# Brief for the Respondent — Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the Respondent
- **Published:** January 1, 1942
- **Citation:** 316 U.S. 168

## Text

iN THE

_ Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER ‘Tram, x. D. 4941.

Ne. 706 |

. .

° .

CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, BOARD

Ok HEALTIL OF TH CITY OF CHICAGO, DR.
Aone: RT A. BLACK, Health Commissioner and
Acting President of the Board of Health of.the City of
Chicagy, «Nig, ; ,_ &
ED, ” Petitioners,
CO OS. .
FLELDCREST .DATRIES, INC. - s
Respondent.
° a] ; \ J :
CERTIORARL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTiL CIRCUIT, THERE HEARD ON APPEAL RROM ‘THE
UNIRRE. STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, FASTERN DIVISION ae
: ;
. re = ° 5 a e
: ore:

‘ Frep A. Gariepy
>

: vv 1 North LaSalle Street, “‘Chicgga, Illinois,
\ OwgRn Ratu, Pees “yf

135 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois.
JOHN SPALDING, Aiea
, | North LaSalle Street, Chicago, Tlinois
Attorneys for Respondent,
9

" BakNAuD & Mipcer. Printers: Fra nklin 0562, Curcaco
* ay

INDEX AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

-

; ; ; PAGE

List of Authoriti@s 5” BRO eta aa ee ates ‘s¢eeSece Hil
Stitement OF The Desc: os ecaess sb yekow eee yee |

a dete oY oe ahah naaeds ‘ enbietunes “ee wee
_ I. The Ordinance Is Sapient to the Illinois Stat-

ute of 1939 and Is Therefore Invalid.:........ 4

Effect of the 1939 Statute on the Powers of

Cee: ke © iciisisccccuel as wodee te

II. State Approval of Single Service Containers Is
* Conclusive that Prohibition of Such Containers
by ‘a slain arate Is Unreasonable as a Matter

OE Be Os kovndcceouascns a Semaine ee aia ewes + hea

TIL The Ordinance Is Pitaiaushs as a Matter of

Patty... 2.0. ccecesceccestevcevcees s walbatve eons Gl
'.. Sanitation and Absorption.:............... ae
Parafiin« Used on Paper Containers......... 74
Odors From Paraffin....... eeav eatin ee 78

The Sanitary Control of Paper Containers... 1

Transparency and Cream Line in Paper Con- .
nS EG ors ete pt jevousccsgerens OG

Presumption of Legislative Correctness esas 90

Use of Single Service Containers ‘Throughout
the United States.............cecscecceeees 91

=

(1928) Pe OP ee EN POA Pee Cpr i te _101
State ex rel. Knise, et a. vy. ‘Kineey, 314 Mo. 80, 989

S. W. 437 (1925)...... peeasune LET Oe ee 39-41
Uservo, Ine. v. Selking, 217 Ind. 567, 98 N. E. (2nd)

Oe I i ri ois ke he Fea LORE hee 110-111

_ Vandenbark v, Owens- Mlinois - Glass nde 311 U.S.
“es s Oe (A941). FusGaruivots usc savevesepeugnrs al Paes a4.°
Village’ of’ Atwood v. Cincinnati, I, & W. Ry. Co., 316
em | Serre eee ee “FESESESEPE ETL 44.45
Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444 (1900)... . 4S

. .@

‘ STATUTES CITED.

; ‘ ‘ PAGE
1 Tilinois Session Laws, 1941, p. 809....... pesesescns 82
Illinois Revised’ Statutes, 1939, ¢.- 38, ‘‘Criminal
Code”, Se BOs iccun cass Vedeekeuen esas ie eieres 77,
Illinois Revised Statutes, 1925, ¢. 564, “Foods”, .
SEE, bceah ce teeceease eet stisaavsaessieudes 24, 26.

’ Tllinois Revised Statutes, 1937, ¢. 564, “Foods”, pars.

OS PSSA Ie Pa ee otra enn aabdce aaa ae ap se ge 24, 25

Niinois Reyised Statutes, 1941, ¢. 564, pars. 115-134,
oe as Milk Pasteurization Act of 1939. .2, 3, 4,9, ‘
, 24, 25, 26-30, 31, 32-33, 34, 35, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, ‘60, 54, 87 -

7 Minots Revised Statutes, 1941, c. 564, ‘‘Foods’’, pars.

TEE Shcbvcra devs eredacccvevestss5kseusteu se 32

, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ‘ce. 1114, ds

a, ae - DE see Ay pe tre - 30
Mlinois Revised Statutes, 1941, c. 127, ‘‘State Govern-. Nag:
ment’’, PAT. DO... e cece e eee eee cence tseeees » B0

* Regulations of the Director of Department of Health

of Tlinots (4a60 cc beawewbsee sence tet eeetnenetes es

DICTION ARIES, TEXTS AND TREATISES CITED.

Century. Dictionary and Cyclopedia... .. faaee me figss. nee
43 Corpus Juris, 215-217.............. AN OPE See et)
Crawford’ on Statutory Construction, 612 (1940)... 35
. Funk and Wagrialls’ New Standard Dictionary ee 111

a Barnet, Law and The Modern City (1937)..10,12

2 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutpry Construction 678
MEDS uccnsh ds coneccdmaegnaveeeenses pebakeheaes

2 MeQuillin on Wasldna’ Cocsentionk 572 (2nd ed.
RE he Senda ci pana ken ead spatesrsssvurseuesel 15

_Webster’s New Titeenetloun! Dietionary ane Ea. ‘Un-

abridged) (1987) ..-.-..ceeeequereeeeeeesees 9a.

IN THE

, Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, A. D. 1941.

sf

zs No. 706

CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, BOARD
OF HEALTH OF .THE CPTY OF CHICAGO, DR.
ROBERT A. BL ACK, Health C ‘ommissioner and
A@ting President of the Board of — of the C ity of

Chicago,

af * Petisionors:

v8.

-FIELDCREST:. DAIRIES, INC.,
| 0 . © Respondent.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT, THERE HEARD ON APPEAL FROM THE
“UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN . DIVISION.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT .

© STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Regarding the reasonablesiess: -of the ordinance, ‘peti-
tioners fail to state that the Master in Chancery who heard :
the evidence found (R. 1734) :

‘‘There is, in my opinion, strong basis for-a finding
. that plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the

*

2

ae a |
evidence that its containers are meritorious and should -

be. permitted to be used. 4

Both courts below, sitting in Illinois and being familiar *

with Mlinois law, were in agreement ‘that the state Milk
Pasteurization: Act of 1939 withdrew from the City of

. Chicago the power to prohibit, as, ‘distinguished from
regulate, plaiftiff’s single service. containers.

The District Court held that the ordinance was un-

reasonable, | ‘and therefore invalid, under Illinois law, if -
- construed to prevent thes use of paper milk bottles .as
. Petitioners argue it’ their brief -
(pp. 34-36) that the Circuit Court of Appeals also held..

J

- standard milk bottles’

that the ordinance was unreasonable. That Court, after
holding that the City of Chicago -had no.power to enforce
the’ ordinance prohibiting paper_m milk bottles after the
passage of the Milk Pasteurization Act of 19: 39, sti ted:

" * Havi ‘ing thus concluded we find no occasion to dis-

cuss at length or decide other controverted questions
as to the validity of the ordinance.’

In view of this statement, it is difficult toeagree with the
petitioners that the Circuit Court’ of Appeals actually de-
cided that the ordinance was invalid’ for-unreasonableness,

but we can freely’ concede that the comments made in the

majority opinion do not in any way disapprove the find-

ing of the .Distriet Court on this issue. .
One of the points on which- we rely in this Court is
that the plaintiff's paper milk bottle is a ‘‘standard milk

” hotile”’ and, is therefore tiot prohibited by section 3094
of the Chicago ordinances.. The trial court so held, but. .
this holding was disapproved by the ireuit Court of

Appeals.- We believe that considerations not adequately

presented to that court, but whieh will be found in our |
_ Point IV, Selow, indicate that the trial. court. was correct

in fmding that. the container is a standard milk bottle.

*

*~

\
3 . i °?

The trial sides considered the oar exhibits
for’ several months and then found that respondent’ s
single- -service containers present: “no new or. unusual
-health hazard’* (R,-1752) and that respondent’s single-
service containers ‘‘confogm with the sanitary ‘and health °
ay are of the city ordinances of the City = Chi-

o”’ (R. 1753).

et trial court also found that **the evidenee shows that
they are safe and sanitary containers in ‘which milk may
be delivered. The uncontradicted evidence shows also

- that containers and receptacles less meritorious in struec- |
ture and design from those of plaintiff’s are in daily
- ouse in the City of Chicago for the sale of milk, chocolate
milk, ice cream, and other. liquids by drug’ stores, hotels,
restaurants and soda fountains. . . The dispensing of such ©
articles—ineluding milk and milk’ products—in pape? con-
tainers is not, as shown by the evidence, deemed to create
any hazard to, the publie health’? (R. 1752-1753).

We respectfully contend that in- determining the mean-
‘ing and validity of the ordinanze in question and the effect —
_ of the 1939 Milk Pasteurization Act enacted by the legis-
- lature, the Circuit Court of Appeals and the trial court
, Were bound to decide the issues of law according to the
law of Illinois as pronounced. by legislative action and by
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State. Vanden.
bark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co:, 311- U.S. 538, 543. Adopt-
ing the rule set forth in ‘this decision, the Circuit Court of
Appeals and the trial court found the issues of law in favor
‘ of, the respondent and we submit that their decisions are in
harmony with the law of the State of Illinois.

4

®& ::

eS

; The Ordinance Is Repugnant to the Lore of 1934 3
and Is Therefore Invalid.

[Answer to ‘Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 12 to 33 |

"The city contends (pp. 17-22) that the: Illinois Milk Pas-
: teurization Act of 1989 (Il. Rev. Stat. 1939,\¢. 564, pars.
115-134) did nof—contrary to the opinion of both courts
below—withdraw from the City of °C hicago the power to
prohibit the use of paper bottles. We strongly contend

that it did, and that the trial court, as ‘a Federal Court, .

was bound to and properly did, gfve effect to the state
law, although it was enacted during the pendency of the
suit. Vandenbark v. ‘Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S

No Illinois case interpreting the statute involved has
been cited and so far as we krew no Illinois court has
passed on it. We agree that the Kederal Courts, in whic ‘h.
the present suit was pending, were entirely competent to
. decide the question of Illinois law and that this. Court is
likewise - eqmpetent. to decide the’ question of local law if

it is¢willing to add or substitute its judgment for. that, of #

the courts below. os gf [4

FE

On pages 31-34 of their brief. the petitioners show ‘that.

there is nothing in Railroad ‘Commission of ¢ Texas v, Pall.

man’ Co., 312 U. 8S. 496 (1941) or in Hawks v. Hamil, 288
U. 8. 52 (1933) which should preclude a decision of the
question of local law by, a Federal Court. The only -con-

« e ;
= . We

-_->

o

te

5 : es

_ trary intimation, that has ever., zbeen ee in this case
appeared i in the petition for certiorari (pp, 36-38) and in
_ petitioners’ reply to our answer (pp. 3-4), and we can
therefore agree with the statement on page 31 of the peti-

- tioners’ present brief :

“The position of the petitioners: on this aspect of ©
‘the case requires an explanation.”

o

Jurisdiction of the Federal Court wis invoked in .the

*present case solely because of diversity. of citizenship

and we know of nothing in any decision of this Court -
in any way disabling the District Court or the Circuit
Court of. Appeals from deciding as a matter ‘of local law
the effect to be given to an Illinois statute: passed while
suit was pending. The fact that the statute was passed
while suit was pending is sufficient proof that plaintiff did
not select the forum with its. eye to a favorable ruling as
‘to the meaning of the statute. :

The construction of the statute being one of local law,
we think that the recent opinion of this. Court in thé case
of MacGregor, Jr. \.- State ‘Mutual Life Assurance Com-
pany of Worcester, Massachusetts, (No. 179, Octobet-ferm,.
1941, decided February 16, 1942), might well be adopted.
in the present case, There, after allowing certiorari and
hearing oral arguments, this Court filed the following
per curiam opiiion : (eer Se ae Ry

. _‘* Petitioner brought this action to recgve er the premi-
um of adife annuity contract purchased. by his decedent.
The sti Was begun in a state: court. ot Michigan, but
was removed, because of diversity of citizenship, to the
United. States District Court, for the Eastern’ District
of Michigan. Petitioner’s claim is founded ‘on the ap-
plicability of Michigan legislation regulating the con-
. duct _of insurance business in Michigan. The District
Courg held‘ that. ‘the contract involved herein having
grey executed outside the State of — the

"Es

\

ee ‘No decision of the Supreme Com, of Michigan,
- or of any other court of that State¢onstruing the +

6
statutes of the State of. Michigan relied. upon by thes
plaintiff. are not applicable.’ Accordingly judgment

went against petitioner. This judgment: was aflirmed
— Circuit Court of Appeals, 119 F. 2d 148°. |

relevant Michigan law has been brought ‘to our atten- ,

. tion. In the absence of such auidannk we shall leave

undisturbed the interpretation placed upon. purely -
local law by a Michigan federal judge of long ex,
perience and by three circuit judges en circuit:
includes Michigan.’’ Affirmed. -

/ the present casé. the trial ‘sages was: for many years
a lawyer of the IHinois bar, was an assistant attorney .
general of the State, president of the Illinois Constitu-
tional Convention of 1920, and a member of the Federal
' district bench since’ 1929. The author:of the majority |
opinion -of the Cireuit Court of Appeals likewise was ar —
« Illinois practitioner of long standing. (having been ,ad-
mitted to the Hlinois bag in 1910) ‘and was a replesite
tive in Congress and a Federal district judge before his
elevation to the Circuit Court of Appeals. | er:

The concurring judge in the Cireuit Court

rather than in favor of its instrumentality, such as a

municipality. In the absence of authoritative decision of ..

the question by a state court, expediericy requires that
the doubt be resolved in ‘favor of the sovereign rather
than in favor of the creature. of the sovereign. Should
the decision of a doubtful question in favor of the crea-

ture be contrary to later. decision of the. question by a-

state-court, the Federal. court will in the interim have
permitfed the mere instrumentality of the sovereign to

delay the carrying out of state policy. Less harm ‘taf® °

. ° 6” ;
result from a decision in favor -of the sovereign than one

_ hak oe

“

in favor of its instrumentality.. All: doubts should be re-
solved in favor of the unimpeded action of the sovereign.
state -and no surrender of power by the sovereign to its
instrumentality should be implied by a Federal court..

Therefore, unless the decision be too.c! ar for argu-
ment, the question whether the power remains with’ the

sovereign state or has been surrendered to its instrumen-

tality ought to be decided by a Federal court in,favor

of the sovereign state. Of course, the petitioners here

contend ‘that the decision, whether it Has the power to
prohibit paper milk bottles, which the sovereign state
has legalized is too clear for doubt? Their position would
be more impressive had not both courts below held pre-
cisely contrary to the petitioner's’ contention.

In passing, it should be said that the attempt on the

rt of the petitioners to make it appear that the ‘Circuit

Court of Appeals bas taken some power away from the

state legislature of Lilinois is entirely fallacious. Peti-

tiongts say (Brief, p. 30):
“The boundary bétween the fields of state and loca)

. regulations may not be clearly defined. The decision -

- of the Cireuit Court of Appeals in effect takes away

from the state legislature the power to fix the-boun-

dary and the court, in the exercise of its function to
construe statutes, assures the power itself.’’

The Circuit Court of Appeals did not hold that the matter

_ was beyond the power of the legislature, but simply held
that in the exercise of its power the state. Jegisiature had

established a “public policy for the state which prohibited,
the enfore vement of an ordinauce outlawing what the state

legislature had approved. Thé. petitioners’ real complaint

is not that the decision of the Cireuit-Court of Appeals |
took any power away from the: legislature, but that the

court wrongly construed the language.of-the legislature

, /
- /

fh

in exercising its undoubted legislative power. The de-
cision takes nothing from the power of the state legisla-
ture. It does take away from the cify the power to defeat,
by prohibiting paper milk bottles, the liberal and progres-
sive attitude of the state toward the use under proper
regulations of modern centainers for milk.

~The courts below properly decided that adequate pro-
tection of the sovereign power of the State of Illinois and
- the realization of its objectives in passing the Milk Pas-
teurization Act of 1939 required a holding that its: crea-
ture, the City of Chicagd, had not been left with the
power to defeat such objectives by prohibiting the use of
paper containers in the sale-of-milk. Such a holding’ does
not improperly take away power from the state. It actu-
ally reinforces and pyotects the power of the state from
impairment by judicial implication from doubtful lan--_
guage contained in an ambigtious statute. In this holding
of the Cireuit Court of Appeals we firtd jo refusal by
that court-—**in effe ot’? or otheywise—to/give full recog-—
inition to the power of the state - legisfature.

The consideration by the petitioners of the effect of the -
Milk Pasteurization Act of 1939 on the po of the City
of Chicago to prohibit the use of single servide containers
for the sale of milk is prefaced by a- discussion of certain
preliminary matters which we shall refer to e in the
order in which they appear in petitioners’ brief.

(1) In the first place, a municipal corporatéon, in

dilinois, may exercise only such power as is eonferred
“upon it by the’ state legislature. Doubt concerning the -
existence of a power or whether such power has been
withdrawn is resolved against the municipality. ° The
doctrine of ‘“home- rule’’ has received no recognition.

The City of Chicago has nd inherent eowde It is a

rea

“-~

o.., ay

creature of the General Assembly. To. prohibit any article,
it must be able to point to a state statute giving it power
to do%o. Furthermore, grants of power to municipalities
are strictly construed. This is’ established by a long line
of.cases, has been the subject of frequent public criticism
by the distinguished corpetation counsel of Chicago, Mr.
Barnet. Hodes, but continues to be the law of Illinois, con.
trolling in this Case (Bullman, v. City of Chicago, 367 I ;

217 W937}): 9 as, oe
Hodes, Law and the Medern City” (1987) says (py. 36,
38): : ; . rs
“Over and over, IHinois Supreme Court has
clung to the traditioual View of all jurisdictions, and.
has declared:.A city ‘may exercise only such powers
as are expressly del legated to it by the Jegislature and
such as, are necessarily implied from those expressly
given. "And also: ‘A city ‘possesses no inherent power.’
Time and again, cities have attempted, first by one
device ‘and then by another, to break through the
barrier set up by these interpretations. But . thers
lias heen little success in this direetion."’,
*’ ‘* So. i . .

‘In applying the rule of strict construction wht
ever cities claim the right to exercise certain powers,
the courts are following a well settled principle which,
as much qs anything else, hamstrings municipalities
This rule; as reiterated in Arms v City of Chicago.
[314 dil. 316) a 1924 casesis:

-** *Statutes which grat powers to municipal
corporations are strictly construed, and any fair
or reasonable doubt of the existence of such pow:
ers is resolved against the municipality which
claims the right to exercise them.’”’ ;

* The author's pre face e states:

“The author, of course; accepts full responsibility for the
views aes Psi he in no Way express any official

| aad’
=

a oe

11 ’

The Illinois rule was stated thus in City of Chicago v

Murphy, 313 I, 98 (1924), (at p. 101):

‘Cities may exercise only such powers as are ex- ;

pressly delegated to them’ by the legislature. The
legislature is vested with all powers not taken from
it hy the State or Federal constitution. Many of its
powtrs may be delegated by it to the cities created by
its act. . Cities “are creatures of the legislature and
derive tlieir existence therefrom. They have no inher-
ent powerse All powers of cities are derived from
acts ef the legislature. The fact that the legislature
has the power to enact a law does not confer that
power upon city councils but the same must be by
legislative act conferred.” |

In Consumers Co. v. Cito Chicagh, 313 Hl. 408 (1924)
the Supreme “Court of Ilinots has expressed the rule in
the following language (pp., 411-412) :--—. - .

ae ‘municipal corporation possesses: and can exer- |

tise the following powers, and no others: First; those

grated ‘in spt words; second, those necessarily -

implied in or ineident to the powers ‘expressly granted ;
and third, those essential to the .Accomplishment of
the declared objects and purposes of the. corporation,
not simply ‘convenient but indispensable. (fluesing

v. | ity of Rock Estland, 128 Mi. 465; 1 Dillon on Mun.
Corp.- 5th ed.—see, 237.) Any fair oF reasonable
doubt concerning the existence of the - power must
be resolved against the municipality and the power
- denied. (19 R. C. L. 769; City of Chicago vy. M.
Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264; City of Chicago v. Pet
| 267 id. 573. Ae

ae .

~
a municipal-

are strictly con-

ho corollarigs to the rule that the power
ity come from/the General Assembly

s{rued are the

- exercise a powér, inconsistent with any Act‘of the General

Assembly or with the public policy declared by it and

(2) the power granted by the “General Assembly may be
Tag

one, .

rules that (1) a npinicipality. may not - °

i
12.

withdrawn or curtailed at the will of that body. The
General Assembly may resume at any time the power
previcusly delegated to a sacisinisla'ty, and this, of course, n
may be done by unplication. Rae |

This doctrine of municipal law is also well stated by
the -distinguished corporation counsel of the City of
Chicago in Law and the Modern Ciy (Hodes, 193%, p. 44)
as. follows:

‘*‘We have seen, up to this point, how two salient
principles are invoked to restrict cities—the principle —
of expres§ authority trom the state, and the cangn of
strict construction aguiust the city.. Suppose a city,
-uv its efigrt to control its” own destiny sails by those
two Shoals. Is it then safe in the sea of state control?
Hardly. Ahead is a rew reef.

‘*The new peril is the principle that if the state sees
fit to exercise ‘power in its own name over an activity,
the city ‘is at once thrust out of the picture. 8 is
the case even where Kay? city lias had jurisdiction_

. for generations and its’ right to exercise the power
has been heretofore firmly established. Application
sof this principle in Illinois has resulted in a gradual
whittlng away of many powers of cities, ranging in

’ importance trom control of beauty shops, to oe
of transportation aa and other utilities.’’ . ‘

~

+ In City, of Chicago v. Jensen, 331 Ill. 129 (1928), the

/ défendant was conv icted @f operating a beauty paflor with-

out a license, in violation of an ordinance of the City of
Chicago. Prior to this conviction a state statute went into

_ effect, providing for the regulation of. beauty culture. . On
suppeal, the, judgment of conviction was reversed, the court
pointing out that the ordinance was inconsistent with the
~after-enacted statute. In discussing ‘prior decisions of the
Supreme Court, and the rule of law to be drayn there-

from, the court “said (p. 131): : NY fey aes

Jo
‘‘This court held that -while the legislature may .
_ delegate power to a municipality to grant a license

‘ 13

for a particular occupation and exact a license fee
therefor, it may at any time take away such power
and the State may. resume the exercise of the power;
that the legislature may repeal or amend any of the
provisions of the act for. the incorporation of cities °
and villages at pleasure, and if the provisions of the
' statute are inconsistent with the powers conferred on
the city, the statute will operate as.a repeal or. amend- /
ment of the powers so conferred upon the. city; that
- a city, as a subordinate political authority, cannot
. interfere with the validity or force of a license issued
by the State under a statute; that the statute controls ;
the whole subject matter. :
‘*The statute repealed ‘any power the city may have
had to regulate and license beauty eulture, the judg-
. ment convicting gs esr was erroneous, and it will.
be reversed.’’ :

tn a case well known in Illinois, Northern Trust Co. v.

* Chicago Rys. C'o., 318 Il. 402 (1925), holding that: the
~ Publi tilities act of Illinois repealed by implication the

power granted to tities and villages to regulate such
matters as headlights on street cars, it. was argued that .
since the ordinance requiring street cars to be equipped

. with brightly lighted headlights was passed prior to the
' enactment of the first Public Utilities act,’ the ordinanee

would not be abrogated until the Comiaiesiin had taken
some action under the statute inconsistent with the ordi-
nanee, The court said (p. 412):

“*When the first Public Utilities act came /into forée,
on January 1, 1914, the power of the cif over the
subject rattes of that act ceased to exist, and it could
not thereafter pass new ordinances or enforce exist-
ing ordinances with reference to matters ‘within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilittes Commis-
sion. The power to enforce-proceeds from.the present
or existing power or authority to enact or to provide.
A municipality carinot be said to possess the power —
to enforce an ordinance concerning a subject upon
which it has lost the power to pass the ordinance.

o

a oo
Any attempt, to entorse in =a a situatio would be

defeated by interposing the act withdrawing the/ mu-
nieipality’ ’s power to enact.’ ;

In the early case of VV rilleie v. “City of Chicago: 188 Ill.
‘444 (1900), a Chicago ordinance required persons desiring

te work as plumbers to obtain a license and pay an annual ¢ —

license fee of $30.00.- ‘Shortly theregfter the legislature
of Illinois passed an act. providing that persons, desiring
to engage in the business of plumbing should be examined
as to their -qualificatiors by a board. created.for that
_ purpose and that successful applicants should receive
certificates. In a,suit to restrain the enforcement of the Ks
~ ordinance on the -two-fold ground that (1) thé city was.
without power to license the business of plumbing, and
(2) even if it had such power, the ordinance was in con-
fiict with the later statute, and hence ‘invalid, the Supreme
Court affirmed a deerée restraining tlie enforcement of
the ordinance. . ae

After pointing out that the power of the city to license
_ the décupation of. plumbing was, at least, very doubtful,
the court said (yp. $5 2-453) +

“*While the legislature may delegate the power to
municipalities to grant a license for a partieular occu

Q pation and to exact a license fee, they may, at any
time, take away. such power or resume the exércise
of it thems ely es. The legislature may repeal-or amend

- any proyision of the act for the incorporation of
cities. ayid villages at their pleasure, and if the pro-
visions of the act ef 1897 are inconsistent. with the,
_power claimed by the city, they will operate as a
repeal or amendment of the charter to that, extent.
* By this law-the legislature have prese ribed the

test which shall enable a person to engage in the
- business of plumbing, and the city, by its proviso, has
prescribed another and additional test. The legisla-
ture, by the law, say he is authorized. to: work at his
trad& throughout the State if he has the” required —

?

15

certificate. The city of Chicago, b¥ the previso to the.

_ * ordinance passed in pursuance of that law, says that
_* he shall not work at his trade in that city except by:
) spaying $30 additional and receiving another license.
“The city, as a subordinate political authority, cannot |
“interfere with the validity or force of the license
issued by its board under the law.. That these pre

. Visions are inconsistent is plain,

The force aiid log&. of thissdecision is ineseapable. It is
clearly determinative of the invalidity of the prohibition
of paper bottles which the City of Chicago seeks to enforce
and thereby forbid what the superior’ political authority
approves and permits. The majesty of the state law ap-
plies to Chicago ordinances now with the same force as it
did forty years ago. — ale ‘

The texts on the subject .of municipal legislation an-
‘nounce the same rulg. See 2 McQuillin on Municipal Cor-
poration, 572 (2d. ed. 1988), quoted by: the. Circuit Cou
of Appeals. Sota

"In 43: Corpus Juris, 21 5-217, ** Municipal Kiepicatens,*

the additional rile is stated that a municipal ordinance °
- must not conflict with the public policy of the state as
‘determined by the state legislature, thus:

‘*Since a municipal corporation is a creature ef the
state,- continuing its existence “under .the sovereign
will and pleasure of the state, possessing such powers
and sich only as the state confers upon it, subject
to addition or diminution of power at the: state’s su-.
_preme discretion, municipal regulations must not di-
rectly or indirectly contravene the general law, nor
can such regulations be repagnant ta, the policy of
the state as declared in general legislation.’’ (Italics
ours. )/ .

The Hlinois cases are uniformly to the same “ ellect.

In City of Chicago v: Union. Ice Cream Mfg. Co., 252
Ti 311 (1911), gs by the abmeek re (Brief, pp. 12- 13)

A

“

*

i

P
oa 16 ; & i ©
the Suprenre Court passed upon the validity of Section
1160 of the Municipal Code of Chicago which then pro-
vided for a penalty | of not less than seca en more than
$100.00 fine for any ‘person who sold or’ offered for sale
any impure or adulterated food. A statute, the Pure
Food Act of July 1, 1907, enacted two years after Section
1160 of the Municipal Code Was- passed, provided for a
greater nalty. In sustaining the oo as valid the
court sajd {p. 313); es

ee

Me laws of.the stat operate. w thine eglimats of
municipal corporations the. same as else é, unless
otherwise. clearly provided by municipal charters or
statute, Local-laws and requlations are at all times
subject to fhe paramount authority of the legislature.’
sae ours.)

.

*.
In the last paragi raph of this decision’ the Supreme

Court used the felloting lanzuage which is indeed ap-
plicable to the ordinance here, saying at p. 315:

: -**Municipal aufherities cannot,’-under a_ general
grant of — such as artiele 5 of ‘the City- and,
Village act, adopt ardinances which infringe the spirit
of a State law or are repugnant to the policy ef the

- State-as declared hy déneral legislation, but the police
regulations of a municipality miy differ from those |
of the State upon the same subject, if they are not
inconsistent therewith. (McPherson v. V illage of Che--
banse; 114 Ill. 46.) Phis ordinance does. not. prohibit

‘ what the statute permits. While the’ ordinance -at-
taches .a less petialty for its violation than. does the

- statute, we find ‘no réepugnancy ‘between them. The
general policy under both is the same. ” (Italies ours. )

z

we The pertinent “not Ne in this decision is ‘‘this ordi

nance does ‘not prohibit what the ‘statute permits.’’ ‘Obvi-
ARE is the test to be applied when ¢ an ordinane e and

state statute are to be construed. .
In City of Chicago v. Drogasawacz, 256 Ill. 34 (1912) the

‘

.
7

7
re

. regulation of the- bread and bakery: business .by ordinance

Aa

9

was involved. The principal question was the right of the

3 city under the state statutes to enact the bakery ordinance.

~The ordinance was sustained as valid, not. being in con-.
flict wath the statute, aid on page 37 the. Court said:

“Municipal ordinances must “be in harmony with
the s assay laws of-the’State (City of Chicago v. Union
Ice Qream Mfg. Co., 262 Til. 311), but this ordinance

es Wet in any way conflict with the State law.’
S Ge

Again, in the cane of City of Marengo v. Rowland, 263
Il. 531 #1914) the court held an ordinance -of the City of
Marengo requiring the closing of Kither shops on Sunday
invalid and again stated on page 534:. -

-**Municipal ‘authorities, dihex a ae grant. of
powey, cannot: sir ordinances which imfringe ‘the

Sie City of Clinton v. Wilson, [297 Ill. 580] supra.) The

Qublie poli¢y of the State is found in its constitution.

Soigy 25 Fg “t oe. poe ve. as., Seagate

and statutes, and, when they are-silert, in its judicial -

decisions and the constant practiée of its public of
ficials.’’ (Italies ours.) a '

We. submit’ that if, as the court said in these decisions,
pae:7 a get “ a Ae Te
a city cannot adopt-an. erdinanee infringing the {spirit: of

a state law, then it egrteimly cannot by any process of

reasoning, enforce one! Since the lewis! ature has clearly

s, expressed - ‘the public policy of Tilinois on. Itealth and the

use of - single servicé milk containers, such public policy
is not to he renderéd inoperative by ordinances or regu->
“dations of a city repugnant % it whether passed before « or
after’such statute.

In City of Lewistown w.- Harrison, 282 Til. 461 (i918)
the-Illinois Supreme Court held that an ordinance which
‘prohibited the barter, exchange or ‘sale. of. intoxieating

©

ae

r

Os 18

liquor’ was ich by the Illinois Cities and. Villages

- Act, which gave to niunicipalities the power to prohibit the

sale of such liquors. To make more definite _and specific
by ordinance what, is provided by general legislation is -

| ‘not a, violation of statute, but merely makes its applica-
tig more certain. But if the ordimance were in: conflict

with the spirit of state law, with public policy or incon-

-sistent with the. language of the stitute, then it would’ be

invalid. The rule was ‘clearly expressed hy “the court in
the LoheN ie word’ @. Hay: Saeed

sate A municipality may-by ordinanee restrict, rezu-
late and prohibit the same acts which are punishadly
and penalized under the law of. the State, so far as
authorized so to do by law, It may make more definite
, , {
regulations than are “ns@filly provided by general leg-
islation and enforce them by appropriate penalties.
It xannot, however, adopt ordinances which infringe
» the sprit of a State law or are repugnant to the pol-—
wy of the State as eelared by -general legislation,
but the police regulations of a city may differ from
those: of the State on the same subject if not incon-
sistent therew ith. ”*. (Italies onrs.)
é 4 ‘
? The fundamental Pin Rt in the Chicago erainance in
question is. thi it it prohibits (if construed as petitioner's
contend) what the statute in_erpress terms pe rmits. It :
not an effort to fill in the details of a broad, gentral ste
ute. To adept and enforce a‘corstruction prohibiting 7
use of singlé-we, rrice contdimers woyld re$ult. in nullifying
a provision-of the statute, which is the paramount regula-
tion. Legislatures are not subservient to: nvanie ipalities in

ro cMiied public policy. ; ‘ ae eae

{ @mstrnine Section 28 of the fiineis Prohibition.
se and an ordinance enacted b¢ the City of Litchfield
which prohibited ‘the manufacture and sale ‘of intoxicating
liquer, the Sripreme & ourt of Mlindis in sts 3 of Litch fi 7 |

&
E . : a
‘ . % . >
: & «

. 19

ae : a ; Po . i ; ;
v. Thorworth, 337 Tll. 469 (1929) pointed out that the
“eity was. bound by the ‘definition of intoxicating liquor

contained in the statute and had no authority to prohibit .
the sale, of liquor not prohibited by the statute. At page

405. the court said: | Tie

“Section 2 ofthe Prohihition Act defines the phrase

‘intoxicating liquor.’ It is the ‘sale*of liquor of the -

kind specified in-the statute that is prohibited. The
statute confers: authority on municipal corporations
to prohibit by ordinance the'sale of the kind of. liquor

prohibited by the statute. The municipality is bound —

-by th™definition contained in the statute and cannot
* prohibit: the sale of liquor uot prohibited hyo the
statute.” (Italies ours. ) “8 ; es

It. is clear bey ond perady enture fromthe foregoing cases
that the City of Chicago has no inherent power, that its
power to regulate milk con es from the State, that, the
“State has the right to take that power away before or
after the enactment of the city’s ordinances, that the ordi-
,°naneces must .not be in conflict. with the previsions -of .the
"+ State statutes, and that the city has no right to prahibit
what a ‘state statute or valid rules and regulations adopted

pursuant thereto -permit. | ae

It will be well to bear in mind those genefal rules in
considering. the ‘saving clause’? which the City reltés. on,

namely, Section 19 of the Att. Before passing to a dis-"
cussion of that questions We wish to call the Court’s atten-

tion to another limitation on the power of the city shown
by the case of City, of Rockfoyd v. “Ihe ¥f. 368, HH. 526 (1937).
In that case it was held that the ¢ fix of Rockford had no
power (under the same sections of the Statute. that the.
. City of Chieago is -retving on inthe present ease) to.
prohibit the sale in Rockford of ice cream mainfactured
in Sterling, THinois(and Dixon, Illinois; by requiring a
license finvolving’ an inspection of the factogies by Rock.

Td

e.

ford inspectors) as a conditién precedent’ to such sale.
This is the latest word of the’ Dlinois courts on the sub-
ject. The Court said (p. 530) ;

“Th [linois, a-city. organized under the ‘Cities and

Villages act has such. powers, only,.as are, therein

_ expressly delegated by the Genéral Assembly or nec-

" essarily ‘implied to render the grant of” specific powers
effective’*:

cand (p. 531) :

‘Legislative. powers of. mia 0 corporations are

. strictly censtrued, and any rational. doubt as to the.
existence of power must be resolved - against the
municipality.”* (Ttalies ours.)

&

e Court then concluded (pp. "533-334) :

“Tn short, the issue. is whether: plaintiff, the City

of Rockford, may require ice cream factories, located

- in other cities, to, meet sanitary requirements. pre-
~ _ seribed. by -the former city in order to entitle them to
Rockford licenses upon ‘payment of. the annual fee
for inspection of their plants: 8

_ “Municipalities have go-extra- territorial jurisdic-
& tien éxcent por do as-@t is expressly or impliedly
delegated -by statuf (55 A. L. R. 1183; City of Chi-
cago v. Brent, 356. Hi. 40; Strauss v. Town. of Pontiac,
40 id. 301. } An inherent or implied limitation upon
the city in the exercise of the powers delegated to it
"by, the legislature is thaf such powers’ shall be exer:
eised within the corporate. boundaries of the munici-
-palities. 3 Shiu

_ + . 5 a ; roe Re ”
“The legislature has not dslemated power to ‘mu.
‘nicipal. corporations to pass a regulatory and ‘license
ordinance, which ‘assumes ‘to regulate ice cream fac-.
tories outside their corporate limits. The. provisions -
which plaintiff admits extend to icé cream factories
in other cities are so inseparably connected with:
other provisiéns applicable. locally. as to’ render the
entire enactment void.”’ ,
: ‘
dt is clear under this case that control of the -re-
spondent’s plant_at Chemung, McHenry: County, Jlinois,
is exclusively within the jurisdiction cf-the Department of
. °. af i " a, ) . %

g r

Se oe
Sg a

* : }

Sf es

Health: of the State a Illinois and ‘that the’ State statute
(Petitioner’s brief, Appendix A, p. 80) relating to pas-
teurized milk which provides, in part, ‘that all pasteurized
milk shall be placed in its final delivery containers at ‘the
_ plant, that bottling or packaging of milk shall be done

“at the place of pasteurization : by” ‘approved , mechanical
equipment, and that it,shall be unlawful for ‘any person
to sell or serve any pasteurized miik ex¢ept> in the onig-
inal containey in which it was placed at the point of ©
* pasteurization, contemplates the approval of the State De-
partmem of Health of respondents’ operations and equip-
- ment ‘without’ requiring the approval of the ~~ of
| Chicago. . : ire
~ It is further apparent that if, after. the -state. has

approved: respondent’ s plant and equipment for packag-

ing milk in paper bottles, only, and has prohibited. the
respondent from selling its milk” in ‘any containets other
. than those in which it was placed: at the point of pas-
teurization, the City of Chicago is perthitted to step that
_ milk at- its eity limits and forbid its “sale, the city is
‘thereby pahen te to exercise iiidireetly an extra-terri-
-torial power over the respondent’ s plant and equipment
which the Hey case expressly forbids. “The City-of Rock-—
ford was therein. deriied power to prohibit, by an inspec-
7 tion” requirement, the-sale in t Rockford of. ice cream 1 made
elsewhere. |

It is important to ‘alles this geographical division of
authority _ between the State of Illinois and the City of:
-Chiedgo, because the sole reliance of the. City of Chicago ce
for its power ‘is on cases like Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 _
~) TIL 122; City of Chicago v. Bowman. Dairy Co., 234 IN.
204, and City of Chicago v.Union Ice’ Cream Co., 252 Til.
3H, Where. the: pasteurizing or ‘manufacturing plant was
located within the. confines of the City of Chicago.

— (2) It i is true, as the petitioners: contend (Brief, p. 12),

22 |’

that there is no ‘constitutional objection to regulation of
the same subject by statute and ordinance. Aside. from
the ‘constitutional question this rule ‘is subject to .the
qualification that the ordinance must be-in larmony With
the statute and with state policy; in the event of. conflict
or inconsistency the ordinance must give way. This quali.
fication of the rule is elaborated in City of Chicago ¥.
Union Ice Cream: Co., 252 Ni). 311 (1911), from which
both the petitioners and we have quoted.

(3) On the question of: the powers of municipalities °
[Petitioners* Brief, pp.-13-17], in Illinois, to Peru the .
sale and distribution of milk, it should be adde«

regulation must be reasonable and that whether “2
ticular’ regulation ‘is or is ‘not reasonable is a jadicial’
‘question. In Noy vy. C ity of Chicago, 263 Til. 122 (1914),
from: which the defendants have quoted extensively the
‘Court said’ (p. > Pee : ae, aoe

Bay hen -the legis: iture has authorizéd a city coun-
cil 16 pass ordinances upon any subject, the. power
thus conferred must he reasonably exercised. Whether -
its exercise in a particular case is reasonable is a
judicial question, and an unreasonable ordinance will
be held veid by the cqurts.’ : : wen

In- City of Chicago v. C. & N- W. Ry € O, 279, Tl. 30
(1916), the court, in holding unreasonable and therefore
invalid, a section of the ‘milk ordinance of the City of
‘Chicago, said (p. 38): :

“The city couficil has authority to pass ordinances -
regulating this question, and the question of regula-
tion, in the first. instanee, rests. with the municipal

: authorit! ‘s, but whether its exercise in a particular
* @ase is reasonable is a judicial question. There must
be some logi¢al connection between the object: sought
to be accomplished by..such an ordinance and _ tlie
means ptesecribed to ‘accomplish the end. An un
_ reasonable ordinance will be held void by the Courts.”’
* (Citing cases.)

Po
} i .

We _emphasize at: this point, the necessity that an ordi-
nance be reasonable.’ Whether tit particular ordinance
now in question is a reasonable exercise by the City -of ©
its power to regulate certain aspecjf of. the milk industry’
in the interest of. the public as
elsewhere in detail (Points II and Til, infra). .The asser-
tion of the city that it had power ‘‘to regulate. every de-
tail of the milk industry” (Brief, p: 15) prior to the .
- enactment of the Milk Pasteyrization Act, and that .it had
', power to prohibit the use of single service containers, is

sumptio which this suit was originally etait to: -
allenge.

(4) The assertion (Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 16.17) that
the ordinance. required the use of: glass‘ containers—
under the. construction placed by the Circuit Coutt~of
Appeals on the phrase ‘‘standard milk bottles’
“treated. fully under Point IV and the applicable rite~of
law -is discussed. It is sufficient here to point out that
under a more recent decision of. the Supreme Court of
Illinois than that cited to and relied on by the. Ciréeuit .
~ Court of Appeals the meaning of legislative language is
not static. The fact, therefore, that single service con-
tainers were not in general use on January 4, 1935,—
the date of the enactment of ~the ordinance—and conse- -
quently: were not considered by the Ry! Council at that

phrase in. tarpreting the: ordinance oli. We ‘submit
that the correct interpretation of the ordinance was
adep‘ed by the District Court which found single service
containers to be “‘standard milk hottles”’.

is a matter we discuss- .

. 24

After pointing - -out‘ that Section ° 19 of. ‘the Milk Pas-
». teurization Law of 1939, is in the same language as’ the

title of the A. , the petitioners develop’ in detail their —

contention that, by ‘reason, of that section, *‘ whatever
aspects of the niik industry may be subjected to state-

wide regulation by the statute, cities and villages retain —

to the fullest extent every power that they had thereto:

fore’? (Petitioners” Brief, p. 19).-This-result is said to >

- be revealed by a t‘cursory reading of the saving clause’’
and ‘a detailed expesition of the language of the section
leaves no possible doubt’? (Brief, p. 19). |

Before discussing the analy sis or exposition of this sec-
tion of “the Milk Pasteurization. Act of 1939, and its effect
on the regulatoty” “powers © “of the City. of ‘Chicago. over
certain phases of the milk industry, that Act must. be con-

‘sidered. in relation to. previous “egislation. on the Same:
_ subject. Sy ee es

In 1925 the Gensial Nakemblo enacted “An ‘Act i in rela- -
& “-: to. ‘the pasteurization of milk-’. * (Smith- ard Mn. B::
1925, «. DOs, pars. 101- 113.) _ In 1935, this Act was

meat (Il R. S. 39387; 564, pars. 101-114).
amended it was in force until the enactment of the ne
ent statute, Section 20 of which: “prov ides :

amended. June 29, 1935 », is hereby repealed: ig

’ The earlier Act prov ided for application to, and issu-

ance by, the State Department: of Public Health, , of ai

Certificate of Approval to persons or firnis’ engaged in
operating ‘a pasteurization plant. who comply with the
provisions of. the Act. The Act imposed certain require-
ments with respect’ to the construction of such plants, for

—
‘‘The Act entitled ‘An Act in relation to the pas- —
. teurizatfion of . milk’, approved June 30, 1925, as -

oa

25
vertain apparatus: for siiblleai temperatures during pas-
teurization and for filter—tests-for-sediment—or stain. In~
addition, employees. in pasteurization. plants were required —
to furnish annually to the State’ Department of Health a -
‘medical certifieate showing them to be free of certain
specified diseases, and provision was made for an ‘‘auto-
‘mobile laboratory”? to enable the Department of Health
to make chemical and other scientific analyses. Upon
failure to comply with the requirements of the statute,
provision was made for revocation-of the certificate of ap-.
proval, and a penalty was fixed for violation thereof.. _

In 1939 the legislature enacted the present Milk Pas-
_teurization Act. The two Acts cover the same subject .
“matter, but in the present statute each provision is
treated with an. elaboration not, présent in the earfier ©
Act. New requirements are added and the old made" ‘More
stringent. oo

There is, moreover, anether major difference in the
Acts. What might be characterized as a * saving clause”’
in the. old Act, but which it wovld perhaps be more ac- °
curate to describe as an “‘exception,”! . prov ides :

‘‘The provisions of this Act do not apply to pas-"
teutization plants located in and furnishing milk or, .
milk products for constimption in ‘municipalities eon-
taining 500,000 or more inhabitants, according to the
last census, which have established a system of regu-
lation and inspection of the pasteurization plants
supplying milk for consumption in-such municipalities
or to any pasteurization plant which supplies milk or

milk products solely for consumption in such munici-
palities.’’ (Ill. B. S. 1937, C. 563, ‘‘Foods’’, par.
Ma) SS ® @ |

f _ The evident ‘purpose of this section was to exclude the
City of Chicago from ‘the operation of the statute, since’
no municipality in INinois, then or now, except Chicago,

m .

SS

‘

%

6

———

ie a eee

satisfied the population requirement. ‘Obviously, the legis.
lature, in 1925, in. first entering this field, was satisfied
‘that the pasteurization regulations. then in effect in Chi-
cago were not inadequate, though even at that date it is: .
noteworthy that the scope of the ‘exception was corifined |
to plants supplying products solely for consumption in
that City. Tk es
~The-Mitk Pasteuriiation Act Of. “1925 w was the first ai-
tempt by the State of Blinois to regulate the distribution

and. pasteurization ‘of milk. J t was neither. comprehensive

nor exhaustive and did not cover the field in detail. The : |

~ City of Chicago, alone of the municipalities in the State,
by the device of .population classification, was excluded
from the’ operation of the statute. The present. statute,
avhich’ repealed the Act of .1925, makes standards, more .
stringent. Additional requirements extend’ the seope of .
prior regulations. The utmost care is taken to include
all important details with reference to the sale and dis-
tribution, as well as the pasteurization, of milk and to
give the State Director of Health power to supplement
the requirements. The application of this Act is state:
‘wide. No municipality is exempted. It is immaterial that
a city or village may or may not have established a sys-

-.- teni of regulation and inspection. No longer does the City

ef ‘Chicago have the exemption * provided by the 1925
- statute. °° 3 .
The intention of the legislature that the Act is to be
effective throughout the state without territorial or other
limitation is apparent - from thet Seaange of. the statute
(sec. 2): ~
"Any person operating. a pasteurization plant who
. distributes, delivers‘ or . sells pasteurized milk: or
_ pasteurized qnilk products for consumption , in the

State of Illinois shall annually make application to
ee ae

the Department for a Certificate of Approval. ” (Ital-
ies ours.) ;

Section 3 provides :

SEE ee

‘*Any person who shall bereatter engage in operat-.
ing a pasteurization plant for the purpose ‘of dis-
tributin selling pasteurized milk or

oe pasteurized milk» products for. consumption in the
State of Illinois, shall before engaging in such .busi-

_ ness make application to the Department for a Cer-

tificate of Spptoral, ’? (Italics ours.)

Section, 9 -states: :

** Any person ‘selling, delivering or distritaiine anil
or milk products in the State of Tllinois.who shall
heat milk or milk products or subject milk or milk
products to other treatment in an effort to make the
milk or milk produets. safe for human ‘consumption
or to preserve its keeping qualities shall comply with
the provisions of this, Act.’ ’*. (Italies ours.) ;

_ Section 11 provides :

“No milk or milk products sold, distributed | or
delivered in this State shall be heated or subjected
to any other treatment hy ay effort to make it safy,
for hunian ‘consumption or. to! preserve its keeping
qualities unless such milk or milk. products are ~

* processed in compliance with fae _ provisions of this
‘Act.”’ (Italics ours.)

Other ‘sections of the “act indicate a recognition of sin- .

gle-service containers and show that the state has as- : |

sumed ‘control of the equipment for the packaging of. milk
and prohibited its sale except in containers filled: on such
equipment. at the pint of. pasteurization.

Section 8. provid OS :

‘All paste rinad milk sind milk products. shall be
placed in their final delivery containérs in: the plant.
in, which a are pasteurized. It met be unlawful

e

“ ae

.
. ~ °
2 . . “a °
‘

Ph Sak A \
for hetels, code fouttoties, restaurants, grocery stores,
milk depots, milk stations and similar establishments
to sell or serve ‘any pasteurized milky ‘milk _prod-
ucts except in the original container th hich it was
i placed at the point of pasteurization, provided that

this requirement. shall not apply ‘to milk or milk”
products consumed on the premises which — may he
served from the original container .or from a° dis-
penser approved by the Department for such service.
The sale or distribution of bulk, loose or’ dipped pas-
teurized milk or milk which has been heated within
the purview of this Act is hereby prohibited.”’

The first paragraph of Section 15 is as follows: ,

‘*Any pasteurization plant coming ‘under the pro-

-. ° Visions ef: this Act-shall conform with all of the. .-

: - +. following items of construction; equipment, mainte- .
| nance and operation and tn accordance with minimum
requirements adopted by the Director for interpreta-

tion and enforcement of this Act.”’ (Italies ours.) 9

‘Following and - as an integral part .of this section are
eertain items, including the following:

“Iteni 10. All multi-wse containers and equipment
-with which milk: or milk products come in contact
shall be constructed in such manner as to be easily
cleaned and shall’ be kept .in good repair. Single
service containers, caps, gaskets and similar articles
shall be*manufactured and transported in a sanitary

Se

manner. (Italics ours.) fon

‘Item 18. Bottling or packaging of milk and. milk
products shall be-done at.the place of pasteurization
by approved mechanical equipment.’ (Italies niga

- oO

tursuant to the power therein granted, the Director of .
the Illinois Department of Public Health has promulgated

“minimum reguérements’? for interpretation and enforee- .
ment offthis/ Act, providing, in part, as follows: :
‘*Satisfacgory compliance.—This item ; |

deemed to have been satisfied if: * * *
a a (9) All sengle-service containers, caps, gaskets and

- .

similar articles are manufactured and handled in

“accordance with requirements of the. Department.
(a). The buildings and rooms in which single-serv-

ice containers and container caps and covers are
manufactured, packed, stored, and handled shall be
clean, well lighted and ventilated, and free of dust
and flies, as prescribed in items’ ee "3, 4, 6, 7, 8
and 11. eet

(b) The average bacterial plate count m2 the stock

from which ‘single-service containers ‘and container -

caps and covers are made shall not exceed 100-col-
onies per gram. No substance shall be present in fin-

ished single-service containers and container mes.
‘and covers which is toxic.

(c) All operations of the fabrication slat EOE

during transportation .of the manufactured articles ©

- shall be so conducted as to reduce to a minimum the.
possibility of contaminating the manufaetured ar.

theles, as prescribed in items 13, 14-and 15.

(e). All single-service containers aud container’

caps and covers shall he so treated as to be as tm
pervious to milk and milk products as. precise.”

(Italics ours.) , . Lo

of the public health, *-* * :

‘At shall he the duty of adl loca! boards’ of health,
__-health authorities and offieers, * * * of:the State or
any “* * city:.* * * thereof td enforce the rules and

regulations. that‘ may be adopted by the State Board
of. Health * * *.”*- -

It will he noticed that under the terms of the above
Acts the Stat® of Illinois, as it has the undoubted right
to do, has taken ufito itself the approval of not only_ the
plant but also the eyguipment and methods of operation
of every _person who » ‘pasteurizes . milk for sale in the .
State of Illinois. It also has occupied the following fields
of milk sanitation: It requires that the ‘‘bottling or

°

@

as they may frony time to time _-

&

31

—
impose such additional requirements, is not such Certifi-

cate of Approval. rendered ineffective ! ?

- One difficulty with the City’ s argument that the statute
establishes ‘‘minimum requirements”’ is ‘in answering the
question: .Who determines whether a ‘Fequirement is‘ a

_ minimum era maximum? Is the City’s judgment on that
' question to prevail against the State’s?

are

a. is clear that the only effect: to be given, to Section
19 is, first. that it prevents a repeal by implication of al!
power of. the municipality to regulate: milk, and, second,
. that the city’s ‘power continues unimpaired as to all of
those numerous matters not governed ‘by the statute or
bt the minimum requirements promulgated pursuant
thereto. Ht gives the City no right to enforce ordinances -
in conflict with the statute or the. regulations made
thereunder.

‘That this is true is: apparent from the proviso to Sec. :

-*'tion 19, which expressly probibits any city, village ed

incorporated town from permitting ‘‘any persqn to. vio-

late any of the provisions of this Act.’’ To violate is ‘‘to

. infringe on”’, ‘to disturb’’, “to ‘disregard”’. Tf a munici-

pality may not permit any person ‘‘to infringe | on, or to’

disturb, or to disregard’’ any provision of the “Act, such

‘ municipality may not itself “infringe on, or disturb, or

disregard”? any provision of the Act,. But to forbid the

use of single service containers, the use of which is ex-_

pressly sanctioned by the statute, is “to infringe: on or

. to disturb or to bathe the plain language of the .
” statute. :

ce

>... Petitioners slate great reliance ‘upon City of Ottawa

v. Brown, 372 Ill. 468 (1939), which involved the following

- saving clause in “*An Act to regulate the Storage, Trans-

portation, Safe and Use of ‘Gasoline and Volatile Oils’’, in

force we be, 1919 (Til. Session Laws, 1919,-p. 692; Hurd’-
Illinois R. S. 1919, e. 38, Criminal Code, par. 4q). }

‘*Except.in cities or villages where ‘regulatory ordi-

nances upon the subject are in full force and effect.

the Department of Trade and Commerce shali have

power to make and adopt reasonable rules and regu-

lations governing the keeping, storage, transporta-
tion, sale or use of gasoline and volatile oils.’’

S

v

37

The petitioners point out that in this decision-the Su-.-

preme Court of [linvis held that a municipality in which, ’
on July 1,-1919, regulatory ordinances on the ‘subject were
in force, had the power to amend its oydinance later with-
‘ out regard: to any coniliet between city, and state regu-
lation. oe af 7

“Phe important thing about the saving ‘clause in this
statute is not that it was given the effect shown in
City of Ottawa v. Brown, but that the Supreme Court
in a - previous case gave to the saving clause a narrow

construction which withdrew all the power to regulate the -

subject matter involved from all municipalities except
those whieh. at the effective date of the act had ordi-
nances in force dealing ‘with. such subjeet matter. The
previous case was Kizer v. City .of Mattoon, 332 Ill. 545
(1928), where the coyrt had, before it thes validity of
an ordinance of the City of Mattoon enacted after July
_1,.1919, purporting to regulate the keeping, storage, sale,
ete., of gasoline. Plaintiffs: sought an injunction ayainst
the enforcement of thecordinance and losing in the trial!
court were appellants in the Supreme Court of Lifngis

There thé plaintiffs contended that the legisjature. had

taken the power of regulation from cities by the act of
July 1, 1919, and the defendants contended that . under
_ clause 65 of Section 1, Article 5, of the Cities and Vil-
lages Act enacted ‘in 1874 (which is the act relied on by
the City of Chieago here), the City of Mattoon had the
power to.enact and enforce the ordinance. The City of
‘Mattoon contended that the act of 1919 did not. repeal
its power under. clause 65 and ‘‘that thefe is not such
clear repugnancy between the provisions of these law:
that they cannot all be carried into effect’’. The court
said (pp. 549-550) :

“The power to pass ordinances such as the one

g

“

a

_ 38

here in question was delegated to cities by. the State
: through its legislature. Where the State delegates.
~suth “power to a municipality it may resume it
through legislative action and thus deprive the mu-
ep eed of the right to = it. (City, of Chicago
Phoenix Ins. Co., 126 Ill. 276; Wilkie, v.: City: of
Chicago 188 id. 444.) Prior to: July. 1, 1919, the #x.
clusive power gf regulation here involved was lodged
in cities» and villages by virtue of clause 65 above
quoted. By its act to. regulate the storage, transper- .
tation, sale and use ‘of gasoline and other. volatile
oils, in foree: July 1, 1919, the State withdrew from
° municipalities this exclusive power of regulation and
gave to the Department. of Trade and Commerce
exclusive power to make and adopt reasonablé rules
and regulations governing the keeping, storage, transS
= portation, sale or use of gasoline and vofatile oils,
“except in cities or villages where regulatory ordi-
nances upon the subject were in full force and effect.
** * The City of Mattoon on July 1, 1919, not having -
in full force and effect regulatory ordinances on the
subject, its delegated power to enact such ordinances
was automatically withdrawn, by the State and the
exclusive power to make -such regulations for the
City of Mattoon became vested in the Department -
of Trade and’-Commerce. The City of Mattoow-hav-
ing been divested of this power by the State, could .
not by its own action, re-acquire such power, but
could only regain it by subsequent action on the
‘part of the legislature.”

It will be noticed that in the above case the court cen-
strned the words ‘regulatory ordinances upon the ‘sub-
‘ject are in full force and effect’? as meaning in effect
on July 1, 1919, when the act became effective. A logical
construction of such language would reqiire the’ words »
‘sare in full force and effect’? to mean ‘tare in full force
from time to time’’. Logically there is no reason for
giving greater force and effect to an ordinance in force
on July 1, 1919, than_ one. enacted on July 2, 1919. The .

39 ‘ , hire ee ee cree
ea xe ; : »

--fact-is that a later ordinance would probably be a bette:
informed effort than ’an earlier one. Notwithstariding
the apparent logic of this consideration, the Illinois Su- .
preme Court ‘gave the ordinance the strictest possible
construction in, favor of state regulation—in favor of
withdrawing from mimnicipalities power which they had
had“under the general Cities and Villages Act upon which |
th itione*s in this ease place their complete reliance.

Other: courts have giv en saving clauses a narrow con-
struction.

In State ex rel. ‘Kaies et al. v. Kinsey Y, 314 Mo. 80, 282 .
S. W. 487 (1925), an Original petition for mandamus was
filed in. the “Supreme Court of Missouri to compel the
Board of Public Service of the City of St. Louis to issue.
permits to: the relators to sell milk in that city. An
ordinance of the city forbade the sale of ‘‘raw’’ or un-
pasteurized milk within. the confines of the municipality.

The State Legislature had also b® statute classified and
defined. various types of milk and milk products and
established standards of purity for such dairy ptoducts. -
‘‘Raw”’ or unpasteurized milk was one of the types of -
milk thus defined by the statute. te ‘

in contending that there was no conic hetween the
ordinance which prohibited the sale of unpasteurized milk,
and the: statute which recognized raw milk as: a lawful
product, the City of St. Louis placed great reliance on
Section 8646 of the Missouri statutes which provided:
‘“All-cities and towns in the state shall have power, *
by ordinance, to license and regulate milk dairies and

the sale of mijk, and ——- for the inspection
thereof.’’ : d

“The relators contended that since .“‘raw’’. or unpas-
teurized milk was declared by statute a lawful product

-
.

0°

that the City of. St. Louis was without power to prohibit

its sale, and that the ordinance purporting so to do wa

void. The Court ‘agreed with this. contention and said

(pp. 438-439 of 282 S. W.):

sé

plan i in defining and specifying different milk products
which it may be lawful for persons to deal in. Section
8646, quoted above, relating to cities, of course only

- authorized such cities to provide for inspection, li-
censes, and -regulations so as to secure conformity to
the general statute. The city may enforce such
regulations as are reasonable in requiring milk
dealers to comply with the law.

This statute shows a. vry comprehensive ©

- «*4 city has ample power by police. regulation to
protect the health of its inhabitants, but a municipal-

police regulation cannot infringe on rights guaranteed
by the Constitution or laws of the state. A, munici-

pality cannot. law fully forbid what the Legislature

has expressly ‘authorized (citing -authorities)

‘‘Here clause 1 of the statute of section: 11985 de-
fines milk. It is required to be fresh, clean, and come
from healthy cows, properly fed and kept. It is not
denied .. ag the- product so produced’ and kept is
wholesome. . . . It-is apparent that’ the statute has
made seeete classes of milk products, of which raw
milk is ene and pasteurized milk another. -The ordi-
nance under. consideration forbids anyone to deal in
raw milk, a product which the Legislature authorizes

as a lawful product and which admittedly is healtp-—
ful and harmless. It cannot be contended that pas=.

teurized milk is the “milk described cin clause + -of

the section, b&ause it is subjected to a process which -

gives it a.different .character. Therefore, under the
. tule of law as stated above, on ‘the face of- the
. ordinance and the statutes, the city had no authority
to’ forbid the dealing in raw milk, and could not
lawfully refuse permits to milkmen to sell it. .. .
Here is a lawful produet, made so by thé statute, of
the state, and the .ordinance-purports to forbid a citi-
zen his constitutional right to deal in that lawful and
harmless prdduct,, This does not mean that the city
may, not make regulations which the statute does

epee sot ascot aard icagO ocean aaa SE es
: Sw, Oak
—

~~

—

41

not impose, conditions which insure the purity: of

_ the product. The city . uray require standards of

. equality in the milk dealt in, where the statute makes.
none. One may violate an ordinance without violat-
‘ing.a statute. But the ordinance here is not limited - .
to those yegulations. It definitely and distinctly for-
bidseanyone to deal in a product which the statute
declares to be lawful.’’

The petition for mandamus was allowed.

“A Connecticut case also shows the extent to which the
_powet of the state over regulation of milk supersedes
municipal action.

In Shelton vy. City of Shelton; 111 Conn. 433, 150 Afl.
-811 (1930), the plaintiff was a licensed milk dealer doing
business in the City of Shelton. The plaintiff had com-
plied with the laws of the state, the rules ‘and regula-
tions of the state milk regulation board and -the -ordi-
nanceg of Shelton concerning the production, handling
‘and sale of milk, except one ordinance of that city which
provided, in effect, that no milk or cream should be sold “—
-at retail within the confines of the municipality unless -
it had been pasteurized or produces from tuberculin-
tested: cows.

The charter of Shelton empowered ‘the city to ide .
ordinances -——

‘“to license milk dealers. and to iewpeliahs the sale and
manner of distribution of milk and to -prohibit the

‘ sale theieof, unless in accordance with such regu-,
lations. =

The- city. was further. wathorised, in the same section
_of the .charter, to adopt, ordinances with reference to
Mee he | eee

‘‘and to prohibit the sale thereof when in such con-
dition as to endanger the public*health.”?

,

%

- the production, care, handling, marketing and sale, of
» milk. and cream .and gave the milk regulation board
-power- to make rules and régulations concerning the
marketing or sale.of milk or cream within the state ‘to

. protect the public from the use of milk and cream which
- is unsanitary or detrimental to public health.’’ .The stat-

3 shall affect the authority gf any town, city or bor-

| ding the sale of raw milk, grade A milk and certified milk.

_ product, was ine¢onflict with the statute and for that rea
‘son void. The court, after pointing out that ordinances

. with the general law of the state and with its public polict

ace a

a

Subsea ent to the incorporation gf the defendant. mu.
nicipality, the General Assembly of Connecticut ‘enacted
certain legislation concerning ‘the inspection of dairies and

ute recognized five types of milk and made all five lawful
provided the statutory .regulations were complied with in
their production arid sale. In addition to pasteurized milk
and milk from tuberculin-tested cows, the statute defined
and ‘recognized raw milk, ‘grade A milk and certified
milk. : aha : Bs

A ‘‘saving-clause’’ in the Act provided:

‘‘No provisions of sections 2485. to 2492 inclusive

ough to. enact ordinances or by-laws for the control,
regulation, sale or distribution, within its Tits, of
milk which may be detrimental to public health.’’ —

°

The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, despite
the saving clause, found that the ordinance, in forbid.

each of which was recognized by the statute as‘a lawful

must not conflict with statutes and must be in harmony

as expressed in: its legislation, said (p B15 of 150 Atl.):

“Obviously there is nothing in section 2491 [the
‘saving clause’) or in section 1 of Chapter 272 ¢
Public Acts of 1929 which gives the city’ of Sheltor
the right to prohibit the sale of milk or cream w
less it be produced from — tuberculin-tested cows 0!

43

pasteurized. There is nothing in the section which
°- grants to this city the right to pxohibit -the sale

of raw milk which meets the statutory qualifications,.

by a producer ‘or dealer who has complied with every
provision of the law.’

And continuing the court said (p. 816 of 150 -Atl.):

‘« |. , The ordinanee conyerts the permissive use
of tuberculin-tested) milk or! - pasteurized milk of ‘the
statute into avcompulsory one. . ‘It prohibits abso-

-lutely the sale and hence the use of raw milk, whose —

use and sale the statute grants conditioned upon
-compliance with. the statutory requirements. The
ordinance repeals this statutory grant within the
‘limits of this ‘city. The passage of this ordinance
was beyond the powers: granted fhis city. °

+The statutes as amended have covered the field

of milk *legislatidn;:at least so far as the General

Assembly: purposed, up to the time of the passage of
this ordinance. The subject- ‘matter is not an exclu-

sively local conditien. To the extent the state legis- _

lation has gone, it has pre- -empted the field. ;The de-
-fendant ‘under its general grant in section 66 cau aid
the purposes of this legislation. It cannot. override
it. It cann@t prohibit what, the ‘statute grants. ' It
» cannot set up new standards, in place of the legis-
“lative standards. It cannot substitute its “judgment
‘for the legislative judgment. It cannot overturn a

‘public policy evidenced in long-continued legislation ~-

over a subject state wide in its rangé and not only

intended to conserve the health of. people but cer-

tainly doing it.

“The statute law recognizes at least»five kinds of
milk and makes all fivé lawful ‘provided the .statu-

tory provisions are cqmplied with in their produc- .

tion and sale, viz: Raw milk, tuberculin-tested milk,

" pasteurized milk, grade A milk, and ceftified milk.

The, city of: .Shelton, was “without power. to. enact
an ordinance prohibiting the sale at retail of any
one of these kiads of milk which are authorized by.

‘. statute. Whether the city could in the exercise. of:
its. police power add to these regulatory provisions os

we have no need to inquire.’

The interpretation of the ‘‘saving clause’’ pf the Illinois
statute by the petitioners is subject to the criticism that .
.it would lead to an_unseemly conflict of jurisdiction . be-
tween the State and the City.

The Lllinois Pasteurization Act cannot mean_ that
specific matters’ shall be subject to determination by both
the state and by the city at one and the same time. That
would mean chaos oin regulation which. is not to. be at-
tributed to the intention of the legislature.and which can
be avoided by halding that the City’s power is withdrawn
by implication in the field actually océupied by the State

_ of Illinois. teen ve of

In Village of Atwood v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis dW. ;
-R. Co.3 316 Tl. 425 (1925), the question was whether the
Public Utilities Act of Illinois repealed by implication the
_ power long before granted to municipalities to require
* watchmen at. railway crossings. The [Illinois Supreme
- Court recognized. the rule that ‘‘the police power-is an at-
tribute of sovereignty and is primarily vested in the’

* General Assembly, which has the right at any time to —
recall. it from the agency to which it has been delegated,
‘and after being recalled to retain it or to. confer it ‘upon
- gome other gency or government. P? “(p. 433.)

After finding (p. 430) - that the Public. Utilities. Act
gave the Commission the power to require railroads to
°* station flagman at grade crossings, the court held (p.

_ 431): xe

“Tf both ‘the commission and die Village authori-
ties can exercise the power, their requirements with
reference to the~same crossing may be utterly con-
tradictory, for the village board may direct the sta-
tioning of a flagman while the commission may order

a separation of grades. Obviously, in such cases both
sik be obeyed, and concurrent authority often
leads to, conflict and — in confusion. The Pub-

lie Utilities act enjoins shalt: to the commis-
‘sion’s orders. That act’is. the later one and covers |.
the whole subject of promoting the safety of the pub-
lic at the intersections of streets and: railroads. It
is éomplete in itself and evidently was intended by
the General Assembly to supersede the power con-.
ferred by subsection 27 of section 1 of article 5 of
the general Cities and Villages act to require rail-
road companies to keep flagmen at street wen”

The court held: that the Publie- Utilities Act and: the
power of the village were so clearly inconsistent that botk
could not stand and that therefore the power of the vil-
lage was withdrawn and transferred to the Commerce -
Commission. pone

It is true that the question in. that case was whether .
there was ‘a repeal by implication of the powers granted
to municipalities but what the court said about the con-
flict of concurrent jurisdiction and about ‘the desirability -
of avoiding such conflict is very appropriate to the case.
at bar. The city has argued, and properly so, that. Sec-
tion 19 of the Milk Act is a saving clause not present in
the Public Utilities Act. We concede that except to the
extent that the state ‘by and pursuant to the 1939 Milk
Act occupies the field of milk regulation; the powers of
the City of Chicago are unimpaged. |

Again, in Northern Tru: Co. ¥. Chicago ‘Rs. Co.,-318 —
Ml. 402 (1925), already referred to, where the question
was-whether the. City of Chicago retained its power to re-
quire street cars’ to ‘maintain brightly lighted headlights,

the court said (p. 410) : me
_ “Pid the Public Utilities Act of 1913, which “¢on-

ferred this ample control and supervision over pub
lie utilities, including street railroads, deprive mu-.
nicipalities “ organized under, the general Cities and

Villages act of the power to pass ordinances requir-
ing street railroads to equip their cars with brightly

- 46
lighted headlights? _If both the commission and the
city could exercise the same power at the same time
with reference to the same subject matter their re-
quirements in respect to the same utility might be
-utterly contradictory. In such eases the utility could
not obey both the commission and’ the city council,
Yet the. Public Utilities aet enjoinéd obedience to the
commission's orders and prescribed severe penalties
for failures to comply. Obviously, concurrent author,

, aa — lead to conflict and confusion. ie
¥ a :

ae again, the question was whether the conflict i:
tween. the Cities and Villages Aét and the Public Utilities
Act was so complete as’ to indicate that the latter had
. repealed the former, but the-reasoning of the court sup- ,

* ports our conténtion that where the legislature has with- +
drawn a portion of the city’ 's power and conferréd it on a
new agency (in our. case, thé Director of the Department

of Health of the State of THinois) at least to the extent
of any conflict between the stata and municipal authorities

- the. state governs. ;

The question may be asked why Section’ 19 wae inserted
if conflicts between the State Department.of Health and ;
minicipalities are to be decided in favor of the state
authority. We believe that we have already properly
stated the purposes of Section 19, that i¢gwas intended . °
to prevent a fepeal of all municipal power. by mpliva-
tion and to jndi¢ate that the Milk, Act should supersede
the power of municipalities only-to the extent that the .
‘state had entered the field of milk regulation. i a

Petitioners coritend (Brief, pp. 29-30) that if there. is
_need for béth city and state regulations there are bound
to be differe nce s between them. They instance the failure
of the ‘state “statute t6 require the date on which the milk
is to be sot to. be placed on the label: They argue from

this that the statute permits the use of undated containers
, : :

47

and approves ‘their use so that if our contention be cor- -
rect the tity ordinance prohibiting the use of undated
containers is invalid. We make no such contention and the
petitioners” argument Shows an .unwillingness on their
part to admit that there is a clear distinetion between
supplemental regulations aud prohibitions.. There is noth-
ing. inconsistent between the requirement of the state
statute that the word ‘‘pasteurized’’ and the name and
pistofice addréss of the pasteurization _plant be. placed
on the label and the city requirement “that the’ permit
number of the Chicago Board of Health and the last date
‘on which the contents are to be sold shall be placed on
the label (R. 37).

What is actually ‘done is that the information required
by-both the: statute: and the ordinance is placed on the
label and there is nothing whatever inconsistent in the
.two requirements. ‘The example given by thé petitioners
isnot comparable to the situation here in which petitioners
attempt to prohibit what the state statute recognizes and
permits, An analogous instance would occur, however,
if the city attempted to forbid the placing of the post-:
office address of the pasteurization plant on the label by :
‘prese ‘ribing@a different fortn of marie and making it ex-
clusive, Sty eer on
"The failure of the state statute to require that~ con-
tainers be dated is neither an express nor implied approval.
of undated containers. The references in the statute to
single service #ontainers are, however, a lefinite recogni-
tion and approval of them. F urthermore, “the ‘grant of
power to the Director of Public Health of the state to
approve the. mechanical equipment for the packaging of
milk (Section 15, Item 18 of the 1939 Pasteurization’
A\et,. Petitioners’ Brief, p. 86) and the Director’s spe-
tific approval, as agent of the state legislature, . of. the

«
.
.

‘

e . : eit. : : OS

. plaintiff’ 8 equipment for the packaging of mill in single.

service containers ° makes the prohibitory ‘ordinance of
Chicago not simply regulatéry or supplementary to the
state action, buf directly in conflict. with it.

The C ireuit Court of Appeals correctly held:

‘“‘Neither do. we agree with defendants’ argument
that the prohibition of plaintiff’s single service con-
, einer: is a. mere regulation.”

As part of the record in. the present case “fhere has
been printed: (R. 23. 122) the milk ordinance of the City of
Chicago passed January 4, 1935, the rules and regulations
of the. Chicago Board of Health, and certain resolutions

by the Board of Health. ‘A comparison of. the. provisions

of the ordinance, and, particularly: the rules and ‘ regula-
tions of the Board of Health, ° with the 1939 Milk Act
passed by the legislature, will indicate to what greater
extent than the'state statute. the Chieago city ordinance
goes. It provides for licenses both of sellers and their
vehicles. (R. 33, R. °34), for the ‘display of the license
emblem on each vehicle (R. 36),-for the revocation of the
license (R. 37), for the labeling and placarding of all

"bottles, cans, packages, and other’ containers enclosing
- milk or any milk product (R. 37), for. the inspection of

dairy farms (R. 39), for the examination of samples. cR.
40), and the permissible ‘‘plate counts’? for bacteria (R.
44), none ‘of which subjects is covered-by the state statute.
It is obvious that thé intention of Section 19 was to pre-

- serve to the, City the right to continue the ‘ordinances

and régulations -on ‘those Lubjects not occupied. by the

state system of. supervision. |

, The next, and, we think, detgrmjnative question, is

: ‘whether in faet, the state of. Illinois has oceupied the
field of approving types of ‘containers so that any acticn
of the City of Chicago in ¢onflict-therewith is’ void. °

49

’ We submit that the state has by the Milk Pasteuriza-_
tion Act of 1939 given its approv al to paper containers
{termed in the Act single- service containers, but at the
present time. the only ginglé-servi ice containers in commer.
cial use are paper.) As ha¢ been seen, Section “4 of the
state statute provides for the issuance of a certificate of
_ approval to a~pasteurization plant after inspection ‘‘if
the plant, equipment and methods of-6peration’’ are found —
‘to comply with the provisions of the Act: It is admitted
by the ‘answer (R. 20) -that the respondent's plant is ‘at
Chemung, McHenry Couhty, Mlinois, and the evidence is
uncontradicted that respondent is equipped only for the
hottling of milk. in Pure-Pak paper containers ‘on two
machines leased from the Fx-Cell-O Corporation,. and. the
respondent-does not have facilities to bottle milk jin glass
containers (R. 890). aot nes |

An integral part of its *‘method of operation,”’ ap-
_ proved by the State of Mlinois 4R. 695-696) is the packag-
ing of milk in these paper containers. That the method
of packaging milk is just as much a part of the method
of. operation which the ‘Director af the Department of
Health of the State ‘of Mlinois ‘approved, is clearly indi-
‘cated by the requirements of Section 8,that all pasteurized

+ milk shall be _placed in final delivery containers in the

plant in which pasteurized and the provision of Section
_ 15, Item 18, that ‘bottling or packaging of milk and milk
products shail be done at the place of pasteurization
by approved mechanical equipment. ”

The Ex-Cell-O Pure-Pak machine, pictures of which are
rather poorly. re-produced i in the printed record (R. 1469,
R. 1498-1501) is equipment adapted solely to the packag-
ing of milk in Pure-Pak paper bottles by means of *
~~ mechanical operation whereby ‘that part of the naper
bottle coming in coritact with the milk is not touched by .

{ 50

human hands at the dairy and before. being filled with
milk is immersed in a hot paraffin bath, then cooled in the
refrigeration unit, eeieouness. filled, sealed and
stapled. .

Section 16 (a) of the state statute giv es wus ‘Depariatn :
‘the right to ‘suspend its certificate of EELS becausé .

of unsanitary conditions of ‘‘milk containers -or equip-

ment.’ This clearly shows supervision by- the-State of
Illinois of the pastenrization plant, the method of. doing
business, the equipment, ‘and milk containers, and is an
occupation of that field, at least with respect to the ap-
. proval of thé pre of container, to the @xclusion of the
City. : ¢

Lést the failure of the Cireuit Conv of Appeals to cite
the case of City of Rockford. v. Hey, 366 1. "526° (1937),
although called ‘to the attention ofgthat court, be’ treated
as a waiver hy us of- the applicability of that “case, we
here.expressly rely on it. See our diseussion ‘above (pp.
19-21). There the City of Rockford had no. power to—
‘prohibit the sale of ice cream in Rockford by requiring
a license andan inspection of a plant ontside the- city;
here the City of Chicago éannot prohibit the sale of milk
in Chicago by rejecting containers and the corresponding
plant Se the state has approv ed outside the
aly. ; os

We have show n above repeated references i in the statute,
and the state ‘Tuies and reguiations promulgated pursuant
-to it, recognizing paper containers; and in view of the
. approval by the State of Illinois, pursuant to the state

statute, of both the pastenrization plant and ‘the method

of operation, namely the use of paper containers instead
of glass containers, we insist that the State of Tlinois ©
has withdrawn fron the City of Chicago the right to pro-
‘hibit (as distinguished ie regulate) hice pottles. On

| ae

one hand the state approves the ‘pasteurization plant and
the type of container and makes it illegal to sell milk in
any way except in that container and ‘on the other hand
the City of Clfcago steps’ in and says: you may not sell
in that type of container. The City is net attempting
to regulate the container approved’ by the state, but to
prohibit it; and the decisive question undér this heading
of our brief is whether, a creature .of the state, such. as
the City of Chicago, may challenge the approval. by the -
parent state made purshant to state law, of a’ method —
of operation recognized ‘as entirely lawful by, although
uot. required by, the statute. -

a

We think, under the cases already cited under this
heading, the -answer is obvious.

Thgse cases hold clearly that in instanees of ecatiiet
between state authority and municipal authority, the latter
must give away, and-we can think of no sharper conflict
than the present instance in which the state appreves
ind the city. attempts to forbid.

We may ask whether in fhis caer ular case an apiplica-
tion of this rule will lead to justice or injustice. We
submit that it will clearly lead to’ justice..In_ this case
we have the City of Chicago alignine the supposed judg-
ment of fifty aldermen rendered in the year 1935, ata
_ time when these containers were not-widely known (and
were not used in (Chieago or its environs) against the
Board of Health of the City of Chicago acting in 1939,
the General Assembly of the State of Tllinois, (which
recognized, single-service containers as proper in the 1939 .
Act), the Director ‘of the Department of Health of the -
State of THlinois (who has approved the respondent’s plant
and its method of operation), the United ‘States Public
Health Service (which has amended jts model: ordinance
expressly to permit single-service’ containers),—and- the
practical- experience of hundreds of other municipalities.

°

emits

j cetang A Sere 52
/ ae |
a > ae 7 1m

' State- Approval of Single Service Containers Is Conclusive
_ that Prohibition of Such Containers -by a Municipality
Is Unreasonable as a Matter of Fact. aig tee
: @

Another line of reasoning leads to thé conclusion that
the ordinance of the City of - Chicago, if construed to
prohibit the-use of respondent’s ‘Pure-Pak bottles, is in-
valid. Under the law of the State of [linois, an unreason-
ible ordinance’ is void and the question of unreagonable-
ness is a judicial question. This point’is not to be confuged.
with a question of. const'tutionality (City of. Lake View
v. Tate, 130 Hl, 247 (1889)-at page 252)... sg
In Chicago-and Alton Railroad Co. v. City of Carlinville,
200 Hl. 314 (1902) involving’.the validity-of an ordinance
‘regulating speed of trains, the. court said {p. 321):

The rule’ adopted ‘in this State is,- that where
the ordinance is passed in purspance of power ex-
pressly conferred by. the legis!ature and the details
of such municipal legislation are préscribed by thie
legiSlature, an ordinance passed in pursuance of such
power cannot-be held invalid by the courts as being
unreasonable; but when the details of such legislation
are not prescribed, an ordinancé, passed in pursuance
of such power must be a reasonable exercise thereof:
or it. will be pronounced invalid. (Citing Authorities)
It is said in. the Tate casé, on page 242: ‘Where the
power to legislate on a given subject is conferred and
the modg of its exercise-is not prescribed, then the
ordinance passed in -pursuance thereof must be a

i reasonahje exercise of the power or will. be-pro-
~ , > nounced invalid.’ In Hawes v. City of Chicago, supra,
Mr. Justice Baker, in speaking for the’ court, in. dis-
cussing the question when a court may rightfully
hold an ordinance unreasonable, on page 658. said:
‘Where the power to legislate on a given subject is
conferred on a municipal corporation, yet if the

¥

By Cae

details of such legislation are-not prescribed. by the
legislature, there the ordinance passed in pursuance
of such power must be a reasonable exercise thereof
or it will be pronounced invalid. ——

' In ‘Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 Il.. 129, the court said

(p. 127): ae:

‘*When the legislature has authorized a city couneil
to pass ordinances upon any subject, the power thus

conferred must be reasonably exercised. Whether its

. exercise ina particular ease is reasonable is a judicial

question, and an‘ unreasonable’ ordinance willbe held
void by the courts.’’

” In City of Chicago v. . Chicago & North Western Ry. '
Co., 275 Il. 30 (1916), holding certain provisions of the |
Chicago Milk ordinance invalid, the court said (p. 38):

“*An unreasonable otdinance will be held void ~ .
the courts.”

The fact‘ that in this case the pow er of the ‘city concerns”
a- matter: of public health does not enlarge its .-powers.

In People. v. Robertson, 302 Ill. .422 (1922), which de-
termined that the City of Chicago had no power without
establishing a board of health, to delegate to the com-.
missioner of sed (gee to protnulgate rules to prevent . -
contagious .disease?, it was geld 4p. 4382) >

Ww hile the powers given. ‘to the health authorities
are broad and far- reaching they are. not without their
limitations. As we have’ said; while the courts will not
pass tipon the wisdom of the means adopted to re-
strict and suppress the spread of contagious and in-

fectious diseases, they will interfere if the regulations .
are ar bitrary and unreasonable.’

>

_ This case also. laid down a rule peculiarly applicable
to the facts existing’ in the present-case-(p. 434): d

. “One of the important elements in the administra.
tion of health and quarantine regulations is a full
measure of common sense.’ fe

oe aes ; \

54 : ? ) ° 3”

In the very recert case of City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian,
369 Ill. 447 (1938) dealing with a Sunday closing ordinance,
the court, after saying that city councils exercise only
delegated and limited powers and that the power to pas:

~ . an ordinance must be delegated in express terms or he

necessarily incidental to an express grant and not simply

-convenieft, stated (p. 449):

“When the power to ewialaks ona given subject
is conferred and the mode of its exercise .is not pre-
scribed in the charter, an ordinance passed pursuant
pongo must be'a reasonable exercise of that. power.

- City of Lake V tew i si 130 iil. 247, and maeemritiee
therein cited.” ie ©

These cases go on the well-established ' lh that the
grant of power by the state legislature té@a municipality
‘is a graift of power to pass reasonable ordinances and only
reasonable ordinances, It is’ not necessary, in order to
prove such an ordinance void, to prove that it is un-
constitutional, and:so the rule in Iilinois is much more
favorable to judicial review of municipal action than
that of other. jurisdictions.

The question before the Court is whethér, under exist:
ing circumstances, the city should be permitted to enforce
its ordinance, assuming: that it is to be construed as
prohibiting paper containers. The question of its reason
ableness .must be viewed today, because, as” stated ii
Northern Trust Co.. Vv. “Chicago Rys. Co., 318 ‘Hl. 402
(1925), (p. 412): , ees

“The power to enforce proceeds from the present

-or existing power or authority to enact or to provide.

A municipality cannot be said to’ possess the power

to enforce ‘an ordinance concerhing a subject upel
which it has lost the: power ‘to pass: the ordinance.’

Assuming! therefore, as. is contended by the city, - that
Section 19 of. the Milk Pasteurization Act preserves to the.

CS See

city the right to pass ordinances on*the question of milk

containers, the preservation of that right is a right to .

pass or to enforce only a reasonable ordinance on ‘that
subject, in view of today’s conditions. @ince the public

policy of the state is that which is declared by the General.

Assembly, and, since the General Assembly and state ‘of-

_ ficers acting under its authority have declared -single-

service containers proper milk container s, it is palpably,
unreasonable for the city to attempt to enforce’ an ordi-
nance absolutely prohibiting them. |

‘The state” having declared its policy Shat single ‘service
containers are proper does not mean. necessarily that the .
city -has been deprived ‘of the power to ‘regulate them,

but we are not talking here of. regulation, but of prohibi-’

tion——a_ prohibition by a child of the act of its aye
by a ward of the act of its guardian, by a creature of:
the agt-of its creator, and by an inferior of the act of”
its superior. “We rely, as. indicating, the unreasonable-
ness of the enforcement of the Chicago’ofdinance at this
particular time, on all‘of the cases which we have cited
under the preceding point which’ indicate that the ordi-
nances of a municipality may not violate or be imeon-
sistent with the public policy of the. State as declared

by the, General Assembly—see particularly the quotations

set forth above from the following: c “Ses:
City of Chicago v. Union Ice Cream Mfa. Co.,
252 lk. 311 (1911).
City of Marengo v. Rowland, 263 Hi 531 (1914).

City of Lewistown v. Alarrison, 232 NL 461 (1918). ;

We pean that. as a “a sinjple qdestion of tact——whetlier
or not the: prohibition of/ single- service containers is ‘a

-reasonablé prohibition—the decision must: be against the

ordinance in view,of the approv al of this type of container

by ” sovereign. : e

~>

Accepting ‘the determination by the General Asmoeabhe
of the reasonableness of: the use of single service con:
. tainers: is “not impairing or abridging’ the power of th
City ‘of. Chicago for it» power never exceeded the power
ta pass reasonable ordinances. — We have already pointed
out that under ‘the Hlinois: law .the grant of power by
the legislature to the city countil is: a grant of power-
to: pass reasonable ¢ airs only. ne

While admitting (Petitioners* Brief, pp. 69- 70) that, i
fact, the city council did mot have in mind in 1935 any a
the item#%namerated by. the master (R: 1734- 1735) upen-
which ‘the legislative body way reasonably. base its’ de-

_-eision’’, petitioners say (p. 70); ,

/

‘*Sinee -the question of feasonableness is deter-
-. mined. in the light of conditions existing today, we
. “© are not. concerned here with what the City Council
actually did consider before it. enacted the ordinance,

s

. 59

but with what jt might reasonably have considered
“assuming conditions to have been as they are today
or, rather, with what it might reasonably consider:
today in the light of today’s conditions. sy

One of today ordinance
which conflicts .with any statute or public - policu
adopted by the State Legislature i is invalid.’ . (Italies
ours.) ** Say

and also when it said: | ha

‘‘The defendants’ contention, if sustained, would__
give the city a broader power than that prov ided by
the Legislature foxgsthe state. It would make the state
subservient to th@@rity. It would impute to the Leg-
islature the purpose of withdrawing the power there-
tofore exercised by the city and by the saving clause
reconferring such power. We are unable to believe’
that stich an incongruous result was infended.”’

The approval by the state of single service containers
constitutes the best guide for the courts in determining
whether a€ a question of fact the ordinance of the City
of Chicago. when sought to be enforeed in 1939, under
Fic chee pd in 1939 was any longer a reasonable
ordinance. ®

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should
be’ affirmed.

°

61
| Tt.
‘The Ordinance: Is Unreasonable as a Matter of Fact.
[Answering Petitioners’ Point fT, pp. 34-79. |

Petitioners cite very few Illinois | cases on the ques- .

tion of unreasonableness of ordinances even though that
question is one strictly of local law. .In so.far as the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is

ae concerned, the deaisions of this Court are, of course) con-
trolling, but ‘in determining whether the erdinance is rea-—
sonable under Illinois law, the decisions of the Tilinois |

nw

Supreme Court are controlling.

We have pointed out ‘under the- preceding point the |
_Tllinois cases holding that there is a distinction in Illinois

between unconstitutionality of an ordinance and unrea-

sonableness. The following cases hold that where a gen-

——-pral grant of power is made to a city without the details

cise thereof or it will be pronounced invalid:

Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. City of Carlinville,
200 Til. “314 (1902) and cases therein cited;

_ City of Mount Vernon v. Julian, 369 Tk. 447, at
p. 449 (1938), 7

; P ‘ f , ; A “+
We have pointedout under Point IT that if due regard

~ heing prescribed by the legislature, an ordinance passed, es
_in pursuance of such power, must be a reasonable exer:

is to be given'to the legislative determination by the high. °

est legislative body in the State of Mlinois, the ordinance
passed and sought to be enforced by a subordinate mu-
nicipality cannot be sustained. In addition, we. submit

that the evidence in this record and matters of public |

notoriety, of which the. courts should take judicial notice,

. abundantly and conclusively show in the language of K ou

:

.@

r % 62

-Y¥. City ane Rica 263 TH. 122 (i914) that the probibition—

of paper coptainers ‘‘is so clearly’a and manifestly. wrong .
that there can be no doubt- about it’’. The rule. that an
ordinance or any other legislative act_is presumed to be
valid’arises from the fact that the judicial branch of the —

- government must recognize the right of a. coordinate

branch, the legislative, to determine facts for. itself, so
that’‘on a merely debatable question the court will not
substitute its own judgment that of. the legislative
body. . “7 ,

Viewing the present situation realistically, it is fanciful
to attribute any actual, legislative determination on the
question’af paper bottles to the City Council of the City
of Chicago when, as the Cireuit, Court of Appeals said

_(R. 1787), ‘that subject was not in their minds at all in

1935. It is a far stretch of the imagination, therefore, to
consider the question at bar as having received any. legis-’
lative détermination by the City Council in 1935; and in
view of the facts in the record showing ‘that the Board
of Health of | the City of Chicago made no effort what-
ever to- ase ertain the sanitary properties, of singlesservice .
containers until almost a week after this suit was filed
(R. 1003), it is also difficult to see where any. real admin-

istrative determination was made. ‘The petitioners’ plea
for attributing correctness to the legislative determination
‘is wholly technical.

Legislatures and city , councils in the exercise’ of the.
police power may, of course, prohibit all things: harmful |
to health and-to the safety and general welfare of society

even though the prohibition invades the liberty .or prop-

erty. of an individual, but when’ the articles or things pro-
hibited do not injure, the public health or the safety of
society, all reason tow the prohibition is absent and the

63
prohibition is not justified, and clearly amounts to con-

-fiseation of property and deprivation of liberty in viola: .
tion of Section 2 2, Article II of the Dlinois Constitution.

Under fhe laws of the State of Llinois the legislature ‘
has no right to prohibit the sale of a known, wholesome
‘article of food and the same consideration would preclude
a prohibition of a known, harmless, modern container
for amilk. :

People x ' Carolene Products Co, 345 Ul. 166
“(931): ; ,

C arolene Products Co. v. MacLaughlin, 365. Ill.
62 (1936); : °

People v. Price, 257 - Ill. 587 (1913).

in contending that the ordinance is both unreasonable
and unconstitutional, we do not overlook the rule of law
that innocent acts may sometimes be prohibited where
neeessary to abate an evil which is a proper subject of the
police power. This is not such a case. The evil intended —
to remedied by this ordinance is briefly and very
clearly stated in the ‘*Publie Health Reasons’’ explaining
the purpose of Section 3094 as follows (R. 109):
“The use of standard milk bottles for ‘delivering -
. milk ands milk products in quantities less ‘than one -
gallon is required in order to prohibit delivéry, in
such containers as buckets, fruit jars, ete., which may
be difficult to wash and to-subject to adéquate bae-
tericidal treatment, which cannot be filled and capped:

with the proper equipment used for these purposes,.
‘and which it is often difficult to label properly.”’

Conceding for the purpose of this’ point the right of
the City to require liquid milk and cream to be sold. in
containers, we deny the right-of the City to prohibit the
use of a container which is not within the object of this
section of the: ordinance ; and which though modern, por-

t

fd

ee re ae

motes publie health and proper-sanitatign as effectively as
the commoniy accepted and officially approved containers
and which does not lend, itself to any “f the evils which,
the City has the power to stamp out. © >

We submit that the action of the: petitioners is arbi-
‘trary and unreasonable. Suceinetly stated, respondent
is denied the right to use its paper miik. container to
compete with ~dairies using the ott-modéed «and much
_ abused glass milk bottle. This restriction fosters monop-
oly rather than protects against it. The restriction dis:
, courages competition: ‘rather than engourgges it. ° “Phe
result of the supposed. rerulation is not to ‘‘regulate”’
the sale of milk in paper containers, but to prohibit
_it and actudlly to preclude persons from engaging in
the milk industry in competition with glass bottle dairies.

The évidence shows,.as the trial court correctly found
(R. 1752}: that the use of the paper container creates
“no new or unusual health hazard,’’ and “that they are
safe and ‘sanitary containers in which mitk may be.
delivered.’ , | | fs

The trial court held in substance that in matters af
fecting public health the law should adopt the best scien-
tific thonght of the age. When research and investigatign.
coupled with vast experience, jastify the adoption of new
_ methéds without prejudice to public health, it should Uil-
hesitatingly be done. Were the rule otherwise, progress —
_ would he stifled (R. 1755). phe

In considering the reasonableness of the ordinance of
- the City of Chicago as a question of: fact we ‘first, of
course, have pointed to the approval of single service
‘ containers by the state iegislature. Next we point to the
approval of Pure-Pak paper milk. bottles and of the re-
spondent’s pasteurization plant by the Department of

° ; 65 .
Health of the State of Illindis,‘a fact which is disclosed

, by the stipulated testimony of Mr. S. V. Layson, Milk
Sanitarian of the Department of* Public Health of the

State of Illinois witb offices at Springfield (R: 695).
While the court may decide that as a matter of law the —
State Department of Health has no jurisdiction to compel
the petitioners. to permit the tise of sifgle-service con-
tainers in the-City of Chicago, the fact is undisputed that
. the Department of Pablic Health of the State of Illinois
has approved the Pure-Pak; single service container, and
‘that fact cannot be overlooked ' in determining whether :
_ the action, of the City of Chicago, in undertaking to pro-
hibit it is unreasonabie or 4s necessary to protect public
~ health.

In determining whether the petitioners are acting rea:
sonably the Court should also. take into. consideration the

‘fact that the United’ States Public Health Service, under

the supervision of Dr. Thomas Parran, has approved

paper milk containérs (R. 1661, 1678, 1699-1704). Con-
| cededly, the Unite Stat¢s Public Health Service has no.

plenary . jurisdiction in the City of Chieago, but it is: ad-

. mitted by the petitioners that. its standards are considered

high and are considered safe, so the action of. the United
States Public Health Service may not, be overlooked -ini
determining whether the City of Chicago is acting reason-
ably in excluding single service containers (Arnold, R.

1165).° ‘

2 ip record shows that the Board of Héalth of the City
of

icago has approved single service containers under

| the standards nid down hy the ‘United States’ Public

Health Service and has recommended an amendment in
the ordinance ‘here challenged to permit the sale of milk,
in single service containers (Bundes , R. 1211; R: 1698-
1704). Iti is true that the Board of Health has noe power

a c . . ° ‘ ‘

66° | | in

to change an n ordinance and that its tecommendation i is not
binding either upon the petifioners or upon the, Court,
but in determining whfether the petitioners are acting rea-
sonably in excluding single service containers, the action
of the Cc hicago Board of Health cannot be overlooked.

Oa Next, in determining whether the City of Chicago is -9
0 We reasonably, weight must be given to the experience °
of other cities where the use of single service containers

has been permitted and where there is not the slightest
suspicion that they have created or tended to create any
health. hazard. We are here not referring to the fact that
the municipalities which have ‘permitted. the use of Pure-
‘Pak containers are great in number on the theory of
9 counting noses (as the petitioners seem to think) but that
the favorable results of the use of the container in those’
municipatities may not be overlooked in deciding whether
the City of Chicago is acting reasonabl} in’ the present
. ease, (Furthermore, this evidence was admissible to: show
how widespread was the,-use of ‘these paper bottles to‘,
prove that they were standard bottles.)

The evidence proves that respondent is and has been
-. engaged in.the sale of wholesome milk and milk progficts
in the State of Hlinois and sells its products in’ these
containers in suburban communities in Cook, DuPage and °
Lake Counties without interference. This had been done |.
daily for almost two years. before the trial court's de-—
cision with no. consequent injury to public health. These
(Xperiences were persuasive to the/rial court; and obvi-
ously, if these experiences in the use of paper containers
* had@disclosed any health hazards, petitioners most cer-
tainly would: have presented. proof of this fact by com-
petent | evidence, and not relied on mere theory and Bm: ~"
jecture. 3 | :

Ci .
ie e :
“We Pam Pe that it can he safely and logic ‘ally assumed.
‘that the milk consumers‘in Evanston, Winnetka and Oak
Park and sixty-five other communities in and about Chi-
eago are no less susceptible to disease than are the resi-
. dents of Chicago. Ther is nothing pectliar about these.
milk consumers which distinguishes theni from -Chicago
citizens. This argument applies with equal, force to the
residents’ and milk. consumers. in -Washington® Detroit,
New York City, Boston and Philadelphia and hundreds
of other cities and villages which use paper containers
daily. . Geographical location does not result in new and
peculiar. health hazards ‘reasonably ‘related to milk con-
tainers. . , . Fe

No reason is advanced, and no evidence was offered,
to sustain the theory of the city that peculiar local ‘con-
ditions exist in the City of Chicago which prevent the
court ‘from considérmg ‘the: satisfactory, experience of
‘hundreds of other communities in using paper milk bot-™
- tles. Millions of quarts of milk in paper bottles are ‘be-
& ing. sold daily in Tllinois and. to army camps throughout
the United States (12,000 quarts daily are sold to Camp
Grant, Rockford, Illinois, by respondent), without sug™
gestion of ill-effect. one

That the city has‘no real fear of the-evils which it
argues the city council ight consider in prohibiting
paper milk containers is proved by the fact that since
the date of the decision of this case by the Distrigt
Court, October. 18, 1940, the city has permitted millions
of paper containers which are -not protected by any
injunction of any court—state or Federal—toe be used
freely in the City of Chicago. No harm has resulted from .
- the use of such other containers or from the distribution
of milk in plaintiff’ s containers under the protection of
' the present injynction and the fact that the petitioner's

- @,
have vielndiinally perinitted the use of these other con-

tairers is eloquent prgof that petitionérs well know. that -
no public health hazard is actually involved,

Another fact which ‘ought not to be overlooked in ie.
ciding whether the prohibition of paper. milk containers.
is .reasonable, is the universal use of paper containers |
daily for liquid, foods of all types. The point here is
not that the articles and uses are 80 similar, that the
City may not permit one without the other, but that
the widespread use of paper containers. stamps: as un-
reasonable when. treated as a matter of fact and not as a
matter of law, the action of the petitioners in: prohibiting
paper milk containers.

The City stipulated that it permits the | use of single-
- service’ paper contdiners for liquid coffee, soft drinks,
and ice cream sold by drug stores and restaurants without
restriction, inspection or regulation (R. 694). This is an
- administrative decision. which proves that they are not a-.
health hazard: Such containers are related to the public
health of. the inhabitants of the city and are used daily by
practically all citizens of-the city in consuming food and
drink. Infants, the aged and convaleseents are permitted
to pfirtake’of ice cream dispensed in. paper. containers
over which the Board of Health exercises no supervision.

Fibér-board pails, ice cream cartons, ‘drinking cups,
. tall paper tumblers and other articles of papier too nn
merous to mention which are much more lightly paraffined
than are Pure-Pak containers have heen used for vears
and are still being used: in Chicago without inspection
and, most signifteant of all, with-the acceptance bv the
common man that there is nothing more sanitary than
a single-service paper "container. |

‘It was stipulated that paper containers were permitted
‘without objection by the Board of Health apd without

69

_any test to determine the sanitary quality of the paper
used for the sale of ice cream,.butter, lard, cottage cheese,
other kinds of cheese, oprsters, ‘pickles, soft drinks and
liquid’ coffee; that. ice éream is sold in metal @ans with a
thin paraffined paper liner between the ice cream and
the container; that jgraffined paper is permitted to be
placed across the top of metal milk cans underneath the
metal cover of such cans? that paraffined drinking cups
and paraffined paper straws are, used in the (City of ©
Chicago, and that paraffined paper linérs for dishes in—
which ice cream is served are also used, all without objec-
tion or regulationoby the Board of Health (! Stipulation,
“R. 694). ;
The common man’s acceptance as a truism that paper
ontainers are sanitary is a better guide to the truth thign
Se ial theories of the experts, real or pretended.
it leads inevitably to the conclusion that paper milk
" containers are sanitary. The trial court considered all .
of this evidence and came to the conclusion that no
health hazard was presented. {)

Lastly, in determining whether the City of cthcago is
acting reasonably, we think the Court shouid give careful
consideration to the evidence hefore it in this case prov-
ing that the single servicd container’ in question has not
at any place or at any ‘time been“ even suspected of con-
stituting a healt! hazard. va, Hae

We now turn to the specific arguments advanced by
the city in support of its. theory that the prohibition :
of paper containers is reasonable.

ed ' FV

| Sanitation and. Absorption.
[Answer to Point. II-(b)-2; Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 44- 51. }

It ‘is argued that paper - milk bottles are rightfully
prohibited because the container* board absorbs a few
drops of milk- It is argued by the city that this factor
‘‘is of utmost significance?’ (p. 48). Yet the petitioners
do not point out, nor does the reeord show in any
respect, that a public health hazard exists merely because
a few drops of milk might be absorbed in the corners of
a paper milk bottle. There is no evidence in the record .
that anne ever became ill or infected, or was likely to
—becoiie so, by reason of a few drops. of milk ‘absorbed
by the paper board. No witness heard of any such ex-

perience, not ‘even Dr. Arnold, petitioners’ main expert
“witness, On the other hand, petitioners champion the
‘glass bottle which the evidence and common knowledge
show is nsed over and over by milk containers, different
ones. daily, many -times; and’ which multi- used glass

bottle is expose «dl daily on the house door-step; subject
to contamination by contact with alt the domestic animals
about the home or neighborhood, ordinary exposure to the
weather, irritants. in the air, breakage and leakage, if
hot or cold weather. In freezing weather it is common
knowledge that the: cream is expelled out of the mouth
of the bottle and exposed to contamination on the*door-
step, window-sill, rear porch or the other usual deposi-
tories for glass milk bottles: Petitioners’ argument that
- the absorbency of paper milk bottles. is of ‘‘the utmost
significance’ fails because of the absence of proof. that
such absorbency ever caused or might cause any. illness
or disease. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
The argument - of petitioners is based on pure theory.’
There is no danger in paper hotties compared to, paper

as 7

‘caps made’ ofthe same materia! and permitted by the city
to be used on glass milk bottles. These caps permit ab-
sorption of milk’ and they are taken off in common use
_ and exposed to the bacteria and the irritants in the air and -
afterwards replaced on -the bottle with ‘the bacteria on
the mside. This may easily contaminate the contents
of- the -bottle.-, The imperfect washing process on the
glass bottle and haphazard inspection of glass bottles by

the petitioners (1400 bottles beigg—yaapected over a period © -

of ayear when 365,000,000 quarts of. milk are .sold in
glass bottles_in the City of Chicago) offers slight support’
‘to the petitioners” efforts to discredit the single service
paper milk bottle on the absorption issue (R.'986 to 996).

- If the absorbency argument yow advahced by the de-
fendapts has any plausibility the Illinois. Legislatare ad-
judged 3 to be of slight significance.

The State of Mlinoik has repudiated shoccbener as
reason for prohibiting paper containers, for Item 5 (e) of
the minimum. requirements promulgated by the Director
of the Department of Health, (above, pages 28-29) pro-
vides only that ‘‘all single-service containers shall be
so treated as to be as impervious to milk as practicable,’’
thus re¢ognizing the impracticability of making them en-
tirely impervious. This policy of the state controls:
the action of the City of .Chicago.

Dr. John W. Rice of Bucknell University, per ea
Pa, found the paper bottle superior to the glass bottle
in abating the spread of. infectious diseases because of
‘its high inherent ‘sanitary quality (R. 406-7; 424). His
research work and ‘experience. disclosed ‘that the bacteria
found i in the’ paper board were not pathogenic. He ever
found any pathogenic baeteria on any paper board used
in paper milk bottles (R. 411). In his opinion, supported
by research, absorption ‘of milk in the” paper board —

. means.
presented no health firoblem (R. 425).. This witness was
requested to testify. by the defendants and his’ time and
expenses were paid by the city.

Dr. John R. Sanborn: of the New. York State Agricul
tural Experiment Station, Geneva, N. Y., testified posi-.’

tively that the absorption item was insignificant (R. 286,
289-290) and the disintegration test, furnisled an index to
the sanitary. condition of the manufacture of paper con-

; ** tainers. This being trne, all reasonable and necessary

safeguards exist in the matter of batteriological control
» and thus the absorption argument loses all: force.

_ Mr. M. J. Woodman of the Evanston, Illinois, health
‘department, testified that in his experience disintegra-
_tion tests offered adequate protection at all times and his
experiments showed that the empty paper container was
essentially free of bacteria in. 300 te 400 tests (R. 680).

Dr. -M. J. Prucha of the University of Mlinois, testified
that after>two and one-half years of research, study and
* experience he found the absorption by paper caps used
in glass milk bottles greater, relatively, than by Pure-
Pak containers becanse of lighter paraffining (R. 716),

‘but testified that even the absorption by the paper cap.
prese nted no health hazard (R. 659).

Dr. “Paul H. Traey of the University of Illinois, after
tivo and one half years of study, experiments and experi-
_ ence, found that the absorption of milk into the paper .
beard presented no health problem - “whatsoever! (R. 519).

- HLM. Packer of the Philadelphia Health Hepartment,,
_ with years of experience in Philadelphia, where, milkhas
‘been sold in paper containers for many -years, fourld: no
objection to the use of the paper bottle 3 ‘reason » of
any absorption (R. 1363, 1364).

Dr. E. H. Yunker of es with usinndile

“ :
“7 \

scactionl experience in, the use of the paper | milk battle,
was of the same opinion (R. 1387).

The City? ‘s. effort to capitalize on the absorption issue
finds: no. support from practical experience. As the case.
takes final forth, this appears to be ‘the chief reliance of
the defendants, All the expert witnesses ‘in this case (ex-
cept Dr. Arnold) were ynahimous that health authorities
possessed’ as adequate bacteriological control over paper
nulk bottles as they’ had over glass bottles.

‘We respectfully submit that the City’s argument on
the absorption issue has no merit whatever when consid-
yea in the light of wide practical experience for years. -
The container has had sufficient use in hundreds of: cities

and villages daily .so that if absorption presented any
o hazard to public health, the City would have readily pre-

sented such evidence. Not one witness was produced by ~

- the City to, testify *to any Bvaes supporting. this academic

e

objection. * .

It fs conceded that absorbency is matériel only iia
of fear of Gontamination from the milk container board,
yet Dr. Arnold testified that he had never found patho-
genie bacteria on, milk container board (R. 1148).

Dr. Arnold also &stified (R: 1165)-that the model ordi-
nance and code of the United States Public Health Service
were generally considered a reasonable and safe standard
for milk sanitation (R. 1165). Surely, since this service
recommends the use ‘of single-serv ice containers and ‘ap-
-proves them in its model milk ordinance, the “absorption
“of a few drops of milk now complained about by the City
is no’ real detriment: The presen

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386403_0017%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.
