# Brief for the National Labor Relations Board — National Labor Relations Board v. White Swan Co. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386401_0398%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Brief for the National Labor Relations Board - **Published:** January 1, 1941 - **Citation:** 313 U.S. 23 ## Text & _ BLANK PAGE Be. [ es al = e ‘ 4 ” — th Ric ESS ath ca be NANG Ng EL VS Mc A EARL ice a Sl a -* e ~ * . . , at . - » ettttimmcasitti Watt s Sat a e INDEX : : Page PD MOT 36 cncesdssconaarddb ves aaweseéawnhaawaeow aire . PN coo nccliccundehnecesacusiecs 4acnaunaswek ESPs 1 Dn SOeeeee GOUUNOE . eco cena ccc sck des nccdcobnascckocetusee 2 | Statute involved..........-..-------------+-----+2-6----- 2 BE INR cians ne cud neccoucsessogheeesessens in gota ein AS Summary of argument--_----.- joensen eee ecenne pa wbedwouds 5 Argument: I. By reason of its collection, servicing and delivery of eS garments which pass to and from its plant in interstate ia commerce, the company is substantially engaged in ¥ such commerce and is, therefore, subject to the Act-- 8 94 II. If the questions certified are not answered in the affirma- i: tive, the certificate should be dismissed without an- ewer to the questions... .--. ....:.2.522252 Hl. eee 20 ——-Gonclusion== === PF yp ys é CIEE FEE) \ - / AP , Apher od se , Pe ever Ome En ty eT Ee ate - = J Ate we a | . ° . ‘ * ar. % ee REG Bry x 4 ed } piv ? EP WTS. REPEL ALES PSG L EDGE ARS —~ a fens tie el ; oa : AN nthe Suprime aurtofthe Waited States OctToBER TERM, 1940 : No. 529 NATIONAL sper RELATIONS BoarRpD y.@ Waite Swan CoMPANY | ON CERTIFICATE FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES _ OPINION BELOW » The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of the National Labor Relations Board are | not yet reported in permanent form; they. are presently available in advance sheet form (19... N. L. R. B., No. 12) and are reproduced. in Appen- dix A, me} pp. 27-28. 3 ts | JURISDICTION «= : ea be fo The certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals’ _ a le was filed in this Court on October 28, 1940. The 1) } * 7 - r] / J e POSSE SP PLES Gy PME F BMNE PP COR GYR PITT BID i PI cy A roe aR co 2 ; i 2 . ° jurisdiction of this Court rests upon -Section wf of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act o | February:13, 1925. QUESTIONS CERTIFIED. aiet © Should the National Labor Relations Act be _ interpreted as having application to a business of purely local character, such as a laundry, merely “ _+ because such business is located in a eity on a state. line and derives a substantial portion of its _Incoine from business which involves collections or deliveries of articles in a state other than‘that | in which the business is located ?”’ __ “2. Where a local business, such as a laundry, is — located in a city on a state line, and is riot en- gaged in interstate commerce, except insofar as it may collect articles to be serviced and may make deliveries to customers living a¢ross the state line, is such byginess, by reason of such collections and deliveries, deemed engaged in ‘commerce’ within the meaning of Subsection 6 of Section 2 of the Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 29 U. 8. & A. 152 (6), so that an unfair labor practice on its part . would be an unfair labor practice ‘affecting com- merce’ within the ‘meaning of Subsection 7 of said-section (29 U.S. C. A. 152 (7)) and Sub- section dig of Section 10, +9 U.S. C..A. 160 (a) ?” \ STATUTE INVOLVED The pertinent provisions®f the National Labou ‘Relations. Act are set forth in — B, ie. ’ 2 EL DIRTY SRM ROLE URRY ATIS So skemnernnes reared - OO CR i OE Be ate ie en A ee Piece Ta RES UENO ES ATOR NO I { ’ ‘ - - , ; ‘ a “Ruy Bt Rn ET ee AER A OUR CREM Ms ete a ne ties EBT RES ater ee Pe seg SS TRE A 5 sy % cigs lng aut oe Ci a Ea eae REM SAG Nah eee Kae Slade ibn 0 oh. hemes omit a anc maak te She OE SM Ge OS 0d oe SE aes SO Be ORI 5 PES Ae \ pate , : at Mieco fe 5 ss “ > I ou 3 - | STATEMENT. ' The National is Relations Board petitioned | the court below for enforcement of an order | against the White Swan Company, a West Vir- ginia corporation, to cease and desist from. cer- : . tain unfair labor },ractices and to offer reinstate- , ment with back pay to certain, employees found — to have been discharged for union activity. The court below states in its certificate (p. 1) that the _ findings of the Board with respect to the unfair : labor practices and discriminatory discharges are. | sustained by s stantial evidence, and expresses . rofe _ doubt only as to the jurisdiction of thé Board. | The facts set forth in the certificate (pp. 1-2) may be summarized as #llows: The Company operates a combined laundry and dry cleaning establishment in the city of Wheel- | | ing, West Virginia. It collects and delivers gar- ments for its customers, and in this connection maintains a fleet of delivery trucks. Three‘of the delivery. routes from its plant are m Ohio, the 3 remaining eleven being in West Virginia. A ra- dius of fifteen miles is the practical limit for a laundry or dry cleaning business in this territory. Approximately 18/percent of the Company’s 1938 gross income Was derived irom the servicing | of garments for customers residing in Ohio: about 12.93 percent with respect to garments trans- de ported’ to ‘and from ‘the Company’s plant in its a8, "own trucks, and shout. 5 percent with respect to He || ara Re scatter! garments which persons not in its employ collected in Ohio, brought to its plant for servicing and then delivered in .Ohio. (hus, the Company’s 1938 . - gross.income was $128,792.96, of which $23,088.43 * was attributable to its Optic business. In the operation of its plant, the Company uses various supplies, consisting of soap, bluing, bleach, solvent, coal, water, paper, tape, and padding. During 1938, it expended $38,333.15 for such sup- plies, of which $10,810.90 was allocable to: sup- plies obtained from without West Virginia. _ The court below states that the Company’s pur- chase of supplies from without the state is not sufficient to gonfer jurisdiction upon the Board (p. 1). But | it recognizes that the collection and - delivery of garment@ across state lines does con-.- stitute interstate commerce,and it seeks the in- ° struction of this_Court only upon whether Con- gress intended the Board to have jurisdiction with respect to such interstate commerce, which it de- scribes as “‘local’’ in character . Upon certification, the Solicitor General filed a motion in the court below, asking that the certifi- cate be amended.- He pointed out that the Board, in its findings (pp. 27-28, infra), had rested its ju- risdiction ypon the out-of-state purchases as we as upon the Company’s activities with respect to its Ohio customers, and contended that it was inap- 1The certificate inadvertently ‘states the amount to be $28,088.43 (p. #, = — propriate for the court to segregate the constituent elements supporting the Board’ s jurisdiction. He therefore requested the court below to amend, its certificate, so as to place before this Court the en- tire basis upon which the Board rested its juris- diction (see note 13, p. 24, infra). The court de- . nied the motion, but at the same time reaffirmed its previous conclusion that the Company’s income from collections and deliveries beyond the state is ‘“substantial’’ and stated that-it merely wished to be instructed as to whether jurisdiction can be sup- ported by such activities (Certificate, pp. 5-6).” SUMMARY 0F ARGUMENT \ = I The Company is directly and ‘substantially en- gaged in interstate commerce by reason of its col- ‘lection, servicing, and delivery of garments which pass to and from i its plant in such commerce? The Circuit Court of “Appeals Aid not doubt, and it is clear, that the Act may be constitutionally applied to the Company. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 341 U. S. 1; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. Vv. wakes Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S. 453; Consolidated Edi- - son Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197; National Labor Relations Board v. Fain- 2The order of the court denying amendment_of the ~ eertificate has been printed and is annexed to the certificate (pp. 5-6). 293299—41——2, Sy, ia ™ " sah ih Paha a Ms RCA AN os a aaa ca eas Batam TRE TON gy ann Shae IAT AS Ma ses ; pein ote, eS i ey abe ‘ GA ae is OL as goa HY na tie aoe 2M) Cin) TRE MEER OM the phe 5a ta and ‘° he wisd wy UL ne eee ak ‘otc 4 eed os as Oe blatt, 306 U. S. 601; National Labor Relations ‘ | 6 Board v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U. S. 318. The only question raised is whether the Act should be limited in application to less than its apparent and permissible scope for the supposed reason that Congress did not intend it to apply to a business described by the court as “purely local’’ in nature. United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 446. But the Act on its face evidences a legislative purpose to exercise the full power of Congress under the commerce clause. Fainblatt.case, supra: The leg- © islative history confirms this intent. And there is no basis for an inference that Congress intended to exclude from the Act substantial interstate com- . merce merely because it is carried on within a lim- ite! area. | P .The fear expressed by the court below, that if the Board’s jurisdiction is sustained in this case, the Act may be applied to many ‘“‘businesses of purely local character,’ is groundless. The Board does_not-apply the Act to entire industries but to partictlgr employers. Each case must be determined as it\arises. Jones & Laughlin case, supra; Santa Cruz case, supra. , Nor is the Company’s business ‘‘purely local.’’ The Company is directly engaged ‘in interstate . commerce. The fact that it constitutes a unit of the power laundry and cleaning and dyeing busi- ness does not lend it ‘‘local character’’ for .pur- . poses of the National Labor Relations Act:, That f 7 P ; a industry, presumably, oceasions large amounts of . commerce among the several States, which com- merce is subject to disruption by industrial strife. There is 2 indication that Congress intended to. exclude that commerce from the protection af- se aan interstate commerce generally. - IT Because of the unusual posture of this case, if © the questions certified are not answered in the affirmative, the certificate should be dismissed without answer to the questions. The questions certified “are not raised by the case made * * #99 Seim v. Hurd, 232 U.' 8. 420, 427. The Board based its jurisdiction upon, the aggre- gate effect of unfair labor practices upon (a) the commerce involved in the Company’s receipt of materials and supplies and (b) the “commerce. in- volved in the Company’s collection, servicing, and delivery of garments. The questions certified con- fine this Court’s consideration to the effect upon the second type of commerce alone. _ : - The Cireuit Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that the threat of obstruction to incoming commerce supports the Board’s jurisdiction. And the volume of such commerce in this case far exceeds ‘‘that tv which courts would apply the ~ maxim de minimis.’ Fainblatt case, supra. More- over the’application of the Act should depend upon whether the aggregate effect of an industrial dis- é ~ | { 8 ‘pute upon all the interstate commerce in which the Company is engaged would be_ substantial. . That is the basis upon whieh the Board considered and disposed of the question. The Circuit Court | of Appeals should not be permitted to require consideration of the-issue by this Court upon a different basis from that upon which the Act was applied by the administrative agency. Pi) An affirmative answer to the questions certified — wij] be appropriate, procedurally, since. such, an answer would dispose of the entire controversy. © But a negative answer would not be appropriate since it would leave open the question presented concerning the application of the Act. ‘ ARGUMENT I BY REASON OF ITS COLLECTION, SERVICING AND DELIv- ERY OF GARMENTS WHICH PASS TO AND FROM ITS PLANT IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, THE COMPANY IS . SUBSTANTIALLY ENGAGED, IN SUCH COMMERCE AND 18, THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO THE ACT About 18 per cent of the Company’s gross reve- nue, or some $24,000 per year, i¢ derived from | servicing operations perfotmed upon garments which-are hrought to its piant in interstate com- merce and which, after being serviced, are rede- livered in such commerce to the owners. More - than two-thirds of the continuous interstate trans- portation which this business involves is accom- - tors who collect the articles in Ohio, bring them to the plant in West Virginia, and later redeliver them in Ohio. This substantial flow of interstate commerce to and from the Company’s plant is occasioned only by the plant’s existence and will continue only while its operations do. The court below correctly recognized that’ “‘the collection and delivery of garments. across state . lines, as above desdribed, constitutes interstate commerce’? (p. 2). And it noted further that such interstate business in this case’ is: “‘substan- tial’? in amount (pp. 3, 5). It suggests not ‘the slightest doubt that»Congress has power t@ confer jurisdiction upon the Board in these circumstances. Nor could any such doubt be entertained, since * the stoppage of the Company’s operations through industrial strife would result in the interruption of a ‘“‘substantial’’ amount of interstate com- merce, which: Congress may undertake to protect * by removing the threat of such interruption at. the outset. N ational Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel ‘Corp. ., 301. U. 8. 1, 41-43; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U. 8. 453, 464-465; Con- solidated Edison‘ Co. v. National Labor Relations — Board, 305 U. S. 197, 221-222 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 604— 605 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Bradford, eet 7 eee -. plished in oo Compahy’s own ttucks; the re- mainder is carried on by independent route opera- . ' ¥ th ¥ ‘ pe is 3 a ae * 2a _ * ae le oy? Noe aS 4 ve } \ 4 ~e Me , ft Om,. PRA PLOTS PES he ry) on =a . . eo. . 10 Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U: 8. 318, 326." And since the volume. of the Company’s commerce is, as the. ~ eourt below conceded, “‘substaritial,”’ it is plainly “more than that to which courts would apply the maxim de minimis.’’ Fainblatt cage, supra, p. 607. } | era ial ‘ Thus, this case reduces itself to a narrow com- pass. No quegtion is here presented as. to the scope of Congressional power under the commerce ~ clause. The sole question is as to whether €on- gress has exercised that-power so as to give the Board jurisdiction, i. e., whether, as a matter of statutory construction, Congress-intended the Na- tional Labor Relations Act to apply in ‘the -° situation here presented. The court below recognizes that (p. 2) ‘‘the letter of the National Labor Relations Act’ may, vover such collections and deliveries*in interstate commerce as are here involved,’ but nevertheless queries “ whether the Act sliould not be construed to ex- .. clude such interstate commerce. It refers to United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S; 435, 446, which suggests the propriety of: judicial relaxation of the literal application of a statute ‘where such an application would plainly run counter to the legislative purpose. Cf. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; but ef. Ciminetti v. “'§ See also, National Labor Relations Board v. ooh B Retinning Co., Inc., 98 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d) ; National Labor lations Board v. National New York Packing & Shipping Co., Inc., 86 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 2d). : 3. ® — 5 ae A eee aces eons areas anaes Pane Atak Tyee: reer . “ + ‘ becoh Ste a Cis he ye . he Poo Se 3 ie te ra. He oh Fe Per tte Ly vrs * ~ i.) _ ' United States, 242 U. 8. 470. By describing the business here involved as “‘local,” the court seems to indicate that there ma be room for judicial con- struction, eliminating from the scope of the Act that which is literally covered thereby and which is plainly within the géompetence of Congress. We respectfully submit that not only is there no occasion to go behind the plain language of the statute, as was done in such exceptional situations as the Sorrells case, but that even if such an exam- ination be pressed, it will conclusively appear that the- -intention of Congress accords with the lan- guage employed. | * 7 TASOEN= RRS: Pa . — + ’ ‘ gle basis of the Board’s ju isdiction. Conceiv- ably, the Board may have be ieved that the effect upon either type of commerce was not in itself _ substantial, but that the aggregate effect was such _ as to warrant or require a conclusion that the ju- risdictional prerequisites were satisfied in this case. The question before the Circuit Court of Ap- peals as to application of the Act, therefore, con- cerned a business whose stoppage would produce i the total effect upon interstate commerce which the Board’s findings reflect. But the court, while - reciting in the certificate (p. 1) the facts concern- ing the Company’s receipt of materials and ~ supplies, has certified questions which confine con- sideration by this Court to the effect of an inter- ruption of the Company’s business upon the commerce involved only in its collection, servicing, » and delivery of garments. The questions in terms relate to an enterprise whose only connectior with - interstate commerce purports to be that which is stated in the questions. > The Circuit Courts of pone for the Sixth, .Ninth nd Tenth Circuits, as well as the court be- low, have held that the threat of obst ruction to inter- @ state commerce in materials and supplies arising (from labor disputes in the state of destination uestion 1 inquires whether the Act applies “merely he- cause” of the location of the business and its servicing 0 articles collected in or delivered to points in other States. Question 2 is as to a business “not engaged in interstate commerce, except insofar as it may collect articles to be serviced and may make deliveries to customers living across. the state line * * *” (Certificate, p. 3). - warrants application of the Act.* [There are no- contrary decisions. The ‘‘familiar-principle” in- . voked by the Court in National Labor Relations. “Board vy. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. 8. 1, 31-82, that obstructions to interstate commerce. are within the reach of. the Congressional power, would seem to recognize no distinction between ef- fects upon incoming or outgoing commerce, or ef- | fects upon both. The Circuit Court of Appeals in _ this case excluded the reeggnized effects of the Com: pany’s unfair labor practices upon its, incoming commerce from consideration by this vate on the bare ground that ‘‘the volume of. the te ‘Commerce thus involved is not sufficient, in our ‘opinion, to bring the business’ within the jurisdic- —+tion of the Board” (Certificate, p. 1). “™ « We believe that the volume of commerce in sup- plies—-$10,810 during 1938, or 28% of the Com- » pany’s total purchases of supplies during that. Oo % Newport Neu Shipbuilding & Dry Dock ‘Co. v. Na- tional Labor Relations Board, 101 F. (2d) 841, 843 (C. C. A. 4), modified and affirmed, 308 U. S. 241; National Labor “Relations Board v. A. 8. Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951, 955 (C. C. A. 4); National Labor Relations Board v. Yorfolk year (Certificate,. Pp. 1)—comprises commesee of an Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 109 F. (2d) 128, 129 (C. C- A. 4); Virginia Electric & Power Cov. v. National Labor ‘Relations Board, 115 F. (2d) 414, 416 (©. C. A. 4).; Con- sumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 113 F. (2d) 38, 40-41 (C. C. A. 6); National Labor Relations Board v. Sunshine Mining Co., 110 F. (2d) 780, 784 (C. C. A. 9), certiorari denied, No. 352, this Term, J ary 13, 1941; Southern Colorado Power Co. Vv. National Labor Relations Board, 111 F. (2d) 539, 543 (C. C. A. 10). / Pp ET GQ ORE LEO LE AISA AOSD CIE OIEVE cal OGG | 24 amount substantially ‘“‘more than that to which courts would apply the maxim de minimis.”” Fain- -_blatt case, 306 U. 8. at 607. The significant fact, however, is that there is no need for the effect upon incoming commerce to be substantial in itself in order for it to be relevant to a determination whether the Company is subject to the Act... The effect upon incoming cémmerce is one element making up on aggregate efféct; the decisive ques- tion is whether the aggregate effect is substanfial, not whether. each ¢ of the component effects in itself satisfies that test. The Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the view.that the Board might base its conclusion that the Agt did or did not. apply upon the total effect of a stoppage of operations upon interstate commerce; in its order denying the Board’s motion to amend the certificate, the court stated that (Certificate, p. 6)— | The case is not one of aggregating different elements upon which a finding of jurisdic- tion might be based ;. but m4 determining | _ whether one of the elem pis tends _ te fur- nish dny-basis of jurisdi tion.” : 18 In the motion to amend the certificate, the Solicitor Geri eral suggested that the following question -was appropriate” . for certification : “Does the National Labor Relations Act ap- ply to a laundry and cleaning and‘ dyeing establishment which, during 1938, the year concerning which evidence 4vas - adduced, received $10,810.90 worth of materials and supplies _ in gnterstate commerce, out of fotal purchases of this kind | amounting to $38,333. %, and, of its gross income of $128;=- 752.96 during that year, derived! $28,088.43 from the ‘serv- icing of garments collected from and delivered to points in - - a State other. than that in whith the p!ant i is — ” : /t PSE IES A Pt AM EERE III PR G0 eee ~ 25 Vy It would have been quite possible for the Board ~ ce -)- to consider the case as involving two separate — | , questions whether the Company is subject to the Act by reason (a) of its interstate purch and - (b) of its servicing of garments collected and delivered in other States. We submit, however, that where the Board has viewed as a single issue ~ whether the effects upon interstate commerce of “an labér dispute in a particular business are such in the: aggregate a as té bring the business within the “ Act, and this view is proper under the Act, the Circuit Court of Appeals should not be permitted, upon a patently unsound ground, to require con- — ideration of the issue by this Court upon a dif- ay ies basis from that upon which tne Act was applied by the administrative agency. ; It should be observed that it would be appro- | priate, procedurally, for the Court to answer the ? 4 certified questions in the affirmative, for such an-_ - ; _ swers would Be dispositive of the controversy. On ~ the other hand, if: negative answers should be given, there would still be left open the question whether both types of activity in the aggregate _ furnish a basis for the Board’s jurisdiction, not- ‘ : withstanding that neither alone may be sufiigat : a -=for that purpose. ‘Aud since the Board rested its — | ae * jurisdiction upon both grounds taken together, , ; ‘ - pather than alternatively, it. would seem inappr : 4 for this Court to decide that one of th Ee grounds, standing aldne, is insufficient. Aceord- rerine © a OPI LOTT ELEY ONE IO IIS LIME FG i een | : ry ; 26 ‘| ' ingly, we respectfully submit that the questions | certified can and should be answered in the affirma- . tive, but that, because of the unusual posture of | ‘this case, if affirmative answers cannot be giver, the certificate should be dismissed. CONCLUSION It is respectfully submitted that the questions certified by the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit should be answered in the affirma- tive, but that, if such answers may not be -re- turned, the certificate .should be dismissed witb- : out answer to the questions. - | ~° / Francis Bippie, i / Solicitor General. | ARNOLD Raum;- J Special Assistant to the Attorney General. r Rosert B. Warts, . N f General Counsel, LAURENCE A, Knapp, - | | Associate General Counsel, . * Mortimer B. Wotr, | } Hua D. SHEa, Apia Attorneys, - National Labor Relations Board.* . FEsRuARY 1941. Re ee an ee eet een mene en een a enter cet AT et hc eee SAT ER Ue Rie FEIT HL RAIS INE SE ENR FOE NTS I OND a gd ae Oe hi . SI ’ ol APPENDIX A The Board’s findings of facts and conclusions of law concerning the applicability of the Act to the Company’s business are as follows (19 N. L. R. B., No. 112): * FINDINGS OF FACT 1; THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT ° White Swan Company is a West Virginia corporation having its office and plant at Wheeling, West Virginia. It operates .a combined laundry and dry cleaning-estab- * lishment. The essential supplies and equip- re _mifent used by the respondent in its opera- ; tions are soap, bluing, bleach, cleaning sol--: vent, coal, water, salt, paper, tape, and . _ padding. During 1938 the respondent pur- — . chased supplies and materials costing §38,- - 333.15. Approximately 28.2 percent, or : | $10,810.90 by value, of its supplies and 1 - equipment were shipped to the respondent’s ae plant from tae outside the State of West ‘* Virginia. The respondent’s’ gross income . during the same period was $128,752.96. itt, The respondent transports garments inits . . a trucks from customers in Ohio to the re-’ Jas ‘ ‘ spendent’s plant in West Virginia to be . i serviced. After they are serviced, the re- spontient delivers the garments in its trucks to the customers in Ohio. Approximately ee | 12.93 percent of the respondent’s gross in- 1 : ns * These findings are based in part on a stipulation of facts. 28 om) | & ... 7 Pee HH i 2 . ye inser ea SERN TE LELRE LE LE A REELING ENS 28 come for 1938 was derived from the servic- ing of garments which were collected from and. delivered to customers in Ohio, in the manner described above: In _ addition thereto, approximately 5 percent of its gross # income during 1938 was derived from the © servicing of garments which persons not in the respondent’s employ collected in Ohio, | brought to the respondent’s plant for serv- icing, and delivered to persons in Ohio after the garments were serviced. The total in- come from work involving interstate ship- ments during 1938 was $23,088.43. * * * * * IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE We find that the activities of the respond- ent set forth in Section III above, occurring ______ in connection with the operations of the re- spondent described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the sev- eral Sta nd tend to’ lead to labor disputes burdening™and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. " CONCLUSIONS OF LAW * d * ~.* * % * 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7 ) of the ae ~ y sah ige Fea gee OR aT Oe OM TCE TT Te Tee eT - ' . . . BT TRE te IE SG eae rg gmap rN ergata aR RS aR ARIES APPENDIX B The pertinent provisions of the N ational Labor Relations Act (Act of July 5, 1935, ¢. 372, 49‘Stat. 449; 29 U.S. C., Supp. V, Sec. 151, et seq.) are as follows: + . _ Sec. 2. When used in this Act— oe * _* ee * (6) The term ‘‘commerce”’ means trade, , traffic, conimerce, transportatien, or com- - munication among the several States, or be- tween the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the Dis- trict of Columbia or any Territory, or be- tween points in the same State but through other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign coyntry. _< (7) The term ‘“‘affecting commerce’’ means in commerce, or burdening or ob- structing commerce or the free flow of com- - merce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing com- merce or the free flow of commerce. . * * * ye — * ho * Sec. 10 (a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This powér shall be exclusive, and shail not be affected by any other means. of adjust- ' ment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise. pi : ) --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386401_0398%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.