# Transcript of Record — Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Transcript of Record
- **Published:** January 1, 1944
- **Citation:** 322 U.S. 292

## Text

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SUPREME COURT OF THE. UNITED STATES
. “OCTOBER TERM, 1942.

No.

ak roe Dla

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER,

. vs.

THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

+

d - ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME Cras
OF = STATE OF ‘MINNESOTA
ty Original ‘ Print
f Record from Distriet Conrt of Ranisey County, Minnesota... © 1°. 1,
} Citation 2... ..2.cseceessssetecneeeeenss are entice 1 ->
Answer ...... ‘Seecnced Weaghesuess oeeO8Scaekesasnadees eS a 2
' . Amended stipulation of facts... .........ccceesccecees ar 5
— of fact, condtasions of Jaw and order for judg-
k ot, EBRD , 9868444660006 FOSS CU1.9 09694 S SASH SOSEHEEE SES heee. 19. ' 10
Jetguiat. onde besnncqacadencpaccsdaseest eaneacseees *s0 016
; Stipulation waiving bond ...... or in printing) .. 32
E Notice of appeal........++++sseseseeeeweceeeeenetones 33 17
:. Proceedings in Supreme Court of Minnesota. vacdacicodecocs 84 17-
% Opinion of the Court, Pirsig, J............eecceeeeseccnces a 18
i Dissenting opinion of Loring, J. .......+-.+.sseeeeeeeeeeee 49 80.
Concurring opinion of Streiseguth, Bropbdccsacnocesdocesiss, -Oe 37
» Jua@amemt *.cscccccccccccccsccscccecs pesenecedsascpsacent 60 39
; . Stipulation as to record..........eseceeeccececcceceeceess , = 40
Clerk’s certificate ..........+-ee00- (omitted in printing). . 62 ‘
Order extending time within which to file petition for writ of .
he certiorari occ cecenecessceceees see Seccsececccesccccees - 8 41
: ; >
Order allowing certiorari ..........+- 9 0000050 ces0egese Sesvetscdes a 41
—ATT

[fol ay. |
IN DISTRICT COURT OF RAMSEY COUNTY

; Pan Sratre OF Minnesota, Plaintiff,

— | - ‘ Ve. 3 ; baal .
ppsszaats ‘Amines, Inc., a aE Defendant
| 2 - CrraTion | |

The State of Minnesota to the Defendant iniwe Sasnel
Whereas, The County ° Auditor of said County has, on

‘the 16th Day of July, A. D..1940, filed with the Clerk of said *

Court a copy.of tle duly revised list of delinquent taxes
upon personal property, for the year 1939, according to the -
provisions of the statutes in such cases’ made and provided.

And Whereas, The sum of $22,498.56 including penalty
provided by law, appears upon said copy of the revised list.
as'the taxes duly assessed against you, for personal prop-
[fol. 2] erty, for the year 1939, and that the same are due
and delinquent, you are hereby cited to. be and appear’ be-
fore the District Court aforesaid, at the next general term
of said Court, commencing on the 7th day of October, A. D.
1940, at 10 0 rlock i in the forenoon of that day, at the Court .
House in ‘the City: of St. Paul, in said County,.then and
- there to show cause, if any there be, why you should not pay
such taxes and penalty, and if you shall fail to pay. said
taxes,. penalty and all the accrued costs thereon to the
Sheriff of said Ramsey County, before the first day of said
term of Court, or upon said first day of said term fail to
show: sufficient cause for said non-payment of said taxes,
and all costs as aforesaid, judgment will be entered against
’ you for said amount of said taxes, together with Costs as
aforesaid and disbursements...

Witness, the Honorable Hugo O. Hanft, J udge of said
Court, and the seal of said Court, at St. Paul, i in, said County
this 25th day ‘of July, 1940.

N. C. Robinson, Clerk, by C. E. Ralphy Deputy Clerk.
—_ remittances to T. J. ne Sheriff.

1—5477

2
[fol. 3] Ins Disraicr Cover or Ramery Country

s , © 2 ane 7 .
Comes now Northwest Airlines, Inc., defendant above

named, and for its answer to the citation hitherto issued in -
the above entitled proceedings respectfully shows to the

Court that;
I al

The defendant is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Minnesota with its principal
place of business at Saint Paul Municipal Airport, Saint
Paul, Minnesota. ,

The citation of Thomas J. Gibbons, Sheriff. of Ramsey
County, Minnesota, dated May 15, 1940, and bearing number

. 6550, was served upon- the defendant on May ms 1940. -

Pie
The sum demanded i is Twenty. three Thousand Six Hun-

"dred Twenty-three and 74/100 Dollars ($23,623.74) as taxes

and penalty for the year 1939 upon personal property of the
defendant claimed jo be located at the Municipal Airport
[fol. 4] in the City of Saint Paul, County of Ramsey and
State of Minnesota.

IV

Defendant is informed and verily believes said assess- 4
ment was based in part at least upon the full value of de--
fendant’s entire fleet of aircraft, even though not physically

. present in Ramsey County on May‘l, 1939, upon the theory

that all of said aircraft are taxable in full at Sait Paul as
their home port.
7.

Defendant is engaged in the business of carrying mail,
passengers and freight for hire in interstate commerce, and

operates aircraft on regular schedules between Chicago,
Tilinois, and Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon,
via Milwaukee and Madison, Wisconsin, Rochester, Saint ~
Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota, Fargo and Biamarck-

Mandan, North Dakota, Miles City, Billings, Butte, Helena . ,

and Missoula, Montana, and Spokane, Wenatchee and Yak-
ima, Washington. Defendant also operates regular sched-

“pled-flights between Fargo, North Dakota, and Winnipeg,

MY
ae?

(fol. 5) fendant has been, operating aircraft on. ‘regular ~

Manitoba. On May 1, ‘1939, si iit siesta
scheduled stops at Saint Panl. Since“June 1, 1940, the de-

schedules een cree | and Daum, Minnesota.
Defendant maintains an overhaul base at Saint Paul,

Minnesota, and operates maintenance bases at Chicago, Illi-

nois, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Fargo, North Dakota, Bil-
lings, Montana, and Spokane and Seattle, Washington; at
which points important service and maintenance work and
minor and emergency repairs are made. At these points
aircraft are kept for originating flights or for changing
ships on through flights. The defendant also maintains
ground crews at various points 4Jéng its lines, and leases
+ owns hangers at various points. . 2

VII’

Au of defendant’s said aircraft are integral parts of its .
said interstate operations; and are necessary instrumentali-- }

-ties thereof; all of said aircraft are continuously

in flying from state to state in the course of defendant’s
said operations, except for brief stops at airports in the
course of scheduled flights and ‘except for occasional lay-
ups for repairs or overhauling. The said aircraft have no
fixed situs, and their location is constantly shifting from
[fol. 6] one county to another and from one state to another,

_On May 1, 1939, there were present during part or all of the

-day in Ramsey County only one Electra, one Zephyr and —

-

.
rene nt - o> ‘ . a eee
= Pry :

one Stinson airplane belonging to the Gcfendent.
VIII -

For the year 1939 the defendant paid taxes on said air-.

craft, or on a proportionate valuation thereof, in the States

of Illinois, Minnesofa, North Dakota, Montana, Oregon. and *

Washington.
Ix

Defendant alleges that the levy and assessment of a per-

sonal property tax against said aircraft, or any paPt

thereof, would be in violation of the following sections ae

the Constitution of the State of Minnesota:
1. Article 1, Section in reapect of thé provision thereof

that ‘‘no member of state shall be ° ° ° deprived

~~

: sn ee ee ” . - . '
| ae 4 | ) +
ee es
7 of any of the rights c or. ‘privileges: secured to any citizen

‘. thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of
_*, his peers”; —

‘ 2. Article 1, Section q, in eigen of ‘the provision thereof
that -‘‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or dae
erty ‘without due process of law’’;

i [fol.7] 3. Article 4, Section 34, in sieneik of the provision
_-—"- thereof that all general laws ‘shall be uniform in their
‘operation throughout the state’’; and

4, Article 9; Section 1, in respect of the provision thereof
that ‘‘taxes shall be uniform apes the same class of sub-
sere ad
x
Defendant further alleges that the levy. and assessment of

. personal property. taxes against said aircraft, or any of the.
same, are in violation of Article I, Section 8, of the Con-.

_ stitution of the United States in respect of the provision
that ‘‘the Congress shall have power * * * to reg-
ulate commerce with foreign. nations, and among the -sey-
eral states,’’ and also in violation of Article XIV, Section ~.
1, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States i in respect of the provision that ‘‘no state shall make -
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-'
munities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’

~ [fol. 8] xi

. | Deteudant alleges that the City of Saint Paul, the County
y . Of Ramsey and the State of Minnesota are each and all with-
| | out jurisdiction to levy a personal property tax upon said -
TL _. aircraft, or any part of the same, and that the levy of said
‘tax upon said aircraft or any part of the same constitutes
an unlawful burden upon the interstate commerce conducted
- by the defendant. | |
; XIT

. Defendant further alleges that even if said aircraft were
‘taxable in part by said County of Ramsey as of May 1, 1939, |
the valuation placed upon said aircraft and the proportion-

e al a
‘ . . wt
’ » ‘ ‘
. . ° rn ’
" .
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:* Paul, Minnesota.

5

ate basis upon which they were taxed v were wholly excessive
and grossly senetenty,

Wherefore, defendant prays ; that it have judgment that

| it owes plaintiff nothing upon the assessment above set —

forth, and that defendant have its costs and disbursements
herein.

Doherty, Rumble, Butler, Sullivan & Mitchell; Attor-—

_neys for defendant, E-1006 First Natl. Bk. Bldg.,
Saint Paul, Minnesota.

Duly sworn to by Eul. Whyatt. Jurat omitted in printing, —

[fol. 9] In Disrexcr Court or Ramsey County

AME} ED STIPULATION OF Facts

Iti is hereby stipulated by and between the parties hereto

and their respective counsel that the following facts may be — |

taken as true for purposes of the above entitled case:

am: 8 UY

The defendant is a corporation organized and existing

‘under the laws of the State of Minnesota with its principal ~

place of business at Saint Paul Municipal Airport, Saint

II

The defendant is engaged in the business of carrying...

persons, property and mail for hire in interstate commerce
and operates aircraft on regular schedulesgpetween’ the City

of Chicago in the State of Illinois and the City of Seattle in ©
‘the State of Washington and the Oity of Portland in the
State of Oregon via the Cities of Milwaukee and Madison.
in the State of Wisconsin ; the Cities of Rochester, St. Paul -

and Minneapolis in the State of. Minnesota; the Cities of

Fargo and Bismarck-Mandan in the State of North. Dakota; _

the Cities of Miles City, Billings, Butte, Helena and Mis-
soula in the State of Montana and the Cities of Spokane,
Wenatchee and Yakima in the State of Washington. The
defendant also operates regular scheduled flights between
the City of Fargo, North Dakota and the City of Winnipeg

. in the Province of Manitoba, connecting with its transeon-

2—5477 -

~™

aa ee ee

POR Bry FRE e -O* re OO”

hem re

tinental flights. The defendant also operates regular sched-
uled flights between the City of Minneapolis in the State
(fol. 11] ‘of Minnesota and the City,of Chicago in the State

. of Illinois. On May 1, 1939, the defendant was making no
scheduled — in the City of St. Paul.

Ill

On May 1, 1939, the defendant maintained its airplane .
and engine overhaul base at St. Paul,.Minnesota, at which
. principal repairs to its engines and planes were made; ‘and
also maintained a hangar at said airport. .

IV J

On May 1, 1939, the defendant maintained and operated
maintenance bases ‘at Chicago, Illinois, Minneapolis, Min-.

nesota, Fargo, North Dakota, Billings, Montana, and Spo-. :

kane and Seattle, Washington, at which points service and
maintenance work were performed. These: service and
maintenance stations each included a hangar, a crew of li-
censed mechanics, each in charge of a foreman, a complete
set of maintenance tools, such as drill presses, hoists, fuel
supply equipment, welding equipment, trucks, tractors,
battery carts and cleaning equipment and.a complete stock:
_room of parts and supplies. All work on defendant’s air-
craft, with the exception of rebuilding and overhauling the
same, was performed at these maintenance:stations. °
[fol.12] At all its stops, including its maintenance bases,
the defendant did on May 1, 1939, maintain a radio opera- -
tor and a station manager, except that there was no radio
operator or dispatcher at-St. Paul. Ai a number of its
stops the defendant—also maintained baggage handlers,
| ticket sellers and information clerks, dispatchers and other
employees.

_At all its stops the defendant either owned or leased build-
ings for housing whatever operations it conducted at that
particular point.

The defendant waned hangars at Chicago, Illinois, and
Fargo, North Dakota. The defendant ‘leased hangars at.
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, Billings and Miles .
, City, Montana, Spokane and Seattle, Washington. At Mil-
’ waukee and Madison, Wisconsin, Rochester and Duluth, Min-
nesota, Bismarck, North Dakota, Butte, Missoula and Hel-
ena, Montana, and Yakima and‘ Wenatchee, Washington,

¢

the defendant owned or saint offices and other space at the -

respective airports for its activities.

The defendant’s flight crews, including pilots, copilots y |

and stewardesses, had their bases, that is to say they began

and ended their runs for the defendant, at the —

points: © .
Chicago-Billings cun—MMinncapetii, Minnesota.

Fargo- Winnipeg run—Fargo, North Daktoa.. (No stew- 7

ardesses on this run.)
[fol. 13] Billings-Seattle run—Seattle, Washington.
___ Spokane-Portland run—Portland, Oregon and Spokane,
Washington.
Qn May 1, 1939, none of the defendant’ 8 Peactig crews had
their base at St. Paul. as.
bh

The defendant’s routes from Chicago to Seattle and Port-—

land and from Fargo to Winnipeg were fixed and followed
along their entire length a series of radio range courses

which were operated day and night by the Civil Aeronautics: .
Authority, these ranges being placed at regular intervals -

along the routes and being so situated as to mark a con-

tinuous course of travel. .Along defendant’s entire route |

there were also emergency landing fields at regular in-
tervals which were maintained by the Civil Aeronautics

Authority. Whenever tlie occasion requires due to weather ©

conditions, it may be necessary to abandon the regular route
of travel and follow another course for short intervals. —

a a

a.

The airplanes owned and operated by defendant were

constantly changing from place to place along defendant’s
routes. All of said aircraft were continuously engaged in
' [fol. 14] flying from state to state in the course of defend-
_ant’s operations, except for brief stops at the airports in
the course of scheduled flights and except for occasional

layups for repairs or overhauling. The location of said.

‘aircraft was constantly shifting from one county to an-
other and from one state to another.

"yr

All of detendant ’s airplanes were in Wiknnnite: from
time to time during the year 1939 carrying ee,

8 Paty i
. : ; 7”

*. “property - - the mails and for the purpose of periodical
overhauling. On May 1, 1939, there were present in.the
State of Minnesota for at least part of the day the following:

_-isted airplanes belonging to the defendant and constituting

° a part of its entire fleet, the time of arrival, time of depar-
ture, and total time present at the respective airports being
as follows : ;
[fol. 15] . _ MINNEAPOLIS :
Total Time
No. of Ship . Time In Time Out at Port
NC 17387 Zephyr 14H 12:03 A. M. 6:55 A. M.
| 3:36 P. M. weve. * 15:hrs. 76 min.
_NC 18994 “ ° ae 12:30 A. M. oe
ee 8:35 P.M. 8:55 P. M. 50 min.
NC 14907 Lockheed 10A . 6:35A.M.. 3:55 P. M. 9 hrs. 20 min.
NC 17392 Zephyr 14H: 8:15 A. M. 6:00 P. M. 9 hrs. 45 min. .
NC 14263 eed 10A 8:19 A. M. 8:39 A. M. ; 20 min.
NC 21713 Douglas DC-3° ied 11:21A.M. —11. hrs. 21 min.
. NC 21711 * 10:10 A. M. 1:30 P. M.
, 8:45 P. M. 9:14 P. M. 3 hrs. 49 min.
NC 21712 “ . }0:55 A. M. 2:38 P. M. »
8:25 P. M. dén's 7 hrs. 18 min. -
~ NC 14170 Stinson Reliant fiee oS! eee, 24 hrs.
NC 17385 Zephyr 14H re arrre 24 hrs.
NC 14900 “ae hes 24 hrs.
NC 14261 “* - oe ~ gadis Te 7 hre. 18 min.
NC 14170 Stinson Reliant. *.... Ste * 24 brs.
‘NC 17385 Zephyr 14H see eas 24 hrs.
NC: 14900 ead 10A re eae eo es 24hrs. |
NC 14261 * E> ee “brs. .
NC 14244 “- ae on 24 hrs.
Fo. a4 ROCHESTER
NC 21711 Douglas DC-3 9:20 A. M. 9:35 A. M. 20 min.
2:10 P. M. 2:15 P. M.
NC 18994 Zephyr 14H = M’ 9:42 P. M. 10 min. |
. PAUL ; A
NC 14262 Lockheed 110A .. ern - 24 hre.:
NC 17886 Zephyr 14H Ries Se 24 brs.
VIII |

On May 1, 1939, the defendant’s flight operations were ©
subject to the jurisdiction of the United Statés Civil Aero-
_ Nauties Authority and its flights were all made pursuant to —
certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by
the Civil-Aeronautics Board. Its airplanes were all re “
tered with the Authority with St. Paul as their home pork eek

*[fol. 26] ~ a a

The defendant filed its: return for the year 1939 and in- -
cluded therein airplanes of its fleet of the total true and full. :
value of $77,000.00. That thereafter an additional assess-
ment. of opitted property -consisting of .the remainder of
airplanes then owned by the defendant as of May 1, 1939,
was added to the tax rolls at a true and full value of $630,- .
000; it was agreed, however, that the actual true and:full
value of said omitted property on said last-mentioned date
_ was the sum of $511,500.00. That said additional assess-
ment was duly entered by the County Auditor on the assess- ~

- 8+8477

14

* |

ment and tax books for the year 1989 but was not paid; that
thereafter the list-of allpersonal property taxes remaining
delinquent on the first day of April, 1940, which included
said additional assessment, was duly certified to and filed
with the Clerk of the above-named district court; that there-
after, said additional assessment still remaining delinquent,
all proceedings req uired by law were duly taken, including
the. issuance of a ‘ State of Minne- —
sota from that certain judgment of the a -named Court
’ filed herein on January. 5, 1942.
Dated January 5, 1942.
_ Doherty, Rumble, Butler, Sullivan & Mitchell, At-
‘torneys for Defendant, E-1006 First Natl. Bk.
Bldg., Saint Paul, Minnesota. |

[fol.34] [File endorsement omitted]
| In Supreme Courr or Minwesora 7

Pirsig, J.
Concur: Streissguth, J. ;
Dissent: ' Loring, J., Gallagher, C. J., J. J. Olson, J.

33176

State or Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.

‘Norruwesr. AIRLINES, Inc., Appellant

.Sy_tasus—Filed December 18, 1942 .-

_ A tax by.a state without jurisdiction to impose it is”
unconstitutional as a violation of due process.

2. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United -
States will be followed in the interpretation of the meaning.’
of due process under the federal constitution. Although
our state constitution contains a similar provision, it was
not intended to be more restrictive than aaa of the federal ©
constitution.

90 ae a.

Defendant filed its tax return ter the year 1939 in which |
it included a portion of ‘its airplanes at the full value of -
[fol. 37] $77,000.. This valuation was based on planes in
the state on May 1, 1939. Later, an additional assessment .
was made by the county auditor in which he included the
remaining airplanes owned by the defenflant at the full
value of $511,500.

From the foregoing facts the lower court concluded that
all of the planes ‘‘had a situs for taxation in the state of .
Minnesota and not. elsewhere’’ and accordingly directed ©
judgment to be entered for the taxes upon all of the planes
in the sum of $16,913.60, together with penalty thereon, .
making a total of $18, 266. 68.

The question before us is whather this state may impose
a tax upon all of defendant’s planes. The right to do so is
attacked on the grounds that it is-a violation of the due
process ‘clauses of the! state‘and federal constitutions and
that it is an interference with interstate commerce.

Taking up first the claim that the tax is a violation of haa

process, the general rule is that a tax by a state which has
no jurisdiction to impose it violates the constitutional pro-
hibition against taking property without due process of
law. For present purposes it is unnecessary to consider
separately the due process clauses of the state and federal
constitutions. If under this clause of the federal constitu-
tion this: state may impose a tax upon all of the planes
owned by defendant, it may also do so under the state con-
_ stitution. The state provision was not intended to be more
restrictive than that of the federal constitution. State v.
_ Weyerhauser, 72 Minn. 519, 75 N. W. 718; W. J. Armstrong
Co. v.N. Y. C.& HE. R. Co:, 129 Minn.-104, 151 N. W. 917.
In In re Estate of Taylor, 175 Minn. 310, 315, 219 N. W. 153,
221 N. W. 64, 65, this court said:

“Ht is our aim to follow the decisions of the Supreme
‘Court of the United States, since we are construing a provi-
sion of the federal constitution, although our own state con-
stitution contains a similar. provision.’

If, therefore, the tax may be imposed under. the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it may also be
' imposed under our constitution. |
[fol. 38} The airplane has raised many unique legal ques-
tions in other fields. We do not, however, consider it of
such a nature that it niust be placed in a new and inde-

i eee eens a | lls

21

pendent category so far as. taxation is concerned. It is but
personal property used for the transportation of persons
and goods. Its distinction lies in that it leaves the ground
and travels through the air. But this is not of significance
here. The sovereign power and jurisdiction of a state is not
limited-to the ground. An airplane in the air over the terri- |
tory of a state is within the state and subject to its sovereign
power. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
has said in Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. Inc., 270

Mass. 511; 521, 170 N. E. 385, 389, 69 A. L. R. 300,308: - .

“Tt is esséntial to the safety of sovereign States that
: they possess jurisdiction to control the airspace above their
territories. It seems to us to rest on ‘the obvious practical
necessityof self-protection.’’ See also People v. Katz, 249
N. Y. S. 719, 140 Misc. 46.

The enaatlen we have, then, is the broader one of when
and under what conditions the state of the owner’s domicile
loses jurisdiction-to tax tangible personal property moving
about from state to state? May the state of domicile tax
the whole thereof? —

. Two classes of cases have particular: bearing on this
question. The first deals with ships upon the high seas. It
has been held in those cases that where a ship sails from its
‘home port and into the port of a foreign state and s
there but temporarily for the purpose of loading or AE
ing it cannot be taxed by the latter state. Hays v. Pacific
Mail S. S. Co.,-58 U. S. (How.) 596; Morgan v. Parham; 83
U. S. (Wall.) 471; Southern Pacific Co. v, Kentucky, 222
U.S. 63. |The rule has been applied to ships plying naviga-
ble streams. St.: Louis v.. The Ferry Company, 78 U®S.
(Wall.) 423; Gloucester bisa Co. v. rates ibienated nia
U. 8.196. | ,

In some of these cases the court relied: upon the maxim
‘Mobilia sequuntur -personam; immobilia situm. Mobilia
non habent sequelam. Another reason given was that the
[fol. 39] property had not ‘‘ become incorporated with other
personal a the state’’ seeking to impose the tax.
Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 58 U. S. (How.) 596; Morgan
v. Parham, 83 U. S. (Wall.) 471; and see Old Dominion
. §. 8. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. 8. 299... The more basic reason

was given in Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S.°
63, 68: ‘‘The ancient maxim which assigns to tangibles, as

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ae

well as intangibles, the situs of the owner for purposts of
taxation has its foundation in the protection which thé
owner receives from the government of his residence.”’
_ If the ship has obtained an actual situs in a state other.
. than: that of the home port, that state might’ validly
subject the ship ‘to the ordinary property taxes of. that.
state. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S.. 299..
In that event, it has been said that the situs of the domicile.

yields tq the actual situs and — dominion of another — a4

‘government.

The second class of cases relating ts the ‘question. here
involved deals with the taxation of rolling stock of railroad
companies. For the purpose of determining whether such ~
property has acquired a situs in a state foreign to that of
the. domicile of the company, Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, introduced a new principle.
_ -In that case Pennsylvania ‘imposed what was in substance a
property, tax upon the cars of an Illinois corporation within
the borders of Pennsylvania. A certain proportion of the
company’s cars-was constantly and continuously present
there. For that reason, the right of Pennsylvania to im-
pose the tax was sustained, notwithstanding the fact that
. individual: ears miaking up the avérage in the state were
constantly changing and were there but temporarily. The-
court looked not at the individual cars but‘at the average,
and that average was.permanently located in Pennsylvania.
See also Marye vy. B. & O. R. Co. 127 U. 8.117. The Pull-
man Car case, 141 U. S. 18, was followed in, among other -
decisions, American R. T. Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70, and
Union. R. T. Co. v. Lyrich, 177 U. 8. 149. The principle
[fol. 40] of the case-has its limitations. The foreign state
. May not tax more than the average number of cars present,
‘even though all the cars of the company might at some time
during the tax period be actually, but temporarily, present .
within the state. A.tax on all the cars is invalid. Johnson
Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, ‘290 U. S. 158.
It is necessary also that an average number of cars appear
to be permanently present. This court has held that where
the railroad cars of a foreign corporation are but tem-
porarily here the right to tax does not exist. State v. Union
Tank Line Co. 94 Minn. 320, 102 I. W. 721. .
_--Defendant contends that the principle of the Pullman
Car. decision, 141 U. 8. 18, is applicable in this case, and
that other states through which its planes are routed are

23
* entitled to tax the average number of planes constantly
present in those states even though any individual plane
may be there but temporarily. The state,on the contrary, -
takes the position that no situs has been acquired in otber ~
states, and, by ‘analogy to the ship cases, this state, being
the domicile of defendant, may tax them all. Neither the °
stipulation nor the findings are as clear as one could’ wish
__—~on whether such an average number of planes was so con-
stantly and permanently in any one ‘state as to acquire a |
situs there. But we shall not puréue the question, for. .—iy.
undet the view we adopt it is not a material factor. We
concede that the principle of the Pullman Car case is as
applicable to planes as it is to railroad cars and that the
findings lead to the conclusion that. some proportion of
. defendant’s planes acquired a situs in other states‘and to
that extent may be taxed there. on -
That leaves the further question whether the acquisition
of a situs in.a foreign state removes the jurisdiction of
the state of the owner’s domicile to tax. The cases so far
discussed do not, except by incidental comment, bear upon
that problem. They deal only with the right of the foreign
state to tax. So far as a specific item of tangible personal -
- property is concerned, the question was decided in Union
[fol. 41] Refrigerator Transit Co.-v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. ne
194. It was there held that if such property has acquired .
a tax situs in another state it cannot be taxed inthe state
_ of its owner’s domicile. The principle so laid down has
since been uniformly followed. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268
U. S. 473, 489, 45 S, Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316;
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 92, 93,
. 508. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180, 67 A. L. R. 386; Sancho v.:Huma-
cao Shipping Corp. (1 Cir.) 108 F. (2d) 157.” ip
It is the claim of defendant that the Transit‘ Company
case, 199 U. S. 194, established with.equal force that the :
result is the same when the situs-is acquired in the foreign . G
state by the application of the doctrine of the~Pullman
Car case, 141 U.S. 18. Hence, since some proportion of
defendant’s: planes may, as conceded, be taxed in other.
States, it'is claimed that this state has lost its power to
_» tax to a corresponding degree. es ey
A careful examination of the Transit Company case will
disclose that it doesnot go to the‘length so claimed for it. . :
It appears that there Kentucky sought to impose what was al
treated as a property tax upon all the railroad cars owned

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by the transit company, which was incorporated in.Ken-
tucky. The headquarters for its cars were located at Mil-
' - waukee, Wisconsin, at which ‘point they . were rented to
shippers who used them for the carrying of freight in the
~~ United States,-Canada, and Mexico. The court held that
Kentucky had no, jurisdiction to tax all the cars of the
company: The record in the case reveals further that some
of the cars were in fact constantly coming into and going
out of Kentucky, and that the state trial court had found .
_ that a definite average number of cars was in the state
during the year for which the taxes were imposed. But it
is also evident that there were larger numbers of the com- .
pany’s-cars which- were never within the state at any time
during the tax period. The opinion of the court makes it
clear that it was this last fact which the court deemed
(fol. 42] controlling. The court states the question before |
it to be. (199 U. 8. 201) ‘‘whether a corporation organized
under the laws of Kentucky is subject to taxation upon its
tangible personal property, permanently located in other
States, and employed there in the prosecution of its busi-
ness.’’ It states further (P.-204) that“property which is
wholly and exclusively within the jurisdiction of another
State, receives none of the protection for which. the tax is
supposed to be the compensation,’ and that such property
does not and cannot receive protection under its laws,
pm. . [P. 206] it is taxable in the State where it is
= permanently located and employed and where it receives
its entire protection.’’ (All italics supplie4). .
In defining -the basis re apg me court denied the
right to tax, it-said (199 U.S . 202):

‘*The power of taxation, indispensable to the qxistenes
of. every civilized government, is exercised upon the as- _
sumption of an equivalent.rendered to the taxpayer in the
protection of his person and. property, in adéing to the

. value of such property, or-in the creation and waintenance
of public conveniences in which he shares, such, for in-
stance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools
for the education of his children. If the taxing power be
in no position to render these services, or otherwise to
benefjt the person or property taxed, and stich property be
wholly within the taxing power. of another State, to which
it may be said’to owe an allegiagce and to which it looks for

- protection, the taxation of such property within the domi-
cile of the owner partakes rather ad the nature of an

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25

extortion than a tax, and has hots repeatedly held by this
court to be beyond the power of the legislature and a taking
of property without due process of law.’’ .

It is plain that the court in denying the right of Kentucky
to tax was speaking about those cars which were perma-
nently in other states and did not reach Kentucky at all. The
facts did not raise the question, and there is nothing to
indicate that the court: intended to hold, that cars going
from Kentucky and from time to time returning to it could
not be taxed by that state because they had contributed to
an average which had acquired a situs in another state. The
only question before the court was the validity of the tax

on all of the: company ’s cars, some of which were perma-
[fol. 43] netnly in other states. It is noteworthy that the
court cites and states the holding of the Pullman Car case
without suggesting that it had any direct application to the
facts before it. We conclude, therefore, that the case does
hot sustain the claim of defendant that this state has lost
the right to tax all its planes because an average of them
had obtained a situs in other states.

‘The only other cases’ requiring consideration upon this
point are New York ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Miller, .
202 U.,8. 584, and Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma, 290
U.S. 158. In ‘the New York Central case, the state of domi-
cile of a railroad company was permitted to tax all the cars

_ of the company despite the fact that an average number of
cars was constantly outside the state. The court distin-
guished the Pullman Car case, 141 U. S. 18, on the gropnd
that it appeared in that case that (202 U. S. 597) “‘The

same. vars were continuously receiving and protection of the

State and, therefore, it was just that the State should tax
a proportion of them.’’ ‘The court expressly reserved the

- question whether there was “any necessary parallelism be- _—

tween liability elsewhere and immunity at home.’’ ‘That

' reservation in itself indicates that the court did not con-

sider the question settled by its previous decision in the
Transit Company case, 199 U. S. 194.

, In the Johnson (il Ref. case, 290 U. S. 158, the owner of

the cars was an Tiinois corporation with its principal place

'. Of business at Chicago. Oklahoma sought to tax all the

cars of the corporation on the ground that they were from

time to time-during the year within the state. The court.

held that the power of Oklahoma to tax the cars was limited

to the average number of cars in the state and that a ic on
‘all was invalid. Broad language was used by court in its
opinion, and, as ably shown by the dissenting opinion of

_ Mr. Justice Loring, it is reasonably susceptible of more ~

‘than one interpretation. We believe that it should be read
[fol. 44] in the light of the facts before the court. It was
_ dealing with a situation where the only basis of taxation
appearing was the average number of cars present in the
, State. The decisiongnd the opinion are not inconsistent
’. with permitting a state to tax additional or all the cars if
additional and constitutionally recognized grounds for ‘the
tax exist. If we find, teefor that an adequate basis ex-
isted in this state for ing all the planes,.the Johnson
case ‘does not deny the right to tax merely because other
states also have the power to do so.

We are left, therefore, thout any controlling aathority ;
f guide us, and in its absence we must resort to tlie basic
constitutional principles upon which the right or juris-
diction of a state to tax depends. In so doing, we cannot —
rest upon any logical application of some legalistic concept
or situs. . When we say that property has a situs within a
state for the purposes of taxation we mean only that-it is
proper and consistent with due precess that that state may.
; impose the tax. There is no constitutional justification for
giving the concept a controlling power of its own.

For a time, under the decisions of the United,States Su- —
preme Court, this was not true. An attempt was ‘made to
use the concept of situs with respect to both tangible and
intangible property for the purpose of limiting the power
to tax to a single state. See Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Min-
nesota, 280 U. S. 204; First Nat. Bank v* Maine, 284 U. S.
312. In the latter case, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes was a
member of the majority of the court which adopted this
view. See also his concurrence in, the dissenting opinions
in Wisconsin y. J’ C. Penney Co., 311 U. 8. 435, and Curry
v. McCanless, 307 U. 8. 357. Much of his opinion in John-
son Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U. 8.
158, can be explained on this basis. On-this ‘ground, Black-

stone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, was overruled. Farmers —

L..& T. Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 209. By this means
the court sought to bring about what it thought to be a
- [fol. 45] desirable policy—the avoidance of double taxation.
See cases cited supra; also Union Refrigerator Transit Co. .
199 U. S. 194. But in more recent cocielons

re

this attempt to read into the due process clause any such
limitation has been definitely rejected as an improper judi-

- gial attempt to compel the application of views as. to wise

: legislative poli¢y through the process of. constitutional in-
terpretation. The possibility of taxation of the same prop-
erty by more than one state is no longer a constitutional
objection. Recently, First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. 8.
312, where the contrary view had been adopted was over-
ruled, and the case of Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189,
restored to good favor. State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich; 316

_ U.S. 174, 62'S. Ct.1008. cai
We look, therefore, not to whether anather state is en-

titled to tax, but rather to whether the power to do so exists —
in this state. Property may have a situs, if-we wish to .-
use that term, in more than one state, depending upon
whether the basic considerations are — which give a.
state the right to tax under the requirements of due process.
These considerations. have repeatedly been stated gto be .
first, the sovereign power of thé state over the person or
property, and, sécond, the rendering in return of a substan-

tial benefit or protection to the person or property taxed. a il

. Thus, in the recent leading case of Carry \ v. McCanless, Re a
U. S. 357, 364, the court said: 7 if
i

~ “The power of government and its agencies to possess - Hi
and to exclude ‘others from possessing tangibles, and thus io

to exclude them from enjoying rights in tangibles located

' within its territory, affords‘adequate basis for an exclusive
taxing jurisdiction. When we speak of the Jurisdiction
to tax land or chattels as being exclusively. in’ the state
where they are. physically located, we mean no more/than _..
that the benefit and protection of laws enabling the y sce ,

| to enjoy the fruits of his ownership and the power to reach
effectively the interests protected, for the purpose of sub-
jecting\them to payment of a tax, are so narrowly restricted

to the state ; in whose territory-the physical property is -
located as\to set pr. ctical limits to taxation by others. Other
states have been said to be without jurisdiction and so with-
[fol. 46] out ‘constitutional ‘pewer to tax tangibles if, be- -
cause of ‘their. location elsewhere, those states can afford .
‘no ‘substantial protection to the rights taxed and cannot
effectively lay holdof any interest i in the satis in order
to compel payment of ee tax.’’

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Again, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435,
_ the court said: .
‘*A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unem-

barrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation
of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation té oppor-
tunities which it has given, to protection which it has af- _

- forded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of be-—
ing an orderly, civilized society * *~* [The] test is
whether property was taken without due process of law,
or, if paraphrase we must, whether. the taxing power ex-
erted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, oppor-.
tunities and benefits given by the state. The simple buf

-* controlling question is whether the state has given any-

:. thing for which it can ask return.’’

See also quotation, supra, from Transit Company case, 199
4 S. 202, See Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. 8S.
We need not consider whether all the cases can be logi-
cally reconciled with the principles thus laid down. It is
sufficient that, particularly in the recent cases, they have
been insisted upon and made the criteria for the constitu-. -
— basis of the power to tax. It is our duty to follow
Applying these principles in this case, we have no diffi-
culty in sustaining the tax of this state upon all the planes
owned by defendant. The power of this state over defend-
ant and the property taxed was present. Defendant was
incorporated here. . Its principal place of business is located
in this state, and all the planes at some time or another
come within its borders. The benefits conferred upon de-,
fendant g government and laws of this state in relation —
to all of defe *s planes is equally clear. The policies
and decisions made by defendant in connection with the
operations of its planes were made here and under the pro-
tection and benefit of the laws of this state. The manner
and extent of their operations were determined and directed °
from this state. Particularly significant is the fact that -
when planes were in need of major repairs and overhauling |
(fol. 47] theecessary repairing and overhauling were done
here. These benefits did not ceaSe the moment the planes
crossed the border into another state. . They continued and
contributed to the successful operation of the planes
throughout the course and ‘scope of their operations.

There is, therefore, no violation of due process in the
_ taxation by this state of all the planes.. There was a fair
basis in the power of this state over defendant and its
planes and in the benefits conférred with respect to this
property upon which the tax may rest. We hold, therefore,
that the tax here in question on all the planes was a valid
one:

Our decision does not rest upon any applicatiow& of the
discredited maxim ‘‘Mobilia sequuntur personam}; immo-
bilia situm. Mobilia non habent sequelam,’’ nor upon the
bare fact that defendant was incorporated here. _A more-
substantial reason for the tax exists. The state is giving a
real and substantial return for the tax it seeks to impose.
Neither do we.question the principle that a specific item of
_ personal property, pérmanently located in another state,
cannot be taxed here. That is not the case before us, We
hold only that there is a fair basis upon which this state

‘ may impose the tax in question and that any right of an-

other state to impose’a similar tax upon some portion of

- the planes does not adversely affect that basis. It may

well be that defendant will be required to pay taxes in other

' states upon some portign of its planes. If so, it is because,

_ under the principles stated, a'fair basis for the tax exists

in those states also. In any event, on the facts as they

appear before us and under the principles already stated,

tes other than this one would not appear entitled to tax

to any greater extent than the average number of planes

within its borders during the tax period. As stated in the

concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in State Tax
Comm.-¥. Aldrich, 316) U. S. 174, 183, 62 §& Ct. 1008, 1013: /

‘*Modern enterprise often brings different parts of an
. organic commercial transaction within the taxing power of
more than one State, as well as of the Nation. It does so
[fol. 48] because the transaction in its entirety may receive

_ the benefits of more than one government.’’

Whether or not it is economically wise or fair.to i impose
the tax herein sustained we are not entitled to consider
under the principles already stated. ‘That question is more
properly addressed to the legislature, whose prerogative
and responsibility it-is to énter into such considerations.
The power to make a good law of necessity carries with it ~
the power to make an unwise one. ‘‘A tax within the law-

. ful power of a state’’ may not “‘be judicially stricken down «

a

- 30 ;

under the due process clause simply. because its enforcement
_ may or will result in restrictyge or even destroying par-
ticular occupations or businesses.’* Magnano Co. v.. Ham-
ilton, 292 U. S. 40, 45 (citing cases).

Defendant’s second objection to the tax is equally ~with-
out foundation. That the planes were engaged largely in
interstate commerce does not deprive this state of the right’
to impose the tax. Property engaged in the transporta-
tion of interstate commerce may be subjected by a state to
the usual nondiscriminatory property taxes if jurisdiction
to tax otherwise exists. Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 141 U. S. 18. See also Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v.
Oklahoma ex rel: Mitchell, 290 U. 8. 158, and cases therein
eited.

The provisigns of the satin vith to taxation of
personal property are sufficiently broad to include all the
planes of defendant. All nonéxempt personal property
owned by a resident is taxed. See Minn. St. 1941, § 272.01
(Mason St. 1927, § 1974), and Id. § 272.03, subd. 3 (4 1979).
The statutes do not in express terms exclude such property
when located outside the state, and the language of § 272.01
' (§ 1974) makes Plain enough that the intention was to
include. it.

_ The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. .
' es BE. Pirsig.

[fol. 49] eed. Justice (dissenting) :

“I find my views at variance with the au arrived
‘ at by the majority. I agree with them that, insofar as
tangible personal property is concerned, the doctrine of
- mobilia sequuntur is outworn and discarded. See Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,.199 U. S. 194, It
follows, of course, as they say, that the place of incorpora- —
tion of the taxpayer does.not control as to such property.
This leaves their opinion resting upon the facts that all the
planes of defendant at regular times come within the pro-
tection of this state, that major repairs are made here, and
that the company’s offices are here.. Does an opinion so
‘grounded harmonize with the principles of due process as
developed and announced by the United States Supreme
Court? '

I think the incahenihts are misled by failing to distinguish .
- between ‘what that court has said in cases involving in-

?

a

31
tangibles and what it has held in those involving tangible —

_ property. If the broad expressions used with reference to

intangible property such as those used in State Tax Comm.
v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 62 8. Ct. 1008, cited by the major-
ity, should be applied to tangible property, which was not
there under consideration, we should find that the doctrine
of mobilia sequuntur, which the majority agree is now dis-

_ carded as to tangible property, would be restored in great

measure and made applicable to tangible property as well
as to intangibles. It certainly applies only to tangible
property wher that property‘ has acquired no situs what-
ever for taxation elsewhere. ‘‘The arguments in favor of
the’ taxation of intangible property at the domicil of the
owner have no application to tangible property.’’. Union
Refrigerator Transit Co.v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 206.

The Supreme Court has drawn a clear distinction be-
tween tangible personal property and intangible property
.’ [fol. 50] in the application of due process. In Curry v. °
McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 365, involving intangibles, Mr.
Justice Stone (now Chief J ustice), speaking for the court,
‘after discussing the situs of tangibles: in relation to the
taxing power, said: :

‘‘Very different considerations, both theoretical and
practical, apply to the taxation of intangibles, that is, rights
which aré not related to-physical things. Such rights are -
but relationships between persons, natural or corporate,
which the law recognizes by attaching to them certain sanc-
tioris enforceable in courts. The power of government over
them and the protection which it gives theni cannot be
exerted through control of a physical thing. They can be
made effective only through control over and protection
afforded to those persons whose relationships are the origin - |
of the rights. [Citing cases.] Obviously, as sources of ~
actual or potential wealth—which is an appropriate meas- |
ure of. any tax imposed on ownership or its exercise—they
canno -be dissociated from the persons from whose rela-

nships they are derived. These are not in any sense fic-

i tions. They are indisputable realities.’’

Therefore, the broad expressions with reference to the
power and jurisdiction to tax contained in cases relative to

'. intangibles, such as State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 316 U. 8.

174, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 86 L. ed. 911 (Advance Sheets), and
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, are not applicable to due '

32 : ms

process as applied to the taxation of tangible property. In
the ‘‘intangible’’ cases, the protection of the rights of
transfer of the evidence of ownership may result, as in State
Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, supra, in what appears to be Gouhle
_ or multiple taxation. —

It appears to me that it would be very sidisiiiiie to
extend to tangible property throries which have been ap-
plied to intangibles only. The Supreme Court has not done
' so. Should the habitual use and flight of airplanes over
the various jurisdictions be held to subject all the taxpay-
er’s planes—not only a proper proportionate share of them
—to double or multiple taxation on their full value, it
would not only be unjust but would create a situation so
burdensome to the airlines as materially to handicap their
development and extension, so vital to the national interest.
It would likewise be unfortunate for those states imposing -
[fol. 51] -the tax on the full value and would doubtless in
the end result in congressional authorization of the in-
corporation of airlines under national law and control of -
taxation. See Mr. Justice Jackson’s dissent, concurred in
by Mr. Justice Roberts, in State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 316
-U. S. 174, 185, 202; supra.

The problem of taxation of airplanes engaged i in sched-
uled aerial transportation i is one of first i impression. Air-. .
planes span the continent in a few hours, passing over many
jurisdictions in the course of a day’s flight. A plane may
be in any one state but one or two hours out of the 24, or
even only part of an hour. In its very nature, aerial trans-
port is largely interstate. If the operations of an airline
were confined to the protection of any single state and to
the benefits and opportunities conferred by the laws of that
state, such a line would be of little importance in the vast
field of air transport. If defendant’s operations were. con-
. fined to the state of Minnesota, doubtless two or three planes
would answer its needs. Its ownership of the large number
of planes here sought to be -taxed is necessitated by its
operations in interstate commerce, where it habitually and
regularly subjects itself to the protection of other juris-
dictions and receives the benefits afforded by the laws of -
‘other states, to whose sovereignty it become subject, except
as it falls within the control of the federal government. -
In that regard there is no distinction between the benefit
and protection afforded by Minnesota and that afforded by

33°
Illinois, Whssoviatia, North. Dakota, ‘ini: Idaho, or
Washington. If the protection and benefit extended by state
_sovereignty to these aircraft, justifies a tax on the full value

of all of them because they Be continually traversing the —

air across this state and because at times they all come
within its boundaries, then every state traversed by the
air route may tax the whole number that flies over such state
on the full value. If the tax imposed by Minnesota on the
full value of-all the planes used by defendant is sustained,
it becomes not only a tax imposed for the protection afforded
[fol. 52] by Minnesota but a tax burdening the entire service
of these planes throughout their route. In reality it assesses
their owner as if its protection covered the planes through-
out their route. Thus, it assesses for protection it does not
furnish and which it has no power to furnish.

‘*The power of taxation, indispensible to the existence of
every civilized government, is exercised upon the assump-
tion of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in protection
‘ of his person and property.’’ Union Refrigerator Transit’

Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 202. -

I am in full accord with the view that the law as applied
to steamships where the sovereignty of the flag follows the
ship throughout the voyage does not apply to airplanes fly-
ing scheduled flights over land. Logically, planes are more
like fleets of railroad cars being operated in interstate
traffic. ;

Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290
U. S. 158, was a case where Pawnee county, Oklahoma,
_ under a state statute, sought to tax the entire fleet of the
Johnson company’s tank cars, which were used mainly in
transporting oil from its refinery in Oklahoma to other |
states. The Johnson company was an Illinois corporation,
but its refinery, trackage, and repair facilities: were in
Oklahoma. Like defendant’s planes, the cars were in almost

continuous movement and the major share of the time were _..

‘beyond the boundaries of the state, though they were all
marked to be returned to the refinery i in Oklahoma, where’
was located the control and supervision of the cars. Thus
we have a‘situation much like that presented to us in the.
case at bar. except that the Johnson company was incor- |
porated in Illinois instead of Oklahoma, a matter which the.
United States Supreme Court and the majority here seem to

34

regard as immaterial insofar as tangible property is con-
_ cerned. A stronger feature for the company in the case at
bar is that its planes are beyond the state boundaries on
regular uniform schedules and routes defined by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority. Oklahoma’s right to tax all the
[fol.53] cars was challenged as a violation of the due proc-
- ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relating to the
_ jurisdiction to tax, the court in that case, speaking through
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, said (290 U. S. 162):

.» “The basis of the jurisdiction is the habitual employment
of the property within the State. By virtue of that employ-
ment the property should bear its fair share of the burdens
of taxation to which other property within the State is sub-
ject. When a fleet of cars is habitually employed 1 in several
States—the individual cars constantly running in and out
of each State—it cannot be said that any one of the States
is entitled. to tax the entire number of cars regardless of
their use im the other States.’’ (Italics supplied. )

True, the Chief J ica speaking for the court, also said

(290 U: S. 161):
“ Appellant had its doviietle in Mincis, and that State

had jurisdiction to tax appellant’s personal property which

had not acquired an actual situs elsewhere. ‘The State of
origin remains the permanent situs of the property not-

- withstanding its occasional excursions to foreign parts.’ ’”

True enough, assuming that the property had acquired a
sttus in the domiciliary state, but the statemen' was obvi-
ously not intended to apply if it had not. Union Refrig-
erator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, supra. But
the situation.in the Johnson Oil Co. case, 290 U. S. 158, as

‘here, was that the tangible personal property had acquired

situs for proportionate taxation elsewhere. In the-case at
bar, the flights on regular daily schedules. throughout the
year were not mere (290 U. S. 161) ‘‘occasional excursions’’
into other’ jurisdictions, but the property (290 U. S. 162)

-*Shabitually. used and employed’’ on such flights within ©

other states acquired a situs for oe taxation in
those states.

As illustrated by the Johnson Oil Co. case, the situs in

the other states for tax purposes may be proportionate
only. It need not be such a situs 4s would confer jurisdic-

tion to tax the full value of all cars which come into the
‘ state even when they come in habitual use. It may bea |
jurisdiction to tax a fair proportion as determined by aver- °
[fol. 54] age presence or other fair method of apportioning
the tax.. It might, in the case of aircraft, be based upon
miles or hours flown in the state in proportion to those
flown elsewhere. ea eee ee .
~ Teannot find that the Johnson Oil Co. case‘has been over-
‘ruled or qualified insofar as tangible property is concerned,
nor do I think it is in conflict with tie previous case of
Peoplé ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. -v. Miller, 202 U. S. ©
584, 597, where New York’s franchise tax, measured by
property, was sustaizied as applied to all the cars of the
-railroad company. There the court said, speaking of the
problem before it: ©

‘In the present case, however, it does not appear that any _
specific oars or any average of cars was so continuously in
any other State as to be taxable there. The absences relied
on were not in. the course of travel upon fixéd routes but.
., random excursions of casually chosen cars, determined by
the varying orders of particular shippers and the arbitrary
convenience of other roads.’’ (Italics supplied.) |

Whatever the actual facts as to car routings may have .
been, the court-in that case viewed the record as showing -
only ‘‘random excursions of casually chosen cars’’ offjmide
the state. The case was decided on that assumption. at
situation is not present in the case at bar. Here we have
air transport planes continyously and habitually used on
scheduled flights over fixed routes, much more extensive.
than through Minnesota, over at. least six other states, .
where they have acquired a situs for proportionate taxa-
tion by virtue of thé protection and benefit of those juris-
dictions, which subjects them to taxation in those states.
American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70,
82; Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma:ex rel. Mitchell, 290
U. S. 158, supra; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch,
177U.8149. ° .« t. aoa tn got
While neither state nor national constitution contains a
specific prohibition against double‘or multiple taxation ‘as
such, obviously the imposition of such a tax may under -
certaii circumstances offend some provision of the funda-
mental law. Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N. W.

102. It is to be avoided if reasonably possible. Bemis Bro.
[fol. 55] Bag Co. v. Wallace, 197 Minn. 216, 228, 266 N. W.
690.. ‘‘Protection against’ * * * wunjust.and oppres-
sive taxation is matter of the greatest moment.’’ Farmers .
L. & T.. Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 212. Here, quite
obviously, it is not only: oppressive but burdens interstate
commerce. It would not do so if it were confined to Minne-
sota’s proportionate share. -

There is no question but that Minnesota may ie its pro-
portionate share ofthe airplanes here involved; but, as
said in Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. ‘Mitchell,
290 U..S. 162, the jurisdiction ‘‘to tax property of this de-.
scription must be determined on a basis which is consistent.
with the like jurisdiction of other States.’’’ It is the power

. of other states to’tax due to habitual use and employment — ,

of the planes within their boundaries which. affects, the
situs of the planes and the right. of Minnesota to tax more
‘than its proportionate share. As said in Farmers L: &°
T.-Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 211, ‘‘the right of. one »
State to tax. may depend somewhat upon the power of an-
other to do so.”’ Certainly that rule has not been changed
as to tangibles as witness the Johnson Oil Co. case, supra.
It is the existence of the power to tax, not the exercise of
it, that affects the situs. Sancho v. Humacao Shipping
Corp. (1 Cir.) 108 F. (2d) 157, 160, though in the case at
bar all states on defendant’s scheduled routes except Idaho ©
have. exercised it.

Whether a proportionate tax should be imposed on the
theory of miles or hours flown within the state as compared
to the total mileage or hours flown, or upon the basis of
average number of planes present in the state under normal ~
operating conditions, having in mind that during most of
the time, as was the case with the cars in the Johnson Oil
Co. case, most of the planes are outside the state, is prob-
ably not a problem for this court to determine. It should
not, however, distinguish this ¢ase from the Johnson Oil
Co. case. That the planes come into the state every day or
nearly every day does not distinguish it. They are ont of

‘ [fol. 56] the state on flights over other jurisdictions a large
proportion of the time. The only difference from the John-
son Oil Co. case is that planes move faster and more fre- .
quently than cars. .The principle is the same. What this
court should say is that the tax may only be imposed by.
Minnesota upon its proportionate share _ on some

e . 37 | ‘
reasonable basis which, aw the taxing authorities a

should first determine.
To summarize: |

‘1, We\have a case of a specific tax on tangible pereonal
property, viz., aircraft. :

' 2. Such property is not subject to the rules applied to
- intangibles.
3. By habituaf; ase and employment on fixed schedules in

flights over. other states, the aircraft have acquired a situs
for proportionnate taxation in those states. :

~ 4, That situs must be taken into cimbideration in deter-
mining Minnesota’s constitutional power to tax, regardless
of the comicile 4 or — place of business of the. tax-
payer. ;
5. Minnesota “may tax only proportionate part of. the
value of the propérty arrived at on some reasonable basis
primarily to be fixed by the taxing authorities.
__ I think the judgment. should be reversed. =
arr * ; ‘Goring, J.

GantacuEn, Chief Justice (dissenting) :

-

I concar in the dissent of Mr. Justice Loring.
Gallagher, C. J.

Juigus J. Oxsox, : Justice (dissenting) :

i concur in the views of Mr. Justice Loring.
: Julius J. Olson, J.

(fol. 57] Sresnidevin, Justice (concurring specially).

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Loring is based
principally upon his interpretation of Johnson Oil Co. v.
Oklahoma ex rel, MitcheH, 290 U. S. 158.° He insists that
that case is indistinguishable from the case at bar, notwith-
standing that there the state, seeking to tax an entire fleet
of floating tank ‘cars, was not the state of the eee :
owner’s domicile. :. To quote from his dissent: .

~ “Thus we have a.situation much like that: presented to us

.. in the case at bar except that the Johnson company was in-
‘ corporated in Illinois instead of Oklahoma, a matter which
the United States ‘Supreme_ Court and the majority here

BB

38

séem to regard as iniiinntantal insofar as tangible property
is concerned.’’

But an ‘eaciiiiieas of the. opinion of Mr. Chief J ustice
Hughes establishes the contrary. To quote (290 U. S. 161):

‘Appellant’ had its domicile in Illinois and that State had
jurisdiction to.tax appellanit’s personal property which had

not acquired an actual situs elsewhere. ‘The State of origin .

remains the permanent situs of the property notwithstand-
ing its occasional excursions to foreign parts.’ ”’

In support of this statement, the Chief Justice cites New
York ‘ex rel: N. Y. C. & H. BR. BR. Co. v. Miller, 202 U: S. 584,
26 S. Ct. 714, 50 L. ed. 1155; Southern Pacific Co. v. Ken-
- tacky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 S. Ct. 13, 56 L. ed. 96. “These cited

cases and not the Johnson Oil Co. case are controlling here,

as clearly pointed out by-Mr. Justice Pirsig in his opinion.
Granted that domicile of the corporate owner,standing alone
will not yest in the domiciliary state the power to tax an
entire fleet of airplanes, yet the additional facts that the
eorporation’s principat place of business is in the state,
that all of its airplanes come within its borders during the

tax year on scheduled trips and for repairs, ‘and that the ~
manner and extent of. their operation is determined and di-'

rected from the state, supply the additional elements neces-
sary to invest the state with power to tax such planes. .
[fol. 58] I not only fully but emphatically agree with Mr.
J ustice Loring that ‘‘to subject all the taxpayer’s planes
° -to double or multiple taxation * * * would
not ae be. unjust but would create a situation so burden-

some to the airlines as materially to handicap their devel- —

_ opment and extension, so vital to the national interest.’’

As a court we cannot, however, concern ourselves with °

policy, a purely legislative question. Our only inquiry is
power. It is an uncontroverted doctrine that courts will
not consider the justice, wisdom, expediency, propriety, ne-
_ cessity, or policy of tax laws or other legislation. -That
-eardinal principle is the basis of the circumspect avoidance
by the judiciary of encroachment upon the exclusive domain
of the legislature, a coequal branch of the government. 11
Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, pp. 802-3-4, 900, §§ 136-138,
198; 1 Cooley, Const. Limitations (8 ed.) 346; State v. Fair-
mont Creamery Co., 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A. L.

R. 548; Champion v. Ames (lottery case) 188 U. 8. 321, 363,

| 39
93 §. Ct. 321, 47 L. ed. 492, 504; McCrary ¥. ae States,

195 U.S. 27, "24 8. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78, 1 Ann. Cas, 561. .
. As recently as November 9, 1942, in ‘the case of. Wickard

v. Filburn, — U. S. —, Mr. J ustice Jackson sara this,
rule in the following language:

“The validity of an Act of Congress i is not to be refuscd

wi

application by the courts as arbitfary and capricious and.
forbidden by the Due Process.Clause merely because it -

is deemed in a particular case to work on sa canara re-.
sult. -

. Mr. Justice Pirsig has convincingly desmeciateaten that this

state’s power to tax defendant’s entire fleet of airplanes
' exists so long'as no part of it is permanently located in
another state. I therefore concur in his conclusion, though
reluctantly and not without suggesting that, for reasons so
forcibly pointed out by Mr. Justice’ Loring, remedial legis-
(fol. 59] lation to correct any possible unfairness to defend-,
ant and other companies similarly situated be enacted with-
out delay. lest congress: assert its undisputed power and
authorize ‘‘the incorporation of airlines under national law
and control of taxation.
: ‘Streissguth, J.

“ « ie :

[fol.60] In Supreme Covrr or Minwesota

¥::

‘In the Matter of the Proceedings to. Enforce Payment of : 3

Delinquent Personal bebcuteaed Taxes for the Sirol 1939
- 33176
State oF ecentinid: Respondent, —
_ a a | .
Norrawest Arauinzs, Inc., a Corporation, Appellant ©
J upement—December 31, 1942

Paciaian to an order of Court heretofore duly made and
entered in this cause it is determined and adjudged that
the judgment of the Court below, herein appealed from, to-
wit, of the District Court within and for the County of

_ Ramsey be.and the same hereby is in all things affirmed.

Men ee en re Donnan

4)
v

40
[fol.61] I~ Supaeme Covar on Mrswasora
| [Title omitted]

SripvLation as to Reconp—March 17, 1943

Upon the proposed petition of the appellant to the Su-

/ preme Court of the United States for writ of certiorari to

the Supreme Court of Minnesota, it is stipulated that ‘the

record to be certified to the Supreme Court of the United

‘States by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Minnesota’
shall consist of:

1. The record filed by appellant of the —_—oa7 in the,
District Court of Ramsey Counfy, Minnesota, excepting and
deleting therefrom the ‘‘Amended Stipulation of Facts’’
found on pages nine to seventeen, inclusive, of said record.

2. Amended Stipulation of Facts appended to respond-
ent’s supplemental brief and found on pages three to
twelve, inclusive, thereof.

3. The opinions (majority and minority) of the Supreme
_ Court of Minnesota.

4. The judgment of ‘the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
5. This stipulation. 73
Dated March 17, 1943:
M. J. Doherty, W. E. Rumble, Attorneys for Appel-

lant. James F. Lynch, . Andrew R. Bratter, Attor-
néys for Renpenions—" tits

ae #

A

(fol 62] Clerk ’s Certificate to uncaiiaiee transcript omit-
ted in printing.

~

~*~ , | “41
[fol.63] Supreme Court or THE Usrrep States, | Ocveian
Term, 1942
No, —

Norruwest AIRLINES, Pe
‘Oi. ae |
4) Tae Staze-on Mnewnsora
Onver Exrenpinc Trae Wrtais Wuicn to Fine Pertriox
FoR CERTIORARI

Upon Consideration of the application of counsel fee the
- petitioner, :

Yt Is Ordered that the time for filing petition for cer-

tiorari in the ibove-entitled cause be, and the same ‘is .

hereby, exte ed to and including April 5th, 1943. ,;
Wiley Rutledge,’ Associate Justice of the —
Court of the United States.

Dated this 31st day of March, 1943.

\"
s

[fol.64] Supreme Court or om Unrrep STaTEs
Over Attowine Certiorant—Filed May 10, 1943

The petition herein for a writ of. certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota is granted.
And it is further ordered that the duly certified copy of

the transcript of the proceedings below which accompanied _

the petition shall be treated as though filed in response to
such writ.

(7077), ,

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386404_0022%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
