# Appendix — In Re Oliver

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386405_0286%3A10

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1948
- **Citation:** 333 U.S. 257

## Text

i ees __APPENDIX A
The Michigan “One-Man Grand ‘Sury” Statute

Whenever ‘by reason of ‘the- filing ‘of any. “complaint, .

_.' which may be’ upon information and belief, any justice of

_ the peace, police judge or judge of a court of record shall.
have probable cause to suspect that any crime, : offense, © -

| misdemeanor or violation of any city ordinatice: shall have | :

been committed within his jurisdiction, and that any per-"

. son may be able to give any ‘material evidence respecting Soto

~ sueh: offense, such justice or judge in his discretion -may,

a and ‘upon_the application of the prosecuting attorney,. or
co - city attorney ‘in. the-case of suspected vivlation of ordi-
- nances, shall require such person to attend before him as”
- a witness and answer, such - questions ° as’ such justice or

Judge may’ require concerning .any violation of law about

os which he may be questioned ; ‘and ‘the ‘proceedings. to sum-

"-mon such witness and to: ‘compel hint ‘to testify shal,. as _
. far as possible, be the same as proceedings to’ summon ‘wit:

nesses and compel their attendance-and testimony, and such ee
Witnesses shall be entitled to the’ same compensation as. —

‘i in other. erjminal proceedings. (C. L. 1929,. ‘§ 172173. Mich.
Stats. Ai § 28048) : Me ci garners pened

oe upon such inquiry the justice or ‘judge shall be_satis-
fied that any’ offense has been committed and. that there
is probable cause to. suspect any person or persons to be

. guilty thereof, he may~eause the apprehension of such per-—

son or persons by proper. process and, upon the return of

". .Sueh process served or executed, the justice or judge shall

proceed with ‘the case, matter or- proceeding in like manner *
as upon forma} complaint. _And if upon such inquiry the
justice, or: jndge ‘shall find, from the evidence that there :

cee appointive and subject to removal by: law, has been

. cal

is probable cause to believe that any inhi officer, . slective

‘guilty af misfeasance. or malfeasance of oftice or wilful
heglect of. duty or of any other offense prescribed as. a
ground of’ removal, the said justice or judge shall make:
\Sf written finding setting up the offénse so found and shall:
serve said finding upon the public officer;, public board or
“body having jurisdiction under the law to conduct removal
proceedings against said officer. And said finding shal! be a
sufficient complaint as a basis for removal of said ‘officer and, *
the public officer, public board or public body having %,.
jurisdiction . of . removal proceedings against said officer
shall proceed in the method prescribed | by law ‘ual a hear-.
ing and determination of-said’ charges. And! in respect ©
of communicating or divulging any statement made by
such Witnesses during the course of such inquiry, the Jus-
-~ tice, judge, prosecuting attorney and other person or per-
- sons who may at the: discretion of such justice, be ad-:

mitted to such inquiry, shall be governed by the provisions
of law relitive to grand jurors (C. L. 1929 ¢. 17 218;. Mich.

Stats. Ann..§ 28.944).

a” % ;

_ Any witness neglecting or refusing to appear in response
to such summons or to answer any .questions which such
justice or judge may ‘require material to such inquiry, shall .
be deemed guilty of contempt arid shall be punished by a
~ fine not exceeding one hundred (100) dotlars oF imprison-
“merit in the county jail net exe ceding sixty (60) days or '

_betir at. the discretion of the vourt: Provided, That if-such
witness after being so seritenced shall appear and answer.
such question, the, justice or judge may in his discretion’
commute or suspend the further execution of such sentence.

(C. L. 1929, § 172195-Mich. Stats. Ann. ¢ 28.945). -

™~

. a
‘ ; ¢ .

No person shall: upon such inquiry be required to answer
any questions: the answers of which might tend to incrimi-
nate him except upon motion in writing by the prosecuting
attorney which shall be granted by. such justice or judge,
‘and any such questions and. answers ‘shall be reduced to

writing and entered upon the docket or journal of such —

justice or judge, and‘no person required to’ answer such
questions upon such motion’ shall thereafter be prosecuted
for any offense concerning which such answers may Have
tended to incriminate him (C. L..1929, 4 17220; Mich. Stats.
Ann. 6 28.946) 3’

.

a

_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _

No. 215.—Ocroser Term, 1947.

Tn -re William Oliver, On Writ’ of Certivcari to the
Petitioner. Supreme Court of Michigan.

(March 8, 1948.] _

Mr. Justice Back delivered the ‘opinion of the Court.

A Michigan circuit judge summarily sent the petitioner
to jail for contempt of court. We must. determine
whether he was denied the procedural due process guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. rae

In obedience to a subpoena the petitioner appeared as
& witness before a Michigan circuit judge who was then
conducting, ‘in accordance with Michigan law, a “one-
man grand jury” investigation into alleged gambling and

official corruption. ‘The investigation presumably: took

place in the judge’s chambers, though that is not certain.

-Two other -circuit. judges were present/in an advisory

capacity.’ A prosecutor may have been present: A
stenographer was most likely there. The record does not
show what other members, if.any, of the judge’s investiga-
torial staff participated in the proceedings. ‘It is cer-
tain, however, that’ the public was excluded—the ques-

‘Uoning was secret in accordance with the traditional grand °

jury method. ‘ oe NE
After petitioner had given certain testimony, the ju
grand jury, still in secret session, told petitioner ‘that

neither he nor his advisors believed. petitioner’s story—
that it did not “jell.” This. belief of the judge-grand |

jury was not based entirely on what the petitioner had
testified. As will later be seen, it rested in part on beliefs
or suspicions of the judge-jury derived from the testimony.
of at least one other witness who had previously given

-_hoH

.

se . / ; ; :
* Under oui circumstances Michigan Jaw permits cireuit judges *
. -to sit with.other circuit judges in an advisory capacity. Mich. Stak

Ann. § 27.188 (Hendersan 1938) ; Mich: Conip. Laws 1929-§ 13666.

Lad

eae pounded to him by this Court :-... .” »

~ “In re WILLIAM OLIVER.

_. evidence in secret. Petitioner had not been present when -—
that witness testified and so far as appears was not even °
aware that he had testified. Based on. its beliefs thus -
formed—that petitioner's story did not “Sell” —the judge-
grand jury immediately charged him with: contempt,

. -immediately convicted him, and immediately sentenced ~ _
him -to sixty days. in jail. Under these circumstances |

- of haste and secrecy, petitioner, of course, had no chance }
to enjoy’ the benefits of counsel, no chance to prepare

._ _' his defense,-and no opportunity either to .cross. examine
the other. grand jury witness orto summon. witnesses
to refute the charge against him.’ ae CT ton

Three days later a lawyer filed on petitioner's behalf ,

“in the Michigan Supreme Court: the petition for habeas © |

corpus now under consideration. It alleged among other a
things.that the petitioner’s attorney had not been allowed =

_ to confer with him and that, to the best of the attorne.’s
_ knowledge, the petitioner was not held in’ jail under ‘any

judgment, decree or.execution, and was “not confined by .

' virtue of any legal commitment directed to the sheriff ©

as required by law.” An order was then entered signed by °

the circuit jute that he had while “sitting as a One-Man

Grand Jury” convicted the petitioner of contempt of court

because petitioner had testified “evasively” and had given

“contradictory answers” to questions, “The order directed

' that petitioner “be confined in the county jail. . fora |
period of sixty days . . . or until such time’as he... |

_____ shall appear and’ answer the questions heretofore pro-

.
PI

The Supreme Coyrt of Michigan, on. grounds detailed

in the companioncase of In re Hartley, 317 Mich. 441,
27 .N. W. 2d 48; rejected petitioner’s contention that the

*In giving reasons in .its Hartley opinion for rejecting this’ peti-
tioner’s constitutional contentions, the State Supreme Court ‘said it ="
would have been an “idle gesture’ to require such adjournment of -
the grand jury and its reconvening as a circuit court. The circuit

¢,

‘* ‘J

IN re WILLIAM OLIVER. .-... 3
- SUMMary manner in which he had been sentenced_to jail: Py
_» in the secrecy of the grand jury chamber had deprived / |
him of his liberty without affording him the kind of -
_ notice, opportunity to defend himself, and ‘trial’ which
the due. process clause of-the Fourteenth Amendment
requires.’ In re Oliver, 318 Mich..7, 27 N: W. 2d 323.
We granted certiorari to consider these procedural due
process quéstions: == =. ss oe. ;
The case requires a brief explanation of Michigan’s

~~ unique one-man grand jury system. That ‘state’s: first

constitution (1835), like the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, required that most criminal prose-. .
cutions be begun. by presentment or indictment:of a grand

judge, while acting as a one-man grand: jury may, in appropriate
cases, summarily adjudge a witness testifying before him guilty of
contempt and impose'sentence forthwith. |

“Plaintiff's contempt, if any, was committed in,.the face of the
court and required no-extraneous proofs as to its occurrence. It
was direct and there was, therefore, no necessity for filing of charges,
notice to accused and hearing as provided in 3 Comp. Laws of 1929, .
_*13912 (Stat. Ann. *27.513). It was properly dealt with summarily. °
3 Comp. Laws 1929, **13910-11 (Stat. Ann. **27.511-27.512).”" 317.
Mich. at 444-445, 27 N. W. 2d at 50. bed ia tit

* By a four to four vote the court also held that there was “evidence
to support the finding” of the judge-grand jury that petitioner had
testified falsely. -Petitioner.has argued here ‘that there was‘ not a
_ shred of evidence which under any circumstances could have ‘“on- —
- ceivably supported this finding and thus thathe was deprived of |
his liberty without due’ process of law. .In the view that we take ~
of this case we find it unnecessary to consider this constitutional’ ©
contention, =. oe HS

* The laws authorizing the system are‘found in Michigan Comp.
~ Laws 1929, § 17217, et seq.; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.943 et seq. (Hen-
_derson 1938). A summary. of the ten states’ statutes which have
some similarities to Michigan’s ap rsin-Winters, The Michigan
One-Man Grand Jiry, 28 J. Am. Ju ., Soe. 137. Se’, e. g.; Conn.
Gen-Stat. § 889f (Supp. 1941) ; McCarthy v, Clancey, 110 Conn. 482,
148 A. 551; Okla. Stat. “Ann. tit. 37, § 83; fit. 21 § 95r (1937); Ez
‘parte Ballew, 20 Okla. Cr. 105, 201 P. 525. dea

4g pe tee wt OLIVER.
jury. Art. I, § ll .This compulsory provision was left

.., : Out of the 1850 constitution and from the present consti- ..

tution (1908). However, Michigan judges may still in
- their discretion summon grand juries, but we are told by
the attorney general that this discretion is rarely exer-
cised and that the “One-Man Grand Jury” has taken the
place of the old Michigan 16 to 23-member. grand jury,
“a particularly in probes of alleged misconduct of public. —
officials.

“The one-man grand j jury law was aia in 1917 follow-
ing arecommendation of the State Bar Association that, in
the interest of more rigorous law enforcement, greater em-
_ phasis should be put upon the “investigative procedure”

' for “probing” and for “detecting” crime.*’ With this need

uppermost in its thinking | the Bar ‘Aibidatiain recom- .

amended a bill which provid hat justices of the peace
be vested with the inquisitorial powers traditionally. .
~ conferred only on coroners. and grand juries. The bill .
as passed imposed the recommended investigatory: powers.
not only on justices of the peace, but on police judges
and judges of courts of record as well. Mich. Laws 1917,
‘Act 196.
Whenever this ‘idee Sveand jury may summon a wit- .
— ness. to. ppear, it is his duty to go and to answer -all
- material questions that do not incriminate him. Should
he fail to appear, fail to answer material questions, or
should the judge-grand jury believe his evidence false and

_ évasive, or deliberately contradictory, he may be found” pa
_ guilty of contempt. This offense may be punishable . 1

@ fine of not more than.one hundred dollars, or imprison-
ment in | the ‘county jail not exceeding si ty days, or both, .

- at thediscretion of the’judge-grand jury. If after hay- .
ing - ‘been 80 sentenced he appears and satisfactorily |

ee

. ® Proceedings of the. T wenty-sixth Annual Mecting of. the ican
_ State Bar Association 101- 105 (1916). $

‘

“In rE WILLIAM OLIVER. =~ 5

_ answers. the questions propounded by the. judgeé-jury,
his sentence may, within the judge-jury’s discretion,. be
commuted or suspended. At the end of his first sentence
he can be resummoned and subjected to the same inquir- -
- jes. Should the judge-jury again believe his answers
‘> false and evasive, or contratiictory, he can be sentenced to.
serve sixty days more unless he reappears before the
judge-jury during the second 60-day period and satis-
factorily answers the questions, and the judge-jury within
its discretion then decides -to commute or suspend his
sentence? / . °. | : kee
In carrying out this authority a judge-grand jury is

authorized to appoint its own"prosecutors, detectives and
aides at public expense,’ all or any of whom may, at the

- diseretion of the justice of the peace or judge, be admitted:

to the inquiry. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.944 (Henderson -
1938). A witness may. be asked questions on all subjects
and need not be advised of his privilege against self-
incrimination, even though the questioning is in secret.*
And these secrét interrogations can be carried on day or.
night, in a public place or a “hideout,” a courthouse, an
éffice building, a hotel-room, a home, or a place of. busi- -
ness; so well is this ambulatory power understood in -
Michigan that the one-man grand jury is also popularly .
referred to as the “portable grand jury.”* ~

- ©In re Ward, 205 Mich. 742, 747, 295 N..W. 483, 485, (First
60-day conviction May 31, 1940,-followed by second 60-day con-
viction July. 29, 1940. A $100 fine was also imposed in each
instance.) =. % ag ia hy Sana oh -
‘In re Investigation of Recount, 270 Mich. 328, 331, 258 N.
776, 777; In ré Slattery, 310 Mich. 458,479, 17 N. W.2d 251, 259.
- § People v. Wolfson, 264 Mich. 409, 413, 250 N. W. 260,.262; Jn‘re

- Watsci, 293 Mich. 263, 269, 201 N. W. 652, 655; People v. Butler, ~

921 Mich. 626, 631-632, 192 N. W. 683, 687, 3

.- ® Winters, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 28 J. Am. Jud. Soe.

' ~ 137, 143;/Unprecedented Success in Criminal Courts, 26 J. Am.
| ee a a ro aisha

\

*

court, are actually. observed by the court, and where. -
immediate punishment is.essential fo prevent “demorali-_

‘gation of the court’s authority before ‘the public.” If .
some essential elements of the offense are not personally . ,.

observed. by the judge, ‘so that“he must depend upon
statements made by others for his knowledge about these

“essential elements, due’process requires, according to the ‘ v

Cooke case, that the accused be accorded t notice and a ‘fair

hearing as above setout. - .

ee mn
eg

wre worere’

a narrow category of cases that can be punis! as contempt -*

: bought or had in their possession certain s6-called bonds

\/

18: es a In RE wiLLiaM-6i OLIVER.

The facts shown by this record put this etiials the .
without notice, hearing and_ counsel AS Since the peti-.
*. tioner’s alleged misconduct all oce in secret, there.
"-_.could be no possibility of a dem ization’ of the court's”
- authority before the public: . Fur
‘the judge-grand jury to the pé tition for habeas corpus
_ showed that his conclusion shat the petitioner had testi-
fied falsely was based, at lefst in part, upon the testimony
given: before him by one or more witnesses other than :
- petitioner. Petitioner and one Hartley both testified the *
- same day ; both were pin-ball machine operators; both had

purchased érom one Mitchell; both were sent to jail for - —
contempt the same day. In re Hartley, 317 Mich. 441,27-
- N. W. 2d 48. The judge-grand jury pressed both peti- a
_. tioner and Hartley to state why they bought bonds'which
‘were patently worthless. The petitioner was also re-
peatedly asked what he had done with the -worthless .
_ bonds. . He answered ‘every question asked him, accord: -
ing to the fragmentary portions of his testimony re- -
ported: to the Michigan Supreme Court, most of which.
is included in that court's opinion. He’ steadfastly de-_
nied that he knew preciseiy what he had done with the .
worthless bonds, but’ made several. different statements
as to how he might have disposed of them, such as that
he might have thrown them into the wastebasket, or
trash can, or might have burned them. . :
In upholding the judge-grand jury’s conclusion that :
_ petitioner had testified falsely and evasively, the majority
ofthe Michigan Supreme Court gave as one réason a
statement in the judge-grand: jury’s answer “That'the ..
Grand Jury, after investigation, is satisfied that the bonds
sold by the said Carman \A. Mitchell to the said William
‘D. Oliver are the same as those sold by the said Carman A.
Mitchell-to Leo 0 Thomas Hartley. : Nothing i in the.peti-

)

°

a In RE ‘WILLIAM OLIVER.

- tioner’s' testimony as reported. could have jemotely justi-
- fied the judge-jury in drawing. such a conclusion. The.
judge-jury was obviously appraising the truth of Oliver’s-

* testimony in light of testintony given’ the same day. in

petitioner’s absence by Hartley and possibly by other wit-
nesses.. The J'erry case’ and others like it provide no

support: for sustaining petitioner’ 8 conviction of contempt —
- of court upon. testimony given in petitioner’s absence..

This case would be like the Terry case only if the ‘judge

* there had not personally witnessed Terry’s assault. upon
the marshal but had: nevertheless sent him to jail for |

contempt of court after hearing. the testimony of wit-

SS. - esses against Terry in Terry's absence. It may be con- |
, ceivable,.‘as is here urged, that a judge can- under some

circumstances correctly detect falsity and’ evasiveness

_ from simply listening to'a witness testify. But this is

plainly not a case in which. the finding of falsity rested
on an exercise of this. alteged power. For this reason we
need not pass on the question argued in the briefs whether

a judge can, consistently ‘with provedural: due . -precess;
convict a witness of testifying falsely and evasively solely .
on the judge’s ability to detect it from merely rns |

& witness and hearing him testify. |
Nor i is there any reason suggested why. « demoralisation

of the court’s authority” would have resulted from giving

the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to appear and

offer a defense in open court to a charge of perjury or to.

the charge of contempt. The .traditional grarid juries

‘have never punished éontempts." ‘The practice that has

_ always been followed with recalcitrant grand jury wit-

‘ nesses is to take them into open court; and that practice,

consistent with due process, has not demoralized the au-

thority of courts. Reported cases reveal no instances .in

which witnesses believe by grand juries on the basis of ioe

dl

i iatoehi dali x thre Sapte ees es

tee ° . ‘ . /
. . . e -
* mage
- > . 4
4 ’ ‘ 2 e .

‘19°:

°

> ae es RE WILLIAM OLIVER.

other testimony to be perjurers, have been. simeviinnt for. .

- eontempt, or for perjury, without notice. of the specific ~

charges against them, and opportunity ‘to ‘prepare | a-de- .

fense, to ob counsel, -to cross-examine the witnesses

against them ‘and to offer evidence in their own defense. .

The right to be heard in open court. -befere one is con-.

demned is too valuable to be whittled. away under the --

- guise of “demoralization: of the court’ s authority. Bes i”

It is: “the ldw of the land” that ‘no man’s life, liberty :

or property be ‘forfeited &S a. punishment until there has

been a charge fairly made. and- fairly tried in a public ~

tribunal. See-Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 236- :
237. The petitioner was convieted without that kind of

trial.

Pa ER ERS

not: inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded

t~

. Gd ;

- The judgment. of the Supreme Court of Michigan’ is.
reversed and the cause is remanded to it it for disposition ne

—— nn.

_SUPRE ME COURT oF THE UNITED STATES

No. 215 = Obronen’ Tena, 1947.

In re ‘William Oliver;)

S
Petitioner, ° Supreme Court of the State

of ee

paren, 1948.]

Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, concurring.

I join in the Court’s opinion: and decis¥on. — But there, :

-is mare which needs to be said. any |

Michigan’s one-man grand j jury, as enimolihed in this :

. record, combines in a single official: the historically sepa-
rate powers of grand j jury, committing magistrate, prose-
cutor, trial judge: and petit jury. .This aggregated au-

.. thority denies tothe accused not only the right.to a public —

, but also those other basic protections secured by

the Sixth Amendment, namely, the rights “to be informed’

of the nature and cause of the aéeusation ; ' to be con-

oh fronted with the witnesses against: him; ? to have com-

| pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in’ his favor, and
. to have the Assistance of -Counsel for his defence.” It

takes away the security against being twice put im jeop- —~
ardy for the same offense ® and denies the equal protection fe

1 The requirement, of course, ‘eositernplates that the aceused. be Pa

inforined’ sufficiently in advance of trial*or sentence to enable him
to determine the ‘nature of the plea to be. entered and to prepare his

. defense if one is to be made. Cf. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764;

Rowell v. Alabama, 287 U.S..45.

The only “witness” in this’ case was -the grand jury judge who, oS:

Se) fates the record discloses, did not submif, to cross-examination.
. 3% As the Court's opinion notes, the state supreme court has held

.. that the witness miy be: reexamined and recommitted for a further “3
60-day period after serving ‘the first sentence of that length, unless‘ :
he reappears .and answers the same questions to the satisfaction of .

’ the gne-man grand j jury.. In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 747.

On’ Writ of Certiorari to re

gees © Iw re WILLIAM OLIVER,

Mr. Justice Biacx at 68.

>

~

of the laws by: leaving ‘to the comniitting funetionary’s ee

, Sole discretion the scope’and contents of the record on- -
. appeal. -U: S. Const. Amend.Vand XIV. --
_ This aggregation of powers and‘inherently concomi- | -
__ tant denial of historic freedoms were unknown to the'com-..

. mon law at: the time our institutions erystallized.in the

Constitution... They are altogether at variance with our

_tradition and gystem of government. » They cannot stand chee
‘the test of constitutionality for purposes of depriving any

_- Pergon of life, liberty or property.’ There is no semblance
-of*due p
_ those ends.' °

of law in the scheme when it is used for.

‘The tase demonstrates how far this Court departed

from our constitutional plan when, after. the Fourtéenth
’. Amendment’s adoption, it permitted selective departure
. by the states from the scheme of ordered personal liberty’ -
established by the Bill of Rights.*. In.the guise of per-'
mitting the states to experiment with improving the ad- . -

ministration of: justicé, the Court left them free to. ©:

_. substitute, “in spite of the absolutism of continental gov- -
ernments,” their. “ideas and processes of civil justice” in-
place of the time-tried “principles and institutions of .the

3

“common: law” * perpetuated for us in the Bill of Rights.

Only by an exer

Cf. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U: S. 255. far as appears, only

in Michigan to this attenuated appellate p

persons committed or fined by ‘a one-man Cae are subjected

* The immediate shift of the proceeding from inquisitorial to puni-:

_ tive function converts it from a grand jury investigation toa pro-.
¢ . | ° .

ceeding in criminal contempt. eae ee Sa oe Os
*Cf. Adamson -v. California, 332 Y: S. 46, dissenting opinion of

| "See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. 8.516, 531. -

boy VR ata fs
Pitot aN aes aN
ik Dahl ee ee
ee to ol A 4
olf y
et.
rey f .

| cise of this freedom has! Michigan, been ae
_ enabled to adopt and apply her sche} } as was done in

ure.. Others con- -
victed of erime, including criminal contempt, apparently are afforded -
‘Tights to coniplete and nondiscretionary records on appeal... ~ io

5 ie , WILLIAM OLIVER. \ ° 3

this ¢ case. ‘ It is the immediate offspring of Hurtado v.

California, 110 U.S. 516, and later like cases.®
; So long as they stand, so long as the Bill of Rights-is
. Yegarded here’ as a strait jacket of Eighteenth Century —
, procedures rather than a basic charter of personal liberty,,
like ‘experimientations ‘may be expected from the states.
_ And the only.cheok against their effectiveness will be the °
, agreement of a majority of this-Court that the experi-.
ment yoolates fundamental notions of justice in civilized
Society.

I do not conceive that the Bill ot Rights, apart from 2

the dué process clatise of the Fifth Amendment, incorpo- .~

rates all such ideas.: But as far-as its provisions go, I
; know of no better substitutes. “A few ‘may be-incon- -
“ yvenierit. But restrictions upon authority for securing .
"personal liberty, as well as fairness in trial to deprive -
one of it, are always inconvenient—to the authority so |
_ pestricted: And in like these I: do ‘not think sub-

tinental ones, offer mromise on/the whole of more im-

stitutions imported. rom other ystems; including ¢on-
vement than hata; either f

the caus¢ of perfecting
the administration ‘Of justice or for that of securing and

f our society as it i is of our Constitution. °.

na tour ciety individual freédom, which, is the main end ee ie
oO

ne cannot attribijte: the collapse of liberty. i in eee ie

and elsewhere during receht years solely to. the “ideas
‘and processes of. civil justice” prevailing in the nations
_ which have suff that loss.. Neither can one rat

significance of the contrast between their success in
Z taining systé ordered liberty and that of other

: ‘tions@vhich in the main havé adhered more closely to the ae
scheme of personal, freedoms the Bill of Rights secures.:
This experience a onstrates, I think, that it is both wiser -

> 9%. 0- Tenn y. Ni Jersey, 211 U. 8. 78; Aidamson V. r Coliente,

332 U. 8.46,

:

4° I re WILLIAM OLIVER.

and safer. to ——~future, and for a people gathered and to be gathered from many
|

~ nations and of many tongues. And while we take just: pride in
the principles and institutions ‘of thé common law, we-are not to
forget that in lands where other systems of .jurisprudence prevail,

_ process of law, in spite of the absolutism of continental governments,

is not -alien to that code which survived the -Roman Empire as the
foundation of modern civilization in Europe, and which has given
us that fundamental maxim of distributive justice—suum. cuique
tribuere. There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as
a broad charter of public right and law,-which ‘ought to exclude the
best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it was the charac-
teristic principle of. the common law to draw its inspiration froin
every fountair of justice, we are not to assume that the sources
of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should
expect that the new and various éxperiences of our own situation

the ideas and processes of civil justice aré also not unknown. Due —

. and system will mold and shape it into new and not less useful forms.”
eee 8. oe

’ .

2 +. - fy Re WILEIAM OLIVER,

crime. . It may, at the same time, surround such pre-

~~ liminary inquiry with ‘safeguards, not only that crime

may be detected and criminals punished, but also that
charges may be sifted. in secret so as not to injure or |
embarrass the innocent. © igs Valois
Flouting of’ such a judicial investigatory system-may
he prevented by the hitherto constitutionally valid power
to punish for contempt. There must; however, be such
recalcitrance, where the basis of punishment is testimony
given or withheld, that the administration-of justice is

"actively blocked... See"Ex parte Hudgings, 249.U. S. 378. .
' And the procedural safeguards of “due. process” must be

observed. * Due notice of the charge and a fair opportu-
nity to meet it, are indispensable. - This invelves an op-
portunity to canvass the: charge’ in the o mp iT)

behind: closed doors. So. long as .4°man- has ample
~ Opportunity to demonstrate his innocence before he is

hustled off to jail, he cannot complain that a State has
seen fit ‘to devise a new procedure for satisfying that op- .

portunity. - Just as it is not violative of due process for

a State‘to take- private property for public use and

leave to a later stage tha ronstitutional vindication of

the right to compensation, it does not seem to me that

_ it would be violative of due process to allow the judge-

grand juror of Michigan to find criminal contempt for’

__ conduct in his proceedings without the familiar elements

of an open trial, provided’ that the State furnishes the
accused a public tribunal before which he has full oppor- ©
tunity to be quit of the finding. ses

But an opportunity to meet a charge of criminal con-

tempt must’be a fair opportunity. -It would not be fair, -
if in the court in which ‘the accused can contest for the

first time the validity of the charge against him, he comes.

_ handicapped with a finding against him which he did: not
_ have an adequate opportunity of resisting. ,

rt,

a

IN RE WILLIAM OLIV ER. | 3

: We are here. dealing. with the attempt of a State having -
the seventh largest population in the Union: to curb or:
_ mitigate the commission. of, crimes by effective prosecu- .

tion. This procedure has been:in operation for over thirty
years. It was not heedlessly entered into nor has it been
sporadically pursued. -In a series of cases it has had the

sanction of the highest court of Michigan. While there ’ ;

-are indications in the opinion of the Supreme Court of

Michigan. from.which we could infer the constitutional |

inadequacy of the procedure pursued . in this case, we
the Michigan system. offends the Constitution of. th
. United States, without a clearer formulation of wha
is that actually happens under this system,‘or did hap ,
“here, than thé case before us reveals. -

. It is to me significant: that the. precise issués on which
this Court decides this case have never been explicitly
challenged before, or passed on, by the Supreme Court

of Michigan in the series of tases in which that.court had
adjudicated controversies arising under the Michigan

_ grand jury system. Ifa State has denied the due process —

required by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is more con-!
sonant with the delicate relations between the United

_ States and the courts of the United States, and the States
. and the courts of the States, that the courts of the States
be given the fullest opportunity, by proper presentation

of the issues, to make such a finding of unconstitution-
ality. |

I do ‘not: think that we have had that.in this case. For_
instance, while I could regard it inadmissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment to have only a partial and muti-

lated record of. che proceedings before the grand juror- .
judge. when the contemnor for the first time has the.
* opportunity to. meet the accusation against him publicly, — —-.-

. the petitioner as in this case seems to repel the

-

‘it ae

6

4° In re WILLIAM OLIVER.

_ Suggestion that that is his complaint.* Certainly, as Mr.
~ Justice JACKSON pointe out, the first ground of the Court's «

opinion was not made the basis for inviting our review
here. I agree with him in concluding that in the light
of our decision the other day in Musser v. Utah, 333°U. S:
—, in.conjunction with Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, :
331 U.S. 549, the cause should be returned’to the Supreme
Court of Michigan to enable that court to pass upon these
issues. oe aaa

- * “Neither in our brief nor in our argument before the court have
we-urged this court to reverse this convietion merely becatise the

partial return of the witness’s testimony to the Supreme Court -con-
stituted-a denial of due ‘process. . > - The questions we present are

much more basic,—the denial of due process in the original commit-

ment. ... [To] us si -is.much more shocking that an accused

- charged with conterhpt not committed in open court be denied any
“trial in the lower court than that he be given a trial only upon an
incomplete record in the appellate court.” Petitioner's “Brief in.

ipre to Brief of State Bar of Michtgan;* pp-13-44..

ee wild

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. ‘ 7 °
—_ —_—_—— ~ .
va
‘

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 215.—Ocroser Teri, 1947,

- . ae ee : é
:*~* ee

In te William Oliver, On Writ of Certiorari to the °
_. Petitioner. - | Supreme Court of Michigan.”

[March 8, 1948.]

Mr: Justice Jackson, with whom Mr: Ju STICE FRAN K-
FURTER agrees, dissenting. ;

The principal ground assigned for reversal of the ihe os

ment of conviction is the alleged secrecy of the contempt
procedure. That ground was not assi or review in
the petition for certiorari .to this Court. Nor was it
raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
state courts. Therefore, it has not been litigated and
the record has not been made with reference to it. On..
the other hand, the principal question raised by the peti-
tion to this Court and argued = the State is not decided
by the Court’s opinion. . :
When a case here from a state court involves a qdeation
not litigated below, not raised by petitioner. -here and
which the state court has had no opportunity to pass .

_ «upon, we should remand the case for its further considera- -

tion, a8 was just done in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. —.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386405_0286%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
