# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc. (No. 217)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1943

## Text

OCTOBER TERM, 1943

No. 217:

GAR CAMPBELL, SALLIE BAKER anp ————
BLACK,

° . vs.

HOLLY SILL FRUIT PRODUCTS, INC.

0 PORE LARS TOMER IRE 4 sil gs 2

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF. CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND BRIEF. IN SUP-
PORT THEREOF.

ill Sell

s

Grorce PaLMER GARRETT,
Counsel -for Petitioners.

SUPREME COURT OF THE: UNITED “STATES ~~

WILMA E. ADDISON, ERNESTINE ©. LYLES, ED-_

Petitioners,

ath

ee

INDEX.

Sussect Inpex.
wns Page -;
"Petition for a writ of certiorari —- 9 : 1.
Nature of the ease and rulings. below. Sait |
Statutory provisions: sustaining jurisdiction 3
Question - presented | 7
Reasons relied upon for allowance of writ
Brief in support of petition * ~~ &
Grounds on which the jurisdiction of.this Court
is invoked _. * eye ae»
Statement of the case. Rie Aaa she ee
- Specification of errors assigned a
Argument ...... 1W..
Question : Was the Court of Appeals in
error in holding ineffective, i in the cireum-
_ stances set forth “in the findings of. the
District Judge, the administrator’s defini- .
tions of “Area of Production’’? a;
- Conclusion Le i CRN oe wr aI A ae 21
ae Tage OF Cannes Crrep. ——~
Abram v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 46 Fed. ope: , =
: 969, 49 Fed. Supp. 393 . 14,16 —
Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. (2d) 11 16
Boyer v. Miller Hatcheries, 42 Fed. Supp. 3t . 16 *
Federal Trade Comm.v. Raladam Co. ., 283 U.S. 648, 2
- T5L, Ed. 1324... .. 14
' Fleming v. Farmers Pecial Co., 128 F. (2d) 404 - . 6,8
' Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Buttow Co. » 113 F. (2d) ©
_ EP ee ai OCS re re oa
Gray v: Powell, 314 U. 8.402; 86 L. E Ed. 301 | ee
; Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., v. Addison, —¥. (2d) .
> RPS TAC ata spe ag 11
: Lofther v. First Nat. Bank of C hicnpe, 48 Fed. Supp.
692 : ; ; 16
Martin v. Mobi? 2 Wheat, 31, 6L. mn. Oe.

" 7358

ii : _- INDEX.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. United vegas 251 U.S.
Me a IS hr i ke eae 1 ee
Opp Cotton Mills-v.Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, 132

‘U.S. 126, 85 L. Ed. 624 ..... 15
_ Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation, - — U. Ss. —,
87 L. Ed. 423-...... LL pa Oa UY OA a mb
Redlands Foothill Groves y. Jacobs, 30 Fed. Supp.
BS oN aa Gay pe ere aan ia a es
Silgaro v. Port Compress, Co., 45 Fed. Supp. 88. i
_ Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. 8. 141, 84 L. Ed. 1124. Peas
/ UL S.'v. American Trucking Association, Tne. ¥ 310
ae | Re Pe NS 21
U.S. v. Bush, 310 U. S. 371, 84 L. Ed. 1259. cee ‘17
U.S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 85 L. Ed. 609. . 15
‘U.S. v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 10 L. Ed. 689... ® w...
ULS.V. Shreveport Grain & El. Co., 287 U. ‘S. 77, 7 a6
ov J ee a as | 17

StTaTuTEs CITED.

4‘ongressional Reeord of—. -

_ July 27, 1937, pages 2895, 9904, 9906-7, 9910 14

- July 30, 1937, pages 10179-81,. 10191 14
July 31, 1937, pages 10246-7, 10267, 10276 ee
December 17, 1937, page 9319 neat 14
May, 23, 1938, page 9626... ..... ii

- May 24 and 25; 1938, pages 9741, 9746 a ahs a
Fair Labor- Standards Act (29 U.S. C. A., Sections '
- .201, et seq., 52 U.S. Statutes 1060, et + seq): AE
Section 2 Leh e Batis pve
Section 3 oe eee 18
‘Section 13 (a) 10. ; 2,5 7,8, 14, 18, 21
Federal Register, Volume 3, page 2536 __. 14

‘udicial Code, Section 240, as amended by the ‘Act .
of February 18, 1925, 43 Statutes 938, 28 1, S. CAs
347

- Regulation #5362, paragraph E of the Adminis-

- trator of the Wage and Hour Division of the De- __

. ° partment of Labor a

Senate’Report #884, 75th Congress,. First Session dd

~!

— SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ©
OCTOBER TERM, 1%3_

WILMA E. ADDISON, ERNESTINE C. LYLES, ED-
GAR CAMPBELL, SALLIE BAKER AND LUTHER
BLACK, vs. Soe Petitioners,

HOLLY HILL FRUIT PRODUC ‘TS, INC,
7 Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS. / :

To the Honorable Justices of the Suprem me Court of the
United States:

Wilma kK. Addison, Ernestine C. Lyles, Edgar Campbell,
Sallie Baker, and-Luther Black, Petitioners, respectfully
petition the Court for a writ of certiorari to rev iew a deci-
sion of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Cireuit, in a certain cause therein lately pending
between Holly Hill Fruit Products, Ine., Appellant, and .

_ the said Petitioners, Appellees, wherein a judgment was
' rendered by said Cireuit Court of ——* on June 24, 1943,

lp ;

' \. County, which had a population of over three thousand per-

reversing the judgment of the District Court, ‘and in sup-
port. of their said petition, ‘petitioners. (plaintiffs in the.
District — respectfully show :

ewe LN

/

‘The matter in controversy in this cause turns upon the
minimum wage and maximum hour’ requirements of ‘ the
Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U. S. Code Annotated, See-
tidns 201 et seqg., 52 U: S..Statutes 1060 et seq.), and more
particularly Section 13 (a) 10, whereby there is éxcepted- ’
_ from the coverage ‘of the Act ‘‘any individual employed
within the area of production (as defined by thé Adminis. .
trator), engaged in handling, packing, storing, ginning,
compressing, pasteurizing, dryi ing, preparing in their raw
or natural state, or canning of agricultural or horticultural.
“commodities for ‘market 2 >>

The District Court found that: ;

The defendant was engaged in canhing fruit during the |
period from November 14, }938, to May 26, 1939, and from
November 16, 1939, to March 30, 1940 (R. 187), and that
throughout said two seasonal periods of operation, defend-—
_ant employed at its establishment in the town of Davenport,
Polk County, Florida, in its citrus fruit canning operations
and ,processes, more than two hundred ‘‘piece workers*’’
( R.-187) and forty-seven ‘‘hour hands,’’ (R. 213); that said
town is a town of six hundred and fifty population accord- .;
ing to the 15th United States Census, 1930, situated within
four miles of an incorporated town, Haines City, in said

v4

‘sons according to both the 15th Census of 1930, and the
16th Census of 1940 (R. 187)...

During the first of these two periods, by visi
promulgated October 20, 1938, the Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor de-

fined an individual as employed in the ‘‘area of production”’
if engagéd in such work on a farm, and on.agricultéral or _
horticultural commodities’ prdduced exclusively on such
farm, or if such commodities are obtained by the establish- |
ment where he is employed from farms in the immediate *
locality, and the number of employees in such establishment .
does not:exceed seven (R. 187 and 188): This regulation _
remained in effect through April, 1939, when, following a
séries of administrative hearings, the Administrator added
a paragraph to his said definition as follows: ‘‘(e) with:
respect to perishable or seasonable fresh fruits arfd vege-
tables, if he is engaged in handling, packing, storing, .dry-
ing, preparing in their raw or natural state, or canning such > ,
products for market i in an establishment which is located
in the open country or in a rural community and. which
obtains all of its products from farms in its immediate lo-
cality. As used in this subsection (e) ‘open country’ or
‘rural community” shall not include any city oF town of |
2,500 or greater population. according to the 15th United
States Census, 1930, and ‘immediate locality’ shall not in-
ai “dude any distance of more than 10 miles’’ (R. 187-188).

On June 15, 1939, effective June 17, 1939, the Adminis-
trator ‘again amended his definition aforesaid to provide.
that the individual shall be regarded as employed in the
“area: of production”’ (a) if he performs those operations —
on materials-all of which come from farms in the genetal
vicinity of the establishment where he is employed arid the
number of employees engaged in those operations in that
establishment does not exceed’ seven, or * ° * (d).if he

’ performs ‘those operations on materials all of which come
_from farms in the immediate locality of the establishment
where he is employed and the establishment is located .in
the open country or in a rural community. As used in this
sub-section (d) * “immediate locality’’ shall not include any
distance of more than ten miles and “open country” or

2p es |

“o ,

&

4 ‘

‘rural community *’ shall not include any city or town of
2,500 or greater population according to the 15th United
States Census, 1940’’ (R. 188-189)..

The District Court further found :°

‘“‘VII. In ‘and throughovt the said two seasonal periods
of operation, the establishment of the defendant did not
obtain all of its agricultura! and horticultural commodities ;
or materials from farms in the ‘immediate locality’ or’
‘general vicinity’ ofthe said establishment as defined
by the Administrator. An appreciable portion thereof
came from a distance beyond the range’ of usual farin:
travel. The géweral vicinity of defendant’s. establishment
was not sparsely settled, there being several towns and
communities within a radius of Jess than ten miles. Thus,
‘considerable fruit was canned and’ processed in the de-
fendant’s eStablishment duritig said season which came
from: the neighborhood of Haines City, which is within’
four miles and has several commercial canning plants
operating in conipetition to defendant’s establishment.
Also considerable. fruit. was cated and. processed in the
defendant’s establishment during the seasons in eontro-
versy, coming from the neighborhood of communities as
far away from Davenport as Lake Wales—20 miles—Bab-
son Park, several miles more than 20, Dundee 14 miles,
Loughman 7 or 8 miles. Much of this fruit was hauled
past other canning factories. to reach the defendant’s es--—
tablishment’’ (R. 192). =e : " ;

“VITL. In and during said two seasonal periods ofsoper-
“ation, the: establishment of the .defendant is not located
in the ‘open country’ or a ‘rural comniunity,’ as de-
fined by the Administrator in his said several definitions,
because there was within the range of usual farm travel, -
at a. point not more than four miles away, a town of more

Way ee

than 2500 iii aceording to the applicable United
States ‘Census’’ (R. 192-3). ‘

“IX. There was practically no téstimony showing the

percentage of the fruit processed by the defendant estab-
» jishment which. was procured from groves. located .at a
distance of more than’ ten miles by the shortest road haul
from the establishment; almost all of the. testimony on
the distance of the point of origin of the commodities
processed by said establishment during said two sefsonal
periods had reference to a ten mile radius, ‘asthe’ crow
flies’ ’?> “(R. 193).

“X, The evidence discloses that the defendant is not
an establishment operated by the farmers raising the com
modities processed, and that the procéssing is not done
by the farmers through the use of their own farm labor ,
on their own farms. On: the contrary, although. its mem-
bership consisted of fruit growers owning groves in two
certain townships in Polk County, Florida, the def ‘endant
accepted a considerable portion of its commodities from
groves of non-inembers ‘and, in fact, processed many
thousands of boxes of fruit deliv ered to the eanning plant
by a speculative. nen-fiember, the Grapefruit Distributors,
Inc., a_corporation. The employees of the de fendant were

‘ not hired by the.members, nor were they farm labor. On:

the contrary, they. were hired aby the defendant corpora-
tion and did no farm or agricultural labor. They were sim-
ply industrial employ ees, The defendant corporation was
not itself engaged in agricultural or- horticultural labor
or work. It was a comitercial industrial concern entitled
to earn a reasonable profit from canning ffuit”’. (R. 193).

The District Court “eoheluded that the total exemption
intended by Section 13 (a) (W) (29 U.S. @. A. See. 2138
(a) (10), of|the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938) was in-
applicable to the defendant (R. 194-197)... -

, .
& , : t

The Court of Appeals found it to be admitted that the

wage and hour requirethents of the Act were not observed *

(R. 225) but adopted the holding in the prior case of
Fleming v. Farmers Peanut-Co. (CCAS, 128 Fed. (2nd)
404), decided by the same Court of Appeals, that the limi-
tation in the Administrator’s definitions as to the number
of employees was void (R. 226). The Court: of Appeals
held that: As to the period from Noveinber 14, 1938 to
April 19, 1939, the evidence showed that 97.24% of the
commodities came from farms. located within 10 miles,
96/100 of 1%. could not be traced, and the balance came
from farms less than 25 miles distant, and that “‘it would
“be most unreasonable to say that the nexfligible quantity

obtained from a slightly greafer distance should affect -

the statutory concept of area of production’’ (R. 226). As-

_ to the period from April 30, 1939, to May 26, 1939, the
Court of Appeals held that the evidence showed that ‘*more

97% of the commodities processed came from farms ~

“located within 10 miles of-the.plant. * * * The purchase
of so great a portion within a ten mile radius of the plant,

gud the acquisition of the negligible balance from farms’

within 25 miles were sufficient to prove that the products
were obtained within the immediate locality’? (R. 226-7).
And, as to the period from November 16, 1939, to March
30, 1940, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence showed

that ‘‘during this period 91.39% of the frhit processed -

- was purchased from farms within ten miles of ‘the plant,
and an additional 4% came from farms within twenty,
five miles; and none yas known. to have come from, any
vreater .distance’’ (R. 227). Thereupon, the Court o
Appeals held that: ‘*In ordinary usuge the words ‘gene ‘ral

- Vicinity’ indicate a larger area than is meant by ‘immedi-

-ate locality’ and a distance of 25 miles in this lay of

highly developed travel facilities is not beyond the ranze
of usual farm trav el’ (R. 227). © And, finally, **that these

/
j

7
appellees were employed within the area of production +
during the entire period involved here, and that the mini-—

mum wage and maximam hour provisions of the Act did —
not apply to -them’’ (R. 228).

1. Jurisdiction is invoked under Section 240 of ‘the Ju-
diciary Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925,
43 Statutes 938, 28 U. 8. C. A. Section 347.

_ 2 The statute of the United States involved: is the Fair.
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29.U. S. C. A. Sections 201
et seq.; 52 U. S. Statutes 1060 et seq.) particularly ion
13 (a) (10) thereof, hereinbefore ‘summarized in the Krst
-paragraph of this petition. =

3. The judgment to be reviewed is dated June 24, ‘A. D..

1943 ,
<3 CG. ,

The qtestion. a ey is whether the Court of Appeals —
correctly held ineffective, in the cifeumstances set forth in
the. findings of the District: Judge, the Administrator’ s*
said three ‘definitions #f-**area of production.”’

, D.

The said ruling and décision of the Court of Appeals
is of such far*réaching extent as to call for a decision of
this Court upon fhe question of federal law here involved... °
If the said. rnling and decision of the Court of Appeals is
‘suffered to stand and become a precedent, it will operate
to the prejudice, not only of the petitioners, but of many
other persons employed in the sonia a fruits and vege-
tables. ; :

Moreover, until the conflict and confusion is resolved in
the seventeeg decisions of the lower courts (all district

;

court decisions except the decisions ofthe Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in the case of Fleming v.
Farmers Peanut Company 128 Fed.. (2d) 404, and in this
present case, construing Section 13 (a) (10) of the Act
and the Administrator’s definitions of ‘‘area of produc-
tion,’’) the- Administrator cannot know the scope of -his ~
powey, nor can the employers and employees intended to
be included in, or excepted from, the Act know: their re-
spective duties and rights under the Act.

The decision of the Court of Appeals, without over-
ruling the findings~of fact made by the District Judge,
determines the case contrary to these findings.

The decision pf the Court of Appeals renders ineffective
the definition of ‘‘area of production’? promulgated by the
Administrator although the Act of Congress expressly
committed to him the’ power and duty to define the phrase.
It disregards the spirit of the Act by exempting a whole in-
dustry from the coverage of the Act. It disregards the .
-rule that the Administrator’s regulation is presumed to
be valid and based upon sufficient factual reasons. It dis-
regards the intent of Congress as disclosed by the legis- >
lative history of the Aet. It disregards the rule that ex-
emptions from the scope of an Act of this type are to be
strictly construed and exempts the defendant although
the’ Court of Appeals concedes that the defendant is not.
literally within the exemption. It invalidates the Admin-
-istrator’s definitions.which are essential to the claim of
_ exemption and yet disregards the corollary that, if the defi-.
nitions are invalid, there can be no exemption.

Prayer for Writ. .

Wuekerore, petitioners pray for a writ of certiorari to
_be issued under the seal of this Court, directed to the United
States Cirenit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
sitting at New Orleans, Louisiana, commanding that C ourt

‘to certify and send to this Court upon a day to be desig-
nated, a full and complete transcript of the record and all
proceedings in the case entitled Holly Hill Fruit Products,
‘Ine. Appellant, v. Wilma E. Addison, et al., Appellees,
‘ being Case No. 10643, in said Circuit Court of Appeals, to
the end that this cause may be reviewed and determined by
~ this.Court, and that the decree of the Circuit Court of
'Appeals may: be reversed, and the petitioners may be-
granted such other and further rejjef as may seem proper.

GrorcE PaLMER GaRRETT,
419 Exchange Building,
Orlando, Florida, '
Counsel for Petitioners.

SUPREME COURT’ OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1943 .

No. 217 |

WILMA E. ADDISON, ERNESTINE (. LYLES, EDGAR
CAMPBELL, SALLIE - BAKER, axnpn LUTHER
BLACK,

Petitioners,
US.

HOLLY HILL FRUIT PRODUC TS, INC., _
- Respondent.

PETITIONERS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

I.

@

The Opinion of the Court Below. |

The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Cireuit was rendered. on June 24, 1943, and is, reported as
Holly Hill Fruit Products, lic. v. Wilma E, Addison, et al.,, .
Case No. 10643 (C.C.-A. 5th) — F. (2d) —, Advance Sheet ,
No. "(not yet printed), oe by Holmes, Circuit .
Judge. »

12 .

I.

Grounds.on Which the Suriadiction of This Court Is
; Invoked.

The decision of the Court of Apgeals involves a nov vel and
important problem and principle of federal law with regard
to which the decisions of the lower courts are in conflict and
confusion. This problem is the determination of the extent ~

to which the Administrator of the Wage & Hour Division of ~

the. Department of Labor, acting under direct authority of
Congress to define the phrase, ‘‘ Area of Production’, limit-
ing an exemptton from the coverage of the Act can, by his
‘definition, reasonably depart f rom the dictionary meaning
of the phrase in order to carry out the intent of Congress, as
he determines. that intent from the legislative history of the.
enactment and from hearings he has himself held. to ascer-
tain the proper practical scope of the phrase and the exemp-

~ tion. This case.constitutes an important precedent for all’
District and Circuit Courts of Appeal in dealing with the
_extent and. scope of the exemption granted by Section —
13 (a) (10) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.: The seven-
teen decisions by various lower federal courts, including
- two by the Circuit-Court of Appeals for the 5th Cireuit, on
the validity and effect of the Administrator’s definition of .
“area of -production’’ are at this moment in utter conflict
‘and confusion as to the effectiveness and scope of this
exemption.

Mm. ene
Statement of the Case.

~ The petition to which this brief is attached sufficiently
states all of the facts that are material to a consideration
of the. questions presented.

; ‘ Hl =
I V ° a
———— . ®

Specification of Errors ‘hetgeill.

There was no error in the District Court. We specify as
error the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing
the District Court.

| ARGUMENT.
Question: Was the Court of Appeals in error in holding
ineffective, in the circumstances set forth in the findings of

the District Judge, the Administrator’ s definitions of ‘‘area
of production’’?

‘Petitioners conceive. that the said ruling and decision of
the Court of Appeals is erroneous, in this:

Said ruling and decision overloeks;-or fails to give ‘effect
to, the essential purpose of the enaetment as manifested in
Section 2 of the Acty (b) ‘*It is hereby declared to be the
‘policy of this Act through the exercise by Congress of its
power to regulate commerce among. the séveral states, to *
correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliniinate,”’ ete., the
existence, in industries engaged: in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detri?
mental to the niaintenance of the minimum standard of liv.
ing necessary for he alth, efficienc ‘vy pnd gene ‘ral well-bei ‘ing .
of workers.

The whole Act is is be read together with the dee Jared
purpose in mind. ; :

The thought back of the Administrator's definitions is
adinirably set forth in the preamble to the Administrator's
first definition of the phrase-‘‘area of production’’, promul-
gated by him on October 20, 1938, undér the authority given —

~ : e. °

14. _
him by Section 13 (a). (10) of the me of Ce ongress., This
_preamble reads as follows:

“nm appraring x that the intent of Congress i in making
the special provisions relating to the ‘area of produc-
tion’ was to prevent undue disturbance .to agriculture
and to exempt small businesses clearly related to agri-. .
culture to employ.oceasional workers in addition to

' members of employer’s family without regard to the
Wage and Hour Standards of ‘the Act, and. |

‘*It appearing that the exemption of only ae busi-
nesses which employ a small: number of workers would -”
not result in material inequalities between firms doing ,
the same type of business; and

“Tt appearing that such small businesses are pre-
dominantly located in the ‘open country’ or ‘rural com-
munities’, receive most of their raw products from
neighboring farms, and frequently employ workers who
spend part of their time in actual operations; and

‘‘It appearing that the exemption herein granted to
such small businesses would not defeat the declared
purpose | of the Act, theréfore, in view of the ‘fore.
going. o © ©» \

Vol. 3, F ede ral Register, Page » 2536.

The basis for this preatuble prefixed by the Administrator
to his original definition of the phrase ‘‘area of production’
is clearly given in the debates in Congress on the Act, the
joint committee hearings, and the committee reports.

‘See, for example, Senate Report #884, 75th Congress,
first session; C. R.. July 27, 193%, pages 9895, 9904, 9906-7,
9910; C. R. July 30, 1937, pages 10179-81, 10191; (@®% R. July
31, 1937, pages 10246-7 7, 10267, 10276; C. R. December 17,
1937, page 2319: C. R. May 23, 1938, page 9626; C. R. May |
24 and 25, 1938, pages 9741, 9746. :

The debates may be considered. Federal Trade Comn. v..
Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 648, 650, 75 L. Ed. 1324;. Abram v.

San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 49 Fed. Supp. 393 at 401. se

e,

ed

15 ’

Moreover, the said Congressional debates and reports
disclose the esserttial intent of Congress in enacting the Act
to include within its provisions all industrial workers and
exclude agricultural workers.

- That the Administrator's problem was deliberately cast
upon him by Congress. and he was left with full authority
to pnomulgate’ a definition, reasonably conceived to carry
out the intent of Cofigress even though it.departed from
the dictionary meaning of the phrase ‘‘area of production’”’,
is clear from the colloquy between Senator Black and Sena-
tor Schellenbach in. the course 6f the debate on the bill, as
follows :

Senator Black whet Senator Schellenbach what would be —
the definition of ‘‘area’’, would it not be possible to define it
more clearly to get the effect. Senator Schelenbach an-
swered, ‘‘I gave that considerable thought. Ido not believe
it is possible, and that i is something that the Board (now the*
Administrator) which has ‘been accused of receiving too
much power, will have ‘to decide. It would have to provide
a definition of ‘immediate production area’ *’
sional Record, July 30, 1937, p. 10181). . |

in resolving his definitions, the Administrator could well
assume that the Art was constitutional. The Supreme *
(' ourt has so held in the cases of: ce

(Congres-

“Opp Cotton Muls vy. Administrator of the v age and
‘Hour Division of the De ‘partment of Labor, 312 U.S.
126, 85 L. Ed. 624, and

United States v. Darby,3 312 U.S. 100, &5 L. Ed. 609,

Likewise, he could well assume that the intent of the Act
was to cover all industrial employees engaged in commerce.

Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation, — <V.&
87 L. Ed. 423

and to except only those establishments coming strictly
and literally within the exemptions of the Act.

?

.
ne t ed

He cauld fairly assume that the Act being a ene one
with a humanitarian end in view is entitled to a liberal con-
struction. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co. (C.C. A.
8), 113 Fed. 2nd 52; Bowie v.. Gonzalez (C. C. A. 1st), 7
Fed. 2nd 11; Lofther v. 1st Nat. Bank of C mcage, 48 Fed.
Supp. 692.

He could fairly assume that exemptions therefrom should
be construed strictly. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Biiton
Co. supra; Boyer v. Miller Hatcheries, 42 Fed. Supp. 137;
Abram v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co:, 46 Fed. Supp, 969.

A reading of the debates in Congress will demonstrate
that the Administrator in defining the phrase properly exer-
cised his judgment and discretion to advance the purpose -
in: the mind of Coa&gress when the Act was enacted.. —__

A reading of the record of the Administrative hearings
by his representative, Merle D. Vincent, to ascertain the
factual basis for such definitions, and a reading of the find-
ings of the said assistant show that the Administrator had
a sufficient basis for using his Congressionally granted
power to define the phrase ‘‘area of production’’ as he did.

The Administrator's definition as to number of employ ees
is upheld in the Texas case of Silgaro v. Pyt Compress'Co.,
45 Fed. Supp. 88.

The distinction between the Administrator’s definitions
and that. of the Court of Appeals rests in the fact that the
Court of Appeals has stuck to the dictionary meaning of the
_phrase and thereby defeated the intent of Congress, where-
as the Administrater has given effect to the intent of Con- .
ress as he determined it to be. \" ate

The Supreme Court has long recognized that while Con-
-wress may not delegate legislative-power to administrative
- agencies, Congress may declare its will, and, after fixing
a primary standard, devolve upon administrative officers
the power to fill the details by prescribing administrative
‘rules and regulations allowing reasonable variations, tol-

17 ; -, ?

‘erances and exemptions which, because of their variety and
need for detailed statement, it-was impracticable for Con-
gress to prescribe. United States v. Shreveport, Grain &
El. Co., (1932), 287 U.§. 77, 77 L. Ed. 177. A regulation
by a department of government addressed to, and reason-
ably adapted to, the enforcement of an Act of Congress, thie
administration of which is confided to such department has
the force and effect of law, if it be not in conflict with ex-
press statutory provision. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United —
Stafes, (1920) 251 U. S. 342,°349, 64. L. Ed. 297. Had Con-
gress. itself defined ‘‘area of production’’ as did the Ad-
mipistrator in his regulations, the provision. would .un-
questionably have been valid. -Cf. Tigner v. Texas,. (1940),
310 U. S. 141, 84 L. Ed. 1124.

The Congress reposed the controlling diseretion as to - -

the scope of the exemption in\ the Administrator. And
where ‘‘a determination has beenleft to an administrative
body, this delegation will be respected and_the administra-
tive conclusion left ‘untouched.”’ Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S.
402, 86 L. Ed. 301, (1949). It has long been held that where
Congress has aufherigd a public officer to take kome speci-
fied legislative action when in his judgment that action
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the poliey of Con-
gress, the judgment of the officer as to the existence of the
facts calling for that action is not subject to rev lew. United
States v. Bush & Co. (1940), 310 U. S. 371, 84 L. Hd. 1259.
As stated by Mr. Justice Storey in Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat.
(U.S.) 31, 32, 6-L. Ed. 541; ‘Whenever a statute gives a
discretionary power to any. person, to be exercised ‘by him
upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule. of
~ construction, that the. statute constitutes him - sole ‘and
exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.’ . -

The Court of Appeals did not reverse the findings of the
District Court. . The findings of the District Court are
clearly based upon sufficient facts to justify the same.-

18

These findings of the District Court find the establishment .
to be of such character as that the establishment does not
fall within the sphere of the exception granted by Section 13
(a) (10).
~ The Court of Appeals concedes that if the Administrator’ 4
definitions. are to all respects valid and the exemption’ is
strictly construed, the defendant’s establishment is not
within the exemption granted by ‘Section 13 (a) (10) of the
Act. It overlooks the rule that ‘‘those who set up any such
exceptiun must establish it as*being within the words as
~ well as within the reason thereof’’; U. S.v. Dickson, 15 Pet. -
141, 165, 10 L. Ed. 689.
Section 13 (a) (10) of the Act exempting “‘any-indiv ‘dual
employed within the area of production (as defined by the
Administrator) ’’ contemplates a definition by the Adminis.
_trator not alone with respect to the meaning of the several
words as as¢ertained by an’inspection of the dictionary, but
as fairly and reasonably understood in the light of the
substantive provisions of the statute, and the declared per.
pose of the Act as set forth in Section 2 thereof.
It is significant that Section 3 of the Act contains no less
than 13-definitions of the words employed in‘the statute. .
Yet, the phrase ‘‘area of production’ is not among those

, defined. In leavi ing the definition of this term to the d-

niinistrator the Congress could only be contemplating that,
~ in adapting its declared purpose to vary ing conditions aris-
‘ing, the Administrator would exercise a sound discretion.
reasonably adapted to the— purpose ofthe Act. ,The Ad-
_ministrator’s several amendments, of his original Aefinition, -
referred to by the District, Court, Record 187 to 192, in-
chusive, show a progressive effort on the part of the Ad-
ministrator in this direction. Why should the Adminis-
trator be expressly empowered to define the phrase if the
dictionary definition is to control?

x,

| o @
It may not be presumed that the Administrative hearings
referred to by the District Judge (R. 188) afforded no basis:
for the definitions promulgated. by the Administrator’s
regulations. Fixing the number of employees at ‘‘not to _
exceed 7’’ has a direct bearing on the Congressional pur-
_ pose of.maintainjng the minimum standard of living deemed
‘necessary. It also has a direct bearing on the intent of
Congress. (1) to mold the exemption so as to prevent ‘the
large scale farmer from securing a competitive advantage
over the small seale-producer, and (2) to enable small plants
to compete with larger more industrialized plants perform-
ing similar operations and (3) to prov ide a wage differen-
tial between rural and urban areas and thereby aid the
small farmer in marketing his. goods.

In the light of this. record it may not be justly said that
the Administrative hearings afforded ‘ho basis for para-
graph ‘‘E’’ of regulation 5362 whereby ‘‘ ‘open country’
_ or ‘rural community’ shall not include any , city or town of
~ 9500 or greater population according to the 15th Census,
1930, and ‘immediate locality’ shall not include any dis-
tance of more than 10 miles’? (R. 188). Obviously, as the
' District Judge held (R. 196) such. a restriction does not
contemplate that a town of: Grenier population than 250)

shall lie within the area.

The opinion of the Court-of Appeals stated that ‘in ‘ordi
nary usage the words ‘general vicinity’ indicate a larger
_area ‘than is meant by ‘immediate locality’ and a distance of
25 miles in this day of highly developed travel facilities ix
not beyond the range of usual farm travel’’ (R. 227): But
_ the-finding of ti® District Judge was that ‘am appreviable
portion (of the commodities or materials processed) came
from a distance -beyond the range of usual farm ttavel’’
~ {R. 192). This was a finding of the facts presented in thi-
controversy as to'the particular circumstances and ought

ad

not to have been suiitaa by the Court of, Appeals te’ a
* conclusion of law as to what, country-wide, in general, is
the usual range of farmitravel:

In the above mentioned finding IX, the District Court
. found that there was practically no testimony in the record
showing the percentage of the fruit processed by the de-
fendant establishment which was procured from groves lo-
cated at a distance of more than 10 miles by the shortest
road haul from the establishment; almost all of the testi-
mony on the distance of the point of origin of the commodi-
ties processed by said establishment during said two sea-
sonal periods had reference to a ten miile radius, ‘‘as the
«row flies’’ (R. 193). ‘‘Shortest road haul’ is the only _
reasonable construction’ of the word ‘‘distance’’ in the
clanse of the Administrator's definitions that ‘‘ immediate
locality shall not include any distance of more than 10
miles."*, Yet, the Court of Appeals, treating the ‘‘distance”
fixed by the regulation to be ‘‘as the crow flies”’, undertook
- to find specifie percentages of these materials to have come
from specific distances within or without a ten mile radius
(R. 226 and 227).

The District Judge found wat each of the Administra-
tor’s three definitions effective during the periods in con-
troversy were in all respects valid (R. 194-5). The Court
of Appeals.cast aside the number factors in the several
definitions (R. 226 and 227) and interpreted the Adminis
trator’s use of the word ‘‘all"’ to méan ‘‘substantially all’.
and by so doing, rendered ineffective that part of the Ad.
ministrator’s definitions requiring that all of the commoili-
ties processed nust be obtained from the immediate locality
or general vicinity of the establishment (R. 227).-

We submit that the District Judge was right in measuring ,

the exemption claimed by the Administrator's definitions. ,

ee ot at ees ae.

If so, then, on the facts in the record, as reflected in the

findings of fact made by the District Judge, he was also

right in finding that the defendant's establishment is not
exempt under Section 13 (a) (10).

However, if the Administrator's definitions are not valid,
no exemption in favor of the.defendant exists. On this
point a California District Court says: sige

**Assuming that the Administrator's definition of
‘area of production’ ix wrong, they (speaking of the
defendants) cannot claim exemption under it unless

the Administrator redefines the phrase. so as to ex-
clude their, establishment. .. ‘

Re dlands Foothill Grov es v. Jacobs, District r ‘ourt,
Southern District of California, Central Divi-
sion, January 5, 1940, 30 Fed. Supp. 995 at 1006,
second column. Opinion by Yankyich, Judge.

We submit that the Administrator faithfully exercised

‘his discretion and: judgment in defining the phrase ‘‘area -

of production’’. His interpretation of this phrase is en:
titled to great, weight.

, Usa. American Tracking diudiiteee, Inc. (1940),

310 U.S. 534. “
Miller Hatcheries v. Boye r. (CC A Sth, 1942), 131 Fee
(2d) 283 at 286.

If the -Administrator’s several definition< are valid, the

defendant's establishment does npt come within the exemp- .

tion granted by Section 13 (a) (10).

If the Administrator's definitions are invalid, no ae. y

tion exists under Section 13 (a) (10), because it was me

sary for him to define the phrase aqere the-exe “iaption

could be claimed.

~
5 \:

eee ner Sear er anee ant ceeemonary epee tat nemananene eleven

_In either event, the petitioners are entitled to affirmance
of the judgment entered by the District Judge in their
favor.

Respectfully submitted,

. GeorGeE PaLMer GarretTT,
_As Counsel. for Petitioners.

(7358)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386404_0036%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
