# Reply Brief — Craig v. Holsey > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_1809%3A4 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Reply Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2004 - **Citation:** 543 U.S. 820 ## Text No. 03-1701 Supreme Court of the United States So El RODNEY LEROY CRAIG, Petitioner, TAMIKA HOLSEY, Respondent. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CRAIG’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI JAMES T. BUDD Counsel of Record MABRY & MCCLELLAND LLP 2200 Century Parkway, N.E. 10th Floor Atlanta, Georgia 30345 (404) 325-4800 Counsel for Petitioner RULE 29.6 STATEMENT No corporation is a party to this action. Petitioner Craig is insured by Infinity Insurance Company. il TABLE OF CONTENTS rn re py. RBs gw hay. 6 ly) Se THE GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING UPHOLDING THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S DECISIONS IN GORE AND STATE A. The Punitive Damages Award is Presumptively Unconstitutional Because Of The 22.7-to-1 Ratio Of Punitive to Compensatory errr Perry re here B. The Georgia Court Of Appeals’ Comparison Of The Punitive Damages Award To Hypothetical Compensatory Damages, Rather Than The Plaintiff's Actual Compensatory Damages, Conflicts With State Farm... .........cccccceceeeees C. The Georgia Court Of Appeals’ Justification Of The Punitive Damages Award By Reference To Dissimilar Conduct Conflicts re Se Fs 5 oivickshawcunsasaereee TS 8 659 6 ede chee eee ili TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: PAGE BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 PN a oidnne conve can V aus eedertecbaveetsanets passim Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2004 WL 869188 (Utah I I EE 6 Go hcp cnn vubiintdeseseensnvns » Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, SNE 4 ca suks tu ciaiensntaduigs seats « vasnnals 2 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, Pe Sis SUD COD io cca vecscecicacrsnvencens passim THE GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING UPHOLDING THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S DECISIONS IN GORE AND STATE FARM A. The Punitive Damages Award Is Presumptively Unconstitutional Because Of The 22.7-to-1 Ratio Of Punitive To Compensatory Damages This Court’s decision in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), makes clear that the 22.7-to-1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in this case is unconstitutionally excessive. Contrary to Holsey’s assertion, Petitioner Craig does not argue that punitive damages awards exceeding compensatory dam- ages by a 9-to-1 ratio are per se unconstitutional. Instead, the award in this case is unconstitutional because “in practice, few awards exceeding a single- digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process,” and this case is not one of the few cases necessitating a departure from the single-digit ratio benchmark set by this Court. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424-425. To attempt to overcome this vulnerability, Holsey argues that the facts of this case are “extraordinary” and that Craig’s conduct was “unique.” (Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at p. 8). This argument is patently defec- tive and without merit. Although all punitive damages cases arguably involve egregious conduct, Craig’s act of driving under the influence was not undertaken with any ill will, sinister motive, or malice. Therefore, this case is no different from any other case involving a defendant driving under the influence and is in no way “unique” or “extraordinary” in comparison to other punitive damages cases. 2 If this Court were to deny Craig’s Petition, and accept Holsey’s argument, it would mean that any accident involving a defendant driving under the influence would be free of the due process limitations on punitive dam- ages awards as set forth in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). Such an exception is clearly incompatible with this Court’s holding that “few” cases can exceed the single-digit ratio benchmark while sat- isfying due process and that a defendant’s conduct must be “particularly egregious” in order to do so. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424-425. Indeed, many cases involving driv- ing under the influence would then constitutionally exceed the single-digit ratio benchmark if Holsey’s posi- tion is accepted. ; Holsey is also mistaken when she asserts that the only basis for the argument that the 22.7-to-1 ratio in this case is unconstitutionally excessive is a single sentence from this Court’s opinion in State Farm. In fact, this Court has on multiple occasions stressed that “an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety” and that “[s]Jingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process.” Id. at 425; Gore, 517 U.S. at 581; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (1991). Despite Holsey’s attempt to downplay it, courts have inconsistently applied this Court’s decisions on punitive damages as is illustrated by a comparison of the Court Appeals’ decision here with the Supreme Court of Utah’s decision in Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2004 WL 869188 (Utah Apr. 23, 2004). In Campbell, the Supreme Court of Utah noted that this Court “strongly implied” that single digit ratios mark the outer limits of due process. Jd. at *9. Accordingly, the Court applied a 9-to-1 ratio between compensatory and © a re mene met 3 punitive damages and, thus, reduced the punitive dam- ages award from $145 million to $9,018,780.75. Jd. at ** 10, 12. The reasoning and holding of the Utah Supreme Court demonstrates that it will likely invalidate any punitive award exceeding a 9-to-1 ratio. Conversely, the Georgia Court of Appeals has signaled that a 22.7-to-1 ratio is permissible in the State of Georgia and that a compari- son of the punitive damages award with the actual com- pensatory damages award is unnecessary. The inconsistent application of Gore and State Farm by the appellate courts of Georgia and Utah evidences a split among State courts necessitating certiorari in this case. In sum, the ratio in this case does not come close to the single-digit ratios that have traditionally satisfied due process. Instead, the plaintiff was awarded punitive damages that were over twenty-two times the compen- satory damages awarded under circumstances that are no more egregious than any other case involving punitive. damages. Thus, the court below did not ensure that the measure of punishment was both reasonable and pro- portionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the amount of compensatory damages as is required by State Farm. 538 U.S. at 425. Accordingly, Craig’s Peti- tion and plenary review should be granted. B. The Georgia Court Of Appeals’ Comparison Of The Punitive Damages Award To Hypothetical Compensatory Damages, Rather Than The Plain- tiff’s Actual Compensatory Damages, Conflicts With State Farm As is fully set forth in Craig’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, the court below never compared the actual compensatory damages to the punitive damages award as is required by the second Gore guidepost, nor did it — 4 address this Court’s recognition that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and com- pensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. Instead, the court below justified the punitive damages award by hypothesizing that the plaintiff could have died as a result of the accident, when in actuality Holsey sus- tained minor neck and back injuries that had nearly resolved prior to trial. The court then compared hypo- thetical wrongful death damages awards to the actual punitive damages awarded to rationalize that there was no disparity between the two awards. Craig v. Holsey, 590 S.E.2d 742, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); App. at 10a. In her Brief in Opposition, Holsey concedes that the second Gore guidepost requires review of the actual harm caused by the defendant. (Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at p. 14). Yet Holsey ignores that the court below conducted no such review and erroneously argues that certiorari is not necessary because Craig’s conduct “could have killed or maimed anyone unlucky enough to find themselves in his path.” (Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at p. 14). The comparison of hypothetical damages to the puni- tive Ca,aages award is in direct conflict with Gore and its progeny because the court below never applied the second Gore guidepost which requires a comparison of the actual harm to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582. Just as due process does not permit courts to adjudicate the merits of hypotheti- cal claims under the Gore reprehensibility guidepost, the comparison of hypothetical compensatory damages to punitive damages under the second Gore guidepost also violates due process. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. = ee ee avec ot OGL Pat > ARS dra Leniendnaton Sack The notion that hypothetical injuries and damages can be used to satisfy the second Gore guidepost, without any consideration of the actual harm to the plaintiff, is fundamentally flawed and erroneous. Accordingly, Craig’s Petition for a Writ of certiorari should be granted to correct the Court of Appeals’ misinterpretation of Gore and State Farm. C. The Georgia Court Of Appeals’ Justification Of The Punitive Damages Award By Reference To Dissimilar Conduct Conflicts With State Farm Despite Holsey’s statements to the contrary, Craig does not contest that his actions were blameworthy. But the degree of reprehensibility in this case was not com- mensurate with the punitive damages awarded and it is clear that the court below impermissibly relied upon Craig’s dissimilar acts to bolster its reprehensibility analysis. In affirming the punitive damages award, the court below relied upon evidence that Craig had smoked mar- ijuana prior to and after the day of the accident and fur- ther considered the details surrounding Craig’s arrest in 1996 and subsequent conviction for possession of a con- trolled substance in Arkansas. In her Brief in Opposition, Holsey also relies heavily on dissimilar acts to support her contention that the Gore reprehensibility guidepost has been satisfied and that certiorari is not required. Holsey offers support for her argument that Craig’s conduct was sufficiently repre- hensible by stating that Craig was already on probation for a crack cocaine charge; Craig was an habitual sub- Stance user; Craig had previously driven under the influ- ence of both drugs and alcohol prior to this accident; and Craig continued to use drugs after being criminally sanc- tioned for his conduct in this case. (Respondent’s Brief 6 ih aA cou a in Opposition at pp. 3, 9, 11). Yet, none of these accu- sations are related to the accident in question. Ps NE Mahl PI Te a hn, State Farm makes clear that the reliance of the Geor- gia Court of Appeals and Holsey on Craig’s dissimilar acts on other occasions cannot support the punitive dam- age award. As is fully discussed in Craig’s Petition, it is well-established that “[a] defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive dam- ages.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422. Accordingly, “[a] defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individ- ual or business.” Jd. at 423. It was the act of driving while under the influence on the date of the accident, not Craig’s conviction for pos- session of a controlled substance, which injured the plaintiff. In his dissent, Presiding Judge Andrews of the Georgia Court of Appeals recognized that “this was an isolated incident” and that “Craig had no previous arrests for DUI.” Craig, 590 S.E.2d at 749; App. at 13a (Andrews, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Just as in State Farm, there is scant evidence here of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured the plain- tiff. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. Furthermore, Holsey erroneously argues that because there is no cap on punitive damages in the State of Georgia when the defendant acted under the influence of alcohol or drugs, there is support for the punitive damages award. While there is no cap on punitive dam- ages in such cases, this does not alter the fact that grossly excessive punitive damages awards are imper- ; missible because they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the issue of whether or not Georgia legislatively caps punitive dam- EEE eee 7 ages is irrelevant because the punitive award here is unconstitutional. CONCLUSION Certiorari is warranted in this case because “of the three guideposts set out by Gore, the last two are not met, and only two of the five factors to be considered are present in the first one. Accordingly, the punitive dam- ages awarded in this case were excessive and the judg- ment should be reversed.” Craig, 590 S.E.2d at 749; App. at 14a (Andrews, P.J., concurring in part and dis- senting in part). In particular, the Court of Appeals’ fail- ure to compare the actual harm to the plaintiff with the punitive damages award, as is required by Gore, makes it imperative that this Court grant certiorari. For these reasons, the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals directly conflicts with this Court’s decisions in Gore and State Farm and the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted, JAMES T. BUDD Counsel of Record MABRY & MCCLELLAND LLP 2200 Century Parkway, N.E. 10th Floor Atlanta, Georgia 30345 (404) 325-4800 Counsel for Petitioner --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_1809%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.