appellants

outside, as well as within thé three-mile limit. On its

no we: nt he assertion oF D

our attention to no South Carolina decision so interpret-

dy the State courts arid since this suit for an injunetion
does not present a concrete factual situation involving the
application of the statute to shrimping beyond the imag-

.* - inary three- mile line, it is inappropriate for us to’ rule in

the abstract on the extent of the State's n

Nar at statute violate 2 It
does not discriminate ‘against in commerce in

shrimp, and the taxable: event, the taking of shrimp;

Seen IO bur: —
un gee American Federation ‘of

| ; (1946) ; Sa as Municipal ota, S81 0-8. 506 (2987).

oe tha tae te, a Neh ot ales
whether South Carolina’s admitted power has been so -
exercised. . We now proceed. to various aspects of that.

ing it. Since we do not have the benefit of interpretation

Third. Appellants contend that § 3374,” which imposes 2
a tax of he a pound on green shrimp taken in the maritime
belt, taxes imports and unduly burdens interstate com-
-meree in violation of §§ 8. and 10 of Art. I of the Con-
stitution. We agree with the court below that there is

t

urge, 2 ‘that the tax is ip{posed on shrimp caught
face the statute has no such effect, and appellants call |

— 327 U. 8. 582 8

9

+ ‘ileges ‘and immunities-clause of Art. IV. 1 2 = > ars
deen Amendment.

ToouER v. WTTSELI. 3 r
ovcurs before the shrimp cari be said to have entered he. j
flowjof interstatecommerce." = ERY ig

1 . * 8

ume s great as those which residents must pay. ‘The. Me ee

purpose and effect of this statute, they contend, is not
to conserve shrimp, but to exclude non-residents and ==
thereby create a commercial monopoly for South Carolina 3
residents. As such, the statute is said to violate the priv-

Constitution and the equal protection clause of. the Four-" .

_ Article IV, f 2, 50 far as relevant, reads as follows: ~~
' “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to al!

: privileges and immunitiés of citizens in he several =) EZ

— he pri im ary purpose of this clause 5 , like the clauses Be-

| alforded by diplomatit processes and official retaliation. .

tween which it is located those relating to full faith and

v. Dept. of C
U. S. 245 (1922);

credit and to interstate extradition of fugitives.from jus-
tioe— was to help fuse into pne, Nation a collection of
independent, sovereign States. It was designed to in-

__, Sure’ to a citizen of State A who-ventures into ‘State B 1
the same privil which the citizens of State B enjoy.” re oe. .

For protection of such equality the citizen of State A \
was not’ to be restricted: to the uncertain ‘ remedies

— — 1. r N 25 3

.™ See Hope N. Gas Co. v. Hull, 274 U. S. 284 (1927); Lacoste

vation, 263 U. S. 348 (1024); Oliver iron Co. .
Lord, 202 U. 8. 172 (1923); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co, 20 8
oev. Errol, 116 U. 8. 517 (1886).

* See note 11 2 N „. iS

* See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180-81 868); Travis v. 2
Yale & Towne Mio, Co., 2 U. S. 60, 78.1020) --

* Travis v Yale & Towne Mig. Co., supra note 24, at 82, Ar.

— -
‘

“co °

CA:

. *
0

3 : : * TOOMER v. WITSEII. 2 a ; aoe

“Indeed, without some provision “of the kind removing

from the eitizens of each State the disabilities of alienage
in the other States, and giving them equality ‘of privilege
with citizens of those States, the Republia would have

3

constituted little more than a league of States; it would

not ha ve constituted the Union which now. exists.” Paul

v. Virginia, 8. Wall, 168, 180 (1868).

In line with this underlying purpose, it was ‘ne ago

deeided that one of the privileges which the clause guar-

antees to citizens.of State A is that of doing business .

in State B on terms of substantial equality with the eiti⸗

_ zens of that State.”

Like many other constitutional: provisions, ‘he priv. 5
ö ileges and immunities clause i is not an absolute. It does.
dar discrimination against citizens of other States where

there is no substantial reason for the discrimination be-
yond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.
But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in che
many situations where there are perfectly valid inde-

_ pendent reasoris for it. Thus the inquiry in each case

must be concerned with whether. such. reasons do ‘exist
and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close

relation to them.“ The i inquiry must also, pf course; be 3

conducted with due regard for the principle that the States
should have considerable leeway i in analyzing local eyjls.

and in prescribing appropriate cures.
. . With these factors in mind, we turn to a egnaideratich
of the constitutionality of § 3379.

By that statute South Carolina plainty and frankly dis-

5 criminates against non-residents, and the record lea ves
üttle doube but what the discrimination is is 80 n that its

# Ward v. Maryland, 127 Walt 418 (1870); see ‘ies Chalkgr v.

-<

Birmingham & V. . R. Co, 249 L. 8. 522 (1019); Shaffer v. C. a

252 U. S. 37, 52-53 (1920).
7 See Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co, 252 U. 8. 60, 79 (1920).
— : : i ig x

—

¥
*
—

: OES, , | : .
| „ BOOMER, v. WITSELL..;, 11
practical effect is virtually exclusionary. This the ap-
pellees do not seriously dispute N or do they argue that
since the statute is couched-in terms of residence it is
outside the scope of the privileges and immunities clause,
which speaks of citizens. Sueh an argument, we agree,
Would be without forceinthiscase™ =. - ee
As justification for the statute, appellees-urge that the - _
State's obvious purpose was to conserve its shrimp sup- ~~’
phy, and-they suggest that it- was designed to head off an “i
impending threat of excessive trawling. The record casts

some doubt on these statements.“ But in any event,

| Stipülated that in 1946, the year befdre non-residents
had to pay higher fees thancresidents, 100 non-resident boats were
licensed and that in 1947. only 15gqguch ats were licensed: Evgn -*
Those 15 were presumably ewned by persons who had fished in South:
Larolina ‘waters the three preceding years and were thus eligible for
$150 licenses, since the appellees conceded on oral argument here that ö
; RO $2,500 licenses had 75 taken. out. See note 11 supra. .. .
: See Blake v. McClung, 172 U. 8. 239, 247 (1898); Chalker "9 3 5

1 The parties

Birmingham & V. . R. Co., 249 U. S. 522 (1919); Travis v. Tale &
Toune Mig. Co., 252 U. 8. 60, 79 (1920). 8 *
lt is relevant to note that the statute imposes no limitation on f
te gumber of resident boats which may be licensed, and it was
| updated that while the number of non-resident boats fell from 100
10 15 between 1946 and 1947, the*total number of boats licensed .
inereased during that time from 254 to 2711. 5 San
I zbe reports of the State Board of Fisheries for several years back;
while expressing solicitude ‘as to the need for conservation measures,
rev, equal concern with methods for increasing} the ‘market for :
. . shrimp—by advertising, air ‘Shipments, ete.—and’ contain frequent N .
* __ Teferences to be économie importance ‘of the shrimp industry to the .. |
: tate. The 1845 report, ſor example, said that “The ghrimp business
ig our State is quite an industry, it. employs numbers of men and

«4

es the money that is \epent by the individuals personally.” -
ign with the possibility of air shipments to lange consuming ©.”
enter as: New York, the same report said that air transporta-
tion “should inorease the consumption of same [i. e:, seafoods] in
large quantities; it will also create a much greater demand for
.. Shrimp and seafoods ali. over the universe, and it will place them

; — 8 y 1 : . 4 : 2 . N —
e 2 8 * . 5 oe . : 5 f 5 * N

crews spend large sums of ‘money on repairs, gasoline, oil and Q ‘ 8 8

12 Toon v. WITSELL. 7

appellee argument assumes that any means Noba to
attain valid objectives necessarily squares with the privi-

. leges and immunities clause. It overlooks the purpose

of that clause, which, as indicated above, is to putlaw ©

classifications based on the fact. of pon-citizenship unless

8 there i is something to indicate that non-citizens constitute aes
£ . peculiar source of the te at whieh ine statute is

aimed. ;
In this connection 8 mention, without *

ES elucidation, the. fishing: methods. used by non-residents,

the size of their boats, and the ‘allegedly greater cost of.

*

No. 21, 1934) 62-63.

enforeing the laws against them. One statement in the
appellees' brief might also be construed to mean that the
State's conservation program for shrimp requires expendi-
ture of funds beyond those collected in license fees funds

to which residents and not non-residents contribute.
Nothing in the record indicates that non-residents use
larger boats. or different fishing methods than ‘residents,
that the cost of enforcing the laws against them is appre-
ciably greater, or that any substantial amount of the
State’s general funds is devoted to shrimp conservation.
But assuming such were the facts, they would not neces-

sarily support a remedy so drastic as to bé a near equiva-

lent of total exclusion. The State is not without power,
for example, to restrict the type of equipment used in its
fisheries,” to graduate license fees according to the.size

in sections where they are very l consumed with the result a
that many more people will gt sold on the idea of éating same.”
And the 1946 report's section on shrimp concluded with the statement:

that “To be able to make this report is certainly a pleasure to/ the
State Board of Fisheries as we are able to show that the catch of

shrimp this season was many. twice as large as in \ the. previous
year.”
u See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 374.1 14 (5) (Supp. 1946) ; 1947 Gen. ‘Laws

of Fla., Act 654; Ga. Code ‘Ann. § 45-109 (1937); Johnson and
Lindner, Shrimp. Industry of the South Atlantic and Gulf States

(V. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau oe Fisheries favestigational Rep.

mental unit and that the government, as a sort of trustee, -
exercises this “ownership” for the benefit of its citizens.
In the case of fish, it has also been. considered that each
gov ent “owned” both the beds of its lakes, streams,
tl evn dh waters themselves ; hence it must
5 algo ‘ ‘own” the
A ‘ment may, the argument continues, regulate the corpus
b. Akte trust in the way best suited to the interests of

2
N
—
1.

80

85 fOOMER « v. WITSELL. 8 13

of the boats,“ or even to charge ‘non-residents a differen-

tial which would merely compensate the State for any
ded enforcement burden they may impose or for any

. conservation. expenditures from taxes which only residents

pay. We would be closing our eyes to reality, we believe,

if. we concluded that there was a reasonable relationship

between the danger represented by non-citizens, as a class,

and the severe discrimination practiced upon tflem.
Thus, 5 3379 must be held unconstitutional unless com-
mercial shrimp fishing in the maritime belt falls within
some unexpressed exception to the eee and i immuni-
ties clause.

Appellees strenuously urge that there i is pa an excep-

tion. Theisargument runs as follows: Ever since Roman

times, ‘animals ferae naturae, not having been reduced

to individual possession and ownership, have been con-

sidered as res nullius or part of the “negative community

of interests” and hence subject to control by the sovereign
or other governmental authority. More recently this
thought has been expressed by saying that fish and game 3

are the common property of all citizens of the govern-

within those - waters. Each govern-

_ the beneficial ; owners, its citizens, and may discriminate

as it sees fit against persons lacking any- beneficial inter-
est. Finally, it is said that this special property interest,
wus which nations and similar governmental N tradi- f

Ay. 1

* South (Mohn “has itedlt imposed such a graduated tax in years |

past. 8. C. Code Ann. § 3375 (1942). See also Ga, Code Ann.

220 (987) N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. * (Supp. 1945).

~~
es
*

8 . TOOMER v. WITSELL:
tionally had, in this country vested in the colonial gov- *
ernments and passed to the individual States.

Language frequently repeated by this Court appears „

to lend some support to this analysis.“ But 1 in only one

case, McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S: 391 (1876), has the ü
Court actually upheid State action discriminating against
commercial fishing or hunting by citizens of other States
where there were advanced no persuasive independent
reasons justifying ‘the discrimination.“ In that case the
Court sanctioned a Virginia statute applied so as to pro-
hibit citizens of other States, but not Virginia citizens,
from planting oysters in the tidal waters of the Ware
River. The right of Virginians in Virginia waters, the
Court said, was “a property right, and not a mere priv-
_ilege or immunity of citizenship.” And an analogy wass
drawn between planting oysters in a river bed and plant: ey
ing corn. in state-owned land.

„It il Ihe noted that there are at least two factual di-
oe fionst etween. the present case and the McCready case 0

—

The most bd exposition appears in the majority opinion
in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1886). *
r rely also upgn Put sone v. — 232 u. S. 138
1914), and Haavik v. Alaska Packers Assn., 263 U. S. 510 (1924).
. Patsone case involved a 1909 Pennsylvania statute forbidding yea
resident aliens to kill game or to possess firearms useful for that pur- .
pose. On the record before it, the Coum concluded that it could
not say that the Pennsylvania legislature was not warranted in assum- ;
ing that resident aliens, were at that time “the peculiar source of the
_ evil that it desired to prevent.“ The statute was therefore held not
to vjolate the Fourteenth. Amendment. But the theory\of the case
was that there was a substantial reason for the discrimination beyond :
the mere fact of alienage. The Haavik ‘case involved the validity,
under an Act of Congress, of an Alaskan statute imposing on non-
residents, but not residents, a $5 fishing license ‘fee. In tfpholding © ~
the statute the Court pointed out that “We are not here concerned
with taxation by a State.” And in considering the power of Congress
to authorize such à tax, it was added the fee was a reasonable
contribution toward the * which” the local — af-
forded to non resi fits. |

— .
~

)

lage

ia

a

“TOOMER v. WIrSEII. 18

First, the McCready case related to. fish which would re-

main in Virginia until removed by man. The present

case, on the other hand, deals with free-swimming fish

which migrate through the waters of several States and

are off the coast of South Carolina only 2
Secondly, the McCready case i ved ry i0
ing in. i whereas the statute now questioned

is directed at regulation of shrimpitig in the marginal

jon of fish- . |

Thus we have, on the pne hand, a single. precedent 5
which might be taken as reading an exception into the

privileges. and immunities clause: and; on the other, a

_ case which does not fall directly within that exception.
Viewed in this light; the question before us comes down 5
to whether the reasons which evoked the exception cal!

for its extension to a case involving the factual distine-
tions here presented. * 33
However satisfactorily the ownership theory explains
the MeCready case, the very factors which make the pres-

ent case distinguishable render that theory but a weak

prop for the South Carolina statute. That the shrimp are
migratory makes apposite Mr. Justice Holmes’ statement
in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 434 (1920), that
Io put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon
a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession.of.

any one; and possession is the beginning of ownership.”

Indeed, only fifteen years after the McCready decision, a.
' unanimous Court indicated that the rule of that case

©

might-not apply to free-swimming fish" The fact; that,
it is activity in the three-mile belt which the South Caro-

* Manchester v. Massachusetts, 130 U. S. 240; 265 (1891). In
that cage appellant, a citizen of Rhode Island; was convicted of

violating a Massachusetts statute which regulated fishing in Buzzard’s 2 5
Bay. The Court upheld Massachusetts’ power to enact the regula-
tion, but pointed out that the statute “makes no discrimination in.
‘favor of citizens af Massachusetts and against citizens of other —

. a ( ih

4. *

3 Jina statute 5 reguiates is of equal relevance i in considering

Unit d States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947), as indi-
er separately acquired. “ownership” of the three-mile belt.“
regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of

Preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important

that vital policy consideration and the constitutional .

we have previously concluded that the reasons advanced

: statute also contravenes the equal protection clause of

°
. 1 * 1 —
1 1 gh
5 5
21 . — i ¢
— : 4

ike Shar ; 3
1 _ ‘TOOMER v. 70 WISE \

oS fein

the pplicability of the ownership -doctrine. ‘While

| above, does not preelude all State regulation of :
e in the marginal sea, the case does hold that neither
the thirteen original eolonies nor their successor States

The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally
the importance to its people that a State have power to
resource. 1 And there is no necessary conflict between

command that the State exereise that power, like its other

f powers, so as not to discriminate without reason against
citizens of other Stats.
These considerations lead us to the 3 that the
McCready exception to the privileges and immunities
clause, if such it be, should not be expanded to cover this.
case.

Thus we hold ‘that commervial shrimping i in tie mar-

alia’ sea, like other common callings, is within the pur-
view of the privileges and immunities clause. And since

in support of the statute do not bear a reasonable relation- _
ship to the high degree of discrimination practiced upon
citizens of other States, it wee that — violates
Art. IV, § 2, of the Constitution. |
Appellants maintain that by a parity of reasoning the

332 U. 8. 19, 31. :
37 See, e. g., Pound, An Introductign to the. Philosophy of Lau,
197-202. The fiction apparently ga. ged currency partly as a result
of confusion between the Roman term imperium, or governmental
power to regulate, and. dominium, or ownership. Power over fish 70
| and game was, in origin, imperium. Idid. : ö

‘ *

— —

3

N aor = 3 ; 4
F TOOMER v. WITSsEIII. 17
‘the Fourteenth Amendment. That may well be true, —
ve do not pass on this argument since it is unnecessary
to disposition of the present case. a 3
Piſth. Appellants contend that § 3414. which requires

that owners of shrimp boats fishing in the maritime belt :
off South Carolina dock at a South Carolina port and

f unload, pack, and stamp their catch (with a tax stamp)

before shipping or transporting it to another state,” bur-
dens interstate commerce in shrimp in violation of Art. I,

§ 8,.of the Constitution.

„ ge 5
The record shows that a high proportion of the shrimp —

caught in the waters along the South Carolina coast, both
by appellants and by others, is shipped in interstate com-
merce. There was also uncontradicted evidence —
e neces-

pellants costs would be materially i

_, Sity of having their shrimp unleaded and packed in South
, Carolina ports rather than at their heme bases in Georgia :
where they maintain their own docking, warehousing, re-
_ frigeration and packing facilities. In addition, an inevi-
table concomitant of à statute requiring that work be done

in South Carolina, even though that be economically di

; 5 :

"Advantageous to the fishermen, is to divert to South Caro.
lina employment and business which might otherwise go é
to Georgia; the necessary tendency. of the statute is to

impose an artificial rigidity on the economic pattern of.

the industry.

: “Appellees do not. contest the fact that the statue

thereby burdens, to some extent at least, interstate com-

?

. Merce in shrimp caught in waters off the South Carolina
coast. Again, however, they relx on the fact that the

_ commerce affected is in fish rather than some other com-
modity. They urge that South Carolina, because of its

ownership of the shrimp, could constitutionally prohibit

all shipments to other States. It follows, they imply,

dee note 13 supra.

— —

182 TOO AER ». WITSELL.

that the State could . i zone lesser restrictions, such as
those-here at issue, on jut-of-state shipments. — °

‘There is consi le authority, starting with Geer v.

— Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896), to support the con-

tention that a State may confine the consumption of its
fish and game wholly | ‘ithin the State’s limits. We need
not pause to ¢ whether this power extends to
free-swimming fish in the three -mile beit, for even as
applied to fish taken in inland waters it has been held
that where a State did not exercise its full power, but
on: States, it
could not at the same time condition such shipments .
so as to burden interstate commerce. In Foster Packing
Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928), the Court held it vas
an abuse of discretion for a district court not to enter
— —— — —-„A
burden on interstate-commerce, enforcement of a Lou-
5 isiana statute which permitted the shipment of shrimp |
1 from Louisiana to other States only if the heads and
ee hulls had previously been removed. In distinguishing
the Geer case, the following comment was made: a
_ “As the representative of its people, the State might
„ ES Cone te nes eee |
therein. . But by permitting its shrimp to be
to be shipped
and sold in interstate commerce, the State necessarily
releases its hold d, as to the shrimp so taken,
definitely terminates its control. Clearly such au-
thorization and the taking in pursuance thereof put
an end to the trust upon which the State is deemed
do on or control the shrjmp for the benefit of its
„ people. And those taking the shrimp under the —
; authority of che Act neccscarily thereby. become enti-
: 2 ee 5
i 6 5

2s U. 8.1, 12.

ou

* 2
. + . *
= . * 2 e “ 0
— /

TOOMER | v. WITSELL. 5 19
In n v. Haydel, 278 U. 8. 16 (4928), the same

conclusion was reached, on the basis of the Foster Packing 1

Co. case, 45 to A similar st, * ‘Nelating to oysters.
Similarlyain-the. onary Carolina has not
_ attempted to retain fants use of its own people the

| ‘shrimp catight in the 2 sea. Indeed, the State

has been eager to stimulate interstate shipments and sales
* as a means of j increasing the employment and income of
its shrimp industry.“ Thus even if we assume that South
Carolina could retain for local consumption shrimp caught
in the maritime: belt to the same extent as if they were
taken in inland waters, the Gee? case would ae support
33414.
In upholding this statute, the court ie * a
reason not advanced by appellees, that the requirements
as to docking, unloading, packing, and affixing a tax stamp,

were a proper means of insuring collection of the bt a
: pound tax.“ But the importance of having commerce \

ͤ—

See note 30 supra. ‘The District Court n that the Foster :
f Fucking Co. and Johnson eases had been rendered inapplieable to

was of a far different type than the one with which we are now

dealing. The statute in effec limited the number of fish which —

unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce, the Coũrt said that
“It in-no way limits or regulates * . the i -movement of the sardines
from outside into the state, or the movement of the manufactured

product from the state to the outside. The act regulates only the

manufacture within the state. Its direct operation, W and
actual, is wholly local.“ 297 U.S. 422, 425-26.
Abe District Court also said that the requirements of 13414

were a reasonahla means of maintaining the good reputation of :
products originating in South Carolina, But the appellees do not

‘pretend that the statute results in better preservation of the shrimp
in healthful form. Moreover, since shrimp caught off the shores

%

20... TOOMER v. wet

between ie forty-eight States flow unimpeded by local ae
barriers persuades us that State restrictions inimical to

the commerce clause should not be. approved simply be-

cause they facilitate in gome measure > enforcement of a
valid tax. nie

Thus we hold that 8 3414 violates 53 commerce 8 Re

of Art. 1, § 8 of the Constitution. a ;
To sum up, we hold that the District Court bedr. f

diction to entertain the attacks pressed by. the individual
aappellants, but not the corporate appellant, on all the

statutes saye the one relating to i income taxes; that South

Carolina has power, in the absence of a conflicting federal. : 1
claim, to regulate fishing in the marginal séa; and that
in § 3374 of. the South Carolina Code, ‘though not in

88 3379 and 3414, the State has exercised that power in

a manner consistent with restraints. which the Consti- |

tution imposes upon the States. The District Court's
judgment refusing equitable relief is affirmed with respect

to § 3374 and the income tax statute and reversed with’ ‘eb sre
respect to §§ 3379 and 3414. 5

N : Affirmed i in Part and reversed i in part.

*

Mn. Justice BLACK 3 in the judgment of the: |
marke and all ot me — — — 5 part g : 1 .

* i N aie ®

of South Carolina are ‘pidistinguishable focus those taken off the

shores of ‘neighboring States, purehasers would have no reason to

1 ol South Carolina.

‘suppose that shrimp Ts in eee, if inferior, ‘were a

4
ae

i SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ..

4

No. 415.—Ocroser Term, 1947. Re

Earle J. Toomet, et al,] Appeal from the United States”.

> Appellants, [ Distriet Court for the East-
„„ ern District of South Caro-
J. M. Witsell, et al. lina, eres

| ae [June 7, 1948. ] ee

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mn. Justice Jack-
SON joins, concurring. 5 5
Barring the portion entitled Faurth I join the Court's as
opinion. While I agree that South Carqlina has exceeded
her power to control fisheries within her waters, I rest
the invalidity of her attempt to do so on the Commerce
Clause. The Court reaches this result by what I deem

to be a misapplication of the Privileges· and-Imniunities

HcClause of Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution.
I 0oũex regard any limitation upon the Privileges-and-Im-
munities Clause as “some unexpréssed exception” and not
give. any clue to the basis on which such an. “exception” _
may be implied is to leave the matter too much at large.
It deals with the Constitution. as though its various
~~ Clatises. were ‘disereteand not a coherent, scheme for:
government. Specifically, the Privileges- and-Immuni-
ties Clause, like the Contract Clause, must be put in
its proper perspective in our ‘constitutional framework.”
East New York: Savings. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U. S. 230,
232. ; 923 : ae i re eS 75
Like other provisions of the itution, the Clause
rh “The Citizens of each State hall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several.
States” must be read in.conjunetion with the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution. This clause pftsup-_.
poses the continued retention by the States of powers

45
—
0

~~

* . to obliterate all special relations between a State and its

1 TOOMER.». WITSELL,

. _, that historically belonged. to the States, and were not a

_ explicitly given to the central government or withdrawn

from the States. I think it is fair to summarize the

+ decisions which have applied N IV. § 2, by saying

athe that they bar a State from penalizing the citizens of other
5 States by, subjecting them to heavier taxation me

because they are such citizens or hy discriminating against

' .« gitizens of other States in the pursuit of ordinary live-

lihoods in competition with local citizens. It is not

conceivable that the framers of the Constitution meant

citizens. This Clause does not touch the right of a State »
to conserve or utilize its resources on behalf of its. own
citizens, provided it uses these resources within the State
and does not attempt à control of the resources as part
of a retzulation of commerce between the States. A
- . State may care for its own in utilizing the bounties
of nature within her borders because it has technical
ownership of such bounties or, when ownership is in no
one, because the State may fer the common good exercise .
all the authority that | technical ownership aan ae
- confers.
When the Constitution was l such, no doubt”
as the common. understanding regarding’ the power of
States over its fisheries, and it is this common understand-
91 that was reflected in McC ready v. Virginia, 94 U. 2
The McCready case is not an isolated decision to
„ It is the symbol of one of the 8
Veichtiest doctrines in our law. It expressed the mo-
mentum of legal history that preceded it, and around it
in turn has clustered a voluminous body of rulings. Not
only has a host of State cases applied the McCready doc-
trine as to the power of States to control their game and.
fisheries for the benefit of their op citizens, but in our ©
own day this Court formulated the amplitude of the
MeCready doctrines by 8 fo “the * or the

/ a: 4

?

E * i 8 4 — : aa 3 ©

; a . 8 a
7 - TOOMER 4 WITSELL 52 3 .

ö distribution of the püblie domain, or of the common n prop- 8 =
erty or resources of the people of the State, the enjoyment a ö
„Ir which may be limited tg@tts citizens as against both 5 1

aliens and the citizens of otfier States. Truar v. Raich, ;
239 U. S. 33, 39-40. 5 8 9 .

But, a State cannot pfoject its powers over ite own , on

8 resources by. seeking to control the channels of commerce „„ 8
among the States. It’ is one thing to say that a food 3 —
sup aly . that may be reduced. to control by a State for ,

f gits own people should be only locally. consumed. .
The State has that power and the Privileges-and- Im- & 0
munities Clause is no restriction upon its exertise. It, is rie 7
a wholly different thing for the State to provide that
only its citizens shall be engaged iy commerce among
the States, even though based on a locally available food
supply. That is not the exercise of the basic right of b ee
a State to feed and maintain and give enjoyment o
own people. Wheh a State regulates the sending of A om Eee
products across State lines we have commerce among the 9

States as to which State intervention is subordinate’ to

the Commerce Clause. That is the nub of the decision

in Foster- Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1. .

South Carolina has attempted such regulation of com-
+ merce in shrimp among the States. In doi img so shé has

st exceeded the W of the See lause. :

ate

3 . . ras 5

SUPREME COURT OF’ THE UNITED STATES

—

No. 415. —Ocroser Ten, 1947.

Earle J. Ae et als, Appeal trom a United States

_ Appellants, N District Court for the East-
FCC ‘ern District of South 8 88

J. M. Witsell, et al. lina.
June 7.1948.

—

Mn. Justice’ Rutepce, concurring.
agree th the result and the Court’s opinion, subject

to / one inte tion or qualification of the opinion 8

Fyfth part.
The requirement that owners of isle fishing in the

märitime belt dock at a South Carolina port, unload, pack,

and stamp their catch (for tax purposes), before “shipping
or transporting it to another s state,” is not merely a regu-
lation of commerce burdening it in the sense of materially
increasing the shipper s costs. Many valid regulations

eae 7 commerce do this. The regulation in question goes

farther. It is aimed in terms. directly at interstate com-
merce alone, and thus would seem to be discriminatory i in
intent and effect upon: that commerce. Moreover, in my

. Opinion, it is of sueh a character that, if applied, for all
practical purposes it would block the commerce.

Since it was exactly that sort of state 8 the

a commerce clause was designed to strike down, I agree
that this one cannot stand. The same considerations I

also think would be applicable to nullify the license fees

levied against nonresidents, since upon the record their
transportation of catches would seem to be ‘exclusively
in interstate commerce, or practically 80.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386406_0039%3A6. Public record. Not legal advice.
