# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Polish Alliance v. Labor Board > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386404_0037%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1944 - **Citation:** 322 U.S. 643 ## Text . . . . a4 . . ee en a a = 4 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. : | i OcropEn Trin, », I). BLE 3 | @ POLISH NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THE UNITED «STATES OF XORTH ‘AMERICA, 4 conroration, - Petitioner. vs, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent: PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE ‘UNITED ‘STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS. FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. AND BRIEF IN SUP- PORT nr + F -6 ‘ ’ 7 : Casimin da. Mipowicz,. Aftorics YW fo? ie hitierne pane Counsel: 3 = . : eee. Ewart: Harris. SRINT EC BY CHICAGO _AaWw PRINTING cc e o ° , 2 '" INDEX ere, Lee St a nee eee el | - PAGF PETITION EEL Pape TES IRR en Rn cialis 1-6 © Summary and ‘short statement of the matter in- volved : ifn onto Oe Fca rt he OO — % _ Jurisdictional basis: -........ Saited pie Hale se Doiced 3 Questions presented ......... REE Sae nae a mae Ae 4 ‘Reasons relied on for the granting of the writ of certiorari idadiglddiondianiiabladieiinsinbadlaiiianiaca asic capone’ : 3 “BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF aa PETITION aiid sain . 7-49 ne MMIII isiacosctcosanioredeisanhoiquigbeceesinsienascnnAciienn eee I ise aise eae “Statement of the case sis icenataaiacaal a aM ai 2 Specification of errors’ ......--.-..vse-:--t(eeeeeeeot oe ae Summary of Argumént ..................-.... Ravan eereme 17 si » Propositions: NY acai sii ceelich Aaiceltsinisenieh 23 ~ Argument Sai a Peller RAO ee ae eR - 1, Thé Cireuit Court of Appeals in this case decided an important question of Constitutional Law, contrary to a long line of decisions in this Court, when it held that ‘insurance is commerce within the meaning of the Com- ‘merce Clause of the Constitution of the United States. 2. The Circuit Court of ‘Appeals decided an important . guestion of Constitutional Law contrary to the decisions of this Court, when it held that use of the mails and of in- terstate means of communication and transportation, of themselves, bring the user within the meaning of the Com- “merece Clause of .the United States, as being engaged in- commerce, or affecting commerce. 3: The Circuit Court ‘of Appeals decided an important -@uestion of general and local law, contrary to the law as laid down by this Court, and by the courts of Illinois when’ it held ‘that a fraternal. benefit society, organized under = { ‘ - 6° | " the laws of Illinois asa not-for profit organization, is, i issying benefit certificates, engaged in the business ¢ insurance. + Tho Circuit Court of Asipeais ceded on iaportin question «: Constitutional Law contrary to the decisions of this Court, when ff held that a fraternal benefit society, “organized and operating under the laws of a State, by its use of the mails and other means of interstate commui- cation in its issuance of benefit certificates. fo persons is. the various states, and in its investments in securities issued in other states, is, by such activities ‘‘ affecting com merce’’ within the meaning of the National Labor Res tions Act, and that a labor dispute with its employees ‘*burdens and obstructs commerce and the free wag commerce.’’ 5. The sities decree of the Circuit Coart of Appeals is not based upon substantial evidence in im- portant particulars, and is not in accordance with the lav. Wherefore Your petitioner respectfully prays that « writ of certiorari be issued under the seal of this Court directed to the United States Circuit ‘Court of Appeals for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, sitting at Chicago, Ili- - nois, commanding said Court to certify and send to this Court on a day to be designated, a full and complet transcript of the record and all proceedings of the Circuit ‘Court of Appeals had in this cause, to the end that this cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court; thet the decree of the it Court of Appeals be ‘reversed, and that petitioner — such other and further re lief as may seem p : Coshan E Mipowicz, | Attorney for Petitioner, . ' Polish National. Alliance of the United States of North America. ll SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Ocroser Team, A.D.1943 a ' by 4 is ee . POLISH NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA, 4 conronamon, : - Petitioner, vs. " NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, - — BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI. aa NO | , Opinion Below. . For’ opinion, see Appendix to Brief, pp. 605-617. ‘Jurisdiction. » The jurisdictional basis is set out in the’ Petition, to : thich reference is made. r STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ‘ & \ ; The Pleadings. “a A complaint was issued March 9, 1942, by the National labor Relations Board (amended March 12, 1942) (App. 8 307, 316) against petitioner, Polish National Alliance of the United. States of North America, charging that peti tioner is a fraternal benefit society, incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois, with its main office in Chicago; and stating that it was engaged in the operation of a death, disability and aceident insurance - business, the publication of a weekly and a daily newspaper and in the investment of funds in real estate and securities. The complaint alleged that petitioner was licensed to . conduct an insurance business in twenty-six states of the United States, in the District of Columbia agd in Mani-. toba, Canada: That it writes insurance, collects premiums und pays out benefits in all the states “and territories-it which it is licensed. That it had investments throughout the United States in _— bonds and mortgages and ‘real estate. It stated that Office sicbanties! Union No. 20732 A. F, of L. is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. The complaint. set out what it alleged to be’ an appropri- ate bargaining unit, including several classes of office em- _ ployees and-excluding others; and stated that on ér about March 26, 1941, a majority of such unit selected the Union as their representative for collective bargaining, but peti- ° _tioner, refused to bargain collectively with the Union, there- by violating ‘Sec. 8(5) of the Act ‘relating to unfair labor practices (App. 308). It -was ‘Charged that one. Anna Owsiak had ine dis- © charged for Union activities. That a strike began Oc- — tober 7, 1941 and éontinued until January. 7, 1942,—pro- voked and prolonged by petitioner. That one. Henry ° Ziolkowski on or abuot October 10, 1941, who had gone — out on strike, asked reinstatement and was refused it. ‘That twenty-six: strikers also asked reinstatement and were refrsed. _ / 9 The acts charged were alleged to have a close relation — to interstate commerce and to tend to cause labor disputes “burdening a obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.’ The answer filed by petitioner (App. 320) admitted that -it was a fraternal benefit society incorporated under the © laws of the State: of Illinois, with its main. office in Chi- cago. Petitioner denied that,it was engaged in the oper- ation of-a death, disability and accident insurance busi- ness and in the publication of a weekly -and a daily newspaper. It admitted its investment of funds and. that it is licensed to do business in twenty-six states, the: Dis- trict, of Columbia and Manitoba, Canada. Petitioner denied that it wrote insurance, collected pre- — miums and paid out benefits other than as a fraternal benefit society organized under the laws of the State of - Illindis. It denied that it conducted an ‘‘insurance busi- -ness’’ or published a newspaper other than the weekly ‘official organ of the society, to circulate among the mem- bers whose subscription was included in their membership fee. It stated that the daily newspaper referred to, was published by a separate corporation whose capital stock - was owned by the directors of petitioner ex officio (App. 821). The answer denied that- saciilcue was engaged in in- terstate commerce witKin. the National Labor Relations Act (App. 322). It stated that petitioner is a non profit organization with purposes set-out in the Preamble to its Constitution, which Were to form ‘‘a more “perfect union of the Polish people in this country; insuring to them a proper moral, intellectual, economic and social develop- ment; preserving the mother tongue as well as the na- tional culture and customs ; and promoting more effectually all movements tending to secure by all legitimate means the restoration and preservation of the independence of ae | criminatory discharge of Anna .Owsiak, the alleged co. - 10 the Polish territories in Europe.’ Its stated objects, in addition, ‘were to ‘‘promote fraternalism among its men. bers, and provide death, disability, accident and other benefits to its members and their beneficiaries.’ _ The answer denied that an appropriate bargaining - ‘unit was set out in the complaint as amended and alleged’ that certain persons and classes sought to be excluded should. be included in the unit (App. 322). It denied that the Union had a majority in an appropriate unit. It ad. mitted its refusal to bargain; saying that it was not engaged in interstate commerce afid therefore not within the Act. The unfair labor practices were denied, also the. dis ércion and interference, and the refusal to reinstate Henry Ziolkowski ‘and the other strikers. It denied that its con- duct ‘led to labor disputes. which burdened or obstructed commerce and the free flow of commerce (App. 325): The hearing before a Trial Examiner resulted in an ' intermediate report recommending an order as prayed in« the complaint as amended, which, upon exceptions and oral - argument, was sustained in great part,.and a Board order issued accordingly (App. 495, 530). | A- petition for review was filed immediately upon the issuance of the Board’s order (App. 578), and the Board - countered with a request for enforcement of its order (App. 586). The Board’s request was granted, subject to minor . modifications, and a decree entered, June 22nd, 1943, ( App. 621) which is temporarily stayed pending the application for certiorari Ane. 620). 7 Phe Evidence and the Board’s Findings. /The charter of petitioner (App. 456) ‘shows that it is an Illinois corporation, organized as a fraternal benefit society without capital stock, for the sole benefit of its « 7 on . | aiden and. their benefictaries, | and not for profit, haying. a lodge system with ritualistic form of work and a | rep- resentative form-of government. The Preamble to its Con- stitution states (App. 326) : - ‘When the Polish Nation, notwithstariding ile _ ‘ sacrifices and sanguinary struggles, lost its independ- - ence, and by decree of Providence became doomed to triple bondage and was divested of its rights to life and development by force. of the invaders, that: por- tion thereof, most severely , wronged, voluntarily, pre- ferring exile to cruel bondage in the Motherland, sought refuge under the guidance of Kosciuszko and Pulaski, in the free land of -Washington, and settling here, found Hospitality and Equal Rights. | - These valiant pilgrims, ever mindful of their duties to their newly adopted country and ‘their own, nation, | founded the Polish National Alliance of the United | States of North America for the’ purpose of forming ) a more perfect union of the Polish people in this | . ‘eountry; insuring to them a proper moral, intellectual, | economic and social development; preserving the | mother tongue as well as the national culture and customs;' and promoting more effectually all move- ments tending to secure, by all legitimate means, the restoration and preservation oi the independence of the Polish territories’ in Europe.”’ | Petitioner is 6rganized into.1817 lodges, which meet at least once a month. Its supreme legislative and govern- ing body is the Convention which meets at least once in four years. Delegates to th: Convention are selected from groups of lodges, each group forrning what is known as a Council, of which there are approximately 190 (App. 443), a & — The elective sllinens are the Censor, Viceconser, and Commissioners, who together form the judicial, = i 12... ~ and supervisory body i in 5 the Alliance known as the Super. visory Council. There. are also elected a President, tw Vice-Presidents, General Secretary, Treasurer and ‘Boari of Directors. The Board of Directors is the executive and managing body of the Alliance. ns On ‘December 31, 1941, petitioner had in force 979,897, benefit certificates of the value of $159,688,583. It owned assets of $30,090,835, in cash and bonds issued by the US. and by the several States and political subdivisions there of, and by Canada and Poland; also stocks, mortgage and real estate in several States. Its income during 11. - ° was $5,717,344 of which $3,732,364 was received from . members, and $1,690,250 from investments. In 1941 bene fits paid amounted to $1,845,126 (App. 444). . ———— Ce eee . . ry wie : ' The operations of the Alliance, beneficiary and fraternal, are centered in the Home Office in Chicago, Illinois. : The Directors of the Alliance are éx officio stockholders ‘of Alliance Printers and Publishers Ine. an Illinois corpo ration with its principal office in Chicago, which publishes ‘the weekly organ of the Alliance, the subscription to which is included in the membership dues; and a daily paper which is put on sale in Ilincis, Indiana and Michigan { App. 449). ~ She ss “ Petitioner has speri $7,109,786.87 since its organization for charitable, educational and fraternal activities among its members (App. 481) and in the year 1941 spent for such purposes the sum‘of $252,210.03 (App. 481). Some of the principal items of this expenditure are: Educational $8; _ 620,862.90; National purposes $2,388,959.52; Relief $698, 042.94; Commissions and Departments $316, 568.02 (Im- migration Commission, Help to Immigrants, etc); Civil | manifestations and memorials $83,353. 49 (App. 481, 482). Office Employees Union No. 20732 is a labor organiza ‘ tion affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. It ~ r : anaes admits to: ‘membership site employees : of pititioner’ ~ Chicago office. | There were 138 employees in the Chicago office (App. — 111 -were-declared by the Board to be an appropriate bargaining unit (App. 548). The Board ‘included i in the unit five chief clerks in charge of depart- ments, over the objection of petitioner that: they . were " supervisory employees. They had-all chosen the Union as their representative. The Board excluded the Chief * Organizer, the Manager of the Real Estate Department. and the Inspector of Rent Collections, none of whom was ' a Union member. The Board included the secretary to the Chief Medical Examiner who had signed a union card and excluded the secretary to the President, who had not. The Board included the two editors who had signed union. _ applications and excluded two librarians who had not. - ‘The eleven rent collectors, who reported each day ,at the office and had quarters assigned to them there, were ex- duded. They were not union members (App. aeaNs 8; 215- 223). ee _ The Board found that sixty employees within the ap- propriate unit of one. hundred arid eleven had chosen the: Union as their bargaining representative. As to one of _ these, petitioner contended that it had shown-an immediate revocation by the signer, but ‘its contention was overruled _ (App. 279, 548). ; . Petitioner refused recognition to the v nion, stating that - it was’ not subject, to the- jurisdiction of the National _ Labor Relations Board (App. 200). When the request was renewed on September 26, 1941, it was denied, but’ time Was asked by petitioner to present the matter to the Supervisory Council which would meet in the following December (App. 64). | Statements of Various persons derogatory to the Union are in evidence. which petitioner claimed were not au- 14 Ores thorized by it or made by those in’ ‘a position to bind it by their statements. The = found - them to be c0- ercive (App. 563). Anna Owsiak, a union member, whose time card showed ‘that from December 10, 1940 to September 9, .1941, she was absent 48 hours on six separate days, tardy 21 times and absent for a total of 14 hours on six occasions (App. 487), on September 11th, 1941.underwent an operation-and - returned on October 6th, ready to go to work. ‘She tes tified that the General Secretary of petitioner: told her that because of lack of work it was determined Ito Iét her go; that she miglit-be called back in a month or thro but ~ should look for another job. and take it if she fonnd it The Secretary testified that he told her to wait for a few. days, maybe a few weeks, but that her ee would re- main open for her. As Anna Owsiak left the building of the Alliance she met two union officials who told her to wait in their auto- mobile outside. They went into the building and among other things discussed with officials of the Alliance the case. | of-Anna Owsiak. They threatened a strike unless she was put to work; and one, Helen Lahajezyk transferred back ° .. to her former posjtion. The President told the Secretary '. to put Anna Owsiak to work. at once, but refused to-re- transfer Helen Lahajezyk. -One of the union officials de. manded that Anna Owsiak, who, unknown to the officers of the Alliance was then outside the building, be telephoned | to come back to her job before seven that evening. He _did not say that she could be ealled in from the waiting automobile (App. 71). She was not elephoned. The © next day a strike was called. nae The Board found that Anna Owsiak was Mevhilensi for union activities; but found no discrimination in the trans- fer of Helen Lahajesyk: 3 ‘ . ° . . : ; . - e 7 Fe : 4 ‘ - Mane tenet . bb ‘The union officials claimed’ that the Oivsiaki ‘and. Lahaj ' cayk incidents caused the strike (App. 65, 72). | 27, 1942, when the strikers, 26 in all, requested reinstate- | ment (App. 423). - Petitioner in certain communications from the Head Office’ to the lodges: and councils charged that certain of the strikers were seeking revénge on the present officers because of their defeat at the last Convention when the “leader of the dissatisfied employees was one of the ean- didates’’ for office of Secretary General. In oné of the issues of ‘the weekly organ of the Alliance it was stated over the signatures of certain officers that the Directors could not permit persons who had nothing in common _ with the Polish National Alliance and Polish traditions to decide who was qualified for work in the offices of the Alliance; and that a labor union was not necessary in a fraternal. benefit society, organized for the mutual benefit ; of all; and that, in any event, the question was one prop~ . erly to be passed upon by the Convention as the ‘‘Supreme Governing body of our Society’’. (App. 421). The article deciared that in the opinion of the sighers the Alliance was not subject to the provisions of om National -Labor Relations: Act. The Board found that ‘‘as a sesutt of the respondent’s (petitioner here) refusal to bargain; its discriminatory discharge of Anna Owsiak; and its other.and numerous acts of interference, restraint and coercion, the employees of the respondent. went on strike,’’ and that the strike . -was prolonged by petitioner’s “‘unlawful -activities’’ (App. 564). | The chief clerk in the Mortuary’ Department, Henry _ Ziolkowski, employed since 1919, went out on strike, but ou the next day asked permission to return to work, which ‘The strike continued from October 7, 1941 until January - 16 was granted. ‘He reported on. October 10, the fourth day of the strike and was told to sign an application for work. ‘This he refused to do, ‘‘because I did not feel like a new. *comer’’. He did not resume his employment. The Board: found that the requirement as to signing an application was an ‘‘unfavorable condition’’ attached to the offer of reinstatement ‘‘in order to —— Ziolkowski for — joined the Union and the strike.”’ ‘ On “January: 27, 1942, the. strikers iisengts their attorney requested reinstatement. No reply was made to the ‘attorney’s letters. Petitioner stated on the hearing that there did not exist sufficient vacancies’ to accomodate all the strikers, since the reorganization of -positions and the transfer of employees from the real estate department, where business'was greatly diminished, to positions former- ly held. by strikers, and because of the consolidation and abolition of certain positions A reorganization table was put in evidence: (App. 242, 249, 290, 484, 566). It appeared that there had béen'a net new employment of six persons since the strike. The Board found a wrongful refusal to reinstate the strikers and ordered their reinstatement, with back pay. . ® Specification of Errors. | The Cireuit Court of Appeals erred: . 1. In holding that petitioner, a not for profit fraternal . benefit society organized under the laws of I}linois, ip engaged in the business of insurance. - to ° Ih: holding that insurance’ is commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations. Act. 3. In-holding that the fraternal benefit operations of . petitioner affected commerce within the meaning ’ of the National Labor Relations Act, and that a labor dispute between petitioner and its employees 17 ae | and obstructed commerce and the free i flow of commerce. —. 4: In holding that use of the siti and of the means | of interstate communication and transportation brought petitioner within the purview of the National Labor: Relations Act, _as having affected commerce - by such use, whether petitioner. has otherwise en- ‘gaged in-commerce or not, or In’ finding that the Union had a majority of an ap propriate bargaining: unit of _petitioner’s employees.” @. In entering the enforcement. decree herein, and each . ‘provision thereof. “e 7. In refusing to dismiss the complaint as amended. % “Summary of Argument. © = \ _ 2 Petitioner is a fraternal benefit society, organized under ~ the laws of the State of Illinois as a not for profit corpora- tion, having\a representative form of government and-a lodge system With. rithalistic form of work. The issuance of benefit certificates\to its members is not engaging in ’ the insurance business, as found by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner is not in commerce, nor do its activities affect commerce, ora dispute, with its employees burden com- merce, or the free flow of commerce, so as to bring it within the National’ Labor Relations Act. . The holding of the Cirenit Court of Appeals that a fra- ternal benefit society is engaged in the business of instir- ance is counter to the law\\in Illinois and other States. These societies in-Ilinois ‘are arganized and operate under’ a special Article of the Insurance Code, ‘and are there declared to’ be charitable and benevolent institutions. “y a , . 18 . The aims of. a fraternal benefit society are religious, cultural and fraternal. They are not permitted to make a profit on their benefit certificates, which are’ consideréd incidental to the main purposes of their creation. With. out the profit motive there is no commerce in the Consti- tutional sense. This is recognized by this Court in the Associated Préss case 301 U.S. 123,-5, where it is stated | that although the Press Association was. a non-profit or- ganization its members were - - —em) in & commercial business for profit.’’ o II. “Insurance is not commerce. The Court of Appeals in holding that petitioner was engaged i in the insurance busi- ness, and was therefore engaged in commerce; or, in any event, its activities affected commerce, refused to follow the long line of decisions in this Court beginning with Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, that insurance is. not’ com- merce. The distinction made by the Court below: that these decisions. are limited to cases involving State taxa- tion and State regulation, and not to: Congressional power — to regulate, is: not, in view-of the language of. these de- ’ cisions, a valid distinction. The cases hold that a policy _of insurance is not a commodity and therefore i is “not the subject of interstate commerce. Ill. That which in its consummation is not commerce, does not become commerce between the. States because inciden- tal transportation or the use of the mails takes place in r connection therewith. The Court of Appeals, in holding, i in effect, ‘that mere ~ use of the mails or. other means of interstate communica- tion incidentally ‘to the issuance of fraternal benefit certif- icates, was alone and of itself sufficient to bring any or Ye 19: ganization, whether conducted for profit or not, within federal regulation, obliterates all distinction between what is commercial. in the Constitutional sense “and what is merely incidental.to operations which in.their consumma- tion cannot be regarded as commercial. Such a rule brings . religious, philanthopic, cultural and other organizations, using the mails and interstate communication, within - federal regulation, and within the operation of the Act in: question. IV. . At the time of the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act insurance had long been held by this Court not to be commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Congress didnot challenge this construction’ and specifically include insurance companies within the cover- age of the Act. Their regulation, therefore, remains with ' the States, and they are not within the Act in question. This Court has held that insurance is not commerce, the making of the contra¢t.of insurance is not engaging "in commerce, and the. policy of insurance is not an in- strumentality of commerce. The ‘‘enactment by Congress of legislation which implic: | itly recognizes the judicial construction’’ of a Constiin- tional provision or a farmer Act of Congress,‘‘is persua- sive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one’? (Apex Hosiery case, 310 U. 8. 469, 487). V. A majority of an appropriate unit of office employees ; of petitioner did not.ask the Union to act as their agent in collective bargaining. The unit, and the majority-for the Union within the unit, _ as created by the National Labor Relations Board was wee ee . - tee d “ ~ the vesuit of illogical inl arbitrary action. In its creation the Board contravened its own rule not to include super. visory employees in the same unit with the ‘supervised It. included five supervisory employees who had signed union cards and excluded- four who had not. The unit as. created consisted of 111 employees, of which 56-is 4 bare majority. The Board found 60 to hate signed union cards. Had the five supervisory employees not have been included there would have been no majority. In other. instances employees who had signed union cards wer included in the unit, other employees doing similar work, who had not signed, were excluded. VI. The employees, Anna Owsiak and Henry Ziolkowski, and the strikers named in Appendix ‘*A’’ to the decree were not discriminatorily refused reinstatement and were not ’ entitled. to back pay. Anna Owsiak, often late and frequently, ini return ing from a stay in hospital, was told there was no-+work for her at the moment. Leaving the ‘office she met two union | officials coming into a conference, and was told to wait in their car outside the building. The officials went in and dema immediate reinstatement of Anna Owsiak or there Would be a strike at once. Their demand was granted, but instead of ealling in Anna — and put- ting her to work the officials required a phtne call to ber aome to be made by petitioner's officers or agents before 7 P.M. This was not done and a strike was called. The strike began October 7, 1941 and ended January 2. 1942, with a request for reinstatement. In the meawtime there had been a reorganizatiqn of positions, an abolition. of some and consolidation of others.- Thé net new em- ployment Was six persons. An offer was made by peti. tioner in its pleadings and on the hearing to take back > - 21 ‘strikers as places become vacant. Chis was - satiafac- tory to the Board. The strike was not immediately caused “by petitioner, but arbitrarily by the union officials, and the strikers are not entitled to reinstatement with back _ pay. t ; _ Henry Ziolkowski who asked reinstatement about two days after going out on strike was told he could come back to work but that he should sign an application. This he refused to do, giving as his-only reason that he did not feel like a newcomer. The request for his signature was a reasonable one and he is not entitled to back pay from. “the date petitioner offered to take him back upon receiving. his written application.- The finding of the Board that this request was made to ptnish the employee, is not warranted by his own evidence. mt VIL. Enforcement of the Board’s order should have been - denied by the Circuit Courf of Appeals, and the complaint as amended should have been dismissed. Because of the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals that pétitioner in- issuing benefit. certificates is engaged in the business: of insurance it has been neaessary to dis- -euss ‘the relation of insurance to interstate commerce and to shew that this Court has held that it is not commerce or an instrumentality thereof. Petitioner, however, as a fraternal benefit society is a benevolent and charitable institution by the terms of the Illinois Code and is farther removed from commerce than an insurance company. Its primary-aims are cultural and directed towayd the inde- pendence of Poland. In this it approaches a religious or philanthropic institution, and | thé issuante of benefit certificates to its members does not make it a commercial institution. LICE CLEA TIAA PLOT CPT NS. NN ct yee 29 The regulation involved is that of labor relations. Peti- tioner because of its aims may rightly expect from its employees something more than i is expected from the usual ‘commercial employee. It may rightly ask that its em. ployees be zealous for the aims of the organization. | In . this, too, there is an analogy between it and a church organization. ‘The rule, however, adopted by the Court below, that mere use of the mails in its investment activi- ties, for instance, would bring such an organization within - federal regulation undér the Act in-question, ‘has no ref. - erence to the nature or the objects of the organization — involved. It works automatically upon showing use of the mails or other means of interstate communication in matters incidental to the collection of funds or the invest- “ment side of the organization. ‘The evidence does not support the findings of violations of the Act by petitioner. The unit and the majority within the unit for bargaining purposes were created by the Board through illogical and arbitrary action, without which there would have been no majority for the Union. Re. versal of the judgment of the Cireuit Court of —_— is asked. ane PROPOSITIONS OF LAW. Petitioner is a fraternal benefit, society, organized under the laws of. the State of Illinos as a not for profit organ- sation, having a representative form of government and a lodge system with ritualistic form: of work. The issu- ance of benefit certificates to its members is not engaging in the ‘‘insurance business’’ as found by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner is not in commerce, nor do its . _ activities affect commerce, or a dispute with its em- ployees burden commerce, or the free flow of commerce, so as to bring it within the National Labor Relations Act. Article‘: XVII Illinois Insurance Code Secs. 894- 927 (Ill. R. S. 1941 Ch. 73). People v. Commercial Insurance Co., 247 ni. 92, *.:.100. Vol: 1 Couch Cye. of Ins. Law (1929 Ed.) p. ‘en. National Union v. Marlow, 74 Fed. 775, 776. 4) Peterson vy. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 244 Th. 329, > 337. | Briggs v. Bankers Ace. Ins. Co., 214 Hil. -App. 181, 187.. Northwestern Life Ine. Co. v. Wi isconsin, 247 U.S. . - 132, 138. ar Insurance is not commerce. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. Western Live Stock v. Bureau ‘of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250. Blumenstock v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 442. | ee Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 401. i | o4 ke The incidental use of the mails and other means of inter. ‘state communication and transportation by petitioner in its operations as a fraternal benefit society is not en. gaging in interstate commerce. That which in its con. summation is not commerce, does not become commerce among the States because incidental transportation takes place. ~heanart. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655. .N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge — 231 U. S. 495, 509. Cooley on Constitutional Law (4th Ed. 1931) pp. 83, 84. | oe. | At the time of the enactment of the National Labor Re. lations Act insurance had repeatedly been held by this Court not to be commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Congress did not challenge this con- striction by specifically including insurance companies within the coverage of the Act. The regulation of in. surance companies, therefore, remains with the States, and they are not within the Act in question. ° ' Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 487. Popovicit v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379, 383. Final Report T. N. E. C. p. 41 (Doe. 35, 77th . Cong. 1st Sess.). V. A majority of an appropriate ‘unit of office employees of — petitioner did not ask the Union to act as their agent, in collective bargaining. See Argument under this point. — 20 N. L. R.. B. v. en Jersey 7 128 Fed. (2nd) 130, 137. In re Western Union, 32 N. L.R.B. 432. ‘In re.Western Union, 34 N.L.R.B. 338. “In re Borden Mills Inc. (1939) 13 N.14R.B. 459, . 455. In re Seiss Mfg. Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 389, 390. . | V1. The employees Anna Owsiak and Henry Ziolkowski and - _ the twenty-six strikers named in Appendix ‘‘A’’ to the decree’ were not discriminatorily refused reinstatement _ and are not entitled to back pay. , See Argument under. this point. Labor Board v. Columbia Co.,.306 U. 8.292. N.L.R.B. v. Auburn Foundry, 119 Fed. (2nd) 331, 337. | rig American Smelting and Refining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 126 Fed. (2nd) 680, 686.- 3 _N.L.R.B. v. Tex-O-Kan, 122 Fed. (2nd) 433, 438. . Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 229. | N.L.R.B. v. Ford Motor Co., 114 Fed. (2nd) 905. Vil, . Enforcement of the Board’s order should have been de- nied by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the complaint as amended should have been dismissed. See Argument under this point. 26 _ Petitioner is a sabia beniie ‘society, organized under the laws of the State of Illinos as a not for profit organ- sation, having a representative form of government and a lodge system with ritualistic form of work. The issv- ance of benefit certificates to its members is not engaging in the ‘‘insurance business’ as found by the Circuit Court of Appeals. - Petitioner is not in commerce, nor do its activities affect commerce, or a dispute with its em ployees burden ‘commerce, or the free flow of commerce, so as to bring it within the National Labor Relations Act. In Article ‘Seventeen of! the ‘Tilincis Insurance Code, See. 926 (314) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 73) it is declared: _ ‘Every fraternal benefit society. organized,, licensed or operating under this Code is hereby declared to be - -.a charitable and benevolent institution, and all of its ‘funds shall be exempt from all and every state, county, district, municipal and school tax, other than taxes on real estate and office equipment.” Petitioner was chartered by the State of’ Illinois as a not. for profit corporation without capital stock, and is oper- ating under the.provisions of said Article Seventeen. It is carried on for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries and __’_.its members and not for profit. It has a lodge system with © ritualistic form of work and a representative form of government, ‘and is organized into 1817. lodges which meet at least once a month. Its supreme legislative and gov: erning body is the Convention which meets at least once - 27 each four years. Delegates to the Convention are selected from groups of lodges which form Councils. It has a number of elective officers, and its elected Board of Direc- . tors is its executive body. , The Court of Appeals found that notwithstanding wit tioner is incorporated as a fraternal association it is ‘fen- gaged in the insurance -business’’ in a fashion similar to mutual life insurancee companies. This holding runs counter to a number of decisions in, Illinois and in other States, and to the policy of the State of Illinois, which declares such associations to be chari- table and benevolent organizations (Art. XVII Ill. Ins. Code, Sec. 926 (314) R. S. Ill. 1941 Ch. 73): In Vol. 1 Couch Cyc. of Ins. Law (1929 Ed.) page 609, it is said: ‘“‘The statutory distinction is that.insurance com- panies are organized for ordinary business purposes, for investment and for the benefit of credit, as well as for the protection of the family, whereas fraternal. Orders and benefit societies are not -organized . for the purpose of profit... Certificates in mutual bene- ~ fit. societies do not constitute insurance within the . meaning of the provisions against other, over or. dou- ble insurance.’’ In People v. Commercial is Co., 247 ill. 92, 100, the Supreme Court of Illinois declares : “That there is a fundamental difference between life insurance companies on the one hand, and those | organizations commonly known as fraternal associa- ‘tions, fraternal beneficiary societies or mutual benefit societies on the other hand, requiring separate codes - for the management and regulation of each, has been recognized by the Legislature of. this State and by this court ever since such associations or societiés | came into general use as a means of furnishing aid to members and to families of deceased members . . . og This distinction has been consistently maintained by the legislature ever since, by declaring that such associations or societies shall not. be deemed insurance companies, by expressly exempting them from the Acts passed to regulate life insurance companies and by enacting eT codes for their organization and control . Life insurance companies. are dcnnniead to. engage . in the business of insuring the lives of persons for profit. -The primary object of fraternal associations is to obtain social intercourse among the .members and to furnish relief:and assistance to members and persons dependent upon them not upon a commercial © or business‘ basis, but upon the broad principle of friendship and brotherly love. The insurance feature _is but an incident to the main purpose of organization. It is-united to the payment of benefits to members and ' to persons dependent upon them and. is conducted. . not for the purpose of gain or profit to the associa- . tion, byt to further the benevolent purposes of its organization.’ ag In National Union v. mare, 74 Fed. 775, 778, the Court say:: “The term ‘fraternal’ can pr: perly be snnlied to such an association for the reason that the pursuit of a common object, calling or profession usually has _ a tendency to create a brotherly feeling among those ‘who are thus engaged. It (the Legislature) has de” elared in effcet, or intended to so ‘declare, that when a certain number of persons, among whom some nat- ural bond of sympathy or interest existed, should form | an association for self improvement, or for the pur- pose of aiding one another. and strengthening the bond of union, such association might be consolidated into a corporation, and incidentally, to further the - 29 ends of its creation, might provide for ‘the relief of. members and their families in case of sickness or death by levying assessments and issuing benefit. certifi- eates . . . this -right, however, is merely incidental to the main purpose of its creation.’ | al soa age : The Preamble to petitioner’s Constitution declares that the purposes of the Polish National Alliance are to ‘‘form a more perfect union of the Polish people in this country ; insuring to them a proper. moral, intellectual, economic and social development; preserving the mother tongue as well as the national culture and customs and promoting more‘effectually all: movements tending to secure by all legitimate means the restoration and preservation of the ‘independence of the Polish territories in Europe.’’ These are not commercial aims. The issuance of benefit ° certificates is but incidental to membership in an organi- zation whose main purposes are cultural and also directed toward regaining by all.lawful means the independence of the Polish territories in Europe. It is the long established policy of the State to encour- ; .age thrift among the membership of these organizations, whose principal purposes are religious and cultural and fraternal, and to this end to permit the issuance of benefit certificates, yet to permit no profit to be made by such . asséciations, -For their encouragement, it exempts them, as charitable and benevolent organizations, from the usual ificidence of taxation (Art. XVII II. Ins. Code, ‘See. 926 (314). R.S. of Ill. 1941, Ch. 73). : ~The quéstion of their difference from insurance com- panies'is not one of logic: it is a question of public policy. To say thaf a fraternal ‘benefit certificate is an insurance -policey by another name, is to niiss _the distinction clearly — made by statute between an organization whose principal , purposes are religious or cultural or- fraternal, -or all 30 three, and which is permitted for the benefit of its mem- bership and their dependents to issue benefit certificates as a — protection against the losses that come in the t of sickness and death; and an organization - whose sole purpose is the sale of insurance at a profit. Without profit as an aim there is no commerce in the Constitutional sense. This is recognized in the case of Associated Press.v. N.L.R.B., 301 U. S: 103, 125 which the ‘Court of Appeals found to be controlling in the present ease. The Associated Press, this Court declared ‘‘is an instrumentality set up by constituent members who are engaged in a commercial business for profit.’’ Petitioner is not engaged in a commercial business ‘for © - pfofit nor are its constituent lodges, its councils,. its Con- vention, its officers or its directors so. engaged in their official capacity. It is principally engaged in promoting fraternalism among its members and in keeping alive among its thousands of memvers the culture and language ; f of Poland; and most particularly at this time, in striving by all lawful means for the liberation of Poland. These aims are expressed in manifold activities which cannot be measured, as it would seem the Court of Appeals ineas- ured them, by taking the total income of the Polish Na- tional Alliance,- (which must be invested and expended in accordance with the laws of Illinois and the constitu. . tion and bylaws of the Alliance,) and comparing this in- _ come with the. very substantial sum spent on cultural and charitable objects, which, though substantial, was but _five per cent of the i come ; and drawing the conclusion, which -the Court did\ that the cultural, fraternal and _ benevolent purposes of the Alliance are but incidental to its activities surrounding ‘the issuance of benefit cer- tificates. - Nor is it a question of more or less—of more ‘certificates issued and less cultural activity. It is a question of the 31 | \ 7: inherent difference between a commercial and a non-profit organization; between trade and fraternalism; between ‘commerce and. cul@mre—a distinction well recognized in the law, which places the profit organizations on one side and the ‘n profit organizations, despite a similarity of activifics one phase of their operations, on the other. As oy by. the Supreme Court of Mineis ‘in Peter. son v.. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 244 Ill. 329, 337:. ‘In the ordinary sense a fraternal order is not an” insurance company. * * * The two classes of corpora- tions are organized under different acts and for dif- ferent a +. The insurance company is an ordinary business cor- ; poration, and its policies are obfained for ordinary business purposes, for investments, for security, for the benefit of credit, as well as for oe protection of - the family. The beneficiary society is organized ‘not for the purposes of profit.’’ The distinction. has honk poten and declared in this. Court also. _ In Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 138, where it was contended that because ‘a State law exempted fraternal beneficiary associations from the ques-, tioned tax, it was a discriminatory law. The Court held not, saying: | ‘‘We think the differénces (between an in- surance company and a fraternal benefit society ) are plain. The fraternal and beneficial features are wanting in organizations like that of Northwestern’ Company.’’ A: ) Insurance is not commerce. . The Circuit Court of Appeals declared that although ‘*a long line of Supreme Court decisions’’ have held that ‘insurance is not commerce’’ or ‘‘at-any rate have held that the issuing of a policy of insurance: is not a transac. tion in commerce,’’ these cases, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168; Hooper v. California, 155. U. S. 648; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U..S. 389; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer: Lodge County, 231 U.:S. 495,—are not decisive, for the | reason, as the Court says, that ‘‘in each of them the court was considering the power of the State fo tax or regulate, ‘and not the power of Congress under the Com- merce Clause.’’ ie, The leas of these cases is. not thus limited, so. ‘as to be inapplicable to the case at bar: The Court, ia them, discusses the nature of the insurance contract itself, as to whether or not itis an article of commerce, and decides cast it is not. “ Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, ‘the Court say: “Issuing e-policy of insurance is not, a transaction of commerce. The policies are simple contracts. These contracts are not articles of commerce it any : ' proper meaning of the. word. . They are not sub- ., jects of trade and barter dllered in the market as something having an existence and value indepentent of the parties to them. They are not commodities to , be shipped or forwarded from one State to another and then put up for sale. * * * Such contracts are not ~ interstate transactions, ‘though the parties may be domiciled in different States. — : ey Vy i. 33 : In Western live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 " 8. 250, the Court say: | e mere formation of a contract between ‘‘That persons i different States is not within the protec- tion of ‘commerce clause, at least in the absence of Congressional action, unless the performance is within its protection, is a proposition no longer open to question.”” (Citing Paul v. Virginia. and other. , cases. )y : . : . In Hooper ‘v. california, 155 Uz. S. 648, 655, it is de clared? ~ ‘‘The business of insurance is not commerce. The contract of insurance is not an instrumentality of ‘ commerce. The making of such a contract is a mere ineident of commercial intercourse.’ . we. Y, ‘Life Ins. Go. Vv. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401, the Court ‘say : ‘We will only repeat: The business of insurance ‘ is not ecommerce. The contract of insurance is not an _ instrumentality of commerce. .The. making of such a _ contract is.a mere, incident of commercial intercourse.’’ In N. Y, Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. 495, itis said: — ° _ “The decision of the cases is that the contracts of insurancé are not commerce at all, neither state nor interstate. ’’ A a rae 5 These are general statements about the nature of the ‘contract of insurance.. They do not concern alone, and are not limited to the contract of insurance, viewed as a subject of ‘State taxation, or of State regulation. They are -made with’ reference” to. insurance as a subject of interstate commerce, and they declare that an insurance 34 : contract is not a commodity in the generally accepted ' meaning, of the term. It is not relevant to this ‘point, therefore, to: procéed, as does the Court of Appeals, to discuss the limits of State and Federal power with ‘ref. erence to a possible regulation of insurance or insurance companies, and to say that this Court, in the case of Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291, 311, has held that it does not follow because a thing is the subject of state taxation it is also immune from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. The question, at this point, is not the boundaries of federal and state regulation, ba the essential nature of the contract of insurance, viewed as to its possibility or otherwise*of becoming the subject of interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals in this connection also relies heavily upon Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, where the question involved is the constitutional power to regulate production of an undoubted commodity,—farm produce : which might become the subject of interstate commerce, - and in any event could exert ‘‘a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce’’ either directly or indi- rectly. The question there was not, as it is here, whether the regulated subject could be the subject of interstate Til. The incidental use of the mails and other means of inter. state communication aud transportation by petitioner iz its operations as a fraternal benefit society is not gaging in interstate commerce. That which in its cov- summation is not commerce, does not become commerce among the States because incidental transportation take: place. Although insurance is not commerce, yet, because peti- tioner uses the mails and other means of interstate com- . _— wo. = ' sation in vonnéction with its issuance of benefit cer- tificates to its members, the Court of Appeals held it to be within the provisiuns of the Nationa} Labor Relations Act, as having, by this use, ‘‘affected commerce.’’ A labor dispute between petitioner and its employees was, thérefore, héld to barden or obstruct commerce or the free flow ef commerce. The Court relied upon Associated Press ¥. N.L.R.B., 31 U. S. 103 which, however, can be distinguished from the case at bar by the-fact that the operations of the ‘members of Associated Press were clearly within the estab- . lished conception of commerce between’ the States. This Court, in that case, (p. 128) say: “The Associated Press is engaged in interstate commerce within the definition of the statute and the meaning of Article 1, Séction 8 of the Constitution. It is an instrumentality set up by constituent mem- bers who are engaged in a commercial business for . profit.’” — “Tt fas,” says the Court, isabout 1350 an eed in the United Statés, and practically all the newspapers represented in its a are. conducted for profi ‘? J ‘The Court of Appeals ignored the fact that in all its operations, cultural, fraternal, and those surrounding the — issuance of benefit certificates, petitioner is a non profit organization, and does not and cannot under its charter and the laws of the State of its creation make a profit by any of its activities. ‘The Court, also, refused to be bound - im this case by the ‘‘long’line of decisions’’ of this Court that insurance is not commerce. It based its decision that petitioner was within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act upon the use by ‘petitioner of the mails a“ all me Rid el ed, (36 and other means of interstate communication. The Court said: : ; = ‘It is beyond question that a large portion of peti- tioner’s activities were of.a business nature and car. ried on by interstate communication. Applying: the pronouncement in the Associated Press case, such busi- ness is interstate commerce within the power of Congress to regulate.’ 7 : “The Court then :proceeds to hold that -even jf “neti. tioner’s contention that it is not directly engaged in inter.. state commerce be tenable, it would still be faced with an insurmountable barrier,’’ in that its ‘‘far flung activities” affect commerce within the meaning of the Act,. and 4 labor dispute within its organization burdens or obstructs ' commerce or the free flow of commerce. ‘That’? says Cooley on Constitutional Law (4th Ed. 1931, p. 84) ‘‘which in its consummation is not coramerce, © does riot become commerce among the States because incidental: transportation takes place.’’ « * ene In monger vy. California, 155 U. S. 645, 6595, the ‘Contt, _ Say 2 ‘ ; ° 355 “Tf the power to? ‘regulate commerce applied to all. the incidents to which said commerce might give rise and to all‘contracts which might be made in the course '. of its: transaction, that power would embrace the _entire sphere of mercantile activity in any way con- nected with trade between the states; and would ex- clude State control over many contracts ‘purely do- mestic ‘in their nature. The business of insurance is not commerce. The contract of insurance is not ah. instrumentality of commerce. The making of such a contract is a mere incident of commercial intercourse.’’ 387 In New Y Life Ins. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, 509, it is declared: .“‘The number of transactions do not give the busi- ness any: other™character than magnitude. Nor, again, does the use of the mails determine anything. That (agents, and applicants for insurance). may live . in different States. and hence use the mails for their ~ communication does not give character to what they do; and cannot make a personal contract the trans- portation of commodities from one State to another. The decision | of the cases is that the contracts of insurance a not commerce at all; neither State nor interstate.’ In this case the Court say (on page 507): “It was also urged that modern life insurance. had * taken on essentially a national and international char- ‘acter, and that when Paul v. Virginia was decided, the business was ‘to a great extent local, that is, con- ducted through the domestic contracts by stock com- panies. The great and commanding organizations | of the present dav had hardly: begnn the amazing development which has made them the greatest assd- ciations of administrative trusts in the business world. These contentions were earnestly made; the reply . to them deliberately meditated and its extent fully . appreciated. The sag in Paul v. Virginia and other cases applied... ;- We... repeated that the business of i insurance is ne commerce. The contract,of insur- ance is not an. instrumentality of. commerce” (p. 508). The rule laid down,by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case at’ bar, that mere use of the mails and other means of interstate communication -isalone-and of itself suffi- cient to bring any organization, whether conducted. for - profit or not, within federal regulation, obliterates all dis- 38 tinction: between what is commercial in the true sense, and ‘what is merely incidental to operations which in their consummation cannot be regarded ‘as commercial in any ‘sense. Such a rule might logically be applied in any eas. where use of the mails is shown, no matter for what pw:- pose they were used—religious, cuJtural, philanthropic, or.any other. Once use of the mails was shown, courts would have to inquire no further as to the nature or pur. pose of the communications. Federal regulation would be - automatically applied. This i is — the law. IV. At the time of the enactment of the National Labor Re. lations Act insurance had repeatedly been held. by this Court not to be commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Congress did not challenge this con struction by specifically including insurance companies within the coverage of the Act. The regulation of in- . surance companies, therefore, remains with the States, _ and they are not within the Act in question. — - Even if it could be held, as determined by the Circuit Court’ of Appeals, that for the purpose of regulation by Congress fraternal benefit societies and insurance com: ‘ panies, which use the mails and other means of interstate communication, are engaged jn commerce; and their activi- ties in this regard affect commerce, and labor disputes between them and their employees burden or obstruct com- merce or the free flow of commerce; yet, Congress has _ not chosen to exercise such a power of regulation by its . enactment of the National Labor Relations Act. The terms ‘‘commerce’’, ‘‘affecting commerce’’, **bur- dening commerce and the free flow of commerce”’ must be - construed in the light of the historical fact, assumed to. be known to Congress, that insurance by a long line of deti- terstate communication is to adopt a rule of decision that works automatically, and without reference to the nature of the organization involved or the primary purposes of its creation. The rule would’ apply equally to religious . and purely philantropic organizations which use the mails and other meams of interstate communication. The regulation involved in this case is that of the labor relations of petitioner. In an organization, devoted a ‘is the Polish National Alliance to the purposes of keeping — ' alive the Polish language and culture, and securing and maintaining the independence of. Poland by all lawful means, it will be obvious that emplo t in its‘ Home ‘ Office and throughout its organization may depend on . otber facfors than those usually sought in an industsia] or commercial employee. Enthusiasm for Polish culture and for the freedom of Poland, faith in, the future of Poland - and its culture, and willingness to work for the independ- ; ence of Poland: by all lawful means might well be sought by petitiones in its employees, and rightfully required as a condition of employment. In these respects it is similar to a religious body..-The issuance of benefit certificates. to its members does not make such an organization an in- surance company or bring its operations within the regula- - tion of Congress under the Act in question. The evidence of the cause of the sttike; its prolongation, and the refusal to- reinstate certain émployees, does not support-the findings of the Board-that in these particu- ‘lars petitioner vidlated the National Labor Relations Act. The unit created by the Board for collective bargaining clearly was the creature of illogical and arbitrary action by the Board, without which there could have been-no majority for the Union. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be set aside, the enforcement decree vacated, and the complaint, as amended, dismissed. _ Respectfully submitted, , . ‘ Castuin E. Mrvowicz, Attorney for Petitioner. Of Counsel: ° Ewan | Hargis. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386404_0037%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.