# Brief for White Swan Co — National Labor Relations Board v. White Swan Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for White Swan Co
- **Published:** January 1, 1941
- **Citation:** 313 U.S. 23

## Text

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CHARLES ELWORE CROPLEY

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1940. ~
NO. 529.

ys . °
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Vv.
| WHITE SWAN COMPANY.

On Certificate From the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

BRIEF FOR WHITE SWAN COMPANY.

*

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H. C. A. HOFACKER,

Attorney for White Swan Company. |
28 St. Nickolas Building, ae
Pittsburgh, Pa. * rs

’ ¢

SMITH BROS. CO. INC., LAW PRINTERS, 208-212 GRANT STREET, PITTSBURGH, PA,

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LANK PAGE
——

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» decision in the Federal Courts wherein the status of the
laundry and dry cleaning business has been definitely
decided when applying the National Labor Relations Act.
Whether such business is intrastate or interstate or na-

tional or local or whether it actually affects interstate .

commerce is now before\ythe Court for the first time.
he Laundries and dry cleaning establishments in every city
a and community are as numerous as the local restaurants,
Me da shoe repair shops, local butcher shops, drug stores, and
aor grocery stores, and in practically every busy city block
f we find several laundry and dry cleaning establishments
- and in almost every town of any size we have the local
‘segs chinaman who operates a laundry and for this reason it

is familiarly termed the Chinaman’s business.

> " The distinguishing characteristic of. the laundry and

dry cleaning business as compared to other types of

business over which the National Labor Board has as-”°

sumed jurisdiction is that the laundry and dry cleaning

business is® purely a service industry and therefore is

necessarily local in nature. To attempt to apply the
ie theory of interstate commerce to a local service com-
: pany requires an unlimited amount. of f imagination plus

— PRESET PG SEE oe : oS aes TORE ty
x *

Argument. ’ 7

a reckless overlooking of the fundamental elements
which comprise the working conditions of a laundry.

In all cases adjudicating other types of business
wherein the jurisdiction of the Board has been sustaired
the defendant has engaged in interstate commerce on a
large scale yet a fundamental difference exists between
those types of business where jurisdiction was upheld
and-the one at bar. We find that in all types of business
where the jurisdiction of the Board is upheld the com-
panies involved in interstate commerce either bought,
sold, bartered, or exchanged their product or they pur-
chased raw material and processed, manufactured, or
changed its form, substance, character, utility, or value

of the goods.

We find also that in other types of business where
the jurisdiction of the Act was upheld the business itself
was either nation wide or c mprised the area of

laundry and dry cleaning business which ‘ne
local only and operates within a restricted
In other types of business where the j |
Board was upheld it was found that althopgh perhaps
the company operated within the confines of one state its
product was one which was used in intersfate or foreign
commerce and the best illustration of this type of busi-

- ness comes from thdse cases where the company re-
paired and built ships and vessels operating in interstate
and foreign waters. Other cases involving other types
of business uphold the jurisdiction of the Board on the
theory that-the title to the commodity i in which the com-
pany deals ee hands in interstate commerce.

Applying all of these distinguishing features which
have arisen in other types of business wherein the juris: .
diction of the Act was upheld to the case at bar, we find :
that the business of the respondent — does not ,

ae : Argument.

come within the purview of any of the illustrations here-

Article 9. The enumeration in the Constitu-

, st of certain rights shall not be construed to deny

oF eepennge others retained by the people.
“Article 10. The powers not delegated to the

" United States by the Constitution nor prohibited to

it by the states are reserved to the states respec-
tively or to the people.

It is the contention of the respondent here that it

merely serves the Wheeling Industrial Community com-
prising a radius of tae cans te We believe the follow-
¥ing case in point:

Veazie v. Moore, 14 Bw, 573, L. Ed. 545,
“Commerce with foreign nations must signify com-
merce which in some sense is necessarily connected
with these nations transactions which either imme-
diately or at somé stage of their progress must be
extra-tertitorial. The phrase can never be applied
to transactions wholly internal by the citizens of
the same community or to a polity and laws whose
ends and purposes and operations,are restricted to
‘the territory and soil and jurisdiction of such
community.” |
“The power vested in’ Congress was not de-
signed to operate upon matters essentially local in

_ their nature and extent.”

From time immemorial it has always been under-

stood that the power of the Congress to regulate com-
merce cannot be broadened to such a point that it inter-
feres with internal trade. We sincerely believe that the
Jgundry and dry cleaning business, as well-as-the-barber
business and the shoe repair business, are the best illus-
trations of local internal business that can be found in
any state. "We believe that it was never conceived by
the, framers of the Constitution that Federal power

i. 4 &

20 : nee Argument. -

could be so extended as to reach these local service
businesses. ae

«. e U. 8. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 44, 19 L. Ed. 593.
ie “This express grant of power to regulate commerce
among the several states has always been under-
stood as limited by its terms and as a virtual denial
; of any power to interfere with the internal trade
$ in business of the separate states.”

_ The individual states have never conceded the sieht of
Congress to regulate purely local small businesses.

2 ’ . a :
2 , . ~ 3 y a > . ve
ew + re a | eh be a - oe - ~ - as

24 : _ Argument.

The Executive Order empowers the NRA Ad-
ministrator to designate the trade and industries to
- which the exemption will apply. |
The exemptions will take effect immediately in I
the following seven trades which have already been __
designated: by order of the Administrator as prop- —
erly included within the purpose and intent of the
Executive Order; Cleaning and Dyeing Trade; Bar-
ber Shop Trade; Shoe Rebuilding Trade; Motor Ve-
hicle Storage and Parking Trade; Advertising Dis-
play Installation Trade; ‘Advertising Distributing
Trade; Bowling and Billiard Trade.
| The President, in
S. L. R. B. Dec. No. 10, Nov. 1, 1937.

Tudor Laundry Co. et al. (1939), N. Y. S. L. R. B.
Case No. S. U. 3581, July 12, 1939. 7

PENNSYLVANIA.

Budget Lahdry Co., et al., ‘Pa. L. R. B. Case No.
170, April 12, 1938.

Cravdall, McKenzie & faesaiiey Inc., et al., 1939,
Pa. L. R. B., Dec. No. 92, Feb. 26, 1940. — RE

‘Lincoln Laundry Co., et al., 19389, ‘Pa. L. R. B. Dec.

No. 136, Jan. 16, 1940.

Wilson agreed Co. et al. 1939, Pa. L, R. _B. Case.
No. 34 Oct. 9, 1939.

Community Laundry Co., Inc., et al., 1937, Pa. L. R.
B. Case No. 123, May 13, 1939.

East Cleaners & Dyers, Irc., ae 1938, Pa. L. R. B.
No. 196, Apr. 20, 1939.

°

ae | | Argument. «

Liberty Laundry, et al., (1939) Re. L. R. B. Case No.
70, Nov. 21, 1939.

eS

WISCONSIN a

Waukesha Palace Laundry Co., et.al., Wisc., he R.
B. Case No. 406, C-24, April 30, 1938.

Badger Nu-Way Cleaners, et al., Wisc,, Li. R. B. Case

No. 31; Ce2, Dec. No. 19, Sept. 23, 1939.

Laundry Workers Int. Union, et al., (1940) W.L.

R. B. Case No. 74 Ce-11 Dec. No. 47 2/23/40.

a i.
Was It the Intent of the Congress to Make the Act Apply
_ to Local Service Establishments? hi

In order to ascertain the intent of the Congress at
the time of the passage of the bill, it is»well to review
again the findings and policy of the bill, as outlined in
Section 1 of the Act known as the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.

Act of July 5, 1935, C. 372, 49 Stat. 449; 29 U.
_§.C., Supp. V, Sec. 151, et seq.

We here take the liberty to quote Section 1 of the
Act, which we deem pertinent to the issue:—

“The denial by employers of the right to employees

to organize, and the refusal by the employers to
accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead ©

to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or

unrest which have the intent or the necessary effect |

of burdening or obstructing commerce by

(a) Impairing the efficiency, safety or opera-
\ tion of the instrumentalities of commerce.

{b) Ocqurring in the’ current of commerce.

Ser sos Ree

-
ead
Sad ese

|

Rees, aaceceane | 31

git (c) Materially stockings restraining or con-
x trolling the flow of raw materials, or manu-
factured or processed goods from or into
the channels of commerce, or*the prices of

such materials pr goods in commerce.

(d) Or causing diminution of employment and

wages in such volume as substantially to
impair or disrupt the, market for goods —

flowing from or into the channels of
ecommerce. “3

It is obvious nica reading this Section that the Con-
gress had in mind when speaking of commerce, either
the instrumentalities of commerce or the flow of raw
materials with the manufacture of processed goods and
the reshipment thereof: into commerce. These are the
very things that a laundry does not engage in. As pre-
viously stated in this brief, raw materials are not manu-
factured or procéssed and reshipped into commerce.
Nor are even prices of such materials or goods in com-
merce affected by anything that a laundry or dry clean-
_ ing establishment does in the way of service. The whole
intent and purport of this Section of the Act is entirely
repugnant to the thought of merely servicing a garment
such as a laundry’ or dry cleaning ‘establishment
performs.

To attempt to apply the National Labor Relations
Act to either the laundry or dry cleaning industry would
be an attempt t» apply a statute which would .produce
results contrary to the plain purpose and policy of the
enactment, since the purposes and policy of the enact-
ment is to regulate business, which has a national aspect
_ rather than a purely local aspect.

We believe the following case in point :—

4

‘not interstate commerce and we take the liberty to oo

32 Argument.

Sorrells v. U, 8., 287 U. S. Reports, page. 435, where
we take the liberty to quote:— - 1

“Where application of the.penal statute, according

to its literal meaning would produce results con-. —

trary to the plain purpose and policy of the enact- —
—ment and flagrantly unjust, another construction |

& should be adopted, if possible.” -

The question as to whether a ennitey i is in interstate
or intrastate commerce has been before.the Courts be-.
fore. See 54 Southwestern Reporter, Page 981. Smith,
Clerk, v. Jackson, Supreme Court of Tenn., December 20,
1899. This case arose out of a tax which the agent of
the State placed on an individual who was a loca] agent ‘
for a laundry situated in another State, and the individ-
ual claimed immunity from the local tax on the theory
that his laundry business was interstate commerce. The
individual collected soiled laundry from his neighbors
in Tennessee and shipped it to a laundry in Kentucky
be washed and laundered. When this was done, it was
senteback by the laundry to the individual in Tennessee,
who delivered it to the owners and received from them
the price of the entire service, which he divided equally
with the laundry. The question was, “Was this individ- .
ual engaged in commerce?” We find that it was here
recognized by the Courts that the laundry business is

the Court in detail on this point:— *°

“The word commerce found in this clause c can not be ,
held ‘to embrace a transaction such as is here pre- .

sented. It implies when-used by businessmen, as it
is defined by Mr. Webster, the lexicographer. Trade
or traffic as in the exchange of specific articles or.
commodities or else of these for money or its repre-
sentative; in a case like the present nothing, in the
true commercial sense, is — or exchanged. The

VYg—e

Argument. : . 33

agent takes the axticles committed to his care and
agrees with the owner that he will send’them across
the State line and have certain labor bestowed on
them, and when returned, then he is to receive com-
pensation equal to this- labor. There is no com-
modity created of which the ownership is changed. —
It is merely a personal contract based upon a val- -

~ uable consideration following within the protection

' of this clause of the Constitution. “ 7

vd The Court further likens this trenauction to the sale
of an insurance policy and quotes Paul y. Virginia, 8
Wall, 168, and likens the laundry business, which it de-
fines as a’ personal contract, unto the sale of insurance
policies, the Supreme Court has held is not
interstate mmerce.

" Since the respondent Company is located on the
State line, and we believe that this is the only reason
that this case ever arose, we velieve the following case

\ in point:

Scannon v. Kansas City Railroad Co., 41 Missouri
APP. 194

“A shipment of cattle to Kansas City, Missoyri, from

a point in the same State is not interstate commerce,

though the stock yards where the cattle are un-

loaded extend into both the States of Missouri and

Kansas, and though the actual point of unloading is

- in Kansas and the assignment is to cormmissioned

‘ merchants whose place of business is across the

State line in Kansas.” ; :

\ -

We find another laundry case cited in Smith v. Jackson,
54 S. W.. 981—103 Tenn. 673:—

7 ‘
eT EI PIT IE LES | ILE LOS OIE PILES RE RN WR ene -

34 Argument. -

“Laundry business is not commerce within the mean-
ing of this clause, and one whose business it is to
collect soiled laundry and express it to its principal
in another State to be washed and laundered and
when returned to deliver it to its owner or owners,

’ receiving from them ‘a price the entire service
which he divides with his principal, is liable for the
payment of a privilege tax.”

In this case, the privilege tax was a State tax, and
the defendant claimed immunity onthe theory that he
was engaged in interstate commerce, and the Court held
it was not interstate commerce, but was intrastate com-
merce.

To the same effect, see Commonwealth v. Pearl
Laundry Co., 105 Ky. 259—49 S. W. 26.

“ In the case at /bar' the lower ‘Court was bothered
with this question because it felt that a laundry busi-
ness was entirely local, and although it might come
within the letter of the statute, it does not come within |
the spirit of the statute, or even the intention of the
-- makers of the statute. We believe therefore, that the
following case is in point on this line of thought:

Holy Trinity Church v. U. 8., 143 U. S. 457:

“It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute because not within the spirit nor within
the intention of its makers.”

“Frequently words of general meaning are used in
2 statute, words broad enough to include an act in
question and yet a consideration of the whole leg-
islation or of the circumstances surrounding its en-
actment or of the absurd results which follow from
giving such broad meaning to the words makes it

Argument. 7 a ,

sg’

bah ans to believe that the legislator intended
to include the’ particular act.”

We feel that ‘to’allow the National Act to Sipply to

a small local business such as a laundry, would create
an absurdity, for the reason that to permit the act to
apply to a laundry would allow it also to apply to a
barber shop, a shoe repair shop, or any of the other

service industries of which there are so many fn every _

small community. In other words, the net result would
be that all business, regardless of type, would be’ en-
‘compassed by the National Act and the individual States
wou’? no longer have control of any business within
the State confines.

' ee 2

We believ@that there is serious danger in extend-

- ing this statute beyond its purpose. The following case,
we believe, is in point:

Caminetti v. U. 8., 242 U. S. 470 at 490:

“Reports to Congress accompanying the introduc-
tion of purpose laws may aid the Courts jn reaching
the true meaning of the’ legislature in cases of
doubtful interpretation.”—See also dissenting opin-
ion, page 502.

“There is danger in extending a statute- beyond
its purpose, even if justified by a strict adherence
to its words.”

wi

a 2"
SSeS

& ¢

lower Court, submit the question very fairly. It is
, argued by the Board, however, that the Court has not
bubmitted the question of purchases in its framed ques-
-tions, and the Board states in its brief, that the ques-

36 Argument.

Ill.

The Answer to the First Question Certified by the Lower
Court, Should Be in the Negative, and the Answer
to the Second Question Should Be in the Negative.

_ We believe that both questions, as submitted by the

tion of purchases also should be considered in arriving

at jurisdiction. The lower Court states, however, that

the matter of purchases, was insufficient, in its opinion,
to confer jurisdiction, and confines itself to the matter
of collection, servicing and. enn f primarily.

We agree whole-heartedly with the Court below on

the matter of purchases, as the same apply to a laundry.

It must be remembered that a laundry does not make
purchases with the idea of reselling them or fabricating
or processing these purchases, and changing the form,
substance, character, utility, or value thereof and then
resell them, but purchases in a laundry business mean
just those little incidental items that are used to per-
form the service on the garment. In other words, it
includes the purchase of bluing, tape which is used on.
presses, and padding which,is also used on laundry
presses. A laundry purch soap and bleach and sol-
vent, and these items are’ used to clean the garments.
Coal and water are used, but only for the purpose of pro-
ducing steam, etc., to wash the soiled clothing. None
of these purchases go into processing or manufacture, —
but these purch are immediately consumed and
therefore have no opportunity, of themselves, to become
a further part of interstate commerce. And in the case
at bar, it was definitey proved that the purchases, as
above outlined, were made in the City of Wheeling, which

aN

: Argument. ; ———

is the home town of tile respondent, and eventhough .
a few purchases may have originated: out of the State,
the contracts for the same were consumated in the City
of Wheeling. : ,

“With reference to the purchase of machinery, we
feel the Board has erred in attempting to consider pur-
chases of laundry machinery as an element of interstate
commerce. As we have previously outlined, the pur-
chases of machinery in the particular case at bar, for
one year were heavy for the reason that the Company
had just passed throtigh a. period of bankruptcy, and
much of the old machinery was junked and new machin-
ery purchased. Now it is absurd to use these new ma-
chinery purchases as a basis for determining whether
or not a particular company is in interstate commerce,
because once that machinery is purchased, probably no |

_. additional purchases of a similar type will be made for
15 or 20 years, and to use these machinery purchases as
a basis- for determining whether a Company is in inter-
state commerce, gives a distorted view of the actual
business itself, because they would not be normal pur-
chases from year to year. Furthermore, as we view

| purchases with respect ,to their effect on commerce, we

| believe the theory of purchases only applies when those

‘articles purchased are used and fabricated and processed

and become a part of a new product, which in*turn is
again shipped out into interstate commerte.

In this case, the articles purchased, which were in

‘the form of machinery, came to rest, and there they, will
stay for 15 or 20 years until again obsolete. Undoubt-
edly the Lower Court detailed the theory the same way,

_ and that is the reason that they éonclude the matter of
purchases in a laundry business as of little importance
in determining the true aspect of the business. as the

_ same affects commerce.

7

38 _ Argument. ;

As before stated, and as incidental, we might again
add that all of these purchases of machinery were ne-
gotiated for and the contracts consummated at Wheel-
ing, West Virginia, the home office of the respondent.

- We concur with the opinion of the,Court below with
reference 8 these so-called purchases, when it states :—

“We are clearly of the opinion, however, as stated
in our certificate, that the volume of interstate busi-
ness involved in the purchase of supplies is not suf-
ficient to bring the business of the respondent with-
in the jurisdiction of the Board.”

: wt. pes
Analysis of the Cases Cited by the Board in Support of
Jurisdiction.

We take the liberty of phinting out Brialiy the dis-
tinction between those cases which the Board cites in |
support of jurisdiction, and the case at bar.

N. L. R. B. v. J. & L., 301 U. S., page 1. Note, In
this case raw materials were drawn from several States,
fabricated, manufactured, and resold in different States.
(White Swan Company manufactures nothing, and sells
nothing. )

re

Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Company v. N. L. R. B.,
303 U. S. 453. Note, In this case the defendant’s busi-
ness was not service, but consisted of canning fruits
and selling them in the different States to which they
were shipped, and title to the fruit passed. The fruit
was. processed, its form, substance, quality and utility
changed, and then title passed in the goods in interstate -

“commerce. (White Swan Company does not buy or sell

or process, but merely renders a service.)

eT a! @
‘ Argument. 7 - 39

Consolidated Edison Company v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.
S., pages 197, 222. This Company-served three and one-
half million gas and electric customers. They manu-
facture gas, electricity and steam. They bought oil, coal
and gas and converted or processed it and then resold.

They also supplied other Companies dealing in inter-.

state commerce, such as railroads, steamship companies,
radios, etc. (White Swan Company manufactures noth-
ing, and does ndt sell the service to those who need the
same-in-interstate commerce. )

N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601. In this case
raw materials were transported from New York to New
Jersey to be fabricated or cloth was cut in.New York
and transported to New Jersey to be fabricated. After
the fabricating and processing was finished, the finished

goods were then-redelivered back to either New York

or to any other State in the union. (White Swan Com-
pany does not process and does not ship to all States
of the union, and does not change the form, color, or
texture of clothes, merely cleans them. )

N. L. R. B. v. Bradford Dyeing & Finishing Asso-
ciation, 60 Supreme Court 918. In this case the respond-
ent processed the gray cloth and manufactured or
changed the character of it. (White Swan does not
process, manufacture or ’ change the character of goods
it services. )

N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Company, 98 Fed-
eral 2nd be CCA 2). In this case the respondent did
more than merely collect and clean ice cream containers,

but it retinned and resoldered same and bought and sold .

others, thus transferring title to the goods. (White
Swan Company does not buy or sell articles of laundry,
‘ merely cleans and presses them.)

{

4 Mins

——

40 Argument. |
N. L. R. B. v. National New York Packing-& Ship-

ping Company, 86 Federal 2nd, 98. This Company acte1

as agent in shipments of national proportions Zo the ©
many States. It participated in the continuity of transit
from buyer in one State to seller in another State. Title
to the goods changed. The form of the packaged articles
changed. The articles themselves were alrea

in interstate commerce from State to’ State. te

“\Swan Company is agent for no one, it does not act as an

agent in interstate shipments, nor does it change the
character, substance or transfer any title to goods, nor
participates in the change of substance or character of

the goods. )

Kansas City Railway Company v. McAdow, 240 U.
S. 51. Note, that the question of Juriediction, was not
raised in this case.

Spokane & Inland R. Company v. U.'8., 241, U.S.
S44. This case has no real applicatio., since from time
immemorial railroads have always been considered in
interstate commérce by the very nature of their opera-
tions, but laundries have not been §° considered.

Ellis v. Inman Poulsen & Company, 131 Federal 182.
Note, That in this case, the goods which defendants dealt
in were bought and sold in interstate commerce. Title
passed in the goods. (White Swan Company does not
buy or sell in interstate commerce, or even in intrastate
commerce. It merely renders a service. )

Fehr Baking Company v. Bakers Union, 20 Federal
Supp. 691. Note, In this case bakery products were
manufactured in one State and were sold in another
State. (White Swan Company does not »uy and sell, it
merely renders a Seeveee. )

Argument. ~- fee 41

~ CONCLUSION.

It is respectfully submitted that the questions init.
fied by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit should be answered in the negative.
‘ ‘ tr
H. C. A. HOFACKER,
Attorney for White Swan einiitin
28 St. Nicholas Building, Pitts-
~. burgh, Pa. ° :

March, 1941. ~ ue

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. =

No, 529.—OgqrToszr Term, 1940.

National Labor Relations Board) On Certifcate from the United

vs. States Cireuit Court of Ap-
White ¥en Company. peals for the Fourth Circuit.
[March 31, 1941°] my oF

Pat

/ > ;
f Mr. Justice Dovauas delivered the opinion of the Court.

A certificate from the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit submitted pursuant te § 239 of the Judicial Code (28
U.S. C. 6) is as follows: |

a’ petition for enforcer ox00

ee ,
2+ ° National Labor Relations Board vs. White Swan Co.

e
from the business obtained from persons in Ohio during this period was
$28,088.43.

We recognize that the collection and delivery of garments across state
lines, as above described, constitutes interstate commerce. We are advertant,

however, to the admonition of the e-urt that in applying the act we are to
bear in mind ‘‘the distinction between what is national and what is local in
the activities of commerce.’’ N. L. R. B. v. Jones § Laughlin (301 U. 8. 1,
30). And although the letter of the National Labor Relations Act may cover
such collections and deliveries in interstate commerce aa are here involved,
the question arises whether a proper interpretation of the Act, in view of
the intent of Congress, would include them. Cf. United States v. Sorrells,
287 U. 8. 435, 446. We are divided and in doubt as to whether such collec-
tion and delivery, which results from the fact that business of a local char-
acter, such as a laundry, is located on a state line, is sufficient to bring such
business within the jurisdiction of the Board under the National Labor Re-
lations Act. To so hold would be to bring under the jurisdiction of the
Board a great variety of businesses of purely local character simply because
they maintain a delivery service in cities located on state lines. As there
are many such cities.in the United States, the question seems to us one of

- sufficient importance te justify us in certifying it to the Supreme Court so,
that it may be definitely settled. ‘

Being divided and in doubt, 1 erefore, this Court fespectfully certifies to
the Supreme Court ofgthe United States, for its instruction and advice, the
following questions of law, the determination of which is indispensable to a

. proper decision of the case. : : :
_1, Should the National Labor Relations’ Act be interpreted as having ap-
plication to a business of purely local character, such as a laundry, merely
. because such business is located:in a city on a state line and derives a sub-
stantial portion of its income from business which involves collections or
deliveries of articles in a state other than that, in which the business is
located?

2. Where a local business, such as a laundry, is located in a city on @
state line, and is not engaged in interstate commerce, except in so far as it
may collect articles to. be.serviced and may make deliveries to customers
living across the state line, is such business, by reason of such collections
and deliveries, deemed ote in ‘‘commerce’’ -within the: meaning of Sub-

section 6 of Section ‘2 of the Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 29 U. 8. C. A.

152(6), so that an unfaiy/labor practice on its part would be an unfair labor

practice ‘‘affecting commerce’’ within the meaning of Subsection 7 of said

section (29 U. S. ©. A. 152(7)) and Subsection (a) of Section 10; 29 °

U. 8. 0. A. 160(a) 91 See ee.

The tertificate must be dismissed. : | .
-By §10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (49 Stat. 449,
453; 29 U. S. C. §160(a)) the Board is empowered ‘‘to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8) affecting commeree.’’ The term ‘‘affecting commerce’’
is defined in §2(7) as ‘‘in commerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to

~, lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the

‘free flow of commerce.’’g And ‘‘commerce’”’ by § 2(6) is defined so

1 The court denied a motion made by the Sol'citor Goneral to amend the certificate by
qubodring the purchase of supplies in interstate cw as well as the collections an

a

National Labor Relations, Board vs. White Swan Co. 3

as to include ‘‘trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communi-
eation among the,several States.’’ On a review ofan order of the
Board in a Circuit Court of Appeals the ‘‘findings of the Board as
to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.’’ § 10(e).
* The questions do- not focus ‘‘the controversy in its setting.’’
Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co., 298 U. 8. 160,
163. From the certificate we do not know on what greanee the
Board based its jurisdiction—that the business was ‘‘in com-
merce’’ or that it was embraced within the other categories de-
serjbed in § 2(7) of the Act. The terms ‘‘business, of purely local
character’’ and ‘‘local business’’ are meaningful for purposes of
§10(a) of the Act only in light of speéifie-findings of the Board.
To answer the questions we would have to make a supposition as to
thé sense in which the Board made. its finding under § 10(a) -that
the unfair labor practices were ‘‘affecting commerce’’. The neces-
sity of making that supposition reveals the hypothetical avd ab-

record the answe: might be clear whichever the* theory of ‘the
Board’s findings docs not make the questions any the less defective.
The reviewing court is passing on the validity of a specific order of
‘the Board. Since the questions certified do not reflect the precise
conclusions of the Bbard and the precise findings on whith those
conclusions were based, they necessarily have an ‘‘objectionable
generality’’. See United States v. Mayer, 285 U. S. 55, 66; White,
«V. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367, 371; Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638,
648 ; Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 8306/0. S. 563, 571;

, they did reflect those tonclusions and findings, they would be de-
fective as calling for a ‘‘decision of the whole case’. News Syn-
dicate Co. y. New York Ceniral Railroad Co., 275 U. S. 179, 188.

' Dismissed.

ee : e 4

Clerk, Supreme Court, U. 8.

stract quality of theg questions. And the fact that on the whole °

Pflueger v. Sherman, 293 U. S. 55, 57, 58. And if, in this ease,:

=

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386401_0398%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
