# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bonavitacola Electric Contractor, Inc. v. Boro Developers, Inc.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_1783%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 543 U.S. 818

## Text

4 weeme Co
/ FILE

31667 APR 192006

NO.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC CONTRACTOR, INC.,
ET AL.,

Petitioners,
V

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Third Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STEVEN F. MARINO, ESQUIRE
301 Wharton Street

Philadelphia, Pa 19147

(215) 462-3200

Attorney for Petitioners

tea come aiihe . 2A LPI

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Complaint sufficiently alleged facts
supporting the existence of a predicate act, a pattern of
racketeering activity and injury suffered by appellants to
give rise to cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A.
§§1962(a) and 1962(c) [relating to the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act] and pendent state claims.

-

LIST OF PARTIES ‘

Petitioners

1. Bonavitacola Electric Contractor, Inc.
1467 County Line Road
Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006
2. Local Union No. 654 International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers
600 Turner Industrial Way
Ashton, PA 19014

3. Local Union No. 98 International Brotherhood of t

Electrical Workers
1701 Spring Garden Street
Philadelphia, PA 19130
4. Curtis Bell
26 Elm Street

Trenton, NJ 08611
Respondents

5. Boro Developers, Inc.
400 Feheley Drive
King of Prussia, PA

6. Frederick J. Shapiro
400 Feheley Drive
King of Prussia, PA

7. Bruce H. Shapiro
400 Feheley Drive
King of Prussia, PA

-ili-

Petitioner, Bonavitacola Electric Contractor, Inc. has
no parent corporation and no publicly owned company owns
any stock in it. Petitioner, Local Union No. 654
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers has no
parent corporation and no publicly owned company owns
any stock in it. Petitioner, Local Union No. 98 International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers has no parent corporation

and no publicly owned company owns any stock in it.

-iV-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RE Be IE eiivicicktsikninseridticesinsieimivosmmerintiidanales, iV
Table OF Cite@ AWEIOTitiO ....0seccsccescssesecscennsscesecesessvansons V-vi
UE OE FUNGI OIIOND vic essiisiseesincsrvscarsciscintinsencepicieeaniins l
I ercinnnintinincnionimninnitiiiotaiaons l

Constitutional Provisions, Treaties, Statutes, Rules and

TRGGRIOINE THVT IG oss ci cceinicrseescovixtevsensesnctscientontpucenes 1-2
PT I vis sccscictein cebstsnsdihectincttnnnteeoiaans 2
I Fe caiicsesihccctivencnaniendnainecisiiaemetiobientin 2-12
PRR Tar CAPRI WT esos siesicvccicricmemiicinenns 12-25
NU cdcecenstiexcciavasemieenetesiats eins teataedsnosmieneades 25
Appendix:
Judgment of Court of Appeals .................ce App. 1-18
5 SI citiicstiticesccicinicionin App. 19-54
Constitutional Provisions, Treaties, Statutes, Rules and
Regulations INVOIVEG «....isescceiscsecsesseseecccesesees App. 55-77
Asma COWRA oo... <6.scsssiecessevensosseseeses App. 78-148

—

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES

Commercial Cleaning Services v Collin Services Systems,

Inc.,271 F.3d 374 (2" Cir. 2001)...c.cccccsccsseeeee, a ahs 21-23

H.J., Inc. v Northwestern Bell Telephone Company,
492 U.S. 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989)... 19

Leonard S. Feinberg, Inc. v Central Asi Capital Corporation,

Limited, 1997 WL 230812 (E.D.Pa.)......cccecccsscsesesessseeees 19

Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496,
105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) .....cceccscscssesecesssees 12

Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v Southmost Machinery
Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir. 1984...............ecccscescescoceoeees 16

Tabas v Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert denied,
--- US. ---, 115 S.Ct. 2269, 132 L.Ed.2d 275 (1995)... 19

Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 105, (3d. Cir.2002) ....... 12

STATUTES
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1962(c), 1961(5) cecccccccccscssescsseccoseeoee

Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §276 et Seq. ...c.ccecsesseseseeeees
2, 4, 6, 7, 8,9, 10, 16, 20

SOTO OPO SEH HEH EEOHEEEEEEEEEEESEEEEEEE EEE EEE EEEEEEOS

-vi-

Pennsylvania Wage and Collection Law,

GS FR S BOS Oi Wa icc caecntns icine 2

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1 et. seq.

stuveuséeensteseisennetigssiiiniiebemeleibsteslataieanaababenananiaaania: 2% 3,9

1S U.S.C A. SGN cciisnieniintnaad 6, 7, 10, 13, 15

16 USCA, DIU cstsmiaineemeamaans 10, 13, 15
RULES

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)........... ay De ee

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).............. 15, 16, 17, 18

~~ Se ee

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

December 8, 2003. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
pursuant to 28 USC § 1254 (1).

Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S.A. §1291. Jurisdiction of the
District Court was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331
for claims arising under the laws of United States and

seeking redress for violations of 18 U.S.C.A. §1964(c).

OPINIONS BELOW
The December 8, 2003 opinion of the Court of

Appeals, whose judgment is herein sought to be reviewed, is
an unpublished opinion, case number 03-1713 (App., infra,
1-18.

The prior opinion for the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, entered February 12, 2003,
is an unpublished opinion, case number 01-5508 (App.,

infra, 19-54.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent texts of the following provisions (App.
infra, 55-77.)

x,»

1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1962(c). ............0 App. 55-56
2. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §276 et seq..............
App. 57-63
3. Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1
OE GI nantnesincnvianetiiccusesvaebindintdiovnandions App. 64-66

CRORE EEE EEE EEE EERE HEHEHE HEE EHEEOHE HEHEHE EERE

OOOOH EEE HEHEHE EHH EEE EEEEEEE HEHE OEE EEEHHEEEEEEE

AMENDED COMPLAINT

This matter arises as a result of the Court of Appeals

interpretation of the sufficiency of the allegations contained
within the body of the Amended Complaint (App., infra, 78-
148) filed in the District Court by the petitioners.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The History of Litigation

This action was brought by Bonavitacola Electric
Construction, Inc., Local Union No. 98, Local Union No. 654,
and Curtis Bell by Complaint seeking relief pursuant to RICO,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1962(c), the Pennsylvania Wage and
Collection Law, 43 P.S. § 260 et seq. and common tort law

remedies, specifically interference of contractual relations and

é

unjust enrichment. On February 12, 2003, the district court
entered an order granting Boro Developers, Inc., Frederick J.
Shapiro and Bruce H. Shapiro's motion to dismiss the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. On December 8, 2003, the Court.of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s order. On January 20, 2004, the
Court of Appeals filed an Order denying Bonavitacola
Electric Construction, Inc., Local Union No. 98, Local Union
No. 654, and Curtis Bell's petition for en banc review. On
January 28, 2004, a mandate was issued by the Court of
Appeals. This instant petition follows.

B. Factual Allegations

Appellant Bonavitacola Electric Contractor, Inc. and
Appellee Boro Developers, Inc. are electrical contractors
engaged in the business of providing electrical services to
local, state and federal municipalities, city authorities, school
districts, and commercial and industrial accounts in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware. Bonavitacola
Electric is a signatory of Local Union No. 98, IBEW and a
party to the multi-employer Commercial Agreement between
Local Union No. 98, IBEW and the Philadelphia Division of
the Penn-Del-Jersey Chapter, National Electrical Contractor's
Association. Pursuant to the Commercial Agreement

participating employers, such as Bonavitacola Electric, are

_4-

required to make a variety of monthly payments to Local
Union No. 98 and Local Union No. 654 consisting of
contributions to the various multi-employer benefit funds
and the remittance of withholding of working dues and
vacation funds.

To procure electrical service, maintenance and
construction municipalities, city authorities and school
districts solicit competitive bids from competing electrical
contractors, such as Bonavitacola Electric and Boro
Developers, and award the public contract to the lowest
responsible bidder. In response to a request for competitive
bid proposals presented by municipalities, city authorities
and school districts Bonavitacola Electric and Boro
Developers often find themselves competing against one
another for the award of public work project contracts. Bid
specifications presented by soliciting municipalities, city
authorities and school districts require that participating
contractors promise, attest, or otherwise certify that the
participating contractor will comply with the Pennsylvania
Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §$165-1 et. seq. and/or the
Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §276 et seq. and pay workers
employed in the performance of the contract the applicable
prevailing wage. Bid specifications require that the
contractor awarded the public work project submit payroll

reports certifying compliance with the prevailing wage laws

e

to the awarding authority. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Prevailing Wage Act the secretary of the Department
establishes a minimum prevailing wage rate for each craft
and classification involved in the craft. It is the -
responsibility of a contractor to properly classify the work
performed by a worker and to pay the worker the applicable
prevailing wage rate as set by the secretary of the
Department of Labor.

On or about April 28, 1999, Boro Developers and
Bonavitacola Electric submitted timely competitive bids to
the Ridley School District to procure the award of a public
contract to supply electrical construction to Ridley High
School in connection with contract No. 9778-329. Boro
Developers, Inc. underbid Bonavitacola Electric by
approximately $81,000.00 and was awarded the public works
contact by the Ridley School District to supply electrical
construction to Ridley High School. On February 20, 2001,
Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98, and Loca! Union
No. 654 became aware that Boro Developers, Inc. had also
been awarded public work contracts by the Neshaminy
School District in the calendar year of 1993 and by the
Department of the Navy in the calendar year of 1996. On
February 20, 2001, Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No.
98, and Local Union No. 654 became aware that Boro

Developers engaged in a fraudulent practice of

he

misclassifying the nature of the work performed by workers
employed in connection with the Ridley High School public
work and falsely pledged to comply with prevailing wage
laws- classifying workers who had performed electrical
construction as having provided duties of a laborer and
prepared Certified Payroll Reports reflecting the
misclassification. The fraudulent practice of misclassifying
workers permitted Boro Developers, Inc, to pay workers a
lower wage rate then would have been properly required by
the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-
Bacon Act and underbid its competition. On or about
February 20, 2001, in addition to Ridley School District
project, Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98, and
Local Union No. 654 became aware that Boro Developers
had engaged in the fraudulent practice of misclassifying
workers, falsifying certified payroll records and falsely
pledged to comply with prevailing wage laws in connection
with public work projects awarded to Boro Developers by
the Neshaminy School District and the Department of the
Navy. On or about February 20, 2001, Bonavitacola
Electric, Local Union No. 98, and Local Union No. 654
became aware that Boro Developers caused the frauculent
certified payroll records to be delivered by the Postal Service
or by a private or commercial interstate carrier to the

awarding agencies in violation of 18 U.S.C A. § 1341

., »

[relating to Mail Fraud]. Boro Developers submitted the bid
proposal to the Ridley School District with intent to engage
in the fraudulent practice of misclassifying workers’ job
status to subvert the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act
and/or the Davis-Bacon Act and gain an unfair competitive
advantage over other bidding contractors, such as
Bonavitacola Electric. But for Boro Developers investment
of the income, derived from its payment of lower wages in
violation of prevailing wage laws and as a result of its
fraudulent practice of misclassifying workers, into the
establishment or operation of Boro Developers, Bonavitacola
Electric would have been able to compete with Boro
Developers on a fair and honest basis and would have been
awarded the contract for public work by the Ridley School
District. Had the Ridley School District awarded the
contract for public work to Bonavitacola Electric,
Bonavitacola Electric would have realized of income and
revenue. Had the Ridley School District awarded the contract
for public work to Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98
and Local Union No. 654 would have realized income in the
form of contributions to the various multi-employer benefit

funds and the remittance of withholding of working dues anc

vacation funds.

C. The Essential Elements of Complaint

(i) Relationship of parties

is

The Amended Complaint provides factual
background and information about each of the parties,
identifying Boro Developers, Inc. and Bonavitacola Electric,
Inc. as companies who compete with each other for the
receipt of various electrical construction, service and
maintenance contracts awarded by local, state and federal
government, city authorities, school districts, and
commercial and industrial accounts in the Pennsylvania and-
New Jersey territories.

(ii) The Fraudulent Scheme

The Amended Complaint alleges that Boro
Developers, Inc. engaged in a course of conduct designed to
obtain the award of electrical contracts from the Ridley and
Neshaminy School Districts and the Department of the Navy
by fraudulently subverting the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage
Act and/or the Davis-Bacon Act. As described more fully
below, the pleading contains a series of fraudulent acts which
viewed in the entirety establishes Boro Developers, Inc.’s
scheme and plan to compete against other electrical
contractors on an unfair and dishonest basis.

(iii) Circumstances Constituting Fraud

The Amended Complaint provides factual allegations
detailing the circumstances constituting fraud. The Amended

Complaint identifies with specificity the nature of the fraud

perpetrated (1) Boro Developers, Inc. caused to be

-9-

submitted to authorities of the Ridley and Neshaminy School
Districts and the Department of the Navy competitive bids to
procure the awards of a public contract to supply electrical
construction and falsely pledged to comply with the
Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1 et seq.
and/or the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§276 et seq.; (2)
Boro Developers, Inc. caused to submit Certified Payroll
Reports with the Ridley and Neshaminy School Districts and
the Department of the Navy in connection with contracts it
was awarded falsely reporting the nature of the work
performed and applicable wage rate associated with certain
employees. The allegations in the Amended Complaint

identify documentation that demonstrates that during the

_time period of December 1999 through June 2001 Boro

Developers, Inc. falsifie’ ,7 weekly payroll reports in
connection with the Ridley School District public work
project; that during the time period of October 1996

through May 1997 Boro Developers, Inc. falsified 25 weekly
payroll reports in connection with the Department of the
Navy public work project; and that during the time period of
May 1993 through August 1993 falsified 15 weekly payroll
reports in connection with the Neshaminy School District

public work project.

(iv) Injury

-\0-

The Amended Complaint alleges that both Boro
Developers, Inc and Bonavitacola Electric, Inc. submitted
competitive bids to procure the award of the public work
project to supply electrical construction issued by the Ridley
School District and that Boro Developers, Inc. underbid
Bonavitacola Electric, Inc. and was awarded the contract.
The Amended Complaint provides factual allegations that
but for Boro Developers, Inc. investment of income it
realized from its fraudulent practices, Bonavitacola Electric,
Inc. would have been able to compete on a fair and honest
basis and being the second lowest bidder would have been
awarded the Ridley School District contract.

(v) Use of Mail/Wire Transmissions

The Amended Complaint alleges that to effect the

fraudulent scheme to procure the award of electrical |
construction contracts through its subversion of the
Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-Bacon

_ Act and carry out the coniracted duties Boro Developers, Inc.

knowingly and repeatedly used the United States Mails
and/or interstate wire transmissions in violation of 18 )
U.S.C.A. §1341 and §1343.
.D. The Rulings Below
The district court found that the Amended Complaint

sufficiently plead the element of “enterprise” required of a

RICO Complaint, but that it failed to plead the predicate acts

2k

of mail and wire fraud with sufficient particularity, finding
that the Amended Complaint did not contain any details of
predicate acts; failed to plead that predicate acts formed a
“pattern of racketeering activity”; and failed to plead that
Bonavitacola was injured as a direct result. The district court
dismissed the Amended Complaint’s RICO counts with
prejudice. |

The Court of Appeals agreed that that Amended
Complaint did not plead the predicate acts of mail and wire
fraud with sufficient particularity, but for reasons different
than the district court. The Court of Appeals acknowledged
that the Amended Complaint alleged that Boro Developers,
Inc. knowingly and repeatedly utilized the United Sates
mails and/or interstate wire transmissions to affect a
fraudulent scheme to obtain the award to electrical
construction contracts. The Court of Appeals acknowledged
that the Amended Complaint alleged that Boro submitted 3
separate competitive bids to 3 different issuing authorities to
gain the award public work projects and that each bid
contained fraudulent promises to comply with prevailing
wage laws. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
Amended Complaint provided details of in excess of 100
certified payrolls falsified by Boro, detailing including the

date of the falsification, the nature of the falsification, and

identify of the document containing the falsification.

<-.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Amended
Complaint did not plead the predicate acts of mail and wire
fraud with sufficient particularity because the pleading did
not identify any particular mail or wire transmission or how
any wire transmission are connected to the fraudulent
scheme. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the Amended
Complaint failed to plead that predicate acts formed a
“nattern of racketeering activity” and failed to plead that

Bonavitacola was injured as a direct result.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED ON
THE GROUND THAT THE RULING OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, THAT THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT INSUFFICIENTLY
PLEAD CIVIL RICO, WAS NOT A PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF THE RECOGNIZED |
PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF CIVIL RICO

A. RICO PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show "(1)

conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of ©
racketeering activity." ' The statute defines racketeering by a

list of criminal activities that constitute predicate acts for

1 Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 105, 114 (3d. Cir.2002); Sedima,
S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d

346 (1985).

te.

purposes of RICO. Among these predicate acts are mail
fraud and wire fraud, the predicate acts plaintiffs have
alleged here. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a). A RICO claimant
must establish a "pattern" of such predicate acts, and
demonstrate the scheme caused injury. Id.

(1) Pattern of Racketeering Activity

(a) Predicate Acts

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint finding that Bonavitacola Electric had
failed to sufficiently plead mail fraud as a predicate act.
Arriving at its ruling, the Court of Appeals appeared to
acknowledge that the Amended Complaint provides factual A
allegations detailing the circumstances constituting fraud and
that Boro Developers, Inc. knowingly and repeatedly used
the United States Mails and/or interstate wire transmissions
in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §1341 and §1343 to effect the
fraudulent scheme. The Court of Appeals deemed the
pleading to have insufficiently plead the predicate act of mail
fraud on the basis that the Amended Complaint (1) “does
not identify any particular mail or wire transmission” or (2)
“allege how any wire transmission are connected to the
fraudulent scheme.”

If the strict standard of pleading a predicate act of

mail/wire fraud in a civil-RICO as stated by the Court of

Appeals which reviewed the instant appeal is correct, that is

-14-

to require the plaintiff pre-discovery to identify a particular
and precise mailing or wire transmission utilized by a
fraudulent offender to advance a fraudulent scheme, it would
impose an almost insurmountable burden on victims of
racketeering. The particulars of the dispatch or transmission
mode of a communication in almost every circumstance will
not be discovered by a victim until revealed through
discovery.

Paragraphs 31, 34, 35, 36, 37 of the Amended
Complaint specify acts of fraud engaged by Boro
Developers, alleging that Boro Developers engaged in the
fraudulent practice of falsely pledging to conform to
prevailing wage laws and falsifying certified payrolls and
other certifications which were required to be submitted to
the agencies who awarded Boro Developers public work
contracts. Paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint, which
accounts for some 23 pages of the Amended Complaint, and
paragraphs 49 and 56 of the Amended Complaint provide
notice of the fraudulent statements - identify specific payroll
reports by number which contained fraudulent statements -
provide the exact calendar dates to which the falsified payroll
reports apply - provide an explanation of the content of the
fraudulent statement - identify how the statement was false

or misleading - identify who made the fraudulent statements

naming Boro Developers, Frederick J. Shapiro and Bruce H.

Shah aeiebe seein

ee a

-15-

Shapiro - identify who received the fraudulent statements
naming Ridley School District, the Department of the Navy
and the Neshaminy School District as the agencies to whom
the fraudulent certified payroll records and other
certifications were delivered. The allegations contained in
paragraph 42, 49 and 56 of the Amended Complaint alleged
details of predicate acts as required by Rule 9(b) and place
each defendant on notice of the precise fraudulent
misconduct with which they are charged.

Paragraphs 41, 48, and 55 of the Amended Complaint
alleging that - to effect the fraudulent scheme and carry out
the contracted duties, Boro Developers, Frederick J. Shapiro
and Bruce H. Shapiro knowingly and repeatedly used the
United States Mails and/or interstate wire transmissions in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §1341 and §1343 - sets forth facts
sufficient to place Boro Developers Frederick Shapiro and -
Bruce Shapiro on notice that false reports were delivered by
mail or wire transmission. Paragraphs 31, 41, 48, and 55 of
the Amended Complaint describe how the fraudulent
statements contributed to the fraudulent scheme and the
purpose of the fraudulent statements. The paragraphs
describe that - Boro Developers, Frederick Shapiro and
Bruce Shapiro engaged in a fraudulent practice of falsely

attesting that Boro Developers, Inc. would comply with the

Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage act and/or the Davis-Bacon

ltée

Act in an effort to deceive the Ridley and Neshaminy School
Districts and the Department of the Navy, and Bonavitacola
Electric by making it appear that defendant Boro Developers
was a responsible and qualified contractor - that Boro
Developers, Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro engaged in
a course of conduct designed to obtain the award of electrical
contracts from the Ridley and Neshaminy School Districts
and the Department of the Navy by fraudulently subverting
the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-
Bacon Act, thereby gaining an unfair competitive advantage
over its competitors.

It is well settled that allegations of fraud pursuant to
the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., are subject
to the requirement of pleading in conformity with 9(b). The
Honorable Third Circuit Court Judge James Hunter, II]
interpreting Rule 9(b) for the Third Circuit and its

application to the RICO statute explained in Seville
Industrial Machinery Corp. v Southmost Machinery Corp., ”

that:
"Rule 9(b) requires plaintiff to plead with
particularity the circumstance of the alleged fraud in

order to place the defendants on notice of the precise

2 Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v Southmost Machinery Corp., 742

F.2d 786 (31d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 496 U.S. 1211, 105 S.Ct. 1179, 84
L.Ed.2d 327 (1985)

:

|
|

“i?

misconduct with which they are charged, and to
safeguard defendants against spurious charges of
immoral and fraudulent behavior. It is certainly true
that the allegations of date, place, or time, fulfill these
functions, but nothing in the rule requires them.
Plaintiffs are free to use alternative means of
injecting precision and some measure of

substantiation into their allegations of fraud."

In the instant matter appellants have provided the
defendants with more than adequate notice of the alleged
fraud. Appellants' Amended Complaint has detailed the
nature of the false and misleading statements, the source
documents reflecting the false and misleading statements, the
location of the false and misleading statements, the dates of
the false and misleading statements, and the manner in which
the statements were false and misleading. The facts
contained in the pleading direct Boro Developers, Frederick
Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro to the existence of specific
documents generated, prepared, executed or otherwise
certified by Boro Developers, Frederick Shapiro and Bruce
Shapiro which evidence the fraud which is the subject matter
of Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98 and Local
Union No. 654's claims. The pleaded facts afford Boro

Developers, Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro notice as

-18-

to which actions or communications are alleged to have been
fraudulent in conformity with notice requirements of Rule
9(b). The pleading contains factual allegations which are
specific and precise enough to give fair notice to Boro
Developers, Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro and permit
the preparation of a responsive pleading. The Amended
Complaint conforms to the pleading standards required of
plaintiffs seeking to advance a fraud based RICO complaint
in the Third Circuit. Accordingly, the rule of pleading as
announced by the reviewing Court of Appeal’s decision is
not a proper interpretation of the requirements of civil RICO
pleading practice. The Court of Appeal subjected the
allegations of predicate acts of mail fraud set forth in the
Amended Complaint to too strict a scrutiny. Construing the
Amended Complaint in light most favorable to Bonavitacola
Electric, Local-Union No. 98 and Local Union No. 654, the
Amended Complaint has alleged the fraud-based offenses
with sufficient particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss
under Rule 9(b).

(b) Relatedness and Continuity

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint finding that as a result the Amended
Complaint having failed to adequately plead predicate acts of
mail fraud, that the pleading alleges only 3 separate non-related

fraudulent transactions effected by Boro Developers, Inc.

Ahan at et RA WOR RISE He GE

Ae Le eet One Tr et aE ae aad es

RAOUL alt tortaren Maem,

-19-

The term "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined
as "at least two acts of racketeering activity" within a ten
year period. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5). To prove a pattern of
activity a plaintiff must show that the racketeering predicates
are related and that they amount to or pose a threat of
continued criminal activity. > Accordingly, a plaintiff must
show both relatedness and continuity. * Under the |
"relatedness" requirement, predicate acts are related if they
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events. ° The "continuity" prong of the analysis
requires "continuity of racketeering activity, or its threat.
Tabas, Id at 1295. It has been explained by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals that continuity may be either closed-ended,
referring to a closed period of repeated conduct, or open-
ended meaning past conduct that by its nature projects into
the future with a threat of repetition. With regard to close-
ended conduct, the related predicates must extend over a

long period of time, generally exceeding one year. Id. at

3 H.J., Inc. v Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, 492 U.S. 229, 109
S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989).

4 Tabas v Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert denied, --- U.S. ---,
115 S.Ct. 2269, 132 L.Ed.2d 275 (1995).

5 Leonard S. Feinberg, Inc. v Central Asi Capital Corporation, Limited,
1997 WL 230812 (E.D.Pa.).

-20-

1293. Opened ended continuity is established when the
commission of the predicates acts is a regular way of
conducting defendant's ongoing business or of conducting or
participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO enterprise.
Id at 1295.

In the instant matter paragraphs 31, 41, 42, 48, 49,
55, and 56 of the Amended Complaint set forth allegations
that Boro Developers have repeatedly utilized a series of the
mail/wire transmissions to further a fraudulent scheme to
subvert the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the
Davis-Bacon Act in an effort to ¢ xin a competitive advantage
over other electrical contractors who bid for public works
contracts. The predicate acts of mail/wire fraud are alleged in
the Amended Complaint to be repeated, alleged to have a
similar purpose, result, and method of commission. The
allegations of the Amended Complaint demonstrate that the
predicate acts have been plead with sufficiency and are
interrelated and not isclated acts of Boro Developers. The
actions of Boro Developers as alleged meet the "relatedness"
of RICO pleading requirement as defined by the Third
~ Circuit. |

The allegations of the Complaint demonstrate that
Boro Developers, Inc. engaged in predicate acts of

racketeering which had the same or similar purposes, results,

and method of commission in connection with the

Sable eile ty aRANG A Meiphtrenil’) ab Aiea Bs th Dak A ata SALVA Ye Mine LN mE ta ard Nate ME PRBS A tS Phan pel Be

ai.

procurement and management of 3 different electrical
construction contracts, which were issued by 3 different
public agencies, in 3 different geographic areas, and spanned
a time period of 8 years. The totality of the allegations set
forth in the Complaint suggest that Boro Developers
routinely does business through the use of the predicate acts
or that there is real threat that Boro Developers will do so in
the future. Construing the Amended Complaint in light most
favorable to Bonavitacola Electric, Local Union No. 98 and
Local Union No. 654, the Amended Complaint has alleged,
the predicate acts of Boro Developers as alleged in the
Complaint meet the relatedness continuity and requirement
as defined by the United States Supreme Court.

(2) INJURY

(a) Bonavitacola Electric

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Amended
Complaint upon the finding that Bonavitacola Electric, Inc.
Local Union No. 98 and Local Union No. 654 had no
standing to bring the suit on the grounds that their injury did
not bear a direct relation to the racketeering activity of Boro
Developers. Arriving at its conclusion the Court of Appeals
acknowledged and accepted, by way of its citation of
Commercial Cleaning Services v Collin Services Systems,
inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2™ Cir. 2001), that standing to bring suit

pursuant to the RICO statute has been conferred upon

22.

plaintiffs similarly situated to Bonavitacola Electric. In

Commercial Cleaning Services , a cleaning service who was

the second lowest bidder on a competitively bid janitorial
service contract, brought suit against its direct competitor
alleging that the competitor engaged in a pattern of
racketeering through an illegal immigrant hiring scheme
which allowed the competitor to gain an unfair competitive
advantage over the cleaning service. The cleaning service
alleged that but for the competitor's pattern of racketeering,
the contract awarded to his competitor would have been
awarded to the cleaning service. The United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, ruled that the cleaning service
suffered a direct injury pursuant to the RICO statute as a
result of its competitor's pattern of racketeering activity. The
' paragraphs of the Amended Complaint allege that
Bonavitacola Electric, Inc. similar to the plaintiff in

Commercial Cleaning Services was the second lowest bidder

on public work projects who was underbid by a competitor
engaged in a pattern of racketeering. The paragraphs of the
Amended Complaint allege that Bonavitacola Electri, Inc.,

similar to the plaintiff in Commercial Cleaning Services,

that but for the competitor's pattern of racketeering
Bonavitacola Electric, would have able to compete in a fair

and honest basis and would have been awarded the contract

furnished by Ridley School District. There appears no

i.

difference in the injury alleged to have been suffered by the

victim of racketeering in the Commercial Cleaning Services

and the instant case. The Amended Complaint alleges that
Boro Developers was able to underbid its competition -
because its scheme to misclassify the class of a worker
permitted it to pay less wages for electrical construction. The
Complaint alleges that Boro Developers was able to qualify
for public work projects because it falsely pledged to comply
with prevailing wage laws. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeal’s rule of pleading that the Amended Complaint need
indicate the degree or extent to which Boro’s bid was lower
than Bonavitacola’ bid or specifically detail whether Boro’s
bid had lower labor costs than Bonavitacola’s bid to satisfy
the notice pleading requirement is not a proper interpretation
of the requirements of civil RICO pleading practice. The
Court of Appeal subjected the allegations of injury as set
forth in the Amended Complaint to a standard of scrutiny not
applicable to notice pleading. Construing the Amended
Complaint in light most favorable to Bonavitacola Electric,
the Amended Compiaint has alleged injury with sufficient
particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).

(b) Local Union No. 98 & Local Union No. 654

The Court of Appeal entered a finding that injury

suffered by the labor unions was indirect the on the grounds

xs

that the Amended Complaint did not allege allegations to
show how the revenues would have been realized by the
unions in the event that Bonavitacola Electric had been
awarded the electrical construction contract. Paragraphs 14
and 15 of the Complaint allege that Local Union No. 98 and
Local Union No. 654 supplied electrical workers to
Bonavitacola Electric and received an income flow from
Bonavitacola Electric in the form of contributions to multi-
employer benefit plans for workers employed on public work
projects. The Complaint provides that Local Union No. 98
and Local Union No. 654's loss of contributions and
remittance is a direct result of Bonavitacola Electric's
unsuccessful bid of the public works contact. Local Union
No. 98 and Local Union No. 654's loss of contributions and
remittance is reasonably foreseeable, anticipated and a
natural consequence of Boro Developers' RICO violation.
The Court of Appeals rule of pleading requiring that the
Amended Complaint rieecd more specifically detail how the
revenues would follow in the event Bonavitacola had been
awarded the contract to satisfy the notice pleading
requirement is not a proper interpretation of civil RICO
pleading practice. The Court of Appeal subjected the
allegations of injury as set forth in the Amended Complaint

to a standard of scrutiny not applicable to notice pleading.

Construing the Amended Complaint in light most favorable

26.

to Local Union No. 98 and Local Union No. 654, the
Amended Complaint has alleged injury with sufficient
particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petitioners respectfully
i pray that this Honorable Court exercise its broad power to

minister justice and grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

MARINO & ASSOCIATES, PC

301 Wharton Street -

Philadelphia, Pa 19147

Telephone: 4215) 462-3200 ;

A

By: Va — :

EAR SR ki SARE a RA Na TAG GRRE ae RR ARIEL cet ad Sa oR Sa Sei PALER EELS LE A RENE Phe

at a F, Maino, quire

éy for Petyffoners

Att

- App. 1 -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-1713

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC CONTRACTOR, INC.;
LOCAL UNION NO. 654 INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS; LOCAL
UNION NO. 98 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS; CURTIS BELL

¥.

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC; FREDERICK J. SHAPIRO;
BRUCE H. SHAPIRO

Bonavitacola Electric Contractor;
Local Union No. 98, International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-05508)
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)
October 30, 2003

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,

NYGAARD and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

+ ea, EOS «

AR BY DG atid

- App. 2 -

(Opinion filed December 8, 2003)

OPINION

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Bonavitacola Electric Contractor appeals the District
Court's order dismissing its amended complaint for failing to
state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-68 ("RICO"). Because
we conclude that the amended complaint fails to allege
sufficiently that the defendant committed a pattern of
racketeering activity as required under RICO and that the
plaintiffs suffered direct injury as a result, we affirm the

judgment of the District Court.

I
Facts and Procedural Posture
On — October 31,2001, Bonavitacola Elcctric
Contractor, along with two labor unions and one individual,’

filed a 27-count complaint against a competitor electric

' For convenience we will use "Bonavitacola" as a collective
reference to the four plaintiff-appellants: Bonavitacola Electric
Contractor; Local Union No. 654, International Brotherhood of Electric
Workers; Local Union No. 98, International Brotherhood of Electric

Workers; and Curtis Bell, an employee of Boro Developers, Inc.

- App. 3 -

contractor, Boro Developers, Inc., and two of Boro's
officers-employees, Frank and Bruce Shapiro.” Bonavitacola
alleged that, over a period of ten years, Boro submitted
competitive bids to perform electrical work on_ public
projects by the Ridley School District, the Neshaminy
School - District, and the United States Department of the
Navy. Bonavitacola alleges that each of these three bids
contained Boro's "fraudulent" promise to comply with
prevailing wage law (the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act,
43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 165-1, and the federal Davis-Bacon Act,
40 U.S.C. §§ 276 et seq.), and as a result Boro was awarded
each of the three contracts over Bonavitacola, the second .
highest bidder. Bonavitacola further alleges that, in
connection with each of the three projects, Boro submitted
numerous certified payroll reports (requirements under
prevailing wage law)-that fraudulently misclassified certain
employees’ activity as "labor" rather than "electrical."
Bonavitacola generally alleges that Boro's conduct involved
"repeated" (but unspecified) instances of mail fraud and wire
fraud, which constitute a predicate act under RICO.
Bonavitacola and the labor unions brought 24 counts against

Boro and the Shapiros under §§ 1962(a), 1962(c), and

P) e . e
“ For convenience we will use "Boro" as a collective reference to the

defendants-appellees.

Le

EA APL DT OO PR ae,

eS a

- App. 4 -

1962(d)° of RICO as well as two counts under state law. In
addition, co-plaintiff Curtis Bell brought one count against
Boro and the Shapiros under state prevailing wage law.

In October 2002, Judge Baylson of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted Boro's motion to dismiss Bonavitacola's complaint.
See Bonavitacola Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Boro Developers,
Inc., No. CIV.A.01-5508, 2002 WL 31388806 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
23, 2002) ("Bonavitacola F'). Specifically, the District Court
found that the complaint did not state a claim under RICO
because it (1) did not contain any specific allegation of acts
of mail or wire fraud, (2) failed to explain how any of the
alleged acts by the defendants furthered the scheme to
defraud or was incident to an essential part of that scheme,
and (3) contained insufficient evidence as to enterprise,
relatedness, and continuity. /d. *4. But the District Court also

granted Bonavitacola leave to amend the complaint, and, in

the form of a detailed requirements for including a "RICO

Case Statement," instructed Bonavitacola on filing a
sufficient RICO complaint. /d. *5.

Bonavitacola filed an Amended Complaint on
November 11, 2002, but made very few substantive changes

from the original complaint. It added numerous

' Eight counts alleging violations of § 1962(d) of RICO were
subsequently withdrawn on July 1, 2002.

- App. 5 -

subparagraphs specifically identifying each of the various
certified payroll reports that allegedly misclassified the
activities of either Curtis Bell or an "unnamed black male
employee" as "labor" rather than "electrical." See Amended
Complaint, {/f| 42A(2) (a)-(aaaa),

42B(2)(a)-(y) and 42C(2)(a)-(p) (App. at AI9-A44).
Bonavitacola also added a brief discussion of supplemental
jurisdiction, removed the § 1962(d) Counts (XVI-XXIV) that
the parties had previously agreed to strike, and added an
allegation (4 109) to Curtis Bell's state law claim (Count
XVIII). But Bonavitacola did not include the RICO Case
Statement as the District Court had required.

In February 2003, the District Court granted Boro's
‘motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6). See Bonavitacola Elec.
Contractor, Inc. v. Boro Developers, Inc., No. CIV.A.01-
5508, 2003 WL 329145 (B.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2003)
("Bonavitacola II). The District Court found that the
Amended Complaint sufficiently pled the element of
"enterprise" required of a RICO complaint, but that it failed
to plead the predicate acts of mail and .wire fraud with
requisite particularity, failed to plead that predicate acts
formed a "pattern of racketeering activity," and failed to

plead that Bonavitacola was injured as a direct result. The

District Court also held that Bonavitacola could not base its

- App. 6 -

RICO claims on alleged violations of the Davis-Bacon Act
because it does not provide a private right of action. The
District Court dismissed the Amended Complaint's RICO
counts with prejudice and dismissed the state law counts
without prejudice. Bonavitacola appeals the District Court's
finding that the Amended Complaint failed to plead

predicate acts, pattern of racketeering activity, and injury.

Il
Standard of Review

Our review of the order dismissing the Amended
Complaint for failing to state a claim under RICO is plenary
Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist. v. Keystone Financial, Inc., 189
F.3d 321,327 (3d Cir. 1999). In applying the same standard
as the District Court, we will construe the complaint
liberally, take all material allegations as admitted, and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. /d. "We
will not affirm the dismissal unless the plaintiffs could prove
no set of facts that would entitle them to relief." /d. (citing
Univ. of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat, Marwick, Main &
Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1537-38 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Ill
RICO Pleading Requirements

- App. 7 -

RICO provides a private civil action to recover treble
damages for injuries resulting “%:2 a defendant's
"racketeering activities" in violation of RICO's substantive
provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Under one such substantive
provision, it is unlawful to conduct an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activities. /d. § 1962(c). Under
another, it is unlawful to invest income derived from a
pattern of racketeering activities. /d. § 1962(a). To allege
successfuily a violation under either of these subsections, a
plaintiff must allege "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity" as well as an
injury resulting from the conduct constituting a violation.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
"Racketeering activity" means one of the various predicate
acts identified in the statute, including acts "indictable"
under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1). When fraud is the predicate act, the heightened
pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
applies. Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 105,114 & n.6 (3d
Cir. 2002). A "pattern of racketeering activity means" at
least two predicate acts that "are related and that amount to
or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." HJ, Inc. v.

Northwestern Bell Tete. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).

- App. 8 -

IV

Analysis of the Amended Complaint

The District Court dismissed the Amended
Complaint for failing to state a claim under § 1962(a) and §
1962(c) of RICO. We agree with the District Court that the
Amended Complaint did not plead the predicate acts of mail
and wire fraud with particularity and did not adequately
allege a "pattern of racketeering activity" that directly
resulted in Bonavitacola's direct injury.
A. Predicate Act

Bonavitacola attempts to plead that Boro committed
mail or wire fraud as a predicate act to violations of R/CO.
Mail or wire fraud consists of (1) a scheme to defraud, (2)
use of the mail or interstate wires to further that scheme, arid
(3) fraudulent intent. United States v. Pharis, 298 F.3d
228,233 (3d Cir. 2002). When mail or wire fraud is the
predicate act to a RJCO violation, the plaintiff must allege
that mailings are related to the underlying fraudulent scheme,
even though mailings need not be an esseitial element of the
scheme and need not’ themselves’ contain § any
misrepresentations. Jabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1294 & n.
18 (3d Cir. 1995); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fide/cor, Inc., 926
Fold 1406, 1413 (3d Cir. 1991). Under Federal Rule of Civil

- App. 9 -

Procedure 9(b), the circumstances constituting fraud must be
pleaded with particularity, though fraudulent intent may be
generally alleged. In the context of R/CO mail fraud
allegations, this means that the complaint must "identify the
purpose of the mailing within the defendant's fraudulent
scheme and specify the fraudulent statement, the time, place,
and speaker and content of the alleged misrepresentation."
Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 2001 n.10 (3d Cir. 1999).
Put another way, the "who, what, when and where details of
the alleged fraud" are required. Allen Neurosurgical Assoc.,
Inc. v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. CIV-A-99-4653,
2001 WL 41143 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2001).

The Amended Complaint alleges that "the defendant
Boro Developers, Inc. knowingly and repeatedly used the
United States mails and/or interstate wire transmissions in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 and § 1343." Amended
Complaint ¢ 41. The Amended Complaint also alleges that
each of the three bids contained a fraudulent promise to
comply with prevailing wage law and that Boro falsified
over one hu: tired certified payroll reports in connection with
the three contracts. But the Amended Complaint does not
identify any particular mail or wire transmissions or allege
how any mail or wire transmissions are connected to a

fraudulent scheme.

- App. 10 -

Even if Bonavitacola had alleged in the Amended
Complaint that the certified payroll reports were the
underlying U.S. mail or interstate wire transmissions, it is
not at all clear from the Amended Complaint how they relate
to an underlying fraudulent scheme. Bonavitacola alleges
that the intent of the fraudulent scheme was "to obtain the
award of electrical contracts from the Ridley and Neshaminy
School Districts and the Department of the Navy." Amended
Complaint § 41. :%ut the Amended Complaint contains no
alleged facts connecting the certified payroll reports, which
Boro submitted after being awarded the contract, to the
alleged purpose of the fraudulent scheme, which was to

obtain the award of the contracts.

B. Pattern of Racketeering

To plead sufficiently the requisite "pattern of
racketeering activity," a R/CO plaintiff must allege predicate
acts that are related and amount to or pose a threat of

continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239.

1. Relatedness
Predicate acts are related if they "have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing

characteristics and are not isolated events." H./. Inc., 492

- App. 11 -

U.S. at 240; Tabas, 47 F.3d at 1292. In Kehr Packages, we
observed that relatedness "will nearly always be satisfied in
cases alleging at least two acts of mail fraud stemming from
the same fraudulent transaction." 926 F.2d at 1414; see also
Banks v. Walk, 918 F.2d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 1990)
(unspecified acts of mai! and wire fraud all related to a single
real estate transaction satisfied relatedness requirement).

As discussed above, the Amended Complaint fails to
allege predicate acts of mail or wire fraud. At best, the
Amended Complaint alleges three separate fraudulent
transactions: the Ridley School District bid, the Neshaminy
School Distict bid, and the U. S. Navy bid, each of which
contained the allegedly false promise to comply with
prevailing wage law. Each of those bids is related to the
various, allegedly falsified certified payroll reports prepared
for the same project. See Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1415.

However, the Amended Complaint does not allege
that the three fraudulent transactions are related to each
other. Bonavitacola ignored the District Court's clear
instructions in Bonavitacola I to state in the Amended
Complaint "how the alleged predicate acts relate to each
other as part of a common plan." Bonavitacola I, at * 5.
| Rather, Bonavitacola retained the initial complaint's vague

and conclusory allegations that predicate acts of fraud were

related by their similar purpose of procuring electrical

SS RRR ETS ns Es ees AMBP hi eccairnet

Keres

Fe Dinara il

- App. 12 -

construction contracts. This is not an allegation of common
plan, and without more-such as allegations detailing the
transactions’ similar results, participants, victims, manner of
commission, or other characteristics-will not satisfy the

relatedness requirement. H.J Inc., 492 U.S. at 240.

2. Continuity

Continuity is "both a closed- and open-ended
concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated
conduct or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the
future with a threat of repetition." H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 241.
For closed-ended continuity, a RICO plaintiff must allege "a
series of related predicates lasting a ‘substantial period of
time." Hughes v. Consol-Penn. Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594,609
(3d Cir. 1991) (citing HU.,Jnc., 492 U.S. at 242). For open-
ended continuity, the plaintiff must allege a "threat of
continuity" that "exists when the predicate acts are a part of
defendant's 'regular way of doing business.'" Hughes, 945
F.2d at 609-10 (citing H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 242).

Finding no relatedness between the three separate
transactions, we cannot measure continuity by collectively
considering the numerous alleged acts of deceit associated
with all three bids, which spanned eight years. Thus the
Amended Complaint lacks predicate acts occurring over a

"substantial period of time" necessary for a proper allegation

- App. 13 -

of closed-ended continuity.

Additionally, nothing in the Amended Complaint
suggests that Boro's alleged fraudulent transactions are its
regular way of doing business. There is no allegation that
Boro submitted other bids in which they falsely promised to
comply with prevailing wage law in order to get that
business. As the District Court properly noted, "[i]f, for
example, over these eight years, Defendants had 1 00-
different contracts, the fact that they may have committed
fraud as to three of them (Ridley School District, Neshaminy
School District, and the Department of Navy) would be
plainly insufficient to support a scheme under RICO." See
Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1418 (with "no indication that
[defendants] made otner false statements or treated other
customers in a similar manner," the complaint did not
indicate that fraud was a regular way of doing business).

Thus, the Amended Complaint did not allege fraud
that was related or continuous so as to plead sufficiently the

"pattern of racketeering activity" element of a RICO claim.

C. Injury

To have standing, a RICO plaintiff must also show
that the alleged RICO violations proximately caused injury
to the plaintiffs business property. 18 D.S.C. § 1964(c);
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268

a Rena EEE > TA ea

Bat MEAL LAS ADEM BIS SPEER IN

RL RS a TS ee ee eae

- App. [4-

(1992). An indirect injury remotely caused by the RICO
violation will not satisfy proximate cause requirement.

Bonavitacola's alleged injury is that, as a result of
Boro's false promise to comply with the prevailing wage law,
Bonavitacola was denied the opportunity to compete with
Boro "on a fair and honest basis," and consequently lost
income and profits that it would have earned if it had been
awarded the Ridley School District* contract.

The Amended Complaint does not allege how Boro' s
promise to comply with prevailing wage law influenced
Ridley School District's decision to award its contract to
Boro and not Bonavitacola. For example, the Amended
Complaint does not indicate the extent to which Boro's bid
was lower than Bonavitacola's bid or whether Boro's bid had
lower labor costs than Bonavitacola's bid. Nor does it allege
that Boro's bid incorporated any misclassified wages, or that
the amount by which Boro underbid Bonavitacola was.
attributable to misclassified wages. In contrast, the Second
Circuit's decision in Commercial Cleaning Services, LLC v.
Colin Service Systems, Inc. (which Bonavitacola cites in
support of its direct-injury argument) illustrates proper

allegations of competitor-injury in a RICO complaint: "The

* Bonavitacola does not explain why only the Ridley School District

bid formed the basis for its damages allegations.

- App. 15 -

complaint asserts that Pratt & Whitney chose Colin because
Colin submitted ‘significantly lower’ bids in a ‘highly
competitive’ price sensitive market. According to the
complaint, Colin was able to underbid its competitors
because its scheme to hire illegal immigrant workers
permitted it to pay well below the prevailing wage for legal
workers." 271 F.3d 374,382 (2d Cir. 2001). A similar
description does not apply to Bonavitacola's complaint.

Furthermore, judging by the facts in the Amended
Complaint, Boro' s promise to comply with prevailing wage
law did not become a false promise until sometime after
Boro had been awarded the bid, when it began to submit
(allegedly) false certified payroll reports. As Bonavitacola
had already lost the bid, it is not at all obvious what its injury
could have been. Nor is any explanation provided in the
Amended Complaint.

The labor unions' alleged injury is even more remote
than Bonavitacola's. The unions state that they would have
received additional contributions to their multi-employer
benefit plans for employees if Bonavitacola had been
awarded the contract. The District Court correctly noted that
the Amended Complaint "does not state the requisite
allegations to show how the contract revenues following to

Plaintiff Bonavitacola, assuming it had been awarded any

contract, would have resulted in benefit to the plaintiff labor

th TOES BL GRE ANITA Stes

pti hE Ak Scots BRL Sg eR SEE char

- App. 16 -

unions." Bonavitacola IJ, at *12. Nor does the Amended
Complaint allege that the labor unions have standing to sue
for "these types of damages which, presumably are for the
benefit of the union members." /d.

For these reasons, we conclude that neither
Bonavitacola nor the labor unions have alleged the direct

injury required for standing under RICO.

¥

Conclusion

We conclude that Bonavitacola did not allege
predicate acts of fraud with the requisite particularity, did not
allege a "pattern of racketeering activity" and did not allege
direct injury required for standing under RICO. Thus we

affirm the judgment of the District Court.

TO THE CLERK:

Please file the foregoing Opinion.

By the Court,

/s/ Thomas L. Ambro Circuit

Judge

- App. 17 -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-1713

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC CONTRACTOR, INC.;
LOCAL UNION NO. 654 INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS; LOCAL
- UNION NO. 98 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS; CURTIS BELL

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC; FREDERICK J. SHAPIRO;
BRUCE H. SHAPIRO

Bonavitacola Electric Contractor;
Local Union No. 98, International

Brotherheod of Electrical Workers,

Appellants

Appeal trom the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-05508)
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)
October 30, 2003

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,

NY GAARD and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

- App. 18 -

JUDGMENT

tr AR ar

[his cause came on to be heard on the record before the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

a i

Pennsylvania and was submitted pursuant to Third Circuit
LAR 34.1(a) on October 30, 2003.

On consideration whereof, IT IS ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the District

Court dated February 13, 2003, is hereby affirmed. Costs

taxed against appellants. All of the above in accordance with

ee eee es BOS A ete ee cal al <->

the opinion of this Court.

ATTEST:
“/s/ Marcio M. Wilson”

Clerk

ee

Dated: December 8, 2003

- App. 19 -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BONAVITACOLA ELECTRIC

CONTRACTOR, INC., et.al. 3 CIVIL ACTION
Plaintitts,
. Vv.
BORO DEVELOPERS, INC., et al., | NO. 01-5508
Detendants.
MEMORANDUM
Baylson, J. February i2, 2003

The issue presented is whether Plaintiffs’ RICO
Compiaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. The Plaintiffs in the instant

action are: (1) Bonavitacola Eclectic Contractor, Inc.

("Bonavitacola'), a contractor that provides electrical
services to governmental agencies and commercial and
industrial accounts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey; (2) two
labor unions, Local Umon No. 654, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and Local Union No. 98,

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which

provide labor to electrical contractors such as Bonavitacola;

Oe ee Ee ee ee

- App. 20 -

and (3) Curtis Bell, an individual who 1s identified as an
employee, agent, servant or representative of one of the
Defendants, Boro Developers, Inc. (collectively,
"Plaintiffs").

The Defendants are identified as Boro Developers,
Inc. ("Boro"), a corporation engaged in the business of
providing electrical services to governmental and private
accounts, and two individuals, Frederick J, Shapiro and
Bruce J, Shapiro, both alleged to be officers and employees
of Defendant Boro, as Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Operating Officer of Boro, respectively, (collectively
Defendants”).

Plaintiffs brought their original Complaint under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 ("RICO") (24 Counts), and state law
claims (interference with prospective contractual relations,
unjust enrichment and under 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 260 (3

Counts)) In Bonavitacola Elec. Contractor. Inc. v. Boro

Developers. Inc., No. CIV.A.O]-5508, 2002 WL 31388806
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2002) ("Bonavitacola I"), this Court

granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint,
but granted leave to amend. This Court found that the

Complaint was "woefully short of the ... RICO

* The parties agreed to withdraw Counts XVI though XXIV of the
Complaint, which allege violations of § 1962(d) of RICO, on July, 2002.

- App. 21 -

requirements" because the Complaint; (1) did not contain
any specific allegation of acts of mail or wire fraud; (2)
failed to explain how any of the alleged acts by Defendants
furthered the scheme to defraud or was incident to an
essential part of that scheme; and (3) contained insufficient
allegations as to enterprise, relatedness and continuity. Id. at
*4. Although this Court believed that it would have been
justified in dismissing the Complaint -with prejudice, the
Court allowed Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint and set
forth specific guidelines for Plaintiffs to follow in amending
their Complaint, including a requirement that the Amended
Complaint, include or be accompanied by a "RICO Case

Statement," as described in Bonavitacola I. Id.'

Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on
November 11, 2002, and-Defendants filed their Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on December 3,2002. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I. Legal Standard on Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
When deciding a. motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6), the court may

look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its

attachments. See, Lordan v.Fox, Rothschild. O'Bnen &

Frankel: 20 F.3d 1251. 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The court must

- App. 22 -

accept as true all well pleaded allegations in the complaint
and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See Angelastro_v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc.; 764 F.2d

939,944 (3d Cir. 1985). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be

granted only when it is certain that no relief could be granted
under any set of facts that could be proved by the plaintiff.
See Ransom v. MalDIzzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988).

Il. Allegations of the Amended Complaint

As in its original Complaint, Plaintiff Bonavitacola
alleges it is a competito.: of Boro, and that, over a period of
years. Defendant Boro has solicited and received business
through competitive bids to various public entities located in
this district, and also the U.S. Department of Navy. A
requirement of the bids is that the contractor comply with the
Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 PA, STAT. ANN. §
165-1 et_seq., and the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276 et
seg. The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants, in
submitting bids on behalf of Defendant Boro, certified that
Boro would comply with the aforesaid Pennsylvania and
federal statutes, but knowingly and willfully submitted false
and fraudulently made bids, and Defendants engaged in a
fraudulent practice of falsifying Certified Payroll Reports

and other certifications, which were required to be submited

to the awarding agencies. (Am. Comp. §j 34.) The Amended

- App. 23 -

Complaint alleges that Defendant Boro received these
awards based upon the false certifications.

The first nine Counts of the Amended Complaint
charge a violation of § 1962(a) of RICO. In the first Count,
which is the most deta:led, Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges that
Defendant Boro submitted false certifications to the Ridley
School District, the U.S. Department of Navy and the

Neshaminy School District. In Bonavitacola I, the Court

found that, although the Complaint alleged conclusory terms
that Defendants committed mail or wire fraud there were no
specifics of dates of mailings or wire transmissions, and the
Complaint was completely conclusory, ignoring well settled
requirements for RICO pleadings in many cases previously

decided in this district. Bonavitacola I, 2002 WL 31388806,

“i.

The remaining eight Counts under § 1962(a) make
claims for each of the Plaintiffs (except Curtis Bell) against
the three Defendants, charged individually.

Counts X through XV (either specifically or by
incorporating previous paragraphs by reference) charge
violations of § 1962(c) of RICO by the Plaintiffs (except
Curtis Bell) against each Defendant individually, and allege
in each Count that the individual Defendant "conducted or
participated in the conduct of the affairs of Boro through a

pattern of racketeering as aforementioned." In the Amended

- App. 24 -

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Boro constituted
an "enterprise" (Am. Comp. § 39) and that Boro, Frederick
Shapiro, and Bruce Shapiro, are each a “person capable of
holding a. beneficial interest in property within the meaning
of 18 USCA § 1961(3).” Id. 4] 40, 47, 54.

Count XVI is brought by Plaintiff Bonavitacola
against all Defendants for interference with prospective
contractual relations; Count XVII is brought by Plaintiff
Bonavitacola against all Defendants for unjust enrichment;
and Count XVIII is brought by Plaintiff Curtis Bell against
all Defendants charging a violation of 43 PA. STAT. ANN, §

260.

Ill. Changes Made in the Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs made very few substantive changes from
the original to the Amended Complaint, and failed to include
a RICO case statement, despite this Court’s clear mandate
that they do so. Although Plaintiffs restructured the
allegations under “Jurisdiction and Venue,” the only
substantive change is the inclusion of a brief discussion on
supplemental jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs added subparagraphs (a)-(aaaa) under
paragraph 42(A)(2), subparagraphs (a)-(y) under paragraph
42(B)(2), and subparagraphs (a)-(p) under paragraph
42(C)(2). Although most, but not all, of the new

- App. 25 -

subparagraphs itemize specific Certified Payroll Reports and
dates, Plaintiffs do not set forth any details on the

requirements of RICQ, as specified in Bonavitacola 1.

The final changes made in the Amended Complaint
are that Counts XVI-XXIV of the original Complaint, which
alleged violations of § 1962(d) of RICO, are not included in
the Amended Complaint. Also, Plaintiffs added paragraph
109 in Count XVIII of the Amended Complaint alleging that
Defendants "agreed to pay Curtis Bell those wages and
muiti-employer benefits due to him as a result of his

performance of electrical constructed" at some job sites.

IV. Sufficiency of the Amended Complaint
As noted above, Plaintiffs® now assert RICO
violations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) and (c), which
state in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has
received any income derived, directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of racketeering activity or though
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person
has participated as a principal within the meaning of

§ 2, Title 18, United States Code, to use or invest,

' Only Plaintiffs Bonavitacola, Local Union No. 654, and Local Union
No. 98 assert RICO claims. Plaintiff Curtis Bell only asserts a violation
of 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 260 by all Defendants.

- App. 26 -

directly or indirectly, any part of such income or the
proceeds of such income in acquisition of any interest
in or the establishment or operation of any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962. To successfully plead a civil RICO
violation under these subsections, a plaintiff must allege
either "a pattern of racketeering activity" or the "collection of
an unlawful debt." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele. Co.
492 U.S. 229, 232, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195
(1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Dilff & Assoc..
Inc.. 483 U.S. 143; 154, 107 S. Ct. 2759. 97 L. Ed. 2d 121
(1987) ("[t]he heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation

of a pattern of racketeering.").
To be successful in a complaint relying on a pattern
of racketeering activity, a plaintiff must allege the details

required in the court's description of a RICO case statement

(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) or

- App. 27 -

racketeering activity. Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 105,
114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A. Enterprise

1. Section 1962(c)

Under § 1962(c), RICO liability requires conduct by
a "person employed by or associated with any enterprise." 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c). "Person" includes "any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
18 D.S.C. § 1961(3). "Enterprise" includes "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity," 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4). In order
to allege a RICO enterprise, the Third Circuit has identified
three elements: (1) that there be an ongoing organization; (2)
that the associates function as an ongoing unit; and (3) that

the enterprise is an entity separate and apart from the pattern

of activity in which it engages. Curtin v. Tillev Fire
Equipment Co., No, Crv,A.99-2373. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19467) at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1999) (citing U.S. v
Console. 13 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom., Curcio v. U.S., 511 U.S, 1076, 114 S. Ct. 1660, 128:L.
Ed.. 20. 377 (1994) and Markoff v.U.S., 513 U.S. 812. 115

S. Ct. 64, 1301. Ed. 2d 21 (1994)).
The leading case in the Third Circuit on the

- App. 28 -

distinctness requirement under § 1962(c) is Jaguar Cars. Inc.
v. Roval Oaks Motor Car Co., Inc.. 46 F3d 258 (3d Cir.
1995). In that case, the Third Circuit held that the defendant

"persons" must be separate and distinct from the named

enterprise. However, the Third Circuit in Jaguar Cars stated:

[W]e conclude that when officers and/or employees
‘operate and manage a legitimate corporation, and use
it to conduct, through interstate commerce, a pattern
of racketeering activity those defenck"1.1 At persons
are properly liable under § 1962(c).

Jaguar Cars, 46 F.3d at 269. In the Amended

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that individual Defendants —
Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro are officers of Boro,
which is alleged to be in the business of providing electrical
services (Am. Comp. § 9) and is both the "enterprise" (Am.

Comp.{ 39) and also a Defendant as to the claim made under
§ 1962(a) (Am. Comp, { 9). The issue is whether Plaintiffs’

allegations satisfy Jaguar Cars.

In Cedric Kushner Promotions Ltd. V. King, 533
U.S.: 158, 121 S. Ct. 2087,150 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2001). The

Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit’s interpretation of §

1902(c) in Jaguar Cars, and rejected the views of other
circuit courts requiring much more distinctness than a mere

Separation of a corporation and its officers. | While

acknowledging the split among the circuit courts concerning

- App. 29 -

how much distinctness was sufficient, the Supreme Court
held that it found nothing in the statute that required more
separateness than the formal legal distinction between a
person and a corporation. The Court ruled that § 1962(c)
"requires no more than the formal legal distinction between
‘person’ and 'enterprise' (namely, incorporation) that is
present here." King, 533 U.S. at 165, because a corporate
owner or employee was a natural person, the Court found
that he or she was distinct from the corporation itself, which
constituted a legally different entity with different rights and
responsibilities. The Court added, "a _ corporation
owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the
corporation itself, a legally different entity with different
rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status," Id.
at 163.

Applying this principle, the Supreme Court found
that King, as all individual person, was legally distinct from
his corporation. Thus, the Court held that the distinctness
requirement was met when a corporate employee unlawfully
conducted the affairs of the corporation of which he was the
sole owner, regardless of whether he conducted those affairs
within, or beyond, the scope of corporate authority.

In their § 1962(c) claims against the Defendants
Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro, Plaintiffs allege that

Defendant Boro constituted an 'enterprise" through which

- App. 30 -

"persons," Boro, Frederick Shapiro, and Bruce Shapiro,
acted. ’ Because Defendants Frederick Shapiro and Bruce
Shapiro are alleged to be employees and corporate officers of
Boro, the alleged enterprise, Plaintiff may bring § 1962(c)
claims against them. The Court, therefore, finds that
Plaintiffs’ have adequately pled "enterprise" under § 1962(c),

as to Defendants Frederick J. Shapiro and Bruce H. Shapiro.

2. Section 1962(a)
Although § 1962(c) requires a distinction between a.

person and an enterprise, there is no_ distinctiveness

requirement under § 1962(a). Leonard A. Feinberg, Inc. v.

Central Asia Capital Com., 974 F. Supp. 822, 850 (E.D. Pa.

1997) (citations omitted). "[A)n entity can be both an
enterprise and a defendant for purposes of § 1962(a): Kehr
Packages v. Fidelcor, Inc.. 926 F.2d 1406. 1411 (3d Cir.
1991), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1222, 111 S. Ct. 2839, 115 L.
Ed. 2d 1007 (1991).

Therefore, Boro can be both a defendant and the

’ Plaintiffs have not carefully pleaded the allegations as to Boro. Plaintiff
do not indicate Boro as a defendant in their introductory headings as to
Counts X-XV; which allege violations of § 1962(c). As noted above,
Plaintiffs assert BORO is the enterprise as to § 1962(c). However, also
indicating that Boro is a "person" under § 1962(c) is somewhat
contradictory. Further by the wholesale incorporation of the § 1962(a)
Counts (where Boro is a defendant) into the § 1962(c) Counts, Plaintiffs
have, by their literal allegations, named Boro as a defendant under §

- App. 31 -

enterprise under § 1962(a), and the Court finds that Plaintiffs
that Plaintiffs have adequately "enterprise" under § 1962(a)
against all Defendants.

Thus, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded an
"enterprise," but as the following discussion shows, Plaintiff

has not satisfied the other pleading requirements of RICO.

B. Pattern of Racketeering Activity

Bonavitacola | summarized the legal requirements of

pleading a pattern of racketeering activity, and required
Plaintiffs to allege:
b. As to the racketeering activity alleged under each
RICO Count,
include the following:
i. List each predicate act which the Plaintiffs allege
constitutes the RICO violation, including such specifics
as names, dates and types of communications or acts.
ii. Describe how each predicate act is fraudulent and/or
part of a pattern of racketeering activity,
ili. State how the alleged predicate acts relate to each
other as part of a common plan.
Bonavitacola I, 2002 WL 31388806. at *5.
i. Predicate Acts

1962(c). If Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint was otherwise sufficient, the
Court would overlook these pleading defects.

- App. 32 -

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants committed various
unspecified predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud.
(A.m. Compl. 4 41, 48, 55,) The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341, applies only where the defendant uses the U.S. mails
as “part of the execution: of the fraudulent scheme. Schmuck
v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 1031.
Ed. 2d 734 (1989). The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343,

"is identical to the mail fraud statute except it speaks of
communications transmitted by wire," i.e. telephone, radio,
or television, and does not apply to _ intrastate

communications. United States v. Frev, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d

Cir. 1994). The Court of Appeals has noted that "cases

construing the mail fraud statute are applicable to the wire

fraud statute as well." Id. at 797 //.2 (quoting United States
v. Tarnopol., 561 F-2d 466,475 (3d Cir. 1977).

The requisite elements of mail or wire fraud are: (1)
a scheme to defraud; (2) use of the transmissions to further
that scheme; and (3) fraudulent intent. Werther v. Rosen, No.
CIV.AO2.3589, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22262. at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 30,2002) (citing U.S. 'V. Pharis. 298 F. 3d 228, 233

(3d Cir. 2.002)). "A scheme or artifice to defraud need not be
fraudulent on its face, but must involve some sort of
fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions reasonably

calculated to deceive persons—of ordinary prudence and

comprehension." Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1415 (quoting

- App. 33 -

United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531: .535 (3d Cir.

1978)). Further, “when alleging mail and wire fraud as

predicate acts in a RICO claim, plaintiff's pleadings must
identify the purpose of the mailing within the defendant's
fraudulent scheme and specify the fraudulent statement, the
time, place, and speaker and content of the alleged
misrepresentation." Werther, 2002 U.S. Dist.. LEXIS 22262,
at *7 8 (citing Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 201 n.10
(3d Cir. 1999)).

In Allen Neurosurgical Assoc., Inc. v. Lehigh Valley
Health Network, No. CIV.A.99-4653.2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2001), Judge O'Neill set forth the

principles under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which
provides that "in all averments of fraud and mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud and mistake shall be stated
with particularity." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). When the predicate
acts in a RICO complaint sound in fraud, Rule 9(b) applies.
Id. at *8 (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F..2d 331, 357 (3d Cir.
1989»). "Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead with

particularity the 'circumstances' of the alleged fraud in order
to place defendants on notice of the precise misconduct with
which they are charged, and to safeguard against spurious
charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior." Id. (quoting
Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corn., 742
F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211,

- App. 34 -

105 S. Ct. 1179,841. Ed. 2d 327 (1985)). This generally

requires the plaintiff to plead the "Who, what, when, and

where details of the alleged fraud," Id. (quoting U.S. ex rel.
Waris v. StatfBuilders, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-1969, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2998, at *4 (B.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1999). While a

complaint need. not set out "precise words.;' it should
adequately describe the nature and subject of an alleged
misrepresentation. Id. (citing Seville, 742 F.2d at 791).
Nonetheless, courts should not focus too narrowly"
on the particularity language of Rule 9(b) and should take
into. account the "general simplicity and flexibility
contemplated by the rules." Id. In applying the principles of

Rule 9(b) in Allen Neurosurgical Assoc., Inc., Judge O'Neill

stated, in relevant part:
[Most of the petential predicate acts listed in the
RICO Case Statement are not pled with the
particularity required by Rule 9(b). Plaintiff does not
plead the "date, place or time" of the alleged
misrepresentations, which, though not an absolute
requirement under Rule 9('0), would "inject precision
and some measure of substantiation" into the

allegations. See Seville, 742 F.2d at 791. Nor does

plaintiff plead “who made the representations" at

issue. See Satporito v. Combustion Engg’g, 843 F .2d

66, 675 (3d Cir. 1988) cert. granted and judgment

- App. 35 -

vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1049 (1989) ...

Similarly, plaintiff does not plead "who received the

allegedly fraudulent information." Id,; Smith v. Berg,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18298, No. 99-2133, 1999
WL 1081065, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1999)...

Finally, plaintiff pleads nothing of the content of each
alleged misrepresentation. Saporito, 843 F.2d at 675

(allegations should include "the general content of the

representations"); Rolo V. City Investin Co.

Liquidating Trust 155 F.3d 644, 658 (3d Cir. 1998)

(allegations of mail fraud should contain the "precise
content of each particular mailing"); Smith, 1999 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 18298, 1999 WL 1081065, at *5 (same).

In short, plaintiff is not pleading "acts" of mail and
wire fraud. .. . Where the Rule 9(b) standard applies,
plaintiff is not entitled to the inference that the essential
elements of mail and wire fraud occurred; plaintiff must
plead those essential elements with particularity.

Allen Neurosurgical Assoc.. Inc.. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

284, at *9-12.

In the present case, because Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants "knowingly and repeatedly used the United
States Mail and/or interstate wire transmissions in violation

of 18 U.S.C.A. §1341 and § 1343" to "effect the fraudulent

- App. 36 -

scheme" (Am. Compl. § 41, 48, 55), Rule 9(b) applies to the
Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint does not
contain any details of predicate acts, as required under Rule

9(b) and also required by Bonavitacola I, as stated above.

There are no specific allegations of (1) the purpose of
the mailing within the defendants fraudulent scheme, (2) the
content of the fraudulent statement, (3) how the statement or
any other communications was false or misleading, (3) the
time, place, and speaker and content of the alleged
misrepresentation, (4) how the fraudulent statement
contributed to the alleged fraudulent scheme, (5) 'who made
the fraudulent statement at issue, or (6) who received the

fraudulent statement. Bonavitacola I, clearly set forth that

such detail would be required in the Amended Complaint
The allegations that Plaintiffs have added (the subparagraphs
in § 42) do not add the requisite information. These
subparagraphs only allege that certain Certified Payroll
Reports were false. There is no ailegation that these
allegedly false reports were sent by mail or wire, or by
whom or to whom they were sent. The Court, therefore, finds
that Plaintiffs have failed to plead mail and wire fraud as

predicate acts with particularity as required.

ya Relatedness

The "relatedness" prong requires that the predicate

- App. 37 -

acts "have the same or similar purposes, results, participants.
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not

isolated events." H.J" Inc., 492 U.S. at 240 (quoting

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C § 3575 et

seq, (partially repealed; Tabas v.Tabas, 47 F3d 1280, 1292
(3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit has applied a six factor test
to assess the sufficiency of continuity and relatedness to

form a pattern under RICO. Curtin, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

19467, at *13. These factors are: (1) number of unlawful
acts; (2) length of time over. which the acts were committed;
(3) similarity of the acts; (4) number of victims; (5) number
of perpetrators; and (6) character of the unlawful activity. rd.
at '" 13-14 (citation omitted) .

In holding that the plaintiff failed to establish
relatedness and, thus did not sufficiently plead a pattern of

racketeering activity in Gintowt v. TL Ventures, 226 F.

Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Pa. 2002), (although allowing leave to
amend) this Court stated:
Nor does the pleading, as written, satisfactorily tie
each Defendant's alleged individual or joint conduct
to "ftaudi.llent miusrepresentations or omissions
reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary

prudence and comprehension." Kehr Packages, 926 F

2d at 1415. This Court is mindful that, in this RICO

- App. 38

case, as In an antitrust case, the character and effect
of a conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering
it and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking
at it as a whole." Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699, 82 S.
Ct. 1404, 8 L. Ed. 2d. 777 (1962). Yet, even viewing

together the many "dots" of fraud alleged, Plaintiffs
Complaint... fails to connect those dots in the
language and particulars of RICO.

Gintowt, 226 F, Supp. 2d at 678.

The Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently plead any details of the alleged mail and wire
fraud as predicate acts in the Amended Complaint almost
inevitably leads to a conclusion mat the relatedness
requirement is similarly missing. Even assuming that the
Amended Complaint adequately alleges two or more
predicate acts, however, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails

to allege the requisite relatedness! even though Bonavitacola

| clearly required that the RICO case statement "state how
the alleged predicate acts related to each other as part of a
common plan." The Amended Complaint does not set forth
any details about the purposes, results, participants, victims,

or methods of commission of the alleged predicate acts, or

prove that the alleged predicate acts are otherwise

- App. 39 -

interrelated. Plaintiffs give no reason for ignoring the Court's

clear instructions in Bonavitacola I.

In Plaintiffs' brief in opposition to 'the Motion to
Dismiss, the Plaintiffs assert that J 31, 41 and 42 of the
Amended Complaint adequately allege the required elements
of relatedness (and also continuity, as discussed below.
(Mem. Opp’n Mot Dismiss at 10.) It is relevant to note that
Plaintiffs do not cite any cases whatsoever in support of the
sufficiency of their RICO allegations. Nor does Plaintiffs’
brief at any time refer to the RICO case statement required in

Bonavitacola I Rather, Plaintiffs' brief only argues that 4 31,

41 and 42 of the Amended Complaint "demonstrates [sic]
that the alleged predicate acts of racketeering were ‘related’
in that the actions described had the same purpose of
procuring electrical construction contracts and subverting the
Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act and/or the Davis-Bacon
Act," and that these paragraphs demonstrate that the
relationship requirement is met because "the actions
described have a similar method of commission" and "were;
not isolated acts but part of a scheme to defraud," (Mem.
Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 9-10.) These arguments in Plaintiffs’
brief are merely repetitive of the concusory allegations, but
the allegations themselves do not have the requisite details.
In fact, the Amended Complaint does not have any

discussion whatsoever of what Defendants’ "method of

- App. 40 -

commission" was nor does it describe in any detail what was
Detendants' "scheme to defraud."

Plaintiffs conclude, on page 10 of their brief, "the
totality of the allegations set forth in the Complaint suggest
that the defendants routinely do business through the use of
the predicate acts or that there is real threat that the
defendants will do so in the future." This statement does not
accurately summarize any of the allegations ill the Amended
Complaint, which should have compiled with the RICO case
statement. If Plaintiffs had the ability, and had taken the
trouble, to comply, they would have met the pleading
requisites for a RICO case. As noted above, Plaintiffs do not
at any time cite to the Court's RICO case statement, object to
it, argue that it is improper or purport to have complied.
Although it was designed to be helpful to Plaintiffs, it has
simply been ignored. There is no basis in the Amended
Complaint to conclude that Defendants routinely do business
in the manner in which Plaintiffs allege, there are no details
as to how or why the Certified Payroll Reports are false,
there are no details that this was a broad scheme to defraud
but merely, because it is existed in several years between
1993 and 2001, that it will continue into the future.

The Court therefore, finds that Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint fails to adequately allege relatedness as to all

Defendants.

- App. 41 -

a Continuity

The "continuity" prong refers either to IID "open-
ended scheme," consisting of past conduct that by its nature
projects into the future with a threat of repetition, or to a
"closed ended scheme consisting of a closed period of
repeated conduct. Curtin,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19467, at
*15-16 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241). Plaintiffs do not

discuss this concept in their Amended Complaint or brief. A
short-term fraudulent scheme posing no treat of future
criminal conduct cannot satisfy the continuity requirement.

Kehr Packages. 926 F.2d at 1412. A plaintiff must prove a

regular way of doing business in an "open-ended scheme’ or
a series of related acts lasting a "substantial period of time"
in a. "closed-ended scheme." Id. at * 16 (citations omitted).
With respect to a "closed-ended scheme," the Third Circuit
has developed a durational requirement of at least twelve
months, which time period is measured between the first and
last predicate acts alleged. Plater-Zyberk v. Abraham, No.
CIV.A.97-3322, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1736, at *23-24
(B.D, Pa. Feb. 18, 1998) (citing Tabas, 47 F.3d at 1293).
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to allege the

requisite continuity. The Amended Complaint fails to
adequately plead "open-ended" continuity because it does
not expressly allege, or provide a basis from which the court

could reasonably infer, that Defendants’ alleged misconduct

ne en pan ne ee

- App. 42 -

poses a threat of future criminal activity. See Lubart v, Riley
& Fanelli P.C., No. CIV.A.97-6392, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
0109, at *33. (E.D, Pa. June 22, 1998) (finding that the

proposed complaint failed to adequately plead open-ended
continuity where the fraudulent conduct did not extend
beyond the life of the matter before the court and where there
were no allegations suggesting a future threat). Although the
original Complaint was filed on October 31, 2001, the
Amended Complaint was not filed until November 11, 2002.
Plaintiffs omit any allegations of events in the intervening
twelve months.

The Amended Complaint also fails to adequately
plead "closed ended" continuity. Although the time period
between the first allegedly false Certified Payroll Report
(February 26, 1993) and the last Report (June 29, 2001)
alleged is over eight years, there are no allegations of false
reports for the years 1994, 1995, 1998 - which omission in
and of itself dispels any notion of continuity. Plaintiffs have
failed to establish that the predicate acts are related,® which
is required for "closed-ended" continuity. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S.
at 242. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff:' Amended
Complaint fails to adequately allege continuity with respect
to all Defendants.

In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to allege what many

- App. 43 -

courts have required for a RICO complaint - a scheme to
defraud, with a pattern of related, continuing criminal
activity. There is no allegation of any collection of the
allegedly false reports submitted to the Ridley School
District, the Neshaminy School District, and the Department
of Navy. There is no allegation as to what other business the
Defendants engaged in and whether they used false payroll
reports in order to get that other business. If. for example.
over these eight years, Defendants’ had 100 different
contracts, the fact that they may have committed fraud as to .
three of them (Ridley School District, Neshaminy School
District and the Department of Navy) would be plainly
insufficient to constitute a scheme under RICO. If these
contracts were the only contracts, or a majority of the total
number of contracts, then a RICO scheme may Exist. There

is no way to tell from the Amended Complaint.

C. Injury

To prevail in a civil action for damages under RICO,
a plaintiff must establish a violation of § 1962, allege an
injury to his or her business property "by reason of"" the
alleged violation of § 1962, and plead the requisite causal

connection between the injury and the violation of § 1962

. See discussion supra Part IV. B. 2.

- App. 44 -

Tri-County Concerned Citizens Assn. v. Carr, No. Crv.A.98-
4184, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14933, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
18, 2001). The Supreme Court has determined that the

phrase "by reason of' in § 1964(c) requires a plaintiff to show
the alleged RICO violations proximately caused the
plaintiff's injury, meaning that the violation cannot be too

remote from the injury.’ Id. (citing Holmes v. Securities

Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 112 S. Ct.

1311, 117 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1992)).
There are three factors to consider in a proximate
cause analysis in a RICO claim:
(1) the directness of the injury - "the more indirect
the injury, 'the more’ difficult it becomes to ascertain
the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to
(defendant's ...,wrongdoing], as distinct from other,
independent factors; '" (2) the difficulty of
apportioning damages among potential plaintiffs -
"allowing recovery by indirectly injured parties
would require complicated rues for apportioning

damages;" and (3) the possibility of other plaintiffs

” The proximate cause requirement the Supreme Court imposes of civil
RICO claims is an aspect of standing rather than an element of a
plaintiffs civil RICO prima facie case. Carr, 200t U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14933, at 18 n. 4 (citations omitted).

- App. 45 -

vindicating the goals of RICO - “direct victims could
generally be counted on to vindicate the policies
underlying” RICO in a better manner than indirect
victims.
Id. at *18-19 (quoting Allegeny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations

omitted)).

A threshold question is whether Plaintiffs have
alleged facts, which, if taken as true, sufficiently establish
proximate causation. Id. At * 19. The following are Plaintiffs
allegations of injury and proximate cause as set forth in the

Amended Complaint:

a. Plaintiff Bonavitacola's Alleged Injury by All
Defendants

In Counts I-III, Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges that
Defendants "received income derived from the pattern of
racketeering activity. . . and used or invested such income in
the establishment or operation of [Defendant Boro]." (Am.
Comp. {| 43, 50, 57.) Plaintiff Bonavitacola further alleges
that "[but for [Defendants'] investment of the income derived
from the pattern of racketeering. . . into the establishment Of
operation of [Defendant Boro], Plaintiff Bonavitacola would

have been able to compete with [Defendant Boro] on a fair

and honest basis and [would have been] awarded the

- App. 46 -

Contract for public work by the Ridley School District to
provide electrical construction in connection with the. .

Ridley High School project" Id. , 4] 44, 51,58. Finally,
Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges that "[a]s a proximate result of
{Detendant’s'] violation of 18 U.S.CA. § 1962(a), [Plaintiff
Bonavitacola] has suffered damages in the way of a loss of

income and revenue," Id. #9 45, 52, 59.

b. Plaintiff Local Union 6541:5 and Plaintiff
Local Union 98's Alleged Injury by Ail
Defendants
In Counts IV-IX; Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and
Local Union 98 allege that "[but for [Defendants] investment
income derived from the pattern of racketeering....into, the
establishment or operation of [Defendant Boro]. [Plaintiffs
Local Union 654 and Local Union 98] could have received
contributions to multi-employer benefit plans for employees
in connection with the . . . public work project awarded by
the Ridley School District." Id. 94 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76.
Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and Local Union 98 further
allege that “[as a proximate result of [Defendants'] violation
of 18 U.S.GA. § 1962(a) [Plaintiffs Local Union 6:54 and
Local Union 98 have] suffered damages in way of a loss of

income and revenue." Id. 4] 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77.

ee

- App. 47 -

c. Plaintiff Bonavitacola’s Alleged Injury by
Defendants Frederick Shapiro and Bruce

Shapiro
In Counts X and XI, Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges
that "[but for [Defendant Frederick Shapiro's and Defendant
Bruce Shapiro's] falsifications and conduct alleged herein
(plaintiff Bonavitacola] would have been able to compete
with [Defendant Boro] on a fair and honest basis and [would
have been] awarded the contract for public work by the
Ridley School District to provide electrical construction on
the. . . Ridley High School project.” Id. 4] 80, 84. Plaintiff
Bonavitacola further alleges that "[a]s a proximate result of
(Defendants Frederick Shapiro’s and Defendant Bruce
Shapiro's] violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c), [Plaintiff
Bonavitacola] has suffered damages in the way of loss of

income and. revenue," Id. J 81,85.

d. Plaintiff Local Union 654's and Plaintiff Local

Union 98's Alleged Injury by Defendants
Frederick Shapiro and Bruce Shapiro

In Counts XII-XV, Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and

Local Union 98 allege that '[b]ut for [Defendant Frederick

Shapiro's and Defendant Bruce § apiro's] falsifications and

conduct alleged therein [Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and

~ Local Union 98] would have received contributions to multi-

- App. 48 -

employer benefit plans for employees in connection with
the...public work project awarded by the Ridley School
District." Id 4] 87, 90, 93, 96. Plaintiffs Local Union 654
and Local Union 98 further allege that “[a]s a proximate
result of [Defendants Frederick Shapiro's and Detendant
Bruce Shapiro's] violation of 18 U.S.C.A § 1962(c),
[Plaintiffs Local Union 654 and Local Union 98 have]
suffered damages in way of a loss of income and revenue."
Id. $9] 88, 91, 94, 97.

Plaintiffs’ chain oflogic is that Defendants submitted
false payroll records which did not comply with
Pennsylvania’s Prevailing Wage Act and federal law, thus
allowing Defendant Boro to submit lower bids which
resulted in Defendant Boro, instead of Plaintiff Bonavitacola,
being awarded the three public -ontracts.

There are several gaps in Plaintiffs' logic as
represented by the allegations which, once again; could have
been cured by Plaintiffs' complying with the RICO case

statement described in Bonavitacola_I. First, although

Plaintiff Bonavitacola alleges that it was the second lowest
bidder as to the Ridley School District (33); it does not
make a similar allegation as to the Neshaminy School
District and the Department of the Navy. Even as to Ridley
School District, it does not necessarily follow that Plaintiff

Bonavitacola would have been awarded the contract if

- App. 49 -

Defendant Boro had not bid, or-had not been the low bidder,

just because it was the next lower bidder. See Northland

Equities, Inc. v. Gateway Center Corp., 411 F.Supp. 259,

264 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that it was not certain that the
award would have been made to the plaintiff, an
unsuccessful bidder, even as low bidder, because other
factors can go into the award of a contract in addition to the
requirement that the contract be awarded to the low bidder).
However, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff
Bonavitacola has satisfied the requirements of pleading
proximate cause under RICO, there still remains
substantial questions as to whether the other Plaintiffs, the
two labor unions, have sufficiently alleged direct injury. As
noted above, the Plaintiff labor unions assert that they would
have received additional contributions to their multi-
employer benefit plans for employees if Plaintiff
Bonavitacola had been awarded the contracts. The Court
finds that this is an indirect injury because the Complaint
does not state the requisite allegations to show how the
contract revenues following to Plaintiff Bonavitacola,
assuming it had been awarded any contract, would have
resulted in benefit to the Plaintiff labor unions. In addition,
Plaintiff labor unions do not allege that they themselves have
standing to sue for these types of damages, which

presumably are for the benefit of the Union members. The

- App. 50 -

Amended Complaint is completely silent on this issue.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
failed to sufficiently plead proximate cause injury and,

therefore, lack standing to bring this civil RICO action.

D. Davis-Bacon Act

In its initial Motion to Dismiss, one of Defendants'
grounds in moving to dismiss was that there is no private
right of action under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3142
et _seq., or the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 165-1 et_seq.

The Court reserved judgment on this issue until it had
the opportunity to determine whether the requisites of RICO
were satisfied in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

The Davis-Bacon Act is designed to protect laborers
and mechanics employed on government projects from being
paid at less that the locally prevailing wage rate. Universities
Rescarch Assoc., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771,101 S. Ct.
1451, 67 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1981). The Davis-Bacon Act sets

forth a detailed administrative scheme to enforce violations
of its provisions, and provides that if the contractor fails to
pay the prevailing wages specified in the contract, the
government contracting officer may withhold so much of the
accrued payments as may be considered necessary to pay the

laborers and mechanics the difference between the contract

- App. 51 -

wages and those actually paid. 40 U.S.C. § 3144(a)(1). In
the event that these funds are insufficient to reimburse the
employees, the laborers, and mechanics may have the "right
to bring a civil action and intervene against the contractor
and the contractor's sureties." 40 US.C. § 3 1 44{a) (2).
Courts have held that plaintiffs cannot base their
RICO claims on alleged violations of the Davis-Bacon Act.

Livingston v. Shore Slurry Seal Inc.. 98 F. Supp. 2d 594,600

(D.N.J. 2000). Because the Davis-Bacon Act is the exclusive
remedy for the alleged underpayment of wages for work
performed on federal construction projects, there is no
private right of action pursuant to the Davis-Bacon Act. Id. at
600-01; see also Miccoli_ v. Rav Communications, Inc.,
CIV,A.99-3825, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10048, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. July 21, 2000.) (stating that no private right of action

exists under the Davis-Bacon Act) (citing Weber v. Heat
Control CQ., 728 f.2d 599 (3d Cir, 1984)).

Plaintiffs do not dispute the abstract correctness of

the proposition that there is no private nght of action under
the Davis-Bacon Ac., which is well settled in the law.
Plaintiffs asserted that the cases relied upon by the
Defendants involved instances where the plaintiffs were
employees of contractors/subcontractors, alleging that they
had been paid at a wage rate below the contract rate for work

performed, but that Plaintiffs’ allegations in this case are

aR Ser ain ae oe Yeu e ner tiriW Seen IMane wo ido ac Sec twn) Weak rh cv a. et te ar Venton

Lob allt

ah a hat

- App. 52 -

different. Plaintiffs themselves do not allege that they have
not been paid a prevailing wage, but rather, that they have
lost business because the Defendants have made fraudulent
misrepresentations as to the Defendants salary and wage
payments, and have used these fraudulent statements to gain
business at the expense of Plaintiffs.

The Davis-Bacon Act only provides a cause of action
for laborers and mechanics employed on government
projects. Plaintiffs have not set forth, and the Court has not
found, any caselaw supporting a cause of action for parties
who are not laborers and mechanics employed on
government projects, but, who have alleged damages as a
result of violations of the Davis-Bacon Act. Moreover, the
Court finds that the cases holding that there is no private
right of action under the Davis-Bacon Act are applicable in
the present case. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot
base their RICO claims on alleged violations of the Davis-

Bacon Act.

V. Pendent Jurisdiction

Because the Court will dismiss the RICO claims,
there will be no federal anchor claim upon which original
subject matter jurisdiction may be based. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court will dismiss the pendent state

law claims in Counts XVI-XVIII without prejudice. See

- App. 53 -

Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co,) 906 F.2d 100, 106 (3d

Cir. 1990) (the rule within this Circuit is that once all claims

with an independent basis of federal jurisdiction have been
dismissed the case no longer belongs in federal court’) (citing

Lovell Mtg. Corp v. Export-Import Bank of the United

States, 843 F.2d 725, 734 (3d Cir. 1988)). Plaintiffs may

refile their state law claims in state court.

An appropriate Order follows.

re

RARE CAA TP LB LORI San A ANI AS AMRIT Ctl nels Sd

eee Oe adh Lis 0 tabi nah

elias

oe ad

Tete abe *e

- App. 54 -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BONIVITACOLA ELECTRIC

CONTRACTOR, INC. et al.,
CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiffs,
V.

BORO DEVELOPERS, INC. etal. : NO. 01 5508

Defendants.

ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of February, 2003, upon
cciailaleibiiie of Detendants, Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint (Docket No. 12) and Plaintiffs’ Response thereto
(Docket No.15), it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint is GRANTED with

prejudice as to Counts I-XV, and that Counts XVI-XV,

based on state law claims, are dismissed without prejudice.
BY THE COURT:
“isi MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, U.S.D.J.”

- App. 55 -

18 U.S.C.A. § 1962

United States Code Annotated
Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure

§ 1962. Prohibited activities

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who-has received any
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal

within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code,

to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A _ purchase of
securities cn the open market for purposes of investment,
and without the intention of controlling or participating in
the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so,
shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of
the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern
or racketeeing activity or the collection of an unlawful debt
after such ourchase do not amount in the aggregate to one

percent of he outstanding securities of any one class, and do

ESSE T A RNASE LIRR, LIGA Lite sicer Sie 5 rel RNAs attain co a cai. ava edt ecctamal

- App. 56 -

not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or
more directors of the issuer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of

_ racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful

debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or.
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this

section.

CREDIT(S)

(Added Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84
Stat. 942, and amended Pub.L. 100-690. Title VI. § 7033,
Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4398.)

- App. 57 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3141
Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a

United States Code Annotated
Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works
Subtitle Hl. Public Buildings and Works
§ 3141. Definitions

In this subchapter, the following definitions apply:
(1) Federal $Government.--The term "Federal
Government" has the same meaning that the term "United
States" had in the Act of March 3, 1931 (ch. 411, 46 Stat.
1494 (known as the Davis-Bacon Act).
(2) Wages, scale of wages, wage rates, minimum wages,
and prevailing wages.-- The terms "wages", "scale of
wages", "wage rates", "minimum wages", and "prevailing
wages" include--
(A) the basic hourly rate of pay; and
(B) for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement
or death, compensation for injuries or illness resulting
from occupational activity, or insurance to provide any of
the forgoing, for unemployment benefits, life insurance,
disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance,
for vacation and holiday pay, for defraying the costs of

apprenticeship or other similar programs, or for other

- App. 58 -

bona fide fringe benefits, but only where the contractor
or subcontractor is not required by other federal, state, or
local law to provide any of those benefits, the amount of-
(i) the rate of contribution irrevocably made by a
contractor or subcontractor to a trustee or to a third
person under a fund, plan, or program; and

(ii) the rate of costs to the contractor or subcontractor
that may be reasonably anticipated in providing
; benefits to laborers and mechanics pursuant to an
enforceable commitment to carry out a financially

responsible plan or program which was communicated

ete bart

in writing to the laborers and mechanics affected.

Kab bo IIE tia othe

CREDIT(S)
(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1150.)

- App. 59 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3144
Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a-2

United States Code Annotated
Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works
Subtitle II. Public Buildings and Works
Part A. General
§ 3144. Authority of Comptroller General to
pay wages and list contractors violating
contracts
(a) Payment of wages.--
(1) In general.--The Comptroller General shall pay
directly to laborers and mechanics from any accrued
payments withheld under the terms of a contract any wages

found to be due laborers and mechanics under this

subchapter.

(2) Right of action.--If the accrued payments withheld
under the terms of the contract are insufficient to reimburse
all the laborers and mechanics who have not been paid the
wages required under this subchapter, the laborers and
mechanics have the same night to bring a civil action and
intervene against the contractor and the contractor's
sureties as is conferred by law on persons furnishing labor

or materials. In those proceedings it is not a defense that

- App. 60 -

the laborers and mechanics accepted or agreed to accept
less than the required rate of wages or voluntarily made

refunds.

(b) List of contractors violating contracts.--

(1) In general.--The Comptroller General shall distribute
to all departments of the Federal Government a list of the
names of persons whom the Comptroller General has
found to have disregarded their obligations to employees

and subcontractors.

(2) Restriction on awarding contracts.--No contract shall
be awarded to persons appearing on the list or to any firm,
corporation, partnership, or association in which the
persons have an interest until three years have elapsed

from the date of publication of the list.

CREDIT(S)

—

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1152.)

- App. 61 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3146
Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a-3

United States Code Annotated
Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works
Subtitle II. Public Buildings and Works
Part A. General
§ 3146. Effect on other federal laws

This subchapter does not supersede or impair any authority

otherwise granted by federal law to provide for the

establishment of specific wage rates.

CREDIT(S)

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1152.)

- App. 62 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3147
Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a-5

United States Code Annotated

Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works
Subtitle I]. Public Buildings and Works
Part A. General

§ 3147. Suspension of this subchapter during a

national emergency

The President may suspend the provisions of this subchapter

during a national emergency.

CREDIT(S)

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1153.)

- App. 63 -

40 U.S.C.A. § 3148
Formerly cited as 40 USCA § 276a-7

United States Code Annotated
Title 40. Public Buildings, Property, and Works
Subtitle IJ. Public Buildings and Works
§ 3148. Application of this subchapter to

‘certain contracts

This subchapter applies to a contract authorized by law that
is made without regard to section 3709 of the Revised

Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5), or on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis or

otherwise without advertising for proposals, if -this

subchapter otherwise would apply to the contract.

(Pub.L. 107-217, § 1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1153.)

- App. 64 -

43 P.S.§ 165-1

Purdon's -Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes

Annotated
Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated

Title 43. Labor

§ 165-1. Short title

This act shall be known and may be cited as the

"Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act".

CREDIT(S)

1961, Aug. 15, P.L. 987, § 1.

- App. 65 -

43 P.S. § 165-6

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes
Annotated
Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated

Title 43. Labor

§ 165-6. Duty of contractor
Every contractor and subcontractor shall keep an accurate
record showing the name, craft and the actual hourly rate of
wage paid to each workman employed by him in connection
with public work, and such record shall be preserved for two
years from date of payment. The record shall be open at all
reasonable hours to the inspection of the public body

‘ awarding the contract and to the secretary.

CREDIT(S)

1961, Aug. 15, P.L. 987, § 6.

- App. 66 -

43 P.S.§ 165-13
Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes
Annotated

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated

Title 43. Labor

§ 165-13. Workmen's rights

Any workmen paid less than the rates specified in the
contract shall have a mght of action for the difference
between the wage so paid and the wages stipulated in the
contract, which right of action shall be instituted within six

months from the occurrence of the event creating such nght.

CREDIT(S)

1961, Aug. 15, P.L. 987, § 13.

- App. 67 -

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12

United States Code Annotated
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts
Rule 12. Defenses and Objections--When and How
Presented--By Pleading or Motion--Motion for

Judgment on Pleadings

(a) When Presented.
(1) Unless a different time is prescribed in a statute of the
United States, a defendant shall serve an answer
(A) within 20 days after being served with the summons
and complaint, or
(B) if service of the summons has been timely waived on

request under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the date

when the request for waiver was sent, or within 90 days
after that date if the defendant was addressed outside any
judicial district of the United States.
(2) A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim
against that party shall serve an answer thereto within 20
days after being served. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to
a counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service
of the answer, or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within

20 days after service of the arder, unless the order

ical teas

- App. 68 -

otherwise directs.
(3)(A) The United States, an agency of the United States,
or an officer or employee of the United States sued in an

official capacity, shall serve an answer to the complaint or

cross-claim-- or a reply to a counterclaim--within 60 days
after the United States attorney is served with the pleading
asserting the claim.

(B) An officer or employee of the United States sued in an

individual capacity for acts or omissions occurring in

connection with the performance of duties on behalf of the
United States shall serve an answer to the complaint or
cross- claim--or a reply to a counterclaim--within 60 days
after service on the officer or employee, or service on the
United States attorney, whichever is later.
(4) Unless a different time is fixed by court order, the
service of a motion permitted under this rule alters these
periods of time as follows:
(A) if the court denies the motion or postpones its
disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive
pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of
the court's action; or |
.B) if the court grants a motion for a more definite
statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within

10 days after the service of the more definite statement.

- App. 69 -

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue,
(4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19. A motion
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading
if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or
objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading
sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not
required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party
may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6)
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such

motion by Rule 56.

- App. 70 - 7

(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the
pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If,
on a2 motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

(d) Preliminary Hearings. The defenses specifically
enumerated (1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether
made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for
judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be
heard and determined before trial on application of any
party, unless the court orders that the hearing and
determination thereof be deferred until the trial. ;

(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required ~to
frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.
The motion shall

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386020_1783%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
