# Brief for the Appellant — Thomas v. Collins > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386404_0086%3A05 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Brief for the Appellant - **Published:** January 1, 1945 - **Citation:** 323 U.S. 516 ## Text 8 * a % 2 a x ‘ 3 £ m] sy | dl ej € Re Sasey = iv AM i i a SAWS RR ARR RES SRA IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1944 No. 14 R. J. THOMAS, Appellant, VS. H. W. COLLINS, Sheriff of Travis County, Texas Appeal From the Supreme Court of the State of Texas BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ON REARGUMENT Lee PRESSMAN, Martin RAPHAEL, Washington, D. C. ERNEST GoopMAN, Detroit, Michigan. ARTHUR MANDELL, HerMaAn WRIGHT, Houston, Texas. Attorneys for Appellant. ea Sl -— eer ge CR EE sched tgmnnatnd aoe rcaenarnenmeien Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ___.. 2 CEPR bee TO Sp alla SD sO ee es OLN Se Oa Questions Presented... Rineie a ee a oy Argument: I. A Constitutional Distinction Between Appellant's Speech and His Solicitation of O'Sullivan May Not Be Validly Made. ~ A. The Organizing Process__.......---.-.------------- B. No constitutional line can be drawn between addressing the audience at large and O'Sullivan, an individual 9 C. A constitutional distinction may not be drawn between the speech and solicitation in terms of their content... — 1] li The Coun's Question... on et hams TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED ee Cases a Page Abram v. United States. 250 a. & 636... ert erie Be Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S, 350 SURE CRRA | Bridges v. California, 314 U. §. 252 ; eto ee J. 1. Case Co. v. NL.R.B.. 321 U..§.-332__/ Lente ac Orr tne dy FP Cooper Company v. Los Angeles Building Trades. et al, 15 Labor Relations Reporter 46, decided Aug. 21, 1944 (Cal. Sup. Cr.) . aS Mae Sa a 23, 24 Ex Parte Texas, 315 U.S. 8 ; Sia O NTE MD 9 | Gompers v. United States, 283 U.S. 604 ___ rere Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 14 Hague v. C1.O., 307 U.S. 496 25 Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U. S. 103 21, 23 Lovell v. Grifin, 316 U. §, 452 23 Martin v. City of Struthers. 399 U. S. 141 13 , ge : , - ~ 9 Matter of Me wines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. I, enforced in 87 F. (2d) $65 (C. C. A. 8) 5 Matter of Alma Mills. 24 N.L.R.B. 9: 10 5 Matter of Donnell, Garment Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 241, 245 5 Matter of Goodyear Tire €? Rubber Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 30), 315- 3 oe 362, enforced in this respect in 129 F. (2d) 450 (C.C. A. Matter of Mexia Textile Sills, 11 N.L.R.B. 1167, erforced in 110 F. (2d) 565 (CC. A. 5) 5 Matter of Republic Steel C: tp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 240, enforced in 107 F. (2d) 472 (C.C. A. 3) Risacccancceercd Missouri v. Dockery. 19] U.S. 165 =e Peele Lae sh Mooney v. Holohan, 294U. S. 103 i er clea Near v. Minnesota. 283 U.S. 697 ES Big ay Seale al a N.L.R.B. vy. Jones €2 Lauchlin Steel Corp., IO1U.S. j Nystel v. Thomas, 42 8. W. (2d) 168, 172 (Tex.) we Jr. ‘se nn P kv. Williams, 322U.S. 4 18, 25 R v. Texas, 193 U.S. 504 s Neer mire ry ¥. C altte ria. os 13. S. 384, wars 14. CO BD mB mee me ee Ky ee — ame rnful v. Alabama, 310 U. S. SS, 97 U.S. v. Carolene Pr ducts, 304 U.S. 144 lt Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. §. 287 21 Vakus v. United States, 64 Sup. Cr. 660) 24 il , ar Miscellaneous ] Adams, ed., History of Cooperation in the United States (Balti rsscacn: Bihan! NC I ONT FEN A A Ee Baldwin & Randall, Civi! Liberties and Industrial Conflict Brooks, When Labor Organizes (New Haven, 1938) _ Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New York, 1910) Chafee, Free Speech in the Unitec’ States (Cambridge, 1941) “Collateral Attacks Upon Labor Injunctions,” 47 Yale L. J. 1136 Curti, American Peace Crusade (Durham, N. C., 1929). Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York, 1943) deTocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, 1900) Dodd, Some State Legislatures Go To War—On Labor Unions— Fitch, The Causes of Industrial Unresi (New York, 1924) Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (New York, 1930) Handbook of Trade Union Methods (New York, 1937). pp. 3-7 Hardman, ed., American Labor Dynamics (New York, 1928). pp. 114-115 Hicks. The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis, 1931) Hines, American Communities and Cooperative Colonies (Chi- cago, 1908, Hobbs, Phe Antislavery Impulse (New York, 1935) I) Labor Relations Reporter 76 (1942) Levinson, Labor on the March (New York, 1938). pp. 189, 241-242, 251 _. Wee Ne a Macdonald, Labor Problems and the American Scene (New York, 1938) , McCrea, The Hur-ane Movement (New York. 1910) McMaster, History of the People of the United States (Nev York, 1895) Vol. I 15 Vol. \I a. , Myrdal, 4n American Dilemma (New York, 1944), Vol. H Nevins, The Emergence of Modern America (New York, 1927) Noyes, History of American Socialism: (Philadelphia, 1876) Oberholtzer, History of the United States Since the Civil War (New York, 1926), Vi if, Ill Ordinance of the City of Athens, Tennessee (1944) Ordinance of the City of Blytheville, Arkansas. (1944) Ordinance of the City of Milledgeville, Georgia (1944) Ordinance of the City of Newnan, Georgia (1944) 1 Pa pe Owens, 4 Study of Recent Labor Legislation, 38 I. L. Rev. 309 (1944) SOR sp Pope, Millhands and Werackars ‘ice Heer. 1942) Post, Popular Free Thought in America (New York, 1943) ~- sages le. Report of R. J. Thomas, “dutomobile Unionism, 1940-1941" (Buffalo, 1941) ; Schlesinger, Nex Viesepoints in Dacsinon History ‘ioe Tak 1926) Schlesinger, The Rise of the City—1878-1898 (New York, 1933) : SDI AE ren DR AS Seow a 5. Seidman, The Needle Trades (New York, 1942). 2- S. Rep. 398, part 5, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1694 Stewart, The National Cisil Service Reform League (Austin, 168,, 1929} Van Tyne, The Causes of the War of isis (Boston, 1° j??) Vorse, Labor's Nex Millio ns | New York: 1938), pp. 138-139 Walsh, C es Rac foe Uniontsm in Action Seid York, 1937), pp. 6%- Wevforth, TE of Labor (Silene 1917). pp. 16-17. 27-29 Zabler, Eastern Workingmen and National Land Policy (New \4ye we wr ‘4e at 2 —_ —— IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1944 No. 14 R. J. THOMAS, Appellant, VS. H. W. COLLINS, Sheriff of Travis County, Texas Appeal From the Supreme Court of the State of Texas BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ON REARGUMENT OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Texas (R. 318-327) is reported at 141 Tex. §91, 174 S. W. (2d) S5&. No written opinion was issued by the State District Court; its order adjudging Appellant in contempt appears in the Record at R. 308-309. JURISDICTION The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Sections 344(a) znd S61(a) of the Judicial Code. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The constitutional and statutory provisions involved are set forth in our Brief in No. 569, October Term, 1943, pp. 2-5. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant R. J. Thomas, president of the Internationa! Union, Uniged Automobile, Aircraft and Agriculturaklm- plernent Workers of America, one of the vice presidente a7? the Congress of Industrial Organizations, was invited by the Oil Workers International Union, Local 1002, C.1.0., to address a mass meeting to be held on September 23, 1943, in the City of Pelly, Texas, for the purpose of organ- izing the employes of the Humble Oil Company (R. 5 2-23, 33, 279). On September 22, 1943, on complaint of the Attorney Generalain the §3rd District Court in Austin, Travis County, a distance of 167 miles from where Appei- lant was staying at Houston, a temporary restrataing order was issued by that court, ev parte, to restrain Appellant from soliciting members in the Oil Workers Internationa! Union or any other labor organization athhated with the C.1.O. without tirst obtaiming an organizer's card “as re- quired by law” (R. 291-295, 315-317). The order was served on Appellant at Houston, on September 3%, 1943, approximately tive hours prior to the meeting (R. 35). At the meeting, Appellant, without having apphed for o: obtained an organizer's card (R. 10, 3§-37), delivered speech in which he discussed the advantages of union mem- bership and solicited the audience at large and one em- plove, Pat O'Sullivan, by name to join the Oil Worker; International Union (R. 4-5, 41, 279-290). At the close of the meeting, Appellant as well as two other speakers were arrested for soliciting members to joi the Oil Workers International Union without tirst obtain- a 3 pI ae as required by the Texas statute (R. 42). Aftef further proceedings’ the district judge found Appel- lant guilty of contempt of court for violation of the re- straining order and rejected Appellant’s contention that the Texas statute was unconstitutional (R. 299-302, 308-309). Appellant, having been remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis County, Texas, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Texas, renewing his contention that the statute was unconstitutional (R. 312-314). On October 20, 1943, the Supreme Court of the State of Texas orally denied a Motion of the State to dismiss the application for the writ, grounded upon the contention that Appellant was without standing to attack the statute because he had violated the restraining order, and on October 27, 1943, the court entered its opinion and judgment, sustaining the constitutionality of the statute, denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanding Appellant to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis County (R. 318-326). On November 24, 1943, the court be- low demed Appellant’s motion for rehearing (R. 327-366). QUESTIONS PRESENTED After hearing argument of this case in the October Term, 1943, this Court restored this case to the docket and as- signed it for rearzument this Term. Counsel were re- quested to discuss in their briefs the following questions : “1. Does the Texas Act by judicial or administrative construction) require a registration or license betor making the speech made by Thomas—if it) had omitted the O'Sullivan. solicitation Did the injunction forbid the speech (; Wt fren (Sullivan's solicitation) and is the order of con- tempt based in whole or in part on such speech? Tt te See f,- 06 Briel X\ Sea ‘,.7 4 not, is the speech used as an aggravation of the ottense? If neither, what is the purpose and ettect of its recital in the papers and orders in this pro- ceeding ? 3. Assuming the speech to be immune and assuming the words addressed to O'Sullivan to be a violation of a valid prohibition of solicitation, what is the ettect on its constitutional validity of including both in one injunction ? 4. Assuming the injunction invalid as applied to the speech, what was the duty of Thomas in respect to obedience so long as it was not set aside? ‘5. Is the application of Section 5 consistent with the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act? “6. Assuming that petitioner had @ constitutional right to make a general argument and solicitation to the entire assembty of workers, should the State punish him in a single penalty because he picked Gut onc member of the assembly and addressed a solicita- tion to him by name ?” Before discussing these questions, we discuss the nature of the distinction between the speech and the O’Sullivan solicitation. I. A CONSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTION BE- TWEEN APPELLANT’S SPEECH AND HIS SOLICITATION OF O’SULLIV AN MAY NOT BE VALIDLY MADE. The questions which the Court has requested Appellant to discuss seem, with two exceptions, to invite exploration of a distinction between Appellant’s speech to and solici- * Questic ns No. 4 and 5. The lat — uestion deals with the relations set ved lewistaty m to the Nat iL at > Rela ations \ t We } nit ) orp ‘ } re pnonse ¢t ’ then ss F 5 tation of his audience at large and his solicitation of O’Sul- livan. We do not believe that such a distinction may be validly drawn, constitutionally or otherwise. The nature of the organizer’s work and of the organizational process makes it clear that such a distinction is not a meaningful one in a consideration of the extent to which his activities enjoy constitutional protection. A. The Organizing Process’ The conventional! pattern of organizing a piant is shaped by two basic considerations. First, the value of a union must be brought home to an ever-widening circle of em- ploves through intensive discussion and_ proselytizing. Second, this process must be set in motion without invok- ing hostile countermeasures and must mature rapidly enough to become immune to such countermeasures. ‘The organizer must not only promote acceptance of the union but, if he is to succeed, must do so discreetly and under conditions often difficult and hazardous. After obtaining a list of prospects from those in the plant already sympathetic with the union, the organizer visits such prospects in their homes in the evening. ‘To each of Ay : : The description of the organizing process which appears in the text does not. « irse, exhaust the various methods used in organizing employees. However. we cueve wt to be an accurate account of a common pattern. It 1s ba ed upon % lowing sources: Handbook ot Trade Union Methods (New York, 1937). pp. 5-7 Vorse. Labor's Nese Millions (New York, 1938), pp. 138-139; Hardman. ed... dmer- in Labor Dynamics (New York, 1928), pp. 114-115; Levinson, Labor on the Marci New York, 1938), pp. 189, 241-242. 251; Walsh, ClO—Industria! TE nionism in fection (New York, 1937), pp. 69-70; Weyforth, Orgamizalality of Labor ( Baltimore. 1917), pp. 16-17, 27-29: Brooks, When Labor Organizes (New Haven. 1938), pp. 1-6: Report of R. J. Thomas, “Automobile Unionism, 1940-1941," (Buffalo, 141). p. 9 Pope, Millhands and Preachers (New Haven, 1942), pp. 239-241: Macdonald Labor Problems and the Amencan Scene (New York, 1938), pp. 476-477; Fitch, The Causes of Industrial Unrest (New York, 1924), p. 177; Seidman, The Needls Trades (New York. 1942). p. 186. For examples of the manner in which the or ng process described in the text operates in practice, see Matter of Donnelly Garment Co, 53 NLRB. 241. 245; Matter of Goodyear Tire © Rubher Co, 21 N.L.R.B. 306, 315-362. enforced in this respect in 129 F. (2d) 450 (C.C.A. § Vatter ot Mexta Teatile Mills, 11. N.L:R.B. 1167, enforced in 110 F. (2d) 545 (CCA. 53): Matter of Agwilines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced in 87 F. (2d) 14 C.C.A. 5): Matter of Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 240, enforced in 107 F (2d) 47? (CCA. 3): Matter of dima Mills, 24 N.L.R.B. 1. 9-10 MICRO CARD2 44. 6) ma mn z mn - D 4 | ard e 4 9? 0) aa i mic Cc Vow ro “ © S ei 6 these workers individually he tells the story of the union, describes conditions in the industry as a whole, compares the wae scale at the plant which he js seeking to organize with those in plants already organized. He answers ques- tions as to the purposes and methods of the unioft, assures those who fear empioyer reprisal that they will be protected. and seeks to refute objections to the organization. Upon making it as clear as possible to each prospect that collective bargaining is more effective than individual! bargaining, he seeks to have his prospect sign a pledge card or member- ship application, The organizer then arranges to meet with those who have manifested an interest in the organization of the O.W.LU., and members for Local Union No. 1oo2 of the O.W.LU. and from soliciting members in any other labor union affliated with the C.L.O. while said defendant is in Texas without. first obtaining an organizer's card as required by law.” it seems plain that the iniunction was not contined io the individual solicitation but included the speech. This is clear not only from the face of the injunction but the allega- tions of the petition: “The writ should be construed-in the light of the alle- Kations of the petition, the subject matter of the suit. and the objects therein sought.” Nystel Vv. Thomas, 42 S.W. (2d) 168,172 (Tex.). 20 2. Is the order of contempt based in whole or in part on such speech? The answer to this question must necessarily be an attirmative one. The petition for injunction based itse!! upon the speech (supra, p. 19). The State’s Motion for contempt (R. 297) alleges not only the O’Sullivan solicita- tion but also, in a separately numbered paragraph, the public solicitation “of an audience of approximately 300 persons .. . all employees of the Humble Oil & Refining Company’s plant at Bay Town” as an “open and flagrant violation of an order of” the court. ~ Evidence adduced at the contempt hearing to show Ap- pellant’s violation of the order included a verbatim copy of the speech, and only incidentally the direct solicitation of O'Sullivan (R. 4-5, 279-290). While the order of con- tempt does not specifically find the speech to be an act ot contempt, any suggestion that the speech formed no bas's for it can only be an afterthought, for the speech unites: and forms the dominant content of the petition for injunc- tion, the Motion for contempt and the evidence offered a: the contempt hearing. See Vystel v. Thomas, supra. Question No. 3 Assuming the speech to be immune and assuming the words addressed to O'Sullivan to be a violation of a valid prohibition of solicitation, what is the effect on its const: tutional validity of including both in one injunction? We believe that the answer to this question must be th.’ both the statute and the injunction are unconstitution« The speech and the solicitation derive from precisely @! same section and sentence in the statute. Since the statu’ has been authoritatively construed to restrain both (sup pp. 16-19), the statute cannot now be redrafted to addr: itself to a field of conduct which is narrower than tha’ 21 which its authors contemplated. Nor is this an academic consideration, for it would manifestly require a precise ' draftsmanship and a clearly articulated intent to ditferen- tiate speech which is constitutionally protected from a so- licitation emerging from it which ts not. Compare Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, reversing 316 U.S. 584; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97; Stromberg v. Call- fornia, 283 U. S. 359, 368; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292. The injunction is in terms of and exhausts te statute. They both must be given a like construction, and since the statute is unconstitutional, the injunction is not saved be- cause as an abstract matter it contains a restraint which might be validly issued should the legislature deem it wise to do so. Moreover, whether or not the Court’s assumption (s%- tra) leaves standing a restraint which may be fairly at- tributable to the legislative purpose, it is plain that the injunction itself may not now be validly confined to a non- Federal subject matter. Since the entire proceeding em- braced both the speech and solicitation and there 1s now no way of knowing whether the injunction would have issued, and indeed, whether the Attorney General would have sought it in the first instance, if he had not assumed that the speech were enjoinable under the Constitution, the injunction must in its entirety be held unconstitutional. \ny other view gives standing to the State’s afterthoughts and countenances a serious impairment of Appellant’s con- stitutional rights. See cases cited, supra. Question No. 4 Assuming the injunction invalid as applied to . .e speech, what was the duty of Thomas in respect to obedience so ’ long as it Was not set aside? 22 The circumstances under which the injunction was issued and violated throw some light upon the propriety of Appellant’s conduct with respect to the injunction Ap- pellant had been invited by the Oil Workers Internationa! Union, Local 1002, to address a meeting on the evening of September 23, 1943, at the City of Pelly, Texas (R. 5, 279). The meeting was conducted as part of a campaign to organize the employes of the Humble Oil Company, located in the adjoining community of Baytown (R. 5, 279). The focus of this erganizing campaign, conducted in the teeth of strong company resistance,’ was a proceeding then pending before the National Labor Relations Board for an election (R. 33-34). To further this campaign, Appeilant accepted the invitation to speak and journeyed from his home in Detroit, Michigan, for that purpose (R. 22-23, 33). On September 22, shortly after Appeilant arrived at Houston, the Attorney Genera! of Texas, upon the basis of newspaper accounts that Appellant was scheduled to speak at the meeting the following day, filed a complaint in the §3rd District Court in Austin, Travis County, a dis- tance of 167 miles from Houston, Harris County, seekinz a temporary restraining order and temporary and perma- nent injunction to restrain Appellant from soligting mem- bers in any C.1.O. union without first obtaining an organ- izers card (R. 291-294). Judge Gardner of the Travis County District Court issued, ex parte, a temporary re- straining order enjoining Appellant while in the State of Texas from soliciting members in the Oil Workers Inter- national Union or any other labor organization without first obtaining an organizer’s card and also issued an order that Appellant appear before him on September 25, 1943. Sce Matter Hurftiic O48 Retimne Co, 16 NLRB 112. 1N4-1TS. 116-134 2 as! ‘ 113 | é (CASS Varser ot Hamble O Rev Co, 48 NLRB IIS 140 F. (23) 777 (CCA. 5): Matter Oil ff R ( NLRB. Pe, 120 7 a 23 two days after the scheduled meeting, to show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue (R. 294~-295, 315- 317). The temporary restraining order and the order to show cause were served on Appellant approximately five hours prior to the scheduled meeting (R. 35). Appellant decided to deliver his speech as planned not only because of his conviction that both the Constitution and the National Labor Relations Act protected his right to make it, but also because preparations for the meeting had already been made and the Attorney General had taken the position that an earlier action to enjoin enforce- ment ofthe statute was improperly brought (R. 36, 48-72, 75-78). We believe that under these circumstances Appellant properly refused to be muzzled (compare Lovel/ v. Griffin, 316 U.S. 452, 453; Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, reversing 216 U; S. 584) and that only a mechanical appli- cation of the doctrine restricting collateral attack upon in- junctions would place Appellant in default.” We must remember that we are dealing with labor relations which have a highly perishable status quo. If Appellant were re- quired to abide by the injunction and to test his constitu- tional rights by direct appeal, the occasion for their exer- cise would have entirely disappeared. Compare Frank- furter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (New York, 1930), Appendix IT. Insofar as the Court’s question with respect to Appellant’s duties under the injunction is directed to his status to raise the constitutional issues involved here, it need only be pointed out that the Supreme Court of Texas refused to hold that Appellant had lost his right to urge the unconstitution- alitv of the Act because he had violated an injunction. Compare Cooper Company v. Los Anzeles Building Trades Tt e rigid 4t . 9 a Wise » ° . field. ec Os Attacks Upon Labor Injunctions,” 47 Yale L, J. 113 24 Council, et al, 1§ Labor Relations Reporter 46, decided August 21, 1944 (Cal. Sup. Ct.) Although the Attorney Genera! urged upon that court that Appellant’s contuma- ciousness deprived him of standing to raise the constitu- tionai question if a Motion to dismiss the application for writ of habeas corpus, the court overruled such Motion. Since restrictions upon collateral attacks upon injunction: as applied to judgments of courts in the same judicial sys- tem reflect a pragmatic local view of the needs of an order!y system of administering justice, we submit that the jud2- ment of the Supreme Court of Texas in this respect should be followed. Since that court did not think that Appe!- lant was disabled to raise the constitutional question in- volved in this proceeding, we need not consider the conse- quences of his contumaciousness under other circum- stances. See Yakus v. United States, 64 8. Ct. 660. Question No. 6 Assuming that petitioner had a constitutional right t make a general argument and solicitation to the entire as- sembly of. workers, should the State punish him in a single penalty because he picked out one member of the assemb!\ and addressed a solicitation to him by name? This question has already been fully treated (supra pp. 4-16). It is suthcient to repeat here that constitutiona’ rights to free ypeech cannot be made to turn upon whethe: the hearer 1s addressed by name or the number of hearer: } addressed. the Mor a ind the Order everruline the Met 25 CONCLUSION The organizer, made familiar by years of horrendous propaganda as the “outside agitator,” has in the past been a favored target of the lawless state. Access to the minds ot ernployes has been, frequently and in many areas, de- nied him or granted by the state upon such terms as to. make it valueless. The process of keeping alive and ex-° panding such access is one which functions through the - constitutional guarantees. Few groups have suffered the invasion of such guarantees more consistently than trade union organizers. The challenged legislation is not an isolated phenome- non. Itis a part of a body of legislation, greatly influenced by wartime emotions, which seeks to revive in new forms the historic attacks upon organizers and trade unions, to burden and cripple the constitutional mechanisms of ac- cess.” Appellant’s objection to the challenged legislation is neither formal nor abstract. The statute, while clothed in the ill-fitting garb of an occupational registration to pre- vent fraud (compare Pollock v. Willams, 332 U.S. 4), virtually suppresses a right. This is so both because it destroys anonymity, which is vital to its exercise, and enmeshes it with a-delay fatal to its effectiveness. These are grave social and constitutional consequences not merely in the negative sense that a section of the market place of ideas has been blacked out, but also in the positive sense "See. for example. Hague v. CI.O., 307 U. S. 496: Anderson v. United State IS U.S. 350: Bridges v. Calttorma, 314 U. §. 252: cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 S. 103: see also, the cases and materials cited in our Brief in No. 569, at p. 47 od Baldwin and Randall Crod Liberties end Industrial Contict (Cambridve. 1938) \s the materials cited in our Brief in No». 569 indicate. organizers in Texas experience nusual difhoulties in their efforts to maintain access to the industrial populat The campaten of terror axainst the organizers and leaders of the O:! Workers Int nal Union attamed such proportions in that State that the Union wa celled to obtain an injunction on February 25. 1942, restraining the Chief of P ef the Citv of Port Arthur and his subordinates from inter alia, “illegaliv arrests 26 that Congress has stated that the spread of such ideas should be fostered. Finally, by its grave injury to the right of organizers to speak, the challenged legislation sterilizes other civil rights which are exercised in the formation and functioning of labor organizations.” Respectfully submitted, Lee PressMAN, Martin RAPHAEL, Washington, D. C. I-RNEST GoopMAN, Detroit, Michigan. ArtrHuR MANDELL, Herman WRIGHT, Houston, Texas. September, 1944. Attorneys for Appellant. The rece ca statutes a rdinances purporting to regulate labor ur seems bye t ; amentally ant ion | Pose The Ca Jateely riginated in areaa where labor unions are weak and ir potent or where t reanized anti-unionismm of powerful employer groups has captured contr eve Cxisiative ma hinery Ser ) id. D>. ¢2... uprd. ar d (Ciwens 4 Stu dy Re ere Labor Legislation, 38 I). I v 309 (1944 In a recent report, the Senate Com- ttee on Education and Labo- (S. Rep. 398, part 3, 78th Cong: 2nd Sess., p. 1694 varned Na \ r exulatory measures anu and } be ex ‘ ‘ ec iberate care! y make sure tha t er ree tir it tere ‘ Teanizec anti-unionism ts not loisting uj Cxisiat I ‘ estroy e the richts abor that are ft amet. t a € t ni We t gutsh between reculat in the pul interest and im ¢ nior infi-union emp a4 uu i! tence W re ¢ 7? pu aware © x eed d ne of snti-union « ve who ct back t this tvpe . law It ur further ¢ i tia if ini eCMmpicve er Ww € ears, refuse to acces ally the principle indust len acy 1\ ‘ “ ci uC eck to ackle the nehts al thr wh ¥ it re ate abs m activ cs the } abl: tere l 4 } 1 but ‘ ai ta for-these-who feel consteained by a-national law that é from coe by « € he right f emp.oyees to organize a burgat tive » great Tia tor c rigi s of iabx ry and rial t i The past Ce C as witnessed the march of r tvra . | « H variab! companiment as bee € by we cre tia ta alike to replace free trace “ ¢ abor f t t | State edict the right abor the ex fr ¢ i AN arying patte those v \ L esita g t ( fra fta 1 res atior ice k t r As this case is being considered a new wave of identically-worded ordinar eared in widely separated cities and towns furporting ¢t license and rex ‘ rérs t ; desiened to halt organization entirely. See. for exar Ordinance of City of Newnan, Georgia (1944); Ordinance of Cits of ythev: Arkansas 1944 fJrdinancer ¢ City f Athens Tenne SEC ] 944) Jeger +> --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386404_0086%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.