# Appellees Brief — Clason v. Indiana

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellees Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1939
- **Citation:** 306 U.S. 439

## Text

No. 517.
ae

IN THE - —-—
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1938.

GERRIT W. CLASON,
Appellant,
v.

STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee.

ArpgaL rreom THe Supreme Court or THe State or
Iywpiaya.

APPELLEE’S BRIEF.

Omer Stokes Jackson,
Attorney General of Indiana,

Rexeti. A. Boyp,
Deputy Attorney General,

* Ussan C. Stover,
Deputy Attorney General,

* Epwarp H. Ks1enT,
Haray M. Sritiz, Jz.,
Counsel for Appellee.

SS eee

INDEX

Page

ee ee errr eee eee 1

CR aC paec eee ee N cde ests mre res eeeees 1

Samteary of AmOMAOE,. ....0 05 c cc cc cescccccecees 8)
I. The purpose of the provisions of Chapter 278,

Il.

Il.

I.

Il.

Acts of 1937 of The General Assembly of Indiana
is to control animal diseases and protect the
health and welfare of the State of Indiana.....

Chapter 278, Acts of 1937 of the General As-
sembly of Indiana was enacted pursuant to the
PEP SP eee

The limitations of Section 8, Article 1, Clause 3,
of the Federal Constitution does not prevent
local legislation on local matters even though
such indirectly or incidently affects interstate

Se 2A TS Os 0 So 2 Oe + OO EO OO Se OOO O Re 6 es

. In determining whether the provisions of Chap-

ter 278, Acts of 1937 of the General Assembly of
Ip is an unwarranted burden on interstate
commerce a test of reasonableness is applied. . .

. The facts of this cause do not disclose an un-

reasonable exercise of the State’s police power

which unreasonably burdens interstate com-
merce

2 2 2 SOS. 6.08 8-o O82. 6 OO +6. 68: 8 01F 2 ae és 8 SO. ee. Oe

2.0) 9 2 O Os 0.9.6.6 8 2 2-0 6 OO € Oe. 4..¢ F0_8..2 Rit #9 8°t: 2 2

The purpose of the statute is to protect the
health and welfare of the citizens of the state. .

The statute was enacted pursuant to the inher-
ent police power of the state.................

1

10

il

13

Pop

III. The Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitu-

IV.

tion does not prevent the states from legislating
on purely local matters relating to the welfare,
health and safety of its citizens, even in those
matters where interstate commerce is affected.
This is especially true where Congress has not
yet occupied the field covered by the State Law. 3

In determining whether a state statute is an un-
constitutional burden on interstate commerce,
the proper test to be applied is that of the reas-

onableneas of the statute.................... 4

. The record of this —__ contains facts suff-

cient to sustain the ings of the trial court
and the decision of the State Supreme Court.
The facts show that the provisions of the statute
were enacted under the police power of the state
and that the statute in its application does not
work an unreasonable burden upon interstate
commerce

owe
eC ec E Ce P etc seve sas eo 2 28 2 8 2 8.0 9 6 02-6

a Fo
ie ee Me ee Oe Oe ee ow AY on Sy ot ee ee

TABLE OF CASES CITED

Page
Atlantic & P. T. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160.. 29
Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328. ..14. 29
Austin c. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343........--..... 13, 22
Baldwin v. Seeling, 294 U.S. 511................. 32
fe BS as 11, 12
Bradley v. Public Service Commission of Ohio, 289
ree ey oe re te ed 33
Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307................ 33
_ City Dairy Company, v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238, m
OSL EC RA cg Ts pel pa 1
Chicago R.I. & P. R. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453. ..14, 29
(Clason v. State, 17 N. E. (2d) 92............. My
Compagnie Francaise, etc., v. State Board, 186 U.S.
Davis ¢. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457................ 38
Davis v. Farmers Coop. Eq. Co., 262 U.S. 312. 317
MPa ese te tee nc rE ee 31
Gulf, C. & 8. PF. R.v. Texas, 246 U.S.58....... 14
Hendrick v. Md., 235 U.S. 610, 622........ a
Hennington v. ks Sn 10, 12
Hygrade'Provision Co., v. Sherman, 266 U.S.497.. 12, 14.31
Kelley v. Finney, 207 Ind. 567................... 33
Kidd 9. Pearson, 128 U.S.1.................... 10, 12
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern Ry.. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. ™
Levey v. State, 161 Ind. 251.............. iiencs ae
Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U.S. 352, p. 402......... 26
Mo, Pac. Ry., v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 362......... 14

National Fertilizer Co. v. Lambert, et. al., 48 Fed.
. 458, 461

cat I Ie ol ae ie Te SP ae a oe er a or ws ie ie ee ea) et ee ee ee er ee

New York, ete., R. R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628.10. 11.

Po,

Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678....... .12,13,2
Public U. C. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 245 (1919)... 3
Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U.S. 198................
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 187.................
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 524 (1912)......... 3

aes @. remeers, Sil U.G. Sl... 2... wwe ones
Stour Remedy Co., v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 205 (1914) :

Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52..............3.. 12,
Smith v. St. Louis etc., Ry., 181 U.S. 248......... 14,
State v. Clason, 13 N. E. (2d) 307.............9, 10)
State v. Clason, 12 N. E. (2d) 760............. 9, 10,

South Carolina, etc., v. Barnwell Bros., 58S. Ct. 510. :
South Covington, etc., Ry.,v. Kentucky, 252 U. S. sesame
Stevenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 351, 264.

Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591................ nt
Washington-Oregon Co., v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87. |
Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. v. Greenwood, 277 U.5.1.. |

STATUTES CITED AND TEXT BOOKS

Sees. 1 to 23, ch. 278, Acts of 1937 of the amis
Assembly of a yas
pendix ‘‘A*’.) The trial court, (the Elkhart Cireuit Cour
of the County of Elkhart, State of Indiana) sustained
motion to quash the affidavit wherein the defendant rast
the question of the constitutionality of the act under t#
Commerce Clause, Article I, Sec. 8, Clause 3, of the Fel
era! Constitution. The state perfected an appeal to the
Indiana Supreme Court upon the adverse ruling and th
cause was reversed and remanded to the trial court by#
decision of that court; 12 Northeastern Reporter (seened
series) 750, rehearing denied, 13 Northeastern Reper
(second series) 307. Appellant, Gerrit W. Clason. moval
to quash the indictment upon substantially the **
grounds as before, and after such motion was overrule
he was found guilty by the trial court and fined in ™
sum of twenty-five ($25.00) dollars. Thereafter the
pellant, Gerrit W. Clason, perfected an appeal to J
Supreme Court of Indiana wherein the judgment of '
trial court was sustained: from which judgment of ‘
Supreme Court of Indiana, this appeal is prosecatel

The precise question involved is whether a state may #
the exercise of its police power, eontrol the traffic over is

e &

ie

3

own highways of dead animals (not slaughtered for food)
although the regulation—which is a sort af internal quar-
antme—requires the prompt disposition of the bodies
within the state and does not permit the removal out of
the state, away from state official supervision. In other
words, may a state, under the circumstances, and by a
reasonable exercise of the police power, prohibit an indis-
‘riminate movement over its highways of the bodies of
arge dead animals not intended for human consumption,
when sueh bodies are destined for shipment out of state,
ad at the same time permit or suffer a regulated and
supervised internal traffic of such bodies to disposal plants
then the vehicles used for local transportation and the
‘isposal plants are under the supervision and control of
“ate officials tu thereby assure a disposal of such bodies
mith the least possible chance for the spread of animal
‘iseases and the nuisances and inconveniences occasioned
oy such traffic and disposition ?

Tae appellant asserts that the statute viclates the Com-
erce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The statute so
‘sailed requires a license for those who haul the dead
anmals, the conveyance used must meet certain require-
nents, there are conditions of cleansing and sanitation
ad disinfection—all to the one end of preventing the
‘bread of disease and somewhat limiting necessary
‘meus conditions by placing the entire process of dis-
heal of the bodies under control of the state.

The State of Indiana maintains that the statute is a
“asonable exercise of its police power designed to con-
aw 3 dangerous article: that the handling and trans-
Portation of such dead bodies over the public highways
* 8 Noxious and fraught with such danger that the bodies
“anot be regarded as legitimate articles of commerce:

t the evils incident to the transportation of the dead

~~

3

bodies cannot be controlled if indiscriminate hauling avi

from state supervision is allowed. If one effect of tis

plan of disposing of dead animal bodies encroaches on %

rights of appellant to carry on interstate commere. 1

does so only in a very incidental manner.

The statutes appertaining to the question, preset
by this appeal are as follows:

Chapter 278 of the Indiana Acts of 1937 provides 2
part:

AN ACT to control animal diseases and to regulate the transporta"®
and disposal of the bodies of dead animals; providing penaltie **
its violation; repealing certain specific acts and all other laws ast
parts of laws in conflict therewith; and fixing a time when ths #
shall take effect.

Carcasses of Dead Animals—Transportation w
Disposal—Policy Declared.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assem"!
of the State of Indiana, That it is hereby deel
to he the public policy of the State of Indiana,
ing through its general assembly, to control
regulate the transportation over the highways “
this state and the disposal of the carcasses of ¢
animals, not slaughtered and intended for hm
food, to the end that the spread of animal dis
in this state shall be controlled and also that ¥
public health and welfare of the citizens of a
state shall be conserved and protected agi
dangers, annoyances and nuisances that might &"
from such carcasses and from such transporte!®
and disposal thereof, if the same be not requir
by law; and this act is designed to effectuate
purposes and public policy, through the exerd**
the police powers of the state. This act shall ¥
libera .y construed to effect such policy and to ?*
mote such objects.

9)

Disposal Plant—Operation—License for—Unlawful
Acts.

Sec. 4. (a) No person shall engage in this state
in the business of operating a disposal plant, as
herein defined, without first obtaining for each such
disposal plant so operated by him, or in his behalf,
a license and any vehicle certificates required, as
herein provided; and no person, except one holding
a license to operate such a disposal plant in this
state, or who is acting for such licensee, or who is
otherwise excepted by this act, shall either trans-
port over any highways of this state, or dispose of
to any person, the bodies of any dead animals in
any manner herein prescribed, or in any other
manner not permitted by law.

State Veterinarian—Record.

(b) The said state veterinarian shall keep a rec-
erd of all applications for permits, licenses and
vehicle certificates, showing a!l thereof issued,
denied, or revoked by him, and such other facts as
he may prescribe.

Dead Animals—Hauling—License.
, Sec. 11. (a) No person, except as herein pro-
vided, may haul or transport over the highways of
the State of Indiana the bodies of any dead ani-
mals, except those that have been slaughtered and
are intended for human food, without first ob-
taining and holding a license issued under the pro-
Visions of this act and which bodies are being
transported to a disposal plant located in this state
and operated by a person holding a license to en-
gage in such business.

Hauling—License—Qualification.

(b) No license shall be issued to any person
solely for the purpose of transporting the bodies of

o's

6

dead animals, but such transportation must bed
solely by persons holding a license for dispad
plants, so that such dead bodies may be proper
and promptly disposed of under the requiremet
of this act; except that any public official of
state, charged by law with such duties, may ren
or supervise the removal of any such dead bois
and the disposal thereof by any method provi
for by this act where necessary to protet ®
public health and welfare.

Hauling—Vehicles Used in—Specifications.

(ec) All vehicles used in the transportation of ®
bodies of dead animals, under the provisions of
act, shall have a tank or metal lining in the ié
such vehicle, or be otherwise so constructed that ¥
same shall be practically watertight, . '

il

This broad power, though subject to limitation, rests
ety within the. discretion of the legislative branch of
state government and in the determination of what
mditions warrant its exercise, the decision of the legis
ture is conclusive.

Levey v. State, 161 Ind. 251;

Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135;

New York, ete., R. R. v. New York, 165 U.S.
628.

Proposition III.

THE EXCLUSIVE POWER GRANTED CONGRESS
Y SECTION 8, ARTICLE 1, CLAUSE 3, OF THE
EDERAL CONSTITUTION TO REGULATE COM
[ERCE, DOFS NOT PREVENT THE STATE FROM
EGISLATING ON PURELY LOCAL MATTERS RE-
ATING TO THE WELFARE, HEALTH AND SAFE-
Y OF ITS CITIZENS IF SUCH EXPRESSIONS OF
HE POLICE POWER ARE NOT INTENDED TO
EGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE. THIS IS
RUE EVEN THOUGH SUCH ENACTMENTS MAY
\CIDENTALLY OR INDIREC’TLY AFFECT INTER-
TATE COMMERCE.

As stated in the two foregoing propositions, the pro-
sions of Chapter 278 of the Acts of the General Assem-
iy of Indiana of 1937, have as their purpose the preser-
ation of the health, safety and property of the citizens
Indiana, and as such is a legitimate exercise of the
herent police powcr of the State. The police power of
he State is subject to few limitations when such power
‘Properly and reasonably exercised in the preservation
f the interests of the State. Sec. 8, Art. 1. clause 3, of
te Federal Constitution is a lirtitation of the power of the
‘ates to regulate commerce and only incidentally limits

12

the exercise of the police power of the state when sm
exereise of the police power is in purpose and effet:
regulation of interstate commerce. An exercise of &
police power which has as its purpose the leginm
functions of the police power is not subject to the
merce clause limitation unless it direetly burdens the
flow of interstate commerce. The act here in question
intended to be, and is a regulation of an internal mat
and was not aimed at interstate ecommerce, and the ‘2°
that it may incidentally or indirectly affect sueb
merce, is of no consequence in determining its const”
tionality.
Hennmagton +. Georgia, 163 U.S. 2%:
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. 8.1;
Block +. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135: :
Capital City Dairy Co.. v. Ohio, 183 1.5. >
~ 40:
Washington-Oreqon Co, «, Washinate. ee
S. 87:
Plumley v. Mass., 155 USS. 461:
Hygrade Provision £6.. v. Sherman, 266 T.*
497.

The provisions of the aet in question are similar 24
respects and in no wise more directly affect inters”
commerce than do quarantins measures of the vane
states. Quarantine measures have been upheli by ™
eourt when their purpose was to effectuate a reason’
exercise of the police power.

Clason v. State. 17 N. E. (2d) 92:

State v. Clason, 12 N. E. (2d) 750:

State v. Clason, 13 N. E. (2d) 307:

Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52;

Reid rv. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137:

Sd: « Hesterburg, 211 U. S. 31:

Powell v. Pennsylvania. 127 U.S. 675:

Compagnie Francaise v. La. Board »* Hea’
18» UL. S. 380.

13

The extent of the police power is sufficiently broad to
nable a state to exelude from its borders an article once
onsideral a legitimate article of ecommerce if in the
pinion of the state legislature, such articles mav be
njurious to the health, welfare.property or morals of its
itzens. and such exelusion is not such a burden upon
nterstate eommerce as to invalidate the action under the
uitation of Art. 1, See. 8, Clause 3, of the Federal
onstitution.

Vregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., v. Wash-

ington, 270 U.S. 87:

Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678:

Plumley +. Mass., 155 U.S. 461:

Austin +. Tennessee, 179 V. S. 343.

Proposition IV.
CHAPTER 278, ACTS OF 1937 OF THE GENERAL
ISSEMBLY OF INDIANA IS UPON ITS FACE AN
SAERCISE OF THE STATE'S INHERENT POLICE
OWER, ANI) IN DETERMINING WHETHER SUCH
TATUTE IS A DIRECT OR UNWARRANTED BUR.
EX TPON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, THE TEST
REASONABLENESS MUST BE APPLIED. To
ETERMINE WHETHER THE EXECUTION OF
AE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE CONSTI-
UTES MORE THAN AN INDIRECT OR_ INCT-
JEXTAL BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
HIS COURT MUST CONSIDER THE OBJECTS AND
ECESSITY OF THE ACT AND WHETHER IN THE
4GHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PROVI-
IONS OF THE STATUTE ARE UNREASONABLE.
PTHE PROVISIONS AND EFFECT OF THE STAT-
TE ARE NOT UNREASONABLE, THE STATUTE
SOT AN UNWARRANTED OR PROHIBITED REG.

i+

VLATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE [IN TH
CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE.

The provisions of the act in question provide fs
licensed and regulated hauling and disposition of
hedies of large dead animals. The police power of &
state is sufficiently broad to enable the state to pre
its citizens and their property from dangers and ant
ances occurring Within the state. especially whes 5°
danger and annovanee is oeeasionel by the ase of we
highways of the state in an adverse manner. The 4
cise of the police power. to accomplish the desired msi.
for the protection of the property and citizens of >
state. requires the prohibitien of the indisermmizs~
movement of vehicles over the state's hizhways to ps
without the state and bevond the jurisdiction of the 53:
Chwago R.1.& P. R. +, Arkansas not
453 :
South Co} maton, rc. Ru. =. Kentuck ‘. ¥2 :

S. 399.

——

Applying the test of reasonableness t+ the case at hand.
us the test of reasonableness is applied in *‘due process”
_anses. it is beyond question that the paramount purpose
t the statute must prevail over some indirect or inei-
ental effect the enforcement of the act may have on
cerstate commerce. That is. balancing the interests of
“te state, its problem of coping with the protection of its
, ‘zezs from the dangers and annoyance occasioned in
te disposal of the buuies of dead animals. against the
aterests - thos- few affected by the act. the previsions
{the aet are not of sueh an unreasonable character as
‘9 eoastitate the act a regulation of interstate commerce
is prohitite i by the federal constitution.

Proposrtion V. she

TF RECORD OF THIS CAUSE DISCLOSES SUF-
FCTENT FACTS TO SUBSTANTIATE THE FINDP-
NGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE JUDGMENT
‘F THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA THAT
THE PROVISIUNS OF THE ACT ARE AN EXER-
‘SE OF THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE
AND DID NOT WORK AN UNREASONABLE BUR:
SEX TPON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

The stipulation of faets in this eause (R. 17 to 21)
wadusively shew that the transportation of dead ani-
tas over the highways of the state is fraught with
‘anger und fnrther. that the bodies of sueh dead animals
2 a sonres and eause of the spreading of diseases to
wth humans and animals. This in itselt is sufficient to
‘lain the reasonableness of-a statutory mode of dispe-
ita of such bodies. and the further showings of the
“Upalations. that disposition in the manner preseribe|
tr this act will lessen the dangers and annoyances.
“M@pletely establishes the reasonabieness of the opera-
4 of this act, even though it may indireetl» affect inter-
Sa’ eommerce.

Nh

~

16

ARGUMENT

i

THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE IS TO PROTEC
THE HEALTH AND WELFARE OF THE
CITIZENS OF THE STATE

_Indiana is an agricultural state. It has over ALL
farm animals, horses, cattle. sheep, hogs. It is one of %
three big corn producing states and for that reason
raising ef hogs is an important source of income.’ Tz
state has enacted many laws looking toward the protet®
of its live stock industry. and the conservation of &
state incomé from that source. The act “to contr
animal diseases and to regulate the transportation and
disposal of the bodies of dead animals** is ~imply
of those laws.

We pass over the offensive conditions which ust
accompanies the transportation of dead bodies of larz
animals over the public highways, the noxious odors.
unsightly appearance. ete. The greater harm from >
transportation comes from the spread of disease t >
healthy live animals. In paragraph 6 of the stipas
evidence, it is stated that a majority of large anizss
die from contagious or infectious diseases. some of *©3
mar be transmissible to man as well as other anims
(Rec. P. 19, Stip. 6). One anima! disease that gives 7*
concern to agricultural interests of Indiana is that of ™
cholera. Farmers in driving a drove of hogs from “7
to farm have a right to assume that the publie high®*

of the state will not be a source of infeetion. yet * *
body of a hog that died with the infectious disea> *
improperly transported along the public roads. the“

‘The World Almanac, 1939, pp. 343-345.

17

ping from the conveyance—or the hoofs of the draft
animals—may carry the disease to other animals travel-
ing on the roadway. If healthy animals are to be trans-
wrted by wagon or truck. the farmer has a right to
assume that no infected dead animal was earried on the
same converance and the conveyance left unsterilized.
Xo record is kept of the disease that causes the death
of farm animals—every dead body is a possible carrier
of disease to healthy animals. The Indiana statute. which
is challenged in the appeal, provides for the burial within
4 hours after death of animals. The conditions of burial
are specified. The hide may be removed if the disease
was known not to be infectious. If the body is conveyed
of the premis.s this must be by one licensed by the
sate to transport the body. The shortest route to the
“disposal plant’? must be followed—the conveyance must
ve reasonably fight so as to permit ne dripping on the
highway (Appendix **.A.°° Sec. 11 (¢)}). Thirty-eight «dis-
posal plants are under control of the state veterinarian.
(Ree. P. 20. Stip. 9). Certain precautions are to be ob-
served at all the disposal plants. It is not permissible for
a track or wagon to leave the plant until the truck or
wagon and the horses drawing the wagon are cleaned
and disinfected so that no infection will be carried hack
“i to the public highwavs. This provision is the very
heart of the statutes. The Supreme Court of Indiana
noted this feature of the law and said of the provisions -
that it might be

“considered as in the nature of a quarantine
against bringing into the state contaminated ve-
hicles Guat have been used in the transportation
of dead animal=’’. .

and the court added.

‘we believe that such a quarantine ts justifiable
én’ reasonable.”

18

4

The State Supreme Court understood of course tha!
the state had no control over the vehicles or disposl
plants out of the state. The only practical thing left w
do was to set up a plan which would keep the state i
control of the dead animal and indirectly the conveyane
from the beginning of the transportation to its final ds
‘position under the supervision of the state veterinarian
office. That is a part of the state’s plan to stamp 0
animal diseases. Unless the public highways and th
vehicles using them in going from farm to farm are ke,
: free froin germs of animal diseases, communicable di
\_eases can never be eradicated.

IL.

THE STATUTE WAS ENACTED PURSUANT TO TE
INHERENT POLICE POWER OF THE STATE

In considering the seope of the police power of ¢
state it’is safe to say that no activity is exempt from!
purview, whether i‘ be one of long duration or of ree
occurrence; in either case such activities are subject
regulation or prohibition if the legislature in a reasonal

ereise of its discretion decides that the prohibition
regulation of such activities are necessary to prom
the peace, safety, health or welfare of the public. 7
basis of reasonableness in such cases is ultimately ‘
termined by facts under a similar test as that applied
eases determining the question of due process of |
(Quarantine laws and regulations dealing with the dis
sition or prohibition of unhealthy, noxious or deleteri
articles have always depended upon the reasonablem
of the object to be accomplished and it has been rept
ediy held by the courts of this and other jurisdicti
that the rights of the individual, even to the preperty
has in such objects are subservient to the public ¥

a

19

“It is the duty of every government, whether
state or municipal, to pass laws or ordinances for
preserving the public health, protecting the good
order and peace of society, and providing for the
abatement of nuisances. Such laws, if they contain
nothing more than the necessary restrictions and
limitations for the accomplishment of such pur-
poses, are not unconstitutional on the ground that
they deprive persons of their property without due
process of law. Quarantine regulations forinstance,
materially interfere with the free and unobstructed
use of private property, and for the time being
restrain, to a certain extent, the liberty of individ-
uals. Yet the health, safety, and welfare of the
community often demand their enforcement; and
such laws havé always been upheld as necessary
police regulations. Several other instances might
be cited where laws of a similar character are
sustained; but the authorities are too numerous,
and the general principles of law too well settled,
to require any extended reference or review. No
person has an inalienable right to produce disease,
or trade in that which is noxious; and in every
community, large or small, some minor rights of
individuals must be surrendered for the benefit.
protection, health, and general good of all. In
Alpers v. City and County of San Franciseo, 32
Fed. Rep. 503, the constitutionality of this ‘dead
animal contract’ was involved; and it was sus-
tained and declared valid as a legitimate exercise
of the police power of the state. Field, J., in de-
livering the opinion of the court said:

““*There is no doubt that the contract between
the plaintiff and the city and county of San Fran-
cisco is one within the competency of the mu-
Micipality to make. It is within the power of all
such hodies to provide for the health of their in-
habitants by causing the removal from their limits
of all dead animals not slain for human food,
Which otherwise would svon decay, and, by cor-

~1

a eee ee a eee a eee ae ee ee cee ee ae eo) ne

’

20

rupting the air, engender disease. gAny provisey
for such removal may be made by contract, as #
as the performance of any other duty toucim
the health and comfort of the city; its authont
always preserving such control over the matters
to secure an observance of proper sanitary ™&
lations. In addition to this general power. t
, constitution of the state of California whieh *
in foree when the contraet with the plaintiff ©
renewed, declares that ‘‘any county, city, or to
& ship may make and enforce within its limits
such local police, sanitary, and other regulation:
are not in conflict with general laws.’’ Articl |
See. 11. And the consolidation act of 1863, stil
force, provides that the board of supervisors
have power ‘‘to authorize the summary abatem
of nuisances; to make all regulations which may
necessary or expedient for the presegvation 0! '
public health, and the prevention of contagious ‘
eases; to provide by regulation for the prevent
and summary removal of all nuisances and |
structions in the streets, alleys, highways. *
public grounds of said city and county; and
prevent the running at large of dogs, and to!
thorize the destruction of the same when at lat
contrary to ordinance.’’’ ’’.

National Fertilizer Co. v. Lambert et @.
Fed. Rep. 458, 461.

The same broad interpretation of the scope of |
police power was accepted by the court in tlie cas
Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 596, wherein the ©
said :

‘“*It is within the general power of a govern®
to preserve and promote the public welfare ©
at the expense of private rights. 18 Am. and &
' Sten Encyc., etc., 739, 740. Police power is defined

New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Hart, 40 La. 4"

21

Am. St. Rep. 374, where it is said: It is the mght
‘of a state fanctionary to prescribe regulations
for the good order, peace, protection, comfort and
convenience of the community which do not en-
eroach on the like power vested in gress by the
federa! constitution.’

“In Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. ( Mass.) 53,
the court lays down the rule that ‘rights of prop-
erty, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being in-
jurious, and to such reasonble restraints and regu-
lations established by law, as the legislature, under
the governing and controlling power vested in
them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient.’

“In Town of Lake View v. Rose Hil! Cemetery
Co. 70 Ill. 191, the court says: ‘The police power

the state is coextensive with self-protection, and

pplicably termed the law of overruling ne-
cessity. It is the inherent and plenary power in
the state, which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort and welfare of society.’ Hale
v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. Law 714; Tiedeman’s Lim.
of Police Power, Section 1.’’

* 2 AB ee ee EY eR SE PR RR ee

ve

- ».@ a. Vv

The power of the state under the pohee power to regu-
late or prohibit internal activities which endanger public
ani welfare is not limited to activities local in
‘cope. Early in the history of our dual form of govern-
ment, the question of the exercise of this power, over
interstate commerce arose. The courts have unhesitat
gly decreed that a reasonable exercise of the police
power by the state is valid even though it affects inter-
“ate commerce. The quarantine laws of the states are
{1 example of this power, wherein it has been determined
“hat the states may absolutely prohibit the introduction
to the state of harmful or deleterious articles. These

*

22

-

eases reason that such articles are no longer legitima'-
articles of commerce, and where the facts reasona).”
show that the health, welfare, property or morals of th
citizens of the state will be protected by the exclusion ©
such, the effects of such prohibition upon the intersts’-
commerce are not of suet: a burdensome nature & °
constitute a regulation of commerce by the state # S
prohibited by the Federal Constitution.

Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678:
Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 348:
Plumley v. Mass., 155 U. S. 461:
Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198;
Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52.

This question of regulation is disevssed as follows ©
Gavit’s The Commerce Clause, (page 161):

‘‘ Although the court has used the word ‘regu
tion,’ when applied to state action, it is not
counterpart of ‘regulation’, when used in eonn’
tion with congressional action. It has a broad’
significance; it may include, as we may Sé, e
interference by a state, in any of its capaciti=

‘““That result is in truth wholly inescapable
the immediately exclusive or paramount charac”
of the congressional jurisdiction is posited.
pointed out above, it is necessary fo give to!
word ‘regulation’, when applied to state actiol.
legal content. State pilotage and quarantine law
are, for example, regulations in fact of those
gaged in interstate ecommerce; they ma) be vau
however, because they are not regulations ‘in t
constitutional sense.” That is, the validity of **
action depends, after all, on something more ™
the mere determination that there is or is M0 '
terstate commerce with which the state Is deal:
The solution of the case depends on whether
not it is a lawful ‘regulation’. The pivpe' metl

23

of settling that question is to apply a test of
reasonableness. ”’

At page 186 the question is again discussed as follows:

“The truth is that under the present theory the
-state lavs down almost innumerable rules govern-
- ing the conduct and interests of those engaged in
interstate commerce. The question is, is it a valid
regulation? Most of the tests and reasons given
by the court must be cast aside. The assertion ‘that
‘this is not a regulation of interstate commerce but
an exercise of the police power’ is at best a result
and neither a reason nor a rule. The suggestions
that the state action is either constitutional or un-
eonstitutional depending upon an imperceptible
quality in the ‘silence of Congress’ is the most
facetious argument to which the Supreme Court
has ever stooped. Congress by its action cannot
enlarge or interpret the Constitution. Certainly
its silence has no greater efficacy.

“The tests suggested by some of the cases: is
this a direct or substantial burden on interstate
commerce: is it an unlawful interference; and all
other similar inquiries are misleading and for the
most part unusable. They deal with causations and
connections, with which it is impossible to deal
satisfactorily.

“The truth is that what is done in any given
case is that the interest of those engaged in inter-
state commerce are weighed against the loeal in-
terests embodied in the state action. The test
ought to be that employed in the due process cases.
under all of the circumstances; weighing the local
mterests against the interests of those engaged
in interstate commerce. is the state action reason-
ably justified? Such a test takes the inquiry out of
the darkness of causes, connections. and silence.
mato the light of an intelligent decision and where
in truth the parties are in a position to produce
some evidence for or against the validity of state
action. As has been shown heretofore, there is

eee,

some indication in some of the more recent cas:
that the court has employed some such test. As hi
been suggested heretofore, a“decision of a ca
under the Commerce Clause is pretty much ‘on &
formation and belief,’ but mostly the latter. Tr
test of reasonableness would make it possible t
employ a method of decision which could bette
utilize available information.’’ (Our italics.)

The foregoing adequately shows that the police pow
of the state is sufficiently broad to prohibit or regula
activities touching interstate commerce when such is
sonably necessary for the preservation of the interes:
of the state and its people. These doctrines have bet
repeatedly expounded when courts have considered te
question of the interference with interstate commerce *!
quarantine prohibitions or internal regulations, but hav
not been so fully dealt with when the prohibition §
against the introduction of harmful, deleterious or 4
eased articles into commerce. Such is the precise quest”
we have at hand, coupled with the regclation of the *
ternal traffic in such articles. The legal and factual ™#
sons which prohibit their introduction into the state &
just as applicable and the exigencies of the circumstao™
just as urgent when the harmful or deleterious artt*
destined for interstate commerce is introduced into
commerce within the state. Such exportation neces”!
requires the passage of such articles and their attends”
dangers through some part of the state, thereb? expos!
the citizens and their property to dangers and nuisa™
which the state could prohibit if the dangers arose 4
converse manner, that is, the introduction of such arte
into the state. As concerns the introduction of
articles, it is not a regulation of interstate commere °
prohibit that introduction, and appellee submits, " “
likewise not an illegal or unwarranted regulation 0! ©

terstate commerce to prohibit: the transportation of such
articles cut of the state when such transportation is over
the highwavs of the state, even though a like transporta-
tion is permitted within the: state for limited purposes
only, such as in the ease at hand, a quick disposition of
such articles by licensed, regulated, and inspected haulers
and disposal plants.

Though no exacting authority has been offered for the
preeding statements, precisely the same question was
presented to the Supreme Court in the ease of Sligh v.
Kirkwood, wherein the State of Florida prohibited the ex-
portation of unripe citrus fruit from the state. The court
sustained this action on the ground that such articles
were not legitimate articles of commerce and interstate
commerce was not regulated by state’s action in
prohibiting their exportation. The court in sustaining
this exercise of the police power said:

‘*s © * * Whether it is a valid exercise oi the
police power is the question in the case, and that
power we have defined, as tar as it is capable of
being defined by general words, a number of times.
It is not suseeptible of circumstantial precision. It
extends, we have said, not only to regulations which
Promote the public health, morals, and safety, but
to those which promote the public convenience or
the general prosperity. ... And further, *‘It is the
most essential of powers, at times the most in-
sistent, and always one of the least limitable ot
the powers of government.’’ ° Eubank v. Richmond,
226 U. S. 137, 57 L. Ed. 156, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1123, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76 Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192.

‘The power of the state to prescribe regulations
Which shall prevent the production within its bor-
ders of impure foods, unfit for use, and such
articles as would spread disease and pestilence, is
Well established. Such articles, it has been declared
by this court, are not the legitimate subject of

26

trade or commerce, nor within the protectwa
the commerce clause of the Constitution. ‘Swi
articles are not merchantable; they are not lent
mate subjects of trade and commerce. They ma
be rightly outlawed as intrinsically and dire‘)
the immediate sources and causes of destruction!
human health and life. The self-protecting pow |
of each state, therefore, may be rightfully exer’

against their introduction, and such exercises ©

power cannot be considered regulations of e-
merece prohibited by the Constitution.” Bowman *

Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 489, 31 L.&.
700. 708, 1 Inters. Comm. Rep. 823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep

689, 1062.°" (Our italies.)

ITI.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL COs.
STITUTION DOES NOT PREVENT THE STATE
FROM LEGISLATING ON PURELY LOCAL MATTERS
RELATING TO THE WELFARE, HEALTH A)
SAFETY OF ITS CITIZENS, EVEN IN THOSE MA?
TERS WHERE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN CO”
MERCE IS AFFECTED. THIS IS ESPECIALLY
TRUE WHERE CONGRESS HAS NOT OCCUPIED TH
FIELD COVERED BY THE STATE LAW

In the Minnesota rate case, 230 U.S. 352 on page #
the court discusses the limitations between the powers -
a state over its internal affairs and the authority
Congress. Speaking of the permissive exercise of POF
appropriate to a state although interstate commerce ™
be affected, the court says:

‘*But within these limitations there necessa™-
remains to the States, until Congress acts, 2 ¥**
range for the permissible exercise of power ap?
priate to their territorial jurisdiction although *
terstate commerce may be affected. It extends *
those matters of a local nature as to whieh it =

27

impossible to derive from the constitutional grant
an intention that they should go uncontrolled pend-
ing Federal interventien. Thus, there are certain
subjects having the most obvious and direct rela-
tion to interstate commerce, which fevertheless,
with the aequiescence of Congress, have t2en con-
trolied by state legislation from the.foundation of
the Government because of the necessity that they
should not remain unregulated and that their regu-
lation should be adapted to varying local exigen-
eies; hence, the absence of regulation by Congress
in such matters has not imported that there should
be no restriction’ but rather that the States should
continue to supply the needed rules until Congress
should decide=#o supercede them. Further, it is
competent for a State to govern its internal com-
merce, to provide local improvements, to create
and regulate local facilities, to adopt protective
measures of a reasonable character in the interest
of the health, safetly, morals and welfare of its
people, although interstate commerce may inci-
dentally or indirectly be invelved. Our system of
goverament is a practical adjustment by which the
national authority as conferred by the Constitu-
tion is maintained in its full scope without un-
“Recesgary loss of local efficiency. Where the sub-
jectis peculiarly one of local concern, and from its
nature belongs to the class with which the State
appropriately deals in making reasonable provi-
sion for local needs, it cannot be regarded as left
to the unrestrained will of individuals because
Congress has not acted, although it may have such
@ relation to interstate commerce as to be within
- the reach of the Federal power.”’

The court then gives illustrations where Congress had
reeogmized the propriety of local action and on page 406
the court further says:

sé - ° .
Quarantine regulations are essential measures
of protection which the States are free to adopt

28

when they do not come into conflict with Feden
action. In view of the need of conforming swt
measures to locul conditions, Congress from ti
beginning has been content to leave the matter,
for the most part, notwithstanding its vast impr
tance, to the States and has repeatedly acquiese!
in the enforcement of state laws. (Act of Februat;
25, 1799, c. XII, 1 Stat. 619, R. S., See. 4797; Act «
April 29, 1878,#. Stat. 37; Act of Februar
15, 1893, ¢c. 114; Stat..449.) Such laws undout
edly operate n interstate and foreign commer.
They could not be effective otherwise. They canne
of. course, be made the cover for discrimination
and arbitrary enactments having no reasouabi
relation to health (Hannibal & St. J. Railroad (
v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 472, 473); but the powe
of the State to take steps to prevent the introdu
tion or spread of disease, although interstate al
foreign ecommerce are involved (subject to
paramount authority of Congress if it decides '
assume control), is beyond question.”

IV.

IN DETERMINING WHETHER A ‘STATE STATUT

IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL BURDEN ON INTE

STATE COMMERCE THE PROPER TEST TO #

APPLIED IS THAT OF HE REASONABLENESS 0!
THE STATUTE

In its inquiry as to the reasonableness of a statute, &
courts will consider the object and the necessity of the

law and whether, in the light of all of the circumstance

the provisions of the statute are clearly unreasonabé

If the provisions are reasonable, the statute is not an &
warranted regalation of interstate commerce in the

stitutional sense.
in ‘*The Commerce Clause,.’’ Gavit, Section 12%

author observes that this court has laid down no stands

29

as to when a state action was or was not an invalid
regulation of interstate commerce. The author then states
that recent cases suggest the ‘‘test of reasonableness.”’
The author says:

‘For example, Justice Harland said this:'

‘We know from the face of the statute that it
has a real, substantial relation to an object as to
which the state is competent to legislate, namely,
the personal security of those who are pas-
sengers on cars used within its limits.’

And a short time later? in a case involving the
stoppage of interstate trains the same Justice talks
throughout the entire opinion about the state action
being a reasonable regulation under the circum-
stances. In Smith v. St. Louis, etc., Ry.? Justice
McKenna upheld a state quarantine law because
it was a ‘reasonable precaution.’

‘“‘In the more recent cases involving the validity
of a license tax against a telephone or telegraph
company for the use of the streets, and for the
cost of inspection, the decision has generally turned
on whether or not the charge was ‘reasonable’.
And alse in the more recent cases involvinng ine
validity of a state regulation as to the stoppage
or furnishing of trains or ears, the court has
talked about the ‘reasonable necessity’ for the reg-
ulation.®
‘Khe case of Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. v. Arkansas®
is decided indiscriminately under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause, and in it
Justice Harlan says this,’

ee
= New York, N. H., etc., R. v. New York, 165 U. S.'628, 632 (1897).
Jn Lake Shore M. S. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 (1899).
‘181 U. S. 248 (1901).
Atlantic & P. T. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160 (1903).
‘1 lantic Coast Line R. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328 (1907).
"219 U.S. 453 (1911).
At p. 466. |

30

‘Under the evidence, there is admittedly wm
room for controversy as to whether the statue
* is or was necessary; but it cannot be said that:
is so unreasonable as to justify the court in al
judging that it is merely -an arbitrary exer
of power and not germane to the objects whic
evidently the state legislature had in view.’

‘‘In Savage v. Jones,® in upholding a state feo!
inspection act Justice Hughes said,

‘The evident purpose is to prevent fraud * **
Its requirements are directed to that end, am
they are not unreasonable.’

And in Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope’ Justice Vx
Devarter held invalid conditions imposed upon tle
right to sue for the price of goods sold in interstat:
commerce because

‘They have no natural or reasonable relative
to the right to sue which they are intended ©
restrict.’

While in sustaining the validity of a state aute
mobile license as against a non-residence, Justi
McReynolds said,?

‘The reasonableness of the state’s action >
always subject to inquiry insofar as it affec’
interstate commerce.’

In Public U. C. vr. Landon® the same Juste
said,

“The receivers might sell and deliver ga ~
transported to local distributing companies ft
from unreasonable interference by the state.

Again in South Covington, etc., Ry. v. Keutucky-
he sustained a Jim-Crow Statute because its effe'

*225 U. S. 501, 524 (1912).
*235 U. S. 197, 205 (1914).
*In Hendrick v. Md., 235 U. S. 610, 622 (1915).
*249 U. S. 236, 245 (1919).
*252 U. S. 399, 404 (1920).

31

—— ~ 7
~~

on interstate commerce was only ‘incidental’ and
not ‘unreasonable’.

“In Davis 2. Farmers Coop. Eq. Co.,' Justice
Brandeis said of a statute imposing judicial juris-
diction over a foreign corporation common carrier,

= ; . .
‘By reqtring from interstate commerce gen-
eral submission to suit, it unreasonably obstructs
and unduly burdens, interstate commerce.’

And in Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman,’ Jus-
tice Sutherland said this:

‘It is enough to say that the statutes now
assailed are not aimed at- interstate commerce,
do not impese a direct burden upon such com-
merce, make no discrimination against it, are
fairly within the range of the police power of
the state, bear a reasonable relation to the legiti-
mate purpose of the enactment, and do not con-
flict with any congressional legislation. Under
the cireumstances they are not invalid because
they may incidentally affect interstate commerce.

‘There is therefore some support in the language
of the cases for the proposition that after all the
test here is whether or not state action under all
the circumstances is reasonable. The court is
really engaged in weighing the reasonable necessity
for state regulation of action which takes place
within the confines of the state, as against its rea-
sonable ‘or unreasonable effect on interstate com-
merce.’’

Dead animal bodies are not a legitimate article of com-
merce. They may under some circumst&nces have a value.
Tke owner may remove and sell the-+hide. That is provided
for in the statute (Appendix ‘‘A*’ See. 12). Value is a
relative word. In this ease, the appellant bought an article
which he knew he had no right to transport over the

netics

‘282 U. s. 233° 317° (1923).
266 U. Ss. 497, 503 (1925).

public roads or reduee to his possession. Such di
bodies decompose quickly. (Ree. P. 19, Stip. 5.) If ar
property rights exist in such a thing, they are so hedg
around with regulations that they have no recognim
measure of value. It is not a commodity that may &
' transported by rail. The law takes note of it only to #
that it is straightway disposed of or otherwise abated
There is no established course of busi: ass in commere
between the states in such a thing.

Under the police power the state may deprive at
owner of any property, even without any compensation.
where essential ‘to the public welfare. All control av
use of any property by an owner thereof or of his age
is impressed with the dominant police power of the st
at all times and all places.

In one of the late Justice Cardozo’s opinions (Baldw
v. Seeling, 294 U. S. 511), he was discussing a New Yor
law which interfered with the sale of milk (wholesom
milk) from another state. The opinion ruled that t
statuie placed an inllegal embargo on milk carried #
interstate commerce, but in the course of his opinion *
learned Justice said, (we omit the citatiors):

‘*Subject to the paramount power of Congr’
a state may regulate the importation of unbealtb!
swine or cattle. Things such are not proper ev
‘jects of commerce, and there is no unreasonab*
interference when they are inspected and exclude
So a state may protect its inhabitants aga
fraudulent substitution, by deceptive coloring ©
otherwise, of ‘one article for another. It may =
protection to travelers against the danger of
crowded hghways and protection to its resides
against unnecessary noises. None of these stata
—inspection laws, game laws, laws intended ”
eurb fraud or exterminate disease—approach e

33

drastic quality the statute here in controversy
which would neutralize the economic consequence
of free trade among the states.’’

We cannot believe that the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution was ever designed to permit the
transportation of the body of a dead animal! out of a state
upon the theory that it was a commodity entitled to move
in legitimate commerce and to that extent was not amena-
ble to the police power of a state.

In this ease it is important to note that the statute
should be considered along with the authority of the State
of Indiana over its highways.

A state owns, maintains, and has a right to contro!
its public highways.

Stevenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 264.
Kelly v. Finney, 207 Ind. 567.

It may condition or exclude motor earriers for hire
from the roads, even those moving in legitimate inters‘ate
‘ommeree. In the case of Bradley v. Public Service ( om-
mssion of Ohio. 289 U. S. 92, the question at issue was
the right of a state to protert its highways and those
wing them in the usual way from truck traffic over high
"ays already conjested. The case of Buck v. Kuykendall,
i U. S. 307, from the State of Washington, was relied
spon by an interstate truck operecor, but this court «is
‘nguished the Buck case by ruling that the primary
Purpose of that law which would have excluded interstate
moter carriers from the State of Washington was not
the promotion of safety but that the law was designed
2 favor intrastate vehicles as against interstate competi-
ton. As to that situation, this court in the Bradley case

3

‘*In dealing with the problem of safety of te
highways as in other problems of motor transprr
tation, the State may adopt measures which fave
vehicles used solely in the business of their owe
as distinguished from those which are operate
for hire by carriers who use the highways as ther
place of business.’’

The court there held that the state commission mist
deny an interstate as well as an intrastate carrier t
right to travel over its highways if such denial had fe
its purpose the safety of the highways and those entitle
to use them.

More recently in the ease of South Carolina, ete. *.
Barnwell Bros., 58 S. Ct. 510, it was held that the state
regulatory measures providing for the weight and ar
of vehicles that move over the highways were within th
legislative power of the state. In that case this cour
said:

‘“*From the beginning it has been reeognized the
a State ean, if it sees fit, build and maintain Its
own highways, canals, and railroads, and that ©
the absence of congressional action, their regv*
tion is peculiarly within its competence. ev#
though interstate commerce is materially affectet
Minnesota rate cases; Simpson v. Shephard, 2
U. S. 352, 416. Congress not acting, state reguls
tion of intrastate carriers has been upheld regat
less of its effect upon interstate commerce. Wit
respect to the extent and volume of the local ©
terests to be protected. and the unavoidable effe’
upon interstate and intrastate alike, regulatit
of the use of the highways are akin to local re
lation of rivers, harbors, piers, and docks, quat®™
tine regulations and game laws. which, Congt
not acting, have been sustained, even though the:
materiaily interfere with interstate commerce.’

35

The State of Indiana maintains that it was within the
power of its Legislature to enact a law which would
regulate and control the traffic over its highways of the
bodies of dead animals not intended for food even though
the law required the disposal of the body within the State
and operated to prevent the transportation of the body
into another state.

V.

THE RECORD OF THIS APPEAL CONTAINS FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE DECISION OF THE STATE
SUPREME COURT. THE FACTS SHOW THAT THE
PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE WERE ENACTED
UNDER THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE AND
THAT THE STATUTE IN ITS APPLICATION DOES
HOT WORK AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN UPON
INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The stipulated facts are that the appellant was trans-
porting a dead animal not slaughtered for food over the
public highways of Indiana destined for the State of Lli-
seis. He had no license or permit or other authority to
transport such body as required by the statute. It is stipu-
lated that decomposition comes quickly to such bodies and
unless they are disposed of, noxious odors will be pro-
dued. (Rec. P. 18, Stip. 1 to 6); that a majority of ant-
nals die from a contagious or infectious disease some of
whieh are transmissible to man (Ree. P. 19, Stip. 6). Such
diseases ancl hog cholera may be spread through drippings
from vehieles used to transport the body. The germs spor-
date and survive for a long period under certain condi
tops. (Rev. P. 19, Stip. 7). When the transportation 1s
Properly done and the vehicles are sterilized, the spread

of disease and also the carrying of disease by flies is mi
mized. (Ree. P. 20, Stip. 8).
The state has licensed 38 disposal plants which are di

tributed over the state so that all bodies may be prompt
disposed of under state supervision. (Rec. P. 2). Stip $

37

The State of Indiana maintains that the statute chal-
lnged in this appea! is a reasonable police regulation
intended to correct a serious evil that can not be dealt
vith in a less drastic way. The law bears a reasonabie
relation to its deelared purpose, that is to prevent the
spread of animal diseases and to protect public health and
property. There is in this ease no question of due process
or the confiscation of property.

The single question presented is whether or not the stat-
ute in its operation violates the commerce clause of the
Federa! Constitution to the injury of appellant Clason.

The statute has to do with a thing that can hardly be
called a legitimate subject of commerce. We believe that
it meets the test of reasonableness when its possible effect
2 interstate commerce is considered. The surveillance of
its highways has always been regarded as a matter within
the exelusive province of the state government. The states,
2 @ sense, guarantee to those using the highways that
they are reasonably safe whether the user is driving 4
‘irove of livestock or operating a modern automobile. The
‘atute simply set up a sort of quarantine to stop the
‘aphazari transportation of dead animal bodies over
‘tate roads and te prevent the return into the state of
itaminated vehicles from some anknown source over
which the state has no control.

The statute occupies a field into which Congress has not
‘tered and, considering the practical results from an
‘nforeement of the law, it can hardly be regarded as
induly burdensome to interstate commerce.

We suggest in conclusion an observation of Justice

Holmes :

38

**Constitutions are intended to preserve prac
and substantial rights, not to maintain theories”

Davis v. Mauls, 194 U. S. 451, 457.

Respectfully submitted.

(mer STOKES JACKSON.
Attorney General of Indu

Rexe_t A. Boyp,
Deputy Attorney General,

Urnsas C. Stover,
Deputy Attorney General.

Epwarp H. Kwieurt,
Harry M. Stitie, Jr.,
Counsel for Appellee.
February, 1939.

39

APPENDIX ‘‘A’’
Cuapres 278.
(H. 258. Approved March 12, 1937.]

\N ACT to control animal diseases and to regulate the transportation
and disposal of the bodies of dead animals; providing penalties for
its violation; repealing certain specific acts and all other laws and
parts of laws in conflict therewith; and fixing « time when this
act shall take effect.

Secnox 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of
the State of Indiana, That it is hereby declared to be the
pablie policy of the State of Indiana. acting through its
rneral assembly, to control and regulate the transporta-
ton over the highways of this state and the disposal of
the eareasses of dead animals, not slaughtered and in-
vnded for human food, to the end that the spread ot
animal diseases in this state shall be controlled and also
that the public health and welfare of the citizens of this
sate shall be conserved and protected against dangers,
tanovaners and nuisances that might arise from such car-
‘asses and from such transportation and disposal thereof,
f the same be not required by law: and this act is
iesigned to effectuate such purposes and public policy.
‘arough the exercise of the police powers of the state.
This act shall he liberally construed to effect such policy
and to promote such objects.

Persons—Things—Trausactions Exempt.

NEC, 2. Nothing containe| in this act shal] apply to or
feet laffect] any of the following persons, maiters, oF
‘erations, to-wit:

(a) To any person slaughtering.butchering. manutac-
‘amng. or selling. in any manner. any anima! flesh and
wreduets, where such animals are killed for the purpose of
wing wel solely for human consumption, or to persons
‘“aagel in transporting and disposing of the dead bodies

we

of any such animals so killea or of any parts or prodws |
thereof to any person solely for such purpose and we.

(b) To any person transporting, disposing of, or
ing the hides or skins of animals;; or tanning such bi
or skins for himself or other persons.

{e) To any bodies of dead fowls, birds, fish, reptiles. *
small animals of any kind, such as dogs, cats and sm!
game.

(d) To any governmental agency, collecting. transper:
ing, or disposing of the bodies of any dead animals in a
manner.

No provisions of any other laws or ordinances rm
lating any of the persons, matters or vocations afores#
shall be affected or repealed by this act.

Meaning of Terms.

Sec. 3. That, as used in this act, unless a differe
meaning is required by the context and may be necess#7
to effectuate the purpose of this act, the following &
nitions shall apply:

Person.

(a) The term ‘“‘person”’ shall inelude individuals ©
either sex, firms, co-partnerships, associations. joint ¥&
tures and corporations, of all kinds and places of ™*
denee, or any other group or combination acting in ©
cert; and the plural, as well as the singular number: &
whether acting as a principal, trustee, receiver. or a8 2
other kind of legal or personal representative: or #3
successor in interest, assign, agent, factor, servant, ©
ployee, director, officer, or any other representative of 8
such person.

Gender.

(b) The masculine gender shall include the femiat
and neuter genders- and the singular number shall ine
the plural number as to all words and phrases.

41

Disposal Plant.

(ce) The term ‘‘disposal plant,”’ or ‘‘plant,’’ shall
apply to and include any plant and*all the equipment
thereof described or referred to in any section of this act,
that is constructed and intended to be operated for the
disposal of the bodies of dead animals by means either of
hrving. or burning, or cooking, or other method herein
preseribed, or hereafter provided for by law and not
wtherwise defined: and shall also include all substations
of any such plant that are used in connection with such
business solely for the temporary deposit or storage of
such dead bodies that are transported thereto by a licensee
pending final delivery thereof to any such disposal plant:
and saal! also include all vehicles and equipment thereof
wed by a licensee for the transportation of such bodies to
such plant for their disposal therein in any manner herein

presertbed.
ate Veterinarian.

(d) The term ‘*state veterinarian’’ shall mean the offi-
‘er now designated by statute under such name; and in the
erent of any subsequent change of such title, or duties, it
shall be deemed to refer to and mean the particular official
or body of this state designated by statute to succeed to
and perform either the same or similar duties required
mder this act: or if not so designated by statute, the gov-
*mnor shal] designate some official for such purposes.

Disposal Plant—Operation—License for—Unlawful Acts.

Sec. 4. (a) No person shall engage in this state in
the business of operating a disposal plant, as herein
!, without first obtaining for each such disposal
plant so operated by him, or in his behalf, a license and
ay vehicle certificates required, as herein provided; and
20 person. except one holding a license to operate such a
plant in this state, or who is acting for such

, Or who is otherwise excepted by this act, shall
either transport over any highways of this state, or dis-

42

pose of to any person, the bodies of any dead animals i
any manner herein prescribed, or in any other manner tw:
permitted by law.

State Veterinarian—Record.

(b) The said state veterinarian shall keep a recori «
all applications for permits, licenses and vehicle cert?
cates, showing all thereof issued, denied, or revoked !
him, and such other facts as he may prescribe.

Acts Constituting Violations of Act.

Sec. 5. Any person, except one holding a license "’
operate such a disposal plant in this state, or who is acti?
for such licensee, or who is otherwise excepted by this a
who shall advertise either in any newspaper having 8 g&
eral circulation in any county of this state, wherescev*
published, or in any manner by written, printed, typed ""
painted matter of any character, or by signs or any kin!
of other devises, whereby he shall indicate that he }
engaged in transporting and disposing of dead animals"
any manner and for any purpose not excepted in this at:
or who shall obtain from any other person, by purchase “
otherwise, the body of any such dead animal. in whole “
in any part, for the purpose of transporting the same ov
any highway of this state and of disposing cf the cares
or the hide, skin, grease, or other products, of such de:
animal, to any person or by any method designated .
effect a profit therefrom for himself, shall be guilty ™
violating this act, and shall be subject to all the penalte
of this act.

License—Application for—Contents—Fee.

Sec. 6. Any person desiring a license to engage or ©
tinue in such business under this act, shall file an applic
tion for such license with the state veterinarian. on a for
provided by him without charge, which application si#
set forth the name and residence of the applicant, tH
location of his place of business, the particular method. °

43

methods, which he intends to employ, or is employing, in
the transportation and in the disposal of the bodies of
such dead animals; the number and location of all sub-
stations he desires to operate, if any; the number and kind
of vehicles he will use; and such other essential informa-
tion relative thereto as such officer, by his rules and regu-
lations, may require. Such application shall be accom-
vanied by an initial installment of $100.00 on the total
anual license fee, to apply upon the expenses imposed by
this act: Provided, however, That any person, now having
or operating a disposal plant, with or without any sub-
‘ations, and holding an annual license therefor, under
etisting law, shall be entitled to continue such operation
util the date such license expires; but not later than
thirty days prior to such date of expiration, he must apply
for a license under this act, and pay the fees as herein
provided, if he desires to continue such business, without
interruption, and thereby he shall have a right so to con-
tmue under his old license, by paying all annual fees, at
the rates fixed by this act, until his new license under this
ut shall be granted, or if refused, until any such refusal
tall be finally sustained upon any appeal taken by him
‘rm such decision.

license—A pplicant—Investigation.

See. 7. (a) Upon receipt of such apolication, the
“ale veterinarian, or some person appointed and desig-
uted by him, shall, within thirty days, if the applicant
thea is or has been the holder of a license under any prior
‘iatute m the conduct of an established business of such
ind in this state, inspect the plant as herein defined, and
‘he locality where such applicant is conducting or pro-
hss to conduct such business, and shal! ascertain

rt or not such applicant is a responsible and suitable
Frson, financially and otherwise, to be entrusted with a
to conduct such business, and that he has fulfilled

“eomplied with the requirements of all the sections of

act and of the rules and regulations herein authorized
“lating to such business.

44

License—Issuance—When.

(b) If such state veterinarian shall find that sueh ap
plicant is such a responsible and suitable person to ¢0t-
duct such business, and that the disposal plant of such ap
plicant, as herein defined, and the methods of operatio
thereof comply with all the provisions of this act and with
the rules and regulations herein authorized, and that sud
business is located in a place permitted by this act, he
shall thereupon issue to such applicant a certificate to that
effect. Thereupon such applicant shall pay to said stat
veterinarian the farther and final installment. of $50.00 for
said annual license fee and said state veterinarian shal
issue to such applicant a license and four vehicle certii
eates and metal discs bearing the applicant’s name and |:
cense number, one of which dises shall be attached to eat
vehicle so used, which license shall entitle him to operat
one disposal plant and which certificates shall entitle hit
to operate not more than four vehicles for transportitg
bodies in such business; Provided, however, That for eatt
such additional vehicle the licensee desires to operate lt
shall pay an additional annual fee of $5.00 and procure #
additional vehicle certificate and dise, and for each substi
tion located elsewhere than on the grounds of the dispos!
plant he shall pay an additional annual license fee “!
$20.00 and procure a substation license: and Providel
further, That the full annual license and other fees spe
fied in this act shall be paid for any licenses and vebit!
certificates issued in any year on or prior to June 30, al
one-half of all such fees shall be paid for the first yeat ft!
any such license or vehicle certificate issued in any Ye
after June 30.

Lice E . tion.

(ec) All licenses and vehicle certificates issued unde
this act shall remain effective until and unless voluntatll
surrendered, or suspended or revoked, as provided in this
act; conditioned, however, upon payment to the state ve
erinarian on or before January 15 of each calendar ye
subsequent to the year of issue, of the required tot

annual license and other fees herein provided for and
specified, as aforesaid, which payment shall operate, with-
out further application, to continue such licenses and
vehicle certificates in full effect during each calendar year
for which such license and other fees shall be paid, unless
sooner surrendered, or suspended or revoked, as herein
provided. .

—" of Plant — When — Additional Inspections —

Sec. 8. (a) Whenever the state veterinarian, by his
frst inspection of the applieant’s plant, as herein pro-
vided, shall find that the applicant has not complied with
ali the requirements: of this act and of sueh rules and
regulations, he shall at onee notify the applicant in
*riting, delivered in person or by registered mail, with
return receipt, specifying the particulars of such failure
to comply therewith and of any further objections he may
have. Upon heing notified in like manner by the applicant
in writing of such compliance and that such plant con-
forms to the requirements of this act and of such rules
and regulations, the state veterinarian shall, within ten
days, make a similar second inspection thereof, but shall
not be required to make more than two of the aforesaid
initial inspections of the same plant under one application
and the original payment of fees, unless he so desires.
one or two inspections additional to the second inspection
are desired by the applicant in effecting a compliance by
him with the requirements of this act, such applicant shall
request the same in writing and pay in adyance additjonal
Inspection fees of $25.00 for each such inspectign so
requested by him; but for any further such inspections he
shall pay a fee of $100.00 each.

Peee—Disposition.

_{b) In the event such applicant shall be refused a
tse and such refusal be finally sustained upon any

appeal, no part of the fees paid by him shall be refunded,

all thereof shall belong to the Stat. of Indiana, as a

part of its general fund.
ee

4

46

Disposal Plants—New or Reconstructed—License—Api
cation—Contents—Fees.

Sec. 9. (a) Any person not owning or in control ¢
and now operating an established plant, but desiring »
engage in such business and to construct a new plamt, «
reconstruct and re-open a plant previously closed, se
first file with the state veterinarian, on a form furnish
without charge by him, an application for a permit f¢
such purpose, with such information as may be require.
together with a set of detailed plans and specifications fer
the plant so proposed to be constructed or reconstracte
and shall also pay therewith to the state veterinarian
fee of one hundred dollars to cover the additional expem*
of investigating and passing upon such application and ©
the initial payment upon the license fee, if granted &
denied. Such applicant shall also set out a general st’
ment of his proposed plan and method of operating *
business and said plant, and shal! show that it is propo
to be located or continued in a place permitted by this #¢
Said state veterinarian is authorized to submit such pis
and specifications and other information to any qualife
architects and engineers employed in any other depar
ment of the state government, or if necessary, to sabe
the same to any such qualified person not employed bs
the state and to pay the latter out of the fee aforesaié!
sum not exceeding $100.00 for examining such plans &
specifications and advising him whether the same comp:
with the provisions of this act. The aforesaid initial &
finai payments shall be made regardless of the time in #
year such application shall be filed.

Veterinarian—Inspection—License—Fee.

(b) If the state veterinarian shall find that such app*
cant is a responsible and suitable person to conduct #0
business and that such plans and specifications and Pp
posed method and place of conducting such a -
ply with all the recairements of this act and of s rales
and regulations, h2 shall thereupon issue to such applic”
a permit to coustruct or reconstruct such plant. Upon the

47

completion of such plant and before the same is placed in
operation, such applicant shall notify the state veteri-
marian thereof, who shall thereupon make the same kind
of inspections as are provided aforesaid for existing
“s‘ablished plants, and in all respects the procedure estab-
lished for such inspections and the issuance of a license.
vith the payment of the additional installment of $50.00
for the annual license fee and any reqaired additional fees
iy sueh applicant, shall apply, and the license shall be
either issued or denied in the same manner and subject
toll the other provisions of this act; ercept that for each
subsequent year the annual license and other fees shall be
the same as for similar existing licensed plants.

New Plants—Location.

Sec. 10. (a) No such new plant shall be located or
enstructed, or any discontinued plant reconstructed or
reopened, at any place in this state inside of, or within
'wo miles of the nearest point of the corporate limits of
any ity or town; nor within one mile of the nearest boun-
dary of the lands then owned or controlled in connection
cither with any state, county, township, city, or town park,
or boulevard; or of any public school or hospital; or of
any charitable, religious or educational institution.

Existing Plant—Destruction—Reconstruction Prohibited—

(b) In the event that any existing disposal plant shall
have heen or may be hereafter destroyed in any manner,
«xeept during the war, to the extent of at least two-thirds
: the operating portion thereot. the same shall not be
cor eetenee and such site shall not be again used for
af purpose, if it be located in or within the distance

oresaid from any of the places or objects designated in
this section.

Dead Animals—Hauling—License.

Bhs ll. (a) No person, except as herein provided.
y haul or transport over the highways of the State of

rd

a8

Indiana the bodies of any dead animals, except those tt
have been slaughtered and are intended for human fone,
without first obtaining and holding a license issued wie
the provisions of this act and which bodies are ae
transported to a disposal! plant located in this stay af
operated by a person holding a license to engage in =
business.

Hauling —License—Qualification.

(b) No license shal! be issued to any person solely ‘#
the purpose of transporting the bodies of dead anmmas
but such transportation must be done solely by persm
holding a license for disposal plants, so that such él
bodies may be properly and promptly disposed of wis
the requirements of this act; except that any public ofied
of this state, charged by law with such duties, may rem®
or supervise the removal of any such dead bodies ani ®
disposa! thereof by any method provided for by ths #
where necessary to protect the publie health and well

Hauling—Vehicles Used in—Specifications.

(c) All vehicles used in the transportation of 2
bodies of dead animals, under the provisions of this #
shall have a tank or metal lining in the bed of
vehicle, or be otherwise so constructed that the same “
be practically watertight, so that no drippings or seem?
from such dead bodies shall escape from such vehie#
where this can be obviated; and all vehicles must hav #
end-gate constructed or lined with the sam. mater®
and hinged at the bottom and fastened firmly at th ™
when closed and so designated, so far as practical, of
drippings and seepings shall not escape from such pat”
said vehiele while engaged in such transportation: *
every such vehicle shall have a bed of such depth @
type of construction and equipment that any dead bel *
bodies therein shall be completely hidden from vie* *
persons using the highways and any public nuisance **

ated while being transported.

ate Veterinarian — Additiona] Regulations — Authoriza-
won.

id) The state veterinarian may prescribe specific and
iso additional requirements, not inconsistent with the
provisions and purposes of this act, governing and regu-
ating such transportation and the construction, equip-
nent. maintenance and operation of such vehicles.

Vehieles—Cleansing—Disinfection.

fe) After the bodies of dead animals have been un-
waded from any vehicle used for the transportation
thereof to the disposal plant, on each trip, such vehicle
and all parts thereof, and in the event draught animals
are used to draw such conveyances, the feet of such ani-
mals, shall he thoroughly cleansed and disinfected in such
manner and with sneh a solution as the state veterinarian
tall preseribe- by regulation, and in addition thereto all
th vehicles shall he washed out thoroughly with steam
hot water after each use thereof in transporting such

dead bodies.

lodies of Diseased Animals-—Hauling—Driver—Duty.

(f} Vehicles, when loaded with the body of an animal
which has died of disease, shall be driven directly to the
place of disposal, except that the driver may stop on the
tichway for other like dead bodies, but he shall not drive
ton the premises of any person unless he first obtains
Permission of such person and he shall avoid creating
4* nuisance during such transportation and in the event
me, drippings or seepage should escape from such vehicle.
* his knowledge, he shall clean up the same and remedy
‘wh eseape, if possible to do so.

Dad Animals Bodies— Duty of Owners or Persons
Caring For.

; Sec. 12. No person owning or caring for any anima!
‘at has died from any cause shall allow the body to lie
“out his premises. Any such body shall be disposed of by

50

such person within twenty-four hours after knowledge ¢
such death, either to a person licensed under this at ®
dispose of it, as herein provided for disposal plants: ©
by the owner or person entitled to such body causing i
same to be buried within that time upon his own or a
other available premises, where the transportation of sul
body along any highway of this state is not required. Ast
such burial shall be so done as not to produce a nuisai.
and such body shall be buried to such a depth that »
part thereof shall be nearer than four feet to the natura
surface of the ground and every part of such body stall
be covered with at least four feet of earth in addition ®
any other materials that may be used for that purpe
Provided, however, That any person so owning oF ©
trolling any dead animal. that has not died of a contagi
disease, shall have the right to remove the hide or sa
thereof on his own premises before burying such bods 8
herein prescribed, but such skinning must be done and 3
disposition of such hide, or skin and body must be made’
a manner that will avoid the creation of any nuisance. }
body of any dead animal shall be hereafter burned |
cooked, or otherwise disposed of, except by burial s
this section provided, at any place in this state excep:
a disposal plant licensed as provided in this act:
may be otherwise excepted by this act. Nothing conta®
in this act shall be so construed as to prevent any per
residing outside of the corporate limits of any city
town, from disposing of the dead bodies of animals hele:
ing to such person, by burning or burying suck &
animals on the premises of such owner. Provided. farth
That no person shali bury or burn the body of any +
animal within the corporate limits of any city or ™
where the same is prohibited by law or ordinance.

Disposal Plants—Specifications.

Sec. 13. No disposal plant shall be deemel a sa
or sanitary place for disposing of the hodies of dead |
mals by any process of cooking or burning. unless
conforms to the following minimum specificatiors:

51

Buiding.
(s) The building must have four (4) walls complete
and be provided with concrete or cement floors and with
oud drainage and be thoroughly sanitary in construction
wd maintenance; and any sewage, drainage, oF waste
exter of any kind, if of an offensive or obnoxious char-
wer or odor, detrimental to haman, animal, agricultura!
aquatic life, or that may constitute a public nuisance,
¢all not be permitted to eseape therefrom until first
treated as herein specified. All sewage, drainage, or waste
rater must first pass through a septic tank or a filter bed
recovered settling pool, that will destroy all infection
terein before passing therefrom and must not thereafter.
tiany time, empty or pass into any body of water, or any
cream other than a running stream, or if emptying upon
te groond. on the premises of said plant, it must be
thsorhed hy the soil and not be allowed to collect in open
mols, or in any other manner so as to create a public

vusance.

Equipment.

(b) All such plants must be properly equipped and
erated with steel tanks, enclosed dryers and cold water
tndensers. and on and after January 1, 1940, all bodies
dull be reduced only by steam cooking in all plants
operating in this state: except in emergencies, where
tuning may he permitted under regulations prescribed
therefor by the state veterinarian.

Tanks.

(e) All tanks shall be airtight. except proper escape=
oF live steam, passing through the tanks during cooking.
rhich steam shall be condensed by use of cold water con-
densers. All such equipment shall be so eonstrued [con-
“meted! and maintained as to prevent any avoidable
‘ape of odors into the air.

52

Dry Rendering.

(d) If a method of dry rendering is used, the |
and discharge doors of the vessels shall be of a trp
gaskets, with the doors drawn tight with bolts
such gaskets, and with packing boxes around the ag
shafts. and with vent for drawing off condensate |
eonstructed that the discharge shall be condensed
use of cold water condensers of sufficient capacity.
with all thereof and every other part and opening I
equipment so constructed and maintained that there
be no avoidable eseape of odors into the air.

Disposal of Bodies—Time Limit— Exceptions.

(e) All skinning and dismembering of bodies shal ®
done within such building and in such manner and s%
be so kept therein that no unnecessary annoyance sha}
caused other persons by the conditions oT :
appearance of such bodies of any parts and cont
thereof: and all such bodies and all parts and conte
thereof, shal] be disposed of within twenty - four h¢
after delivery to such plant, by some method herein
fied: except where rendered impossible by aceider’
other casualty preventing the operation of the plast.
except where some epidemic or act of God has caused ®
hodies to be accumulated than can be reasonably dis™
of within such period of time by the continuous opers:
of the plant; in any of wh'.h events the plant sha
placed in operation as soon 45 possible and sha.
operated continuously until all bodies are disposed 0

Burning—Regulations.

(f) In the event any bodies, or parts thereof. 3
posed of at sach plant at any time by burnin. the ?
and equipment used therefor shall he so located.
structed, arranged, maintained and operated tha!
avoidable odors will escape inte the air: and all por
of such bodies not so entirely consumed, oT that ms
otherwise left undisposed of, shall be buried. a5
provided.

of Bodies—Duty.

iz) In the event @*y hodies, or parts of bodies. are
posed of at said plant by burying the
, done in the same manner and period ©
wring the same a5 is provided in this act suc
gh barial by the owner or person controlling sue
oror to dispnsition thereof to any such plant.

Sumace Prohibited.

) Such disposal plant
crated and maintained an
sndueted at all times as not
«sarily a public nuisance.

same. this shall
f time after
+h {for}
h bodies

shall be se situated. con-
a all operations therein s°
to ereate and continue unnec-

Rules and Reguiations—Effective—Wnen
Sec. 14. The state veterinarian shall make. publish and

aforee sach reasonable rules and regulations relating to

orb disposal plants and dead bodies and all matters con-
advisable and whieh are

teted therewith. as he may deem

ot meonsistent with any of the provisions of this act. All
ah rules and reculations shall be in writing OF printed
ind two copies thereof shall be sent to each person holding
r receiving a license under this act. also to the clerk ot
“ch county in this state, whieh rules shall be forthwith
spread of record and properly indexed for reference there-
im and no such rule or regulation. or any subsequent
‘anges therein. shall be effective unti! ten days after
wh eopies shall have been mailed to the last of such

“anty elerks and to each such licensee. a record of which
sailing shall he entered by such state veterinarian 01 his
lations shall have the forer

eords. Such rules and regu
wd effect of law and all perse
this act shall obey and comply

ns within the provisions ot
therewith.

Rae Veterinarian—Plants—Inspection of—Duty.

rson or by anyone
plant and placer

h vear. and as

See. 15. The state veterinarian. in pe
authorized by him. shall inspect each
lensed under this act at least once eac

54

often as he may deem necessary, and shal! see that
heensees and all other persons comply with this act a
conduct such basiness in conformity to this act and to
rules and regulations made and published by him pursuz
thereto.

Licenses—Suspension—Revocations—Grounds— Hearing-
Procedure—Order—aA ppeal— Procedure.

Sec. 16. The state veterinarian shal! have power '
suspend for any fixed period, or to revoke the license he
by any licensee under this act, in the event such heen
shall violate and fail or refuse to obey any of the prot
sions of this act, or of the aforesaid rules and regulation
or in the event any licensee has been finally convicted |
violating the laws of this state or of the United States:
any manner affecting his conduct of said business: of
the event the state board of health shall certify in writ
to the state veterinarian that any particular disposal pls
is a menace to the public health, stating the chart
specifically and definitely, in which ease the hearing he’
inafter provided for shall be held within thirty days aft
such charges of said board are so filed: Provided, he
ever, That before any license shall be suspended |
revoked, the licensee shall be furnished with a writ
copy of the charges made against him and a hearing shi
be had before the state veterinarian, or his author
representative, at such time and place as he may fix. 0?
at least ten (10) days notice in writing to the licen®
to determine whether such license shall he suspended
revoked, which notice may be served either by registe
maii, with return receipt, addressed to such licensee at“
address shown in his application, or in the manner f°
vided by law for the service of a summons. At the ©
and place fixed for the hearing, the licenses may ap
in persor. and by counsel and such charges shall he dee™
denied, without any answer thereto, unless the licen
desires to file an answer. The hearing shall he condaet
in a summary manner, under such procedure as the ru
and regulations may prescribe, and the state veterinari

435)

+ his representative, shall receive and hear all the evi-
ieee and arguments offered by both parties and shall
sford the licensee full opportunity to present all defenses
silable to him. When a hearing under this section is
wadyeted before a representative of the state veteri-
‘arian, a written report and summary of the evidence at
sch hearing shell be made by him to the state veteri-
‘arian, with recommendations for action thereon. The
sate veterinarian, after such hearing before him, or after
~asidering such report and summary of the evidence by
is representative, shall render such decision and make
eh order in the premises as he may deem just, either
dismissing the proceedings, Or suspending the license for
uy fixed period, or revoking the license, which order shall
entered on his records and written notice thereof shall
% forthwith mailed by registered mail, with return
neipt, to or served personaliy upon such licensee: and,
Provided, further, That any licensee affected adversely
'y any such decision and order of the state veterinarian
may appeal therefrom to the Cireuit Court or Superior
Lourt of the county in which the plant is operated by the
deensee, by filing in such coart, at any time within thirty
ays after the day on which such decision and order is
‘tered of record, a complaint to rehear such charges,
whieh complaint shall name the state veterinarian as the
~ defendant and shall be sufficient if it set out a copy
f the charges and of any answer filed, upon which such
waring wes conducted, and recite generally the conduct
ich hearing and the decision and order inade therein
ad pray for a new hearing and judgment by the court.
The party appealing shall file at said time, with the com-
—_ a bond. with such surety or sureties as the clerk
7 such court may approve. conditioned to pay all costs
f such appeal be decided adversely to the appellant. and
te shall also cause a summons to be issued and served
= such state veterinarian, as in other civil actions.
ther the attorney-general of the state, or the prose-

‘aling attorney of said county, or both. upon notice from
—o shall appear tor such state veterinarian
efend such appeal. A motion to dismiss said appea!

56

may be filed by the defendant, if it be not perfected »
time, but no further pleadings shall be required, and the
allegations of such complaint shall be deemed denied
The appellant shall have the right to inspect and obtaa
copies of any of the proceedings, papers and records i
the office of said state veterinarian or under his contro,
applicable to or affecting such hearing and appeal. Sud
appeal shall be placed on the advance calendar and heard
as soon as possible, and if the court be in vacation, the
same may be heard at any time by the judge thereof, ot
by any other judge designated and appointed by him, 2
the same manner and with the same effect as if all sud
proceedings were conducted in term. The court shall hear
and conduct said appeal de novo, as a civil action, up
all the issues; and either party shall be entitled to off¢
all competent evidence relevant thereto, and the cout
shall be governed in all other respects by the procedure
and rales governing the trial of civil causes; except tht
such appeal shall be tried and decided solely by the cou,
and either party may have a change of judge, but ther
shall be no change of venue from the county. The cout
shall make a general finding and render judgment there
and shall have the power to reverse, affirm, or modify, 2
whole or in part, the decision and order appealed from
and a certified copy of such judgment, when final, shall &
filed with said state veterinarian, who shall enter the sam
of record and in all things comply therewith. Either part
to such proceedings may appeal from the deeision ari
judgment of such court to the Appellate Court of Indians
as in other civil causes, and such appeal shail operate “
a stay of such judgment until finally determined.

License—Suspension—Revocation — Order — When Eft
tive.

Sec. 17. (a) No decision of the state veterinar®
suspending or revoking any license shall become effect
until the expiration of the period of thirty days all
for appealing from such decision; and in the event of a"
such appeal to the lower court, or thence to the Appells'*

57

(out by either party, such decision shall not “ecome
dfeetive until any such appeals are finally determined, as
iforesaid.

Compliance with Act.

(>) Pending any proceeding to suspend or revoke any
lense, or any appeal from any decision therein, every
wrson affected thereby shall continue to comply with this
wt, and such compliance may be enforced then and at all
wher times by any appropriate action in the name of the
State of Indiana, which shall be filed and conducted by

the attorney-general upon written request of the state
Teterinarian.

Violation of Act—Penalties.

Sic. 18. The violation of any of the provisions of this
ui or the rules and regulations made in pursuance there-
‘f, is hereby made a misdemeanor and any person, upon
‘avietion thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less
than $25.00, nor more than $100.00, for the first offense;
ai by a fine of not less than $100.00, nor more than
$0.00, for the second offense; and for any subsequent
oflense, in addition to the fine provided for a second
offense, there may be added imprisonment in the county
ail for not more than ninety days.

—

Feet_Disposition—State Veterinary Disposal Plant Fund
—Appropriation.

Sec. 19. All monies received by the state veterinarian
mder this act shall be reported by him to the auditor of
“ate, at the end of each month or at such other time as
tay be prescribed by law, and at the same time he shall
“posit the entire amount of such receipts with the treas-
wr of state for deposit in the state general fund, but all

80 received shall be paid into a special continuing
‘count of such general fund to be known as ‘‘state veteri-
“ary disposal plant fund,’’ and shall be available for the

58

payment of all the necessary expenses in carrving out al
the provisions of this act, which payment shall be mai
as now or hereafter provided by law: Provided, however,
That at the close of each fiseal year any sum of mone
in said special account, in excess of five thousand dollars
($5,000.00), shall revert to the general account of the state
general fund. For the purpose of providing a fund
administer this act until sufficient monies are r2eeivel
from license fees, the sum of five thousand dollars
($5,000.00), or so much thereof as may be necessary,
hereby appropriated to the aforesaid special account om
of any monies in the state treasury not otherwise appt
priated, to be available from the date that this act tak#
effect for a period ending June 30, 1939.

Separability.

Sec. 20. Should any section, or any clause, sentence
provision, phrase, or word of any section of this act ®
declared invalid for any reason, or be repealed, the vai
ity of any and all other portions and provisions of this #
shall not be affected thereby; but it is hereby deelam
that each and all of such other portions and provisi
would have been enacted if any or all of such invalid w
repealed portions or provisions had not been contaile
herein, and all such remaining portions and _ provisi':
shall be construed, if possible so to do, so as to uph
and effectuate the purpose and effect of this act "©
matters covered thereby.

Specific and General Repeal.

Sec. 21. That each of the following acts, or parts”
acts, and all acts amendatory thereof or suppleme!®
thereto, be and each is hereby specifically repealed. te-*".
Acts of 1905, section 59214 of Chapter 169; Acts of het
Chapter 111; Acts of 1913, Section 8 of Chapter 135:*"
Acts of 1935, Chapter 205; and generally all laws ®
parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repet

09

Construction of Act.

Sec. 22. This act, or any provision thereof, shall not
construed as being repealed by implication by any
wher act passed at the same time or subsequent to it at
this session of the general assembly, but any repeal there-
if shall require a specific reference to this act by its title
wi date of approval. Except as it may be so specifically
tpealed, this act shall control in ail its provisions over
uy other act passed, as aforesaid, at this session, in the
went of any conflict therein, if such provisions in any or
il such acts cannot be reconciled so all may remain effee-
tre: Provided, however, That in the event any other act
passed at any time should provide generally that license
‘ws shall be payable for an annual period beginning
ther with the state fiscal year, or with any other date
tan the ealendar year, then the respective months of such
immual period corresponding in order to January and
Jane, as designated in this act for such payments, shall
substituted for the latter said months as the times for
yment of license fees and other charges hereunder, and
tk last day of the month ending any semi-annual period
‘tall be used in computing such period.

Bective Date.

Sec. 23. This act shall be in full foree and effect on
and after April 1, 1937.

——

APPENDIX “‘B’’
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDI

State of Indiana v. Gerrit W. Clason, decided Feb. 7.’
12 N.E. (2d) 750.

The appellee, as defendant below, was charged by +
davit in one count with a misdemeanor for the violst
of Chapter 278, Sec. 11, Acts of 1937. There was a mot
to quash on the grounds (1) that the facts stated in
affidavit did not charge a public offense, and, (2) that
affidavit contained matter which, if true, constitute
legal justification of the offense charged. The trial
sustained the motion to quash and discharged the deft

: ant, with a finding that the statute is unconstitutional
was not claimed that the charge was otherwise insufie
and the State has appealed.

The affidavit alleges in substance that on a date na
therein the defendant unlawfully -hauled and transpo
over a certain public highway in Elkhart County, Indi
to a disposal plant located in the State of Illinois, a¢

. horse, which had not been slaughtered and intended
human food, the defendant not being licensed so to 4
required by the above act.

The act upon which the prosecution was based is lem
and we deem it sufficient for the purposes of this ap
to summarize its pertinent provisions. The title dist
that its purpose is to ‘‘control animal diseases 4”
regulate the transportation and disposal of the bodie
dead animals.’ The first section recites that it #
exercise of the police power of the State to prevent
spread of animal diseases, to conserve the public be
and to protect the citizens against dangers ani nus!
The act has no application to persons slaughterins
butchering animals for human consumption, nor
transportation of the products thereof. The dispo*
the bodies of dead fowl, birds, fish, reptiles and of *
animals, such as dogs and cats and small game, are
wise exempted.

; ae

il

Sandards for disposal plants are set up and frequent
aseetions thereof provided for. Annual licenses are
mired for these establishments and the cost of admin-
sering the act is paid out of the proceeds thereof. Only
wilers of licenses may operate vehicles for the transpor-
wien of dead animals on the public highways of the
Sate, and there are express requirements as (0 the
«“upment of these vehicles. The beds in which dead ani-
uls are hauled shall be tight, so as to avoid drippings
ud seepings, shal! be of sufficient size and depth to hide
tecontents thereof from the view of other persons using
highways, and such vehicles are required to be
toroughly cleansed and disinfected after use. The act
thorizes the owner of any dead animal to bury or burn
t+ same on his own premises, if they are withont the
corporate limits of any city or town; such owner may also
age the skin of any dead animal and transport it to
uarket, if such animal shall not have died of a contagious

Appellee 's brief has been of no aid to the court in the
tnsideration of this case. It contains no helpful proposi-
ws, and no points and authorities, beyond the bare
wertion that the act upon which the prosecution is based
Twlates Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitution
tthe United States. This is the so-called interstate com-
tere elanse, and it provides: ‘“*The Congress shall have
wrerto... regulate commerce ... among the several
Pates,”’ :
While the laws of the state must yield to Acts of Con-
tes passed in execution of the powers conferred upon it
% the Constitution, the mere grant to Congress of the
hwrer to regulate ecommerce among the states does not, of
tif and without legislation by Congress, impair the
thority of the states to establish such reasonable regu-
is as are appropriate for the protection of the health,
ane and the safety of their people. New York, ete.,
Co. v. New York (1897), 165 U. S. 628, 631, 17 8. Ct.
48, 41 L. Ed. 853.
When the local police regulation has real relation to the
protection of the people of the State, and is rea-

Se i, i

/

62

sonable in its requirements, it is not invali! hea
may incidentally affect interstate commerce. prom
does not conflict with legislation enacted by Congres:
‘suant to its constitutional authority. Savace +. /
(1912), 235 T. S. 301, 32S. Ct. 715. 56 L. Bei. UR
Austin v. Tennessee (19), 179 UT. S. 345. M4 SO
132, 45 L. Ed. 224, affirming (1898) 101 Tenn.
S. W. 35, 70 Am. St. Rep. 703, () L. BR A 4
Under the exercise of the police power it has bet >
that a state may adopt laws: Prohibiting the sim
out of the state of citrus fruits which are unnpe of *
wise unfit for consumption, Slich v. Kirkwoul {Fal
237 U. S. 52, 35 S. Ct. 501. 59 L. Ed. 835: prohibitizg
slaughtering of calves unless in healthy condition
least four weeks old, and prohibiting the s$ipment
from such animals to or from any part of the state. P ’
v. Bishopp (1904). 44 Mise. Rep. 12. 89 N. Y. 5. 1°
hibiting healthy persons, either from within or sitet
State, entering an area infected with a contacious a=
Compagnie Francaise v. Louisiana State Board of H
(1902). 186 U. S. 380, 385.22 S. Cr. SIL 46 LAD
prohibiting the disinterment or exhuming of the bel“
deceased person, even when it is intended t» transpet
remains of an alien to his own country fer final pa=
without first obtaining a permit from the promt @*
In re: Wong Yung Quy (C. C. Cal. 1880). 2 Fei ©
It has not been pointed out to us wherein the or*
matter of the act before us conflicts with any federal
lation. and we know of none. We find nothing in 12 t*
poses or provisions repugnant to the settle] prineip*
constitutional law. The wisdom of the law was ft >
determination of the legislative branch of the cover=™®
and we think the objectives being for the prot-ctit & *
public health. the health of domestic animals «{ ztes'**
nomic value. and the prevention of nuisances «0 the best
ways of the State were all within the purvie™ ©
powérs of the General Assembly. We are oblige ?
indulge the presumption that the act is constiton®
unless and until the contrary is made to appear. War

63

wert. State (1931), 202 Ind. 424. 173 N. E. 238: Levy
, Segre (1903). 161 Ind. 251, 68 N. E. 172: Overshiner Vv.
te (191). 156 Ind. 187. 59 N. E. 468. We therefore
— act valid and that the affidavit charged a public
Prersxi, with directions to overrule appellee's motion
‘ash and ‘o require him to plead to the charge.

eee of Indiana v. Gerrit W. Clason. rehearing denied
Mareh 10, 1938, 13 N. E. (2d) 30%.

isd afterwards to-wit: on the 10th day of March, 1938.
wee the Mth Judicia! Day of the November Term. 193°.
ayike’s petition for rehearing was denied with the fol-
wrag opinion pronounced by Shake. a.

is our original opinion, 12 N. E. (24) 750, 751. we said:
“ippelikce’s brief has been of no aid to the court in the
sasideration of this ease. It contains no helpful pr>posi-
ts, and no points and authorities. bevond the bare
tertion that the act upon which the prosecution is basei
telates Article I, Seetion 8. Clause 3, of the Constitution
d the Unitel States."’ The appellee. through other coun-
has now presented a petition for rehearing. supported
* an able and exhaustive brief. For this reason we deem
pteper to express our views with reference to the prop-
‘tens therein contained.

We find nu objection to the statement of general prin-
ies contained in appellee's petition. to the effect that in
musing upon the constitutionality of an act. its purpose
mt he decormined from its natura! and reasonable
fet: thas the legisiative declaration of purpose is not

‘adnz. ani that whether a reculation of a useful dust-
ws is a valid exercise of police power is a judicial
‘stor.

The appellee has cited a number of cases from this
wert and from the Federal courts to sustain his elaim
Tat the statute under consideration constitutes an unad-
‘Dorieed interference with interstate commerce. One of the
rarest and most comprehensive siatements that we have
2 with reference to the authority of the states to legis-
2+ won such subjects. is to be found in the ease of

LEE ne

64

Uregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. rv. &
of Washington (1926), 270 U.S. 87, 46S. Ct. 279, &.
L. Ed. 482. In that ease Mr. Chief Justice Taft said: *
the relation of the states to the regulation of interst
commerce by Congress there are two fields. There is |
in which the State can not interfere at all, even in
silence of Congress. In the other * * * the State 2
exercise its police power until Congress has by affirmat
legislaiion occupied the field by regulating interstate ¢
merece and so necessarily has excluded state action.”
the same case the distinguished jurist further says: °
the absence of any action taken by Congress on the sub
matter, it is well settled that a State in the exereise of
police power may establish euarantines against human
ings or animals or plants, the coming in of which may
pose the inhabitants or the stock or the trees, piants
growing crops to disease, injury or destruction ther
and this in spite of the fact that such quarantines »#
sarily affect interstate commerce.”

It a state may. in the exercise of its inherent pe
power, adopt quarantine statutes prohibiting the impo
tion of dangerous or noxious articles or objects, we t
it may likewise, inferentially, license and regulate the
of its highways to accomplish the same ends, even the
such regulation may incidentally affeet interstate 4
merece. Kidd v. Pearson (1888), 128 U.S. 1,98.
32 L. Ed. 346.

It seems to us that the proper disposition of the anf
is to be found in the answers to these questions: (1!
Chapter 278, Acts of 1937. a reasonable quarantine Tee
tion within the police power of the State which ine
tally affects interstate commerce: or (2) is it a @
interference with interstate commerce, under the ga
an exercise of the police power!

We cannot, in the interest of space and time. review

. of the authorities cited by the appellee. but shall point
wherein several of them are not applicable to the situa!
with which we are here dealing. The cases reviewed |
typical of the others relied upon.

od)

‘s The State. ex rel. Corwin v. The Indiana, ete.. Mining
1989), 120 Ind. 575, 22 N. E. 778, 780. 6 L. R. A. 579.
wart considered an act prohibiting the transportation
‘wtural gas from any point within this State to any
mot or place without the State. The court held that the
ererence with interstate commerce, under the eireum-
: shown. was direct and not merely incidental. In
% opinion Chief Justice Elliott said: ‘Phe act does not
weame to provide for the safety. health, or comfort of the
rons ** *. It is not a regulation of the mode of pro-
mmz, transporting. or usinc natural gas designed to
ware the health, safety. or comfort of the citizens of
hima ° * * The act can not be taken out of the opera-
cof the Federal decisions upon the theory that it is a
nid exercise of the police power resident in every sov-
im state. for the theory is without foundation. ”’

ls Jamieson v. The Indiana Natural Gas & Mil Co.. et
£1991), 128 Ind. 555, 28 N. E. 76, 83. 12 L. R. A. 652,
*s court had under consideration another natural gas
‘ante which prohibited the transportation of gas within
*vithout the State under artificial pressure exceeding
W pounds per square inch. In holding the statute valid,
> court remarked: **We do not assume that a State can
*talate for the regulation of interstate commerce—that
¥rer is undoubtedly Federal—nor do we assume that
miter the guise of exercising the police power there may
*aregulation of commerce between the states. but we
® assume that it is settled by the decisions that State
“elation is not invalid simply because it operates upon
raffeets commercial commodities or instrumentalities. So
™z as there is nothing more than an exercise of the
wire power. and no regulation of commerce. there Is

gf more than the exercise of a State power.”

_2 Manufacturers Gas. ete. Co. v. The Indiana Natural!
#8. ee. Co, (1900), 155 Ind. 545, 58 N. E. 706, 707, this
ui held another statute regulating the transportation of
‘ural gas unconstitutional. and said: ‘‘Nothing done by
%* appellee is complained of. excepting only that it re-
8 natural gas out of the State of Indiana. No ground

mune men

66

for the exercise of the police power of the State to pr
vent such removal is shown. Nothing, save the nak
right to transport the gas beyond the limits of this Si
is contested in this action. The only reason whieh ean!
urged in support of the restraint sought t» be impos
upon the appellee is that the supply of natural gas bet
limited, and the article being one of great value and «
venience, its use ought to be reserved for and enjoved'
the people of this State, to the exclusion of the inhabitar
of any other State.’’

The appellee has also cited and quoted from Fost
Fountain Packing Co., et al., v. Haydel (1928), 278 l.
1, 49 S. Ct. 1, 4, 73 L. Ed. 147. This is the socal
‘Louisiana Shrimp ecase’’ and involved the constituty
ality of a statute of that state which prohibited the st
ment to other states of shrimp taken from the waters
Louisiana, unless they were processed in its factories. 1
act related directly to interstate commerce. and the ¢
said: ‘‘But by permitting its shrimp to be taken and
the products thereof to be shipped and sold in interst
commerce, the State necessarily releases its hold and.
to the shrimp so taken, definitely terminates its contre
The act in question was in no sense a health or «uarast
measure, and we do not consider it as bearing ape |
proposition before us. Wee

In the ease of Vandalia Coal Co., et al., v. Special ©
& Food Comm. of Indiana, et ai. (1920), D. C.. 28 F
572, 573, the court held invalid an order of the Coal 4
Food Commission of Indiana requiring coa! mines vt
had contracted to deliver their products outside the *
to sell them within the State. This was held to be a di
burden on interstate commerce. But the court recoet!
the presumption that a statute is valid until the cont™
is shown, and that a state is free to ‘*meet and comb
wrongs that injure ‘‘the safety and welfare
people.”’

We adhere to our former opinion that Chapter 278.4
of 1937, is for the protection of the public health.
health of domestic animals of great economic value. !
the prevention of nuisances on the highways. It does

67

‘iy or materially place a burden on interstate com-
~. and the extent to which it affects commerce of
character may be said to be clearly incidental. We
ui that antil the Congress of the United States invades
ld and legislates upon the subject, the act must be
Sarded as a proper and valid exercise of the inherent
vice power of the State of Indiana.

iebearing denied.

Gerrit W. Clason v. State of Indiana, decided

November 1. 1938, 17 N. E. (2d) 92.

The appellant was charged by affidavit with unlawfully
vusporting a dead animal, not slaughtered and intended
‘human food, over a highway of this state to a disposal
pat located in Illinois, without being licensed as pre-
tied in Chapter 278, Acts 1937. Burns’ Ann. St. 1933,
6817 to 16-837 (pocket Supp.). Sees. 3901-1 to $901-
4 Baldwin's 1934 (1937 Supp.). There was a trial by
© wart. the evidence being stipulated, and the appellant
ms found guilty and fined. He has appealed. assigning
tet the affidavit upon which he was prosecuted did not
earze a public offense and that the court erred in deny-
his motion in arrest and in denying him a new trial.
This is the second appeal of this cause, the former case
az reported as State v. Clason. Ind. Sup. (1938). 12
SE (2d) 750. 13 N. E. (2d) 307. That appeal involved
"7 the sufficiency of the charge. This court held the
Sarit gould and, on the authority of the former opinion,
tow hold that there was no error in overruling appel-
22's motion to quash the affidavit filed subsequent te the
* appeal.

Bang conceded by the appellant that ‘insofar as this
ae prescribes the kind of vehicles and the manner
2 whieh (but not the places to which) careasse~ may he
™nported over the highways of this state, the statute
— to be within the scope of the police power: does
mee with federal legislation: and bears a reason-
tion to the declared purpose of the enactment.
ri. the limitation of the spread of disease, the protection
‘the publie health. and the prevention of nuisances.”

aay

A number of propositions are presented and urged
support of the appellant’s contentions, but we believe t
ther may be fairly summarized as follows: That since’
statute authorizes the transportation of carcasses of d
animals over the highways of the state but limits §
transportation to carriers of licensed operators of re
tion plants in this state, the effect of the statute is
prohibit interstate commerce of such dead animals in
lation of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constit
of the United States. Appellant’s position may be il
trated by this hypothetical situation: Since a pe
operating a vehicle constructed and equipped as requ
bythe act, may obtain a license for its use in transpor
dead animals to a licensed reduction plant in Indiana,
may not employ a like vehicle, possessing the same §
tary features, to transport dead animals across the b
daries of this state, the statute must be construed
prohibitory and not merely as regnuiatory.

It is important, we think, to keep constantly im?
the nature of the objects with which the statute 4
That the carcasses uf large animals not killed for hu
consumption are inherently dangerous to the publie h
aud liable to become nuisances, is clearly disclosed by
stipulation upon which the case was tried below. It
there shown that a majority of such animals die |
contagious or infectious diseases, many of whiel
readily transmissible to human beings; that ir the
of such dead animals decomposition starts within
hours after death, and that if such carcasses are not
posed of within twenty-four hours they wil! pr
noxious odors over a wide area; that contagious
infectious diseases may be communicate to mal
beasts by the transportation of the bodies of such
animals upon the highways, but that the dangers ine
to such transportation may be minimized by the P!
cleansing and disinfecting of the vehicles employed
that purpose. It was further stipulated that there
now thirty-eight disposal plants in the State of Ind
licensed and operating under the act; that these plan’
so distributed and equipped as to dispose of -the bedi

large anials-ret intended and slaughtered for human
as die within the limits of the state, and that the
ate of Indiana has a state veterinarian and facilities for
enforcement of the act. One provision of the statute
wides that: ‘‘After the bodies of dead animals have
unloaded from any vehicle used for the trensporta-
thereof to the disposal plant, on each trip, such
ticle and all parts thereof, and in the event draught
mls are nsed to draw such conveyances, the feet of
animals, shall be thoroughly cleansed and disin-
in steh manner and with such a solution as the
le veterinarian shall prescribe by regulation, and in
ition thereto all such vehicles shall be washed out
ughly with steam or hot water after each use thereof
transporting such dead bodies.’’ Acts 1937, Ch. 278,
«11 (e), Burns’ 1933, Sec. 16-827 (e) (Pocket Supp.)
w. 3001-11 (ec) Baldwin’s May 1937 (Supp.).
tt seems clear, therefore, that the statute under con-
ration is not dealing with an article of commerce as
Mit term is ordinarily used and understood. And while
Hmay be conceded that the bodies of dead animals have
‘emmercial value, we do not think that it is to be
ted that the state of Indiana might, by appropriate
Mation. have specifically provided that there should
% commerce in such bodies, but that the same should
vel without recompense to the owners thereof.
ease of City of Indianapolis v. Ryan (1937), 212
hd. 47,7 N. E. (2d) 974, this court held that it was
n the proper function of the legislature to regniate
te disposition of garbage and to provide for its destrac-
wt. notwithstanding its intrinsic value. We think it
‘ually elear that it would be within the purview of our
feral assembly to prohibit the importation into this
“ate of the carcasses of large dead animals not slaugh-
ered for human consumption. In the ease of Bowman v.
ino & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1888), 125 U. S. 465,
8. Ct. 689, 1602, 31 L. Ed. 700, the Supreme Court of the
Py States made this observation relative to the powers
the state to impose quarantine provisions: ‘** Doubtless
Sates have power to provide by law suitable measures

“= oe

P|

or en ERR EBER A E 2 ER

——

70

to prevent the introduction into the states of articles of
trade, which, on account of their existing condition, would
bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such as
rags or other substances infected with the germs of yellow
fever or the virus of smallpox, or cattle or meat or other
provisions that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise.
from their condition and quality, unfit for human use or
consumption. Such articles are not merchantable; they
are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce. They
may be rightly outlawed as intrinsically and directly the
immediate sources and causes of destruction to human
health and life. The self protecting power of each state.
therefore, may be rightfully exerted against their intro-
duction, and such exercises of power cannot be considered
regulations of commerce prohibited by the Constitution.”

But one question remains, and that is whether the state.
in the exercise of its police power, may prohibit the inte:-
State transportation of dead animals by a plan that allows
intrastate transportation by its licensees under such
circumstances that may result in the profitable handling
of such articles within the state. As we have already
suggested, it is not to be doubted but that the state might
have set up and operated its own disposal plants. If this
had been done, the effect would have been to divest such
dead bodies of every semblance of merchantable prop-
erty. Instead of adopting this means of coping with the
prou.em, the general assembly has authorized the plan
embraced in the statute. It was apparently found that by
licensing carriers and disposal plants, by-products mighit
be salvaged sufficient to render the business profitable
to the licensees, thereby relieving the state of the burden
of dealing directly with the problem. The principles ot
constitutional law that protect interstate commerce are 10
more basic or sacred than those that protect private prop-
erty from confiscation. It follows, a fortiori, that the in-
herent police power of the state, in dealing with a sub-
ject of this character, is sufficient to divest the carcasses
of dead animals of their attributes of commerce. And it
may be pointed out that if the statute under consideration
was construed as severable in character, so that the regu

71

latory features might be preserved, and interstate traffic
permitted, as appellant contends, this construction might
result in destroying the whole plan. If a substantial per-
centage of these carcasses were exported from the state
through the operation of int«rstate commerce, those re-
maining within the state might be so reduced in quantity
that it would no longer be profitable for licensees to oper-
ate their plants. The state would then be confronted with
the problem of incurring great expense to dispose of those
remaining, and this expense might well be increased by a
reduction in the return from the by-products recoverable.
We have already quoted from a section of the act which
requires that vehicles and the feet of draught animals
used in transportimg..carcasses to the licensed disposal
plants of the state, shall be thoroughly cleansed and dis-
infected after each delivery and before again going upun
the highways of the state. It must be presumed that the
state has ample facilities for the enforcement of this pro-
vision. If the transportation of dead animals from points
within this state to places beyond its boundaries is to be
permitted, it is conceivable that vehicles used for that
purpose will spread disease in this state upon their re-
turn. It is no answer to this problem to say that the
state might impose like standards for vehicles used in
interstate transportation as are required by the terms of
the act. The impracticability of adequate inspection would
defeat the ends sought and would place upon the state
veterinarian, or some other public agency, the burden of
constantly policing every one of the many public high-
Ways leading into the state. The provisions of the act
against interstate transportation may therefore be con-
sidered as in the nature of a quarantine against the
bringing into this state of contaminated vehicles that have
been used in the transportation of dead animals. We be-
lieve that such a quarantine is justifiable and reasonable:
that it bears a direct relationship to the objectives sought
by the act considered as a whole, and that any interfer-
ence with interstate comme

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386401_0129%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
